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RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES

NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARL KRAUCH ET AL. (CASE VI)

AUGUST 14, 1947-JULY 30, 1948

Roll 38

Prosecution Document Books

XVI-XXV



THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

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INTRODUCTION

On the 113 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records of Case VI, *United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.* (I. G. Farben Case), 1 of the 12 trials of war criminals conducted by the U.S. Government from 1946 to 1949 at Nuernberg subsequent to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) held in the same city. These records consist of German- and English-language versions of official transcripts of court proceedings, prosecution and defense briefs and statements, and defendants' final pleas as well as prosecution and defense exhibits and document books in one language or the other. Also included are minute books, the official court file, order and judgment books, clemency petitions, and finding aids to the documents.

The transcripts of this trial, assembled in 2 sets of 43 bound volumes (1 set in German and 1 in English), are the recorded daily trial proceedings. Prosecution statements and briefs are also in both languages but unbound, as are the final pleas of the defendants delivered by counsel or defendants and submitted by the attorneys to the court. Unbound prosecution exhibits, numbered 1-2270 and 2300-2354, are essentially those documents from various Nuernberg record series, particularly the NI (Nuernberg Industrialist) Series, and other sources offered in evidence by the prosecution in this case. Defense exhibits, also unbound, are predominantly affidavits by various persons. They are arranged by name of defendant and thereunder numerically, along with two groups of exhibits submitted in the general interest of all defendants. Both prosecution and defense document books consist of full or partial translations of exhibits into English. Loosely bound in folders, they provide an indication of the order in which the exhibits were presented before the tribunal.

Minute books, in two bound volumes, summarize the transcripts. The official court file, in nine bound volumes, includes the progress docket, the indictment, and amended indictment and the service thereof; applications for and appointments of defense counsel and defense witnesses and prosecution comments thereto; defendants' application for documents; motions and reports; uniform rules of procedures; and appendixes. The order and judgment books, in two bound volumes, represent the signed orders, judgments, and opinions of the tribunal as well as sentences and commitment papers. Defendants' clemency petitions, in three bound volumes, were directed to the military governor, the Judge Advocate General, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The finding aids summarize transcripts, exhibits, and the official court file.

Case VI was heard by U.S. Military Tribunal VI from August 14, 1947, to July 30, 1948. Along with records of other Nuernberg

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and Far East war crimes trials, the records of this case are part of the National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records, Record Group 238.

The I. G. Farben Case was 1 of 12 separate proceedings held before several U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuernberg in the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany against officials or citizens of the Third Reich, as follows:

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>United States v.</u>	<u>Popular Name</u>	<u>No. of Defendants</u>
1	<i>Karl Brandt et al.</i>	Medical Case	23
2	<i>Erhard Milch</i>	Milch Case (Luftwaffe)	1
3	<i>Josef Altstoetter et al.</i>	Justice Case	16
4	<i>Oswald Pohl et al.</i>	Pohl Case (SS)	18
5	<i>Friedrich Flick et al.</i>	Flick Case (Industrialist)	6
6	<i>Carl Krauch et al.</i>	I. G. Farben Case (Industrialist)	24
7	<i>Wilhelm List et al.</i>	Hostage Case	12
8	<i>Ulrich Greifelt et al.</i>	RuSHA Case (SS)	14
9	<i>Otto Ohlendorf et al.</i>	Einsatzgruppen Case (SS)	24
10	<i>Alfried Krupp et al.</i>	Krupp Case (Industrialist)	12
11	<i>Ernst von Weizsaecker et al.</i>	Ministries Case	21
12	<i>Wilhelm von Leeb et al.</i>	High Command Case	14

Authority for the proceedings of the IMT against the major Nazi war criminals derived from the Declaration on German Atrocities (Moscow Declaration) released November 1, 1943; Executive Order 9547 of May 2, 1945; the London Agreement of August 8, 1945; the Berlin Protocol of October 6, 1945; and the IMT Charter.

Authority for the 12 subsequent cases stemmed mainly from Control Council Law 10 of December 20, 1945, and was reinforced by Executive Order 9679 of January 16, 1946; U.S. Military Government Ordinances 7 and 11 of October 18, 1946, and February 17, 1947, respectively; and U.S. Forces, European Theater General Order 301 of October 24, 1946. Procedures applied by U.S. Military Tribunals in the subsequent proceedings were patterned after those of the IMT and further developed in the 12 cases, which required over 1,200 days of court sessions and generated more than 330,000 transcript pages.

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Formation of the I. G. Farben Combine was a stage in the evolution of the German chemical industry, which for many years led the world in the development, production, and marketing of organic dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, and synthetic chemicals. To control the excesses of competition, six of the largest chemical firms, including the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, combined to form the Interessengemeinschaft (Combine of Interests, or Trust) of the German Dyestuffs Industry in 1904 and agreed to pool technological and financial resources and markets. The two remaining chemical firms of note entered the combine in 1916. In 1925 the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, largest of the firms and already the majority shareholder in two of the other seven companies, led in reorganizing the industry to meet the changed circumstances of competition in the post-World War markets by changing its name to the I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, moving its home office from Ludwigshafen to Frankfurt, and merging with the remaining five firms.

Farben maintained its influence over both the domestic and foreign markets for chemical products. In the first instance the German explosives industry, dependent on Farben for synthetically produced nitrates, soon became subsidiaries of Farben. Of particular interest to the prosecution in this case were the various agreements Farben made with American companies for the exchange of information and patents and the licensing of chemical discoveries for foreign production. Among the trading companies organized to facilitate these agreements was the General Anilin and Film Corp., which specialized in photographic processes. The prosecution charged that Farben used these connections to retard the "Arsenal of Democracy" by passing on information received to the German Government and providing nothing in return, contrary to the spirit and letter of the agreements.

Farben was governed by an Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board of Directors) and a Vorstand (Managing Board of Directors). The Aufsichtsrat, responsible for the general direction of the firm, was chaired by defendant Krauch from 1940. The Vorstand actually controlled the day-to-day business and operations of Farben. Defendant Schmitz became chairman of the Vorstand in 1935, and 18 of the other 22 original defendants were members of the Vorstand and its component committees.

Transcripts of the I. G. Farben Case include the indictment of the following 24 persons:

Otto Ambros: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Chemical Warfare Committee of the Ministry of Armaments and War Production; production chief for Buna and poison gas; manager of Auschwitz, Schkopau, Ludwigshafen, Oppau, Gendorf, Dyhernfurth, and Falkenhagen plants; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

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Max Brueggemann: Member and Secretary of the Vorstand of Farben; member of the legal committee; Deputy Plant Leader of the Leverkusen Plant; Deputy Chief of the Sales Combine for Pharmaceuticals; and director of the legal, patent, and personnel departments of the Works Combine, Lower Rhine.

Ernst Buergin: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Works Combine, Central Germany; Plant Leader at the Bitterfeld and Wolfen-Farben plants; and production chief for light metals, dyestuffs, organic intermediates, plastics, and nitrogen at these plants.

Heinrich Bueteftisch: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; manager of Leuna plants; production chief for gasoline, methanol, and chlorine electrolysis production at Auschwitz and Moosbierbaum; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer; member of the Himmler Freundeskreis (circle of friends of Himmler); and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (Lieutenant Colonel).

Walter Duerrfeld: Director and construction manager of the Auschwitz plant of Farben, director and construction manager of the Monowitz Concentration Camp, and Chief Engineer at the Leuna plant.

Fritz Gajewski: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben, Chief of Sparte III (Division III) in charge of production of photographic materials and artificial fibers, manager of "Agfa" plants, and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Heinrich Gattineau: Chief of the Political-Economic Policy Department, "WIPO," of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office; member of Southeast Europe Committee; and director of A.G. Dynamit Nobel, Pressburg, Czechoslovakia.

Paul Haeffliger: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; member of the Commercial Committee; and Chief, Metals Departments, Sales Combine for Chemicals.

Erich von der Heyde: Member of the Political-Economic Policy Department of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office, Deputy to the Chief of Intelligence Agents, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, and member of the WI-RUE-AMT (Military Economics and Armaments Office) of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) (High Command of the Armed Forces).

Heinrich Hoerlein: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; chief of chemical research and development of vaccines, sera, pharmaceuticals, and poison gas; and manager of the Elberfeld Plant.

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Max Ilgner: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office directing intelligence, espionage, and propaganda activities; member of the Commercial Committee; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Friedrich Jaehne: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; chief engineer in charge of construction and physical plant development; Chairman of the Engineering Committee; and Deputy Chief, Works Combine, Main Valley.

August von Knieriem: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief Counsel of Farben; and Chairman, Legal and Patent Committees.

Carl Krauch: Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Farben and Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung (General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production) on Goering's staff in the Office of the 4-Year Plan.

Hans Kuehne: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Works Combine, Lower Rhine; Plant Leader at Leverkusen, Elberfeld, Uerdingen, and Dormagen plants; production chief for inorganics, organic intermediates, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals at these plants; and Chief of the Inorganics Committee.

Hans Kugler: Member of the Commercial Committee of Farben; Chief of the Sales Department Dyestuffs for Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; and Public Commissar for the Falkenau and Aussig plants in Czechoslovakia.

Carl Lautenschlaeger: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Works Combine, Main Valley; Plant Leader at the Hoechst, Griesheim, Mainkur, Gersthofen, Offenbach, Eystrup, Marburg, and Neuhausen plants; and production chief for nitrogen, inorganics, organic intermediates, solvents and plastics, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals at these plants.

Wilhelm Mann: Member of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Commercial Committee, Chief of the Sales Combine for Pharmaceuticals, and member of the SA.

Fritz ter Meer: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand that planned and directed all of Farben's production; Chief of Sparte II in charge of production of Buna, poison gas, dyestuffs, chemicals, metals, and pharmaceuticals; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

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Heinrich Oster: Member of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Commercial Committee, and manager of the Nitrogen Syndicate.

Hermann Schmitz: Chairman of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Reichstag, and Director of the Bank of International Settlements.

Christian Schneider: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Sparte I in charge of production of nitrogen, gasoline, diesel and lubricating oils, methanol, and organic chemicals; Chief of Central Personnel Department, directing the treatment of labor at Farben plants; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer; Hauptabwehrbeauftragter (Chief of Intelligence Agents); Hauptbetriebsfuehrer (Chief of Plant Leaders); and supporting member of the Schutzstaffeln (SS) of the NSDAP.

Georg von Schnitzler: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben, Chief of the Commercial Committee of the Vorstand that planned and directed Farben's domestic and foreign sales and commercial activities, Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer (Military Economy Leader), and Hauptsturmfaehrer (Captain) in the Sturmabteilungen (SA) of the Nazi Party (NSDAP).

Carl Wurster: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Works Combine, Upper Rhine; Plant Leader at Ludwigshafen and Oppau plants; production chief for inorganic chemicals; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

The prosecution charged these 24 individual staff members of the firm with various crimes, including the planning of aggressive war through an alliance with the Nazi Party and synchronization of Farben's activities with the military planning of the German High Command by participation in the preparation of the 4-Year Plan, directing German economic mobilization for war, and aiding in equipping the Nazi military machines.¹ The defendants also were charged with carrying out espionage and intelligence activities in foreign countries and profiting from these activities. They participated in plunder and spoliation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France, and the Soviet Union as part of a systematic economic exploitation of these countries. The prosecution also charged mass murder and the enslavement of many thousands of persons particularly in Farben plants at the Auschwitz and Monowitz concentration camps and the use of poison gas manufactured by the firm in the extermination

¹The trial of defendant Brueggemann was discontinued early during the proceedings because he was unable to stand trial on account of ill health.

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of millions of men, women, and children. Medical experiments were conducted by Farben on enslaved persons without their consent to test the effects of deadly gases, vaccines, and related products. The defendants were charged, furthermore, with a common plan and conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Three defendants were accused of membership in a criminal organization, the SS. All of these charges were set forth in an indictment consisting of five counts.

The defense objected to the charges by claiming that regulations were so stringent and far reaching in Nazi Germany that private individuals had to cooperate or face punishment, including death. The defense claimed further that many of the individual documents produced by the prosecution were originally intended as "window dressing" or "howling with the wolves" in order to avoid such punishment.

The tribunal agreed with the defense in its judgment that none of the defendants were guilty of Count I, planning, preparation, initiation, and waging wars of aggression; or Count V, common plans and conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace and humanity and war crimes.

The tribunal also dismissed particulars of Count II concerning plunder and exploitation against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Eight defendants (Schmitz, von Schnitzler, ter Meer, Buergin, Haeffliger, Ilgner, Oster, and Kugler) were found guilty on the remainder of Count II, while 15 were acquitted. On Count III (slavery and mass murder), Ambros, Bueteftisch, Duerrfeld, Krauch, and ter Meer were judged guilty. Schneider, Bueteftisch, and von der Heyde also were charged with Count IV, membership in a criminal organization, but were acquitted.

The tribunal acquitted Gajewski, Gattineau, von der Heyde, Hoerlein, von Knieriem, Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, Mann, Schneider, and Wurster. The remaining 13 defendants were given prison terms as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Length of Prison Term (years)</u>
Ambros	8
Buergin	2
Bueteftisch	6
Duerrfeld	8
Haeffliger	2
Ilgner	3
Jaehne	1 1/2
Krauch	6
Kugler	1 1/2
Oster	2
Schmitz	4
von Schnitzler	5
ter Meer	7

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All defendants were credited with time already spent in custody.

In addition to the indictments, judgments, and sentences, the transcripts also contain the arraignment and plea of each defendant (all pleaded not guilty) and opening statements of both defense and prosecution.

The English-language transcript volumes are arranged numerically, 1-43, and the pagination is continuous, 1-15834 (page 4710 is followed by pages 4710(1)-4710(285)). The German-language transcript volumes are numbered 1a-43a and paginated 1-16224 (14a and 15a are in one volume). The letters at the top of each page indicate morning, afternoon, or evening sessions. The letter "C" designates commission hearings (to save court time and to avoid assembling hundreds of witnesses at Nuernberg, in most of the cases one or more commissions took testimony and received documentary evidence for consideration by the tribunals). Two commission hearings are included in the transcripts: that for February 7, 1948, is on pages 6957-6979 of volume 20 in the English-language transcript, while that for May 7, 1948, is on pages 14775a-14776 of volume 40a in the German-language transcript. In addition, the prosecution made one motion of its own and, with the defense, six joint motions to correct the English-language transcripts. Lists of the types of errors, their location, and the prescribed corrections are in several volumes of the transcripts as follows:

- First Motion of the Prosecution, volume 1
- First Joint Motion, volume 3
- Second Joint Motion, volume 14
- Third Joint Motion, volume 24
- Fourth Joint Motion, volume 29
- Fifth Joint Motion, volume 34
- Sixth Joint Motion, volume 40

The prosecution offered 2,325 prosecution exhibits numbered 1-2270 and 2300-2354. Missing numbers were not assigned due to the difficulties of introducing exhibits before the commission and the tribunal simultaneously. Exhibits 1835-1838 were loaned to an agency of the Department of Justice for use in a separate matter, and apparently No. 1835 was never returned. Exhibits drew on a variety of sources, such as reports and directives as well as affidavits and interrogations of various individuals. Maps and photographs depicting events and places mentioned in the exhibits are among the prosecution resources, as are publications, correspondence, and many other types of records.

The first item in the arrangement of prosecution exhibits is usually a certificate giving the document number, a short description of the exhibits, and a statement on the location of the original document or copy of the exhibit. The certificate is followed by the actual prosecution exhibit (most are photostats,

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but a few are mimeographed articles with an occasional carbon of the original). The few original documents are often affidavits of witnesses or defendants, but also ledgers and correspondence, such as:

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>
322	NI 5140	1558	NI 11411
918	NI 6647	1691	NI 12511
1294	NI 14434	1833	NI 12789
1422	NI 11086	1886	NI 14228
1480	NI 11092	2313	NI 13566
1811	NI 11144		

In rare cases an exhibit is followed by a translation; in others there is no certificate. Several of the exhibits are of poor legibility and a few pages are illegible.

Other than affidavits, the defense exhibits consist of newspaper clippings, reports, personnel records, Reichgesetzblatt excerpts, photographs, and other items. The 4,257 exhibits for the 23 defendants are arranged by name of defendant and thereunder by exhibit number. Individual exhibits are preceded by a certificate wherever available. Two sets of exhibits for all the defendants are included.

Translations in each of the prosecution document books are preceded by an index listing document numbers, biased descriptions, and page numbers of each translation. These indexes often indicate the order in which the prosecution exhibits were presented in court. Defense document books are similarly arranged. Each book is preceded by an index giving document number, description, and page number for every exhibit. Corresponding exhibit numbers generally are not provided. There are several unindexed supplements to numbered document books. Defense statements, briefs, pleas, and prosecution briefs are arranged alphabetically by defendant's surname. Pagination is consecutive, yet there are many pages where an "a" or "b" is added to the numeral.

At the beginning of roll 1 key documents are filmed from which Tribunal VI derived its jurisdiction: the Moscow Declaration, U.S. Executive Orders 9547 and 9679, the London Agreement, the Berlin Protocol, the IMT Charter, Control Council Law 10, U.S. Military Government Ordinances 7 and 11, and U.S. Forces, European Theater General Order 301. Following these documents of authorization is a list of the names and functions of members of the tribunal and counsels. These are followed by the transcript covers giving such information as name and number of case, volume numbers, language, page numbers, and inclusive dates. They are followed by the minute book, consisting of summaries of the daily proceedings, thus providing an additional finding aid for the transcripts. Exhibits are listed in an index that notes the

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type, number, and name of exhibit; corresponding document book, number, and page; a short description of the exhibit; and the date when it was offered in court. The official court file is summarized by the progress docket, which is preceded by a list of witnesses.

Not filmed were records duplicated elsewhere in this microfilm publication, such as prosecution and defense document books in the German language that are largely duplications of the English-language document books.

The records of the I. G. Farben Case are closely related to other microfilmed records in Record Group 238, specifically prosecution exhibits submitted to the IMT, T988; NI (Nuernberg Industrialist) Series, T301; NM (Nuernberg Miscellaneous) Series, M-936; NOKW (Nuernberg Armed Forces High Command) Series, T1119; NG (Nuernberg Government) Series, T1139; NP (Nuernberg Propaganda) Series, M942; WA (undetermined) Series, M946; and records of the Brandt case, M887; the Milch Case, M888; the Altstoetter case, M889; the Pohl Case, M890; the Flick Case, M891; the List case, M893; the Greifelt case, M894; and the Ohlendorf case, M895. In addition, the record of the IMT at Nuernberg has been published in the 42-volume *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuernberg, 1947). Excerpts from the subsequent proceedings have been published in 15 volumes as *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10* (Washington). The Audiovisual Archives Division of the National Archives and Records Service has custody of motion pictures and photographs of all 13 trials and sound recordings of the IMT proceedings.

Martin K. Williams arranged the records and, in collaboration with John Mendelsohn, wrote this introduction.

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CASE NO. VII
Prosecution Document Book No. XV

Engl.



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK 16

Principal affidavits
of the defendant VON SCHNITZLER

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description	Document Book Page
NI-5191	39	Affidavit of the defendant von SCHNITZLER, dated 4 March 1947: conditions under which he gave information during the 1945 investigations; includes three of his 1945 statements or interrogations with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	1
NI-5192		Affidavit of the defendant von SCHNITZLER, dated 5 March 1947: includes a 1945 statement by him on I.G. Farben's acquisition of the Polish "Beruta" plant together with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	16 (13)
NI-5193		Affidavit of the defendant von SCHNITZLER, dated 7 March 1947: includes several statements by and interrogations of him in 1945 together with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	26 (22)
NI-5194		Affidavit of the defendant von SCHNITZLER, dated 10 March 1947: includes several statement and interrogations on I.G. Farben's general "foreign" policy, and on I.G. Farben's acquisition of the Skoda-Wetzlar, Aussig-Elkennau and Beruta plants, together with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	65 (48)
NI-5195		Affidavit of the defendant von SCHNITZLER, dated 17 March 1947: includes eight more of his statements or interrogations of 1945 (including his "Yow Order" statements) together with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	93 (75)
NI-5196	40	Affidavit of the defendant von SCHNITZLER, dated 18 March 1947: includes six more of his statements or interrogations of 1945 together with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	109 (92)

NI-12547

Interrogation (word) of Dr. von
Schnitzler. - 1 -



Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description	Document Book Page
FI-5197	18	Affidavit of the defendant VON SCHNITZLER, dated 27 March 1947: includes eleven more of his 1945 statements or interrogations, to- gether with his additions and corrections as of March 1947.	134 (117)
FI-5198		Affidavit of the defendant VON SCHNITZLER, dated 2 May 1947: includes more of his 1945 statements and interrogations together with his additions and corrections as of 2 May 1947.	173 (159)


A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. I was living near Frankfurt, Germany in late March 1945 when the American armed forces occupied the area. I was taken into custody on 7 May 1945 by the American authorities and I have remained in detention ever since that time, except for three periods when I was granted authority to be with my wife under house arrest. During the period from May until the late Fall of 1945, I was regularly questioned by American and Allied investigators, particularly by the American investigators, Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Weisbrodt, Mr. Glaser, Mr. Linville, Mr. Hollander and Mr. Devine. During this period of investigation I was ordinarily brought from Freungesheim prison in Frankfurt, Germany to the Reichsbank building in Frankfurt nearly every day along with a number of other former officials of the I.G. Farbenindustrie. There I and the other officials were asked to give information concerning the history of the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters either through interrogations or by writing up or dictating various statements concerning topics which were given to us by one or more of the investigators.

2. It has always been my intention to give the truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief to the Allied investigators. I never intentionally gave false information of any kind. The relationship between the investigators and me in Frankfurt during 1945 was very free and open and very cordial. In Freungesheim American soldier prisoners were also detained. On a number of occasions I felt that I was mistreated in the jail because of the dislike which certain of the soldiers had for me. When I reported some of these incidents to the

(signed) G v Schnitzler



investigators, they interceded on my behalf with some success and sometimes without success. The investigators generally stated that they wanted me to give my best recollection of events without access to documents. Except for a few occasions when my recollection was refreshed by being shown a document, the statements I made and the interrogations to which I subscribed were based entirely upon my recollection and belief as of the time I was interrogated and made the particular statements. At no time during the investigations of 1945 was I prevented from correcting any statement which I made if thereafter I thought I had made an error. The typewritten statements which I signed were made in the following manner: I would first be asked to give information on a certain topic. Thereafter I would go to a room where I could be alone and write up the matter in longhand or else make longhand notes which I later used as a basis for dictating a statement to a German or American stenographer who took English stenography. Sometimes it took me less than a day to write up some of the statements. With some of the longer statements, however, it took me as long as three days to complete them. After the stenographer or typist reduced the statement to writing I went over the statement to make any corrections and then certified to the truth of the statement. The records of the interrogations were made as follows: Sometimes the questions and answers were immediately reduced to writing as originally made. Sometimes, after a period of discussion between the interrogator and me, a question or answer would be written down for the record which summarized the results of the matters discussed. Whichever of these methods was followed in these interrogations, I thereafter went over the written record of the interrogation to correct any errors and thereafter certified to the truth of the matters stated in the interrogation. In October I was removed from prison and placed under house arrest and thereafter re-arrested again. Mr. Edelman, CIC Finance Chief,

(signed) G v Schnitzler

informed me this was done on orders of higher headquarters because I was in the category of mandatory arrest. At that time I was informed in writing by Mr. Devine that the reason for my further imprisonment was not because of any failure to cooperate with the American authorities. This same letter states that my "assistance from an information gathering standpoint has been invaluable."

3. After these interrogations in 1945 were concluded I was detained in a number of prisons or detention camps along with leading officials of the I.G. Farbenindustrie. After discussing a number of matters concerning which I had given information with my colleagues, I came to the conclusion that I gave some erroneous information to the investigators in 1945. In no instance do I feel that I gave erroneous information intentionally. What I stated and concluded in the statements and interrogations in 1945 represented the truth as I saw it then to the best of my recollection and belief. I account for any errors which I made entirely for the following reasons: After the collapse of Germany I was in a state of great mental depression. I felt clearly that the Hitler regime had caused the ruin of Germany and of a great deal of Europe. Under these circumstances I associated some events together which I do not now feel should have been associated together in making some of the conclusions which I made. Moreover, I was asked to give my recollection and my conclusions concerning a number of events which were connected with I.G. Farben in the technical or in other fields where my duties had not given me a full insight into the true facts and concerning which I could then, in 1945, obtain no assistance by reference to the I.G. files. What I stated to the investigators in 1945 was true to the best of my recollection and belief at that time. However, since then I have talked to some of my colleagues who were better informed of these matters than I was and I must conclude I made certain errors which I certified as the truth to the Allied investigators.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

4. Between 18 February 1947 and the present time, representatives of the Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes showed me many of the statements and interrogations to which I had subscribed in 1945. I have been asked to point out any falsehoods or errors which I made in these statements or interrogations. I have stated to them under oath that I had made no false statements, because the statements I made were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at the time that I made them in 1945. However, where I unintentionally made errors in these statements, I have pointed out these errors. The errors I now find after re-reading the statements or interrogations mentioned below are set forth below:

5. On the 11 September 1945 I signed a three page statement entitled "Curriculum Vitae / George Von Schnitzler," the text of which is as follows:

"I am born in Cologne on the Rhine Oct. 29th 1884.

My father: Paul von Schnitzler was a judge

my mother: Fanny Joest, 84 years old still lives in Godesberg on the Rhine.

Having finished school (Humanistsichs Gymnasium), I visited the Universities of Bonn and Berlin, became Dr. jur. and Gerichts-Assessor, qualification for becoming a judge or lawyer.

I am married to Lilly von Hallinckrodt, born in Cologne June 25th 1889.

Her father Wilhelm von Hallinckrodt was German,
her mother Charlotte Günther Belgian.

We have married in Antwerp. We have two married daughters, the elder one lives separated from her husband, and 4 grand-sons.

I entered business in Hoechst am Main at Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning, one of the mother-houses of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., July first 1912. Thus I am 33 years with the company.

I started with commercial apprenticeship, going over all commercial departments including the technical departments for the application of dyestuffs and was sent to Munich as a first post.

When world war I broke out, I volunteered with the Infantry-Leib-Regiment Munich, but on account of a timely deficiency of my heart I was appointed to the Generalkommando of the I. Bavarian

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Army-Corps in Munich with the rank of a sergeant and did not become an officer of the army. In 1915 I was registered as "Intendantur-Beamter for war-time," as a military I remained sergeant (Unteroffizier).

After my demobilisation I returned to Frankfurt and was charged in Hoechst with the negotiations with the French occupation-authorities. In June 1920 I became a deputy member of the Vorstand and in summer 1923 an ordinary member of it, having in the meantime very quickly acquired the highest commercial position in the Farbwerke. My first experience in foreign dealings I acquired as right hand man of late Mr. Carl von Weinberg, whom I accompanied continuously on his voyages to Paris in order to settle the questions arising out of the Versailles-treaty (1919-1924).

After the merger 1925 I became deputy-chairman of the so called Farben-Ausschuss, the chairman was Dr. Schuon, and when Schuon retired, at the end of 1927 I became his successor.

In 1931 Zentral-Ausschuss of I.G. was formed and from the very beginning I was its member, first under the leadership of Bosch and later on under Schmitz.

In 1929 Stresemann asked me through Geheimrat Duisberg to become Commissioner of the Reich for the world-exhibition of Barcelona. I accepted and since that time I always was considered as being one of the first experts in Germany in the domain of fairs and exhibitions and acted for a certain time as chairman of that committee in the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

Politically I have never been active, I considered myself as belonging to the Deutsche Volkspartei (Stresemann-party) and fostered this party financially. I gave them 11 500.- for every election. Unfortunately this party entirely lost its standing, it came down to only two representatives.

When Hitler came to power I like many men of my kind felt it my duty to endeavour a certain influence when ever possible in order to check the most senseless and the revolting clauses of the party program particularly the handling of the Jewish problem. In the years 33-36 I always hoped that things might get better if men of sense and morality would win some influence and partook in the socialistic part of the Hitler-program gaining the confidence of the masses back. - This attitude might explain the following steps.

At the end of 1933 practically all owners of private cars among the directors of I.G. Frankfurt were asked to enter the NSKK. Being at the time 48 years of age I agreed to enter it but practically did not do any service. Thus in the year 1934 in the month of May on another call addressed to me directly by the president of Frankfurt police I was taken over from NSKK which at the time was part of SA to SA group-staff in order to help them in the unemployment problem, which at the time stood in the foreground. At the end of 1934 this question being practically solved my advisory capacity came to an end. It had only been exercised by coming into the office of SA group-staff, studying papers and applications for employment and eventually giving suggestions but

(signed) G v Schmitzler

I did not handle any questions myself under my own responsibility. The titles of "Sturmführer" merely honorary were conveyed on me as an acknowledgement of the before-mentioned help; they did not include any functions nor was any kind of service to be performed. As I did not want to be mixed up with the policy of the party and agreeing only with the socialistic part of the party-program - the creation of "Die klassenlose Gesellschaft" - that means abolishment of the struggle between the social classes - I refracted and abstained from the membership of the party as long as ever possible. After having become the first of January 1938 Betriebsführer, that means first officer, in I.G. Frankfurt, a position which in the interest of the company as well as of the people employed in Frankfurt I accepted, I was inevitably enlisted as a party member.

The application was made in February 1938, my number is high above 5 million, it should be something like 5.385.000. I never got a party-book, but only the so-called red-card which will be found with my files in I.G. The date of entry was dated back on May first 1937.

I have never had any advantages financial or other through the party or party affiliations. As beforementioned I am a member of Zentral-Ausschuss of I.G. since 1931. 1931 was the year of my highest income, it never reached that height later on again.

My personal record is well known in Frankfurt, in the first instance by personalities having been asked in office lately by the American Administration, namely Mr. Holbach, Dr. Lertens, Dr. Beutler Mitrov, Dr. Euler, Reiffenberg and the new president of the Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Petersen. About this Mr. Redecker, former US Consul in Frankfurt, who as I heard has been newly appointed as Consul here, will surely be ready to refer about me.

From 1935-41 I was deputy-chairman of Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie; when in 1942 the Wirtschafts-Gruppe was transformed in a corporative institution under a "Präsidium" with a strong party-note I with the other members of the "Engerer Beirat" including Dr. Hess, the former chairman, were dismissed.

In Oct. 1943 when Weber-Andreas died, a new solution had to be found for his succession. - I became the chairman of a Zentral-Direktorium of "Verkaufsgemeinschaft Chemikalien". Apart from myself Haefliger, Borgwardt and von Heider were members."

Frankfurt, Sept. 11th, 1945.

(signed) G. VON SCHNITZLER.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except, referring to page 2, I believe my Party Card Number was about 5,835,000 instead of about 5,385,000.

6. On 20 August 1945 I signed a three page statement entitled

"Statement of Mr. Von Schnitzler", the text of which is as follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

VS "The I.G. is what is called in German language a "concern."
The term "concern" means that an enterprise has taken up an evolution that it comprises not only different domains, but that different firms of a varied character are united under the heading and the guidance of the controlling enterprise. Apart from I.G., the best known old established concerns in Germany are Vereinigte Stahlwerke and Siemens-Schuckert. The development of I.G. from a number of independent firms to a concern was performed in a relatively short time. It is publicly known that I.G. has been constituted in 1925 by a merger of six chemical firms which took over the shares of the seventh one, "Cassella." Even at that time although the bigger ones of the so-called mother houses represented a huge potential of economic power -- the term "concern" did not apply to the whole combine. The activities of I.G. could be VS strictly distributed in the (1) inorganic chemistry (acids, caustic soda, etc.) (2) the aromatic organic field (dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals) and (3) the high pressure industry (nitrogen and methanol). Thus I.G.'s activity was strictly limited to the purely chemical domain and had not yet entered the many new fields which led her on the way of the metallurgical as well as of the oil, and the domain of plastic masses, including rubber. The germs of the new developments were laid, but had not yet come to blossom, and nobody could foresee how fantastic the results of the development would be. Retrospectively seen, the growing to a concern was a continuous and uninterrupted one year after year even in the time of the deepest depression. In the years of the world crisis of 1931, the technical progress did not come to a standstill and when the program of autarchy and rearmament came to execution, the speed of the expansion became an overwhelming one. The aliphatic chemical industry which had been developing as a third big part of chemical activity and which apart of the limited quantities of ethylene made by coke gases entirely reposes on carbide reached a volume in weight ten times as big as was represented by the aromatic organic chemistry. This aliphatic chemical industry was only taken up in 1917 and up to that time, the aromatic industry represented practically along the organic chemical industry. The main products in this aliphatic domain were Buna and different new plastics, but the progress made was not smaller in the domain of the electrochemical field where Bitterfeld and its affiliations realized an enormous expansion in aluminum and magnesium and exactly the same happened in the cellulose chemical field where rayon and photographic articles showed a continuously climbing turnover, in the synthetic fabrics altogether there indeed I.G. had a relatively small share (15%), but for which I.G. had to supply the bulk of the raw materials -- caustic soda and sulphur S.C.2, a development from nil to nearly 300,000 tons a year was realized. It can not be the object of this statement to enumerate the different endeavors which succeeded in the bringing up of so vast an expansion. The laboratory work prepared and continued since decades the property of a huge range of patents and a staff of highly trained and gifted chemists cooperated to constitute the basis for an industrial achievement, which, in this country, had no parallel. The economic result for the company was no less brilliant than the chemical achievement. Up to the end of 1944, not only the turnover but just as well the profit figures showed an upward trend. In the meantime, following the decree of the first days of the war regarding prices, at least 120,000,000 R. per annum were sacrificed on the original pre-war prices and all that was achieved notwithstanding that equipment and material during the war always became more expensive

(signed) G v Schnitzler

and that the quality of the workmen showed a decrease, instead of of the skilled men who more and more got to be mobilized, women and foreign workmen became employed and it was inevitable that they could not realize the same performance as the men whom they had replaced. It had often been complained of in I.G. circles that I.G. practically alone showed in the chemical field an activity in inventing and carrying through technical processes which met the corresponding efforts of the American chemical industry, where at least half a dozen big firms were devoting themselves to new inventions and processes. The poor endeavors and the feeble results of the other chemical industries (partly due to a lack of enterprise and readiness to take over substantial commercial risks) meant for I.G. a strong obstacle in her relations with them. Notwithstanding that, I.G. always had to protect that industry by the most varied methods in supplying them with raw materials, intermediates, licenses and know-how. The jealousy of this industry was never to be quieted and the unpopularity of I.G. to a large extent was due to that jealousy which never or seldom openly came to expression but was always like a gleaming fire under the surface. However it was, I.G. could not bring science to a stand-still because the smaller chemical industrialists would have liked her to do so and the progress of science brought up another development in an additional field. In former times, I.G. always had taken the standpoint that it should limit its activities on the proper domain of chemistry and not interfere with their customer's business. Thus I.G. never took an interest in textile factories or in dyer's trade and even refused every participation in the lacquer and varnish industry, although some of the pigment dyes were made simultaneously by those producers and I.G. itself. The newly developed products in the field of aliphatic chemistry as well as in the light metal field demanded a change of this policy. In order to teach the consumers industry the employment of these new products, I.G. had to erect or to buy entire plants in which these products were transformed into the finished articles, the fabrication of which normally would have been the task of the consumers. As to an example, I may only refer to the tire factory in LEV, which had to play a pioneer's role in the employment of Buna, and in the great laboratories of Bitterfeld as well as in the Dynamit A.G. works in Troisdorf, a substantial manufacturing of finished articles in all kinds of plastics, tubes, wires, entire parts of machinery, etc., was done. In the light metal field, a great firm Hegu in Leipsig was acquired which was in the first line a foundry in order to give practical application for magnesium alloys and even a rolling work in Lethmathe was taken over jointly with Vereinigte Stahlwerke for rolling tentatives of such alloys. I.G. had to engage specialists for these different tasks, men who were not acquainted with I.G.'s main activities and only could have a loose connection with the chemical field in general. The more I.G. became a concern in the aforementioned way, the less efficient became the power and survey of the central administration. Bookkeeping and financial control more and more replaced the immediate knowledge of the technical and commercial methods in which one was engaged and the central committees developed to registry offices where scientific reports were given and where one took notice of figures. The management of I.G. was in no way satisfied with that development and for years the question was discussed if by splitting up I.G. and creating new independent companies one could not achieve the following three

(signed) G v Schnitzler

aims: (1) to withdraw from I.G. the reproach to be a "state within the state." (2) to separate the original old business of dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals and chemicals from the newly developed great commodities like nitrogen, Buna and oil over which perpetually the danger of nationalization was pending, (3) to have the newly put factories of Auschwitz and Heydebreck with the coal mines united in Ost-Chemie A.G. None of these aims ever materialized and even from the Nazi government, also being strongly opposed to I.G. as an institution, never came any suggestions as to what in their opinion I.G. should do. The difficulty of splitting up augmented from year to year as the interconnection of the factories became more and more complex. Heydebreck, for instance is practically a repetition of Oppau, the whole scientific work being done in Oppau, and even for Leuna up to now Oppau is to a large extent the scientific brain center. Generally speaking, the historical evolution from the Rhine to middle Germany and Upper Silesia materialized in such a way that a new works always were a kind of colonies of the old ones and a great responsibility would have to be taken over when one would have tried to separate the young works from the old ones. Also from the aspect of the shareholder it was extremely difficult to find an equitable solution. In offering him for instance shares of a newly built Ost-Chemie, A.G., had I.G. not to take a guarantee for the dividends and would such guarantee not make any illusion the whole construction of the new so-called independent company?

VS

Thus everything as far as the general structure of I.G. was concerned remained unchanged and every month added something new to the existing potential. The industrial position of I.G. in Germany had no parallel with any other enterprise. Vereinigte Stahlwerke employed more people and the state-owned Hermann Goering Works had collected so many different enterprises that their capital and their turnover might even have been higher than that of I.G., but both their domains of activity, their earning capacity and scientific performance, was incomparably smaller than what I.G. could show in these domains. Compared with the great companies abroad, even in the United States, no single individual company had so large a field of progressive scientific enterprise as I.G. Dupont, next to I.G., the greatest chemical combine in the world, has the great merit to have brought out the first marketable synthetic rubber, neoprene, and was just as active in the whole chemistry of polymerization as I.G. Apart from that, Dupont invented the nylon fiber and realized substantial progress in the field of vat dyestuffs in bringing them into new and efficient forms. Also in the general chemical field, Dupont was highly progressive; the same applies to the Union Carbides, the American Colanese, as well as to Eastman Kodak, but all these enterprises were much more specialized than I.G. and did not cover so large a field as I.G.'s research work did. Of course one must not forget the entirely different structure of the American and of the German economy. Germany was a small country, was of relatively poor soil having only a strong coal basis and relatively strong basis in water power. Transportation was well-developed and the distances short. Thus the inducement to produce commodities, which in countries being larger and richer than Germany were available by the gift of nature, was far bigger in this country and it is not a pure hazard that as well the nitrogen as the Buna has come from Germany, the traditional country of the synthesis. The predominant role which I.G. had to play in this development was

(signed) G v Schnitzler

indicated by the fact that I.G. represented the combined force of the firms which even before the merger were the strongest and the most active ones in the chemistry of all Europe, if not of the world. It is the Badische Anilin and Soda-Fabrik, and Farbenfabriken in Leverkusen, the laboratories of which constituted the cells from which the whole technical expansion originated."

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

This statement still appears to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) At page 2, I perhaps exaggerated by saying I.G.'s "Central comm. s developed to registry offices", but that does give the sense of the development.

(b) At page 2, eighth line from the bottom "a new works always were a kind of colonies" should be written "the new works always were a type of colonies".

(c) At page 2, second line from the bottom "illusion" should be "allusion".

7. On 18 July 1945 I signed the transcript of a one page interrogation on the "Auslandsorganisation", the text of which is given below:

- Q. What do you know about the A.O. and your foreign agencies?
A. The A.O. is a department of the party under the guidance of Herr Bohle.
Q. What was the purpose of the A.O.?
A. The famous work "Gleichschaltung". That means going on a certain line.
Q. What is the line?
A. The line was firstly to want no Jews; secondly to want as few foreigners as possible; thirdly all that was German "Verein" should disappear and only one unique Nazi social organization should result in everything forthly collect as much money as possible.
vS Q. How would you classify foreign propaganda?
A. The propaganda department was just a department of the whole. They wanted the absolute control of German firms abroad, except the USA. But even there they interfered in the "Deutsche Verein" in New York, which blew up. Victor Riddler left the Deutsche Verein in New York.
vS Q. What was the relation between I.G. and A.O.?
A. We were for the first years under continuous pressure, we had more and more to follow the official line.
Q. When did the relationship between I.G. and A.O. begin?
vS A. About 1933. In 1933-1934.
Q. It improved so much that I.G. completely harmonized its policy with the policy of the A.O.?
A. Not completely harmonized.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. What were the frictions?
A. The A.O. considered certain men not fit to represent the I.G.
in foreign countries.
Q. For example?
A. In many countries in the Southeast."

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear
that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr.
Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft

The answers to the questions as written in this interrogation transcript
still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief. A typographical error in the second answer should
be corrected. "Famous work" should be "Famous word". In the third
vs answer a semi-colon should be placed after "everything". Of course much
vs more is to be said concerning the relations between A.O. and the I.G.

8. I have carefully read each of the eleven pages of this declara-
tion and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have
made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each
correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath
that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Sworn to and signed before me this 4th day of March 1947, at the
vs Palace of Justice in Nuernberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler,
known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
Drexel A. Sprecher

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 5191
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the
above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5191, the original
of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

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12

Case 6

4

Ex 1813

COPY OF DOCUMENT No. NI-12547
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Witness: Dr. Georg von Schnitzler.
Interrogator: Drexel A. Sprecher
Reporter: Dorothy Adams
Date: 2 May 1947
Time: 1505 to 1530 hours

Q. This is a continuing interrogation of Dr. Georg von Schnitzler.
Well, Dr. von Schnitzler, you have been away for some weeks.

A. Yes, three and one-half weeks.

Q. Now we had not corrected the last record of interrogation which you and I had together. The reason being that I did not want to hold up in any way your going back to the Dachau Camp merely because that was not corrected, so I thought we might have you look through that interrogation this afternoon. Furthermore I have incorporated in a proposed affidavit some of the further statements or interrogations which you made in 1945 which we had discussed in either the last interrogation, or in one of the later interrogations in any event. I thought we might also go over that. It won't be necessary for me to remain here all that time, but in any event you can be going over them and I will be available. Now before we go any further, there are two things I want to take up with you. The first thing is that Mrs. von Schnitzler has asked to see you and I think she is in town today, in which case some time, I think this afternoon, she can come down here for a while and, except for the guard, you can probably be alone with her. In a number of cases either families of leaders of I.G. Farben who are here, or else German lawyers who have been approached by families of I.G. Farben leaders who are here, have asked some questions about defense counsel in the event of a trial involving any leaders of I.G. Farben. I believe I explained to

von Schnitzler Interrogation
2 May 1947 Page 2

/of you some time before ~~that~~ the question of defense counsel, in the event of an indictment which names any particular people as defendants. The question is one for the Secretary General of the courts or of the tribunals and not a question for representatives of the Office of the Chief of Counsel of which I am a staff member. Therefore, I have not been in a position to give any final answers about the matter, nor have I been in any position to make any recommendations one way or the other. However, I believe that your wife had made some approaches to a German lawyer who might be a counsel for you in the event of a trial. We will have no objection if you wish to talk to her about that matter. I recall that when you talked to your wife on the telephone before in my presence that some question arose about this matter and you told her that the matter should be left in your own hands. So the matter is entirely up to you. Certainly at this stage, in some sense in any event, the matter is somewhat premature. But if you would like to discuss with your wife the possibilities, that is a matter for you and your wife to decide this afternoon.

A. Thank you very much. In my opinion it is premature because I have no idea on what eventually I could be indicted personally.

Q. In one case a lawyer approached me on behalf of the family of another leader of I.G. Farben and, since he had some other business which he wanted to consider, he only wanted an assurance that if there were a trial he might be retained as one of the defense counsel and I arranged

that the proper messages could be exchanged. Now as I say, it is not

von Schnitzler Interrogation
2 May 1947 Page 3

a matter of my business at all, except that where I can assist in making the family feel a little bit better about someone who is detained here, I will certainly try to do what is possible under the circumstances.

- A. Thank you very much. I am only interested in a retainer and this I would like to discuss with my wife when I see her this afternoon so that she will retain for me one of the lawyers, but that is a question which has come up even months before.
- Q. I am quite aware of that although I have no knowledge of the details. I was not aware of it in your particular case. But a number of lawyers one or two of whom have been around Nurnberg for some time, have discussed the matter with us so I am somewhat familiar with the plans. Dr. Dix is one, I believe. Is that right?
- A. That is right. There was a lot of news over the radio regarding I.G. Farben but I think that could be incorrect.
- Q. I thought perhaps you had become familiar with some of the radio reports. I heard about some of them only indirectly but am not advised of the actual contents.
- A. The Munich radio seemed to be specializing in sensational news about and, as in Dachau, the Munich radio was heard every day. I did not listen as I did not want to trouble my nerves with that. But other people told me about that, so I always said, "You see, it is just unjustified news."
- Q. How the second thing I want to come to gets back to your attitude and your position in connection with the Allied authorities

von Schnitzler Interrogation
2 May 1947 Page 4

and the whole question of the truth. Now you have been away from Nurnberg for over three weeks and during that time you have not been interrogated. Is that correct?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. Now has anything occurred during that time which in any way causes you to have any further remarks concerning your statements made here and interrogations which we have had together?
- A. Nothing, Mr. Sprecher, except the name of Sir William Lerk who is called William and not Francis as I said erroneously. And then one other thing again. Of course I thought it over so very often because I realize the importance of that for other people. That was my talk with Mueller-Gunradi. You remember that, when he spoke to me that the rumor was running about things which happened in Auschwitz Concentration Camp, and I was horrified and said, "But do the people on the spot, Arabs and the other people, know anything of that too?" This is entirely written into my memory. Now his answer was understood by me in the affirmative but if he had said "Yes" or if he had said "Ja, ya" as one says in German, or if he has only nodded, that of course I cannot remember any more.

- Q. Now is there anything else that occurs to you, before I go forward, which should be amplified or corrected in any of the matters we took up before you left Nurnberg a little over three weeks ago?
- A. Nothing, sir. That is all.
- Q. Now before I excuse the reporter and we go over the further statements and the record of the last interrogation, I would like to show you a

von Schnitzler Interrogation
2 May 1947 Page 5

chart entitled "Arbeiter" dated 1 October 1944. You will note that Dr. Struss has written his name on the bottom of this. This is a chart which was made by the TEA Bureau and one of the charts on the labor force of I.G. Farben such as from time to time appeared on the walls of the TEA room either in Frankfurt or in Berlin where some of the meetings were held there during the war. I would like to have you look over particularly the entries in the left column which show the type of workers. Thereafter I will have just one or two questions.

- A. I cannot remember that chart. And I should think that I have not seen it because it is on the 1st October 1944 and after that date the regular TEA meetings, as they used to be held in Berlin and Frankfurt, did not take place any more as far as I can recollect. At that time we met only at Heidelberg and then I was not present any more at any TEA meetings.
- Q. Well actually this is a late version of a type of chart which appeared on the walls of the TEA room in Frankfurt many times during the war which merely lists the employment force in the principal I.G. Farben plants and shows the breakdown of the types of labor. Do you recall seeing those charts?
- A. Oh yes, I recall seeing those charts on the walls or tables inside the room but I never realized those small figures here. I never realized that and I can repeat that the only time I heard of those concentration camp laborers, that was the one occasion when Ambros spoke of that in the Vorstand and my reaction was, as you remember just like in "Gone With the Wind."

von Schnitzler Interrogation
2 May 1947 Page 6

- Q. Yes. You were pointing to the entry in the left column which refers to the concentration camp labor. You do not recall--
- A. I do not recall ever having paid attention to that. It did not come to my attention. I saw those kind of charts in general--while you were sitting in the room and you just saw the charts and there wasn't only that chart. There used to be at least a dozen different charts on the walls.
- Q. So you don't recall having seen on any charts whatsoever which were made by I.G. Farben that I.G. Farben did employ concentration camp inmates?
- A. I never saw that on those charts. Of course I knew that fact since Ambros' remark and I cannot entirely recollect if the remark was made in 1943 or 1944, but I would say it was in 1944.
- Q. I did not have any particular additional point in mind, except that I

thought if you saw one of these charts it might refresh your recollection. We can then proceed without the reporter to go over the record of the interrogation and the proposed affidavit which incorporates some of your old statements or interrogations. That will be all.

Dorothy Adams, Reporter

Proof-reading and corrections
concluded on May 5th 1947

11h 40

G.v.Schnitzler

Dr. Georg von Schnitzler, Witness

Drexel A.Sprecher, Interrogator

Witness: Dr. Georg von Schnitzler
Interrogator: Drexel A. Sprecher
Reporter: Maxine Martin
Date: 5 May 1947
Time: 1140 - 1142 hours

Q. This is a continuing interrogation of Dr. von Schnitzler. Is it correct, Doctor, that we have just finished correcting the record of the interrogation of 2 May 1947?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You mentioned while we were going over an affidavit on the 2nd of May 1947, or was it on the 3rd of May 1947, that the prison authorities had taken some of your records during an investigation. I made inquiries about the return of all of those materials and I just wanted to be sure that everything was returned to you.

A. Everything has been returned.

Q. Do you have anything further? I just want to be sure.

A. Nothing, sir.

Q. Now, let me ask you this Doctor. Do you have a copy now of all the records of our interrogation?

A. Yes. I have all the records without exception.

Q. That will be all.

CERTIFICATE

I, Maxine Martin, AGO No. A-444949, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct record of the interrogation of Dr. Georg von Schnitzler by Mr. Drexel A.Sprecher, conducted from 1140 to 1145 hours on 5 May 1947.

Maxine Martin

CERTIFICATE OF COPY

I, John J. Boll, AGO # A-444412, U.S. Civilian, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the Document No. NI-12547.

JOHN J. BOLL,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO #A-444412

END

-4-

A F F I D A V I T

I, Georg von SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before a representative of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I. G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider a further statement which I subscribed to in July 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 16 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to this statement in July 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading this statement are set forth below after the text of the statement.

2. On 4 July 1945, I signed a five page statement for Mr. Glaser entitled "Statement re BORUTA", the text of which is given below:

"The dyestuff industry in Poland has a long history. Even at the time, when Poland was a ~~part~~ of the Zsaris Russia and the big German firms had their great subsidiary works in Moscor (Bayer, Badische, Höchst) ~~ex~~ Riga (Cassella) two smaller national factories always existed in the neighborhood of Lodz, where for a century a great textile industry (cotton and half-wool) was established.

The bigger one of the two factories was the Chemische Fabrik Zgierz (the name of Boruta, means Dyestuff, was added later on, I should say in 1919) and the Wola Krystajowska, which did belong to a family called Szpielvogl. In the following always the names are used which became the trade-names after 1919 "Boruta" and "Wola". The two firms had an economical basis insofar as they always had the profit of a relatively high duty on imported products and were able to cover their needs in coals and heavy chemicals a.s.o. in their own country.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

In addition to this they could buy in the open market most of the intermediates they did not produce themselves and they needed for the range of the more or less simpler colours which they produced.

Apart of Boruta and Wola - also in the neighbourhood of Lodz the Ciba owned a third dyestuff factory in the town of Fabianice, which practically worked on a very similar basis as Boruta.

But there always existed the difference between the two firms, that Boruta continuously worked at a loss and that Fabianice was considered by the Swiss as a company with satisfactory earning capacity. Technical inefficiency at Boruta and waste of money on costly investments may have been the main reason for it, furthermore the in comparison with the volume of its affairs the number of the personal was extremely high and so was the payment of directors and other chemical people. -

Commercial relations between the German firms and Boruta always existed, in 1910 already Boruta was partner in a direct and a sulphurblack convention and after the world war and after both countries Germany and Poland had overcome inflation a more or less friendly competition existed. Fighting alternated with short time agreements. Two facts at least can be described as the source of the long-termed Cartel agreement of 1934 which was destined to the last till 1942.

About 1930 Zgierz began to be interested in export to Russia and to the Balkan countries, the quantities were small but in the dyestuff trade with even small quantities a market

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can be seriously effected.

In the meantime I.G. had in 1928 concluded the first great cartel agreement with the French dyestuff industry and as the French had built up quite a substantial import business in Poland which in the long run seemed to be endangered by Boruta, he fostered the French endeavours to build up a fourth dyestuff factory in Poland, the so-called Winnica near Jarsaw, in which I.G. secretly took 50 % which were later on turned over to I.G. Chemie Basle, and the I.G. representatives in Lodz to a certain extent became sellers of Winnica's products.

Winnica-itself was bought back from Kuhlmann at their book-value in connection with the Francolor agreement 1941/42 and then liquidated and dismantled after I.G. had indemnified I.G. Chemie. -

The reason for the liquidation was obvious, the remaining market of the General-Gouvernement having become so small that the Co. could not continue.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Under the pressure of the beginning and even more the future competition of Winnica on the one hand and the Cartel on the other hand, having the desire to regulate an eventual export trade Zgierz could have developed the parties at last joined to the cartel agreement, signed in Warsaw in 1934. This cartel agreement contained substantial advantages for the Polish group. Not only the Polish group secured for itself a share which was higher than its status quo, but a constant improvement during the 8 years' period was granted to them. The France-German-Swiss Cartel had to make substantial transfers of business and to guarantee the supply of an important range of intermediates at economic prices. -It has to be admitted that the execution in praxis of this cartel agreement became more difficult than any other one of the numerous agreements in the dyestuff domain.

This was due to a large extent to the market conditions in the district of Lodz where protective measures practically could not be carried through, but altogether the fact remained that Boruta under the cartel agreement not only could not fulfil its quota, receiving therefore substantial money in cash, but continued to work at a loss. On the other hand the Polish group never made the slightest endeavour to raise prices which policy the 3-party cartel: France, Germany, Switzerland, would have been prepared to follow, whenever the Polish group would have made a corresponding application. The management of Boruta was entirely in the hand of government representatives - Pilsudski men - General Hatischevski being the president and Dr. Piasecki the technical director. They apparently had to follow the official line of the policy of the Polish government which held the strict line of not allowing any raising of the general price level.

It is difficult to say if Szpielvogl did work economically or not, his small establishment was connected

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with a distillery and little agricultural industries. By mixing it all up he might have "muddled through". -

When the German troop entered Poland in autumn 1939 I.G. proposed to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium that two of their directors should be appointed jointly as commissioners for the Polish dyestuff industry, Dr. Schöner for the technical and Schrab for the commercial belongings. This proposal was accepted and the two men took over the management of Boruta whose directors had fled to Hungary or Turkey as well as of Wola and the French share of Winnica - in their capacity as commissioners of Reichswirtschafts-Ministerium.

Not
intelligible
vs The Winnica question was being solved, as ter Meer pointed out before, and in exactly the same way the liquidation of the French stocks in dyestuffs have been taken in hand. The result was turned over to the French group.

The 2 Polish firms were administrated as an unity and as the Wola manufactured only Azo colours and as these

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Azo colours were mostly identical with Azo colours Boruta could produce, Wola practically was taken entirely over by Boruta. A special installation Wola had for the so-called "Naphtole" was destined to be transferred to one of the German factories but I am not sure if this ever had been executed. That during war-time Wola should come again into action was out of question as the "hole plan" from a general economic point of view could not represent any commercial or technical interest.

As is known the industrial property in the so-called annexed Poland-Warthegau and Silesia and not to be "confiscated" (?) with the General Government where the Polish property, as far as I am informed, was respected - was handed over to the Treuhandstelle-Ost which disposed of the different works following certain rules which to a very large extent were made up by the Office for "Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums", an office under Himmler's immediate administration. No transfer was effected unless this office had given its agreement.

It was only too natural that I. G. had a strong interest to acquire the works of Boruta. On one hand they wanted to make use of the installations of Boruta which although not being very important in volume still represented an interesting addition mostly in the domain of intermediates which Boruta in the last years had considerably developed, and as the main plant of I.G. for these products Leverkusen was considered as highly endangered by air attacks. - Secondly so long as the question of property was not solved, practically nothing could be done in the technical improvement of Boruta because I.G. could not foster an eventual new competitor inside their own territory in the dyestuff field which was I.G.'s oldest and strongest domain.

Thirdly; It had been fixed as a general rule that the industry in the newly conquered districts should become the domain of the smaller industrial firms and not come under the control of the big concerns, thus it was to be feared

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that somebody strange to the dyestuff trade might become the buyer who in future should develop as a very cumbersome competitor. Fourthly: I never - this was my personal opinion - believed that Lodz and its suburbs would remain German, the population indeed is entirely Polish. I think with all tricks one had succeeded to make out of 600.000 inhabitants 60.000 so-called Germans partly only because they had a German name and/or their grandfather had come over from Germany but their knowledge of the German language was so poor that, as I was told, it was difficult to make oneself understood even about the simplest matters.

Thus, one day Lodz had to become Polish again and having always been a strong adherent of a policy of reasonable distribution of industrial activity between the different European countries I never varied in that opinion, that Boruta was destined to become Polish property again.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

But in the interest of I.G.'s international standing which I always had at heart, it seemed to me a much fairer solution that I.G. themselves should be able to hand over the factory in a good shape to its legitimate successor, than to let it fall into the hands of speculators.

The money invested in it if such a fair solution would be found, should always be recuperated. Consequently we approached the Treuhandstelle Ost and after long negotiations and only with the help of Dr. Herle (?) himself, the head of the industrial department of Treuhandstelle, who was an old friend of mine from the times when he was under Duisberg manager of the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie 1925-31/32, we came to terms with a sum of something like 5,000,000.- M. as lump sum for the works including goodwill and volume of business, and with the obligation to spend another 5 million Marks in the following 5 years on enlargements and improvements.

The price of 5 million was not an excessive one. Notwithstanding that Boruta had not made any money with it, plant and equipment were valuable, the goods were taken over at reasonable prices - the bad debtors remaining with the Treuhandstelle. - The Treuhandstelle rightly pointed out that the business volume of Boruta/Wola to be added to I.G.'s volume represented for I.G. a substantial profit in itself. So the lump sum was justified even when the evaluations of the assets made by the experts from both sides not quite reached the amount of 5 million Marks.

As aforesaid I.G. could only get this contract in taking over the obligation of re-arranging and rebuilding many departments and erecting some new ones, but these were necessary investments which would normally have been to be made and which could be written off at the normal rate of 5 % on buildings and 10 % on equipment. Thus this obligation practically did not mean only genuine sacrifice, a fact which to a man of so much routine as Dr. Herle was clear from the very first beginning, but it was an impressurating (?) figure for "Amt für Befestigung des deutschen Volkstums" and such appropriate to oust other competitors who eventually would not dare to take over such a charge. - The Treuhandstelle

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as well as Dr. Küpper and Schrab tried to keep in touch with the Amt, but a favorable decision was not to be got. I should say, some month were "dratted" in such a way, till at last I addressed myself to Dr. Eichenauer. - In the meantime two serious competitors had been active with the aim that not I.G. but they themselves with the financial aid of S.S. should be allowed to acquire the works, the two brothers Gutbrodt on one hand and as far as I was rightly informed, the son-in-law of a man called Bruno Schilde, the latter being representative of a small Swiss dyestuff producer Rohner, with whom I.G. for years entertained friendly relations and who for himself owned quite a small factory for producing dyestuffs from intermediates bought in the market.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The brothers Gutbrod were particularly well backed by mighty party-interests as they had been with the party even in the early 20 years and having made bankruptcy with a factory of paint and varnish about 1925. Richenauer, a director of the Stickstoff-Syndikat who had been very useful for I.G. in another domain: in the question of prices and excess-profits, which he had made his speciality, was an intimate to Mr. Greifelt, the head of the Amt, and he arranged a luncheon party in the Hotel Continental, Berlin, where he gave me the opportunity to develop the thesis that a dyestuff factory could carefully only be run by I.G. for that very reason that I.G. alone disposed of the technical and commercial experts being able to do the necessary work, that every other solution independently of the money-question must lead to an economic failure, which in the first instance would mean the detriment of the textile industry in Lodz. - I had never seen Mr. Greifelt before and neither did I ever see him afterwards again, thus I was myself a little surprised of the success of this unique conversation.

Shortly afterwards the Treuhandstelle informed us that the permission had been granted; an old Berlin lawyer whose name I can't recollect at present, was charged to act as trustee and the definite agreement was concluded in which Dr. Kupper acted as legal advisor.

Boruta under the management of Dr. Metzdorf continued as I.G. property its activity and proved to be useful notwithstanding that the general development and the military set-backs in the East prevented the realization of the contractual obligations.

New investments could only be made to a very small extent as no material was being granted. In the supply of two important products Boruta gave I.G. a considerable help: Acide H an intermediate for azo-colours and Hydrosulphite conc. as a reducer for vat colours.

July 4th, 1945.

signed: G.von Schnitzler
G. von Schnitzler"

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) On page 3, the following paragraph now appears unintelligible to me: "The Winnica question was being solved as ter Meer pointed out before, and in exactly the same way the liquidation of the French stocks in dyestuffs have been taken in hand. The result was turned over to the French group." This paragraph should therefore be ignored, since I believe
(signed) G v Schnitzler

the typist made some errors in typing it from my original handwritten
vS statement. At page 3, line 4, "1919" should be "1939."

(b) At page 3, the third full paragraph should be modified to indicate that the Wola plant was never acquired by the I.G. Since Wola was in the General-Gouvernement, it was liquidated by the Reichskommissars Schmal and Schoener before I.G. acquired the BORUTA plant. The Wola matter, in my opinion, should be considered separately from the BORUTA matter.

(c) On page 3, fourth full paragraph, second and third line, "not to be 'confiscated' (?)" should be "not to be confused". This is another typographical error I did not notice in checking over the typewritten statement in July 1945.

(d) On page 4, last paragraph, seventh line, the word "only" should be stricken out before the words "genuine sacrifice". In the ninth line, the word "impressurating (?)" should have been typed as "impressive." In the eleventh line "and such" should be "and as such."

(e) On page 5, first full paragraph, eleventh line, the word "carefully" should be "properly."

(f) I should add to the entire statement concerning BORUTA that the entire Lodz textile industry desired that the BORUTA dyestuffs factory be developed. The Boruta practically was the property of the Polish state. As the Polish state at the time of the negotiations about the Boruta only existed "de jure", but not possessing any territory, we considered for the time being the Boruta as a kind of "no man's land". One needed its production-capacity, being of course a small one, but important on account of the fact that inside the old German territory some of the intermediates produced at the Boruta were only manufactured at Leverkusen, which factory any day could be destroyed by air-raids. Furthermore, there were 2 other serious competitors for the Boruta, both patronized by mighty party-affiliations who on the other hand had not the
(signed) G v Schnitzler

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WAR CRIMES : CONT'D

necessary qualities to run this factory.

Thirdly I.G. still had advanced money to the Boruta as the HTO was not ready to do so and more money had to be spent to give the factory the efficiency needed. For those 3 reasons the purchase seemed to be inevitable. To the best of my knowledge and belief we have taken away nothing from that factory, on the contrary we left it in a much better shape than it was before.

As I said in the statement which I made for Mr. Glaser: My own intention always was to give the factory back to their legitimate owners, represented by General Matischewski in such a state that the friendly relations which for years had existed between ourselves and the Polish group could be resumed at once.

3. I have carefully read each of the eight pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Sworn to and signed before me this 6th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nuernberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
Drexel A. Sprecher

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

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WAR CRIMES CONT'D

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the
above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5192, the original
of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I subscribed to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I was shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. At the time I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these statements or interrogations mentioned below are set forth below after the text of each of the statements or interrogations.

2. On 31 August 1945, I signed a three page statement entitled "Statement re negotiations with the British and French authorities and industries after the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty", the text of which follows :

"When the World War I came to an end, the factories of I.G. on the borders of the Rhine were occupied and so-called control-officers were appointed, who had the task not only to supervise what no products for an eventual warfare should be fabricated but endeavoured to study all processes in order to get full knowledge of the whole dyestuff-pharmaceutical and nitrogen-industry. It was a legalised "Berk-Spionage" of the highest degree. The men appointed by the British and French military authorities were chemists, partly employed by the state, partly by the private chemical companies of England and France. Dr. Bosch who at the time was the head of the Badische Anilin and Soda-fabrik, was the first one, who in autumn 1919 started

G. v. Schnitzler
(signed)

negotiations with the well-known French minister Loucheur for the construction of a factory of nitrogens after the so-called Haber-Bosch process near Toulouse.

Shortly afterwards negotiations with the French dyestuff-industry represented by Mr. Frossard were inaugurated and lead to the conclusion of the so-called Gallus-Vertrag, which provided for a technical help in the whole dyestuff-domain to be given by the I.G. firms. This help has been carried through under the leadership of Dr. Krokeler, first technical director of Leverkusen.

As a countervalue the French group paid a lump sum of I think some 6 million francs suisses, and had additionally to pay an annuity of 50% of their net profits for a very long period.

A third agreement was concluded on behalf of I.G. by Carl von Weinberg with the Reparation-Commission by which the clauses of the Versailles treaty concerning the delivery of 25% of the current production in dyestuffs and nitrogens to the Allies as reparations in kind were substituted by the obligation of I.G. to supply the Allies at "most favoured prices" on reparation account. How successfully Mr. von Weinberg had dealt with that question became evident by the fact that instead of the theoretical 25% of the production

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upon which they theoretically had a right the Rep. Commission only has claimed 7% in the average of the years 1920-25.

Lead in hand with these 3 agreements the technical control in the factories was lifted and the officers of control disappeared; the control of the production became invisible in such a way that it was limited to a mere supervision of prices.

On the verge of the year 1922/1923 a change took place as the German government declares itself unable to continue the payment of reparations as it had done up to then and the so-called Ruhr-war which lasted nearly 10 months brought a break into the fulfilment of the 3 before mentioned agreements. During the year 1923 the Etablissements Kuhlmann got control over the Compagnie Générale des Matières Colorantes, which had signed the Gallus-Vertrag, and Kuhlmann refused to recognise the validity of the Gallus-Vertrag, when the Ruhr-war was over. Thus the Gallus-Vertrag had only lasted for 2 years and no payments apart from the lump sum had been made as the French group pretended not to have made any profits during those 2 years. A state of tension between the two industries followed, which only was bridged after the conclusion of the cartel-agreement in 1927. During the so-called Ruhr-war it came again to an occupation of the factories of Hoechst and Ludwigshafen/Oppau by French troops and with the aid of Alsatian workmen great quantities of dyestuffs and nitrogens were taken away.

The factories came to a complete standstill which practically persisted the whole year. Only in November 1923 negotiations were started in Coblenz, which resulted in a reprisal of the deliveries of dyestuffs and nitrogens as well as of the current production. These negotiations have been conducted in a moment of the utmost emergency, but it was doubtful if the Reich would recognize this agreement as valid, as it had been made at a time when the official

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

obstruction was still going on. Fortunately for I.G. as well as for the negotiators, who acted under their own responsibility and did expose themselves to punishment by the authorities of the Reich - the Reich took over the financial obligations arising from the agreements of Coblenz and the agreements made formerly by Mr. von Weinberg was coupled with the treaties of Coblenz in such a way, that the last year of the reparations in kind - 1924 - passed without further incident. It will be remembered that the British government

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did not participate in the Ruhr-war. Thus the factory of Leverkusen was neither occupied by British troops nor was the production of it hindered. - Leverkusen could continue its business without interruption and even could send its goods unmolested through the French occupied Ruhr-territory in the unoccupied Germany as well as into foreign countries.

At what precise date the British control of Leverkusen came to an end, I can't recollect, it had never been as sharp as the French one in Höchst and Ludwigshafen. At all events it ceased with the readiness of the I.G. firms to conclude with the British Dyestuff Corporation a similar agreement as had been concluded with the French industry. The two industries came to terms but the British government refused its approval. - Negotiations of the same kind were never renewed. -

Only at the beginning of 1932 - in the meantime Brit-Dyestuff Corp. had been absorbed by Imperial Chemical Industries - this latter Co. joined the so-called 3-party cartel in special cartel-agreement, which was destined to last till 1938!

Frankfurt, Aug. 31th, 1945

(Signed) G. von Schnitzler.

Ps. The chief reasons for the French group to conclude the Gallus-Vertrag consisted in their need for technical help as they were technically far behind I.G. -

This technical inferiority in comparison with I.G. can up to now be considered as a motiv for the French industry to renew commitments with I.G.

(Signed) G.v.S."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. In my opinion this account of the historical development is very important for understanding the Francolor agreement.

3. On 30 August 1945, I signed a one page statement entitled "Statement re. the attitude of the French dyestuff-group after the defeat of France", the text of which follows :

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

"The "Blitzkrieg" (lightning-war) of 1940 had left the French dyestuff-factories in Paris-St. Denis, Villers and Oissel (near Rouen) unharmed. - But owing to the lack of coal, electric power a.s.o. they very soon came to a total standstill. H. Joseph Frossard, the man, who is still the spirit of the French dyestuff-industry as well as he is its creator but whose nerves after a long life - he is 66 of age and has lived through many set-backs - have suffered, has not had and perhaps could not have had the moral strength to let things go as they were and to simply wait. As the 3 factories apart from Phenol and Centralite for powder had no "kriegswichtige Produkte" on their list, and as Phenol and Centralite at the time were not scarce, the Wehrmacht was not interested in the factories, and there was no chance to be seen that under the armistice they could come to a new activity. - Frossard consequently started nearly at once - I think it was in August - with his endeavours to come on speaking terms with us; he not only addressed Dr. Kramer in Paris, but he let me know through Mr. Koechlin of I.R. Geigy in Basle that he was desirous of a conversation with us. - We saw Mr. Koechlin in October 1940 in Zürich. Notwithstanding the applications made by I.G. to the German Government I was not in hurry to react on these suggestions. - As we were not prepared to renew our relations with the French group on the basis of the old cartel-agreement, but aspired to a much deeper rooted agreement, I thought it advisable to let them simmer in their own juice and to wait, till they asked for such private negotiations through the official channel of the armistice-commission.

This happened very soon, and on the demand of the French Government we first met in the second half of November in Wiesbaden. But Frossard was not among the French representatives. Duchemin and Thesmar, both now members of Conseil d'administration of Francolor, represented the French industry and Duchemin based his arguments for the reprisal of the old cartel-agreement on the "official policy of collaboration" laid down by Hitler and Pétain at Montoire.

Frankfurt, Aug. 30th, 1945.

(Signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4. On 5 September 1945, I signed a one page statement entitled "Statement regarding the French Chemical Industry", the text of which follows :

"The relations between the German and French chemical industries have always been some what closer than the relations between the other producing companies in the dyestuffs domain. In former statements, I reported of the technical help which the French dyestuffs industry, from the very beginning of its existence, desired to get from I.G.; the first contract between the Compagnie Generale des Matieres Colorantes, and the I.G., the so-called Gallus-Vertrag, signed in 1921, had its basis in the granting of a large scale technical equipment which I.G. had to furnish. The factories of Azo-dyes and their intermediates, in Oissel and Villers, are entirely built up on the plan gotten from Leverkusen and based on the model of Leverkusen.

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

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The procedure for phthalic acid, an intermediate for vat dyes, as well as a component for lacquers, goes back to a license and to the know-how granted by Ludwigshafen. The Gallus-Vertrag became the victim of the Ruhr War. When in 1927, in connection with the Franco-German negotiations for a commercial treaty, a new scheme for further teamwork was elaborated and the idea of a cartel based on the reciprocal turnover first materialized, this time, again, it was provided that technical help should be granted whenever it was in the interest of both parties concerned. Hereby, it was understood that whenever the French group should be under-delivered, the I.G. would, among other measures to be taken on the commercial side, supply the French group with licenses on new products and eventually the necessary know-how, in order to help them break even again.

This special Franco-German agreement including technical help, remained in force during the whole time that the existence of the so-called four party cartel agreement was in effect, which in itself had only commercial clauses, and purposes.

When Duchemin in November, 1940, in Weisbaden, made the suggestion to renew the cartel agreement, he undoubtedly had this technical problem as its first aim in mind, and we ourselves in our counter-proposals laid down in the memorandum of Weisbaden, took the same line, knowing that only by offering the technical teamwork, we would convince the French group to accept our proposals. In the Franco-German agreement the clauses dealing with the technical help to be given, have always been considered by us as being the most important ones for the French group, notwithstanding the fact that the Franco-German agreement had only been in force for a little more than two years, a substantial technical help, particularly in the field of accessory products for textiles and for cleansing purposes materialized.

I am certain that the French industry would only be too glad to resume those cartel relations with I.G., and if this supposition of mine is right, I am ready to elaborate more fully the propositions which are adapted to the present situation.

Frankfurt, September 5th, 1945.

(Signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. This statement shows with what optimistic prospects I still viewed the situation in September 1945.

5. On 14 September 1945 I signed a one page statement entitled "Short statement re the personal situation of the French people having dealt with I.G.", the text of which follows:

"In former statements I repeatedly pointed out that I.G. always endeavored not to harm private interests whenever it was in their power to act accordingly. Thus in principle whenever I.G. acquired a property in the conquered countries the men on the spot were kept at their post and their salary remained unchanged. By taking over the 51% interest in FRANKOLOR one single man had been refused but not for political reasons, but for lack of personal reliability: Mr. Auguste REHN, Alsatian and formerly till 1919 employee of Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik. On the other

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(signed)

hand it was provided for that RHEIN could remain with the Kuhlmann Company and that he was put in charge of the products of FRANCOLOR, the sale of which remained with the so-called mother-houses. All other men kept at least their former income and some of them like Mr. Francois who became head of the commercial department were substantially raised. The leading personalities in FRANCOLOR will have had another advantage in so far as - to the best of my knowledge - they had a personal share in the Compagnie de St. Clair du Rhône. - This company was evaluated at 12% of FRANCOLOR's total assets = 96 million francs. The nominal capital of the Co. was insignificant. As the Vichy government in a special law re FRANCOLOR (16. XII. 1941) granted the revalorisation free of taxes, the shareholders of St. Clair du Rhône realized a substantial indirect benefit.

Not less favourable was the solution carried through for Mulhouse-Dornach.

This company again was revalorised at a rate entirely out of proportion with the nominal capital = 2 million marks = 40 million francs; leaving about this the newly built little plant in St. Clair du Rhône to the Roessler family. - In addition Mr. Armand Roessler, a naturalized Swiss citizen, who died during the war received a personal retainer of frs. suisses 250.000.-. The company Mulhouse-Dornach itself which during the first years of the war had worked at a loss was restored to a sound financial basis and paid for the year 1943 6% dividend. Not only the capital amount of 20 million francs but also the dividend of 6% could be transferred in French francs to St. Clair du Rhône.

Frankfurt/Main, September 14th, 1945

signed: G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

6. On 16 July 1945 I signed a four page record of an interrogation which generally concerned the French chemical industry, the text of which follows :

"Q. When were the I.G. plans for the formation of Francolor first crystallized?

A. This I can easily tell you. It was at the luncheon after our assembly in 1940 -- could be the 1st of August.

Q. Can you tell me briefly what the general theory of I.G. was in regard to the formation of Francolor?

A. Yes. My idea was to create peace between the French and German dyestuff industry and to eliminate all friction. This friction came from the first war.

Q. What were the instructions or the theory worked out in regard to the French dyestuff industry between the Nazi government and I.G.?

A. The Nazi government had nothing to do with the whole affair. It was an entirely proper private affair of I.G.

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

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Q. Were there any discussions in August 1940 or before August 1940 between officials of the Nazi government and I.G. in regard to the French industry?

A. No, I can't remember.

Q. Whether or not there have been discussions between I.G. and the Nazi government in regard to the French industry?

A. Not in Berlin.

Q. Where?

A. Only inside I.G. discussions. The government did not interfere at all.

Q. Did the government take any part in any discussions with I.G.?

A. No.

Q. There were no discussions between Officials of I.G. and officials of the Nazi government in regard to the treatment of the French dyestuff industry?

A. I can only tell you that the government, that means the Armistice commission in Wiesbaden, or Reichswirtschaftsministerium or in Paris General Michel were only helpful to bring our plans through.

Q. Was there ever any correspondence between I.G. and Reichswirtschaftsministerium in regard to I.G. treatment of the French dyestuff industry?

A. No. I cannot recollect.

Q. Was there any correspondence between I.G. and the Reichswirtschaftsministerium in regard to the French dyestuff industry?

vs. A. I can only tell you the first plan came out ^{of} that luncheon on August 1st and lasted very long, the ideas came into discussion also with other people of the Aufsichtsrat, it was mostly Schmitz, ter Meer, and I; we worked the idea out, to come to a private arrangement with the French dyestuff industry with a "Kapital-Verpflegung."

Q. Did you ever send your proposals regarding your treatment of the French dyestuff industry to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there were discussions between you and the Reichswirtschaftsministerium regarding the treatment of the French dyestuff industry?

A. Yes.

vs. Q. What was the ^{gist} of the discussions between I.G. on the one hand and officials of the Nazi government in regard to the treatment of the French dyestuff industry.

(page 2 of original)

A. I think you can find it in our files. We have made an entire plan how we wanted the French problem to be treated.

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

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Q. And what did you propose?

A. I proposed to the government that we should take a capital interest in the French company on a purely private economic basis. The help of the government only started first in Wiesbaden.

Q. With which German government official did you speak in regard to the German French peace treaty?

VS. A. I think I have only talked the matter over with the Referent Ministerialdirigent ~~Hayfert~~.

Q. And you never spoke to anybody else?

VS. A. Probably I spoke with Mr. Schlotter. Schlotter was Ministerialdirektor in the RZM. There was another man over him, von Jagditz.

VS. Q. What was the position of Mr. ~~Hayfert~~?

VS. A. He was ^{not} a very important man. He was the man in charge of the chemical department in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium.

Q. I.G. went to the government and said I.G. wanted to deal with the French dyestuff industry on a private basis, and the Nazi government said "go ahead" is that right?

A. No, you must allow me.....

Q. You made an idea (proposal), i.e., I.G. submitted it to the Ministry of Economics. Was the proposal that I.G. should deal with the French dyestuff group as to the formation of Francolor on a purely private basis?

VS. A. That is not in my recollection. The negotiations with the French did not start from ourselves. We were in the beginning not so much interested. Then the French, with which we had been in ~~agreement~~ agreement, approached the German Government through their own government that they could take up negotiations with us. That was in November. Our first idea arose in our brains on Aug. 1st.

Q. What was your idea?

A. To deal with the French dyestuff industry on a private basis.

Q. And the Nazi officials never indicated to you that they were opposed?

VS. A. No. On the contrary. I was for the first time in Paris about 15 August. The meeting of August 1st was in Frankfurt. Then I went to Paris together with Tschann, not to see the French people, only to see the German authorities, that was Mr. Michel, then a man who later on was in Denmark, Mr. Best. I told them that I was of the opinion that the French chemical industry must exist, must remain there. The dyestuff problem could only be a practically solution by the French initiative, not by ourselves. I always favoured letting the French simmer in their own ~~stew~~ as you Americans say.

Q. What was your proposal in regard to the French dyestuff?

A. That was more or less a scheme of Francolor, to deal with the French on a private basis and take a capital participation.

G. v. Schnitzler
(signed)

Q. The Nazi government told you to take over the entire French dyestuff industry?

A. No.

Q. Why, then, did you write to the Nazi Ministry of Economics that you wanted to buy 50% of the French dyestuff industry from the Nazi government?

A. That's an error. The government did not want to take the chemicals.

Q. I know because we have the document's signed by yourselves!

A. That I.G. wanted to buy 50% of the French dyestuff industry from the Nazi Reich

(page 3 of original)

I can't remember.

Q. The document was signed by you - in summer 1940.

A. No, it was not our plan.

Q. Was I.G. suggesting to the Nazi government that they do that? You signed it. You made concrete proposals that 50% of the French dyestuff industry be bought from the Nazi Reich, not from the owners of French industry?

A. I have forgotten it.

VS. Q. Was it the original plan of I.G. to buy from the Nazi government all the French industry including the dyestuff industry?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Why did you sign this letter saying that I.G. would buy 50% of the French dyestuff industry from the Reich?

A. Possibly in negotiating with the French.

Q. Then was it I.G.'s own plan for the Nazi government to seize French industry including the dyestuff industry as in the case of Poland?

A. Yes, of Poland.

Q. And to treat the French industry in the same way, was it the intention of the Nazi government?

A. I can't tell. That was before the so-called collaboration time. It was in the first beginning before anything was done in regard to Francolor, that we wanted to buy 50%.

Q. When?

A. Must have been August/September 1940.

Q. Was it the original plan of I.G. that the Nazi government seize the entire French industry including the dyestuff industry?

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

- A. We wanted to buy 50% of the French dyestuff industry -- from the government, because there was no possibility of negotiations. The possibilities came only when the collaboration was started.
- Q. What was the situation in August 1940 and the plans of the Nazi government?
- A. I can't tell you.
- Q. I repeat, in August 1940 was it the I.G. and Nazi government plan to seize the entire French industry including the dyestuff industry?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I.G. then proposed that it (I.G.) buy 50% of the French dyestuff industry from the Nazi Reich?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When was the first indication you had on a basis of discussions with the Nazi government that the plan would be modified?
- A. After Montoire. Hitler and Petain shook hands and there was created the idea of collaboration. That must have been September/October.
- Q. After the French/German Vichy collaboration? Yes.
- A. Yes.

(page 4 of original)

- Q. The original plan of I.G. and the Nazi government to seize the French industry was modified?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The original plan had been for I.G. and the Nazi government to seize the French dyestuff industry and any other industry, and for I.G. to purchase 50% of the dyestuff industry from the Nazi Reich? Is that right?
- A. That is right.
- Q. Why did I.G. then ask for 51% for itself and 49% for the French after the Nazi/Vichy collaboration was established?
- A. That was firstly an interior reason that the technical man, Dr. ter Meer, etc. was of opinion that we must have 51% and secondly the new French law on so called Societe' to' Anonyme gave extraordinary rights to the President of the firm.
- Q. Who was the first president of the Francoeur?
- A. Frossard. I know him for 20 years.
- Q. Mr. Frossard was an exponent of Vichy/Nazi collaboration?
- A. Yes. He might be a Vichy man, had the picture of General Petain over his desk.

G y Schnitzler
(signed)

Q. You recommended that Mr. Frossard be president of the Francolor because he was an exponent of I.G., -- Vichy-Nazi collaboration?

A. No, of course.

Q. You?

A. Yes, I.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

(Signed) G. von Schnitzler.

Vorstandsmitglied der I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft."

The statements I subscribed to in this interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that I should say the following: In the early part of this interrogation I forgot entirely what has happened in the short period of the first two months after the French collapse in 1940 because my memory was entirely over-shadowed by the Francolor agreement which came later. After the interrogator, Mr. Weisbrodt, refreshed my recollection he got me back on the track again. I had forgotten that shortly after the collapse of France, I.G. proposed to the Reich Government that I.G. have a 50/50 participation in the French dyestuffs industry. I wanted Mr. Weisbrodt to suppress that entire interrogation and start anew because I had entirely forgotten the earlier proposal, but Mr. Weisbrodt informed me that under American practice whatever has been recorded cannot be omitted.

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

7. On 17 July 1945 I signed a four page record of an
interrogation which generally concerned the French chemical industry,
the text of which follows :

- "Q. Yesterday you told us that in August 1940 it was the plan of the Nazi government to seize the entire French industry including the dyestuff industry. Is that right?
- A. Not to take over. "Beschlagnahme" means not as much as "seize" in English.
- Q. To sequester the property?
- A. Yes
- Q. Based on discussions between I.G. and the Nazi Government in July or August 1940 I.G. made the proposal to the Nazi Government that it be permitted to purchase 50% of the French dyestuff industry from the Nazi Reich?
- A. Yes, eventually. That means for us....
- Q. Did you make the proposal to buy 50% of the French dyestuff industry from the Nazi Reich?
- A. I think so it is in the letter to the Reich.
- Q. Is that letter to the Reich signed by you?
- A. Yes, it must have been signed by me.
- Q. You then told us that after Hitler and Petain shook hands at Monthoire there was a change in regard to dealings with the French industry. It was to be on a collaboration basis in the purely economic sphere?
- A. That is right.
- Q. When did you first learn of this change of line? In regard to the treatment of French industry?-----
- A. What I only know is this: We wanted to acquire 50% for us, of course it made no difference whether we bought them from the Reich or.....
- Q. When did you first hear of a change of line?
- A. Shortly after Monthoire.
- Q. From whom?
- A. From the newspapers or the discussions in Berlin.
- Q. With whom?
- A. Herr Mulert.
- Q. Was there another meeting in Wiesbaden?
- A. Wiesbaden comes later.

G. v. Schnitzler
(signed)

- Q. What happened at this meeting in Wiesbaden?
- A. The French group approached us.
- Q. Was this a meeting with the officials of the Nazi government?
- A. Yes, with Mr. Hommen. He was charged with the negotiations as civilian head, was appointed by the Nazi government to handle armistice questions.
- Q. Who attended this meeting?
- A. On the part of the government Hommen and Schone; of I.G. tor Meer, myself, Waibel, Kugler, Eckert. In November 1940.
- Q. At this meeting minister Hommen told you that you could deal with the French industry on a purely private basis?

(page 2 of original)

- A. Yes, we could deal with them on a private basis.
- Q. This was part of the armistice negotiations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How were these negotiations conducted, what happened first?
- A. The French started these negotiations. The renewal of the cartel agreement was refused by me and Hommen. We came to the idea that we should take a participation in the French industry, limiting strictly on the dyestuff field.
- Q. How much of the participation did you ask for in the French dyestuff industry?
- A. At that time neither the 50 nor 51% have been cited.
- Q. Did you hand the French a memorandum on that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When?
- A. In November.
- Q. Was this memorandum handed over to the French at the first armistice meeting?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ask for a percentage of the French dyestuff industry?
- A. I asked for the "Führungsanspruch". I can't tell you whether in this first memorandum we asked for the percentage.
- Q. What was the theory on which the memorandum was based?
- A. I have never asked the French any other figure than 51%.
- Q. You asked for 51% of the French dyestuff industry in the memorandum and never asked for less?

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

- A. Never less than 51% (Führungsanspruch means claim for leadership).
- Q. In your original proposal to the Nazi Reich you have asked for 50% of the French industry?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why was it that you now asked for 51% in regard to your dealings with the French on a purely private basis?
- A. This was due to an innerpolitical development inside I.G. I would only have asked for 50% but the technical men said we must have 51%. In-the-meantime the new French-"Aktiengesetz" had appeared.
- Q. Whom did you recommend for president?
- A. We have recommended Frossard.
- Q. He was a Nazi/Vichy government collaborator?
- A. Yes. He was the only man who was ready and able.
- Q. Any who were the other members of the French board?
- A. Duchemin.
- Q. Was he a collaborator?
- A. Yes, to a certain extent.
- Q. All the other members who became leader on the French side were collaborators?
- A. Yes, more or less adhering to Petain.

(page 3 of original)

- Q. Who were the representatives of I.G. in the board?
- A. We were four, I, Dr. ter Meer, Dr. Ambros, Walzel.
- Q. Who had recommended Frossard for the position as president?
- A. I said to Mr. Duchemin, the president of Kuhlmann: Of course, there cannot be any doubt that Frossard would be president.
- Q. You recommended him?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the French agreed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there any members of the original French company who did not become members of the new Francolor?
- A. We took all the personnel over with the exception of M. Rhein. He was an employee of the Badische Anilin und Sodafabrik Ludwigshafen, before the first world war. He was not apt for military service. During the first war he was in Ludwigshafen as a German subject, being Alsatian by birth. After the war he became French.

- Q. Was he a member of the original company? I.G. felt that they could not control him?
- A. Yes, in a certain way. We refused him from an economical point of view, did not think him reliable.
- Q. How many French dyestuff companies were there before the war?
- A. Practically only three.
- Q. Of these 3 French dyestuff companies how many would join the new Francolor?
- A. All.
- Q. In the newly organized German/French company the entire French dyestuff industry was absorbed?
- A. Yes, except two small factories. They did us no harm.
- Q. Did you have them closed?
- A. Partly having closed them and partly giving them the products of Francolor to sell.
- Q. You controlled them?
- A. Indirectly we controlled them.
- Q. What happened to all the stocks, properties, etc.?
- A. All was absorbed.
- Q. What happened to the foreign properties of the company? What happened to the stocks in South America? Were they absorbed by the new Francolor?
- A. In principle the Francolor took over everything concerning the dyestuff domain including the foreign holdings, but only if they could be reached.
- Q. Because you could not reach the South American stocks you could not take them over?
- A. Yes.
- Q. As a result of the negotiations the Alsatian-Lotharingian property got into the control of I.G.?

(page 4 of original)

- A. Yes. Later on. We had to take over the control from the authorities in Strassburg. The Reich considered this Alsatian property as seized and not to be free for negotiations of a private character. We could deal about the whole French position all over the world, except this small factory in Mulhausen.
- Q. Did you propose that only the I.G. controlled Francolor be permitted to deal in dyestuffs and to control the entire dyestuff industry?

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you also propose that all constructions either new construction or enlargement of existing plants in regard to chemicals which could be used in the armament field be under the control of the Reich?
- A. I think so. That has nothing to do with Francolor.
- Q. In regard to chemicals what did you propose as to a cartel arrangement?
- A. This is difficult for me to answer. You know that our firm is split up in different departments. I did not handle the chemical matters.
- Q. How did you propose to control the resources of greater German controlled Europe in regard to your dealings with countries of the world which were yet free, e.g. the USA?
- A. We followed simply the governmental lines. This thought of Grossraum-Wirtschaft should work in such a way that the total of the European countries should have an entire uniform policy.
- Q. What was this policy in regard to Chemicals in the armament sector? Did you, for example, hope to negotiate with the United States with respect to chemicals in the Military sphere through your control of South American markets?
- A. Never. Nothing so far reaching.
- Q. You intended to use your cartel foreign participations and exchange of experiences in order to control relations between this European sphere and USA?
- A. No. In no way to the U.S.A.
- Q. In regard to what countries?
- A. In regard to the countries of the Grosswirtschaftsraum Europe, except Russia.
- Q. Did you sign that letter to Mr. Schlotterer?
- A. Yes, that might be.
- Q. What countries did I.G. propose to control in regard to their supply of military chemicals?
- A. South America, besides the European countries.
- Q. Why did you want to control the supply of military chemicals for South America? Did you fear South America's might?
- A. No, but the eventual production which could be the help in a new conflict.
- Q. Between whom?
- A. Say USA and Europe.

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

Q. Did you intend to control the supply of military chemicals in Latin America because you feared a potential conflict between Germany and USA?

A. Yes.

Q. These were Post War Plans?

A. Yes.

(signed) G. v. Schnitzler"

The statements to which I subscribed in this interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief with the following limitations:

(a) In the twelfth answer on page 2, the striking of the sentence "In the meantime the new French 'Aktiengesetz' had appeared" should be removed so that this sentence remains a part of the interrogation. In making the corrections to the transcript of the interrogation at the time, the investigator apparently struck an additional line and I did not notice this at the time. The other corrections on this page are entirely correct.

(b) At page 3 I was in error in saying that "we had two small French dyestuff factories closed". Frossard, the principal leader of the French dyestuff industry, carried out these negotiations with the two small factories himself during the period after we had reached agreement in principle concerning the Francolor Agreement in March 1941 and the time when Francolor was finally established. This was an amicable arrangement and no harm was done to the smaller firms. Insofar as these firms did not continue production, they continued to sell Francolor products.

(c) It might be added that before the war of 1914, the mother companies, of which I.G. was the legal successor, controlled 88% of the French dyestuff business. In proposing the Francolor agreement to the French representatives, I stated that we were making them a proposition which we would have made even if the wars of 1914 and 1939 had not occurred, since it was abnormal that a concern of a foreign country should have 88% of the market in another country.

G. v. Schnitzler

(d) At page 3, it should be made plain that Francolor absorbed only the stocks, properties, etc. of the three larger French firms and not the stocks, properties, etc. of the two smaller companies.

(e) In respect to the small French factory at Mulhouse (Muelhausen) in Alsace-Lorraine, we could not deal officially with the French representatives, since the German authorities in Strassbourg had seized that property as well as the property of all French nationals in Alsace-Lorraine. Therefore I.G. acquired this property by dealing directly with the German authorities. However, it was my personal idea, which I could not express at the time, that this factory should be returned to the French mother companies after a definite peace had been concluded between Germany and France. I also believe that it was never the view of I.G. generally that the French group should lose the Mulhouse plant permanently.

(f) At the bottom of page 4, I stated that the plans for controlling the supply of military chemicals in Latin America were post-war plans. I could only have meant post-war plans with respect to the period after the end of the war on the European continent.

8. On 3 August 1945 I signed a five page record of an interrogation which generally concerned the dyestuff industries of France and the armistice negotiations, the text of which follows :

"Q. In regard to the dyestuff industries of France, I.G. directly participated in armistice negotiations with the French group which resulted in the establishment of Francolor?

A. That is right.

Q. Did I.G. participate directly in armistice negotiations with the French group in regard to I.G.'s other interests, for example the chemical field, the pharmaceutical field, the textile field, etc.?

A. I think when Mr. Mann concluded a smaller agreement in the pharmaceutical domain he did it just as well under the roof of the armistice negotiations.

Q. Are you familiar with the nature of the pharmaceutical negotiations with Rhone Poulenc?

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

- A. Only by the report Mr. Mann made in the Kaufmannische Ausschuss, but of the details I have not a good recollection. I think they formed a 50:50 company for a certain group of products, and apparently joined patent processes.
- Q. In connection with your dealings with the French other than in the above mentioned fields, they were handled by the military officials? Is that right?
- A. The relations with the French industry were resumed in different fields, so in the chemical industry just as well. I remember of bichromate there was something done with Kuhlmann. I don't think that was done by Military, I should think that was done directly. The placing of orders to Kuhlmann might have been done through the military authorities.
- Q. In changing the line towards the French industries from the originally planned "Beschleagnahme" to the new collaboration in view of the shaking of the hands between Hitler and Petain was it then proposed that there be no restriction, no compulsion upon the French in regard to the chemical industry?
- A. I think that's going much too far. In those relations the basic question was always the coal question. There could not be sent coal from Germany and the French coal production was always much too small for the French market, and as the industrial development in France became relatively strong, there was always the question who should get it, who was the most important one to get coal. There was a special authority in Paris but to get coal from this authority was a great difficulty.

(page 2 of original)

- Q. By regulating the distribution of the coal the German military commander of France could determine what French industry could resume production and what should have to be closed? Is that right?
- A. That is absolutely right.
- Q. Did I.G. make any suggestions to the military commander in regard to getting coal and the necessary raw material?
- A. No. We always insisted upon the importance of certain production but we never interfered in such a way that we said: Take it away there and give it to us, - according to my knowledge.
- Q. What was the French group which determined French policy in the chemical industry?
- A. That was the French group with Mr. Painvin as chairman, he was one of the directors of Ugine?
- Q. What was the French policy-making group?
- A. You see we have a Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie. In France they called it by a corresponding name which I forgot for the moment.
- Q. When was that group established?

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

A. There always has existed in France a certain private association of chemicals.

Q. When was it established as a quasi-government organization?

A. The group in France with Mr. Painvin was not so much semi-official as our Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie. Only at the end of the war we came to a real corporate system.

Q. When was this French group established with the quasi-governmental character?

A. In autumn 1940. When we came to Paris in January 1941, I met Mr. Painvin and he was in that position.

Q. Was it set up under German auspices?

A. The word might be right. The Germans had a certain part in it. I should say they have given the suggestion to form an association to discuss certain questions. For instance, when the gentlemen came to Leverkusen (in 1942) to see there the buna installation, Mr. Painvin was also there and they considered him not only as a representative of his old firm but as a semi-official.

Q. Did you know Mr. Painvin?

A. Yes, but not very much.

(page 3 of original)

Q. Was he a Vichy collaborator?

A. Of course, he was a collaborator. Nobody forced him to go to Leverkusen and nobody forced him to take up the position. The Pechiny people in Lyon, their most important factory was in the unoccupied territory, were the only ones who could be called refractory.

Q. So that under German initiative a counter-part to the German Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was established for the French chemical industry?

A. It was not exactly the same thing, but there was a certain organization of the French chemical industry.

Q. How was it planned to adapt the French group to the German point of view?

A. I think that Dr. Ungewitter and Dr. Hess were in Paris, but I am not quite sure whether they talked over these questions.

Q. Who is Mr. Michel?

A. That was the chief of the German civilian administration. He was an official of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium. He was a general of the military administration.

Q. What were the plans made to adapt the entire French chemical industry to the German chemical industry?

G v Schnitzler
(signed)

- A. They never got as far as that. It was just a keeping in touch for certain distribution of raw material, but I cannot say that there was a continuous intercourse between the German and the French organization.
- Q. Were any Germans placed in charge of or in a very influential position in regard to the French foreign trade commission and foreign exchange commission?
- A. Yes. I think that in the French foreign exchange commission was placed a German as an official adviser. I can't remember the name.
- Q. And what about the foreign trade commission?
- A. I don't know. I think the Reichsbank gave it an official adviser.
- Q. How else did Germany intend to adapt the French chemical industry and all other French industry to the German industry?
- A. For the other industry I can't speak. For the chemical industry only in so far as there was a necessity for the French production. As far as distribution of the essential raw materials was concerned, the French industry worked on its own.

(page 4 of original)

- Q. On official government basis, the Germans placed an official adviser in the French division of Foreign Exchange?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All dealings were under control of the German military commander? Is that right?
- A. Yes. He was responsible for the German policy.
- Q. On a private basis there was planned with the chemical industry to establish a French chemical group which would be made dependent on a German chemical group? Is that right?
- A. No, the idea for the Germans for that time was only to facilitate the business relations and the distributions relations between the two industries.
- Q. Do you want me to refresh your recollection?
- A. I remember the plan was to adapt the French chemical industry to the German one. As far as the intercourse of the two groups and distribution plans of raw material should be dealt with on a German basis and under German leadership.
- Q. So Germany would determine all production and all distribution not only of the French chemical industry but of all French industry?
- A. Yes, that is 100% correct.
- Q. So that even after Hitler came together with Petain at Montois collaboration meant complete domination of French industry by the Germans?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was Rhone Poulenc located?

A. In the both parts.

Q. Where was the pharmaceutical branch of Rhone Poulenc located?

A. I think mostly in the unoccupied part. There were two companies, one was in Paris and the other one in Lyon. I think they had their head office in Lyon.

Q. So that it would have been difficult to influence production of R.P. in the unoccupied part? Is that right?

A. It was more difficult than in the occupied.

Q. Did I.G. make any suggestions in regard to the influence there was to be exercised on R.P. in the unoccupied territory?

A. I don't know.

(page 5 of original)

Q. Are you aware that I.G. strongly recommended to the military commander that they deprive Rhone Poulenc of all raw materials in the unoccupied territory?

A. No. If we had done that, that might have been a mistake. But it was not a general line, might have happened once.

Q. What do you mean by a general line?

A. Our general line in France was the chemical industry. After having succeeded shortly after the armistice and had concluded an agreement in the Francolor domain we wanted to continue friendly relations with the whole industry. There was a certain jealousy of other companies in France. I had a long talk with Mr. Painvin and we considered our relations with the whole French chemical industry as an item we always wanted to continue. I remember my saying: We are certainly like the woman with whom everybody likes to sleep. Because there was a certain hesitation on the French side in the chemical industry that we intended to give the Kuhlmann group and Francolor a sort of monopoly for all we wanted to bring or to do in France.

Q. What arrangements did you come to with Rhone Poulenc after final agreements were made?

A. There was a pharmaceutical arrangement and then the buna agreement, and I think in the domain of plastic they had certain talks just as well.

Q. What happened in the pharmaceutical line?

A. As far as I recollect they formed a joint company and the products which were of joint invention and of joint patents.

Q. In regard to the pharmaceutical line too I.G. got a participation?

A. Yes. But it was a small company only, a very small domain, only specialities.

Q. Actually I.G. was interested mainly in dominating the dyestuff field in France?

A. Yes.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

The answers as recorded in this transcript still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except:

(a) In the middle of page 2, I stated that there had always existed in France "a certain private association of chemicals". This is not expressed too clearly. What I wanted to say was that there always existed "an association of chemical industrial interests".

(b) Also at the middle of page 3, I stated that "only at the end of the war we came to a real corporate system in Germany". I now believe that that is going a little too far. I think it would be more correct to say we were on the way to a real corporate system. I do not think it was completely achieved.

(c) At the bottom of page 3, I stated that the French representatives came to Leverkusen in 1942. Re-considering this matter, I believe it was in December 1941.

(d) On page 4, I stated that it was "100% correct" that Germany would determine all production and all distribution, not only of the French chemical industry, but of all French industry and that collaboration meant domination of the French industry by the German industry. This is, of course, correct as that was the development during the war, but I should have added that this was not a question of basic policy, but a question of the war emergency.

(e) At page 5, second answer, I stated "our general line in France was the chemical industry". I believe that in August 1945 the stenographer omitted several words which I did not notice when I

G. v. Schnitzler

originally corrected the transcript of this interrogation. What I stated was "Our general line in France was the maintenance of the chemical industry".

(f) At page 5 in the last question and answer, I answered in the affirmative to the question that I.G. was interested mainly in "dominating" the dyestuff field in France. The word "dominating" does not entirely gather the sense of our agreement. As I now re-read this after one and a half years, I believe I should have answered in the affirmative only if the question was whether I.G. was mainly interested in "co-ordinating" the dyestuff field in France.

9. On 6 August 1945, both Dr. Hans Kugler and I signed a one-page record of an interrogation concerning the French dyestuff industry, the text of which follows :

- "Q. When was the first time that plans were made in regard to the French dyestuffs industry?
- A. I think it was in the middle of June, before the armistice. The exact date can be fixed if you permit me to look at the files.
- Q. Now, if you remember, you told me that the original plan was to sequester the entire French industry.
- A. Yes. I told you about that.
- Q. How did you find out in June that the original plan was to sequester the French industry?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) From the very first, the Nazi government had made it clear that it wanted to use the French industry for warfare.
- (Kugler) In the preamble to the armistice with the French, there is a provision that reparations would be taken from all plants sequestered or taken over by the French after the first world war, and from that we deducted that sequestration of those plants would take place now.
- Q. Now were there ever any discussions at this time with the German Government or with officials of the German Government from which you gathered that the plan was to see that sequestration of all French industry went through?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) I can only say that the plan was to use the French industry for the Wehrmacht for warfare, and from that, I concluded that we would sequester all French industry which could be used for the German war machine.

G y Schnitzler
(signed)

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

(signed) Kugler

Director

(signed) G. v. Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I. G.
(Position in I.G. Farben)
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

(signed) Kugler

Director"

vs. The answers of both Dr. Kugler and I to the questions appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. It should only be pointed out that we were discussing the period before the armistice and before the collaboration policy with France was worked out.

10. I have carefully read each of the 25 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Sworn to and signed before me this 7th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
Drexel A. Sprecher

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the
above is a true and correct copy of document No. NI - 5193, the original
of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

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A F F I D A V I T

I, GUDRG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these documents are ^{below} set forth after the text of the respective statement or interrogation.

2. Sometime between July and September 1945 I signed a three page statement entitled "Statement re the activity of I.G. abroad in the years 1933-1938", the text of which follows:

My tradition and following the trend of business I.G.'s general policy was much more directed to the West and Southwest of Europe and to Oceania than to the European East and South-East. All the great problems of chemical development lay in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin countries, there alone a great literature scientific as well as of a practical nature existed and there alone the competition of great and powerful enterprises was to be met. Of course a substantial export has always been made to the direction of the S.E. countries, for dyestuffs as well as for pharmaceuticals. The succession-status of the former Austr.-Hungarian monarchy was an old ~~field~~ ^{field} of activity and the same applies to quite a lot of chemical products, - but the idea of industrialization was far away from the conception of I.G. officials.

The only company in I.G.'s domain which showed an industrial activity in these countries was Dynamit-Pressburg. But Pressburg

(signed) G v Schnitzler

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itself as a factory was nearly deserted and only Pressburgs subsidiaries in Austria, Hungary, Roumania and Yugoslavia were better occupied.

It was Hitler who from the very beginning, i.e. from 1933 on, tried to develop the South-East as an annex of Germany's economy and to attach it to the German industrial potential. But how little of this program in the first years has been realized is best shown by the fact that up to 1938 not a single individual project has been taken up by I.G. - In the same time I.G. in the field of dyestuffs and chemical products alone undertook the following in the Western and Southwestern countries of Europe and in America:

Italy: a substantial enlargement of the plants

- 1) at the Lenna:
Polyvinylchlorid
new dyestuffs (Vat and Naphтол A.S. range)
necessary products
- 2) Biinchi
Igepon and other auxiliary products
- 3) Two factories for Gum in cooperation with Pirelli were started
- 4) Semis: a small factory for Magnesium after the electro-thermic procedure
- 5) Lithopone with Montecatini.

France: Licenses given to the Kuhlmann-group in the dyestuffs-field, into the cartel agreement

Licenses given to Ugine in the magnesium field

England: Uni-Lever-contract on Igepon for cleansing purposes (1935)

Magnesium-plant with I.C.I. (1938)

Trafford-Park Chemicals Co. with I.C.I. (1938)

(page 2 of original)

Spain: new plans elaborated for the enlargement of F.B.C.E.
(intermediates and dyestuffs in the Azo-Range)

new plans elaborated for the enlargement of Vlix
(new electrolyse)

both problems were held up by the civil-war and could be taken up activity only in 1940.

U.S.: Close technical teamwork with G.A.P. in the field of dyestuffs, intermediates and Azo-Photo-products.

Magnesium Co. with Alcoa

Licence for phosphoric-acid to Monsanto

different licensing agreements with Dupont in the dyestuff- and the plastic-field.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Latin America:

Although greater plans did not materialize I.G. was strongly impressed by the constant development of "Düperial" and apart of a certain enlargement of 2 small dyestuff-factories in Brazil different smaller industrial enterprises in Argentine, Brazil and Columbia were started.

It must be admitted that I.G. was not very successful with these little factories, but the desire to get industrially a foot down in South-America was strongly advocated by the entire I.A.

All these projects did not demand a substantial capital. The government was most reluctant in granting the permission for the use of foreign currency. We had to finance the same capital, incurring to us by the way of intermediates, machines, ordered in Germany, all kinds of equipment supplied by I.G., prepaid licences and so on. In granting the permission for taking the participations in England (Magnesium plant and Trafford Park) the government undoubtedly wanted to do England a favour; it was the time that Hitler believed England would not hinder him in his plans for the European East. -

But taking the before-mentioned activities altogether one clearly recognizes how strongly I.G. remained on the line of developing a world business in close team-work with their competitors, who in Europe at the same time were their cartel-partners. -

Practically most part of the work of the leading commercial people has been dedicated to that purpose, the domestic business not demanding such an uninterrupted endeavour of the I.G.'s first representatives. The strong trend directed to the South-East only took hold of I.G. after the Anschluss of Austria had been carried through. I.G. if it wanted to keep up its leading position in, what up to then had been its export-business to the S.E.-countries had to take up the manufacturing in the various fields of which formerly has been reported. - It was a policy which to I.G. was prescribed by the government and which inside the I.G. was in no way unanimously accepted. The outbreak of the war stopped these discussions and as

(page 3 of original)

vs. the government had made up its plans on the full use of every industrial possibility in these countries and the demands of the "Vier-Jahres-Plan" expressly included the erection of large scale factories in the newly conquered (Poland, Czech-Slovakia) and the political dependent countries (Hungary) the activity of I.G. abroad became entirely and in the first line directed to these countries.

How far this industrialization will be kept up, will depend on the future economic structure and development of them.

Will they fall back to small units regulating their home-markets in the way as they did it before 1939, most of the factories will be of little use. The size of Auschwitz and Heydebreck as well as of Neosibirsk and Prossburg is adapted to a great home market. Thus the problem will be to make their production available for the entire East and South-East. Only by following such an economic policy the Bunt and Hydrogen-works in Auschwitz, Heydebreck and

(signed) G. v. Schnitzler

Mosbierbaum as well as the Vistra-factory in Pressburg have a chance to survive and to become instruments of a peace-economy to the greater advantage of these countries and to the acquiring of a higher standard of living of their population. Additionally they will need the constant technical help of I.G.'s scientific laboratories as they are not owning appropriate installations within themselves.

(signed) G. VON SCHNITZLER.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that in the middle of page 2 where I spoke of Hitler's "plans for the European East", I meant "South East" as becomes clear when one reads further in the statement. My thoughts concerning the future developments of the factories of Auschwitz, Heydebreck, Mosbierbaum and Pressburg, as stated in the last two paragraphs of the statement, were given at the special request of the American investigators.

3. On 15 August 1945 I signed a four page statement, the text of which follows :

"Beginning with the peaceful conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia (Sudetenland) and continuing with the military conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and France (with the peaceful conquest of Denmark following in between) and also in regard to the South-eastern countries, it was the primary purpose of the German government to incorporate the economies of these countries to the purposes of Germany. This undoubtedly meant that these countries must work for the German war machine. The principle from the first was "Folktum" but that these countries must do it themselves. I remember that Dr. Schlotterer, Ministerialdirektor of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium announced this principle in a meeting of the Beirat (advisory committee of the Reichsgruppe Industrie) after the conquest of France. I.G. also acted in accordance with this slogan.

The rapid accommodation of the Austrian industry to Goering's 4 years plan was amazing. Based on the water power of Austria which, of course, was relatively expensive, a substantial industry of manufacturing products in the metallurgical field was at once started. There were at least three big enterprises between Vienna and the Czechoslovakian frontier created for the manufacturing of processed goods in the metallurgical field, and I.G. itself was planning in last summer in connection with the Mosbierbaum plant of magnesium to become interested in one of them. 12,000 t of magnesium being projected for Mosbierbaum, that should mostly be converted into finished goods in Austria itself.

Furthermore the oil production in Austria was developed and at a certain time one had hopes that the oil fields in the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

north of Vienna could become a second Pennsylvania with the yield of 6 - 7 million tons of oil. I.G. took certain interest in that field too in the form of participations on which Dr. Bützfisch at once reported in the Vorstand. He can give every detail about it. Later on the excessive hopes did not materialize, and, I think, the Austrian production remained at somewhat at 1 million tons. I.G. in Moesbierbaum did erect a hydrogenation plant which was destined to transform this Austrian oil and eventual oil coming from the Southeast up the Danube into highly octan gasoline for aviation purposes.

In the nitrogen field a plant of 50,000 t N was built up in Linz which was financed in the form of an "Umlage", taken from the producers in accordance with their participation in the turnover of nitrogen.

Still the Austrian industrialization in such a sense was only at the beginning because for the future one expected to get cheap coal from upper Silesia. This, of course, only could be materialized after the construction of the Oder-Danau Kanal. In Austria water-power and coal was very expensive because of the high costs of transportation and, of course, the water-power was not yet written off. But for the future one expected that both items for an extensive industrialization would be obtainable at competitive costs to the other German "Industrie-Riviere". The highly skilled Austrian population offered a labor potential which the government had decided to use to its full extent. The contribution of Austria to the war machine was very substantial, more in finished goods than in so-called commodities. Goering became very unpopular in Austria because when delivering there

(page 2 of original)

his first speech in spring 1938, he said: "Now it's over with the 'Gemütlichkeit' (comfort), you must spit in your hands and go to work," which was resented because in Austria a highly developed finished industry has always been existing.

I.G. took the newly founded Donau-Chemie A.G. as an "overcoat" to buy huge land property in the so-called Tulln field which was a small city about 20 - 30 km up the Danau from Vienna and was excellently situated for industrial development. - Goering-Werke erected iron and steel plants, I think, in Linz which were connected with the nitrogen plant.

In general one always wanted in Austria to have Austrian companies on the spot and that was the reason too that I.G. took Donau-Chemie as an overcoat, but under that overcoat the big manufacturing plants in Moesbierbaum should be run directly and were run directly by I.G., so far for instance the hydrogenation vs. plant and the projected plant of Moesbierbaum. magnesium.

The German industry tried to penetrate and generally did it in the same way as I.G. did it. "Reichsdeutsche" were not popular in Vienna, generally spoken, and it was interesting to observe that most of them had left Austria again when war came to its end.

In Czechoslovakia the private industry in general was not allowed to develop an industrial activity, all the available lignite mines being taken over by Herman Goering Werke, and so was the huge plant in Brdix where more oil was produced than in Leuna. They wanted to achieve 500,000 tons

All of this was done by the Goering works, and this was based on the lignite districts of Brdx and Dux where some 16 - 18 million tons of lignite were mined.

The Skoda works were developed enormously. German Goering Werke took a participation in the Skoda Werke as well. The Czechoslovakian contributions in the direct "Rüstungsindustrie" were very important. Apart of Skoda, Prager Eisen, Ringhoffer, and then the famous iron works near Marava Ostrava, in which the Rothschilds held 50% which were also taken over by Goering Werke, did supply an enormous contribution to the war machine.

The way by which these different Nazi governmental instrumentalities like the Goering Werke and the S.G. entered Czechoslovakia's industrial economy, was highly to be blamed as it materialized practically as a looting of private interest.

I.G. did not participate in this whole domain and remained solely on its 50% participation on Chemische Werke Aussig-Flakau. These works developed only modestly because their coal and power basis was too small to allow strong development and apart of that Chemische Fabrik von Heyden was neither willing nor able to make money investments. Goering took everything over for himself so that there was no opportunity of the I.G. technicians to develop anything in Czechoslovakia.

In regard to Poland at first Goering wanted to take everything. He laid hand on the whole mining industry as far as it was not German private property or American one. He did

(page 3 of original)

not want the so-called big industry to be participated. A word is reported of him: "Natürlich Gieseler's Erben, die wollen wieder erben, aber daraus wird nichts, und die I.G. bekommt schon gar nichts." But at last things developed in quite another way as I.G. was asked by the government or by Krauch to start in an enormous industrial development in creating two entirely new works, one in Heydebreck, in an old German territory, that means a territory which was allotted to Germany by the plebiscite in 1921, near the frontier, and the second in Auschwitz between Kattowitz and Krakau on Polish territory. The industrial conditions because of favourable location were so promising that we could not decline the invitation to start new industries in these places. The two biggest items in it were the burn in Auschwitz and then, of course, the hydrogenation in Heydebreck and in Auschwitz. Heydebreck is practically another Oppau.

I have already made a statement regarding I.G.'s taking over of the Polish dy-stuff industry.

VS./for In Germany two big enterprises were planned for the Magnes-Luftwerke, one through the Reichsgesellschaften called first Ius, Al. WERK and later on HANSA Light Metal for Aluminium, and the second NORDISCK LEBMETALL, a joint factory of I.G., Norsk Hydro, and Luftwerke/. The first was given up and never materialized, VS./the but after having spent hundreds of million marks for the plant, second of which I.G. was interested, it was destroyed by air raids and never came to work.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The idea was to use the Norwegian water power which offered still great possibilities, and the clay necessary for the production of aluminium was of Norwegian origin just as well.

In regard to Holland and Belgium there is no doubt that the industries of these countries were also used for the German war machine.

The French contribution to the German war machine was tremendous. First in the agricultural domain; it was said that from France to Germany more cereal products came than from all the eastern territories together. But the industrial performance of France was also very important mostly in such finished articles where not much coal and power were used. In France the contribution of the chemical industry for the aforementioned reason was more or less modest. I would cite especially the tire industry and the motor-car industry, especially the Renault Works, for their tremendous contribution to the German war machine. In the first part of the war textile industry based on important stocks could also give a substantial contribution.

vs. In regard to the South-eastern countries the same
vc. principle of the complete accommodation of their industries to the German war machine was aimed. But the industry capacities of these countries being relatively poor, the main concentration was in regard to agricultural products and certain raw materials, like pyrites from Almaden in Serbia, and then chrome ore from Bulgaria and Greece, and, of course, oil from Roumania.

The different Dynmit-Nobel participations in these countries supplied the axis army with powder and explosives.

(page 4 of original)

Side by side with Germany's tremendous utilization of the industries of the conquered countries for the German war machine there came to be a great German penetration of the economy of the conquered countries largely by such governmental instrumentalities as Goering and the S.S. I.G. played an important part in adapting the economy of the conquered countries to the purposes of the German war machine. Also I.G. required companies, increased its participations in other companies, and made important new capital investments in the conquered countries.

(signed) G. von SCHNITZLER."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that :

(a) In the third paragraph of the first page, "highly octan" should be "high octane". I should add that I am not entirely sure if high octane was really produced in Leosbierbaum.

(b) In the sixth full paragraph of second page, I reproached the Herman Goering Works by stating that the way it entered Czechoslovakian

(signed) G v Schnitzler

industrial economy materialized practically as a looting of private interest. This was an opinion of mine which is not backed up by information given me by Dr. Paul Fleiger and Dr. Wilhelm Voss, both members of the Vorstand of the Goering Works, while we were confined together during the last year. These gentlemen informed me that the manner in which the Goering Works acquired industrial property in Czechoslovakia was absolutely correct and that they did not do any looting.

(c) At the top of page 3, I stated that "I.G. was asked by the government or by Krauch". In other words I consider Krauch identical with the government in this connection because he did this as head of the "Leit fuer Wirtschaftsaufbau", a government position, and not as chairman of I.G.'s Aufsichtsrat.

(d) To the third full paragraph on page 3, I should add that the bauxite for the Norwegian plants had to come from the continent.

(e) To the last paragraph of the statement, the paragraph on page 4, I want to make several points clear. I.G. did not want to take any property away from persons in the occupied countries, but I.G. did invest in the occupied countries in order of the government. When I wrote that "I.G. played an important part in adapting the economy of the conquered countries to the purposes of the German war machine", I did not mean to indicate that that was all deliberately done on our own initiative. It was done on government order.

4. On 11 September 1945, I signed a statement entitled "Statement re other private firms having acquired property in the conquered states", the text of which follows :

"Deutsche Bank in Österreichische Kreditanstalt, Wien
Österreichische Unionbank, Prag

Mr. Flick: Patschek - Lignite - works Prag and Sudetenland

Mr. Bergmann: Leichtmetallwerke Egerau near Wien

Vereinigte Stahlwerke, 50% in Böhler-Stahlwerke, Wien
Düsseldorf

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Vereinigte Aluminium Werke	Wiener Leichtmetallwerke Wien
Chemische Werke Goldschmidt	Chemische Werke Dreibach (Kärnten)
Continental Gummi, Hannover	Temperit-Werke, Wien
Degussa/Auer	Societe Terres rares (Alsace)
vs. Kali-Chemie	Societe Chimique de Thann (Alsace)
Chemische Fabrik von Heyden	Chemische Werke Oderberg
All German oil-Cies.	in oil fields around Vienna
Krupp and Mannesmann	different interests in Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Frankfurt, Sept. 11th, 1945

(Signed) G. von Schnitzler.

Of the before mentioned property

the investment in Oest.Kreditanstalt formerly was with the
Rothschild-group

" " " the lignite - works did belong to Mr. Petschak - Prag

The transaction was made on a private basis with foreign currency

The two Alsatian companies had been seized and were sold to the
purchasing commission by the Civil-service Strasbourg

As far as the other companies are concerned I am not sufficiently
informed, how these transactions have been made.

The oil-concessions near Vienna partly will have been foreign-owned,
Chemische Werke Oderberg must have been Polish possession.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief. If I thought the matter over, I might be
able to recollect some additional acquisitions.

5. On 26 July 1945, I signed a one page statement entitled "Donau-
Chemie A.G.", the text of which follows :

"I have very little to say about the past.

Although disposing only of a relatively small volume and
mostly unmodern factories the firm of Skoda-Wetzlar was
an old-established enterprise in Austria. Still there could
not be any doubt about the necessity for I.G. to acquire
these factories, when Austria in 1938 became annexed to
Germany.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The majority was held by the Wiener Creditanstalt and this bank succeeded to let I.G. pay a very substantial price for it. - Volume of business and earning capacity never corresponded with that price. But the possession of Donau-Chemie was of invaluable importance for I.G. as a stepping stone for entering in the field of the rapidly increasing industrialisation of Austria.

Under the name of the Austrian Co. "Donau-Chemie" we acquired the huge property of Moosbierbaum and started the great installations for sulphuric acid and the new power works.

Furthermore on order of the Luftwaffe we began with the erecting of a magnesium plant of 12,000 tons. And under its own name I.G. itself erected a great factory for the hydrogenation of crude-oil which was successfully working up to all supposed (?) destruction by air-raids.

vs.
its

In comparison with these great enterprises, of which the magnesium plant of course never came to a start as the Luftwaffe stopped all work on it since summer 1944 the original business of the different old factories of Donau-Chemie played only an inferior role.

(played)

As partner in many conventions and united with the sale of I.G.'s chemical products still its value was much higher than the sales-figures did express. - After some years of losses I think in the last 2 years Donau-Chemie could break even.

Frankfurt-on-the-Main, July 28th 1945.

sign. G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

G. On 30 July 1945, both Dr. Max Ilgner, another member of I.G.'s Vorstand, and I signed a record of a joint interrogation concerning the acquisition of the Skoda-Wetzlar company, the text of which follows:

Q. Prior to the Anschluss, when I.G. was negotiating for the acquisition of the Skoda Wetzlar Works, it never knew exactly with whom it was negotiating. Is that right?

A. (Ilgner) No. We negotiated with the Kredit Anstalt.

Q. But you said that you did not know who owned the Kredit Anstalt?

A. I certainly did not know.

Q. So that when you negotiated for the acquisition of the firm, you didn't know who owned the firm which you wanted to buy?

A. We negotiated with the Kredit Anstalt in Vienna.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. In negotiating with the Kredit Anstalt, didn't you know who owned the Kredit Anstalt?
- A. If I negotiated with the Kredit Anstalt bank in Vienna you must remember it is a very large institution, and I did not know who owned it. And I think it has no importance at all for the negotiations.
- Q. Then how do you know who has the power to sign for the Kredit Anstalt?
- A. The members of the board.
- Q. Who were the members of the board prior to the Anstalt?
- II. A. I remember the man I have already mentioned, Mr. Gohm. It might be that Mr. Friedel and Mr. Fritsche were also already directors before the Anschluss, but I am not quite sure on this.
- Q. But after there was a change of ownership in the Kredit Anstalt, you did know who were the owners. Is that right?
- A. Because this was something that was done in the public press. Everybody talked about it, so naturally, it became evident.
- Q. What was the "This" you were talking about which became evident?
- A. That the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft and the Deutscher Bank stepped into the Kredit Anstalt.
- Q. Didn't the way they stepped in become public information?
- A. No. Because that was negotiations between the Bank and whoever it might be.
- Q. What did you read in the newspapers that caused you to say it became public knowledge?
- A. It was not in the newspapers.
- Q. Where did you hear about this?
- A. In Vienna.
- Q. Who told you?
- A. I can't tell you.
- Q. Then tell exactly what you heard?
- A. It was information not so precise. I saw it later on myself that the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Bank played a role, because when I was asked to enter the board of the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft, I cannot remember whether it was the end of 1933 or later on, I should say that the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft and the Deutscher Bank were represented by personalities. (At this point of confusion in answer of Ilgner, von Schnitzler at the direction of interrogator translated Ilgner's German for the record as follows).
- II. A. It was information not so precise. I saw it later on myself that the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Bank played a role, because when I was asked to enter the board of the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft, I cannot remember whether it was the end of 1933 or later on, I should say that the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft and the Deutscher Bank were represented by personalities. (At this point of confusion in answer of Ilgner, von Schnitzler at the direction of interrogator translated Ilgner's German for the record as follows).

(signed) G. v. Schnitzler

(page 2 of original)

Mr. Ilgner was invited to attend a meeting of the board of the Kredit Anstalt and there he saw representatives of the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft Bank and the Deutscher Bank, and from that he deduced that these banks had an interest in the Kredit Anstalt of Vienna.

Q. (To Ilgner) Did you become a member of the board of the Kredit Anstalt?

A. Yes.

Q. And while you were a member of the board, you never heard any mention nor ever re-read any documents which would have told you how the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft acquired ownership of the Kredit Anstalt?

A. No sir, I was never told these questions.

Q. Is it not a fact, Mr. von Schnitzler, that a trustee was appointed for the Kredit Anstalt? And is it not a fact that it was largely a Jewish-owned bank?

... (von Schnitzler) As far as I could remember, the Kredit Anstalt Bank was always closely connected with the Rothschilds, and I always understood that what the Deutsche Bank acquired in the Kredit Anstalt were the shares belonging to the Rothschild interests.
II. They were always very closely connected, because Louis Rothschild interests. They were always very closely connected, because Louis Rothschild, whom I knew very well socially, was president of the Kredit Anstalt.

Q. (To Ilgner) Did you know Mr. Ilgner, that Mr. Rothschild was president of the Kredit Anstalt?

A. No sir, I really did not know.

Q. Did you ever see any newspaper in which it was stated that the Rothschilds were divested of their interests in the Kredit Anstalt?

A. No. I did not read that.

Q. Did you ever read in any newspaper that Rothschild had an interest in the Kredit Anstalt?

II. A. No. I do have a recollection that Mikolaj acquired the Rothschild interests. Mikoli told me about this personally, when I met him occasionally on the train.

Q. So that to recapitulate, Mr. Ilgner, when I.G. was negotiating with the Kredit Anstalt before the Anschluss for the acquisition of the Skoda works, you never learned or inquired as to who owned the Kredit Anstalt? Even after you were invited and attended a board meeting of the Kredit Anstalt after the Anschluss and learned that the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft Bank were now the new owners of the Kredit Anstalt, you still did not know or did not try to find out who owned the Kredit Anstalt previously? And even after you accepted a position as a member of the board of the Kredit Anstalt, you had never

(signed) G v Schnitzler

and to this day do not know who formerly owned the Kredit Anstalt Bank. Is that right?

- Il. A. He sir. You asked me about the interests of the Rothschilds in the Kredit Anstalt, and he was a guest of the Kredit Anstalt. I do know there are some Belgian interests because I met a gentleman from this group in a hunting place in Klacker which belonged to the Kredit Anstalt and he was a guest of the Kredit Anstalt.

(at this point, play back of this dates original questions were put to Mr. Ilmer)

- Q. Was there any mention of Mr. Rothschild in my first question to you in regard to the ownership of the Kredit Anstalt?

A. (Ilmer) He sir. It was later.

- Q. Then why did you not tell us about the Belgian owners the first time?

A. Because you asked me who owned the Kredit Anstalt and owning to my knowledge means who has a majority of interest in a company. I don't remember that the Belgian group was the deciding group. I really do not know in my imagination, that the Kredit Anstalt was owned more or less in the market.
(von Schnitzler) What I think he may be trying to say is that what was publicly known was that the Rothschild interests had a very large interest in the Kredit Anstalt Bank of Vienna, even under Schussnig.

(page 3 of original)

It was publicly known that the Kredit Anstalt Bank ran into financial difficulties and that in order to prevent the crash, Rothschild gave up his own real estate and landed interests and Schussnig was reproached for allowing Rothschild to do so. I am not certain of all the details of the transaction, but what I have just said is public information, except for the part regarding Rothschild's personal sacrifice. (Ilmer) I want to explain how it was possible that I was not informed that the Rothschild group was the deciding owner of the Kredit Anstalt. I never had any information as to who were the owners of the Kredit Anstalt. When I met the Kredit Anstalt the first time I believe being in the year 1932 together with Wilhelm Roth, he told me about the Shoda Works idea. I was a member of the board who was Heffrit. He was Jewish gentleman, together with another man whom I don't remember. But this was only a short visit. Then, I did not see the Kredit Anstalt before 1938 and in the meantime, I was mostly, as a matter of fact outside of Germany. I was in East Asia, then travelled to South America and other continents. In the meantime between 1932 and 1938, I was not in Austria. I was not in particular contact with Austria and when I came the first time to Austria in 1936, the question of whether I.G. was to get the allowance or permit to acquire the Shoda Works was not granted. So that I had nothing particular to do at this time, neither with the Kredit Anstalt or the others, as I was for the reasons stated in Vienna. Because of the troubles we had with the party and then later on the negotiations with the Kredit Anstalt, negotiations had been carried through by Pischner, Cattineneu and Gersin, I believe, in contact with the chemical dept. And then after the shares of the

Il.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Skoda Works were bought, it was agreed that the new company the Donau Chemie in which the Skoda Works was merged, should have the Kredit Anstalt as the leading banking contact. A representative of the Kredit Anstalt, Mr. Pfeifer was invited to enter the board of the Donau Chemie, and I was asked to enter the board of the Kredit Anstalt, when I came for the first time to a board meeting of the Kredit Anstalt, I met already representatives of the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft and the Deutsche Bank, and in this way found proof of what I had heard before, that the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft and Deutsche Banks had entered the Kredit Anstalt. I can swear I don't know more. It may sound ridiculous, but I don't know. And I can certainly state that never in the board meetings of the Kredit Anstalt, when I was present, was there any talk about who acquired from whom?

Q. What one person invited you to join the board?

Il. A. I believe it was Mr. Fischberg. Later, a letter must have been sent to my office and my secretary showed me the letter. I was ill at that time. I believe it a letter written by Mr. Fischberg who, well, I am not sure on this, but I think it was sent to my office, but I was not infinitely sure.

Q. Do you remember seeing the letter?

A. I can only say what I remember. I think it was reported orally to me by my assistants or by my secretary.

Q. How did they report it to you? Did they read it to you?

A. I think I was asked to enter the board of the Kredit Anstalt, and I think I said then they must ask the permission of Dr. Schmitz, as nobody was allowed to enter the board of another company without the consent of the President, Mr. Schmitz, and I got the information that Mr. Schmitz had agreed.

Q. Did you speak to Mr. Schmitz about this?

... I think later on, when I came back. Yes.

Q. Did you have any idea that the Kredit Anstalt was partly Jewish owned?

A. (Ilgnor) Yes, it was partly Jewish.

Q. Did you ever inquire or find out what happened in regard to the Jewish shareholders of the firm?

A. No.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

vs.

M. ILGNER
(Signature)

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

In this interrogation Dr. Ilgnor was principally being questioned.

I assisted principally by translating or summarizing for him at one or

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

two points. However, the answers I gave still appear to me to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

7. On 8 August 1945, I signed a one page record of an interrogation concerning the Skoda-Wetzler company, the text of which follows :

"Q. What was the importance of the Skoda Wetzler Works to I.G.?

A. It was the only factory producing chemicals in Austria. It made such ordinary chemicals as acetic acid, bleaching powder for cleaning oil, super-phosphates and carbide.

Q. So, in acquiring Skoda Wetzler Works, I.G. controlled the chemical industry in Austria.

A. Yes. It must be explained that the Dynamit Pressburg which was a subsidiary of Dynamit Treisdorf, which in turn was controlled by I.G., also had an interest in the chemical industry of Austria. However, Donau Chemie was a one hundred percent I.G. concern, and Dynamite turned over two of its factories to the Donau Chemie, and as a result, Dynamite interests in the chemical field of Austria became very small.

Q. From whom did I.G. acquire the Skoda Wetzler Works?

A. It acquired them from the Vienna Kredit Anstalt Bank.

Q. Now, prior to the Anschluss, who had the controlling interest in the Kredit Anstalt Bank?

A. The Rothschilds were the decisive influence in the bank. I don't know whether or not they owned more than 50% however, because a lot of shares were bearer shares on the market.

Q. How did the Deutsche Bank and the German Kredit Anstalt Bank acquire the Rothschild interest in the Kredit Anstalt?

A. That I don't know.

Q. Have you any thoughts on the Subject?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that the Nazi Government confiscated the Rothschild interest in the Bank?

A. I presume that is so.

Q. Do you think that the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Anstalt Bank then purchased it or acquired it by some way or in some manner from the Nazi govt.?

A. Yes, I think so. From whom else could they have gotten it? I conclude from this that I.G. acquired the Skoda Wetzler Works from the Deutsche Bank and the Reichs Kredit Anstalt Bank, which

(signed) G v Schnitzler

had acquired the Skoda Wetzlar Works by participating with the "azi Government, in a theft of the property.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G. von Schnitzler
Signature

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft
(Position in I.G. Farben)

The answers I gave in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that I now desire to make the following additions or corrections:

(a) In the first line "acetic acid" should be "sulphuric acid".

(b) In the last answer I subscribed to the statement that the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft and the Deutsche Bank "had acquired the Skoda Wetzlar Works by participating with the Nazi government in a theft of the property". I intended to discuss the conclusion expressed in the word "theft" with the American investigators with a view to correcting this conclusion, but I forgot to revert to it thereafter. I knew, of course, that Louis Rothschild had been president of the Oesterreichische Kredit Anstalt, that the Rothschilds were closely connected with the Oesterreichische Kredit Anstalt, and that Jewish interests in Austrian economy were eliminated by the Nazi government as they had been in German economy. Moreover, I know that the Oesterreichische Kredit Anstalt had the controlling interest in the Skoda Wetzlar Company. However, I did not know and do not know any details concerning how the new management of the Oesterreichische Kredit Anstalt was changed by the Nazi government, the Deutsche Bank or the Reichs Kredit Gesellschaft. Whether or to what extent the Rothschilds were compensated, I do not know even now. Therefore, it was an error for me to subscribe

(signed) G v Schnitzler

to the conclusion that the transaction was a theft. Moreover, in acquiring Skoda-Wetzlar, I.G. dealt directly with the Österreichische Kredit Anstalt after the new management had been established and I.G. had nothing to do with changing the management. If a German concern had refused to do business with any firm where Jewish shares had been taken away, it usually could have done no business at all. I.G. actually paid relatively more in acquiring Skoda-Wetzlar than the amount for which the Österreichische Kredit Anstalt had offered to sell to I.G. before the Anschluss.

8. On 3 July 1945, I made a statement entitled "Short statement re acquisition of Aussig-Falkenberg", the text of which follows :

"When it became evident that the Sudetenland would be turned over to Germany in the autumn days of 1938, I.G. approached the Reichswirtschaftsministerium with the proposal that Dr. Augler should be appointed commissioner for the two factories of Aussig and Falkenberg - including their three affiliated lignite - mines - all belonging to the Frager

VS.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Verein. The reason for this notice was the following. - It had penetrated that party-circles behind which Konrad Henlein, the party-leader of NSDAP in Sudetenland was supposed to stand, felt the strong desire to terminate such a commissioner on their own account to be taken from their own confidential men.

Incidentally this later on proved to be a man whose relations to the party were not at all as intimate as it seemed to be at first sight - it was Dr. Brunner, Falkenau, a director of the Prager Verein, who in the first line was a mining engineer and had very little knowledge of chemistry. Still the support for him was strong enough that in the first move he and Kugler were nominated joint commissioners. But Brunner acted, as far as I can recollect, only a very short time. Konrad Henlein seemed to have refused him his agreement and as nobody had objected to Dr. Kugler the latter one remained the only commissioner. - Independently of this action Chemische Fabrik von Heyden in Dresden, Radaboul, had succeeded in getting a first claim from Reichswirtschaftsministerium to negotiate with the Prager Verein about the acquisition of the two works and through Dresdner bank, which on the one hand had a great influence on v. Heyden, two directors of Dresdner Bank being members of the Aufsichtsrat of v. Heyden, and on the other hand was on very friendly terms with the Zivistenbank, Prag, which practically controlled the Prager Verein - a certain connection between Dresden and Prag had yet been established. When I came to see the man in charge of the Chemical Dept. of Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Mr. Neubert, he only could give me the suggestion to take up the matter with v. Heyden.

Thus together with Dr. ter Meer I did approach Mr. Jungel, Chairman of the Vorstand of v. Heyden, and made him the proposal that v. Heyden - I.G. should jointly acquire the two factories taking them over in the only fair partnership of 50:50 and that the new company to be created should let on lease the dyestuff-department to I.G. on a long term lease.

(page 2 of original)

On this general line an agreement was in a short time reached which, of course, took many months to bring into the appropriate legal form. But already on November 7th Dr. Masch, chairman of the board of directors of Verein and Dr. Dovrazek, general director of Zivn-Bank came to Berlin to negotiate with the group I.G./v. Heyden the sale of the two works, the Dresdner Bank acting as friendly intermediary and at the same time as host.

Seldom a great international economic agreement containing so many clauses and covering so many domains has been concluded so speedily as this. In one day the agreement in principle was reached and the lump sum was fixed. In the thirty following days all clauses were prepared and in another 2 days negotiations in Berlin about December 7th, the agreement and all its by-laws were signed. The works were acquired on a basis which provided for a payment of 1 crown cheque for every crown of turnover made by the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

two works. This turnover should only include the business made in Germany and Sudetenland which in round figures was evaluated at some 200 million crown p.m., the remaining 100 million which mainly consisted of business made in the remaining Tscheco-Slovakia - the so-called second republic - should remain with the Verein. The Verein reserved himself the right to continue this business - or from his remaining works in Houschau, Handlawa and Nowak and/or to buy the necessary products from Aussig and Falkenau - at economic prices as long as his own remaining and the proposed new factories were not yet capable to take over that business out of their own production. - Together with land and mines the total selling price was handled out at 230 million crowns today which corresponded at the rate of 10:1 to 23 million Marks, at the rate of 8:1 to 22,4 million Marks. To this question of exchange I shall revert again in a more particular statement.

The Verein, of which, as said before, the majority was pooled at the Zivna-Bank, the Bank itself and their friends owing about 45 - 48 % and Solvays 6 - 8 % had a large range of products, and this range should be kept up, notwithstanding that the 2 main works were being sold out. The Verein furthermore should not suffer in its independency by being cut off from these two works.

Not only should the Verein be entitled to rebuild new factories corresponding to Aussig and Falkenau in his own country, but Aussig and Falkenau had for several years to give the Verein an efficient help and protect the Verein's business.

(page 3 of original)

In a by-law I.G. and Verein signed jointly a document providing for the continuance of their close and friendly relations.

This latter agreement was being uninterruptedly executed up to the very last months. The undersigned once together with Dr. Elner and a second time furthermore accompanied by Weber-Androne v. Heider and Eugler visited Prag in November 1940 and in February 1943 and last time a final agreement was reached. -

The discussions both times had a purely economic basis - minutes in Frankfurt available.

July 6th, 1945.

signed: G. von Schnitzler.

PS. The main interest of I.G. in the whole problem was the dyestuff-question. I.G. could not and would not let the factory of Aussig go over to a third party which would be acquiring it with a strong foothold in this domain."

(signed) G v Schnitzler

This statement still appears to me to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

- (a) In paragraph one of page one, tenth line, there is a typographical error - "to terminate" should be "to delegate".
- (b) In paragraph two, page one, next to last line, "Mr. Neubert" should be "Mr. Mulert".
- (c) On page two, third paragraph, third line, "owing about" should be "coming about". The typist misread my longhand writing and hence made the above errors in typing the statement.

(d) Concerning the postscript on page three, I think this the most interesting part in that it shows that I.G.'s main interest was in the dyestuff question. As soon as the Aussig dyestuff plant became a part of the German economic sphere, I.G. became active to control the Aussig-Falkenau plant because it did not want a dyestuff competitor in the German economic sphere, having always controlled dyestuff production in Germany.

6. On 14 September 1945, I signed a two page statement entitled "Short statement re personalities having handled the transactions Boruta and Aussig-Falkenau", the text of which follows:

vs. "The Boruta was sold to I.G. by Treuhandstelle Ost. Head of Treuhandstelle Ost was Mr. Winkler, former mayor of a town in the Prussian Province Posen, I believe it was ~~640230~~ or Bromberg, which became Polish in 1919. - Mr. Winkler acted under Bruening and Stresemann as financial expert for German banking interests in Holland, Poland a-s-o. Later on he also became trustee for state-owned companies in Germany. - In connection with the Boruta-transaction I saw him only once, when Dr. Morle, the head of the industrial department of Treuhandstelle and I jointly presented the case to him.

Dr. Morle, formerly Gesch"ftsf"hrer of Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie had been dismissed from his post in 1933 and replaced by Dr. Glth. Dr. Morle later on became connected with Vasec.

Both men and their subordinates whose names I have forgotten acted as trustees of the Reich and tried to get the best possible price. On the other hand I.G. had no interest in cutting the price down as I.G. feared nothing more as to be reproached for having deliberately made a bargain.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Mr. Greifelt was the head of the Amt für Befestigung des Deutschen Volkstums. - As Lodz and Zgierz, the latter being practically a suburb of Lodz were incorporated in the so-called Warta region the Amt für Befestigung had to give its approval to every transfer of real estate property including all factories.

There were two competitors in the field, favoured with strong party-relations, in order to convince them, it was necessary to explain to Greifelt personally, that a dyestuff-factory could only be run by experts and that these experts only were to be found with I.G. He greasing the palm with all the 3 men took place.

vs. About the two directors of Dresdner Bank who became active in the purchase of Aussig-Falkenau the following can be said. Mr. Rasche came from a smaller bank in Rhineland-Westphalia and was considered to be closely attached to Mr. Kappler and his circle. He had not to deal in particular with the case of Aussig-Falkenau - but only in a general way with the relations to Zirmostenka-Bank and probably to other banks as well.

Mr. Zinsser on the contrary came from the very bottom of Dresdner Bank and had made his career solely by his intelligence and his industry.

(page 2 of original)

Though relatively young he played a prominent roll on the board of supervision of Chemische Fabrik v. Heyden and enjoyed the full confidence of Mr. Jungel, chairman of v. Heyden.

With both men "greasing" was out of question.

Frankfurt, Sept. 14th 1943.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that there is a typographical error in the first line of page two where "he played" should be "he played".

7. On 11 September 1943, I signed a one page statement entitled "Statement re. Aussig-Falkenau and Keruta", the text of which follows:

"The officials of the German Government, who authorized the acquisition of Aussig-Falkenau have been:

Staatsschreiber Brinkmann
getten crax in the mean-time
Ministerialdirektor Schlatterer
Ministerialdirigent Halert)
Oberregierungsrat Hoffmann) department "Chemie"
all of Reichswirtschaftsministerium.

The directors of Dresdner Bank, having dealt with the question, have been:

(signed) G. v. Schnitzler

Mr. Rasche
" Zinsser (member of the Board of supervision
of Chemische von Heyden).

The negotiators for Verein have been

Mr. Bosch, Generaldirektor of "Verein"
" Dvorzack, " " Zivnostenska Banka.

The authority for the acquisition of Beruta has been given
by Reichswirtschaftsministerium:

Ministerialdirektor Schletterer
Ministerialdirigent Mulert
Oberregierungsrat Hoffmann

by Treuhandstelle Ost, who negotiated for the government

Dr. Winkler, head of Treuhandstelle
Dr. Herle, " " industrial department of
Treuhandstelle

by "Amt für Befestigung des Deutschen Volkstums"

Mr. Greifelt.

Frankfurt, Sept. 11th, 1945.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief.

11. On 8 August 1945, I signed a two page record of interrogation
concerning the Aussig-Falkenau Company, the text of which follows:

"Q. Prior to the German occupation of the Sudetenland, who owned
the Aussig-Falkenau?

A. The so-called Aussiger or Prager Verein.

Q. What was the Prager Verein?

A. This is one of the oldest chemical establishments practically
as old as the great mother companies of I.G.

Q. Can you give us some idea of the ownership of this company?

A. The Prager Verein is controlled by a majority group of the
Zivnostenska Bank and Selvey, the Belgian group, and they had
together about 54 percent ownership.

Q. Did I.G. have an interest in this concern?

A. Formerly, no. We bought later a certain amount of shares, a
little more than two percent.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. When did you buy them?
- A. We started to buy after the agreement.
- Q. About what date was this?
- A. In the year 1938.
- Q. Now, when the German troops occupied Sudetenland what happened to the Aussig-Falkenau?
- A. There were two commissars, Dr. Kugler of I.G., and Herr Brunner.
- Q. When did I.G. begin negotiations with the Prager Verein for the purchase of the Aussig-Falkenau?
- A. The seventh of November, 1938.
- Q. How were negotiations for the purchase of the Aussig-Falkenau factories from the Prager Verein begun?
- A. The negotiations were made through the Dresdner Bank represented by Rasche and Zinser.
- Q. Was the Prager-Verein informed that it would have to sell the property?
- A. Yes. The Dresdner Bank insisted that the Zivnosdenka Bank exercise its controlling influence in the Prager-Verein, to get the Prager-Verein to sell the Aussig-Falkenau.
- Q. What interest did the Dresdner Bank have in the transaction?
- A. The Dresdner Bank is in close relations with the Chemische Von Heyden and Mr. Zinsler is on the Aufsichtsrat of Chemische Von Heyden, and Chemische Von Heyden received first claim from the Nazi government to deal with the Prager-Verein.
- vs. Q. So that, in effect you would say that the Zivnosdenka Bank was compelled to exercise its controlling influence in the Prager-Verein to get the Prager-Verein to sell the Aussig-Falkenau?

(page 2 of original)

- A. I would rather say "induced".
- Q. Now, how do you distinguish between inducing and compelling?
- A. The Dresdner Bank convinced the Zivnosdenka Bank that they could not handle or manage the factories which were in wholly German territory.
- Q. If the Zivnosdenka Bank had refused to do what the Dresdner Bank convinced it to do, what measures would have been taken?
- A. It would be difficult for me to say but no doubt the German government would have sequestered the property and installed commissars to manage it on a permanent basis.
- Q. Were the Aussig-Falkenau factories important chemical and dyestuffs producers?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. Yes, I would say so.

Q. Can you give us some estimate of their size?

VS. A. At the time when we bought the works, they had a turnover of about two hundred million crowns in Sudetenland ^{and Germany} and one hundred million crowns in the remaining Czechoslovakian territory. The textile industry was mostly in the German part. In the Czechoslovakian part was the so-called chemical and heavy industry.

Q. In regard to the dyestuffs industry what agreement was made between Chemische Von Heyden and I.G.?

A. We acquired the works jointly on a fifty-fifty basis, and then the newly formed fifty-fifty-basis company Chemische Von Heyden leased the dyestuffs factories to I.G.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true".

G. von Schnitzler
Signature "

The statements recorded in this record of interrogation still appear to

me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

VS. In my last answer the three words "Chemische von Heyden" should be stricken.

12. On 12 August 1945, I signed a one page statement "To the

attention of Mr. Weissbrodt", entitled "Additional statement re Aussig and

Wola", the text of which follows :

"1.) It might be interesting to know how I.G. has acquired the shares of the "Verein" of which I reported in the hearing re Aussig-Falkenau.

Shareholders of the Verein residing in the Sudetenland had objected to the Reichswirtschafts-Ministerium that their interests could be damaged insofar as Verein eventually could or would not be transferrable. Thus Reichswirtschafts-Ministerium decided that v. Heyden and I.G. had to exchange eventual shares of Verein belonging to such people against shares of v. Heyden or I.G. at a fixed relation I can't recollect any more in its value. Nearly all Sudetendeutsche shareholders who made use of this authorization did choose I.G. shares, only a small amount was exchanged against shares of v. Heyden. As v. Heyden had no interest to keep these few shares of "Verein", I.G. took over the whole block. These together with small amounts bought by Dresdner Bank made together less than 2% of the Prager Verein.

2.) Wola.

I must correct former statements as far as the plant of Wola is concerned. This plant was not taken over by I.G. in the Baruta settlement, but being situated in the General Gouvernement this latter at the end of 1943 sold it to a competitor unknown to me. Of course the liquid assets and

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the liabilities had been dealt with beforehand by the "Kommissare". How far raw materials and equipment have been taken over by Bruta, I am unable to say. Mr. Schwab will know all the details.

August 12, 1945.

signed: G. von Schnitzler."

/Could or would not pay a dividend or that this dividend "

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. The insert mark "F" should have been inserted three lines higher after the word "eventually".

13. On 19 August 1945, I signed a two page statement entitled "Statement re Prager Verein, the text of which follows :

"In the following I try to recollect the happenings of the summer of 1938 which preceded the annex of the Sudetenland.

The recollection creates a certain difficulty, because my memory of them is completely overshadowed by the negotiations regarding the acquisition of Aussig and Falkenau.

It had been for years customary that the cartel-meetings of the so-called 4-party cartel were held at the following dates:

March:	Paris - 3 party-cartel
	London - 4 party-cartel
June:	Basle
September:	Paris
December:	Frankfurt.

Thus, I am certain, that in June 1938 we met in Basel and I am also certain, that the question of the relations to the Verein were on the minutes. Also I believe that as an annex to the cartel-meeting we had a meeting - the last one - of the 3 party-cartel with the management of the Verein. However it was, in the month of June 1938 in Basel there could not be any question of talking about plans, which only much later materialized. - The relations to the Verein at that time were absolutely normal. In July only the crisis about the Sudetenland which gleamed under the surface, became acute and it became evident that Hitler planned for the annex of Sudetenland. Shortly afterwards the British government sent Lord Rensselaer to Czechoslovakia to study the conditions existing there and to prepare a compromise solution.

Since then it was inevitable that the future of the two factories in Aussig and Falkenau being situated in an entirely German territory became a problem and the standpoint inside the management of I.G. was, that if ever a change in the political status should happen, I.G. must take an interest in these two factories as the importance of the dyestuff-factory in Aussig being closely connected with the rest of the factory commanded, that not a third party could get the control over it.

It could not be foreseen, what the issue of the political negotiations would be, thus definite plans could not be fixed. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

I.G.'s first interest was to acquire a first right of refusal in the case Aussig would come into German hands, that she was entitled to deal about the question of the future of these factories whatever might happen. In this order of ideas as a first step the proposition has been made, that Dr. Harster for the technical and Dr. Kugler for the commercial side should be appointed as

(page 2 of original)

"Kommissare", who should take over the management of the two factories as soon as the territorial question was solved. In the meantime the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" had been active in Berlin. and at the end of September I was informed by Dr. Schubert, that in Reichenberg one had the desire that at least one of the Kommissars should be a "Sudetendeutscher". A young employee of I.G., whose name I don't remember, but who is known to Dr. Kugler, brought Dr. Richter from Reichenberg to us in the Hotel Adlon and there we got the news that the candidate of the Sudetendeutsche Partei in Reichenberg was a Dr. Brunner, technical director of the Vercin's factory in Falkenau. Although we did not know Dr. Brunner, we had no reason to oppose to his candidature and the issue was that the ministry appointed Dr. Kugler and Dr. Brunner jointly as Kommissars. Dr. Brunner of course acted only a very short time, there came a strong opposition against him out of the works in Falkenau and he was compelled to resign as Kommissar. - Later on the Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau took him over to Aussig as head of the mines as by profession he was an engineer.

apart of the question of the nomination of the "Kommissare" it was taken up with the "Reichswirtschafts-Ministerium" under what conditions and with what I.G. could take up negotiations for the acquisition of the two factories - always under the heading, that I.G. alone was able to run the dyestuff-factory and that this dyestuff-factory was interconnected in such a way with the rest of the Aussig works that a separation was impossible. We learned from Mr. Schubert that Chemische v. Heyden had succeeded in getting the first claim to such negotiations and that we had to address ourselves to them. -

What followed afterwards is known by former statements and interrogations.

Frankfurt, Aug. 19th 1945.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief

14. I have carefully read each of the 37 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under

(signed) G v Schnitzler

oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEO G VON SCHNITZLER

to and signed before me this 10th day of March 1947, at the
Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to
me to be the person making the above affidavit.

FREXEL A. J. FLOCHER

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATE

I, EDNA E. UIBLEALL, AGO D 150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of document No. MI 5194, the original of which is in the English language.

Dated: 26 February 1947

EDNA E. UIBLEALL
U.S. Civ. D 150096

E.D.

A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I. G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 16 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these documents are set forth below after the text of the respective statement or interrogation.

2. On 12 July 1945, I wrote up in longhand a four page statement concerning Francolor entitled "Statement to the different questions July 9th - Second part," the text of which follows:

"1) Francolor

(1) date of acquisition of shares

The French Law authorizing the Foundation of Francolor has been published December 16th 1941 (Journal officiel). This date although can be regarded as the date of acquisition of shares. The I.G. shares having been given as countervalue to the French group are carrying coupons beginning with the years 1942.

2) The basic conditions are

- a) definite and eternal peace between French and German dyestuff-industries - settling all differences from I. world war, Ruhr-occupation and second war;

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- b) full occupation of French dyestuff industries as soon as normal conditions are restored; 7000 t of dyestuff a year;
- c) I.G. grants technical help - to a large extent without counter-value;
- d) Francolor normally will only export to neighbouring countries i.e. Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Germany (to Germany through the channels of I.G.) eventual other export countries later on to be discussed.
I.G. only exports to France products of the domain of dyestuffs, which Francolor does not manufacture at all or not in sufficient quantities;
- e) products which up to now have been manufactured in the factories brought into Francolor and which do not fall under the domain of dyestuffs (means dyestuffs properly spoken, intermediates for dyestuffs and auxiliary products in connection with dyeing a.s.o. - remain with Francolor but are sold by the so-called mother-houses, Kuhlmann, St. Denis, St. Clair-du-Rhone;
- f) so-called "new products, that means-products on one hand not falling under the domain-dyestuffs" and on the other hand not yet having been fabricated by the mother-houses in the Francolor-factories can only be taken up after the Conseil d'Administration has given its consent with a majority of 2/3;
- g) participation in the capital;
I.G. 51%
French group 49%
both sides: 4 administrators each.

(Page 2 of typewritten copy)

The president has always to be French, can only be taken from the French list with the consent of the French government. As the French law provides that no decision can be taken against the voice of the President the participation of

51% I.G.

and 49% French group

practically means parity.

If for instance I.G. would have tried to bring a decision through against the President's opinion, the latter would have resigned, a new President would have to be found and the consent of the government would have to be requested.

Thus the eventual endeavours to overrule the French group from the very beginning was excluded. The first Conseil d'Administration consisted of

French side:

Joseph Frossard, President
René Duchemin
Georges Thesmar
Georges Despret

I.G. side:

G. von Schnitzler
F. ter Meer
H. Walbel
O. Ambros

- h) The capital was fixed at 800 Mill.Frs. This amount corresponded to the evaluation of the fixed assets which were taken over at such a high price that Kuhlmann for instance had to put some

(signed) G v Schnitzler

100 million francs into an extra-reserve created in connection with the Francolor-transaction.

The resp. plants and equipments at Kuhlmann having been written off before.

The current assets were being taken over at the cost-prices of 1939 with an addition of something between 30 and 40% owing to the depreciation of the franc and the higher general index.

- i) I.G. shares were accounted at the approximate rate of July 1939, i.e. 160;
 - k) a technical and a commercial committee had been constituted. Both had to do the preparatory work for the decisions to be taken by the Conseil d'Administration.
- 3) No Reichskommissar was appointed.
The French group approached I.G. in November 1940 for the first time in Wiesbaden through the Commission of armistice.
The negotiations then were conducted in an purely private way.
Only twice representatives of both governments were present.
The first day in Wiesbaden and at the decisive day, when the agreement in principle has been reached in Paris in March 1941.
- 4) To the question of "sponsoring" (Statement of July 10th) I would like to add to my statement that I have given a description of the happenings as correct as possible, in details a mistake might have arisen, as so many years have passed, but this mistake can only be of minor importance.

July 12th 1945

(sgnd.) G. von Schnitzler"

This statement still appears to me to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that in paragraph (h), page 2, I wrote "some 100 million francs" but I meant to say "several hundred million francs."

3. On 30 August 1945, I signed a one page statement re German-French relations, the text of which follows:

VS "Under the armistice and based upon the "slogan" of collaboration and intercourse between the German and French industries had developed, which practically included the whole French industry.

In the chemical domain it was only Pechiney, the factories and water-over stations of which were in the inoccupied part of France, which showed a more refractory attitude.

All the other companies did cooperate in full, but even of Pechiney I was informed, that at one of the last monthly dinners, which took place between representatives of the German authorities and industrialists on one and the corresponding French ones on the other side, a representative of Pechiney was present. As another example I may cite the name of M. Marcel Boussac, the greatest industrialist in the textile field. His

(signed) G v Schnitzler

works were occupied to a large extent for direct or indirect orders of the Wehrmacht, and he himself was frequently with German representatives at luncheon- and dinner parties. The same applies, as far as I can judge it, to the iron- and steel-industry, and the work done by Schneider-Creusot for the Wehrmacht is publicly known. - As another example of this collaboration the following might be of interest:

In the summer of 1942 the International Chamber of Commerce showed a new activity. Under the presidency of Mr. Bagge, a high ranking Swedish judge the "Court arbitral" at the Chamber in Paris was newly put in function. - As Vice-presidents were designated M. Albert Buisson, Paris, formerly undersecretary of state and now "President de Conseil" of Rhone-Poulenc and myself. M. Buisson as well as I, we both accepted the invitation of Mr. Edström, the Swedish president of the Chamber and acted jointly twice or three times for the settlement of certain cases, which of course were entirely prepared beforehand.

Frankfurt, Aug. 30th, 45.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

4. On 19 July 1945, I signed a four page record of interrogation concerning Winnica, I.G. Chemie, and General Aniline and Film (GAF), the text of which follows:

"Q. Before the Nazi occupation of Poland who owned the Winnica?

A. The Winnica was owned 50% by the French group and 50% by the I.G.Chemie Basle. We turned these 50% over to them. If the I.G.Chemie had turned them over to another firm, I don't know. We controlled practically the other half from the business standpoint.

Q. When was the Winnica founded?

A. About 1931 or 1932.

Q. Were you in charge of the negotiations in regard to the Winnica?

A. Yes, between the French. We financed our half of the capital mostly by the way of intermediates we supplied to the Winnica.

Q. In 1931 or 1932 I.G. was anxious to penetrate the Polish dyestuff industry? Is that right?

A. No, the idea came from the French. The French had built up a substantial business in Poland. They looked for a foothold in Poland. It was Frossard who bought this soap factory, and that was the beginning.

Q. Is it not true that I.G. urged Kuhlmann to form this Winnica as a French company because I.G. did not want the Polish government to know that I.G. was entering the Polish dyestuff field?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. We could not erect a factory in Poland for our own. We had in Poland no
vS "Wegfallungsrecht" right of settlement. It was convenient for us that the
French who had the right of settlement did it 50:50. We could not enter
directly.

Q. Then you approached Kuhlman and said to Kuhlmann: Suppose you build a new
French company in Poland because you have the right. Is that right?

A. It is just like when two young people approach each other. It is very
difficult to say.

Q. It was easier for I.G. to have the French enter?

A. Yes.

Q. And your negotiations with the French were with Mr. Frossard?

A. Exactly, the same man.

Q. 50% of the ownership of Winnica was openly held by Kuhlmann?

A. Yes.

Q. The other 50% was held openly by I.G. Basle? Is that right?

A. I think they were not openly held. Kuhlmann held openly a 100%.

Q. Openly Kuhlmann held a 100% interest?

A. It was only a French-Polish board and the Poles were the Guinea-pigs.

Q. Not, in fact, 50% of the Winnica was secretly held by I.G. Basle?

A. Yes, I.G. Chemie had it on its own risk. I can tell you that at that time
I said to the men of I.G. Chemie: "Daran sollen Sie kein Geld verlieren"

WS

(Page 2 of the original)

Q. Who put up the money for the stock secretly held by I. G. Chemie?

A. We, later on I.G. Chemie.

Q. You paid partly in money and partly in goods for the Winnica shares?

A. Yes.

Q. But in fact I.G. Chemie paid nothing for the 50% of the shares of the Winnica?

A. Originally no.

Q. Where were the shares held by I.G. Chemie?

A. They were for a long time in Paris with Kuhlmann. Later on they were turned
over to Basle. I think for a very long time Kuhlmann held the shares and they
were not given to Basle.

Q. When the Francolor arrangement was consummated I.G. Chemie had not yet re-
ceived part of the shares.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. Originally it is correct to say that the shares were actually owned by I.G. Farben through I. G. Chemie.
- Q. They were deposited with Kuhlmann?
- A. Right.
- Q. And later on most of the shares were deposited with I.G. Chemie in Basel?
- A. I think I.G. Chemie never had all the shares on deposit.
- Q. At the time of the Francolor arrangement Kuhlmann still held on deposit part of the shares?
- A. So it is in my recollection.
- Q. After the Francolor agreement did I.G. Farben openly take over 100% of the shares?
- A. Yes, practically.
- Q. Who liquidated the company?
- A. I.G. Farben.
- Q. In the course of the Francolor transaction you liquidated the Winnica as a dyestuff company?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who owned I.G. Chemie?
- A. You must ask mostly Mr. Schmitz. I.G. Chemie is to a very large extent owned by an American company. The General Aniline Corp.
- Q. Who is the beneficial owner of I.G. Chemie and General Aniline Co.?
- A. They between themselves.
- Q. What is I.G.'s relationship with Sturzenegger?
- A. Thereupon we have statements. Schmitz has given a declaration.
- Q. Who is the beneficial owner of the firm of Sturzenegger?

(Page 3 of the original)

- A. That is only known to Mr. Schmitz. We don't know. We forced him: "If you don't make an appropriate declaration we must separate from you. We must tell the American gentlemen, you will never allow us to look into the inner construction of the company." It was a small circle of personalities who were around Schmitz.
- Q. When did I.G. ostensibly sever its interest in I.G. Chemie?
- A. We sold our American interest to the I.G. Chemie.
- Q. When?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. In 1939
- Q. How much was your interest in General Aniline Co.?
- A. 100%. At first 50% with Grasselli, then it was taken over by Dupont. For a certain time we were 100%.
- Q. Who of Farben officials participated in negotiations for the possible sale of General Aniline and Film Corp. in fall 1940?
- A. There were no negotiations, that was a talk?
- Q. Who were the people who were talking with Howard of Standard Oil about the possible sale?
- A. Present were: von Knieriem, ter Meer, I.
- Q. Did you hear the talk?
- A. I did not hear it. I heard it at a social talk. They always sought to find a suitable American who could be interested in General Aniline & Film Corp. I can't tell you who made the suggestion. I don't know whether Schmitz was present.
- Q. And how was it proposed that Standard Oil should acquire its interest in General Aniline?
- A. I.G. would buy an oil interest in Grossdeutschland which eventually could be turned over to Standard Oil--after the war. We would have exercised the option. Not really an option, it was a "Verkaufsrecht"-right of purchase.
- Q. Who were present during the talks with Howard?
- A. Mr. Gadow of I.G. Chemie.
- Q. What American? Duisberg and Williamson?
- A. D.A. Schmitz was present, or Duisberg, or Williamson.
- Q. Do you remember that ter Meer was present?
- A. I am sure he was.
- Q. You mentioned a scientific man?
- A. Perhaps Dr. Lohr was present, but I don't know.
- Q. The question was whether the I.G. would agree to such a sale?
- A. The doubts concerned whether the fair exchange of value could be reached.
- Q. You are sure this meeting took place in the fall of 1940 or in the beginning of 1941?
- A. I am sure.

(Page 4 of the original)

- Q. The real issue was whether or not I.G. could trade the interest which it had through I.G. Chemie in General Aniline and Film against a fair exchange of Standard Oil property?
- (signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. That was the issue, but it never materialized. It never got to definition.
- Q. The issue at the meeting between I.G. officials and Mr. Howard and all other American representatives which took place either in the winter of 1940 or in January 1941 was whether or not I.G. could trade its interest in General Aniline & Film which it possessed through I.G. Chemie for a fair exchange of value from Standard Oil? Is that right?
- A. Yes, that was the question.
- Q. Wasn't the contract between I.G. and I.G. Chemie allegedly severed before that meeting?
- A. Perhaps I made an error in the dates. But we could always deal again with Basel to reconstruct the situation.
- Q. This so-called legal severance of the Agreement between I.G. and I.G. Chemie was only a legal form and never had any real effect on the actual relationship between I.G. and I.G. Chemie?
- A. We could always take up the matter again with Basel.
- Q. Could not I.G. at any time resume its former relations with I.G. Chemie: is that right?
- A. Yes. That depended somewhat on the people of the Swiss side. But the shares are lying with G&F and the firm of Groutert owns so many shares. I had never any doubt that we could at any given date resume this relation. It may be that I am wrong about the date and that the talk with Howard took place after the severance.
- Q. In other words, the date of severance makes no difference?
- A. No difference. In my opinion we could always resume the relation with Basel.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler
(Signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farbenindustrie
(Position in I.G. Farben)
Aktiengesellschaft"

"The statements I subscribed to in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. However, to amplify the matters in the interrogation I would like to add the following concerning Winnica:

The Winnica owes its existence to the French and particularly to the initiative of H. FROGSARD. On account of the protection by high tariffs, which the Deystuffs industry in Poland enjoyed, the French more and more had lost ground in their export trade to Poland. The Swiss partly had paralyzed this by developing their own factory at

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Fabianice, Poland. The French following their example acquired the Winnica, a former soap factory. Notwithstanding that I.G. had a better position insofar as I.G. had a higher developed range of colors than the French, we ourselves were greatly interested to keep up certain positions which were going to be lost. Hence, we associated in the French endeavours and participated secretly with a 50% participation in the Winnica. We could not do that openly because there was no right of settlement provided for in the German-Polish commerce treaty. When the plant of Winnica became part of the General Government, the "Kommissare" for a certain period of time maintained the production at Winnica giving its personnel every possible help and assistance. By and by it became impossible to continue. No coal, no material was available and furthermore no market existed anymore, as most of the products of Winnica had gone to Lodz, under "Zollschutz," and Lodz now was incorporated in the German sphere. Thus, the liquidation of Winnica was inevitable; everything on the spot would have literally gone to pieces. One more cold winter, and Winnica, situated on one of the roads from Warsaw to the N.E. only would have been a heap of "debris". In the '30's the I.G. Chemie, Basle, had acquired at I.G. Farben's instigation 50% of the share-capital of Winnica from Kuhlmann. Thus the Winnica was owned 50:50 by I.G. Chemie and the Kuhlmann group. In order not to create financial losses to them, we proposed to both of them that we would acquire their stocks in the Winnica at their own book-value. This was done. We paid to both of them, without bargaining, exactly what they asked. As far as I can recollect, to the Kuhlmann group, 20,000,000 frs equal to M. 1,000,000 over the Franco-German clearing arrangement; to I.G. Chemie, 850,000 Swiss francs.

5. On 5 September 1945, I signed a one page statement concerning I. G. 's interests in the industry of the conquered countries, the text of which follows:

"I.G. always exercised the predominant influence in the chemical domain on the European continent. Therefore, I.G.'s interests in the conquered countries of Europe did not extend primarily to the chemical domain. However, we were extremely interested in the dyestuffs field. The dyestuffs field was of especial importance to us because our profits to a large part came from our exports of dyestuffs. For example, in regard to Poland, the Polish chemical industry was important domestically but had no significance on the export market. The Stickstoffwerke in Chorzow, as far as I know, have been taken over by the Reich-owned "Vag". I am unable to say if they came to production during the war. If so, this production will have been marketed by the Stickstoff-Syndikat, in which I.G. had over 60% interest. As far as the other chemical companies of Upper-Silesia are concerned they were treated in a similar way, that means the Reich took over the different enterprises which, to my knowledge, mostly had belonged to the Polish state. - They produced to the best of my knowledge only some heavy chemicals in connection with coal-mines and steel-works. The French chemical industry was also never of a nuisance to us in the export domain, and in regard to its domestic business we could always eventually

(signed) G v Schnitzler

reach new cartel arrangements if we were interested in export.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) To the first sentence I would now say that I.G. always exercised "a more or less" predominant influence in the chemical domain of the European countries. Moreover, I.G. export business, except for dyestuffs, was relatively small since the other countries in Europe had their own basic chemical industries which were protected by tariffs and by the different cartel agreements existing all over Europe. In all these cartels, I.G., of course, had a very substantial quota.

(b) When I made this statement I did not separate in my own conception Austria or the Switzerland from the German economic sphere since they were both populated by Germans.

(c) Much of I.G.'s participations in the East and South East were extended by force in the sense that their production was needed because of the war.

6. On 5 September 1945, I signed a one page statement concerning the Neuordnung and on 3 September 1945, I signed a one page statement entitled "Statement re 'Neuer Plan'". These two statements can best be considered together. The text of each follows:

September 5, 1945

"It must be remembered that in preparing the Neuordnung we were following the lines of the so-called Gross Raum Politik laid down by the government. We were looking to the overwhelming downfall of France and the eventual capitulation of England when we prepared the document. It must be remembered that we knew well the aims and policies of the government, and we knew that it was the intention of the government to improve its strength in relation to the countries outside of the European sphere. This meant, of course, the United States because outside of Europe the United States was the only strong country with which Germany had to reckon. Therefore, we wrote in the Neuordnung that we intended

(signed) G v Schnitzler

to keep Germany as strong as possible militaristically in relation to the United States. We could accomplish this only by limiting the production of armaments in Latin America. We did not want in the event of an eventual conflict with the United States to permit Latin America to supply the USA with the war materials. It should be remembered that I.G. had to follow the lines of the Nazi government.

Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER"

Statement re: "Neuer Plan".

"To what an extent the ideas and intentions of the Reichs-Wirtschafts-Ministerium have determined the drafting of the "Neue Plan" of I.G. becomes clear by the fact that Torhaar who was in continuous contact with Reichs-Wirtschafts-Ministerium and was thoroughly informed of their aims, took personally the "Regie" of the preparatory work in hand, he came to visit the different "Verkaufsgemeinschaften" and explained in especially put up "working-committees" the clauses which he had elaborated on the basis of the guiding principles which he had received from Reichs-Wirtschafts-Ministerium. He pointed out, that the plan should be as comprehensive and as thorough as possible and that the point of view of the authorities should under all circumstances be respected, namely by far reaching guarantees through a reliable German control to achieve the best possible strengthening of the German militaristic potential.

The elaboration should be made in such a way, that it should not give a weapon in the hands of those manifold circles in the Reichs-Wirtschafts-Ministerium, in which criticism against I.G. was prevalent. F linked and entang-I.G. being known as internationally infirmed and possessing many led vs friendships and relations abroad should not give the impression of a redelection for liberal handling and thus give those circles -Kehrl and his surrounding- an easy argument to refuse the plan of I. G. as an insufficient instrument. Then the "Neue Plan" was elaborated, the war with England was still going on. One expected England's defeat but one could not discount it in such a way that special plans for England could be handed over to the government. Thus I am firmly convinced that the "Neue Plan" did not contain proposals regarding England. The preparatory work done inside the different departments had only an importance of informational character, but can in no way be regarded as I.G.'s official standpoint as the preparatory work had not yet been presented to the competent authorities inside of I.G. itself. It is obvious that the government's first interest was a militaristic one. Therefore the main points in the "Neue Plan" will have been.

Firstly a strict control over the whole chemical industry of Europe that no new plants for military chemicals should be created and that the production of such chemicals in the existing factories should be supervised.

Secondly: no licenses or know-how for such chemicals should be given to the chemical industry outside of Europe without before having asked I.G. of their opinion. This measure of course can be understood as

(signed) G v Schnitzler

being directed against the U.S. because U.S. remained apart from Russia the only country with a great economic potential in the outside world.

Frankfurt, Sept. 8th, 1945.

(signed) G. VON SCHNITZLER

These statements still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. However, the two statements should be considered in the light of the following explanations:

(a) A complete understanding of the Neuordnung can only be had if one considers the situation in the summer of 1940 at the time the Neuordnung was prepared by I.G. At that time there was the downfall of France on one side, continuance of war with England on the other side and the shadow of the possible conflict with the United States in the background.

(b) After Dr. Kurt Krueger and I signed the Neuordnung document which was sent to the Reich Minister of Economics (RWK) in about August 1940, I never saw the document again. Consequently, when I wrote about the Neuordnung document to the American investigators in 1945 I did not have any details of the document in my recollection.

(c) The Neuordnung was not written upon I.G.'s initiative, but was written upon the request of the Government as an "expertise" to be written by I.G. as the first expert in the chemical field.

(d) In the statement of 5 September 1945, I stated that we could keep Germany strong militaristically in relation to the United States only by limiting production of armaments in Latin America. By this, I meant that the following: If an Armistice came about in late 1940 or thereafter so that there was peace on the European continent, we would limit thereafter the production of war materials in Latin America by exporting materials to South America rather than having the South American countries build up their own production facilities, thus in case of a later war with the United States, the Latin American countries would

(signed) G v Schnitzler

not have such extensive production facilities with which to furnish war materials to the United States.

7. On 21 August 1945, I signed a two page statement entitled "Statement re repercussion of rearmament on the standard of living in the newly annexed countries," and on 21 August 1945, I signed a one page statement entitled "Additional Statement re standard of living and industrial transformations in the occupied countries." The text of both these statements follows:

S t a t e m e n t
re.

repercussion of rearmament on the standard of living in
the newly annexed countries.

"On order of the Nazi-Government with the annexation of Austria and Sudetenland and later on with the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in these newly conquered countries the economic system applicated in Germany at once was introduced.

Rearmament-production had to replace the normal production for peace-consumption and in a very short time the stocks were exhausted which in both countries were still available when the German troops entered into them.

VS The German troops themselves and dealers following them tried to acquire as much as possible of whatever was available in important goods - textiles, coffee a.s.o. which had yet become scarce in Germany, - and the domestic production was transformed from a platform of highly qualified export-industry into goods serving the rearmament purposes. This process developed with a rapidity which even surprised the economic circles themselves which were acquainted with the preceding development in Germany, and it was also surprising, how quickly the standard of living in these countries was adapted to the one existing in Germany. - And this not only happened in the industrial field, but in the agricultural just as well. Butter and ham of Prague disappeared from the market as quickly as coffee and chocolate and even meat in a short time became meager because the foreign-imported fodder was exhausted.

The workmen for instance in Aussig realised very soon that their nominally higher income represented in buying capacity a step backwards and the hardship of daily life to the population very soon became apparent.

The rearmament process materialized in such a way that first the capacities not entirely employed became used in full for Austria as well as for the Sudetenland huge plans for war production were at once set up, for Austria the Hermann Goering Werke at Linz, in connection herewith a Nitrogene-plant for 50.000 tons N, the utilisation of water power and the enlargement of the many different metallurgical works in Vienna, Wiener Neustadt and Steyr - in.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Sudetenland the great hydrogenation-plant in Br^ux set up for 700.000 to of oil-gas, which were nearly completed at the end of 1940. I.G. participated in this development with the great factory in Moosbierbaum near Vienna, which of course only made very slow progresses and was far from being terminated when war came to an end.

(Page 2 of the original)

For my opinion one can not speak of a displacement of industries from the West to the newly conquered countries, the industrial capacities and the industrial possibilities of these countries were used as an additional asset to the existing potential.

Frankfurt, 21.8.45

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

Additional Statement
re standard of living and industrial transformations in the
occupied countries.

"The factories having existed beforehand in Austria and Czechoslovakia in which I.G. took interest were relatively small and did not request a substantial capital-investment-compared with the huge enterprises which I.G. started as a new enterprise. But the old works of Donau-Chemie A.G. as well as Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau as Teerfarbenwerke Aussig - one and three being a 100% I.G. property No.2 a 50% participation, had to transform their activities according to the rearmament plan and later on to the necessities of war. Many of their departments simply continued and raised their production in the same products, these products, like sulphuric acid or chlorine and caustic soda being used as well for peace as for war purposes - and not being taken only for the latter purposes, but many of their departments were transformed from typical peace - into typical war-products. Thus in the Teerfarbenwerke Aussig the department of Naphtol AS dye, a typical export-article in the first line for India, had to fabricate Betanaphthylamine for the manufacture of Buna, and the Chemische Werke made new investments for typical war-products like Sulfur-Carbon and Hexamethylentetramin. The same applies to the Boruta in Poland, where of course during the whole war the production remained a restricted one, but the dyestuffs and intermediates produced there did practically all go to the Wehrmacht as they were used mostly by the textile industry of Lodz. Apart from that I.G. had the intention to construct a plant for accelerators at the Boruta, as the only other I.G. plant for accelerators was in Leverkusen. In France: Francolor preferably had to supply the French consuming industry with dyestuffs and auxiliary products, but a substantial part of the articles for which they were used, did go to the Wehrmacht, the intermediates which were made, to a large extent, did go directly to the Wehrmacht or they were sent to I.G. in order to complete I.G.'s deliveries for Wehrmacht purposes.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The most important ones among the latter were phenol and stabilizers for powder.

Frankfurt a. M., August 21st, 1945

sg. G. von Schnitzler"

These statements both still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

8. Concerning the general policy toward the economy of the occupied countries, I would like to make the following summary. Beginning with the occupation of Austria, it was plain from the statements of the government leaders that the "Grosswirtschaftsraum Politik" would be applied to the economies of each of the occupied countries. The general objective was to realize a more intimate relationship between the economy of the old Reich and the economies of the occupied countries under German leadership. This German leadership was either effected by the leadership and supervision of state controlled agencies, such as the Hermann Goering Works, or by private German enterprises under conditions satisfactory to the Reich economic authorities. However, excepting the "Auflagen" imposed upon I.G. for undertaking special duties in foreign countries, I consider that I.G.'s general policy in the occupied countries was merely one of intensifying previously existing relations on an amicable basis. Of course, the leadership which we exerted on this basis could not be achieved without the approval of the government economic authorities. However, I.G. never forced anybody to accept its propositions, even though it is true that the legal position of the leaders of the industry of occupied countries was that of an enemy national and not that of a free agent in peacetime. Many times, representatives of the industry of occupied countries proposed to I.G. that we enter into more intimate relations. As long as the war lasted, it was clear that the leadership and administration of the industries of the occupied countries had to be done on behalf of the German military potential. Otherwise the Reich government would have seen to it that a

(signed) G v Schnitzler

different leadership or administration was created. When I.G. sought to supervise or administer the production of a particular plant in an occupied country, we were only allowed to enter such an activity when we proved our ability to undertake this job and proved that it was necessary for the German military potential that I.G.'s "know how" and technical knowledge be used. The fact that the industries of the occupied countries were used to assist the German military potential is a part of an entire complex, and it applies to the entire German industry, and not alone to I.G. Moreover, in the dyestuffs field, the French civilian population obtained a bigger percentage of the dyestuffs produced in France than the percentage which Germans received of the dyestuffs produced in Germany. Furthermore, without I.G.'s help and assistance, the plants and companies merged in Francolor probably could not have run at all during the war. The same applies to the industrial activity in Norway and Czechoslovakia. This principle, of course, does not apply to the "Auflagen" where I.G. was directed by the government to undertake new types of production in the occupied countries.

9. I have carefully read each of the 16 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 17th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Muenberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPRECHER
U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of document No. NI-5195, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

A F F I D A V I T

I, Georg von SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before a representative of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I. G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 13 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading the statements or interrogations mentioned below are set forth below after the text of each of the statements or interrogations. 1945.

VS statements or
VS interrogations mentioned below are set forth below after the text of
VS below-are-given-after-the-text-of-the-statement-I-subscribed-to-in-August
VS each of the statements or interrogations.

2. On 8 August 1945 I signed an eleven page statement covering many points in the development of the I. G. Farbenindustrie during the Nazi Regime. I worked on this statement for two or three days in seclusion in Frankfurt in August 1945 and wrote it up in longhand. After the statement was typed up from my longhand original, I signed and certified to the truth of the typewritten statement. The text follows:

"The I. G. by force had to follow the general development in Germany. Whatever government ruled Germany, the key position of the I.G. in the whole chemical field undisputed since I.G.'s foundation in 1925 had to play and always played the decisive role in everything which was connected with chemistry. I remember a remark of Strossemann made to me in 1927: 'What have I as a trump in my hands apart of you, the I.G., and the coal people? That I.G. would follow a line, which was not in conformity with the line of the government, was simple

(signed) G v Schnitzler

unimaginable and that I.G. could refract from an order given by the government or take the attitude of an open or clandestine opposition was out of question - even at a time when Germany was a democratic state and government measures could be openly criticized.

Thus I.G. was "governmental" under Stresemann as well as under Brüning, as under Papen.

When Hitler legally came to power, instituted by old Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, in the beginning the attitude of I.G. in regard of the Nazi government was simply the continuation of the attitude I.G. had taken vis a vis former governments. - But very soon it became evident that the Nazi-regime which had started as a coalition-government together with Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei - which latter party had 3 ministers in the cabinet - intended to go quite different ways from former governments and by and by we learned what a totalitarian state meant in reality and what consequence that had for us.

The party claimed all power for itself. "Die Partei befiehlt dem Staat" - "The party gives its orders to the state" - was the official device, and the state is the instrument through which the totality of its inhabitants is ruled.

No political influence of professional groups was anymore tolerated - and in short I.G. found itself entirely devoid of all political influence. This state of things in no way was regarded as satisfactory and without a special order given in that direction a large-scale subvention action was started. From the local little houses up to Hermann Goering personally under the most varied names and through the most varied channels bigger and smaller sums were being given to the party, all with the aim to creating a better atmosphere, because very radical ideas in certain party-circles about the "Gross-Concerns" and particularly about the I.G. were common opinion.

The money was being taken but the result was more or less null and up to the last time of the war I.G. always was suspected to be "a state in the state" and the dismemberment of I.G. never left the clandestine party-program. On the other hand the party in the form of "Adolf-Hitler Spende" and "Interhilfs-werk" - W.H.W. and many other ways converted the subventions given formerly as a sort of bribery into a legal claim. -

When Hitler came to power he had promised to the masses the end of unemployment and he put this part of this program in the foreground.

In order to create work the industry had to get orders, and I.G. undoubtedly was one of the first ones to have advantages of it. As foreign currency was scarce - the great crash of 1931 lay only two years behind - an interior market had to be created and products which had before been imported had now to be manufactured in Germany - with the double aim, to save the foreign currency necessary for the import of textiles, metals, food, etc. and at the same time give additional work to German workmen. Thus, now 12 years later it is difficult to ascertain if the beginning of the "rearmament"-movement was rightout started as a military measure or if the first phase till the end of 1936 was not a primarily economic one in so far as the production of synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, rayon, synthetic fibres, a.s.o. was not only fostered to get materials for warfare but in order to make Germany in those products self-supporting and save the foreign currency for their importation. -

signed) G v Schnitzler

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The policy of "autarcy" and "rearmament" was so closely interconnected with one another that it really represents unsurmountable difficulties to distinguish which element of both was the prevalent one.

However it was, I.G. very soon profited by it and whereas in 1932 I.G.'s total expenditure for new plants and equipments was, I think, only 10-12 million marks, it climbed in the years 1934 - 36 rapidly and from thereon took a raging trend.

The technical possibilities being involved in that trend had undoubtedly a great fascination upon our technical people. Plans for which they could not see any practical realization as long as a normal economy existed, became realisable and the most fascinating prospects seemed to lie in the future. That this development in the last must lead 1) to impoverishment that means to a lowering of the standard of living, 2) to war, nobody did or wanted to realize. Even a man so strictly opposed to the Nazi-regime as Dr. Bosch who was the only one who once has dared to contradict openly Hitler - with disastrous result by the way, as I later on was told, had no hesitation to put Krauch at Goering's disposition, when being asked for a high ranking chemist who should take over the leadership of "Amt fur Wirtschaftsausbau" and Bosch was a convinced democrat, a convinced partisan of a peace-policy.

The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team-work with government and Wehrmacht.

The export-trade remained stationary at some 400 - 450 million marks and the buying-capacity of the civil population was not heightened (raised) as the nominally higher incomes in toto were counterbalanced by a loss in the so-called "Realeinkommen" and higher taxes.

Practically the whole augmentation in the turnover of I.G. from a little over 1 billion marks to 3 billions in 1943 is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war policy of the German government.

The totality of Buna, of metals, of high-octane oil, of most chemicals, at least 2/3 of the Nitrogen, and a great percentage of dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals went directly or indirectly to the Wehrmacht. A high percentage of this turnover from the very beginning was more or less guaranteed by the Wehrmacht. Agreements of the most different kind were being concluded but nearly all were based on solid ground insofar as the Reich guaranteed the amortization (light metals) or had arranged for a protective duty (oil, buna) or prescribed the use for the consuming industry (synthetic fibre). The result always was identical after a certain time the factories become or should become I.G.'s unburdened property. This latter result could be achieved with a raised rapidity with the so-called Ostwerke where the whole equipment could be amortized in the year of its investment provided that the owner made sufficient profits in the whole.

The direct consequence hereof was that I.G. notwithstanding that it spent some 500 million marks in the average of the last years had not substantially to augment its capital and that I.G.'s balance sheet under "plants and equipment" shows a practically unchanged figure. This state of things and the apparent splendid situation of I.G.'s balance weakened the central administration. - Young and active technicians like Ambros, Bütefisch, Wurster, but even men in positions not ranking as high like Altwicker and Ziegler in Bitterfeld

(signed) G v Schnitzler

in the metal-field handled on their own, problems of the greatest importance, engaged I.G. in always greater commitments. They used the word "Auflage", - "impost" of Wehrmachtsstelle X, but sometimes it never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage". The central administration registered the facts, when it

(Page 3 of the original)

came to the settlement of the expenses, but had very little to say in the matter. - To a large extent Krauch's office was a governing factor in these relations as the "Amt" under Goering's responsibility in the domains reserved to it, decided what quantities and where the respective production should be erected. In Sparte I Dr. Büttefisch took the lead in this direction and practically rounded out Dr. Schneider in the oil field, but Dr. Müller-Cunradi in close contact with Dr. Krauch did the same in the different domains being connected with Oppau and including the whole high-pressure field with the exception of the oil - but still Dr. Müller-Cunradi being in charge of the new works in Heydebreck was hereby the head of the so-called Tannol-Anlage, which to the best of my knowledge represented a new high octane fuel. A similar development took place in Sparte II. Dr. Ambros and Dr. Hurster as well as the chemists in Bitterfeld, here mostly in the metal field, but in some other domains of chemistry destined for warfare just as well became entirely independent of the "Sparten-leitung" and acted immediately with the different authorities of the Wehrmacht.

But things were very complicated in such a sense as the Wehrmacht had 3 or 4 quite independent departments and apart of the Wehrmacht Reichswirtschaftsministerium and Reichsbeauftragter Chemie had many functions reserved to them.

Between Reichsbeauftragter Chemie (Dr. Ungewitter) and Dr. Krauch quarrelling never ceased, as overlapping of authority happened all the time.

In the last phase of the war following ideas of President Kehrl of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, the organization of the "Gewerbliche Wirtschaft" became entitled to act to a large extent as a decisive factor and in principle a corporative system was in full creation. The result for I.G. was - although I.G. men generally were not being put in the foreground, because President Kehrl was in strong opposition against I.G. - that the overwhelming technical position of I.G. rendered it the deciding factor.

As an example I only may cite Dr. Hurster's activity - he indeed was put in the foreground - in the field of sulphur and sulphuric acid, who in fact ruled that important item of warfare chemistry with sovereignty. This system of corporative development was neither invented nor in principle fostered by I.G. but the facts were stronger than Mr. Kehrl's ideas and the industrial potential of I.G. became bigger and bigger.

Surely personal ambition and the pleasure of expending, mostly of the younger chemists, played its role in that development, but on the whole it was natural consequence of the war becoming more and more "total" and because nobody else than I.G. could handle those problems.

The combination of highly qualified chemists, big laboratories, an enormous potential of patents and experiences and a great financial capacity was too strong as not always being the decisive factor to I.G.'s advantage whenever a problem arose which had to be solved.

Apart of this technical situation the development of I.G. during the last 12 years can't be separated from the Government's foreign policy.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

From the very beginning it was the government's intention to make the "Mitteleuropäische Raum" as far as possible self-supporting and direct German import from overseas to the continent. Intensifying trade-relations to the south and the south-east of Europe even at the price of material sacrifices was the "mot d'ordre"; the next one was the intensification of the South-America business on the basis of barter-trading in order to get from there the products which were not available any more for Germany in the U.S. as the Reichsbank did not dispose of the necessary Dollars. Although I.G. was not in the least a partisan of this policy and would have preferred to develop its great international business on the line of a "most favoured nation"

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basis it had to follow the new trend - on the simple reason, that there did not exist any other possibility. Occasional suggestions in order to get a better stand were successful in the case of England for instance, but on the whole the official policy was carried through without giving the export-industry a chance to intervene. During the years from 1933 to 1937 I.G.'s expansion outside of Germany did not make a substantial progress. It kept up its position and its participations, but very little as far as I can recollect, had or could have been done or was added to it in entirely new investments, but what has been done, did not yet happen in the S.E. countries but in the countries of I.G.'s old established industrial activities in the Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries, in England f.i. the foundation of the British Magnesium Co. A complete change took place since 1938. Firstly by purely private negotiations of course with the approval of the government with I.C.I. an important agreement was being concluded, the foundation of the Trafford Park Chemical Co.

Much greater problems, however, had to be approached in by the incorporation of Austria and Sudetenland into Germany, with the creation of the so-called "Gross-Deutschland". To both countries I.G. always had exported on a large scale, in both countries a chemical industry existed, of which the "Aussiger Verein" and Dynamit A.G., Pressburg were old established enterprises, built upon a broad basis:

Relations of close team-work with the Aussiger Verein and I.G. had been operating for decades. In the dyestuff field a cartel agreement with the Verein had been concluded in 1934.

This dyestuff position of the Verein was the key of the whole problem, I.G. being the only producer of dyestuffs in Germany except one small Swiss-owned company in Grenchen on the German-Swiss border. Thus I.G. did not want anybody else enter that domain inside the German territory. As Chemische Fabrik V. Heyden had succeeded to get the permission of Reichswirtschaftsministerium to deal with the Verein about the purchase of the works in Aussig and Falkenau, I.G. had firstly to approach v. Heyden. An agreement was reached that both handled the question jointly on a 50:50 basis. In the then following negotiations the group v. Heyden-I.G. acquire the two factories with their coal-basis at a fair price, formed a new company, called it Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau G.m.b.H. and this latter company leased the dyestuff department by a long-termed agreement to I.G.

The relations with the Verein remained friendly. Not only was the Verein's position in the remaining Tschecho-Slovakia fully recognized, but a joint plant of synthetic fibre on I.G.'s processes was built up in Pressburg with a participation of 40% of the Verein, reserving to the Verein the supply of raw-materials from the Verein's factories in Nowaky and Handlora.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Undoubtedly the I.G. as well as v. Heyden took advantage of the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, but on the other hand the Zivno-Bank and its Generaldirektor Dovrazek were of the opinion that the Verein could not keep the factories under the changed circumstances. Mr. Dovrazek himself took an active part in the negotiations and even helped to find the compromise-formula, upon which the two parties agreed.

Whereas in the Sudetenland no other industrial activity of I.G. became practical the industrialisation of Austria required a substantial participation of I.G. in it. After the Anschluss I.G. had acquired the majority of Skoda Wetzlar works from Wiener Kreditanstalt and transformed this company into the Donau-Chemie A.G. The Donau-Chemie in the future became the stepping stone of the great development which took place in the chemical domain and culminated in the building up of huge installations in Moosbierbaum in the domain of power, sulfuric acid, hydrogenation of oil and magnesium. The latter plant, of course, never came to a start as the Luftwaffe stopped all work on it. In connection with this activity in Austria another great step to industrialisation took place in Slovakia. Since long years the D.A.G. (Dynamit A.G.) had a controlling interest in Dynamit Pressburg. Apart of the main works in Pressburg, D.A.G. owned a couple of smaller factories in Austria and participations in Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia.

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Of the Austrian factories part was consumed in Donau-Chemie (Bruckl and Landeck), the others remained as such in the form of independent Dynamite Cos. Pressburg itself took a gigantic expansion and developed a great export-trade to Hungary and the Balkan countries. - But the development in the S.E. was by far overrun by the industrial development which took place after the war against Poland. Based upon the coal of Upper-Silesia two gigantic works were being taken under construction, the one in Heydebreck on old German territory (recognised as German after the plebiscite of 1921), the other one on Polish territory in Auschwitz, between Kottowitz and Krakow. The factory in Heydebreck entirely belonged to Sparte I, the one in Auschwitz represented a combination of Sparte I and II, under the leadership of Sparte II and with Buna as the main-product. Both works for my opinion made slow progresses and came into fabrication only very late, with more substantial quantities in 1943 and 1944, but they never reached a state of real or full accomplishment. I think, some 800 million marks have been spent on them, half of which nearly, I would say, was written off.

Although at different times Dr. Ambros had invited me to visit Auschwitz, I have never been neither in Auschwitz nor Heydebreck and my knowledge solely reposes on reports given by Dr. Ambros and Dr. Müller-Cunradi. In connection with these works we acquired a controlling interest in a coal-mine - the Furstengrube - and were just dealing about a further interest in it, when the war entered in its last phase. Apart of this huge enterprises the Pharma had acquired land not so very far from Breslau on the Oder near Dyhrenfurt with the idea to construct there a pharmaceutical factory.

This never materialized and Dr. Ambros at a date unknown to me took over the leadership of that place. There under the firm of Anorgana G.m.b.H. for the account of the Reich I.G. fabricated the new, as I later on heard, in Elberfeld invented poisoned gases. This fabrication, of course, was kept so secret, that only in the beginning of the year 1945 (January to February) I heard for the first time of it, when Dr. Ambros in strictest confidence told me what I have given as my personal knowledge to Major Tilly at the end of April and what consisted of the fact that such gases based upon an inter-

(signed) G v Schnitzler

mediate of Ludwigshafen "Metaphenylendianine" had been made in a special equipment (all in glass) but that the whole production owing to the Russian advance had been shipped to the interior of Germany. Dr. Ambros at the time spoke of the great danger if ever smallest quantities of this product evaded. -

At that time (end of April) I was still under the impression that I.G. as a firm was only indirectly connected with the fabrication of that gas insofar as we had put chemists at the disposition of the Reich and supplied the intermediates. Later on by Major Tilly I heard that Anorgana which ran the plant was 100% I.G. and that the whole fabrication practically was an affair of I.G. He told me furthermore that these gases had been used by the Nazi authorities as a tentative in Auschwitz concentration camp.

In the last quarter of 1944 I should say, it was at the end of November or in the beginning of December, an allusion was made to me confidentially by Dr. Muller-Cunradi that terrible things had happened in the concentration camps of Auschwitz, that gases had been used there to kill people and that I.G. products were of something in it - of course it was only an allusion. Not knowing anything of Dyhrenfurt at the time, I could not bring this allusion in connection with the new gas, but I was so horrified by it that I only reacted "but do other people know that too", which he confirmed, yes, Ambros and the other men in Auschwitz know of these things. To Schmitz I made a remark about terrible things being connected with Auschwitz and Dyhrenfurt but without going into details. How far he was informed about it, I can't say, for my opinion he should have heard about the general happenings regarding Anorgana a.s.o. as financial interests of great importance were connected therewith and Ambros and Muller-Cunradi must have reported to him about the situation under all its aspects. - But that, of course, can only be heard from the 3 men themselves.

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I myself had never seen the agreement regarding "Anorgana" which was concluded before I took over my activity with the Chemikalien-business. I was of the opinion that the Reich owned plant and equipment of the so-called "Reichsbetriebe" at 100% and that Anorgana was a 50:50 position of Reich and I.G. for the handling of those products which were sold to manufacturers (Weiterver-arbeiter).

How secret all these matters had to be held by the men immediately concerned with them might become evident by the fact that Dr. ter Meer notwithstanding that we always worked together in the dyestuff domain in the closest cooperation never mentioned them to me and I was greatly surprised when I heard by Dr. Locher only a few days before I was taken in custody (May 7th) that under ter Meer's papers confidential material of this kind had been found. -

What motives induced Dr. Ambros to take over the factory in Dyhrenfurt, which primarily was destined for the management of the Pharma people of Elberfeld, I am completely at a loss to explain. I can only presume that his sometimes illimited technical ambition has driven him in this terrible job.

In Poland furthermore we acquired from Treuhandstelle Ost the Boruta and in connection with the Francolor transaction the Wimmica, the latter one had to be liquidated as no economical basis for it was still existent.

Boruta practically belonged to the Polish state, the share capital was lost and a state-owned bank which had given the necessary credits to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the Boruta was the real owner. As the German government in the parts of Poland which had become incorporated in Germany considered itself as the legal successor of the Polish state, no private interests were hurt by this transaction. This was unfortunately the case with Wola but the owners had to leave the place, fled to Warsaw and nobody was on the spot to look after the place. - The Wola had to be closed down as its economic value in war-times was null and the material, as far as it was transportable, was carried over to Boruta. In an extensive statement made on the Boruta/Wola question I explained the reasons for which it was necessary to acquire these factories. The factory of Wola was not acquired by I.G. The liquid assets had been sold out by the Kommissare and then the General Government Krakau sold the factory to a third party, Binder. As 85% of the dyestuff potential of I.G. was on the borders of the Rhine and as this whole territory had to be considered as endangered by air-raids, every capacity in the centre of the Reich and in the East had to be used.

Notwithstanding their relatively small volume the dyestuff factories of Aussig and Boruta became very valuable for keeping up the plans for the manufacturing of dyestuffs and intermediates. Thus Dr. ter Meer and I after the German troops had entered Poland proposed Dr. Schoner (technical chief of Wolfen) and Direktor Schrab, Frankfurt - commercial leader of dyestuff-business in Poland and Russia to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium as "Kommissare" and later on inaugurated the negotiations with the Treuhandstelle-Ost. In my above mentioned statement I said that I never believed we would keep these factories whenever it came to peace negotiations, still we could not let them fall into the hands of a third party and had to use them during the war in our and in the common interest and this was only possible if we secured for us their property.

About Norway it seems to be superfluous to report as these interests we had taken there in the light-metal field became invalid. The Luftwaffe decided that the works at Herøen scattered by air-raids should not be reconstructed.

In Holland and Belgium, to the best of my knowledge, no interests of importance have been acquired. Our relations with the group Solvay in

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in Belgium were immediately resumed and we ourselves interfered at the Reichswirtschaftsministerium that in the majority position of the group Solvay in Deutsche Solvaywerke, Bernburg, where Solvay held 75%, I.G. 25% no change should take place. Certain endeavours of the Salzdettfurth-concern to get part of Deutsche Solvaywerke with the aim to break up Solvay's majority position remained fruitless.

The plans we had elaborated for the handling of the industrial problems in the chemical sector in France are known.

In the first phase after the armistice we thought it necessary that the Government should sequester the whole chemical industry in order to make it work for the German war potential. Later on this policy was changed and after Monthoire the era of collaboration started. I do not think that any seizure had been carried through in this domain. - The key position very soon became the Francolor problem.

The guiding principle in its solution for I.G. was

- 1) the definite reparation of the injustice which I.G. had suffered when its factories in France had been taken away by the Versailles treaty,

(signed) G v Schnitzler)

- 2) a definite peace with the French dyestuff industry granting their industry a full occupation (7000 to of dyestuffs and a substantial development in the most varied fields).

We considered the whole affair as an equitable solution, nobody in France had lost one Franc by this transaction, on the contrary the value of the shares of the so-called mother-houses gained a considerable advance in the stock-exchange - as well as in their intrinsic value; the exchange basis for the I. G. shares being given as a counter-value could not be fairer. - In fact no money has been taken out of France, the dividend-clearing showed a "break-even", the factories not only remained intact but were improved in different domains. The arrangement had been considered by I.G. as a first step to a renewed European dyestuff-cartel, to the negotiating of which the German-French group should appear as one partner and we, that means ter Meer, Waibel, Ambros and I, always understood that Duchemin and Frossard would figure as partners in such negotiations.

The "Führungsanspruch" of I.G. once having been recognized in the handling of dyestuff matters, there was never a contrast or even a friction. I.G. helped Francolor in all its dealings with the Military Commander in France whenever this was possible or necessary and Francolor was a loyal partner. When Dr. Kramer left Paris, he told me, Duchemin said to him: "You have been loyal for us, you will see that we shall be loyal against you." The same principle of fair dealing was the aim of our negotiations with Rhone-Poulenc and Ugine in the field of Buna, plastics and pharmaceuticals. - Not having been an immediate participant in those different negotiations, which were conducted by Dr. ter Meer, v. Knieriem, and Amros or Kern - but having often seen H. Bau as well as H. Painvin, I have never heard the slightest complaint on their part of pressure or unfair dealing. When both gentlemen were in Leverkusen to visit the Buna installations in the late autumn of 1941 or 1942, an atmosphere of cordiality, if I may use that word, and not at all of animosity has reigned between the representatives of both sides.

Always in conformity with the principle of developing the continental Grossraum, I.G. was very active in Spain. The development of the two factories in and near Barcelona FENCE and Flix made substantial progress. In FENCE the installations for the (immediates) intermediates of Azo-dyestuffs were brought to termination, a pharmaceutical factory was in full construction, in Flix the new "Chlorelectrolyse" was gradually improving and plans of making the "Inquiesca" a subsidiary company for the manufacturing of derivatives of Carbur,.

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an active business proposition were being followed. - With "Unquiesca" in Bilbao license agreements in the field of Phenol and Formaldehyde for "Phenoplaste" were concluded and to "Altos Hornos" licenses for Nitrogene with technical help on the whole line were being granted. Apart of that the old friendship to Union Explosives Espanola was cultivated.

In Italy the participations in Acna and Bianchi kept on their normal development in the light-metal field the Samis tried to make progress and the two factories in which Buna was fabricated, came into production.

On the whole in all these countries as well as in the planning for a future industrialization of the South-East, I.G. fostered everywhere the industrial evolution with its patents, experiences and know-how and, as far as the government allowed it to do so, also with capital. The men who did the actual work, mostly did not even think of the political meaning of this development in the direction of "European Grossraum-Wirtschaft" and even inside I.G.'s Vorstand that was often forgotten. Words like "rule" and "dominate" were never (signed) G v Schnitzler

used, and I am sure that all these people having worked with I.G. in Spain and France, in Norway and Finland, in the South-East as well as in Italy have not had the feeling of being pressed or looted. On the contrary, they nearly all had personal profits of this collaboration and were after us to intensify our help. Dozen of files will and can prove that.

Coming back to the general policy: Undoubtedly I.G. had not only followed the government's "Grossraum-Politik" but had drawn substantial profit out of it. In figures as they appear on the balance-sheet an enormous progress has been made. As the export-figures in the whole remained unchanged and only a displacement from overseas to the European continent took place, the turnover in the so-called "Gross-Deutschland" up to the end of 1943 reached nearly four times the size of 1932. - Only part of it could be considered as being a perpetual asset. In Buna, in synthetic fibres and their raw materials and intermediates, in light metals and in hydrogenation many installations to a large extent are to be understood as war-dependent, but as a consequence of the close interdependency of autarkie and rearmament a great deal of the investments made under the four year's plan could be considered as valuable even under a complete peace-policy. - May I give as an example the "Nitrogene". The total German capacity should be - the destruction by air-raids not being taken into account - about 1.000.000 tons of "N". I.G.'s pre-war share in N was about 70%. One generally estimated that for agricultural purposes in Gross-Deutschland nearly 700.000 to of N were needed. Thus with all the possibilities in the development of the "Technical Nitrogene" the remaining 300.000 to. should have found a secure market - even without having to press on a forced export! The enormous amortizations which I.G. had been able to carry through would have given it an easy possibility of a revalorisation of its assets without having to lower the figures of its investments as participations on the balance-sheet of the so-called "Handelsbilanz".

Summarizing this part of I.G.'s activity: The close teamwork with Government and Wehrmacht in the joint endeavour to make Germany to a large extent autarchic and rearm her, involved a great amplification of I.G.'s potential and at the same time a substantial increase of her balance-figures.

The collaboration with the Wehrmacht followed two additional lines. In order to keep up a continuous contact in 1934 the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin was founded, in 1936 the so-called Abwehr-Delegierten were being designated. The Wehrmacht insisted on the highest secrecy of all its plans

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and let all people being in charge of planning or executing rearmament work, swear that they never let other people know what had been divulged to them in connection with their activity for Wehrmacht purposes. This had gone so far that for instance when Dr. Paul Muller of Dynamit A.G. in 1937 lead the members of Z.A. of I.G. over the Dynamit plant in Troisdorf, he refracted from showing to them entire departments saying "this is under strictest secrecy". Every infringement would have been punished with high penalties of hard labour. So practically everybody of the high-ranking staff was in such a way sworn in, the survey of what I.G. really did make or not make for the Wehrmacht became more and more a pure guess-work and one abstained of asking in order not to put one's technical colleagues in a difficult position. How far Schmitz himself was informed, who had the last responsibility for the balance figures, I am unable to say. My impression was that even he had only partly a more profound knowledge of what really happened and that a full picture of what had been done can only be got when one has heard every single one of the high ranking I.G. technical leaders, and not only the Vorstands-Mitglieder but also most of the Direktors and Prokurists just as well. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

But speaking of responsibilities in general Schmitz was responsible insofar as he was in charge of the distribution of the different domains of activity to the individual "Vorstands-Mitglieder". Thus each Vorstandmitglied in the case of having to take a graver and far reaching decision was bound to report about it to the chairman, that means to Schmitz. -

Independently of Abwehr and Vermittlungsstelle W the Wehrmacht engaged I.G. in active helps by asking it to get news out of axis and neutral countries. I reported on that matter in a former statement. I.G. put its means at the disposition of the Wehrmacht but it was understood that I.G. people whenever they were asked for such help had not to enter the typically military espionage but only had to report about economic matters in the largest sense. How far the Wehrmacht had made use of I.G.'s readiness to participate in this service can only be guessed by the satisfaction explained by O.K.W. of what had been done. Every individual man acting under secrecy and being prohibited of speaking about it under highest penalties.

A further team-work between Wehrmacht and I.G. developed under the heading "M-Fragen". This comprised all personal questions regarding men to be made free from service, special plans for the distributions of key-commodities to the different branches of I.G.'s technical activity and the so-called "Kriegsspiele", furthermore all questions arising in the military field, eventually not covered by the different activities I have mentioned before.

As I stated in the beginning of this report since 1934 the Wehrmacht first being only an additional factor to the relations having always existed between I.G. and the different Ministerien more and more developed to be the decisive or at least the most important factor.

The Nazi government acted on I.G.'s business through these different Ministerien, but the party itself interfered continuously in the following two directions.

1) After having dissolved all trade-unions, associations of employers a.s.o. the so-called Deutsche Arbeitsfront was constituted. Everybody practically had to participate in it, it became the decisive factor for the handling of all personal problems and found its legal basis in the law "Zur Ordnung der nationalen

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Arbeit". By this law the responsibility of the owner or undertaker of the Co. was not altered insofar as the conduction of the business and the fulfillment of its financial obligations was concerned but rules for the interior functioning were established which had to be strictly observed. Based on that law and in connection with the so-called Nürnberger Gesetze the party exercised a continuous pressure on all I.G. organizations to fulfil all the clauses of the party program, particularly the Nürnberger Gesetze.

Whilst I.G. was a compliant partner in regard of all demands of the Wehrmacht, it tried to refrain with all means from this latter intervention into its relations with its leading as well as the other personal. For years it maintained all its Jewish employees, to begin with Messrs. von Weinberg and Dr. von Simson, being members of the then still existing Verwaltungsrat, the highest institution of I.G. (a committee of the Aufsichtsrat) on their posts and did not dismiss a single one of these individuals, before his living abroad was guaranteed. Thus Mr. Flechtheim, Mr. von Simson, Mr. Kalisches, Mr. Hummel, Mr. Carl von Weinberg, whenever at last it became necessary to suggest to them to leave Germany, it has taken care of them in such a way that they had not to endure emergency. Only

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Mr. Arthur v. Weinbert, who always had believe that they would except him and some other men like Karf, for whom a prepared situation in England in the last moment did not materialize because the owner of that firm retracted or retired, became victims.

The party resented that attitude and gave I.G. continuous warnings that I.G. was not fulfilling the obligations incumbent to it and a state of tension always subsisted.

The same attitude was that being taken by the A.O. of the party in regard to the foreign representatives. In the first years practically nothing had been done on I.G.'s side to alter anything in the existing conditions. By and by by friendly negotiations and with lump sums generously fixed to satisfy them financially I.G. had to sever the connection with those representatives but when going over the files one will recognise that I.G. in every case tried to do its utmost to protect the men who had loyally served it and whom I.G. would never have dismissed if not this hard pressure would have been exercised upon it. That a company at last has to obey its government's orders is inevitable, but I.G. by conviction has always done its best to create as little hardship as possible and often only could get the Governments and the A.O.'s approval to the agreements with these employees by pretending that an ungenerous attitude on the side of I.G. would damage its international prestige. I.G. was driven from A.O. from concession to concession and the agreement made by Mr. Waibel with A.O. in autumn 1937 that in the future only such young men would be sent out who firstly belonged to the vSD.A.F. and secondly were ready to participate in the meetings, a.s.o. on the spot was a compromise on long negotiations by which Mr. Waibel succeeded that at least upon the "old" men on the spot the pressure was lowered.

vs Altogether these relations and negotiations with D.A.F. and A.O. remained and were always a most unpleasant chapter in I.G.'s activity but one may not forget that all the power was with the party and I.G. always was in the position of the defendant.

Apart of these two main domains of party-activity the Gauleiters interfered continuously in local questions but seldom in direct business, mostly in personal questions and then generally in the favour of such employees who were being considered as "confidential men".

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But up to the last time I.G. could refract from taking any typical party-men on Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat, a fact which should not be overlooked, as pressure from the most different sides in this direction never has ceased. Gauleiter Sprenger for instance always hinted at Avieny of Metall-Gesellschaft becoming member of the Aufsichtsrat.

I stated at the beginning of this report that after Hitler had come to power and before the official subventions of Adolf Hitler-Spende and U.H.V. had been inaugurated subventions of the most different kind had to be given and were given. I had never heard that I.G. before 1933 had fostered NSDAP financially, as I.G. had always done with the so-called "bourgeois-parties". It is considered vs this as improbable as Dr. Kalle who presided the committee being charged with these questions always was strongly opposed against the Nazi-party. If notwithstanding this had been done in 1932 Geheimrat Schmitz only can explain it, the question never having come to a discussion in the Zentral-Ausschuss.

To summarize the following must be stated:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

1) With the growing of the military interest in the government's program I.G.'s relations to the Wehrmacht firstly became an additional factor in I.G.'s official relations to the different other ministries, by and by the Wehrmacht became by far the most important one, and with the beginning of the 4 years plan the investment-policy of I.G. was not to be separated anymore from the policy of the Wehrmacht. Nearly all investments were made directly or indirectly for the Wehrmacht. I.G. was on the whole a loyal and complaisant partner of the Wehrmacht. That the Wehrmacht was not a typical Nazi-institution and only followed itself in material the line prescribed by the party is well known. The higher officers doing their duty as law-abiding officers were not Nazis by conviction, they have proved it on July 20th, 1944.

2.) I.G. followed the "Grossraum-Politik" of the government because there was no other economic policy to be made.

That I.G. itself would have preferred a policy of "most favoured nation treatment" and "world-wide trade" became a pure theory and could not lead to any real consequences.

3.) In the handling with party matters I.G. acted after the policy "Muddling through" with the result that in the last it always had to yield.

4.) Thus in acting as it had done, the I.G. contracted a great responsibility and constituted a substantial and in the chemical domain decisive help to Hitler's foreign policy, which led to war and to the ruin of Germany.

5.) Thus I must conclude that I.G. is largely responsible for Hitler's policy.

Frankfurt, August 8th, 1945.

Signed: G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Generally speaking, it does not sufficiently separate the pre-war from the war period.

(b) At page two, paragraph 4, it was erroneous to say that "The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team work with government and Wehrmacht." I would say now that this development "is due to the development of chemistry in general, to autarchy, to rearmament and, finally, to the war itself." I would now make the same qualification to the sixth paragraph on page 2, where I said the whole augmentation of I.G.'s turnover "is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war

(signed) G v Schnitzler

policy of the German government."

(c) In the last paragraph on page 2, I meant no reproach against the technical men of I.G. when I said "It never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage." An "Auflage" was more or less an order to or imposition of a task upon a concern or plant by the Wehrmacht. In working upon the "Auflage" as team workers with the Wehrmacht, I.G.'s technical men had the opportunity to suggest modifications of an old "Auflage" or to suggest a further project which later became an "Auflage."

(d) At the top of page 3, I should qualify the statement that the various plants became independent of the leadership of the Sparte heads and acted directly with the different Wehrmacht authorities. This result came completely to a head only after the war began, although it began as early as 1938, particularly after the Anschluss in March 1938.

(e) In the last paragraph of page 5, I wish to make some corrections. I stated here that Dr. Muller-Cunradi made "an allusion" in late 1944 that gases had been used in Auschwitz concentration camps to kill people and that I.G. products "were something in it." By this I meant I.G. products could have something to do with it. This was more of a reference to a rumour than it was an "allusion" to the fact. Since August 1945, I have talked to Schmitz and he does not recall that I ever mentioned the matter to him. However, my recollection is that I mentioned the matter to Dr. Schmitz at a lunch in Heidelberg when we were there for a Vorstand meeting in January or February 1945. Schmitz did not say anything at the time and since the Russians at that time were before the doors of Auschwitz, nothing thereafter could have been done about the matter.

(f) At page 6, paragraph 3, I stated that I could only presume that the unlimited technical ambition of Dr. Asbros had driven him to take
(signed) G v Schnitzler

over the factory in Dylrenfurt. That was my impression in August 1945.
But in the meantime I have learned that this was not because of the ambition of Dr. Ambros, but because of an "Auflage" from the Wehrmacht.

(g) At page 6, paragraph 5, I stated that the raw materials of the WOLA plant in Poland "was carried over to" the BORUTA plant in so far as it was transportable. It should be added that this was done before I.G. acquired control of the BORUTA plant during the period when the Reichkommissars Schoener and Schwab were administering the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I.G. had suggested that Schoener and Schwab, who were I.G. officials, be appointed as experts to administer the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I also wrote in the statement that I had made an extensive statement as to why it was necessary to acquire "these factories". Instead of "these factories" I should have said "the BORUTA factory." As far as the WOLA is concerned, the owner, old Mr. Szpielvogl with his family, had fled to Warsaw. The place had remained deserted.

VS The "Kommissare" for the "Reichs-account" liquidated the dyestuffs-department. The whole property, as Schwab had stated, was later on sold out by the General Government, Krakow, to a third party, whose name I only heard in the summer of 1945: Binder. Shortly after the occupation of Poland I once gave a hint to Schwab that he should try to assist the old
VS gentleman if ever possible, and I think he did something, but later on all traces of him were lost.

(h) On page 9, second full paragraph, the reports of the Vermittlungsstelle W and the Sales Organizations to the Abwehr were reports about economic matters which I.G. acquired in the normal course of business. It was not a typical military espionage. Of course where the Wehrmacht chose and engaged an individual of our sales organizations for its special purposes, I.G. could not influence that and the individual was sworn to secrecy. It only became evident that an I.G. representative

(signed) G v Schnitzler

abroad had Abwehr duties when we sought to recall the man or to free him for military service and then came a general order that we should keep him. VOWI must be dealt with separately, since the Wehrmacht at first wanted to take over VOWI's entire organization at the beginning of the war and Dr. Kurt Krueger, then head of Berlin N.E. 7, was at the same time mobilized as an officer with the Wehrmacht.

(i) On page 9, third paragraph from the bottom, I overstated by saying, without qualification, that the Wehrmacht became the decisive or at least the most important factor in I.G.'s development. I should have said "during the war." The Wehrmacht War Ministry was an important agency after 1934, but between 1934 and 1939, the Ministry of Economics, and between 1936 and 1939, the Four Year Plan were the principal agencies with which I.G. dealt. I might also point out that Hans Kehrl of the Ministry of Economics had continuous frictions with Krauch of the Four Year Plan.

(j) On page 10, paragraph 2, I believe the typist miscopied my longhand at one point. I wrote "refrain" and she typed "refract."

(k) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I made a mistake due to my lack of more detailed knowledge of technical matters. The technical development of I.G. concerning bunn, artificial fibres, and synthetic oil was not as dependent upon the Wehrmacht's intentions as I thought in 1945. As I have since found out by discussions with my technical colleagues, these matters were developed under the Autarchy Program with the Ministry of Economics and the Four Year Plan and the Wehrmacht did not interfere at all. However, with magnesium, the Wehrmacht had a direct interest from the very beginning. In the other fields the Wehrmacht only became by and by more interested and, of course, interested overwhelmingly when the war broke out.

(l) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I said the Wehrmacht followed the party line "in material." I meant in the Latin "in materia" -
(signed) G v Schnitzler

or in the German "in der Sache, aber nicht in der Ueberzeugung," which can be translated "in the fact but not with conviction."

(m) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheadings 4) and 5), I must now make the following qualifications: I believe that I and I.G. Farben as a whole have contracted a great responsibility before God in that our acts constituted a substantial help to Hitler's foreign policy. However, I did not mean that I accept any responsibility in the legal sense. To the best of my conviction we never did anything unlawful against humanity. But we were in this terrible boat with Hitler, and since we have participated in handling this boat, we have a responsibility before God and consequently before mankind. I can explain this in the words of the "Matthaeus Evangelium": There are two duties for a Christian, the love of God and the love for your neighbor. Concerning mankind, we acted against the love of our neighbor, and that is what I mean when I say we consequently have a responsibility before mankind. The last two paragraphs were inserted because I felt a moral, but not a legal responsibility, because I.G. had contributed a substantial, and in the chemical domain a decisive, help to Hitler's foreign policy which led to war and to the ruin of Germany and Europe, by the mere fact that without a substantial chemical industry modern warfare is impossible. It would not have been possible to carry through in the years 1939 to 1945 without the potential of the chemical industry. By this I do not mean to indicate a graver moral responsibility for I.G. than I believe should also be accepted by other Germans or other German concerns who made a comparable contribution with the necessary implements of warfare in the broadest sense.

3. On 15 August 1945, Dr. Max Illner and I signed a one-page statement simply entitled "Statement," the text of which follows:

"Since 1936, I.G. officials paid by I. G. and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel all paid by I. G., planned for the Nazi Government, the Rearmament phase in the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera. This was handled by the Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau and the Generalbevollmächtigter für Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung, under Mr. Krauch.

(signed) G. v Schnitzler

(signed) H. Ilgner"

Frankfort on the Main
August 15, 1945.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct, except that I would now qualify it in two places as follows:

(a) For the words "The rearmament phase" I would substitute "the autarchy and rearmament phase."

(b) For the phrase "such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera," I would substitute the words "such industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera, which were important industries for the autarchy program and the rearmament program and which we also hoped would be economically workable under a peace time regime."

4. On 21 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement entitled "Statement re Mobilization in the Summer of 1938," the text of which follows:

VS "Since the peaceful invasion into Austria the whole German country practically was on the foot of mobilization.

This state of things became even more accentuated, when Hitler had entered into Prague and preparations for a campaign against Poland were started. Since July 1939 many of our employees and particularly the officers of the reserve of the so-called new army were called to their regiments and lined upon the Polish frontier.

Simultaneously the industry was mobilized. Mobilization-plans which in the case of war was allowed or ordered to be produced, had a long time ago been prepared.

These plans, which beginning with 1934 had been made up by individual firms in close team-work with Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie and the competent ministries - became effective in such a way, that Wigrü returned them to the individual firm with his approval stamped on them.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

For my opinion the respective plans had been handed over to the firms in the current of the summer 1939, mostly with the instruction that they should be applicable at the moment of the outbreak of the war. Thus the plan for dyestuffs as far as I can remember became effective the first of September. For some commodities of purely military character, as the so-called implements of war, the mobilisation-order must have become effective to a much earlier date.

I should say, beginning with the spring of 1939, one after another of these latter products or objects has been put in the state of mobilization. The orders by Hugu-Chemie did not pass through the hands of the commercial administration; or they were sent straight to the producing works or passed through Tea-Büro. - I myself was so firmly convinced, that at the last moment an agreement about Danzig and the so-called Corridor would be reached, that I left Frankfurt about August 11th or 12th on a vacation-trip by car with my wife and my unmarried daughter to Yugoslavia - and was called back about the 27th or 28th of August from Belgrade.

Frankfurt, Aug. 21st 1945.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Instead of the word "mobilization" in the title, and in the first paragraph, I would now use the word "preparedness." The mobilization (in the German "Mobilmachung") had been prepared, both personnel and war materials being mobilized in a certain sense, but the order placing the mobilization plans in final effect was not given until war broke out, as I have been informed since 1945. Therefore, the use of the word mobilization ("MOBILMACHUNG" in the German is a technical term) without qualification might be misleading.

(b) In the second line, first paragraph, I meant to use the word "footing" instead of the word "foot."

5. On 28 August 1945, I signed two one-page statements, the longer one entitled "Statement re 'Tense Situation' in Summer 1939" and the shorter one entitled simply "Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler." These statements are complementary and can be properly commented upon together. The text of each follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

"28 August 1945

Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler

v3 I would say that in my capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Wirtschaft Gruppe Chemie I had occasion to meet with Mr. Ungewitter at least once a month in Berlin. There we discussed official business regarding the different matters concerning the chemical industry. It was in July 1939 at one of these meetings in the presence of Mr. Earmann, Deputy to Ungewitter, that Mr. Ungewitter told me that Hitler was determined to invade Poland and that, in view of the assurance given by England and France to Poland, we must be prepared for an attack on our western front. There could be no doubt in my mind from the manner in which Mr. Ungewitter spoke that the attack would take place as soon as the harvest was collected, which meant some time in September. Ungewitter told me also that the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Economics had informed him that our "Eriegewichtigen", that is, the Ludwigshafen and Oppau works must be moved from the western frontier because they were too close. We feared also that they might have guns which could shoot over the 60 km. distance between our factories and the French frontier. I said at once to Mr. Ungewitter that this idea of moving the works seemed quite impossible to me. When I spoke to Dr. Ter Meer one of the next days, he told me that he was well aware of the plan and he confirmed that it was impossible to move the works and I am certain that Mr. Ungewitter has talked over these questions much more strongly with Dr. Warster and Dr. Ambros than he did it with me, who was not responsible for the Ludwigshafen - Oppau works. It is incontestable that Mr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the Vier Jahres Plan, when he informed me in the beforementioned way.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

"Statement re "Tense Situation" in Summer 1939

When Hitler had entered into Prague, one could not have any doubts that he was ready to go for war. The tension which since the Anschluss of Austria lay over Europe, became nearly intolerable. The German country was in a continuous state of mobilization. This had gone so far that even men like myself being not under any military obligation in March 1939 got a "Mobilmachungs-Order" to be in the case of war, at the disposition of their firm. The plans for the Mobilmaking of the key-industries were handed out to the individual firms, partly, for the so-called implements of war, they at once had to become efficient, for other domains it was provided for that they should enter in force with the outbreak of war — this applied for instance to the best of my knowledge for dyestuffs.

Shortly afterwards, it may be in June, the first incidents were provoked at the German/Polish border, riots in Danzig were "arranged" and as we know from last year in the Sudetenland, how such things were being managed, we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland, if Poland should not accept his demands.

Optimists like myself remained hopeful that at the last moment an arrangement should be found but the earnestness of the situation could not be hidden as the guaranty of England for Poland was a fact. The public about this was misled by the announcement of the great apothosis which should happen in Tannenberg at the end of August in order to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Tannenberg as well as to disclose the sepulchrum for old Marshall Hindenburg.

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I think it was in July 1939 that I had in Berlin a conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in the presence of his deputy, Mr. Hermann. In this conversation, Dr. Ungewitter informed me that the conflict with Poland could break out at any time and that after the opinion of the competent ministerium in principle the manufacturing of all chemical products important for warfare should be removed from Ludwigshafen/Oppau and be transferred to other works not so near to the French frontier.

I said at once to Dr. Ungewitter that this seemed quite impossible to me as such producing capacities in the other works were not existent.

The same was confirmed one of the next days by Dr. Ter Meer when I talked to him about that conversation and I am certain that Dr. Ungewitter had talked over those questions much more thoroughly with Dr. Warster and Dr. Ambros, than he did it with me, who was not responsible for Ludwigshafen/Oppau. It is incontestable that Dr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the "Vier Jahres - Plan," when he informed me in the before-mentioned way.

Frankfurt, Aug. 28th, 1945

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

Both these statements were made upon the basis of a strong impression I had in August 1945 and they were firmly written in my recollection. The statements both still appear to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief except that I would like to make the following explanations:

(a) Recollecting all my anxieties of that summer of 1939, all the wild fury which I felt against Hitler's policy, I am inclined to believe that unknowingly or subconsciously I might have interrelated (unterschieden) certain of my own worries and concerns to Dr. Ungewitter and I believe that this is a psychological and understandable error! Ever since the invasion of Prague, which happened the very day when we were sitting in Düsseldorf on the so-called Anglo-German industrial committee, and after having exchanged reactions on that event with Sir Francis Clarke, the head of the British steel industry, my anxieties about the future steps which Hitler might take never came to an end. Apart from some personal friends not being connected with I.G., I only showed from time to time my deep worries and concerns to Carl von Weinberg, Dr. Hans Kugler, and Richard von Szilvinyi.

(signed) G. v. Schnitzler

(b) It is clear that I had a specific conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in about July 1939 in which he stated that it was opinion of the competent Reich authorities that the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant would have to be closed down because they were too close to the French frontier. But as I now view it, he must have meant and must have stated that this order was prepared so that it would go into effect in case of war. Moreover, I am now doubtful if Dr. Ungewitter actually said that Hitler was determined to attack Poland. He could not have known this then. However, since he was the link between the government and the chemical industry, I know he was speaking on behalf of the Four-Year plan concerning the closing down of Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant and I was very impressed by the manner in which he spoke. When he additionally expressed himself to the effect that the international situation was grave and that it was quite possible there could be a war with Poland, which would involve France and England, I probably read into his statement that he said Hitler was determined to attack Poland.

(c) In the second paragraph of the larger statement, I said "we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland". This was my firm impression in August 1945, but I should have only spoken for myself and not said "we". Moreover, I thought Hitler's foreign policy of bluff backed by the strong fist would probably cause Poland to give in to his demands. However, I was a very worried man, particularly after the invasion of Prague, since I felt that England, France and America were bound to take a stiffer attitude to Hitler's words and actions, and that ultimately Hitler's policy would bring Europe to war and ruin.

6. On 22 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement concerning war preparations, the text of which follows:

"Even without being directly informed that the government intended to wage war, it was impossible for officials of I.G. or any other industrialists to believe that the enormous production of armaments and preparation for war starting from the coming into power of Hitler accelerated in 1936 and reaching unbelievable proportions in 1938 could have any other result."

view of the enormous concentration on military production and of the intensive military preparation, no person of I.G. or any other industrial leader could believe that this was being done for defensive purposes. We of I.G. were well aware of this fact as were all German industrialists and on a commercial side, shortly after the Anschluss in 1938, I.G. took measures to protect its foreign assets in France and the British Empire.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

This statement represents my impression in August 1945. This statement offers an appropriate basis for making some additional statements concerning the feelings I held before the outbreak of war in September 1939. I resented Hitler's rearmament policy, and I was terribly oppressed by it. I mentioned my feelings confidentially to my close collaborators and to my personal friends, such as Professor Rousselle, Carl von Weinberg, Richard von Szilvinyi, and Dr. Hans Lugler. I often said confidentially that that man (referring to Hitler) would bring us to ruin because the world in the long run would not tolerate his actions and his offensive speeches. I disapproved of the movement of troops into both Austria and Czechoslovakia. However, my feelings concerning the use of force to effect the Anschluss were influenced by a strong feeling, which I held to this day, that Austria and Germany are basically one nation and that the Austrians wanted a union with Germany. Therefore, the propaganda and the reports which came out concerning Austria, just before and just after the Anschluss, did not necessarily appear exaggerated to me. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia (leaving aside the occupation of the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement) in March, 1939, was an entirely different matter for me. This military invasion deeply shocked me to the deepest depths of my heart. The occupation occurred when I was in Düsseldorf at the German-English Conference of industrialists. On the way to a luncheon party at this time Sir Francis Drake of England gave his reaction to this terrible step. My opinion was identical to his. I was just as shocked as he was and had neither an explanation nor an excuse. I always considered that Czechoslovakia was a godchild of the United States and that this occupation would deeply offend America. The 13th of March 1939 is the decisive date for me with respect to the foreign policy of the Hitler Regime. On that date it

(signed) G v Schnitzler

became absolutely clear to me that Hitler would lead Europe to ruin. I so expressed myself to my close friends, and proof of this can be obtained from them. From the very first moment it was clear to me that it was a terrible wrong to mankind which was done by the occupation of Prague. I know only too well many Czech people not to be fully aware that they were not Germans and that they did not want to have a German domination. After the Sudetenland was incorporated into the German Reich, I did not believe a word of the propaganda against Czechoslovakia. With respect to the Polish question, I distinctly disapproved from the first moment of any coercive or forceful measure. I didn't accept the Polish border "incidents" as true nor did I accept the propaganda concerning Poland. But, on the other hand, I didn't believe them to be as artificial as I recognized them to be after the collapse of Germany, because I felt that hatred was being made by both sides and that there was injustice concerning the Polish Corridor and East Prussia. I did not think the Polish question would come to war because I thought Hitler, following his policy of bluff, backed up by the strong fist, would secure his demands of the Poles by his bluff. However, I was among that group of Germans who were worried that Hitler might not get away with his bluff toward Poland and that this would mean war not only with Poland but as well with France and England. After Ungewitter had told me in July 1939, that the government was concerned about the proximity of the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant to the French border, I was worried by the prospect of war. As head of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss of I.G., and as the person in charge of the biggest part of I.G.'s export trade, the dyestuffs field, I quite naturally took every precaution of a cautious and considerate business man in case a clash should occur. I was not a gambler myself, and I considered gambling too mild a word to describe Hitler's foreign policy. I then considered Hitler's foreign policy a matter of "Verbrecherisches Spekulieren", which can properly be translated as criminal speculations. The steps I took to protect I.G.'s

(signed) G v Schnitzler

foreign assets abroad were the natural protective steps of a cautious business man against this criminal speculation. At the time in 1939, I felt that a captain should stay with his ship, that I owed certain obligations to my employees, and that I had a responsibility to I. G. Farben, in total, including the shareholders. For those reasons I did not resign or withdrew to an unimportant position in spite of my aversion feelings concerning Hitler's policy.

7. I have carefully read each of the 25 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 18th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Draxel A. Spracher
DRAHEL A. SPRACHER

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATION

I, ERMA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5196, the original of which is in the English language.

ERMA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

end

A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945; after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these documents are set forth below after the text of the respective statement or interrogation.

2. On 21 August 1945, I signed a two page statement principally concerning I.G. and the chemical industry of Germany and of Europe generally, the text of which follows :

"When one tries to compare the I.G. with the rest of the chemical industries of Germany, one should never forget that the mother houses of I.G. which constituted the merger in 1925 themselves were by far the biggest enterprises in the chemical domain in Germany. After the revaluation of the mark in 1923 and 1924, the three greatest of the I.G. firms, Badische, Bayer, Hoechst each had a share capital of 150,000,000 marks and by capital turnover, earning capacity, or by whatever aspect is being taken were each at least three to four times bigger in size than anyone of the other chemical firms. It has always been characteristic for the German chemical industry that there was on one side this huge agglomeration of industrial power called I.G. and on the other hand an extremely great number of small enterprises split over the whole country. Wieru-Chemie gathered four thousand firms and very few of them had a turnover of more than RM 1,000,000. I.G., at the top of her activity, showed a turnover of three billion marks and their subsidiaries including Dynamit A.G. had a turnover of another billion marks. Of this latter billion marks, of course half at least can be considered as typical ammunities business without importance for peace time. Compared with this, three and one-half or

(signed) G v Schnitzler

four billion marks, the next one on the list, the so-called Henckel concern of Dusseldorf, manufacturer of soap and other washing products, figures only with a turnover of somewhat two hundred million marks and this gives a true picture of how outstanding I.G.'s position was. As a third firm, the Deutsch Solvay Werke and Schering A.G. of Berlin in fourth place has a turnover of between one hundred and two hundred million marks and that probably closes the list of the combines with over one hundred million marks of yearly turnover. Altogether the German chemical industry in the top year of 1943 including Austria and Sudetenland might have had a turnover of approximately ten billion marks. But if one only compares the six and the four billion, one is far from a true picture of what the real potential of I.G. in relation to the combined total of the other German firms represented. Not only that new inventions of outstanding importance practically were alone made by I.G. and that research work on a large scale was exclusively done by I.G., the real importance of I.G. in her qualities as a supplier of all basic products to the other chemical industries was even much higher. Entire groups of chemistry like the varnish and the lacquer industry and dyestuffs and solvents were entirely dependent on I.G. and in the pharmaceutical domain even firms like Schering and Berck also possessing a big share in the pharmaceutical business of finished products depended on I.G. in her basic organic products like aniline and the different derivatives of acetic acid. It has once been made an analysis which part I.G. had in the pharmaceutical business and as a test case one had analysed the turnover of two Krankenkassen in different parts of Germany. The analysis only showed a share of I.G. of somewhat as 20%, but on the one hand the Kassen did not take articles with a standard name like Aspirin, buying as little as possible and trying to place their orders in the market of the products without the special brand of a firm so that practically I.G.'s share will have to be much bigger (but it must not be forgotten that practically all pharmaceutical products as before said are based on raw materials and intermediates bought from I.G.). It is not exaggerated to make this statement that the entire pharmaceutical industry literally would come to a standstill if I.G. would stop production. The same applies to the entire textile industry which reposes on I.G. for dyestuffs and all kinds of auxiliary products including the cleansing and wetting process.

vs. There is only the soap industry, properly speaking, which to a large extent is self-supporting on their own basis and then of course Solvay and the other less important producers of carbonate of soda and chlorine and caustic soda.

To summarize I may give some samples of I.G.'s relative share in the different key domains of chemistry: dyestuffs - 100%; auxiliary products at least 50%, probably in pharmaceuticals at least 1/3, the other 2/3 all depend on the supply of basic organic products through I.G.; nitrogen, before the war - 70%; general chemicals apart from I.G.'s own consumption

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between 20% and 80%; photographic articles - 80%; carbides at least 80%; bums - 100%; plastics, etc., modern thermoplastics made by polymerization - 100%, the old products, phenoplast 30-50%; light metals, magnesium at least 90%; only one small producer apart from I.G., Wintershall, aluminum only, a modest participation. Thus from whatever angle one takes up the problem, I.G. has the key position as producer in the whole range in inorganic and aromatic organic products and a walkover position in the aliphatic field. This taken together with the overwhelming position I.G. has in the field of photographic products and the strong majority in nitrogen, one has to make the statement that chemistry in Germany and I.G. is to a great extent synonymous. But it does not cover the entire position of I.G. in the chemical field, if one does not analyse the interconnection between the German chemistry and that of the neighboring countries. None of these countries including France is self-supporting in such a sense that

(signed) G v Schnitzler

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they under normal economic circumstances can get rid of I.G.'s supplies and the intercourse with her. Not only the textile industry of Scandinavia, Holland, France, Czechoslovakia can be separated from the supply of dyes, auxiliaries, etc., from I.G., but also the chemical industry of these countries is closely related to her and it is fairly unimaginable that for instance Holland, Belgium, and Scandinavia will renounce to any intercourse with the I.G.'s chemical works located on the borders of the Rhine River. Also the pharmaceutical products of "Bayer" can not be thought away from a Belgian or Dutch or Swedish dispensary. Even in France where a much stronger chemical industry exists than in the aforementioned other countries, I.G.'s products as well as I.G.'s licenses will be needed in many important domains and as well the Kuhlmann group as Rhone Poulenc will be only too glad to reassume those relations. I can not imagine that England or United States can entirely replace this position which had been held for such a long time and which is based upon scientific and business relations as well as the reciprocal knowledge of the language. After World War I, relations with Holland were being resumed at once, with Belgium after a very short interval, and with France in a slowly climbing tendency up to 1927 when Germany became the first industrial supplier of France and this without competing against the domestic industry in France. The business done in these countries by I.G. was not directed against the English and American importation, which only partly materialized in the same fields and which as far as the English were concerned were mostly protected by cartel agreements. Speaking generally of exports, I.G.'s share in the export of German chemical industries can be considered as being the half of the total export. Exact figures were never available because the official figures did not always coincide with the figures made up by the individual firms and as the handling of turnover figures of subsidiaries of I.G. was not identical in the official way compared with the handling inside of I.G.

G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that in the second paragraph, page one, I exaggerated the importance of the dependence of the other German pharmaceutical firms upon I.G. I.G. did have at least a one-third share of the German pharmaceutical interest, but balance of the German pharmaceutical industry did not all depend on I.G. to supply the basic organic products. I really am not able to make an accurate estimate of the dependence of other pharmaceutical plants upon organic products produced by I.G.

2. On 9 August 1945, I signed a one page statement concerning I.G.'s investment and amortization policy, the text of which follows :

"Whenever the I.G. had to make substantial investments for the Wehrmacht's needs and wanted to take the whole risk upon her own shoulders or was compelled to do so, then of course in the agreements, she always endeavored, and to the best of my knowledge, succeeded in getting the high amortizations necessary to write the factories off in the shortest possible time. Apart from the amortization, I.G., tried to get protection of

(signed) G v Schnitzler

such a kind that the product in question should not be replaced by other products in the event of a change in market conditions. The normal amortizations for I.G. installations were calculated at 5 percent for buildings and 10 percent for equipment. In installations for Wehrmacht purposes, we tried to get higher percentages, and for example, in the case of Aken Leichmetal in Aken, we succeeded in getting 15 percent on the equipment, which meant that in the seventh year the whole equipment was written off. Protection was asked and granted for buna in such a way that for the import of natural rubber, a sliding scale was fixed that the consumer always had to pay as much duty for the imported rubber to the Reich as to cover the difference between the price paid for natural rubber "CIP" Hamburg, and the prices fixed by the government for buna. This price for buna was from time to time modified and continuously lowered with the progressive production and the higher efficiency of I.G. processes.

I think the last price for buna has been something like 2 marks 30 pfennings (2.30) per kilogram weight (IG), but it was hoped that it would go down further to 1 mark 30 pfennings (1.30) per kilogram weight or to 1 mark, 80 pfennings (1.80) per kilogram weight. A similar scheme was fixed for the importation of natural oil, and the last price basis which I can recollect should be 22 pfennings per kilogram weight, as compared with 7 pfennings per kilogram weight "CIP" Hamburg.

VS. In the field of synthetic fibre a number of regulations for the textile industry made secure that the production of synthetic fibre which, if I am not mistaken, went to three hundred thousand tons per year, would be consumed.

The so-called Ost Steuer Hilfe permitted equipment to be immediately written off by 30 percent, and I believe 30 percent for the plant. Thus I.G. was able to amortize the two great factories at Auschwitz and Heydebrück to almost half the cost value, and these works never had, up to the end of the war, been in full production. Of course, this provision was only granted when the profit of the total enterprise was sufficient to pay the normal taxes on it.

I have read this statement and swear that the facts stated therein are true.

G. v. Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Of course, I can be mistaken on certain percentages, but the general idea I wanted to demonstrate is absolutely clear from this statement. Dr. Fritz ter Meer, aided by Dr. Buhl, represented I.G. in the negotiations with the Reich Government which resulted in the tax on natural rubber which was equal to the difference in the cost between natural rubber and buna. Dr. Heinrich Rüfenach and Dr. Ernst Fischer represented I.G. for the same purpose with respect to a tax on natural oil equal to the difference in the cost between natural oil and synthetic oil. In securing the government regulations to secure the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

consumption of synthetic fibers, I.G. was represented by Dr. Fritz Gajewski and Mr. Wilhelm Otto.

3. On 18 August 1945, I signed a two page record of interrogation principally concerning the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie, the text of which follows :

"Q. When was the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie organized?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was organized in 1933. It grew out of a private association of the chemical concerns which was a very old organization. However, in 1933 it became a semi-official organization and its functions were to advise the government on policy matters in the chemical industries.

Q. What was your position in the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. In the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie I was member of the "engerer Beirat", (the inner Board) since 1933.

Q. What official position did you hold?

A. I was deputy chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie which was a component of the Reichsgruppe Industrie.

Q. Who appointed you deputy chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. In so far as I can remember the chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was appointed by the Ministry of Economics. I think I was appointed by the chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie as his deputy. Of course, my appointment could not have been made without the consent of the Ministry of Economics.

Q. Who was the manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. Dr. Ungewitter.

Q. Who was Dr. Ungewitter appointed by?

A. Dr. Ungewitter was formerly in the Verein the manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie and then, of course, he was appointed by the Ministry of Economics.

Q. Who paid the salaries?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe.

Q. How did the Wirtschaftsgruppe get its money?

A. In the form of an "Umlage" on account of the chemical firms based on the totality of wages and the number of employees. Membership in the Wirtschaftsgruppe was compulsory.

Q. In regard to important steps or decisions to be made by the Wirtschaftsgruppe were you informed?

A. Yes. When important steps were to be taken the leader conveyed the "engerer Beirat".

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Can you give me an example of a policy decision made by the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. The two most important things the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie has done were: Firstly the Z.A.V., the "Umlage" of the Z.A.V. on the industry. That was in 1934 or 1935, and secondly during the war it handled the question of the statements of the excess profits from the standpoint of the price commissars.

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Q. What were the "Mob" plans?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe or its different affiliations had the function to control the entire production in the chemical field and to prepare the distribution of the available and the needed commodities. This was done for every important product of the chemical industry. I remember that the most important commodities figures on a special list which was particularly supervised by Dr. Ungewitter personally. The production plans of the different branches of the chemical industry could only be made up in accordance with the prescription of Dr. Ungewitter. Dr. Ungewitter in his person united different functions.

Q. Can you give us the history of the development of the production plans for war, i.e., the "Mob" plans?

A. From the very beginning of the Nazi regime the Wirtschaftsgruppe was charged with semi-official functions in order to prepare an eventual German mobilization for war. In this connection they made an analysis of every chemical firm in Germany what their producing capacity was and what they had in stock, etc. For the so-called great commodities a production plan has been made up and the distribution for the needs of an eventual war was prepared. Representatives of the Wirtschaftsgruppe, that means officials, acted in close collaboration with the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of War to collect that material and get from the different firms these plans which he did approve or disapprove. With the beginning of the war the long prepared system was put into action and functioned with the greatest accuracy. No firm was allowed to go beyond the production plans fixed beforehand and the commodities used for their manufacturing were strictly controlled. Thus Wirtschaftsgruppe and the other affiliations were from the first beginning an instrument which served as an intermediary between the Ministries of Economics and War and the individual firms.

Q. When was the order putting the plans into action issued?

A. All the German industries were mobilized in summer 1939 and in summer 1939 the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie issued an order that the plans for war were in action. In June or July 1939 I.G. and all heavy industries as well knew that Hitler had decided to invade Poland if Poland would not accept his demands. Of this we were absolutely certain and in June or July 1939 German industry was completely mobilized for the invasion of Poland.

G. von Schnitzler."

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The statements made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that my last answer in this interrogation should be qualified by the explanation of Ungewitter's statement to me in June or July 1939 which I have previously given in paragraph 5 of my affidavit of 18 March 1945, where I discuss together two statements I signed on 28 August 1945.

4. On 21 July 1945, I subscribed to a five page record of interrogation principally concerning the Mob-Fragen (Mobilization Questions), the text of which follows :

"Q. What was the M-question?

A. The M-question contained everything with regard to personnel questions connected with the war.

Q. Will you please explain it?

A. For instance, it started in the year 1940, that the Reich permitted that the years 1906 and 1907, if they were occupied in a "wehrwichtige" organization, could stay with their firms. Later on from time to time, the question how far one could ask people to be what we call uk = unblödmlich, free from army service, was dealt with. Then it contained the regulations to the Wehrmacht, generally spoken but not "Abwehr" questions - sometimes Abwehrfragen too - (i.e. C.I.C.) not active but the passive defense against enemy espionage), the inner organization of army questions as far as of interest to us, which ministry was competent for what purposes, always only as far as the commercial side of the problem was concerned.

Q. What does "I" mean?

A. "I" is an abbreviation of "Mobilmachung" (Even I had a yellow slip stating that in case of Mobilmachung to be at the disposal of I.G.)

Q. In respect to I.G. "I" meant what I.G. must do in regard to the war programme?

A. But mostly from the standpoint of organization and to put people into disposition for military authorities. For example, we would not have discussed the erection of a new magnesium plant under "I" questions.

Q. What kind of discussion would you consider that? -----

A. That would be a separate point of business at the same time of military interest. Under "I" we did not take altogether what has to be done and should have to be done in connection with war but mostly the personal side.

Q. Were espionage questions "I" questions?

A. Yes, as well as counter-espionage. Generally the circle was too great in the Kaufmännische Ausschuss. We would have not spoken of things like that.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. To whom would you speak about things like that?

A. Only between 2 or 3 men.

Q. Which men?

A. Possibly I and Ilgner, Kugler and Frank Fahle. I with von Heider or Kugler, the three of us, Ilgner, Frank-Fahle and I have made statements for Mr. Glaser as regards the relation to the Wehrmacht.

Q. In regard to the actual military phases you and Fahle and Kugler and Ilgner discussed those?

A. If they came up.

Q. Did they ever come up?

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A. Yes. For example, the discussions which we had with officials of the so-called Kanaris staff.

Q. What is that?

A. The Kanaris staff was the head of the Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht. The men I know in this staff were Oberst Piepenbrock and Major Blech.

Q. What did you discuss with them?

A. They were interested to get news of an economic character out of neutral and axis countries.

Q. They were not interested in getting news from enemy countries?

A. They were of course interested.

Q. Did they speak to you?

A. Yes. They applied for our help to get news out of neutral and axis countries eventually.

Q. We were speaking about countries hostile to Germany. Did they ask for news in regard to those?

A. Not from me.

Q. From whom did they ask information?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. Don't you want to tell us or you don't know?

A. I don't know it.

Q. Whom did they ask in regard to the U.S.? Who made reports on U.S. production?

A. If for instance Col. Piepenbrock would have asked me what I know of U.S. - before 1937 of course I would have told him.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did he ask any other I.G. officials?

A. We never spoke with one another. All was under strictest secrecy, when we had to deal with these matters.

Q. Is it not true that before the invasion of France, I.G. officials sat down with the Wehrmacht and planned the invasion in respect of the matters which I.G. knew?

A. I remember in the first years of the war I was once to visit a department of the Wehrmacht, head was an Oberst Becker, and he asked me what I know of the different plants of the Imperial Chemical Industries.

Q. When was this?

A. In the first years of the war, 1939/1940. I would not call that a sort of espionage or whatever it is.

Q. Prior to the invasion of each country that Hitler attacked, I.G. officials were called in by the Wehrmacht and planned the part of the military attack with which I.G.

A. I am sure they have asked what we know about the factories, say of I.C.I. in England.

Q. Whom did they ask?

A. Different people.

Q. Did they ask you?

(page 3 of original)

A. I can remember only as far as England is concerned. There was only an occasion in Berlin when Oberst Becker showed me a map of England which was much more complete than my knowledge. He asked me whether I knew something of the British Magnesium plant in Coventry. I said no. I have never been there.

Q. Who else were called for to give this information?

A. They asked most technical people of I.G. All these people who were technicians and specialists in the chemical field, and then our Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung under Dr. Reithinger in Berlin which belonged to Ilgner's organization did a lot of work for the Wehrmacht as well as for the government. They succeeded in getting so many men free of military service only on account of the work they made.

Q. I show you a biography of the Aussigen-Haydon Company. Is that an example of the type of report about which you are speaking?

A. Yes. The ministries, the foreign office, etcetera based their knowledge on these biographies.

Q. In regard to the purely military aspects of the campaign against France, Russia, etcetera, didn't I.G. experts sit down with members of the Wehrmacht and plan the chemical aspects of that campaign?

A. Not to my knowledge. I know we made up these biographies as correct as possible and, of course, we made them for ourselves and we made them at the same time for the Wehrmacht and the ministries.

(signed) G v Schnitzler.

Q. When did you begin to make them?

A. This department is nearly over 10 years old.

Q. Is it not true that prior to an invasion and in planning that invasion, I.G. experts and technicians were called in to assist the Wehrmacht on the purely military aspects? And to locate the plants, to be exactly informed where the plants were located, for example?

A. For all European countries they made up plans. Every plant of chemical interest was indicated in a complete map.

Q. Prior to the attacks on France, Russia, etcetera, did I.G. experts and technicians assist the Wehrmacht in making its plans?

A. I don't think so. I never heard it. I know that technicians helped the Wehrmacht to prepare a map. I object to "prior to an attack".

(page 4 of original)

Q. Before they attacked France, they set down and made out their military plans, in Holland, Belgium and all the conquered countries? Isn't it true that before these plans were carried out, I.G. officials and technicians sat down with the Wehrmacht and planned these campaigns insofar as they touched the chemical industry?

A. I am sure that they asked our technicians about any and every chemical installations and factories, whatever is fabricated in those countries, but if they sat together with technical people of ours to make real plans what has to be destroyed, that I can't tell you.

Q. Who would know that?

A. A lot of our technical people could tell you. You must ask Termeer and Butefisch, Schneider, and Gajowsky perhaps, then Wurster and Muller-Gunradi, he is an expert on all kinds of nitrogen.

Q. Isn't true that by the M-plans I.G. went every aspect which was of military nature?

A. Yes, this is absolutely true.

Q. Under what heading would they discuss it?

A. They have had fancy names.

Q. So that in its commercial meetings the military methods were discussed under the heading "M"? In regard to the other committee, like the technical committee, what were the military plans known as?

A. I think they called it also "M" questions.

Q. So I.G. at all times, since the beginning of Hitler's wars, had a separate section which was called the "M" section or some other letter section?

A. You know in Berlin the Vermittlungsstelle W. It is rather complicated. We had to centralize our commercial activities as far as this domain is concerned at Berlin. In the commercial field, H. Fragen/handled partly by Volkswirtschaft A.B.T. and partly by Frank-Fahle. Under H. Fragen, were discussed the military domain, personal defense against

(signed) G v Schnitzler

espionage, eventual working in neutral countries. With the technical people, it was more complicated because they did not have that unification. They had in Berlin an organization which they called Vermittlungsstelle W. They dealt through this Vermittlungsstelle W. with the different departments, etc. of the Wehrmacht. It seemed that the 3 Spartans inside I.G. never were in full agreement about this Vermittlungsstelle and so Spartan I made use of Vermittlungsstelle W. and did it only partly, and Dr. Gajewsky of Sparte III

(page 5 of original)

did not want to have to deal with the Vermittlungsstelle W. and did it on his own. So, for instance, say when it came to Agfa film of highest value in competition with Kodak, Gajewsky dealt those questions personally with the Wehrmacht and did not go through the Vermittlungsstelle. I think they used different names on the technical side of I.G. It was not so concentrated as on the commercial. The man for the Vermittlungsstelle in Frankfurt who was the superior of 3 or 4 chemists, is Dr. Struss. He did that for Dr. Farber. Of course, they were in constant contact with the different military authorities. For example: When Russia was invaded, a staff of chemists was kept together - of Buna chemists - to be at once on the spot. They were sitting there. And then when the farthest point was reached, near Kaluga or so, there in a town they found a great Buna plant and they were able to stay there for 6 hours and they came back with the impression that the Russians were able to make buna from alcohol, not as we do from carbide. Under that heading our technicians would for instance, have called this buna action for Russia, I don't know. I think that goes much further than "H" questions.

Q. Isn't it true that I.G. maintained, in regard to the chemical industry, its own warfare planning section which was of service to the Wehrmacht and used by the Wehrmacht in a commercial sense, in an economic sense, in the technical sense and in a military sense, whether it was known under the name "H" or by some other letter it devoted itself to all military matters, and it handled military matters?

A. That is true.

Q. When was the H plan founded?

A. I think the real H plan in such a way, was only founded when war broke out, I think in September, 1939, and then very quickly.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true".

G. von Schnitzler

(signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft
Position in I.G. Farben

The statements in this record of interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that the last answer needs amplification. When I answered that "the real H plan" was founded when the
(signed) G v Schnitzler

war broke out, I was not referring to the mobilization plans of the Wirtschaftsgruppe or of the Government, but only to the mobilization plans of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

5. In paragraphs six through ten below, are contained records of interrogations which I subscribed to between July and September 1945, which involve Vermittlungsstelle W (V/W) among other things. On my statements on V/W, I would like to point out the following. I am certain that if I had been in seclusion during the entire period of the last one and a half years and would be asked the same questions today, then I would make those statements exactly in the same words as I did in the summer of 1945. But having been together with my technical colleagues in Gransberg, having received so much information from them and having Dr. Fritz Ter Meer's statement of 30 March 1946 concerning V/W at hand, I must now make certain corrections on the basis of this information from my technical colleagues and state that I perhaps made V/W more important than it really was. On the other hand I have no explanation myself for the fact that one of I.G.'s first technical men, Prof. Dr. Karl Krauch, was made head of this section if it were so unimportant as my technical colleagues say. I must thus answer that I have no explanation, because in my own field or domain I would never have put one of my first men on an unimportant job. Not only was Krauch placed to head V/W when it was created, but when Krauch was transferred to other jobs, he was succeeded as the head of V/W by ^{von} Gustav Brünning, who was considered a first grade technician and one of I.G.'s future factory leaders. From what my technical colleagues have told me since 1945, I think that I have not put sufficiently in the foreground V/W's function as an intermediary between I.G. and the Wehrmacht. Moreover, in these interrogations the distinction between rearmament and autarchy, always a difficult distinction to establish, is not sufficiently shown.

6. On 25 July 1945, I subscribed to a two page record of interrogation which principally concerned the "Job Fragen", the text of which follows:
(signed) G v Schnitzler

VS. "Q. In our discussions relative to M. Fragen, you told us a little about the relations between I.G. and the Wehrmacht in regard to military matters. Can you give us more details in regard to this?

A. Yes. Just now I wanted to tell you that the VOMI, after war had begun, was practically working more for general staff of the Wehrmacht. What they did was more interesting for us, but in the main they worked directly for the Wehrmacht. I think the Chief, Mr. Reithinger, a well known economist; was sworn in by the Wehrmacht.

Q. Would you say that Mr. Ilgner knew it?

A. He was ill at the time.

Q. Would you say that he knew it? When he came back was he informed of it?

A. I should say so. Ilgner became ill in the winter before the war -- the winter of 1938-39. He was a long time ill. His deputy was Dr. Kruger, and he was an official in OEW. (Oberkommando Wehrmacht).

Q. Isn't it a fact that Reithinger was preparing his bombing surveys for the Wehrmacht before the outbreak of war?

VS. A. I can't tell you when the OEW began to take a keen interest in Mr. Reithinger's work. I think this was an independent development and it grew more and more important and of course during the war it took a typically war trend.

VS. Q. But before the Nazi programs of aggressions these surveys contained fragmentary commercial information. They were more or less balance sheets, and it was on I.G.'s initiative that they began to contain more and more information which could be useful for military purposes, and it was on Mr. Reithinger's and Mr. Ilgner's initiative that the Wehrmacht became convinced that these I.G. surveys could be very useful for purely military purposes?

A. I would say that you were right. The Wehrmacht got these reports. The interest of the Wehrmacht was aroused and then Mr. Reithinger developed them and followed the suggestions of the Wehrmacht. What I know in effect was that practically the whole VOMI was under the initiative of the OEW, and given a draft exempt status.

Q. The inference, or conclusion, you draw from their draft status is that the VOMI was officially recognized?

VS. A. For the Foreign Office just as well. The military value of the VOMI was officially recognized.

Q. The Vermittlungstelle W was organized in 1933, soon after Hitler came into power. Is that right?

A. I am not sure about the date.

Q. But you are sure that it was organized by I.G. after Hitler came into power?

A. I am sure -- yes.

Q. How many groups comprised the Vermittlungstelle W?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. Only group 2 worked on Vermittlungstelle W matters. Later on Group 1 joined to a certain extent.

Q. What was the function of Group 2 of the Vermittlungstelle W?

A. All negotiations with military and quasi military authorities for questions (secret questions) regarding the four-year plan and rearmament.

Q. Isn't it true that soon after it was established Group 2 began to prepare plans for the Chemical industry in the case of war?

A. I see it so that the Vermittlungstelle W was a consequence of the rearmament plan.

(page 2 of original)

Q. But one of the functions of Group 2 as a consequence of the Hitler military plan was to prepare plans for the Chemical Industry in the case of war?

vs. A. The V.W. did not prepare. As its name implies, it means that it should be an intermediary between the military and the I.G. and the leading men in ^{the} factories.

Q. Did you know that Group 2 of the V.W. was requested by the Wehrmacht in 1933 to prepare plans for the Chemical industry in the case of war?

A. I don't think that is probable.

Q. If that is true, Mr. Struss or Mr. ter Meer would know it?

A. Yes.

Q. In 1933, I.G. prepared what they called war games to enable the Luftwaffe to practice bombing of industrial establishments. Is that right?

vs. A. I can only tell you what I know about these things. Of course when the new plants were erected which were considered as safe from the military standpoint, there was a close contact between the different military authorities. As an example, I might recite when the ^{IG Farben} ~~IG Farben~~ factories were erected at Aachen (1935), the man responsible there in Bitterfeld with representatives of the Luftwaffe made a tour in the airplane around that country and the General of the Luftwaffe in charge of the problem did not find the place in Aachen. He said, "If I, an expert, cannot find the place in Aachen I think you have chosen the right spot." All plans were made with the military authorities that a place chosen from a military standpoint would be as secure as possible.

Q. I am speaking of plans made to assist the Luftwaffe in its bombing, to prove its bombing technique in case of war.

A. I am sure that they did because for example this magnesium plant was to a large extent meant for incendiary bombs. That was very clear.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did Mr. Struss or Mr. ter Meer tell you in 1933, or did you learn in any other way, that I.G. was engaged in these so-called Kriegsspiele?

A. The word came that I.G. was engaged in war plant games. It can be possible that inside the Group I they used the word Kriegsspiele to refer to that. In 1932 our expenses for new plants were very low, about 10 or 12 million marks. And then it climbed slowly. In 1933 or 1934 what has been spent or planned, I am not so sure, it was not of so great importance. In 1935 it started and of course it grew and climbed tremendously.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G. von Schnitzler
(Signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G.,
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
(Position in I.G. Farben)"

The statements I subscribed to in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) My technical colleagues have informed me since 1945 that V/W was originally established to concern itself with questions arising under the High Treason clauses of the penal code which punished every unauthorized bringing of industrial secrets to foreign countries.

(c) V/W did not act as intermediary between I.G. and the Government in working out materials for mobilization questions (M-Fragen), as one might deduce from this interrogation. The plants, Sparten, and the TEA dealt directly with the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie on this matter.

(d) Page 2, fourth answer, lines 4 and 5, "Aachen" should be "Aken". 7. August 1945 I subscribed to a three page record of interrogation of both Dr. Max Ilgner and me which was held on one morning of 4 August 1945 the text of which follows:

"Q. When were the first discussions held with the Wehrmacht in regard to the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle W?
(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. (Ilgnor) I don't know exactly. The first negotiations were made by Krauch and Selck.

Q. (Von Schnitzler) I think it was in the year 1933 or 1934, but I am not quite sure. Struss should know.

Q. What was the gist of these discussions and what was the basis of the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle W. Why should the Wehrmacht have come to I.G. in 1933 or 1934 for the establishment of a military office in the I.G.?

A. (Von Schnitzler) I think there were some chemists put into this Vermittlungsstelle W. and they were in constant contact with the Wehrmacht for the reason that the works of I.G. were spread over the whole of Germany.

(Ilgnor) One of the reasons was that the Wehrmacht prevented us from exporting our technical know how and patents.

Q. So that in your opinion, Mr. Ilgnor, one of the reasons the Vermittlungsstelle W. was first set up was in order to prevent I.G. from giving out to other countries its experiences, know how, patents, whenever the Wehrmacht felt that it should not go out?

A. (Ilgnor) This is what I always felt. Yes.

(Von Schnitzler) This was a part of it, and the other part was its relationships to the Wehrmacht in the whole field of re-armament. As I said at another hearing, it was mostly all Sparte II. Sparte III wanted to conduct its own affairs.

Q. What was the function of Sparte III?

A. (Von Schnitzler) This was the whole cellulose chemistry field. That means rayons, textiles and synthetic fibres and also the photographic field.

Q. So that, since 1934, the Wehrmacht and I.G. were on a war basis in the chemical field. Is that right?

A. (Von Schnitzler) That is saying too much. Because the German Government considered itself as having left the League of Nations in Geneva. The German nation considered itself free of international obligations. I understood it with others when the Wehrmacht began warfare developments again, lots of questions did arise in the domain of chemical warfare in the large sense, such as munitions and the light metal field, acids and oils. The questions arose as to how far one was technically to take over synthetic rubber. All these questions became of interest for the Wehrmacht, which got in contact with I.G. It seemed to me that the questions and dealings were so many that for this purpose, the technical leaders of I.G. thought it advisable that they put some man in Berlin, who was in closest continuous contact with the Wehrmacht.

(Ilgnor) Technical people handled things on their own, so how the Vermittlungsstelle W. originated, in my opinion, can only be told by those technicians who made the negotiations, and the name of one of the men was Krauch. I think Selck must also be informed on this too, as I know he had to handle the organization of the Vermittlungsstelle W. So, it is a matter of fact that if such arrangements were made, with the authorities, it could happen that the commercial men were not told at all.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did you know, Mr. Ilgner, that the Vermittlungsstelle W. had been established?

A. Yes, certainly. It was directed against my organization.

Q. Why was it directed against your organization. What was your organization doing that made them organize the Vermittlungsstelle W., to combat your organization?

A. (Ilgner) Well they didn't want my organization to become bigger.

Q. Did they feel that if they didn't do it, you would do it?

(page 2 of original)

A. They didn't want my organization to handle these questions at all because they were technical matters, and they wanted to handle it by a special technical organization.

Q. Was your organization prepared to handle the technical matters?

A. No, they were not prepared for that. They were afraid that the Vermittlungsstelle W. would be made a part of my organization, and they wanted their own organization, and therefore my organization had to keep our hands out of the pic.

Q. Did you indicate to them that you would take them over?

A. No.

Q. Then, how did you know that they were afraid of your organization taking over?

A. Because Selck told me this personally.

Q. When?

A. When I came back after my far eastern trip in the fall of 1935.

Q. Did you ever make any attempts to get the Vermittlungsstelle W. within your organization?

A. Yes. When I heard it, I said to Mr. Selck that I think it is stupid that you have in Berlin an organization with all the central departments and now you organize other departments. My organization was the central organization in Berlin, and therefore it seems appropriate to me that all centralized affairs should be part of my organizations, and that the Vermittlungsstelle W. should therefore have been included in my organization, especially as I saw that the Vermittlungsstelle W. on these matters I mention, like "industrial-works", had to do with the same official authorities as my organization.

Q. Who would have handled the technical matters Mr. Von Schnitzler was talking about?

A. In this case, it would have been quite a new organization.

Q. Were you informed of the real functions of the Vermittlungsstelle W.?

A. (Ilgner) I don't know.

(Von Schnitzler) Yes. As I have explained above.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Now, since 1934, I.G. had an organization to handle all Wehrmacht affairs. That organization was the Vermittlungsstelle W. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the first head of the Vermittlungsstelle W.?

II. A. (Ilgnor) My impression was always that the three leaders of the Sparten were the chiefs. Terneer of Sparta II and Krauch of Sparta I, and in regard to Sparta III, I am not sure as to the leader. He was, I believe, Gagesky.

Q. Now what did Sparta I do?

A. (Von Schnitzler) We do not know exactly.

Q. When did Mr. Krauch go over to Mr. Goering's four year plan?

A. (Von Schnitzler) At the end of 1936, because the four year plan was born in that year.

Q. And what was Mr. Krauch's position in the four year plan?

A. He was head of the Department of Wirtschaftsausbau.

Q. What did the Wirtschaftsausbau do for the four year plan?

A. The Wirtschaftsausbau handled the department of the new great factories, answering the demands of the military in the domains of the chemical industry as well as oil and magnesium and Buna, and then to a certain extent, and for a certain time I think, the synthetic fibres, and certain raw materials necessary for the synthetic fibres.

Q. Who paid the salary of Mr. Krauch while he was functioning under Mr. Goering?

A. (Von Schnitzler) I think I.G. continued to pay Mr. Krauch.

Q. And did Mr. Krauch take any other I.G. technicians with him to assist him in his work for Mr. Goering?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us who they were, and how many he took with him?

A. Oh, quite a lot.

Q. And who paid their salaries while they were working for Mr. Goering?

A. I think they all remained on the I.G. payroll.

Q. So, since 1936, I.G. officials, paid by I.G., and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel, all paid by I.G., planned for the Nazi Government, the rearmament phase in the chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, synthetic fiber and oil, etcetera. Is that right?

II. A. (Ilgnor) Yes. The Krauch office was not only ^{Abt. Wirts.} ~~Wirtschaftsausbau~~ but also general ~~bevollmachtigt~~ ^{beauftragt} für sonder fragen der chemischen erzeugnisse.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Now, would you say that I.G. increased its capital investments tremendously during the re-armament years under the four year plan?

A. (Ilgnor) Yes.
(Von Schnitzler) Yes.

Q. Is it a fair statement to say that this tremendous capital increase of I.G. was mainly in the field in which the Wehrmacht was interested?

(page 3 of original)

A. (Ilgnor) Yes.
(Von Schnitzler) Yes.

Q. And is it a fair statement to say that I.G. Benefitted tremendously insofar as its capital investments were concerned from the rearmament program of the Nazi Government?

VS. A. (Von Schnitzler) I would say that it is very right and even more. Many of our chemists believed that this new investment was of continuous use even for peace time because, they thought, that the enlargement of Buna, oil and nitrogen, would also serve for peace purposes in filling out the market. We distinguished the purely war plants, mostly financed by the Reich and which were taken under Montona and ^{AN}Organa, etcetera, from those developments which we considered as being of perpetual and peace time use. Our technical people wanted to have them built by I.G. because they thought they would be more independent in running those factories. Of course after a certain time, even the war plants all became unburdened property, because the amortization rates were very favorable. We spoke of Alken yesterday which was started about 1935 and also of the beginning of 1944, when Haefliger, Von Heider and I, paid our first visit to Bitterfeld. We saw that the investment in Alken was almost completely written off. And I might also say that side by side with the development of the rearmament program, Germany became more and more autarchic, more corporate, more fascist. ~~#####~~

VS.

"I have read the record of this interrogation, and swear that the answers given therein by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true."

G. v. Schnitzler

Ilgnor
Signature

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft.

Member of Board
Position in I.G. Farben Co.

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) After Dr. Ilgnor answered that one of the reasons V/W was set up was so that the Wehrmacht could prevent I.G. from exporting trade secrets
(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Ilgnor's third answer on page one), I added that V/W also had relationships to the Wehrmacht in the whole field of rearmament. Also, on page two, eighth question and answer, I answered affirmatively to the statement that V/W was the I.G. organization for handling all Wehrmacht affairs. On the basis of information given me by my technical colleagues since 1945, those two statements are exaggerated.

(c) My last answer, page three, is mainly to be understood under developments taking place after the war broke out.

8. In August 1945 I subscribed to a five page record of interrogation of 4 August 1945, entitled "Continuation of Interrogation of Von Schnitzler and Ilgnor", the text of which follows :

"Q. In your opinion what did the Vermittlungs W. do for the Wehrmacht?

Von S. A. I can only guess. I think they had talks with high officers of the Wehrmacht and took the plans and suggestions of I.G. to the Wehrmacht and brought the plans and suggestions of the Wehrmacht to the I.G. I consider the activity more or less as an ambassador of a country who has nothing to say on his own, but who had to explain and inform and receive information himself.

Q. What kind of information did the Wehrmacht take from I.G. and what kind of plans do you think I.G. submitted to the Wehrmacht from Vermittlungs W.?

Von S. A. Let us take for example the Aken plant. Everything from the entire range of matters from where the plant would be located, what the plant would produce, what the Wehrmacht required, what transportation was necessary would be matters which would be taken up between the Vermittlungs W. representing I.G. and the Wehrmacht.

Q. Actually you told us this morning that on behalf of the appropriate Nazi government agency in the chemical field, an I.G. man, assisted largely by an I.G. staff and paid by the I.G., planned the building up of the chemical industries and metal industries for the Wehrmacht?

Von S. A. To a very large extent.

Ilgnor A. Yes, in the fields which had been reserved for Mr. Krauch's organization.

Q. In regard to the rearmament policy in special fields, I.G. personnel largely determined that policy. Is that right?

Von S. A. Yes.

Q. And I.G. benefited considerably in capital investments from the rearmament program laid down by I.G. personnel?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Von S. A. If you go by the balance sheet. You see, a large part of these new investments would have no post-war use to I.G. and we would be left with big factories and a lot of personnel.

(page 2 of original)

Q. Would I.G. have preferred to negotiate with Japan for natural rubber instead of developing the synthetic rubber industry in Germany?

Von S. A. We did not have the necessary counter value to pay for an unlimited amount of natural rubber. We could have bought certain quantities but it would have been insufficient to meet the demands of the Wehrmacht.

Q. Did the Vermittlungs.W. of I.G. handle I.G.'s relations with the Japanese Military?

Von S. A. I don't believe that. I have never heard of it. That would be a very delicate matter and I think the chiefs would do that themselves so that I know that in respect to the hydrogen agreement which was just concluded in January of this year, Dr. Butefisch, Mr. Ringer, and Mr. Pier handled these negotiations themselves.

Q. Did you ever participate in any negotiations with the Japanese? Are you familiar with any negotiations with the Japanese?

Ilgnor A. I was only invited for the lunch in Berlin at which the contract was signed and I know that with my foreign exchange department, Mr. Gierlichs and Mr. Mantze of the office of the commercial committee, Mr. Saxner assisted in some special questions.

Q. When did I.G. establish its Counter-Espionage Department?

Von S. A. I think it was in the war.

Ilgnor A. I think it must be in the end of the year 1940 or the beginning of the year 1941 because Fahlé was back from the army. I know that.

Q. What were the functions of the Counter-Espionage Department?

Von S. A. It was the centralization of the questions arising out of that domain. Every I.G. branch factory had its own Counter-Espionage Department. This was a counter-espionage agency in the factory and the men were named Abwehrbeauftragter, Mr. Schneider was made chief of the Berlin central counter-espionage office.

Q. What did the IM-7 have to do in regard to Vermittlungs W. questions?

Ilgnor A. The IM-7 really had nothing military to do with Vermittlungs W. matters. However, we had been handling questions in regard to the export of

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know-how and licences and patents to foreign countries with which the Wehrmacht was directly concerned.

Q. What did you have to do with the export of know-how, licences, and patents to other countries which concerned the Wehrmacht?

(signed) G v Schnitzler .

Ilgnor A. We required the agreement of the Reichsstellechemie and handled the foreign exchange matters.

Q. So that you should be competent to tell me all cases in which the Wehrmacht prevented the export of I.G.'s know-how, patents and licenses to foreign countries?

Ilgnor A. As far as these questions have come up to our foreign exchange department, we would be able to give you from the files a history of the cases in which the Wehrmacht interfered. In the technical fields, the technical people dealt directly with the foreign representatives and we wouldn't know about it.

Q. In every case in which it was an export of know-how either technical or not, wouldn't the foreign exchange authorities have to be informed about it to arrange for the financial end of the transaction?

Ilgnor A. Certainly they would have to know about it, but please ask Mr. Gierlich for the details.

Q. What did your agency do for the Wehrmacht and when did it begin to do it?

Ilgnor A. Beginning in 1939, the economic department of my organization established relations with Wehr Wirtschaft Thomas and I have already told you about Mr. Deithinger's preparation of material for the Wehrmacht and that Mr. Kruger, in the year 1939 before the war, was sworn into the Wehrmacht and handled the relations between my organization and the Wehrmacht. Before 1939, there certainly would have been occasionally contacts between my departments and Thomas, but I can't tell you precisely what the contacts were.

Q. What was Mr. Thomas' job?

Ilgnor A. He was the mobilizer of the German economy in preparation for war. He was a member of the general staff of the G.K.W.

(page 4 of original)

Q. Before the war, before Germany began its military aggression, did your organization establish close contact with the "Vermittlungs" and begin to actively work for the Wehrmacht?

Ilgnor A. As to the best of my knowledge, no.

Von S. A. I don't know.

Q. Then to the best of both of your knowledge, the I.G. 7 or any of its departments did not actively engage in Wehrmacht matters either directly or through the "Vermittlungs", even though your department, Mr. Ilgnor, went on a war basis before the war with your permission?

Ilgnor A. If you ask me so precisely, I must say that I wasn't there.

Q. Were you there in 1938, in 1937?

Ilgnor A. Certainly.

Q. Then are you telling me that, if you were there, you wouldn't have participated in assisting the Wehrmacht in its plans for aggression?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Ilgner A. I would have done the things that have been ordered by the authorities.

Q. But you told us this morning that in regard to Vermittlungs W., you wanted to assimilate the Vermittlungs W. in your department. Had you been ordered to assimilate the Vermittlungs W. in your department in 1935 and 1936?

Ilgner A. I explained my purpose in this morning's interrogation.

Q. Before the war broke, Mr. von Schnitzler and Mr. Ilgner, did you intend to establish close working relationships with the Wehrmacht in your own fields?

Von S. A. The Wehrmacht was another agency with which we were in continuous contact.

Summary by Von Schnitzler

In 1934 the Wehrmacht became important and, with increased tempo after 1936, the Wehrmacht became the prominent factor in the whole picture. Since 1934, a strong movement for investments in our plants for commodities of decisive military importance became more and more pronounced with the main objective of increasing the military potential of Germany. At first, autarchic principles to make Germany independent of importation from abroad was one of the leading objectives. Since the

(page 5 of original)

declaration of the 4-year plan in 1936, this movement took an entirely military character and military reasons stood in the foreground. Hand in hand with this, the relations between I.G. and the Wehrmacht became more and more intimate and a continuous union between I.G. officials on one side and the Wehrmacht representatives on the other side was the consequence of it.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine - and my summarized statement - are true.

G. von Schnitzler

Verständnismitglied I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft"

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) In the "Summary by von Schnitzler", beginning bottom of page 4,

I over-exaggerated the degree of I.G.'s relations of the Wehrmacht before the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

outbreak of the war. In the beginning it was not the Wehrmacht, but rather
vs the KfI and the Four Year Plan which acted as ^{representatives} regulations for the Reich in the
different dealings re synthetic oil, buna, synthetic fibers, a.s.o., and
the Wehrmacht was primarily not directly engaged in these so-called
"autarchy-dealings". Of course, the Wehrmacht was highly interested in
them and made tests with all the products contained in that program.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

9. In August, I subscribed to a four page record of interrogation of Dr. Ernst Struss, Dr. Oskar Loehr and myself which was held on the afternoon of 11 August 1945, the text of which follows:

"Q. I am interested in the development of the "Auflage" Wehrmacht-stelle X. How did the development take place?

A. (Von Schnitzler) It is characteristic for I. G. that its relationship to the Wehrmacht became more and more intimate. From a relatively small start, a huge investment of 400-500 million marks yearly directly or indirectly by the Wehrmacht was the end. In this way, the central administration lost entirely the survey that had been done or could be done. It was split up in so many different places inside I.G. so that the control and what really happened was difficult to survey by the central administration.

In the intercourse between our men and Wehrmacht it was difficult to say whether it was a real "Auflage" which came from the Wehrmacht or whether the individual technician was interested to produce and brought the "Auflage" for himself from the Wehrmacht. All that has weakened the central management of I. G. and strengthened the local.

My first strong impression I got at my visits to Bitterfeld. They told me there how they had gone into new fields, for example the new alloys of magnesium, etc., and I said to myself: "Is this the Wehrmacht, or is it Mr. Altvicker of I. G.?"

(Struss) -- In the last years, Dr. ter Meer had the opinion that all what we must build was "Auflage". But it came not directly from the Wehrmacht but from Krauch. In most cases, the Wehrmacht was going to Krauch and his men and then I. G. must construct the works. I think we had in the last time the inventions of Dr. Bayer of Leverkusen of "desmophens".

(Loehr) It was a rather new and interesting development that had begun in the laboratories in Leverkusen prior to the war. Dr. Bayer found a new reaction which resulted in products called "disocianates", which were useful for a great many purposes. For instance, one purpose which was very outstanding was that these compounds could bind together rubber and metal in such a way and so close if you put stress on it, it would not break. By combining this diisocyanate with a certain kind of ester you could get coatings which were very hard and flexible so that you could fold a sheet of metal without breaking the coating. That was not only applied to metal surfaces, but to other kind of material too, wood or plastics. That was the start in 1937/39.

(Struss) The time when it was ripe was 1942.

Die Wehrmacht hat sich an Krauch gewandt und Eckell beauftragt. Eckell hielt eine Sitzung ab, an der 60 Offiziere von allen Wehrmachts-teilen anwesend waren. Sie verlangten 10 mal so viel wie möglich war. Diese Sache ging durch Krauch

(Translation by Dr. Loehr)
The Development from the laboratory stage to the stage of production took about 4 years. At that time, Dr. Krauch called a meeting at which at least 60 officers of the Wehrmacht were present almost everyone brought forward his requirements and it was quite a lot. That was a complicated case.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Struss) Einfache Fälle waren Gasoline und buna, centralit, da wurde einfach von einer Stelle bestimmt und uns wurde die Auflage gemacht.

Q If a research was carried on by I. G. personnel in Leverkusen, and you had the necessary materials in Leverkusen, how did the Wehrmacht become familiar with this work of yours?

A (Loehr) There is one point. We had to submit our patent applications to a certain agency who examined it according to their use for the Wehrmacht. By that agency the Wehrmacht knew what was going on.

(Page 2 of the original)

Q You filed your applications up in 1937. Did the Wehrmacht immediately send a man to the plant?

A They met at this meeting with the I. G. officials.

Q Who brought it to the Wehrmacht? Was it Krauch?

A Struss. From the technical men.

Q Tell me how it got to Krauch?

A (Loehr) These were kept as secret patent applications. I don't think that scheme applied to the applications in 1937, that was introduced later on.

Struss:

Ich glaube nicht immer auf dem gleichen Wege. Es war doch wohl zwischen den leitenden Herren, z.B. Ambros, ein enger Konnex mit den militärischen Stellen, dass es ohne weiteres bei den Militärs bekannt werden musste, wenn etwas Neues da war. Es wurde durch die Patente bekannt, keineswegs ist es durch die Zentralstelle gegangen

(Translation by Loehr:

In this case such an interesting development became quickly known in other I. G. Works. Thus, Ambros of course in regard to the Wehrmacht dealt with many things. It might have been that he brought the matter to the Wehrmacht, but that is only a presumption. It might be Dr. Haberland, who had also to do with Wehrmacht authorities. In one way or the other it might have come to the Wehrmacht's attention.

Loehr:

I think, but I don't know, some experiments had to be made with articles, for instance some rubber puffer and in the workshops, Wehrmacht people went out and they might have heard of that in that way too. Outside, the works you never were sure whether the matter was in your hands or the Wehrmacht had it.

Struss:

Der aktivste Teil der Wehrmacht war die Luftwaffe. Die Luftwaffe brauchte Leichtmetall and ging direkt zu den Werken, manchmal unter Ausschaltung von Krauch.

The most active part of the Wehrmacht was the Luftwaffe. It kept close touch with the technicians of I. G. And they very often went after such development without the help of Krauch.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Besonders bei solchen Endprodukten, die direkt den Wehrmacht-zwecken dienten, wie Centralit, explosives, da, glaube ich, hat die Wehrmacht meistens direkt verhandelt. zum Beispiel die dritte Centralit-Anlage kam über Krauch, die zweite kam noch direkt von der Wehrmacht.

If a products was concerned as a final product, it originates from the Wehrmacht. The first plant came from the Wehrmacht and was dealt with Wehrmacht and Uerdingen direct. The second plant in Wolfen came also direct from Wehrmacht. In any way, the initiative came from the Wehrmacht and they dealt with the plant. The third plant was Moosbierbaum and later on Auschwitz, that came from Krauch. But the initiative came from the Wehrmacht and they used Krauch to look after the matter.

The reason was that there were too few men and too little steel. Till 1941/42 the Wehrmacht could itself give the iron and steel and other things to the factories. They had a large allocation. Later on they have not get any steel, that was why it had to be handled by Krauch, because he handled the allocation of raw materials.

(Page 3 of the original)

Q The work of I. G. and the Wehrmacht became a completely cooperative one. I. G. went to Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht to I. G. Is that true?

A Struss:

Das hat sich langsam so entwickelt.

That was the end of the development. result came to be slowly

Q In 1934 according to your own Tea-Buro files, the contact between I. G. and Wehrmacht became so close, there were so many discussions that you had to set up an office to handle that business, - the Vermittlungsstelle W?

A. Struss:

Wir hatten in der Vermittlungsstelle W. schatzungsweise in 1934 einen Patentmann, der allen 4 Wehrmachtstellen die Patente einreichen musste.

In 1934 the Wehrmacht had so many problems to deal with us that it seemed advisable to have an agency in Berlin to handle these problems.

Q Then in 1936 the I. G.-Wehrmacht connection, and the work by I.G. for the Wehrmacht was so great and they (I.G.) wanted a man in the government offices who was familiar with I.G. and Wehrmacht matters, who could handle it efficiently. Therefore they sent Krauch to that office?

(Struss)

A Ich bin nicht genau im Bilde. Man wusste nicht, wie Herr Krauch überhaupt an diese Sache gekommen ist. Krauch hat eines Tages ter Meer mitgeteilt, dass er diese Stelle in Berlin übernehmen hätte. In der I. G. war man sehr überrascht, dass einer der führenden Leute einen derartigen Posten in Berlin übernahm. Dann wurde Krauch in diese andere Stelle

(signed) G v Schnitzler

hineingezogen und daraus ergab sich, dass die Vermittlungsstelle ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung verlor, da nunmehr ja der erste Mann von Bröning war, der ja für Wehrmacht und I. G. verhältnismässig wenig bedeutete. Die Wichtigkeit der Vermittlungsstelle ging an die neue Reichsstelle über. Die enge Verbindung kann nicht geleugnet werden. Natürlich war Krauch nicht nur für die I. G. dort, sondern auch für die andere chemische Industrie in Deutschland.

(Von Schnitzler)

It was Bosch himself who put Krauch at Goering's disposal. He saw in Krauch the possibility of making great developments in the chemical field. He wanted that "keine Durcheinander gemacht wurden" - that it should be done in a reasonable way. It was more autarchy than rearmament.

However, as soon as Goering went in, it was absolutely clear to me that it was a rearmament program.

Loehr:

In 1937 I was convinced too that it was a rearmament program.

Struss:

I feared it was a rearmament program.

(Page 4 of the original)

Q But Krauch was put in under Goering, i.e.: nominated by Bosch to go into the "Amt" under Goering. If that is so, how could there have been in I. G.'s mind any question of autarchy. This was rearmament. Is that right?

A (Struss) There was no doubt that it was a rearmament, but I have hoped that it wouldn't come to war.

Q So you all went along with the rearmament program and you put an I. G. man in to manage the rearmament program?

A (Schnitzler) We knew that with the rearmament program in 1936, the situation was very dangerous insofar as the possibilities of war were concerned.

(Loehr)

In 1937, I became convinced of it, because I was abroad and saw the opinion abroad.

Q In all these rearmament questions, in all the building up of new plants and the war machine, Mr. Schmitz had been advised and he consented. Is that right?

A (Struss) Yes, that is sure.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q Which department of I. G. handled the construction of new plants?
- A (Struss) That was the TEA - "The Technical Committee".
- Q Schmitz was the chairman of the board?
- A (Von Schmitzler) Yes. He was also informed beforehand.
- Q Who signed the agreement with the Wehrmacht?
- A (Loehr) It was signed by the people concerned, Bitterfeld, or the others.
- Q They signed it because they had the approval of the technical committee and the board?
- A Yes.
- Q Was Schmitz's prior approval always received?
- A Yes. (Von Schmitzler and Loehr)

(Struss) The works exchanged their projects figures before the TEA meetings, and so the figures were available to the board members. There was a short report on the credits and it was recommended for approval by the board.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true."

(signed) Struss
(signature)

(signed) G. von Schmitzler
(signature)

(signed) Director
Position in I. G.

(signed) Oskar Loehr
Position in I. G.

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) In my first answer, page one, I only wanted to show the close team work which had developed between the Wehrmacht and the different plants. I did not want to criticize the attitude of the technical men in question.

10. On 24 September 1945, I signed a four page record of interrogation principally concerning Vermittlungsstelle W, the text of which follows:

(signed) G v Schmitzler

- Q When was the Vermittlungsstelle W formed and what was its purpose?
- A It was formed in 1934 and was designed to hold up or maintain continuous contact with the Wehrmacht.
- Q Who was in charge of the activities of the Vermittlungsstelle W?
- A Professor Krauch was the head of it, until 1937, and then there were different chemists in charge of the Vermittlungsstelle W., to begin with, there was von Bruening and the last one I think was Dieckman.
- Q What section of the Vermittlungsstelle W were Bruening and Dieckman in charge of?
- A The Vermittlungsstelle W was always in the first instance for Sparta II. It was busy in the interests of Sparta I just as well, but in the case of Sparta III there was never a special delegate in or for the Vermittlungsstelle W. I think Dr. Gajovsky did it by himself.
- Q Was not Sparta II in charge of the preparation of mobilization plans for war?
- A I think all Spartas were busy in that. In Sparta II, there were buna and metals, like light metals, and all the chemical products.
- Q Did the various sections of Vermittlungsstelle W draw up mobilization plans to be used in the event of war, or were these done by the individual plants.
- A I should say they were done by the individual plants. Of course this was done with the help of the delegates from the Vermittlungsstelle W.
- Q And the Vermittlungsstelle W would act as intermediary?
- A Yes.
- Q Were these MOB plans first drawn up in 1934 and then submitted to the Wehrmacht?
- A They would be submitted through the office of the Vermittlungsstelle W, which was at that time under the direct charge of Professor Krauch. As far as I am informed, all these things were very secret. I only knew from personal knowledge of the MOB plans for the dyestuffs domain. This mobilization plan came through the Reichsbeauftragts Fuer Chemie. It was approved by Dr. Ungewitter. It was of course made up in the individual plants in the dyestuff domain. It was likewise made up by Dr. Struss in the so-called Teabureau.
- Q With respect to the MOB plans, what function, if any, did Dr. Krauch serve?
- A I think that Dr. Krauch only made up the programs for the production. I don't think he made the MOB plans himself. Of course he might have been occupied with some parts of it, and then in the products for which he had specially the duty to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

develop. His offices were called Amt für Wirtschaftsausbau. This means the creation of something new.

(Page 2 of the original)

Q I thought we were talking about 1934. In that year, was Dr. Krauch spending all his time with Farben?

A Yes. He was head of Sparta I.

Q Do you mean with respect to his own products, like buna, hydrogenation, etcetera, that he had drawn up the MOB plan?

A I thought you asked me of Krauch's activity when he became head of the other plants. I think the only MOB plans for which he was responsible were for Sparta I.

Q When Krauch assumed his new position in the Four Year Plan in 1936, in addition to certain technicians whom he took with him, did he likewise take a section of the personnel who were employed in the Vermittlungsstelle?

VS A No, I do not think so.

Q When Krauch went to work for Goering, did he take along with him certain I. G. personnel, including technicians?

A Yes, quite a substantial lot.

Q In connection with his moving to Goering's plan, did he likewise take persons from the Vermittlungsstelle?

A I am not quite sure.

Q When and where were the Kriegsspiele held with respect to I.G. plants?

A My Kriegsspiele experience comes second hand. It is not of great value. These were carried out in Louna and Leverkusen too.

Q Approximately when was this?

A In 1934 or 1935 it may have started.

Q Under whose supervision were these Kriegsspiele held, both from the standpoint of I. G. and also from the military standpoint?

A All four parts of the Wehrmacht were participants in this. And then probably in the factories where it happened, there was the first director, who arranged it.

Q According to your knowledge, did Dr. Krauch have an important part with respect to the Kriegsspiele?

A I think he must have known of this Kriegsspiele. Whether he himself arranged this, I don't know.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q How active was professor Krauch in the management of I.G.F. after 1936?

A Not at all. He refrained entirely.

Q Were the reports of Dr. Reithinger made available to Dr. Krauch while he was in charge of the chemical section of the Four Year Plan?

A Surely.

(Page 3 of the original)

Q And did these reports contain statistics on production capacities and production figures for chemical firms outside of Germany?

A Yes. Reithinger made analyses of all big chemical companies in the world.

Q Since what date were such compilations made available to Dr. Krauch would you say?

A I would think always since Krauch assumed his position in the Four Year Plan. Dr. Reithinger was proud of his work. He made no secret of this at all.

Q Were the reports considered to be very thorough and first-class work?

A Yes. The Reich itself had not so good an organization, and these reports were very valuable to all of us.

Q Do you know whether Krauch informed Dr. Bosch, possibly in 1938, that Germany was going to war?

A No. I don't know about that.

Q Are you acquainted with an attempt by Dr. Bosch to see Goering in June or July of 1938, because of his (Bosch's) concern about Germany going to war?

A I have no information at all on this.

Q Prior to the invasion of Russia, did I.G. or the government keep a staff of chemists available to immediately go into Russia to examine its Buna plant?

vS A Yes. I think so. I can't tell all the details. Dr. Ambros could tell you. I know that in Dresden, quite a lot of able chemists were conducting experiments and got together on this, but only after the outbreak of the war, to start at once with the manufacture of the Russian processes for buna. I was informed that for a few hours in one of the Russian factories, they were able to make certain investigations with the result that they were very much impressed with how highly technically developed the Russian processes were.

Q Were those chemists gotten together by the Reich?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A Yes. By the Reich.
- VS Q At that time was Dr. Krauch or Dr. Ambros~~ch~~ charged with the responsibility of productive capacity of buna?
- VS A Yes. It could be said that Ambros~~ch~~ was charged with the direct responsibility.
- Q In what capacity?
- A He was the head of buna, with ter Meer still over him, but he had
VS no factory to run himself, but Ambros~~ch~~ was in charge.

(Page 4 of the original)

- VS Q Ambros~~ch~~ was an employee of I.G. Farben. Was he acting in some capacity for the Reich at that time? Were the chemists who were convoked, brought together on behalf of I.G. Farben or on behalf of the German government?
- A No. On behalf of the German government.
- Q If they were brought together on behalf of the government for the further exploitation of rubber or buna in Russia, was that not then under the jurisdiction of Professor Krauch?
- A Yes. That must be right.
- Q These men were collected at one point and were prepared to go into Russia as soon as it was possible to get to the particular plants involved.
- A Yes. That is right.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser are true.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I. G. Farben
(Position in I.G.)

Interrogator:

(signed) Bernard Glaser

The statements made in this interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(b) Answer five, page one, is wrong according to information I have received from my technical colleagues to the effect that Vermittlungsstelle W did not assist the plants or the Sparten in preparing materials for the MOB plans. The principal liaison between the government and private industry concerning the "MOB Fragen" was the Wirtschaftsgruppen. The materials collected for the Wirtschaftsgruppe were made up directly by the plants concerned with a particular type of chemical production. The various plants submitted the information to the appropriate Sparte, and thereafter it was registered with the TEA Buero. The TEA Buero forwarded the material directly to the Wirtschaftsgruppe. The plants often acted directly with the Wirtschaftsgruppe and only informed the TEA Buero of the completed result.

(c) Answer two, page two, is subject to the correction I have
vS made before: I.G. did not make up the MOB plans but only prepared the material for them.

(d) Beginning at the middle of page two, I discuss the "Kriegsspiele" or war games. The Kriegsspiele involving the Wehrmacht and the I. G. Farben plants at Leuna and Leverkusen were handled secretly between the plant directors and the Wehrmacht. There were no damages, since the
vS Kriegsspiele were conducted on a purely theoretical basis. It was only never brought up in Vorstand meetings and, in my presence, it was never brought up before the TEA Buero.

(e) On page 3, the sixth question and answer may be misleading. Mr. Glaser asked me if I.G. or the government kept a staff of chemists "prior to the invasion of Russia" who were "available to go immediately into Russia to examine its Buna plant." My answer, which begins, "Yes. I think so," is misleading unless one takes from the rest of my answer what I really meant to say, namely, that the assembling of the chemists in Dresden took place after the invasion of Russia. Nothing was prepared by

(signed) Gv Schnitzler

I.G. chemists prior to the invasion of Russia.

11. Concerning plans for industrial and commercial activity in occupied Russia, I can add this. I was a member of a committee of the Wirtschaftsguppe Chemie which was established to prepare for the sales of chemicals in Russia and for the eventual exploitation of the chemical industry in Russia, but this never materialized and so far as I know there was not a single session of this committee. Upon the demand of the government, the entire German chemical industry inside the Wirtschaftsguppe Chemie (Economic Group Chemistry) was to deal with eventual problems arising out of the Russian situation. A small "C.M.B.H.", a firm with limited liability, was founded to deal with Russian problems and in this firm all the bigger German Chemical Companies were represented -- I., Schering, Heyden, and Ruetgerswerke. It was clear from the very first moment that bauxite should be reserved to I.G., that nitrogen should be reserved to the Stickstoff Syndicat, and that other requests to produce in Russia should be dealt with jointly by the chemical industry in total under the leadership of Dr. Ungewitter, manager of the Wirtschaftsguppe vs Chemie. But all those plans never materialized. I.G.'s Bayer Concern created for the pharmaceutical industry an important plant for the manufacture of sera in Lemberg (Lwow), Poland.

12. On 23 July 1945, I wrote up a two page statement entitled "Plans regarding England", the text of which follows :

"To the best of my recollection as far as plans for England are concerned, only preparatory work had been done. Through Terhaar we were told that the Reichswirtschaftsministerium had complaint that in the case of France we had not have had any plans ready at the day of the armistice.

This should not take place a second time, and the necessary material should be prepared, that in the case that England should ask for peace-terms the R.W.M. would have material on hand.

When the question was raised in the M.A., it met strong opposition, I remember that Dr. Mann energetically refused to participate in an endeavour so absolutely premature, and Dr. Krüger joined him. - The others felt more or less the same way. Thus,

(signed) G v Schnitzler

what the different departments had prepared, did not pass the competent authorities inside the I.G., and I am of the opinion, that the R.W.M. never officially got this preparatory material. How far R.W.M. inofficially was informed of it, can only be testified by Terhaar.

I myself have a clear recollection only of the preparatory material of the Verkaufsgemeinschaften Farben and Chemikalien, which had been made up in the Gröneburg, but I think that Stickstoff and Agfa had developed certain ideas too.

The general aims, as farben (dyestuffs) are concerned, were:

- 1.) a greater share in the U.K.,
- 2.) certain restrictions of the British Industry in export markets,
- 3.) replacement of the positions lost in the British Empire.

There was never raised the question of a capital interest in I.C.I., but all parties concerned were of the opinion, that normal business relations to I.C.I. should be reestablished.

Sacrifices of I.C.I. in the dyestuff-domain were being proposed in the following directions :

- 1.) I.G. did not ask for the abolishment of the license-act, but for a new distribution of the market, which meant an argumentation of the I.G.'s share by ca. 50%. I.G. asked for 1/3 of the total market. It was left open, if this additional volume had to be taken partly by curtailing the Swiss importation or had to go entirely at the charge of I.C.I.

(page 2 of original)

- 2.) Restraint in export trade was asked

- a) for the European Continent) but I can't re-
- b) for the Far East) member the details.

The propositions in the Chemical Field were of a very varied character and included certain improvements of the I.G.'s position in the British market and certain sacrifices for the British industry in the export-markets.

For the so-called military chemicals a far reaching suppression was aimed at, but I should say, that this question had not yet found its definite solution. As the whole problem very soon lost all actuality, after five years very little of it has remained in my memory.

Frankfurt, July 26th, 1945.

gez. G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct according

(signed) G v Schnitzler

to the best of my knowledge and belief.

13. On 17 July 1945, I signed a two-page record of interrogation, the text of which follows :

"Q. Yesterday we talked about the use of I.G. technicians and I.G. chemicals in the development of poisonous chemicals to be used in warfare.

A. Yes, we spoke shortly about it yesterday.

Q. Tell me what you told Major Tilly the first time when he asked about poisonous gases?

A. To the best of my knowledge at that time I.G. made not-itself poisonous gases nor had it been discussed inside I.G. as far as I know in I.G. laboratories they have not worked on it.

Q. But only in the so-called Reichs laboratories with I.G. technicians and I.G. directors and full knowledge of this fact.

A. Yes. But I knew at that time, it was in winter. Dr. Ambros told me only privately that in Dyhernfurt they produced a poisonous gas from an intermediate of.....coming from Ludwigshafen, and this gas is fabricated in an equipment only consisting of glass and one has to be very cautious that nothing can get out of this equipment because even very slight quantities are very dangerous. All the finished stuff had been removed in time to middle of Germany.

Q. Who is Dr. Ambros?

A. He is one of our first younger technicians. He was in charge of Dyhernfurt as well as Auschwitz and Gendorf.

Q. Where was this gas manufactured?

A. In Dyhernfurt.

Q. Who owned the plant?

A. It was owned partly by the Reich and partly I.G. You must hear Direktor Dencker about the details.

Q. How much by I.G. and how much by the Reich?

A. The plant for the gases was owned by the Reich. I think so. But it was run by a company, called Anorgana.

Q. To whom belonged this company?

A. It belonged 50:50 to the Reich and I.G. but Major Tilly told me, it is practically all I.G. The only thing I really knew was what I said to Major Tilly.

Q. The plant was owned by the Reich?

A. Yes.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. What was owned by I.G.? The company?

A. Anorgana, which run the plant for the Reich.

Q. And all production by I.G. of this plant was on behalf of the Reich?

A. Not entirely.

Q. What proportion was on behalf of the Reich?

A. By far the biggest part.

Q. Who owned Anorgana? Who of I.G. should know that?

A. Herr Dencker.

Q. Who was in charge of the chemical sector of I.G.?

A. That was Mr. Weber-Andren. He died in October 1943.

(page 2 of original)

Q. Who succeeded him?

A. I succeeded him as chairman of the chemical committee (commercial committee?).

Q. And you as head of the commercial field in chemicals did not know the ownership?

A. No. I don't know. I know of the existence of the Anorgana Company, but I did not know what all was behind it.

Q. Who of I.G. knew about it?

A. Schmits, as chairman, Ambros and ter Meer.

Q. During the last quarter 1944 (you said yesterday) that a Mr. Muller-Cunradi alluded to you that the poisonous gasses and the chemicals manufactured by I.G. were being used for the murder of human beings held in concentration camps?

A. So I understood him.

Q. Didn't you question these employees of yours further in regard to the use of these gases?

A. They said they knew it was being used for this purpose.

Q. What did you do when he was told you that I.G. chemicals was being used to kill, to murder people held in concentration camps?

A. I was horrified.

Q. Did you do anything about it?

A. I kept it for me because it was too terrible. I was always under the impression that these gases were not manufactured by us. I asked Muller-Cunradi is it known to you and Ambros and an other

(signed) G v Schnitzler

directors in Auschwitz that the gases and chemicals are being used to murder people.

Q. What did he say?

A. Yes, it is known to all I.G. directors in Auschwitz..

G.v. Schnitzler.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G.v. Schnitzler."

The statements I made in this interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

14. I have carefully read each of the 39 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 27th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPEECHER

U.S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473507
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI - 5197, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

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A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these documents are set forth below after the text of the respective statement or interrogation.

2. On 1 August 1945, I signed a one page statement entitled "Statement re K.A.", the text of which follows:

1) The K.A. was not entitled to make I.G.'s policy or to decide over problems which did arise in the different domains of I.G.'s activity, the decision and responsibility was alone with the Vorstand. The K.A.'s main task was to bring these different activities of I.G. as far as the commercial side is concerned on a common line. All problems of actuality were being discussed. The minutes generally show such a picture that one only reads:

Mr. X reports...

The autonomy of the different Verkaufsgemeinschaften was not affected by the existence of K.A. Thus for instance: Francolor was decided upon in the Farben-Ausschuss, Nordisk Letmetall in the Chema (Chemikalien

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Ausschuss), all their decisions being subject to the agreement of the Vorstand. Consequently upon important questions in the different departments the man who was responsible for them - say Mr. Mann for Pharma or Mr. Weber-Andreas for Chemikalien or myself for Dyestuffs reported first to the K.A. to inform his commercial colleagues and then separately in the Vorstand in order to get its agreement.

The minutes of the K.A. only represent the opinion of the assembly of the commercial leaders which, if not directly by the interested member of the Vorstand as said before, were proposed by me to the full board, that means to all other members, to get their approval.

August first, 1945

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

This statement still appears to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. However, I want to point out that notwithstanding that the K.A. had only the function of coordinating the policy of the different "Autonome Verkaufsgemeinschaften", my personal influence on the most important members of the KA was such ^{that} an entire harmony existed between them. This to a large extent was due to personal friendships, which in the first place existed between myself, Mr. Mann, who at the beginning of his career had been my secretary and Kugler's predecessor; furthermore, with Illner, Krueker, and Frank-Fahle. We all acted in common and were unanimous ^{by opinion} of the fact that Schmitz was not the man to run such a huge company and in the technical field, after Bosch died in 1940, many things developed in a way with which we did not agree at all. These before-mentioned circumstances created a strong bond among the leading commercial people which of course during the war materialized only to a very limited extent.

3. On 28 August 1945, I signed a one page statement in my own long hand entitled "Statement re 'M-Fragen'", the text of which follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

To the best of my recollection the term "W-Fragen" under which we discussed in the K.A. problems regarding the Wehrmacht and her demands was first employed shortly after the Anschluss, that means in Spring 1938. Since that time a state of mobilization continuously existed, and the danger of a clash was constantly imminent.

Frankfurt, Aug. 26th 1945

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I would make the following amplification to be certain that it is clear that the K.A. did not deal with the factories and technical matters involved in the W-Fragen. The A.A. dealt with W-Fragen by (1) taking preparatory steps to see that key commercial personnel were not called up by the Army; (2) discussing the shifting of imports from countries which could be cut off from Germany in case of war to those which would not be cut off in case of war; (3) discussing the shifting of export trade from overseas to continental countries, but this became actual only after war broke out.

4. On 19 June 1945, I wrote up a four page statement as a preliminary statement on I.G. and the Wehrmacht, the text of which follows:

The competent military office in the O.K.W. for news which had to be taken from sources in neutral or formerly Allied countries up to the summer of 1944 was headed by Admiral Canaris.

To the best of my recollection I never met Admiral Canaris personally, at all events I have never had any negotiations with him.

My personal knowledge concerning this office was mainly limited to Col. Piepenbrock and Major Bloch, and only with the latter one I was in closer touch.

VS The attitude of the office of Admiral Canaris has been that in principle any news whatsoever coming from abroad were of interest to them and that they alone had the capacity to decide if an information was important or not important. Thus they said they would be obliged for getting everything which could be of a general or a specific interest, indifferently what importance we thought the incident or the event related could present.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

It was at all times clearly pointed out that one expected from I.G. or its employees, representatives, etc., no military news. For informations connected with this domain they said to have other people on hand. I.G. people furthermore should not be asked or were not supposed to have or to entertain any contact with so-called agents, charged with "dangerous tasks".

What was expected from our people has been a sort of "intelligence service" on commercial happenings in a general sense as well as on concrete specific circumstances including technical objects. The military authorities were fully aware of the great importance that the firms representing I.G. abroad remained undisputed and that they should not be endangered by getting mixed up with economic espionage.

On these general lines a collaboration developed in such a sense that a continuous intercourse took place, which on the side of I.G. was mainly conducted by our Zentrale in Berlin. From the beginning an awkward situation was created by the fact that apart from the office of Canaris other military authorities - sometimes of only regional character - wanted to get in touch with I.G. offices in Germany or abroad and had the ambition to get informations for their proper account. Even in last summer (1944), after a reorganization in the staff of Canaris had taken place, a Lt. Col. Falkenhorst (?) who in Heidelberg before the members of I.G. Vorstand gave a report about "Abwehr-Fragen", had to admit that no total concentration up to then had been achieved.

Thus it might have happened that in the same I.G. organization different men were charged with different questions by different authorities.

As far as Frankfurt - and so, too, I believe Berlin - was concerned, to the best of my knowledge we refrained from any such intercourse with other authorities than the one of Canaris which later on was taken over by a man called Schellenberg, or Schellenberg whom I have never met.

(page 2 of original)

The Wehrmacht, as far as I had been informed, acted in 3 directions:

1. They were interested to see I.G. men coming back from abroad to have their personal impressions, including such of technical character.
2. They engaged - practically always without letting beforehand in touch with I.G. head offices or with the chiefs of the organizations abroad - certain I.G. men who mostly had been for years on the spot, in order to work for them.
3. They tried to induce I.G. itself or the heads of the organization on the spot to take over certain men, who under the cover of the I.G.'s representative firm should work for purposes practically not connected with I.G. business.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

This latter way proved to be practically irrealisable as the firms abroad found in themselves the greatest difficulties at having their German experts getting the licence for labour, a man not being acquainted with chemical matters would have rendered himself from the very beginning as suspect.

I personally discouraged Major Bloch, as far as I remember, in 3 cases to make a corresponding endeavour, and he found, as I believe, another way - in charging a small Berlin company "Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung", which normally was occupied with the making of market analyses for third parties to send the respective men out.

As far as I remember, the head of this small company was called Lortz.

Still, I will not go so far as to entirely exclude the possibility that in one or the other individual case an I.G. organization abroad with the consent or the knowledge of the competent men at home has taken such a man in one way or the other under its protection. I myself cannot recollect any such case. At all events this will have been quite an exception.

For my opinion the activity developed according to Nr. 1 was by far the prevalent one.

As the I.G. with its affiliated firms represented in the average from 8-10% of the total German export-trade to the different European countries, the number of I.G. people continuously en route to such countries was a considerable one, and many of them - mainly if technical problems had to be dealt with - had to be in a certain sense long-time residents in the countries of destination.

As far as Nr. 2 is concerned, from my proper knowledge I can report of some cases in Spain and Portugal that people whom we did not consider as absolutely necessary on their places had to or would remain there or get back to them in another capacity not connected with our trade after having been mobilized in the meantime. The names, so I was told, are Dr. Löw and presumably one or two other men in Lisbon viz. Porto (Maueleshausen ?) and Moldenhauer in Madrid.

(page 3 of original)

In Sweden and in Switzerland I am sure that as far as Frankfurt's organization is concerned no similar cases do exist.

In Switzerland, as far as I know, there is one German citizen only as a technician in the Tefal's service, and it seems to me out of question that apart from his technical work in the application field, mostly with the textile industry, he was charged with anything else - and in Sweden the situation should be identical, there again up to my knowledge only one German citizen - again a technician - is with Dr. Lickfett - the Anilin-Kompaniet, as far as I can recollect, having exclusively Swedish subjects on their staff. As far

(signed) G v Schnitzler

as the so-called South-Eastern countries are concerned, I am not able to give any specific personal information, except one journey to Hungary in September 1942, where I assisted in Budapest at the Deutsch-Ungarischen Industrie-Verhandlungen, and one short visit to the Dynamit-Nobel Works in Pressburg in July 1943. I did not visit any of these countries. Dr. Ilgner and Dr. Kugler have a thorough knowledge of all these countries. For Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, of course, it has to be said that the two leading men having had the control over them for I.G. purposes, Mr. Waibel and Mr. Voigt both have lately died in a short interval. Summarizing the activities under Nos. 1 and 2, I myself can only speak of general lines which were being followed.

As far as risk had to be run that the position of I.G. in the different countries was endangered and no inimical act against the hospitalizing country was committed, it was considered as inevitable that such informations as O.K.W. expected were to be given.

I am not able to say to what an extent such informations had been given in reality, nor can I give any details concerning the kind of these informations.

As every man who reported was under the obligation of the strictest secrecy and would have exposed himself to the heaviest punishment if ever he would have talked, it is easily to be understood that practically nothing of the kind has "pierced".

From me personally specific informations were never asked. Of course, my activities abroad took place under the "open stay", and the questions to be dealt with were such that they only concerned I.G.'s general business-policy.

May I include here a personal remark. For the last 10 years I was always closely surveyed by Gauleitung and Gestapo. They distrusted my attitude. Our house Westendstr. 41, before it burnt down, was considered as being a sort of a shelter for all kinds of people being more or less in opposition to the regime.

My wife and I kept up all our friendships and acquaintances with our Jewish and half-Jewish friends as long as they stayed here. During the war we managed to see Mr. Carl v. Weinberg, whom I helped to get a regular German passport for Italy, at the opportunity

(page 4 of original)

of his 80th birthday (September 1941) in Florence. At home we saw continuously people not being in the party's grace, - i.e. Dr. Boutler, Prof. Houscole, Reiffenberg, Frau Kurtz, etc.. When therefore in last summer the chief of Frankfurt Gestapo Regierungsrat Bredares assisted by Kriminalrat Schmidt who in my opinion was charged with my personal control, hinted at a possibility if in Spain I could now get in touch with the "other side" I consider this as a trap, my simple answer was that this was "out of question".

As far as the relations to the I.G. of the party are concerned - and I am not quite sure if the question about the "propaganda abroad" was understood in this sense - it is difficult for me to give a thorough report. Mr. Waibel, who died in March 1945, had been

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the intermediary between I.G. and A. O. On different places abroad I.G. representatives were charged with party functions, but to the best of my knowledge one cannot speak of a Party Propaganda made by I.G. Individual men had to fulfil certain obligations, but the so-called "Propaganda" was exclusively made by the A. O. itself.

Its activity developed to an always higher degree. A. O. interfered mainly in the following matters: It collected money as well from the firms as from their employees. It tried to organize the employees for party purposes. It became interested in salary - and questions of leaves (vacations). No employee could be sent out before the A.O. had not given its agreement.

"Undesirable people" had to be removed, or to be put in the back-ground (vide Seaborn, Lisbon), I.G. had in many cases entirely to remodel their staff - vide the different S. E. countries.

G. von Schnitzler

19.6.45

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that the following amplification and typographical corrections should be made.

(a) The statement concerns the period after the war. Whether approaches by the Wehrmacht were made to I.G. after the "Anschluss" and before the war, I am not quite certain;

(b) In the next to the last paragraph on Page 4, I said that no employee could be sent abroad before the foreign organization of the Party, the A.O., had given its agreement. This is correct, except that I am not certain whether a special permit had to be given in each case or whether it was generally understood that I.G. would not send out people who were undesirable to the A. O.

(c) On Page 2, paragraph 7, the name "Lortz" should be "Kuenzler".

(d) On Page 3, paragraph 7, "open stay" should be "open sky".

(signed) G v Schnitzler

5. On 30 June 1945, I wrote up in longhand and signed a two page statement entitled "Statement re Gesellschaft fuer Verkaufsforderung", the text of which follows:

My relations with this company originated from the interest which I always have taken in the matters of industrial publicity in the largest sense. Thus I was the promoter of an intensive participation for a dyestuff show in the first German exhibition after the war - Munich 1921 -.

In 1929 the Reich appointed me as commissioner (Generalkommissar) for the Barcelona World-Exhibition. The architect whom I charged with the executive work was van der Rohe, who after 1933 with Frau Reich, a highly gifted Jewish lady, who always and also in Barcelona acted as his help, went to Chicago; The German participation became a great success. Photos of the German pavillion as well as of some departments were published all over the world including USA and President von Hindenburg in 1931 thanked me personally for my endeavours, granting me his photograph with his signature. My deputy in Barcelona was Dr. Maiwald who later on was commissioner for all German exhibitions Düsseldorf, Paris, Liege a.s.o. and designated for Rome.

For general industrial problems connected with these exhibitions there was always competent the Ausstellungs- und Messe-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, which depended from the Reichswirtschaftskammer and practically was an annex for the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie.

The latter was later on changed in the semi-official Reichsgruppe Industrie.

In the frame of the Reischsgruppe since 1933, or 34 I acted as Chairman of the A & M Ausschuss which was closely linked to a committee (Ausschuss) for industrial publicity of which I also was the chairman. This latter committee consisted mainly of men, who in their Wirtschaftsruppe or in their firms were in charge of the publicity questions in general or its publicity department. v. Winterfeld (Siemens), v. Helem - (Stahlwerksverband) Bleick (metallurgical Industrie), Schleich (Textil) Fisher-Jane I.G. were some of the best known names.

vs The committee acted as a sort of advisor and/or counterbalanced to the Werkerrat der Deutschen Wirtschaft and tried to protect the interests of the manufacturing industries in all kinds of publicity: advertising at home and abroad, Film-publicity for special firms and products, magazines (so-called Hauszeitschriften) booklets and so on - always purley from the industrial point of view. The acting man, Geschäftsfuehrer, on both Ausschüsse fairs and exhibitions as well as publicity uninterruptedly up to 1933 was Dr. Doering, Berlin, with whom I had close relations from 1928-1943. Dr. Doering was for over 25 years and employee of the Reichsverband and retired in 1943 partly owing to his physical inability to continue partly because Reichsgruppe let off some departments.

His successor Dr. Albrecht, who formerly was synodic of Wirtschaftsruppe Optik took over the two departments in addition to his main occupation (department of foreign commerce relations).

(signed) G v Schmitzler

Under Dr. Albrecht's management both Ausschüsse practically lost every activity which to a large extent was due to the general development. Among the numerous guests who attended the gatherings of the committee for industrial publicity which took place once or twice a year sometimes were present Messrs. Lortz and Künstler, who were in charge of the Fachschaft Deutscher Werbefachleute, an organization which had been created under the auspices of Mr. Hugo Fischer and had to be considered as a party institution. These two men did approach - I should say in 1937 - the Reichsgruppe with the idea that independently of their company. Then they separated, Lortz remained on the top of the Fachschaft, Künstler left it and became businessman. His idea was to make a living for himself and at the same time serve the German export-trade in to to to create a business on his own account under the name of "Gesellschaft fuer Verkaufsförderung". The aim of this company should be to prepare on orders to be given as well as abroad. He thought, he might be able to disclose certain new possibilities and needs which would offer additional export-chances and help to better Germany's capacity of payment.

(page 2 of original)

He asked for the support of the Reichsgruppe, which could not be given financially but a moral support was granted to him.

This moral support consisted mainly in the fact that Dr. Doering, Mr. Reinhold Krause of the well-known Berlin paper firm Max Krause and myself - and some 6 other personalities being interested in publicity questions, formed the Verwaltungsrat a more or less honorary committee, as the Gesellschaft was no juridical person but a society of civil law. The original capital was very small; I thin, some 10,000 M. which Künstler himself brought into the Co. - probably he has borrowed the money from somebody else.

The company should not take any financial risk but only act on firm orders from industrial firms at remunerative prices. Mr. Krause controlled from time to time the books of the Co. and the Co. has never shown a loss. With the enlargement of its business - partly due as a consequence of the relations which began to develop with O.K.W. - I can't exactly say if even before the war these have been of a substantial size - a certain need of capital became inevitable and I.G./A.E.G. and I think a third firm were ready to give certain advances on future orders (I.G. advanced as far as I remember M 10,000.-) which enabled the Co. to continue normally her business.

Hajer Bloch always pretended that he paid in cash for all costs occasioned by orders given through O.K.W., but it was probably difficult to keep the industrial activity so completely separated from the other activity of the Co. that this ever became absolutely clear. The company never was active in any sort of propaganda.

Retrospectively the granting of this moral support by the Reichsgruppe was a great mistake it took more than 2 years to liquidate it. I think with the end of 1942 the Verwaltungsrat had disappeared and no financial claims from any side were raised against his members. But the initial idea, that an enterprise should be created which had to work in the interest of

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the German industry in toto was never realized. I.G. and A. E. G. will still be creditors in the Cos. books - and in the last years Künstler was continuously, as I have been informed, on voyage. Even his name came off my memory and I mixed him up with Lortz but after having read Künstler's name again I am as good as sure that Lortz never was a partner in the firm nor worked for her. Instead some other good publicity men, Kriede and Schneider (?) have acted in for her.

The greatest profit of the Co. undoubtedly had O.K.W. The Canaris office valued the Co.'s services as highly useful and felt obliged to Reichsgruppe for having supported her.

For me personally it was a great relief for when the relations to the Co. were definitely severed - without having occasional difficulties of personal or financial character. I must frankly admit that it was a very awkward commitment and I was only to glad that it was a unique one for me.

June 30th, '45

signed: G. von Schnitzler

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except a lot of typographical errors, occasioned probably by the stenographer who copies my longhand statement. vs

6. On 22 August 1945 I was interrogated principally on the subject of the "Gesellschaft fuer Verkaufsförderung".

The record of the interrogation follows:

Interrogation
of v. Schnitzler
by Mr. Glaser.

22 August 1945
10.55 - 12.00 a.m.

- Q. When was the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung founded and by whom?
- A. I thought it over once. Didn't I put it in the statement? I would rather say in 1937. It was Mr. Künzler who founded it. He went to make a job for himself of it and he came to the Reichsgruppe and claimed that it was of a certain public interest.
- Q. Prior to the founding of this business, had Mr. Künzler been a member of a party organization dealing with advertising?
- A. Mr. Künzler was in the management of the so-called Central Organization of the "Werbeaufseher".
- Q. Was that a party organization?
- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. What was your position in the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung when it was founded?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. I accepted together with Dr. Döhning and Mr. Krause and Mr. Fischer of I.G., and some other man I can't remember the name, to be a sort of an honorary "Verwaltungsrat". I personally became the chairman of the Verwaltungsrat in my quality as chairman of the "Ausschuss für industrielle Wirtschaftswerbung" of the Reichsgruppe.
- Q. Did you hold that position on a personal basis or as a representative of the I.G.?
- A. As representative of the Reichsgruppe Industrie.
- Q. Was your position in the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung equivalent to the chairman of the administrative board?
- A. No, because it was a private company. This Verwaltungsrat was practically only a form to show that the Reichsgruppe was helpful to Kdnzler in building up the company.
- Q. Would you describe yourselves as being chairman of the administrative council of this business?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who contributed the original capital to the business?
- A. I don't know. Kdnzler himself brought the capital. But I don't know whom he got it from.
- Q. Did I.G. Farben contribute any of the original capital?
- A. No, not of the original capital.
- Q. Will you describe the nature of the business of the corporation and from whom it rendered its principal services?
- (page 2 of original)
- A. It was a free private company which tried to make analysis, on orders of industrial firms, of market conditions in Germany and the neighbouring countries of Germany. It was mostly destined to do that for enterprises of a medium size which had no great selling organizations at their own disposition, but still orders from great firms have been collected, for instance from Agfa.
- Q. What was the nature of the reports which were drawn up for Agfa?
- A. I can't remember the details. I can't remember for what market.
- Q. Who is Mr. v. Puttkammer?
- A. Mr. v. Puttkammer was for a certain time an employee of I.G. connected with Benzler at Duisberg and later on travelled to China, and since then I lost every sight of him. He was engaged to go to China. I think he was in connection with Mr. Kdnzler.
- Q. What connection did he have with Mr. Kdnzler?
- A. I am not sure. I can't remember. Perhaps it is absolutely wrong. You asked me about v. Puttkammer. I have heard later on that there was something about China.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. Wasn't Mr. v. Puttkammer associated with Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. Yes, I think so. When it came back to my memory it might be possible that Mr. v. Puttkammer has gone to China for the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung, but I am not sure.
- Q. How long was he employed for I.G.?
- A. I would say in the years 1930/33 or 1934.
- Q. When did he make his trip to China?
- A. It's impossible for me to say, but before the war.
- Q. In 1933 or 1934?
- A. No, later on.
- Q. I repeat my question: How long was he employed for I.G.?
- A. 3 or 4 years perhaps.
- Q. Would you say from 1933 to 1937?
- A. I would say it was earlier.
- Q. Was Mr. v. Puttkammer in the hire of I.G. when he went to China?
- A. No, to the best of my knowledge.
- Q. Was he in the hire of the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung when he went to China?
- A. I think so.
- (page 3 of original)
- A. Firstly they got a lot of orders out of the industry for purely private purposes. Then Künzler came into touch with Major Bloch and Bloch used the firm for obtaining economic information out of neutral and axis countries.
- Q. What position did Major Bloch hold in the O.K.W.?
- A. He was in the so-called Kanaris Office and his superior was Oberst Pickenbrock.
- Q. Was Oberst Pickenbrock head of the espionage and intelligence Office?
- A. He was the head of the economic department of the Kanaris Office.
- Q. What was the Kanaris office?
- A. That was the so-called intelligence office of the O.K.W.
- Q. Was it the practice to accommodate various governmental agencies, who wanted to place men on special missions, by using the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. That developed.
- Q. When did that develop?
- A. I think it developed only during the war.

- Q. Are you acquainted with the nature of the tasks performed by such men?
- A. No, not at all.
- Q. Did you know that it was for other than economic purposes?
- A. Yes, I know that.
- Q. What was your impression of what the purpose was?
- A. The purpose was to get economic news out of the countries which were useful for the Kanaris organization.
- Q. Do you can confine the statement to economic information?
- A. That was said to me by Major Bloch.
- Q. If the foreign department under von Ribbentrop was to attach a man to this company, would you suppose that it was for the obtaining of economic information?
- A. I don't know of such a case.
- Q. Do you remember having personally referred a member of v. Ribbentrop's office to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you recall a man named Rheinbaden?
- A. I think he had nothing to do with the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung. Mr. Rheinbaden has been formerly under Stresemann in the foreign office, I think as Ministerialdirektor.

(page 4 of original)

- Q. Did you ever refer Mr. Rheinbaden to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. No, that's entirely new for me. I knew that Mr. Rheinbaden was in Portugal.
- Q. Did you know what he was doing there?
- A. I don't know it but I can suppose it. He was lobbying for getting informations from everywhere he could get it. And he was supposed to have a liaison with an Egyptian woman. The company developed during the war into a company for obtaining such information, and I myself gave the suggestion to Major Bloch when he wanted that I.G. should send out to say Spain or Portugal the one or another man, that he should better use the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung because that company was unknown in Spain and Portugal and nothing could happen which could endanger any business position of the company.
- Q. What purpose did you ascribe to the people who were trying to get on the I.G. payroll in foreign countries?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. They should try to get economic information of secret character like production figures, how many steamers, etc. For this purpose I wouldn't have like I.G. people.
- Q. Didn't your Verbindungsmaenner do the same thing?
- A. The Verbindungsmaenner were only charged by I.G. to give I.G. general economic information but not lobbying in favours or other places to inspect what's going on there.
- Q. When did I.G. put money into the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. I would think 1941, it could also be 1940.
- Q. What other firms besides I.G. put funds into this organization?
- A. A.S.G. and I think Siemens.
- Q. Wasn't the company able to take care of itself financially at that time?
- A. No, it was a little short. This money was given in the idea that it should be paid back. It was given in the form of an advance.
- Q. In 1940 and 1941 was the majority of the business which was performed by this company for the O.K.W.?
- A. This developed in that way and this was the reason we wanted to resign, Krause, Döhring and I. This was far away from the original purpose of the company.
- Q. Did the O.K.W. compensate the firm?
- A. The O.K.W. compensated them in such a way that it pretended that they always paid back the money which was spent on their account.

(page 5 of original)

- Q. What money was spent on O.K.W.'s account?
- A. It was never said to me and I didn't ask. It was a secret.
- Q. Did they pay espionage agents?
- A. That I can't say either. I don't think they paid agents.
- Q. If the O.K.W. reimbursed the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung for monies paid out by it, what was the underlying nature of such payments?
- A. The costs which were occasioned by the journeys of those men in foreign countries who were travelling officially for the Gesellschaft.
- Q. When you decided that it was a proper time to resign from the firm, wasn't that the same time that you came forward with money for this business?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. Yes, that was a little later. Perhaps, I would think, half a year later.
- Q. Would you say in fact that the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung was subsidized by I.G., A.E.G. and Siemens?
- A. Yes, it was. Of course, in the form of an advance.
- Q. Do you know whether Siemens and A.E.G. also had occasion to have men employed by the Gesellschaft für special secret purposes?
- A. No, I don't know. I.G. had no men engaged for it. They simply said to Major Bloch to take these men to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung.
- Q. Would you say then that I.G. in order to protect itself from having such persons attached to its organization did, in fact, arrange for a dummy corporation to perform that function?
- A. Yes, there is something in that. It's difficult to answer with yes or no. For I.G. it was quite, say, comfortable that eventual demands of such a kind of the O.K.W. could be turned over to the company and therefore a certain interest did exist that the company could run on and if it was short of money so I.G. gave it an advance. So an indirect connection undoubtedly is given.
- Q. Was your position with the Gesellschaft a personal one or in a representative capacity for I.G.?
- A. No, Farben had nothing to do with it. I came as representative of the Reichsgruppe.
- Q. Do you recall how much money was put in this business by I.G. and approximately when?
- A. I think it was 10,000 marks, in the years 1940 to 1941.
- Q. Were there any subsequent payments made by I.G.?
- A. No. (page 6 of original)
- Q. After you informed Major Bloch that it was more proper to make requests of this kind to the Gesellschaft, did he thereafter make any more requests to you?
- A. Not to me personally.
- Q. Do you know to whom?
- A. It's easily possible to some of the Berlin people, von der Heyde, etc.
- Q. Did you or Farben receive many requests from 1939 on for persons to be placed with your branches and what disposition was made?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. Yes, we got such requests. But the cases which were represented to me did not materialize on the I.G. platform, according to my opinion.
- Q. Was it the usual method to refer such persons to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. No, that is much too much said. This is absolutely clear that the Generalstab asked of those people being there on the spot lots of information regarding any kind of economic, but never, according to my knowledge, of what one calls military espionage, only of the economic side.
- Q. You are now referring to people who were already employed in your foreign branches?
- A. Yes, and people whom they wanted to send out under our branch firms it was outspoken theory they didn't want to endanger I.G.'s position with military espionage.
- Q. If they could have gotten such economic information from those people who were already in Spain or Portugal, why should it have been necessary to apply for additional persons?
- A. Because they didn't get enough information according to my opinion.
- Q. You were not opposed to the people in your branches giving the O.K.W. economic information?
- A. It was their duty.
- Q. When the O.K.W. felt that it was necessary, for their purposes, to send one of their men to any of your branches, could it be assumed that it was for other than economic information?
- A. No, I don't think so. Because they promised me that for the so-called espionage they had other people. "We don't need you".
- Q. How many times, under those circumstances, did you put men on your payroll in your branches?
- A. I think there were 2 or 3 cases, but Overhoff and Kugler must know it.
- Q. Why did you directly employ these men?
- A. It could be done in a way which was not apparent.
- (page 7 of original)
- Q. Why did you refuse in other cases, to hire within your own organization, but referred O.K.W. to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. Because I thought that that kind of men could not be taken on our payroll without becoming apparent. Because those were men who had never anything to do with the chemical business.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. What was to be feared if they were only going to give economic information?
- A. That it still regarded as economic espionage and that the responsible superior of those men would eventually be expelled.
- Q. What kind of economic espionage do you refer to now?
- A. Economic news of every kind, say, production figures, trade development, ships going out and in, reports having come over from enemy countries, etc.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser, are true."

I still feel that the answers I gave to the questions are entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. / except a lot of typographical errors, occasioned probably by the stenographer, who copied my longhand statement.

7. On 27 August 1945, I was interrogated by Mr. Glaser, an American investigator. A record of the interrogation follows:

Interrogation
of v. Schnitzler
by Mr. Glaser.

27 August 1945.
10,30 - 10,50 a.m.

- Q. When and in what capacity was von Puttkammer employed by I.G. Farben?
- A. I told you, he must have been engaged with Dr. Duisberg in Leverkusen.
- Q. What is your best recollection of when that was?
- A. Dr. Duisberg died in spring 1935, so it must have been much earlier. He was ill for a long time, nearly half a year. It can only have been in 1933 or 1934, if not earlier. That is all I know about him. He is one of hundreds of persons that passed me.
- Q. Is it your impression that after Duisberg's death von Puttkammer was no longer with I.G. Farben?
- A. I think he has written something for Duisberg. He came once to me to see me with a recommendation of Duisberg. So it is in my recollection.
- Q. Do you know whether or not he was employed by I.G. after Duisberg's death?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. I am not sure. That could be checked in Leverkusen, if you send a question to Leverkusen if ever a Mr. von Puttkammer was on the payroll of Leverkusen, but it may be that he never was on the I.G. payroll, that he was privately used by Duisberg for his different works.
- Q. When did you first know that von Puttkammer was associated with Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung?
- A. He had here certain relations in Bad Homburg. Perhaps even his wife has been for a certain time in Bad Homburg and he came to tell me that he had come into relation to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung and his intention was to go to the Far East.
- Q. When was that?
- A. That was in 1940.
- Q. At the time in 1940 when he informed you that he was associated with the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung, did he indicate the nature of his position in the firm?
- A. It could be possible that he said: "I have become secretary of the company". According to my recollection it might be that he told me: "I intend to go to China", and of course that must have been in 1940, because in 1941 the relations with Russia became even difficult. I remember that in spring 1941 we discouraged my colleague Weibel to take the risk of such a journey.
- Q. When was it that Mr. Weibel intended to go to the Far East?
- A. In Spring 1941. Since Molotov had been in Berlin, and that was, if I am not mistaken, in winter 1940/41, one knew that the German government had refused the demands of Russia regarding Finland and Constantinople and great parts of Roumania, and we feared the overwhelming position in the Baltic States. But still we sent Hoppen out, one of our men, Weibel's first man

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for the East. He has travelled to Japan in the month of March 1941. So v. Puttkammer, when he came to see me and told me about his trip to the Far East, that must have been not later than autumn 1940.

- Q. Did he tell you what his mission was to be in the Far East?
- A. No, I wouldn't have asked him.
- Q. Did you have the impression that it was on personal business or that it was for Farnon or for the J.K.W.?

(signed) G v Schmitzler

- A. It was nothing for Farben. I think it was mixed up for the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung and for O.K.W. just as well. That was my impression.
- Q. When von Rheinbaben requested that a letter be given to him by I.G. which would indicate that he was going on business for I.G. to Spain and Portugal, was he referred to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung for such a letter?
- A. I think I did that. You showed me that letter in which he asked me. I knew Mr. von Rheinbaben for a long time. He was with the Deutsche Volkspartei, member of the Reichstag. He had nothing to do with Nazi government. He addressed to me and thought perhaps that I.G. or I would help him. Of course, I.G. or I as member of the managing board of I.G. would not recommend him because I knew perfectly well that he was no business man. And then I simply turned him over to the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung because I knew Künzler was a man who handled a lot of things.
- Q. But you know, at that time, Künzler and the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung were engaged in work with the O.K.W.?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Can you tell me when and under what circumstances the firm closed down?
- A. No, we got out of that firm. We wanted to get out end of 1940, at last we succeeded in 1942. Since then I have never heard anymore of the company.
- Q. Is the company still in existence?
- A. I think it was liquidated. I don't know because I did not hear anything anymore.
- Q. When did you and your associates of the Reichsgruppe withdraw from the firm?
- A. We withdrew at the end of 1940. It lasted two years before the arrangements were settled.
- Q. What was your reason for the withdrawal?
- A. The reason for the withdrawal was that our opinion was that the Gesellschaft für Verkaufsförderung had entirely developed in such a way that for the Reichsgruppe, that means for the Aus-

(page 3 of original)

schluss für wirtschaftliche Werbung, was not the slightest interest to be connected with that.

- Q. Specifically, what was your objection to the way this firm had developed?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. The relations with O.K.F. had become too intimate.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser, are true."

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

"My answers to the questions in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

8. I have carefully read each of the 20 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Sworn to and signed before me this 2nd day of May 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nuernberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Rexel A. Sprecher
REXEL A. SPEECHER
U.S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATION

I, EVEL E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of document No. NI-5198, the original of which is in the English language.

EVEL E. UIBERALL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO.
CASE NO. VI
Prosecution Document Book No. XVI

to english



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK NO 17.

Exhibit Number	Document Number	Description Document Book Page
	HI-6700	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 14 April 1947 concerning the validity of statements made by him to the American authorities after German surrender.
	HI-6544	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 30 April 1947 concerning the organization of I.S. Berlin 7, its functions and activities, and the activities of I.S. liaison agents.
	HI-6702	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 25 April 1947 concerning the propaganda activities of I.S.
	HI-6701	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 14 April 1947 concerning a trip in Latin America taken by Max Ilgner and a report on Latin America based on that trip.
	HI-6713	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 2 April 1947 concerning positions of I.S. German officials in the State, the Party, and Public Life.
	HI-6649	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 30 April 1947 concerning Sembacher's relations with I.S. German.
	HI-6593	Affidavit of Max Ilgner of 15 April 1947 containing his personal history, positions with I.S. German, and his professional and political activities.



AFFIDAVIT

I, MAX HILGEMANN, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

1. I was in Wurzburg, Germany, late in March 1945 when the Allied Troops occupied that area. On 27 March 1945 I was with Hermann SCHMIDT and August von KNIERIM in Heidelberg. Together we went back to Wurzburg where we presented ourselves on 7 April 1945 on the Left Bank of the Main to the competent office of the 7th American Army. I was there taken into custody by the American authorities and I have been detained ever since that time.

2. During the period from May until the fall of 1945, I was continually questioned by American and Allied investigators, particularly by the American investigators Mr. LINDEN, Mr. ROSE, Mr. QUACKEN, Mr. LINVILLE, Mr. HOLLANDER and Mr. ESTER. During this period of investigation I was ordinarily brought from Freungeshain station in Frankfurt, Germany, to the Reichstank Building in Frankfurt nearly every day along with a number of other former officials of the Third Reich. There I and the other officials were asked to give information concerning the history of the I.G. Farben and on other matters, this was done by means of interrogations or else by having us write various statements on topics which were given to us by one or more of the investigators.

3. I have always disclosed the full truth to the best of my knowledge, recollection and belief, to American or Allied investigators since the surrender of Germany, both in written statements and in oral conversations.

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I never intentionally gave false information of any kind. I never intentionally withheld information of any kind. Most of the statements made by me during the summer of 1945 were written by me in my own handwriting. Many of them were written on topics of my own choice which I thought were of importance to subjects in which the authorities had shown interest. These statements are completely the product of my own mind, except in certain cases where I was given permission to consult my former colleagues and associates. All the facts stated in them are true to the best of my knowledge. Of course, I was very depressed by what had happened in Germany and by my environment and so many times I may have omitted information. However, I usually went far beyond any requests made of me and volunteered information.

4. At no time during the investigations of 1945 was I prevented from correcting any written statement which I made subsequent to the time of its making. I felt that I had made no error.

5. From the time I was apprehended until the 17 April, I was interned in Jugenheim; from the 17 to 30 April, in Ritzingen; from the 30 April to 2 May, in Goepfingen; from 2 May to 9 May 1945, in Paris; from 9 May to 19 May 1945, near Versailles; 19 May to 20 August, Freungeshain; 20 August to 29 September, Oberursel; 29 September to 9 October, Internment Camp, Alaska; 9 October to 13 October, Oberursel; 13 October 1945 to 21 November 1945,

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6700
Cont'd

Kranzberg; 21 November 1946 to 15 January 1947; Muerenberg; 15 January to 13 February, Ludwigsburg CIC #74; 13 February 1947 to 19 March 1947, PW Hospital #1, Ludwigsburg; and since 19 March 1947 in Murnberg.

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6. Many of my colleagues were interned with me in these many camps and prisons. After discussing with my colleagues a number of matters concerning which I had given information, I came to the conclusion that a few times I had given some incomplete information to the investigators in 1945. However, I had made no serious errors or omissions and told no untruths. Particularly at Kranzberg, I and the other officials of I.G. Farben interned there had numerous discussions over some months on the subjects of all our previous interrogations, and I was able to obtain information about I.G. Farben which I had not previously had. TER MEER and von KNIERIEM and I discussed with von SCHNITZLER statements which he and SCHMITZ had made to the authorities in which they had confused certain issues and blamed I.G. Farben for certain things, for which it should not have been blamed. The members of I.G. present there were able to convince SCHMITZ and von SCHNITZLER that they were not technically competent to speak on some of these subjects. This took place only after long discussion in which SCHMITZ, TER MEER, von SCHNITZLER, von KNIERIEM, GALEWSKI, MOERLEIN, BUECHERSON participated.

I have carefully read each of the three pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that in this statement I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Dr. Max ILGNER
Signature

Sworn to and signed before me this 14th day of April 1947 at Muerenberg, Germany by Dr. Max ILGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Otto VERBER
Otto VERBER, U.S. Civ.
AGO #A-444385
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, No. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 6700.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
A.F. NO. 34079

END

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Max ILGNER, a member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktien-
gesellschaft Frankfurt (Main) from 1934 until 1945, after having been warned
that I will be liable for punishment when making false statements, herewith
state under oath the following, of my own free will and without coercion:

1.) Since my capture by the American authorities in April 1945, I have
prepared numerous reports on the organization of I.G. Berlin NW 7 and its
functions; on the I.G. liaison agents and the support given by I.G. to the
State and the Party with regard to foreign countries, as well as on I.G.'s
relations to the authorities in general. I refer especially to the following
reports and interrogations:

Date:

Subject Dealt With:

18 June 1945) Request for support abroad from the) I.G. by the Wehrmacht, the Security) Service, the Government and the Party.
28 June 1945) Organization and functions of I.G.,) Berlin NW 7.
18 July 1945) Report on various questions regarding) the interrogation of 18 July 1945.
22 July 1945	Additional remarks to various reports.
23 July 1945) Interrogation on the organization of) I.G., Berlin NW 7, and the special) functions of Volkswirtschaftliche) Abteilung: (Political Economy Depart-) ment).

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Date:

Subject Dealt With:

1 August 1945) The manner in which I.G. Berlin NW 7) was managed and my own work.
4 August 1945) Report on the interrogation: "I.G.'s) support of the Wehrmacht."
18 August 1945) History of the Chemneyco, Inc. and) functions of this statistical) department.

2.) With the exception of the above-mentioned interrogations all the afore-
mentioned reports were drawn up in my own handwriting. All facts referred
to in the reports and interrogations were truthfully reported, according to
my best knowledge and recollection. I point out, however, that then (1945)
I was not as well informed on many happenings as I am today after I could
obtain information in Gransberg camp from my colleagues and associates on
many things of which, in 1945, I had only incomplete knowledge or no

knowledge at all; on the other hand, my recollection was in 1945 in many respects more vivid than it is today. When reading through the aforementioned reports I noticed that I reported on many facts very vaguely and in generalities while matters often were not expressed in the interrogations as I would have laid them down in an unbroken report. In my first interrogation in Nuernberg, in April 1947, I already reported orally on the external circumstances under which most of the reports and interrogations came about in the summer of 1945.

In the following I am combining all the facts given in the afore-mentioned reports and interrogations in one consolidated report and at the same time I am adding a few dates which I communicated to Herr Otto VERBER, in the first two weeks of April 1947, in Nuernberg.

(Page 2 of original)

3.) Upon the request of C. v. WEINBERG, FLIENINGER and SELCK I set up the organization of I.G. Berlin NW 7 in 1926, to establish a contact with Dr. SCHMITZ in his capacity as I.G. financier. About the time of 1927/28 the Finanz-Abteilung (Finance Department) I.G. Berlin NW 7 came into existence which became the basis for Zentralfinanzverwaltung (Translator's Note: ZEFI - Central Finance Department) in 1931, the other I.G. finance offices (in total approximately seven) being liquidated.

4.) As a sub-department of Finanz-Abteilung I.G. Berlin NW 7 the Volkswirtschaftliche Archive fuer die Beduerfnisse der I.G. Finanzen (National Economy Archives for I.G. Finance Requirements) was established in 1927. In the year of 1928 Geheimrat BOSCH caused Professor von MOELLENDOERFF, a member of the Aufsichtsrat of I.G. to take a trip to the U.S., to collect information acquainting him with the structure of the National Industrial Conference Board, first of all, and also with other American statistical organizations, as well as those of political economy, preparatory to the establishment of a similar organization in Germany; this was done in 1929, with my assistance, as the Volkswirtschaftliche Archive were expanded and made into an independent unit as Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung. In connection with this expansion Professor WAGEMANN, resident of the Reich Statistical Office (Statistisches Reichsamt) - who is also the head of the Institut fuer Konjunktur Forschung (Institute for Market Analysis) assisted us by putting qualified personnel at our disposal. WAGEMANN was under personal obligation to I.G. because in 1928 he, too, through the intervention of Dr. SCHMITZ whose personal friend he was, had made at I.G.'s expense an extended trip for study purposes to the U.S.A.. In later years I gave to Dr. REITHINGER, the head of Vowi (Economic Department) a certain leeway in admitting outsiders as associates for carrying out investigations pertaining to political economy, to obviate the need of employing too many qualified assistants with Vowi of I.G. It is for this reason also that I.G. paid considerable amounts to the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung (Institute for Market Analysis) in Berlin, and to the Weltwirtschaftliche Institut in Kiel (Institute for World Economy) so as to permit making use of the highly qualified working staffs of these institutes for its own work related to political economy. For a similar reason Vowi maintained a collaborators' relationship with the Statistical Department of Chemneycobased on an I.G. retainer contract by reason of which especially the statistics and other material pertaining to political economy published in the U.S.A., were passed on to Vowi.

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Returning to my position as Betriebsfuehrer ("Plant Leader") of I.G. Berlin NW 7 (mid-1940) after having been away because of sickness, I heard that my brother, Rudolf W. ILGNER, the Chief of the Statistical Department of Chemneyco, was on trial in Washington because of the destruction of files and data of Chemneyco. I am not informed why this happened but from what I heard in the meantime I am inclined to assume it was because after the outbreak of the English war and prior to the outbreak of the American war, Chemneyco had sent data on political economy to Vowi from which inferences with regard to the American armament could be made and, apparently, one felt concerned that American authorities might establish such conclusion. If this assumption should be correct, I am of the opinion that this destruction of files was superfluous and not right. As a result of the cooperation by way of Chemneyco with other political economy institutes, such as the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung in Berlin, the Weltwirtschaftliche Institut in Kiel, the National Industrial Conference Board in New York, and other American political economy institutions, the high scientific standard of the Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung of I.G. was at the same time guaranteed.

5.) At the time of the Brüning government, i.e. at the time of the severe German depression, Geheimrat BOSCH established a secretariat in Berlin; his secretary in Berlin, Dr. GATTINEAU, was at the same time put in charge of a Referat on commercial policy and of the press office of I.G. in Berlin. These departments were under the direct supervision of Dr. DUISBERG, the head of the Z.A. Büro (Office of the Central Committee) in Frankfurt (Main), and indirectly subordinated to the Central Committee. As far as I know, Dr. GATTINEAU kept up also a certain contact with the Wirtschaftspolitische Beraterkreis (Circle of Advisers on Economic Policy) of Geheimrat BOSCH, the so-called "KALIE-Kreis" (KALIE-circle). With the economic depression becoming more stringent the Handelspolitische Referat (in particular I.G.'s wishes relative to tariffs and quotas) gained growing importance, which still further increased after the Nazis took over the power and controlled economy was more rigidly applied. Following a resolution by the Central Committee, the Handelspolitische Referat was reorganized as the Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung of I.G.(Wipo), it being also directly subordinate to the Central Committee. As the State and the Party increasingly interfered in matters of economy, the main task

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of Wipo as an auxiliary organization and, especially of the Verkaufsgemeinschaften (Sales Combines) of I.G. was to obtain approvals - in a great number of cases required of authorities - and in the respective cases to represent I.G.'s wishes in dealing with the authorities. As the control of economy became more rigid from year to year, the scope and the importance of Wipo kept on growing. After 30 June 1934 Wipo and Press Office - in the case of the latter it may have been somewhat earlier - were integrated into the organization of I.G. Berlin NW 7; this was done primarily because of personal difficulties which Dr. GATTINEAU had by reason of 30 June 1934. Because I myself left Germany as early as August 1934 to proceed on my Far East trip, I practically took over the supervision of Wipo not until after my return in mid-1935. During the war the Pressestelle was entrusted with the task of providing the needed newspapers and magazines from abroad; this was done by way of Portugal, and possibly also by way of Switzerland and in conjunction with the Verkaufsgemeinschaft Pharmazeutiker (Bayer); details are not known to me.

6.) From the general commercial functions of the original "Buero of Dr. SCHMITZ" (1926) the K.A. Buero developed in various stages, in 1931/32 approximately, from which in 1936 the "Buero des Kaufmannischen Ausschusses" (B.K.A.) originated.

7.) Apart from the five "Hauptabteilungen" (Main Departments) already mentioned, the office of I.G. Berlin NW 7 also comprised two other special main departments (sachliche Hauptabteilungen), - the Rechtsabteilung (Legal Department) and the Exportfoerderungsabteilungen (Department for the Promoting of Exports) - and four general administrative departments: Direktions-Abteilung (Directorate Department), Verwaltungs-Abteilung (Administration Department), Personal-Abteilung (Personnel Department) and Bau-Abteilung (Building Department). The Rechts-Abteilung had originated from a sub-department of the Zentralfinanzverwaltung, the Finanz-Sekretariat, and later on became independent. Similarly, the Exportfoerderungs-Abteilung developed from a sub-department of "Zefi", the Kompensations-Abteilung (Compensation Department); the latter had been established in 1931, in connection with the effects of the bank crash and the freezing of currencies in countries of South-eastern Europe. For the same reason the Zefi-Vertrauensmaenner were then appointed whose function - incidental to the export promoting program - was later on broadened to cover the function of I.G. Verbindungsmaenner (I.G. liaison agents). I have already prepared a chart which gives a survey of the organization.

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of I.G. Berlin NW 7, the personnel and its functions. In the following I am giving once more a brief survey of the management, the seven special main departments and the four general administration departments of I.G. Berlin NW 7:

- I. Management: ILCHER, Betriebsfuehrer, KRUEDER, Deputy
FRANK-PAUL, GATTINEAU - later on TEGHAAR, KIRSTEN - later
BACHEM (The latter two as assistants to the Betriebsfuehrer)
- II. Zentralfinanzverwaltung: KRUEDER, FRANK-PAUL, HELFERT, v. MEISTER
(Top Management: Geheimrat SCHMITZ)
 - A. Finance-Secretariat: KIRSTEN, GIERLICH, MENZE
 - B. General Foreign Exchange Control: GIERLICH, SCHEERER, MENZE
 - C. Foreign Exchange Control:
 - Commodity Imports: GIERLICH, A. MUELLER
 - D. Credit Department: v. MEISTER, RONG, RITTER
 - E. Bookkeeping: ACKERMANN, FAUL
 - F. Securities Department:
 - Coupon Control: SCHMIDT, HAUCK
 - Cashier's Office
- III. Export Promoting Department: KRUEDER, DIHLMANN, BACHEM
 - A. Compensations: BACHEM and others ?
 - B. Office for Creation of Additional Exports (Zusatz-Ausfuhr-Verfahren) (Z.A.V.): BACHEM and others
 - C. Special Transactions (Sperrmark (blocked marks) etc.): BACHEM and others
 - D. I.G. Soja Interests: WEICHERT, HELB, v. FLUEGE

- IV. Legal Department FRANK-FAHLE, KERSTEN, SILCHER, HOENE
(Top Management: v. KNIERIEM)
- A. General legal questions of all departments of I.G. RW 7
B. Contact with I.G. Legal-Committee (v. KNIERIEM)
C. Work for other I.G. offices:
 a) for v. KNIERIEM SILCHER
 b) for Oil Department: REINTGES
- V. Bureau des Kaufmannischen Ausschusses: FRANK-FAHLE, G. SCHILLER, later
(Top Management: v. SCHMITZEL) SCHWANTE

- A. Department West: SCHWANTE, later WALLOTH, SCHOENE
B. Department East: SAKEN, LANDWERN

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- VI. Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung: GATTINEAU, later TEUGHAAR, E. MUELLER
- A. Liaison Office Sales Mixed Color: E. MUELLER, GASE
B. " " Sales Mixed Chemicals: PRENTZEL, v. BOENNINGHAUSEN
 and Purchases
C. " " Sales Mixed Pharma-
 ceutics EICHNER, DELERUECK
D. " " Sales Mixed Agfa:
 KALLS ECKER, JAGUES
E. " " Nitrogen, Oil,
 Agriculture v.d. HEYDE (Military Intelligence
 delegate RW 7)
 BLANCHI, MALTZAN
F. Trade Policy Branch:
G. Liaison Office with Industries'
 Economy: AHLEMAN

- VII. Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung: REITHINGER
- A. General investigations in the field
 of political economy - currencies -
 payment and trade balances. FUEHST, PLATZER, BURKHEISER
B. Market analyses and prognoses,
 reports on countries, maps of
 countries, travel reports KULT, WEOMANN
C. World Markets in Chemicals: LORENZ, ZIEMER
D. Firms and Finance Archives: PANGERT, DORN
E. Vowi (Economics Department) Branch
 Office Frankfurt-Main: DAMMAN, ANTONI
F. Vowi (Economics Department) Branch
 Office Vienna: GROSS, RICHTER

- VIII. Press Office: PASSANGE
- A. Press at Home: BRETTNER, HOLTGREVE
B. Foreign Press: v. THIRPITZ

- IX. Direktions-Abteilung (Directorate Department: G. SCHILLER, later KERSTEN,
PRENTZEL, later de HAAS, later
RACHEM.
- A. General functions of the movement: Minutes on mail discussions,
 application and use of the I.G.
 Minutes etc.
B. Personnel card index and records on presents.

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- X. Administration Department: HELPERT, SCHUERMAN
- A. General administration: house, club, car etc.
- B. Administration of offices handling evacuation (Ausweichstellen).
- C. Travel Office: HENSCHEL
- XI. Personnel Department: JACOBSEN, BAUMANN, HOEFELICH
- A. Salaries, accounting: HOEFELICH
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- B. Social benefits: SCHROENBERG (Betriebsabmann of I.G. Berlin NW 7)
- C. Office handling indispensable persons' cases
(Translator's Note: U.K. Stellung can not be replaced) RUEDIGER (Deputy, Abwehrbeauftragter of I.G. Berlin NW 7)
- D. Salaries and allowances for the executive staff and foreign associates: v. ABEL (Office v. ABEL)
- XII. Building Office: BOESME-RIECHTER
- A. Administration of I.G. houses Berlin NW 7
- B. New constructions (houses in shift set-up); evacuation premises.

8.) In connection with the steadily increasing air raids during the war and the expansion of evacuation premises for the operations of I.G. Berlin NW 7 there arose at the same time the need for expanding the air raid protection service. Primarily to relieve from such duty the executive officials who were already overburdened, I engaged as air raid wardens for my various office buildings in Berlin and for various evacuation premises a number of officers who had been discharged from the Wehrmacht (General LECH, Lt. Col IRMGANG, Capt. PIEKNERROCK and two or three Staff and subaltern officers, whose names slipped my mind). After the outbreak of the war General THOMAS approached my deputy KUEGER -- I myself was sick -- and requested him to place the retired General MUMMENTHEY with I.G.; the request was submitted to Geheimrat SCHMITZ who decided for the employment. MUMMENTHEY was to be used in the aluminum scrap trade; in the beginning he was also used to maintain liaison with General THOMAS and, later, in the Petsamo Nickel matter. Envoy NEUBACHER recommended to me to employ General MUFF, also retired, who at one time had been Military Attache in Vienna and who was familiar with South-eastern Europe from his own experience. In connection with the clay-aluminum (Tonerde-Aluminium) project in Transylvania I used him as liaison man for the Experts' Committee on Questions pertaining to Industrial Financing in Romania with the Romanian Armaments Ministry in Bucarest. In a similar manner I engaged General GAUTHIER, from Vienna, whom I knew personally, as an associate as he, too, had been discharged toward the end of the war. I had intended to use General GAUTHIER who had been recommended to me by Herr v. MILMOVSKY -- as a liaison-man within the frame of industry negotiations in Hungary; however, because of the advanced stage of the war,

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it did not even come to making actual use of General GAUTHIER. Upon the recommendation of my colleague ter MEER, I finally engaged, toward the end

of the war, Col v. GERSDORF who had been discharged in Italy in connection with the events of 20 July 1944, to carry through the shifting of parts of my I.G. Berlin NW 7 establishments to Bitterfeld.

9.) From the organizational point of view the setup of I.G. Berlin NW 7 was in the main finished in 1932 although the organization spent years of labor to find recognition within I.G. Contrary to the experience of I.G. Berlin NW 7, the Central Bookkeeping Department with its organization embracing the whole Konzern in all its details, was a fully recognized central office; the same holds true for the extensive organizations in the technical field, especially for the TEA-Office (Zentralstelle des Technischen Ausschusses - Central Office of the Technical Committee), the Sparten offices (central office of the three Sparten), but also for the Z.B. Bureau (Central Office), the Zentral Einkauf (Central Purchase), the Central Tax Department, the Central Insurance Department, the Central Office for Acquisitions, the Zeiltra (Central office for Railroads and Transportation), and the Vermittlungsstelle W (Liaison Office W). These were all central offices of I.G. which carried out their functions quite independently of the NW 7 organization. In the course of the economic depression and the planned economy resulting from it, a closer connection between the various I.G. Berlin NW 7 departments developed of necessity, especially with the various Verkaufsgemeinschaften (Sales Combines) of I.G. for whose assistance NW 7 discharged functions in an increasing measure so that proportionate to the work my responsibility and that of my co-workers increased likewise; this was the case especially during the years of the war although - as a result of war conditions - the scope of my organization diminished considerably during that time, and of the main and sub-departments which had existed in 1932 - totaling approximately 40- many had already been dissolved or no longer actually functioned.

30.) Division of work in the I.G. Berlin NW 7 movement:

The Division of work within the movement and among the so-called "W.A." (Verantwortlicher Abteilungsleiter - responsible head of department) of I.G. Berlin NW 7 was in broad outline as follows: Apart from the fact that I was the responsible head of the I.G. Berlin NW 7 organization, my work before the outbreak of the war was decisively curtailed (Translator's Note: German text not clear).

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by the fact that during the years of 1938 - 1939 I spent more than half of my time on overseas trips and travels abroad, or I was sick; about one-fourth of the time I spent on trips within Germany, participated in the meetings of I.G. commissions, etc. or was kept away from my office by other activities. For this reason I had arranged for a regular partnership system with my colleagues KNEUEGEL and FAHLE according to which each of us was independent to a far reaching degree; the same holds true with appropriate modification for the other members of the movement and the other responsible heads of the departments, respectively. I had reserved to myself all questions basically organizational, relating to personnel and social welfare matters and, in particular, the basic questions pertaining to the export promotion field, the industrialization of the Financing Companies and, especially, questions pertaining to currencies (Security Problems). During the war I devoted about half of my time to South-east Europe and problems related to foreign trade. Herein I was assisted primarily by REITHINGER, GROSS, FUERST, v. HAJEK, Fraulein BARHALLA, and others. This activity included my various functions in the individual Committees and Associations handling the South East and the foreign trade: as Chairman of the South-east and Hungary Committee of the Reich Group Industry; as Chairman of the Export Committee for Questions on the Financing of Industry in Romania; as Chairman

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of the South-east Committee of the Economic Group Chemical Industry; Vice President of the Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstag (Central Europe's Economy Day) and as member of the Arbeitskreis fuer Aussenwirtschaftsfragen der Reichsgruppen Handel und Industrie (Circle of Workers Dealing with Foreign Trade Questions arising for the Reich Groups of Trade and Industry). I spent approximately one-sixth of my time on the projects of Norsk-Hydro, Nordisk Lettmetall and Banque de Paris; KERNSTEN, RACHEN and HENZE assisted me in this respect.

About one additional sixth of my time I spent in the last years of the war on the organization and the construction of evacuation premises for my organization; toward the end this also included the maintaining of contact between the I.G. Vorstand in Central Germany and in the West. In these functions I was assisted by von RACHEN, de HAAS, HELMECKING, JOHNE, v. TILGERTZ, v. GERSDORFF and many others. The remainder, one-sixth was available for the current tasks of my organization in Berlin.

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KRUEGER was my permanent deputy in the years of 1933 until 1944; he managed the organization during the long periods of my absence especially during the period of December 1938 until approximately June 1940. In addition to this KRUEGER was in special charge of the management of Zentralfinanzverwaltung, the Exportfoerderungsabteilung, and the Soja interests of I.G.. KRUEGER furthermore devoted his attention especially to questions pertaining to South-east Europe (Soja), Turkey and Russia. At the same time he was delegated to the management of the Stickstoff-Syndikat G.m.b.H., for handling financial questions. When the war began KRUEGER was drafted into Wehrwirtschafts-Stab THOMAS as an officer of the reserve forces, but at the same time he was granted leave to take charge of the I.G. Berlin NW 7 organization, and to see to it that the work capacity of "Vowi" which was under commitment (?) to the Wehrwirtschafts-Stab THOMAS was actually made available in the requested measure. In mid-1944 Dr. KRUEGER separated himself from the management of I.G. Berlin NW 7 and joined the management of the Stickstoff Syndikat as the presumptive successor to Dr. OSTER.

In 1920, in my capacity as member of the Board of Directors and Vice President of the American Chemical Corp., New York, I recommended to the Board of American I.G. the employment of Dr. FRANK-FAHLE as assistant treasurer; FAHLE became later on treasurer, and in 1932, we agreed on his separation from the American I.G. and his joining the I.G. Berlin NW 7. In this organization he was in charge of the Legal Department which, at a later date, however, became more and more independent under v. KERNSTEN as the chief manager. FRANK-FAHLE also directed the Office of the Commercial Committee where he was put in charge of the minutes. Besides, he devoted his special attention to the Dutch and English Finanzierungs-gesellschaft (Financing Company) (Mapro and Axo) and to the business in general with the Reichsbank, as well to negotiations for credit abroad; altogether, he was on frequent occasions called upon special assignments (Powder project Argentina; International Nitrogen Convention, Inns, London, and Oslo). During the war he also acted as financial adviser to the Verkaufsgemeinschaft Chemikalien (Sales Combine Chemicals), metals, for the projects of Petsamo-Nickel and Osmat-Denmar. Until mid-1944 FAHLE was second deputy chief of I.G. Berlin NW 7. After KRUEGER left he

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became the deputy chief of I.G. Berlin NW 7 and at the same time the head of Zentralfinanz Verwaltung. GATTINEAU was head of the Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung until 1938; he then took over the functions in Austria and Slovakia (Donau Chemie A.G., Vienna, and A.G. Dynamit, Bratislava) and at the same time he acted as liaison-man for I.G. with regard to the interests of the Group A.G. Dynamit, Bratislava, in South-eastern Europe.

TERHAAR was deputy chief of Wipo from 1933 until 1938 and became its chief after GATTINEAU left. At the time of the Sudeten crisis, in 1938, he was assigned the task of handling the M-question (how to deal with commercial employees of I.G. in case of complications arising from the war), and of the conferences thereby arising with the Reich Ministry of Economics; he was assisted herein by v.d. HEYDE. After the outbreak of the war, von SCHMITZER, the Chairman of the Commercial Committee, requested TERHAAR to attend regularly the meetings of the K.A., and to report early in the meeting on the general situation; - in the beginning also regularly on the M-question - in regard to the latter he often had the assistance of v.d. HEYDE. Towards the end of the war TERHAAR also had under his control - without paying close attention to it - of the Press Office and, at the same time he directed the evacuation premises STULZE, v. MALTZAHN assisting him in this.

REITHINGER was the real organizer of the Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung and directed it from 1933 until the end. He was at the same time Privatdozent (unsalaried university teacher) at the University of Berlin. In 1931 he accompanied Geheimrat SCHMITZ to the International Economics Conference in London (Hoover moratorium); SCHMITZ was then economics advisor to Reich Chancellor BRUENING. REITHINGER belonged also to the Wirtschaftler-Kreis (Economists' Circle) which in the years of 1931/32 acted in advisory capacity for the BRUENING government; in this circle he closely cooperated with me and throughout the following years he was mine as well as Geheimrat SCHMITZ's consultant in political economy matters; for my person this applies especially with regard to my activity in the industry committees for South-east Europe in the Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstag (Central European Economy Day), and in the Arbeitskreis fuer Aussenwirtschaftsfragen (Circle of Workers on Questions Pertaining to Foreign Economy) of whose work staff he was a member. He was managing Chairman of the Political Economy Committee in Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag, and in the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung he mainly discharged my duties as a deputy.

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member of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium), i.e. attending of meetings. At the beginning of the war the Political Economy Department was placed under commitment to the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Military Economy Staff) THOMAS (I do not know the details). REITHINGER was responsible for the writing of the political economy reports requested by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab.

M. PASSARGE directed the Press Office of I.G. from 1933/34 until the end; being somewhat handicapped by his bad health in the last year of the war TERHAAR during that time took over a certain general supervision of the Press Office. PASSARGE was a member of the Propaganda Committee of I.G. (Proko) and in my place discharged all duties arising from my membership in the Aufsichtsrat of the Transocean-Gesellschaft (attendance at the meetings). PASSARGE was a member of the Vorstand of the Vereinigung Carl SCHURZ and at the same time its press consultant. As chief of the I.G. press he was also press consultant for the chairman of the Vorstand of I.G., Geheimrat SCHMITZ, assisting at press receptions incidental to general assemblies of I.G., assisting also in editing the press communiques.

11.) Aside from the various departments of I.G. NW 7 which apart from their numerous other duties and incidental to the discharge of these duties had to maintain current contact with government agencies - since 1933 also with party agencies - this applying especially in regard to the Wirtschafts-politische Abteilung - I.G. further comprised a great number of organizations and persons who, incidental to the discharge of their specific tasks, likewise had to maintain current contact with official agencies. In this connection

it must be pointed out that within the frame of measures arising from control of economy - introduced already under the BRUENING government - an ever increasing necessity developed for I.G. to approach the authorities for their approval on normal matters of economy. This became more and more pronounced after 1933 and, finally when during the war the government and the Party practically determined what was to be produced, out of what raw material, at what price, and to whom it was to be delivered, the need arose for every executive official of I.G. to maintain a constant contact with the government offices competent for his field of work in order to guarantee the execution of the tasks he was charged with.

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The list of I.G. officials and I.G. Gremien (brain trusts) given below cannot claim to be complete but these may be said to be the most important ones who, for official I.G. purposes, maintained contact with the government agencies and later on also with Party offices:

1. I.G. officials or Gremien:

State or Party agencies:

Wirtschaftspolitischer Berater-Kreis)	
der I.G. (Kalie-Kreis) for consultation)	
by Geheimrat BOSCH)	Maintained contact and supported the
KALIE (member of the Reichstag) (Deutsche)	Reichstag Parties such as the
Volkspartei (German People's Party))	Centre and the moderate Right and
Chairman)	Left. The circle existed from about
HUGEL (member of the Reichstag) Staats-)	1925 until 1935/36 (unofficially
partei (State Party))	somewhat longer, perhaps).
LAMERS (member of the Reichstag))	
Zentrum (Centre))	
MOLDENHAUER (member of Reichstag),)	
Volkspartei))	
v. MOELLENDORFF (leaning toward Social)	
Democrats))	
FLECHTHEIM (International Lawyer))	
IRGNER (Contact-man of Geheimrat BOSCH))	
v. SINSCH (Foreign Trade Economist))	

2.

SCHMITE)	
v. SCHNITZLER)	
WAIHEL)	Maintained contact with the various
W.R. MANN)	committees of Reich Group Industry
ILGNER)	(Beirat, Committees on Laender-,
KRUEGER)	Insurance, Law, Foreign Exchange,
REITHINGER)	etc.)
FUSTEFISCH)	
KWEPER)	
HOYER and others)	

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3. I.G. officials or Gremien:

State or Party agencies:

TER MEER)	
WURSTER)	
v. SCHNITZLER)	Maintained contact with the various
GAJEWSKI)	committees of the Economic Group
OTTO)	Chemical Industry (Irresidium, Beirat
SCHNEIDER)	(Advisory Council); Fachgruppen (Sub-
ILGNER)	Groups); Laenderausschuesse (Lander
REITHINGER, and others)	Committees), etc.).

4. Propaganda Committee of I.G. (Troika)

W.R. MANN, Chairman) Weberat (Propaganda Council) der) deutschen Industrie (subordinated) to Propaganda Ministry).
WEIGANDT, Successor	
v. SCHNITZLER	
UHL (Agfa)	

5.

SCHNEIDER, Hauptbetriebsführer of I.G.) Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German) Labor Front)
(Plant Leader)	
BERTRAMS, Assistant to the Hauptbetriebs-	
führer)	

6.

SCHNEIDER, Chief Abwehr Beauftragter) O.K.W. Abwehr, from 1944 on also) Security Service.
(Agent) of I.G.	
BUERO A (Abwehr)	
DIECKMANN, for the technical sector of	
I.G. and v.d. HEYDE for the commercial	
sector of I.G. (before 1933 MERBECK,	
Leverkusen)	

7.

v. KNIEREM) Ministry of Justice
SILCHER, and others	

8. Agricultural Department and
Experimental Station Limburger Hof

STROEBELE, in charge) Maintained contact with all) agricultural authorities (Food) Ministry, Reichsnährstand (Food) Estate) etc.). with regard to) fertilizer production and agricultural) questions.
Prof. WARMOLD	
OSTER	
v.d. HEYDE	
HELMERKING, and others	

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9.

BOERLEIN) Reichsgesundheitsführer (Reich) Health Leader) with regard to) pharmaceuticals
MANN, and others	

10.

WAIHEL in concert with the Sales Combines) Auslandsorganisation der Partei) (A.O.) (Party Organization of Germans) living abroad).
of I.G.	
(v. SCHNITZLER, HUGLER, WEIGER-ANDREAS,	
MANN OTTO) and I.G. Berlin NW 7 (ILGNER)	
and especially KRUEGER, GIERLICH,	
(Foreign exchange) and TERHAAR	
E. WUELLER (Wipo)	

11.

SCHNEIDER)	Maintained contact with KRAUCH in his capacity as General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of the Chemical Production within the frame of Four Year Plan, and the Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsaufbau (Reich Office for Economic Development) respectively.
BUEFELFISCH	Sparte I		
MUELLER-CUNRADI			
AMEROS			
BUEGIN	Sparte II)	
WURSTER			
GAJEWSKI	Sparte III		

12.

Vermittlungsstelle W dipo (Translator's Note: Crossed out))	
DIECKMANN			
GORR	Chiefs)	Contact with Ministry for Armament Munition, later Armaments Ministry
SCHNEIDER			
BUEFELFISCH	Sparte I)	
MUELLER-CUNRADI			
AMEROS)	
BUEGIN	Sparte II		
WURSTER)	
GAJEWSKI	Sparte III		
KLEINE)	

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I.G. officials and German:

State or Party Office:

13.

BUEGIN)	Contact with the Aviation Ministry, for the production of light metal, Nordisk Lettmetall A.S., Oslo.
HAETFLIGER	Nordisk Lettmetall		
ILGNER	A.S.		
v.d. BEY	Oslo		
MOSCHEL			

14. Liaison Office (Verbindungsstelle))	Contact with all official German agencies in Norway, especially with the Reich Commissioner with regard to the industrial interests of the I.G. in Norway.
v.d. BEY, Chief		

12.) Because of I.G.'s big staffs of qualified associates with broad training, requests for personnel of that type, and wishes, were frequently brought to I.G. by official and public institutions.

When, in 1933, I became President of the Carl SCHUMER association, I myself wanted to have a secretary there upon whom I could personally rely; for this reason my associate de HAAS was placed at the disposal of the Carl SCHUMER association as manager. He practically remained in that position until 1939/40. During the war such assignments became more frequent; for the greatest part they came about upon the request of authorities. Thus about the time of 1942, ASLEMAN (Wipo), for example, was being asked for - upon the request of the Reich Group Industry and for my assistance in the various South-East Committees - for the South-East Department of the Reich Group. After the termination of the Frankfurt - campaign, the Economic Group Chemistry asked Vowi to make FUERST and FORSTER (former charge d'affaires in Paris) available for several weeks, for the sorting of captured files.

Towards the end of the war the Economic Group Chemistry, in addition, asked for RUPE (Vowi) for their own office. FUERHOLZER of the press office of the I.G. was requested for the Foreign Office, and upon the request of FISCHER (Fuel Specialist in the Ministry of Economics), DIHLMANN was placed at the disposal of the Continentale Oelgesellschaft (Continental Oil Company).

13.) In the same measure as qualified I.G. personnel, also the political economic exposés of I.G. (Vowi) were in demand by all authorities, on account of their high quality. This holds true especially for the Economic Department of the Foreign Office; RITTER, who was the head at that time, had made it a practice to come frequently and gladly to Vowi - since its establishment in 1929 - to obtain information on matters pertaining to political economy because, according to his own statements he obtained information quicker from Vowi than from the Statistisches Reichsamt (Reich Statistical Office) and yet it was equally reliable. Vowi's expositions which dealt with world problems as well as with studies into questions pertaining to Germany's home economy and the economy of other countries were read with special interest by Herr RITTER because they were in a green binder these exposés were called the "Green pamphlets of Vowi". In these analyses Vowi would make use of all the material it had at its disposal at any given time; also it contained, first of all, all the data which - by reason of the existing associate agreements - became available to Vowi through the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung in Berlin, through the Weltwirtschaftliches Institut in Kiel, but also through the National Industrial Conference Board, New York, and other institutes, as well as through statistical departments and political economy departments of banks and industrial enterprises at home and abroad. Over and above that, one also made use of all economic facts and information in any way interesting and important for economy as they were gleaned from I.G.'s actual current business. The latter were collected especially from the regular sales reports of I.G. representatives in countries all over the world. The introductory passages of these sales reports, which reported in general on the economic situation of the respective country - were extracted by the office of the Commercial Committee and were transmitted to Vowi, in addition to all interested parties and offices in the I.G. Konzern. In this way Vowi had at its disposition a unique type of information material along the lines of private economy and political economy, which, in conjunction with the high quality work within Vowi on political economy helped to establish for the "Green Pamphlets" a high reputation. Very soon after his separation from the Statistisches Reichsamt and his employment with I.G. (1929), REITHINGER had begun to cultivate his old relations with the heads of the statistical departments of the various ministries in that he made interesting Vowi analyses (rudimentary comparison in political economy between the U.S.A., England, France, Italy and Germany, - analyses on Europe, - on France (customs union), currency analyses, etc. available to these heads of the statistical departments of the ministries

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for which he received in return valuable material on political economy and statistics for the analyses by Vowi. With the growing of Vowi's tasks within I.G. this practice was being intensified from year to year, also after the seizure of power by the NSDAP, 1933, it was continued. My own reports on travels (Far East and Latin America) - for which the essential preparatory work had been performed by Vowi, - also became thus known or were transmitted to a vast circle of interested persons. Apart from the few cases, when I was personally approached with requests for I.G. analyses or reports (on these cases I am reporting in the following) I am not informed in detail with which offices reports were exchanged and to what extent I.G. analyses and reports were made available. I know, that in many instances I have

myself asked to send out Green Pamphlets of Vowi, and usually they were then sent out by Vowi in my behalf; probably I was frequently not at all informed, because these were things which I left to the Responsible Department Heads, for their independent decision. The line of demarcation between the Vowi analyses and I.G. foreign reports coming from I.G. liaison men and agents were fluid insofar as the latter were frequently incorporated in the former. During the war the requests for such exposes increased very much. As an example, at the beginning of the war, Herr KETTLER at that time Under-Secretary with the Foreign Office, asked me on the occasion of a South-East Europe Meeting to forward to him occasionally, interesting information from foreign countries in case I received such. I passed this request on to my Secretariat, Fraulein BAKELLA, Frau BACHEL-DUESING, and I primarily used this opportunity for bringing to the attention of Herr KETTLER some sound criticism against German policy, that is - as I remember from one concrete case, - against the conduct of the German occupation authorities in France, about which I had been informed by JACQUES JAINES, a Frenchman with whom I was acquainted. KETTLER once or twice inquired about such information because, time and again, my Secretariat and I forgot about it and at last - after Herr KETTLER had received but little - it ceased at all.

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Contact with the Wehrmacht Agencies.

A. War Economics Staff THOMAS.

14.) I made the acquaintance of THOMAS in the year of 1930/31 when together with Geheimrat LEDERER, I visited LOCKMEYER - Chief of the Army Ordnance Office - on behalf of Leuna to promote the introduction of a standard type engine fuel in Germany. THOMAS was at that time Captain and aide-de-camp to LOCKMEYER. Until 1938 my contacts with THOMAS were then exclusively of a general and social character. After having been appointed Military Economy Leader in 1938, through the intervention of THOMAS, he approached me in the course of an evening party on the subject of a closer cooperation between his office and my political economy department. Because shortly afterwards I fell sick, which meant the beginning of a long period of absence (December 1938 until the middle of 1940) I do not believe that a closer contact developed already at that time; but I am inclined to think that THOMAS right then was just as much interested in the Green Pamphlets of Vowi as it was the case for many other official agencies, and that he also had received them.

15.) The explanations given in the following are without exception based on what I learned after my return to my position as Betriebsfuehrer of I.G. Berlin NW 7, in the middle of 1940; in part, however, my knowledge was obtained during the time of my American captivity only because lack of time during the war made it impossible for me to take an interest in these facts postfestum. Early in the war a number of official agencies had an interest for Vowi, among them also the Military Economy - Staff, THOMAS. This agency placed Vowi, or perhaps only management and some of the important Vowi key men under a commitment. KRUEDER, who at that time was the Betriebsfuehrer of I.G. NW 7 Berlin, was drafted by the office of THOMAS as a reserve officer and so to say, was at the same time, re-assigned to I.G. Berlin NW 7, in order to supervise there, among other things, the proper execution of the tasks which had been assigned to Vowi by the agency. In the further course of the war also v.d. HEYDE was at one time temporarily attached to the Staff of THOMAS as a reserve officer.

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Preparation of the Vowi exposes for the Economics Staff, however, was

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probably done by direct contact between REITHINGER, with his collaborators, and the Staff of THOMAS.

16.) I remember that after my return (middle of 1940) REITHINGER submitted to me about once a month a list which gave informations on analyses made for the Military Economics Staff. I do not know whether this report covered all the exposes or whether REITHINGER was forced to withhold even from me some of them as being secret.

In the beginning I always briefly discussed these lists under the heading of "Miscellaneous" before the close of the meetings of the Commercial Committee (Kaufmannischer Ausschuss). According to my recollection the analyses themselves dealt essentially with the chemical industry of the countries which then were enemy countries; I cannot remember having read these exposes although they certainly reached me, but I then had no time for them.

B. OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht - Abwehr).

17.) If I remember correctly, I met BLOCH, then still a captain, for the first time in 1933 during a small evening party with Dr. Max HAHN, - at that time the chief manager (Hauptgeschaeftsfuhrer) of the Mitteleuropaeischer Wirtschaftstag. I remember that already then HAHN remarked to me in the presence of BLOCH that one merely needed a group of generals in order to do away with the whole gang of HITLER and his consorts. I infer from this, that also the friendly contact between the President of the Mitteleuropaeischer Wirtschaftstag, Freiherr von WILMOWSKY, and Colonel PIEPERROCK, - of which I became aware only very much later, in 1941, - had as its foundation the bond of common opinion, because in connection with the 20th of July, Admiral CANARIS, PIEPERROCK's chief, as well as two leading personalities of the M.W.T. (Mitteleuropaeischer Wirtschaftstag) (Ambassador von HARSELL, then retired, and the agriculturist WENTZEL-TENTSCHENTHAL) were hanged. At the same time WILMOWSKY with several other personalities of the M.W.T. were put into the concentration camp, and the officers of the CANARIS Department which was taken over by the S.D., were sent to the front. Aside from BLOCH, of OKW Abwehr, I but very briefly met through Dr. OECKL, PIEPERROCK with one other officer

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(name forgotten), one single time, during his farewell dinner, and another Lieutenant Colonel also (the name I forgot, too); about this I am reporting further down. I have had no contact whatsoever with Admiral CANARIS. I saw BLOCH in the years 1933/34 several times in connection with the Circle of Economy Leaders of the Ministry of Propaganda and, after the dissolution of this Gremium (brain trust group), after 30 June 1934 approximately once every year; after that perhaps only every 1 to 2 years and then mostly on the occasion of General Assemblies, or lectures of the M.W.T.

18.) After completion of the first volumes of my Far East Report, Major BLOCH came to see me in my office at 78 Unter den Linden some day in the summer 1936. He had read my Far East Report, congratulated me incidental thereto and told me that in his house (OKW/Abwehr) this report had met with so much interest that it had been manifold copies had been made for the official inter-office use (Dienstgebrauch). BLOCH was interested in how the report originated and I told him that, in keeping with my general practice of systematically preparing for all my travels, I had asked Vowi to incorporate all the material which we already possessed on the Far East in monographs on these countries and to send them months in advance of my departure to the

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Zefi- confidential agents and to the I.G. contact men, respectively, in the respective countries with the request to correct them or supplement them as the case may be. At the same time Vowi had prepared questionnaires on all of the things in which the I.G. was interested, but about which we could nowhere obtain information. BLOCH asked me whether these questionnaires were being sent out regularly, which I affirmed as I made a point of keeping all our reports and analyses abreast of latest developments. BLOCH now became interested in these questionnaires and he wanted us to add for him certain questions in which he was especially interested. Thereupon I explained to BLOCH, in solidarity with the opinion of my business colleagues, which was known to me, that while upon OKW's request I.G. would place its analyses and reports -- as they originated in the course of the normal business procedure -- at the disposal of the OKW, I.G. could, in view of its far flung export interests and its very sensitive standing in foreign countries,

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in no way become involved in things which might become embarrassing under certain circumstances. Major BLOCH fully appreciated this and asked my permission to discuss all questions of detail with my associates. Without being quite sure about the names, I had asked in for this discussion, my personal assistant Guenther SCHILLER, who had accompanied me on my travel to the Far East, SAKER (East Department of the B.d.K.A. (Bureau of Commercial Committee)) and the head of Vowi, Dr. REITHINGER. Because this conversation with Major BLOCH was a single occurrence I also do not know -- in any case I cannot remember -- what was the outcome of the discussion with my associates. BLOCH still had expressed the wish to be informed of visits of I.G. contact men to Berlin, as he would like to talk to one or the other of them; it so happened that at that time Willi SCHMIDT, the I.G. contact man for Indo-China, Siam -- was in Berlin or he was expected. I do not know if and which meetings took place. As more than 90% of the time of I.G. contact men was taken up with sales, they mostly visited during their travels to Germany only their respective sales combine, so that, frequently, they did not, or only very briefly come to Berlin. I am inclined to think that the highest chief of the B.d.K.A., FRANZ-JAHLE, is better informed on these questions.

19.) The following contacts, in part directly, in part indirectly, were also made with OKW, as far as I know.

a) LERSNER was an old friend of Geheimrat BOSCH and transferred in 1939 his residence to Constantinople. Since by reason of his activity as consultant in the past and in his capacity as contact man for BOSCH in Berlin, LERSNER continued to draw his retainer from the I.G., -- but not having a fixed relationship with I.G., -- he was completely independent with respect to the selection of his domicile. The reason might have been that being a semi-non-Aryan he did not want to remain any longer in Germany and at the same time, PAPEN, who had become Ambassador at Ankara, had possibly encouraged him to go to Constantinople. LERSNER informed KRUEGER of it; v. KNIERDEM was likewise informed (possibly on account of the retainer contract ?)

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Now, as regards the contact with the OKW Abwehr LERSNER writes every month or so what is called "Situation Reports" (Stimmungsberichte) which he sent to WEISSACKER (FOREIGN OFFICE) and to the OKW/Counter Intelligence. With WEISSACKER's consent LERSNER, -- possibly because he wanted to be obliging to I.G. in view of the retainer's still being in effect -- had one copy for I.G. sent to the attention of KRUEGER.

- b) It was perhaps in 1942 or 1943 on the occasion of a general assembly of the M.W.T. that BLOCH once asked me whether I could place a Hungarian officer to whom he was under obligation, in Budapest. I endeavored unsuccessfully, and by way of DIETRICH (M.W.T.) I heard then that I no longer need to trouble myself because the respective officer had already been placed somewhere else.
- c) At about the same time during the war I was informed by my former employee, Dr. OESCHL, who at that time had been drafted to serve as a soldier with OKW Abwehr, that a Lieutenant Colonel of the OKW-Abwehr (I have forgotten the name) wanted to talk to me. I went there and was asked about Portugal; as Portugal is one of the few countries which I do not know at all, I referred him to my business colleagues in Frankfurt/Main and Leverkusen. Whether, as a result anything was done and what, is unknown to me.
- d) In the year of 1943, my colleague FRANK-FAHLE gave a farewell dinner for his regimental comrade, Colonel PIEFENBERG, to which he also invited Major (or at that time Lieutenant Colonel) FLOCH and still another officer; v. SCHMITZLER, KRUEGER and I participated in addition. On this occasion I made the acquaintance of Colonel PIEFENBERG. All three officers left the OKW/Abwehr at that time and went to the front. During the dinner KRUEGER and FAHLE carried on a conversation with PIEFENBERG about v. FLUEGGE; I, however, was unfamiliar with the subject. In all other respects, the gathering taking place at the Auslands-Club, reflected its social character.
- e) Upon the suggestion of SCHNEIDER and in his capacity as Chief Abwehr Beauftragter, a lecture was given by a Major of the OKW/Abwehr (the name slipped my mind) in Heidelberg, in the summer or autumn of 1944, on the occasion of a meeting of the Vorstand. It was a very primitive lecture, its purpose being to animate I.G.'s Vorstand.

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in its readiness for support to the OKW/Abwehr. After the lecture the Major stated - by implication - that I.G. Berlin NW 7 in fact, had done only very little which was confirmed by FRANK-FAHLE who stood beside him; I was somewhat surprised because I had been of the opinion that as a result of the repeated reclamations by v.d. HEYDE (I am going to report on this further down) the most necessary had been done.

20.) During the war the following associates and/or employees of I.G. Berlin NW 7 had been drafted to the Wehrmacht and assigned to OKW/Abwehr or they were used by the Abwehr directly. On principle it should be remarked regarding this that, as a rule, this could become known by chance only because the persons concerned were not at all allowed to talk about their being used by the Abwehr.

a) Since 1931 v. FLUEGGE was an associate of I.G. Berlin NW 7 concerned with cultivation of Soja beans in Romania and Bulgaria and with the compensation business (promoting of exports). Being a semi-Aryan he established residence in Vienna after 1933, and after the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 he sojourned mostly in the Balkans and in Turkey (ore-compensations). When during the war the Ministry of Economics wanted to block the payment of foreign exchange to FLUEGGE as being superfluous the OKW/Abwehr prevailed upon the Ministry of Economics to leave FLUEGGE in Turkey because the reports which FLUEGGE had made on Turkey had aroused the interest of the OKW. I.G. agreed because in this way one could provide a further residence abroad for FLUEGGE, a semi-Aryan. When in 1944 FLUEGGE returned from Turkey he was arrested upon his arrival and sent to a concentration camp.

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b) KUEGLER was I.G. liaison agent in Budapest, since 1933. He assisted me in the industry discussions in Bucharest. Through a chance coincidence - he could not meet me at a date I had set - he informed me that although a soldier on leave from the Wehrmacht, he still received occasional orders for the Abwehr for Turkey. I do not know details because I did not question KUEGLER any further. This use had not disturbed me so far nor had it caught my attention because KUEGLER

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had always been available in Bucharest when I needed him.

c) OECKL too had during the war been temporarily assigned as a soldier to the OKW/Abwehr. I already reported on this casually.

I.G. Abwehr Organization

21.) Already before 1933 there existed an Abwehr organization at Leverkusen which had been established upon the suggestion of Geheimrat DUISBERG and it was under the direction of MENGECK (?). As far as I am informed this organization remained in existence until the institution of the Abwehr Beauftragte (Agents) (Einrichtung der Abwehr Beauftragten) in the establishments (approximately in 1934/1937).

22.) The Abwehr Beauftragte for the establishments were employees of the respective firms which with the consent of the Party had been appointed by the OKW Abwehr. I do not know whether this appointment at the same time also was in behalf of the Security Service. Originally the tasks of the Abwehr Beauftragte covered exclusively espionage counter-intelligence in the plants and enterprises. Whenever a certain Abwehr Beauftragter personally was a member of the S.D. (Security Service) he has probably also reported on the inner-political conduct within the plant; but I have no reliable knowledge of this. Since the outbreak of the war the Abwehr Beauftragten was responsible also for the forwarding of reports from abroad - travel reports - to the Abwehr. It may be assumed with certainty that all previously existing contacts were absorbed into this contact. In my organization I.G. Berlin NW 7 the Abwehr Beauftragter was v.d. HEYDE who belonged to the SS and, probably, also to the S.D. When, towards the end of the war, v.d. HEYDE joined the Army, his deputy RUEDIGER took over this function. I remember that during the war v.d. HEYDE transmitted several times Abwehr complaints to me regarding the inadequate supply of reports. During a "Postbesprechung" (Discussion on Mail) I announced such complaints and gave order that v.d. HEYDE consult TEHHAAR, REITHINGER and SAKER to ascertain which reports and -exposés had to be passed on to the Abwehr.

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23.) At the beginning of the war (1940/41) the OKW/Abwehr suggested that I.G. recommend a Chief Abwehr Beauftragter to the Abwehr; this institution was to serve as liaison center between the Abwehr and all the Abwehr Beauftragte (Agents) of I.G.. To the greatest displeasure of the OKW/Abwehr Geheimrat SCHMITZ kept putting off the question of the appointment of a Chief Abwehr Beauftragter for months. FRANK FAHLE who because of his friendship with Colonel PIERPHEMCK (they had been regimental comrades in World War I) knew of this vexation informed me about it and added that the Abwehr officials would not be displeased with seeing him appointed as Chief Abwehr Beauftragter. As a meeting of the Central Committee was imminent at which this question was to be discussed I informed v. KNIERIEM about this. SCHMITZ simply did not wish that I.G. Berlin NW 7 be charged with this delicate matter and therefore

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SCHNEIDER was suggested also because the authority needed with regard to Abwehr made it necessary that he be a member of the Supreme I.G. Gremium. In his support SCHNEIDER established the Office A (Abwehr) with offices on the premises of the Vermittlungsstelle W. Within the Office A Dr. DIECKMANN took charge of the technical sector and Dr. v.d. HEYDE of the commercial sector.

Abwehr Organization of the S.S. (Security Service - S.D.)

24.) If I remember correctly, the local Security Service in Leverkusen - according to a communication from KAHN - at the beginning of the war requested of everyone who during the war made a trip abroad that he pledge himself to turn in afterwards a report on the trip. I believe that similar demands were made also in Berlin and that I, too, may possibly have had to furnish such reports; however, my trips during the war mostly being either directly or indirectly connected with official agencies, such agencies were already automatically being informed on details of my trips as performed.

25.) When, after 20 July 1944, the OKW/Abwehr was made subordinate to the Security Service new complaints arose on I.G.'s lack of willingness to cooperate. BUETEFISCH as a member of the HIMMLER Circle having contact with the SS, heard of these complaints. He had a talk with

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SCHULLENBERG of the Security Service who wished to speak to SCHMITZ. On the occasion of a Vorstand meeting, in the summer 1944, BUETEFISCH discussed this with SCHMITZ who, finally, also consented to confer with SCHULLENBERG. Afterwards, however, SCHMITZ became doubtful again, and he requested me to look up SCHULLENBERG in Berlin and to try and find out what really he wanted of SCHMITZ. Because I did not know who SCHULLENBERG was or where he could be reached, I had my Secretariat determine this and then to inquire whether upon the request of Geheimrat SCHMITZ I could see him. Having received no answer and the next meetings in Heidelberg again being imminent I wrote a few lines to him and proposed, in order to save time, to have breakfast with me in our I.G. Kasino; but again I received no answer. In Heidelberg, BUETEFISCH informed me excitedly that he had had great embarrassment as SCHULLENBERG wanted to talk to SCHMITZ and not at all to me; my Political Economy Department might be interesting, but not I myself. In connection with a private matter I later on had occasion to ascertain in an office of the Security Service (Prof. SCHMID) that for numerous reasons the Security Service had a bad opinion about me and my type of management. Thereupon a conference of a small group took place SCHMITZ-BUETEFISCH-SCHNEIDER and I. BUETEFISCH brought out that one was very dissatisfied with I.G. An attempt for cooperation with the Sales Combine PHARMACEUTICA - to which BUETEFISCH had made reference to SCHULLENBERG as the best organized Sales Combine, - had failed. Now it was agreed that SCHMITZ was to write a letter to SCHULLENBERG in which he agreed to receive SCHULLENBERG. This was done but in the meantime the Security Service was so much occupied with the consequences of 20 July 1944 that there resulted neither the meeting nor an exchange of letters; the matter was forgotten.

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I carefully read each of the 29 pages of this affidavit, countersigned them in my own handwriting, made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my own initials and I herewith state under oath that in this statement I told the pure truth according to my best knowledge and conscience.

(Signed) MAX ILGNER
Signature

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Cont'd

Sworn to and signed before me on this 30th day of April 1947 at Huerfberg, Germany, by Dr. Max ILGNER, known to me as the person making the above affidavit.

(Signed) OTTO VERNER
OTTO VERNER
U.S. Civilian, AGO No. A-444385
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTEA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-016355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6544.

HERTEA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-016355

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6702
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, MAX ILGNER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie, A.G. from 1934 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. Since the time I was taken into custody by the American and Allied authorities in April 1945, I have made numerous statements on I.G. Farben's assistance to the Nazi Government and its responsible agencies and organizations in creating good will abroad for I.G. Farben. In particular, on 8 May 1945 at Paris, I published a statement entitled, "The Relation of the I.G. to Mr Ivy Lee, to 'Propaganda', and the Activities of the Vereinigung Karl Schurz" ("Karl Schurz Association"); on 16 July 1945 I wrote a report entitled "Consolidated Report on the Vereinigung Karl Schurz e. V., Berlin"; on 22 July 1945 I wrote a report entitled, "Additional Remarks to Various Reports", which contained further information on the Karl Schurz Association and Ivy Lee; on 12 August 1945 I wrote a statement entitled, "Contact with the Foreign Organization in South America"; and on 19 August 1945 I prepared a statement entitled, "Statement on Nazi Propaganda". All of these statements were written by me in my own handwriting, and the facts stated in them are true according to the best of my recollection, knowledge and belief. I now restate the facts contained in those statements for the purpose of consolidating them and for the purpose of incorporating certain further details which I have told Mr. Otto Vorbar of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes at Nurnberg during the first two weeks of April, 1947.

IVY LEE AND EARLY "PROPAGANDA" ACTIVITIES

2. On the occasion of the establishment of the American I.G. Chemical Corporation in New York in spring 1929, a sharp attack against the I.G. and the American I.G. was made in the New York Times by the former Alien Property Custodian of World War I, Frank Carvan.

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In order to counteract this press campaign directed against I.G., I.G. and American I.G., respectively, made a retainer-agreement with Mr. Ivy Lee, who was the publicity adviser of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey and who had been recommended to me by Mr. Torgler, the President of that company who was suggested to me by the President of the National City Bank, Mr. Charlie Mitchell. Mr. Lee was given all the printed material concerning the I.G. and the American I.G., and he furnished the leading newspapers in the United States with information about the companies and their work. He was paid a retainer of approximately \$ 10,000 annually, by resolution of the Board of Directors of American I.G. of which I was a Vice-President.

3. As, in the spring of 1933 attacks were made in U.S. Press against National Socialism, and, at the same time, against German Economy, including the I.G., I wrote or cabled to Mr. Lee and asked him if he could not come over to Europe to see us and give us his advice on what was to happen. Mr. Lee came to Germany and surveyed the European situation; he had an interview with MUSSOLINI and one in Berlin with HITLER, also coming in contact with most of the German Ministers and many leading personalities. On his visits to the Ministers in Berlin, including to HITLER, he was accompanied by his

son, Jimmy, and by the First Secretary of the Karl Schurz Association, Mr. de Haas, who was an employee in my Berlin I.G. NW 7 Office, put at the disposal of the Vereinigung Karl Schurz. I accompanied him when he visited the Vice-Chancellor, Von Papen (whom I knew from the Civil-Casino), and the Minister of Economics Dr. Schmidt, because I did not know Schmidt and was interested in meeting him. The introductions to Hitler and the other leading men were obtained by the Karl Schurz Association, that is by the Vice-President, Dr. Dreyer, who had the necessary connections. Mr. Lee also paid a visit to the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, and saw many of the U.S. press representatives in Berlin, such as Lochner and Oechsenor.

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4. As a result of his journey, Mr. Lee gave us the following advice: to publish in some well-established economic weekly or semi-monthly magazine in Germany, a series of articles which could interest the public in the United States, and which, above all, would carry the signature of personalities well-known in the United States or enjoying an indisputable international reputation in their particular field of activity. The purpose of having these articles printed in Germany was that they could be reproduced in the American press as articles for which permission for publication in Germany too had actually been obtained. The subjects did not touch on such obvious questions as the Jewish question and were not at all about specifically political subjects. Mr. Lee handed over a list of various subjects, (about 20), which he had personally chosen, and which he thought would interest the American public, as i.e.: "Is Germany going over to Autarchy?"; "Will Germany pay her debts?"; "The condition of agriculture and industry in Germany".

5. Further, Mr. Lee gave us (or sent us later), a large index of several thousands of addressees of American personalities generally, and also people who were interested in special matters, as i.e. farmers, who were interested in the German agricultural reform, currency specialists, who were interested in the German Monetary Laws, and other leading people in American economic life.

6. The I.G. declared itself ready to support this publicity financially; it was carried out through the Institute for Market Analysis. This institute to which I.G. had contributed for years and to the Board of Trustees of which I belonged later on, was headed by Professor Wagemann. He was in contact with I.G. and a close friend of Schmitz. The institute had a weekly publication which was one of the best national economic papers with excellent standing in Germany.

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This magazine also enjoyed an international reputation, gave interesting economic information, and its editor, Professor Wagemann, was a well-known expert on market analysis. Professor Wagemann himself agreed to the idea because he also thought that such publicity was serious and could be advantageous to his own weekly as well.

7. The Karl Schurz Association, about which I will say more below, joined in this venture in a decisive way. This association sent copies of the articles to Americans who had been guests of the association and to such persons who, according to Mr. Lee's index of addressees, should find interest in these articles. The fact that in the following years the Propaganda Ministry tried more and more to use the Karl Schurz Association for Nazi propaganda does not change what is said above.

8. The articles which were published in this manner in the Institute for Market Analysis weekly newspaper were written by Professor Wagemann himself, and people like Schacht, General von Reichenau, Professor Warmboldt (Prüfer's Economic Minister). These articles were translated into English by De Haas.

9. In addition to the articles sent abroad by the Institute and by the Karl Schurz Association as stated above, I and some of my friends, also from the Experts' Circle (F.-Kreis) of the Propaganda Ministry (such as von Winterfeld and O.G. Fischer) sent copies to Americans we personally knew "with our compliments". The American newspaper representatives in Berlin received an advance copy of the articles. An interesting example can be given about the effect of these articles: the representative in Berlin of an important American Bank, which had invested many German loans in the U.S.A., happened to read one of these articles. I think it was by Dr. Schacht and was entitled, "Will Germany pay her debts?". As, at that time, this bank was overrun with questions from its clients as to whether they should keep their German stocks, the representative

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of the bank thought that this article would be valuable factual information for their customers and he ordered several hundreds of copies of the article for which he paid the regular price.

10. I discussed the question of the payment to Mr. Lee with Dr. Schmitz and as I.G., as the greatest German enterprise with large American interests, was particularly interested in a favorable American press on German economics in general, as well as on I.G.-interests particularly, Schmitz talked this matter over with Professor Bosch who agreed that I.G. should pay the retainer to Mr. Lee. Bosch always liked to do such things alone or not to do them at all, and in this case he did not want anyone like Siemens or A.E.G. to be approached. The retainer paid to Mr. Lee was either 25,000 RM or \$10,000 or an equivalent sum in Reichsmarks.

11. Another advice given by Mr. Lee was that press evenings should be arranged from time to time within the framework of the Karl Schurz Association, in which the representatives of the American press, among them Oechner, Lochner, and others, were to hear a speaker from German public life. Those speakers sometimes were men who were in contact with the Karl Schurz Association, such as Schacht.

MINISTRY OF PROPAGANDA AND FOREIGN ORGANIZATION

12. During the spring of 1933, after Hitler had risen to power in Germany, Funk approached a number of leading German business men in order to form a committee which could advise the Ministry of Propaganda on its foreign activities. The people chosen were selected on the basis of their thorough knowledge of conditions abroad and at the same time represented great German export interests which were favorably looked upon abroad. I was invited by Funk to join the Circle, which became known as the Circle of Economic Leaders of the Propaganda Ministry, (F.-Kreis) after Dr. Heinrich Guttmann had informed me that he had had a talk with Funk on the subject. The purpose of this organization was to advise

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the Ministry of Propaganda which at that time was using very crude and shocking methods which did great harm to German export interests.

13. The Propaganda Ministry at that time was just in the process of organization. At the meeting of the Circle of Experts, which took place about every two months, Goebbels usually first made a speech, expounded his ideas and problems. Afterwards the members of the circle were given a chance both to make their comments on the problems presented as well as to make their own suggestions and criticize the matters of which they had knowledge. Besides these meetings, weekly or bi-monthly private sessions of the economist members of this circle, at which neither Goebbels or any of his representatives were present, took place in order to prepare or to discuss the meetings with Goebbels. Most of the actions proposed by the members were to be carried out by groups and organizations in which the members or their firms played a leading part, or by other organizations that they proposed. After the 30 June 1934, the Experts' Circle was for all practical purposes dissolved.

14. Already many years before 1933 (i.e. before the accession to power by National Socialism), the I.G. used to pay contributions to most of the international associations, and supported them in various ways. Just as in 1933 I was called into the Circle of Economic Leaders of the Propaganda Ministry, my colleagues, von Schnitzler and Menn of the Board of the I.G., were called in a similar way to the Advertising Council of the German Economy, working under the Propaganda Ministry. The influence of the Economist in all these institutions was only a minor one, and finally the well-known Nazi propaganda methods finally became predominant in most of them.

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15. The visit of important German industries by foreign visitors in 1933, arranged by the Automobile Club of Germany, had been substantially supported by the I.G.. Basically it had already been planned in 1932. Its purpose was to give an opportunity to influential economists and business people of the neighboring countries for getting a live picture of Germany immediately after the seizure of power by National Socialism, by means of visits, interviews, open discussions etc. Many business friends of the I.G. were, of course, also invited on this occasion, and the visits to the I.G. plants, in combination with the hospitable festivities arranged by I.G. personalities, such as a garden-party in Geheirat Duisberg's part, and the Rhine Wine-Growers fete on the Petersberg organized by the Peyer Direction together with the German Wine-Growers League, gave lasting impressions of I.G. to the foreign guests.

16. On the occasion of the 1936 Olympics, which I also mentioned in my autobiography, the I.G. invited a large number of foreign personalities, important to the I.G., that is leaders of important firms, and above all influential members of banking firms with which the I.G. was dealing. It is evident that, on this occasion as well as during the meetings of the Kieler-Woche (Kiel Week) in 1938 and 1939, which served both business and economic purposes, everyone from abroad could convince himself with his own eyes that the German economy had well recovered since 1932. I dare say too that these meetings organized by the I.G. and other large enterprises were in great style and had nothing in common with the gaudy shows which were used by Nazi Propaganda. It cannot be denied that though the purpose of these social meetings was purely a business and economic one of course they also could not help showing the so-called "New Germany" from a favorable angle and certainly for that reason such meetings were not looked upon unfavorably by official circles, even though the authorities did not like anybody to act at his own initiative.

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17. It would take us too long to cite all the international meetings since 1933, such as exhibitions, industrial fairs etc., in which the I.G. participated, and anyhow, I would not be able to give them all; but it can be said that on all such occasions, the final purpose of the I.G. remained the finding of a suitable means to increase the sale of their products.

18. In the structure of Nazi propaganda abroad, the Foreign Organization (A.O.) of the Nazi Party played an important part. The I.G. had many difficulties with the Foreign Organization and for that reason a member of the Vorstand of I.G., Weibel, was appointed in 1937 to be the central liaison man and to keep steady contact with the Foreign Organization and handle all fundamental matters with that organization. Weibel was to keep close contact with the chiefs of the I.G. sales combines and with me and my organization, and especially with Krueger, Gierlich (Central Finance) Terhaar and Mueller (Economic Political Department). A resolution was incorporated in the minutes of the Commercial Committee stating that only those who had a "positive attitude towards National Socialism" should be sent abroad. It was to be a matter for the chiefs of the sales combines to take the steps in these matters which they considered necessary. These directives had been worked out jointly by the A.O. and Weibel in Berlin.

19. Owing to the fact that I.G. did business in all countries of the world and held first place in German exports, the German I.G. representatives or agents always - already before 1933 - played a leading part in the German colonies, schools, and other kinds of clubs or organizations. After 1933 there was always trouble with the Foreign Organization in the various countries because of insufficient cooperation, insufficient financial assistance or not showing the Swastika Flag on all occasions, or employees not contributing sufficient to the Winter Aid Program. This was the reason why the Foreign Organization later on (about 1935/36) specifically demanded that leading men of I.G. who went abroad on extended journeys should visit the local party leaders, the "Landesgruppenleiter" or "Ortsgruppenleiter". On my trip to South America in 1936 I spent some time trying to smooth out relations between I.G.

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and the Foreign Organization by counselling our people to conform with the wishes of the A.O., as far as it would not harm the I.G.'s interests. The Foreign Organization had a strong position in the Ministry of Economics in the matter of foreign exchange permits and exit permits. This position permitted the A.O. to refuse the issuance of an exit permit to anybody they felt like doing. This, of course, touched directly upon the current I.G. export business and its personnel policy.

21. Many of the leading men of I.G. Sales Organizations abroad held leading posts in the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP or in the German Clubs, German Chambers of Commerce or in similar organizations;

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Cont'd

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
KRAMER	France	Economic Advisor of Party in France
DIRK	Spain	President of German Chamber of Commerce
LUBERT	Spain	Economic Advisor of A.O.
KLUTZ	Italy	Member of Vorstand of German Chamber of Commerce, Milano.
WEBER	Italy	President of German Chamber of Commerce Milano.
EMPTING	Yugoslavia	Landesgruppenleiter.
GERLACH	Yugoslavia	"President German Chamber of Commerce Zagreb. Economic Advisor of NSDAP"/
TOMJENOVIC	Yugoslavia	Member of Vorstand of Yugoslav-German Foreign Trade Bureau.
V. GAMPHAUSEN	Greece	Member of Vorstand of German-Greek Foreign Trade Bureau.
PETER	Bulgaria	DAF (German Labor Front) Wart for Bulgaria.
HEROLD	Bulgaria	Deputy Landesgruppenleiter and NS-Wart (National-Socialist) for Bulgaria
UNE	Turkey	Economic Advisor of German Legation
Dr. SONNTAG	Rumania	Economic Advisor of NSDAP in Bukarest
Dr. RUEGLER	Rumania	Economic Advisor of German Legation in Bukarest.

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
DEYALE	Hungary	Vice-President of German Chamber of Commerce
LICKEFT	Sweden	Member of Vorstand of German Chamber of Commerce
SVENSON	Sweden	Member of Branch of German Chamber of Commerce.
FILLING	Norway	Party Judge (?)
URORS	British-India	Landesgruppenleiter of NSDAP
RIEPLING	Dutch East Indies	Treasurer of German Chamber of Commerce, Batavia. Member of "Main Vorstand" of the "German Union" for Dutch East Indies, Batavia.

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Cont'.

NAME	COUNTRY	POSITION
FURERHOP	Siam	Member of Vorstand of German Chamber of Commerce (?)
GADOW	China	Vice-President German Chamber of Commerce Shanghai.
SCHWENDEL	China	Vice-President, later President of German Chamber of Commerce Tientsin.
LATZ	China	Chief of Branch Office of German Chamber of Commerce, Tsingtao
Dr. MAI	China	President of German Chamber of Commerce, Mukden, Chief of Economic Bureau of NSDAP, Mukden.
FIELOCKE	China	President of German Chamber of Commerce Orta, Gruppenleiter of NSDAP Canton.
H. BOSCH	Japan	President of German Chamber of Commerce.
V. BERING	Japan	Member of Committee of German Chamber of Commerce, Kobe-Osaka.
THUECKNER	Japan	Advisory Council of German Chamber of Commerce, Tokyo.
PAUL	Japan	Member of Vorstand of German Chamber of Commerce Kobe. Chief of German Colony, Kobe-Osaka, President of German Club 'Concordia', Chief of German Aid Committee, Kobe-Osaka.
KAELELE	Brazil	President of German Chamber of Commerce.
HO MANN	Argentina	Deputy Treasurer of German Chamber of Commerce, Buenos Aires, President of German Club, Buenos Aires.
DOERFEL	Argentina	Deputy Treasurer and Member of "German-Argentine Cultural Institute".

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NAME	COUNTRY	POSITION
SCHAEFER	Uruguay	Member of German Trade Vorstand Montevideo.
WILCKE	Uruguay	Substitute Member of German Trade Vorstand, Montevideo.
SIERING	Chile	Deputy Chairman of German Chamber of Commerce, Santiago

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Dr. MARGERIE	Venezuela	Landesgruppenleiter of NSDAP
FISCHER	Mexico	Vice-President of German-Mexican Chamber of Commerce

KARL SCHURZ ASSOCIATION

22. The Karl Schurz Association was established in 1926. Its first President was Robert Bosch, from Stuttgart, and the first Secretary was Dr. Hans Draeger, who later became Vice President. Robert Bosch left in 1931 or 1932 on the occasion of his 75th birthday and there was no President for one year. In 1933, Dr. Schacht was asked to take that post, which he refused on account of his other commitments. He and Dr. Draeger then proposed me, which proposal was submitted to the general assembly, and I was consequently elected. Schacht and Robert Bosch became honorary members. Later, upon my proposal, Hugo Eckner and Wilhelm Furtwaengler were also appointed honorary members, because they had been a credit to the German name in the United States. These four honorary members remained until now.

23. One of my collaborators in the I.G. Emil de Haas, who had been in the United States for a long time, became General Secretary of the Association. Although we endeavored - in the beginning very successfully - to limit the influence of the Nazi Party on the Karl Schurz Association, this only succeeded to a certain extent in the long run. There is, however, an important point where we succeeded in maintaining complete independence; we kept the normal management within the Association by maintaining the current budget with our own means, that is supported by the membership, contributions of the firms. Therefore, it was possible for the Association to carry out my motto: "Come and see". (Translator's Note: the motto is in English in the original).

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24. In this connection the travels made in Germany by American students must be mentioned and, above all scholarship students, the constant care we took of visiting professors and other guests who were recommended to us.

25. If I remember correctly, I participated once or twice in the students' study travels which took place every year and always ended at Liblar, the birthplace of Karl Schurz. The American Embassy and the General Consulate of Cologne were always represented. On the occasion of one of these travels, an Agfa-Film was made, which was shown to the participants in Berlin after the trip, and each of them received a copy of the film. Afterwards the participants took their films with them to show in their home Universities. These trips were financed by a students' foundation, which, in turn, received its money from the cultural section of the German Foreign Office. The Ministry of Propaganda tried to influence these tours. The German Olympic Committee entrusted the Karl Schurz Association with the entertainment and care of the American delegation at the Olympics 1936.

26. The Karl Schurz Association also sent abroad the copies of the weekly of the Institute for Market Analysis which I have described above, and about once a month held a "Press Evening" in the Karl Schurz House, at which a prominent personality was always present and prepared to be interviewed in an open discussion; of course, these discussions always had a confidential and personal character and were not to be published. The idea of these

"Press Evenings" was Mr. Lee's. Mr. Lee advised that the Karl Schurz Association should arrange a meeting of American journalists about once a month to meet outstanding German personalities when they might question and in whom they were particularly interested. These evenings, as I have mentioned before in this statement, achieved a certain reputation among the American journalists in Berlin. In arranging the programs, I was assisted by Mario Passarge of my Berlin NW 7 Office who advised me also in his capacity as member of the board of the Karl Schurz Association on the Association's general press matters and who normally directed these press evenings. I remember one special piece of advice:

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the American journalists complained that they did not receive Hitler's speeches to the Reichstag quickly enough and not completely. Passarge, as I mentioned above, arranged that complete copies of these speeches were translated into English very quickly and immediately given to the American journalists. Later on at the suggestion of some friends of mine and myself similar evenings to the "Press Evenings" were arranged with American banking representatives called "Bank Evenings". American and German bankers participated in these, but they did not take place as often as the journalists' gatherings, perhaps even only once or twice.

27. Of course, I did not know all, or do not remember precisely all, the activities of the Karl Schurz Association; I did not, except for once or twice in the beginning, attend the weekly meetings of its working committee, which were held under the chairmanship of my deputy, Dreyer, with de Haas as Secretary. Bertling, Chief of the America Institute, Mancke, the Chief of the German-American Economic Society, the Directors of the Berlin offices of the HALLAG and of the Norddeutscher Lloyd, von Maibohm and Koetho were also present as members. Besides that a representative of the Foreign Office, and one of the Propaganda Ministry, and later on, a representative of the International Associations' Union were present.

28. Shortly after the outbreak of the War with England (1935) a luncheon, at which Dieckhoff of the Foreign Office was present, took place at my office. It was decided to immediately stop all foreign activity of the Association, and this was done. I would like to say that my own activity and that of the I.G. (naturally besides the business interests of the I.G.) were directed by the idea of helping, and with the conviction that we would really help in the first years after the seizure of power by the Party. But in the later years apart from everything else we were again and again hampered by the attempts of the Nazi agencies to interfere. The increasingly apparent will of the Nazi regime to use economy for propaganda purposes caused us to keep away from all not purely economic events. The same is true

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in principle of the German Foreign Club which was the successor of the Automobile Club of Germany in its social activities. Originally, it was a luncheon club used also by the higher officials of the ministries and by business men to entertain foreign visitors. This was the Club which I, in 1933, proposed should bring together leading German and foreign business men and economists during the KIEL Regatta for the purposes repeatedly mentioned. The German Automobile Club accepted the suggestion and, under the chairmanship of Duke Adolf Friedrich zu Mecklenburg, organized the first meeting in May 1933. It had already been decided in 1933 to repeat this meeting in 1934, but as I was so ill since December 1933, I neither participated in the

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preparation nor did I participate in the meeting myself; but I was informed later on that the meeting took place more or less in the same way as in 1933 despite the increasing political tensions of the year 1939. During the war, the German Foreign Club was influenced by the Ministry of Propaganda which used it as a club.

I have carefully read each of the 14 pages of this affidavit and have countersigned them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting; and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

(Signature) Dr. Max ILGNER
Signature

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of April 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Max ILGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Otto VERGER
Otto VERGER
U.S. Civilian AGO No. a-441385
Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P.NO. 34075, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 6702.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34075

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6701
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. MAX ILGNER, at present in Nuernberg, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farben-Aktiengesellschaft from 1934 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. From 12 August to 1 December 1936 I traveled in Latin America. I visited every country in South America with the exception of Paraguay. I was accompanied by my assistant, Diploming. Hans-Joachim Schwarte, and, for the greater part of the trip, by Dr. F. Ahlgrimm, who was an agriculturist in the Nitrogen Syndicate.

2. The purpose of this trip was to discuss important currency questions and methods of export promotion with I.G. Farben Verbindungsmannen (Liaison Men) and to negotiate several projects in which I.G. Farben and the Dynamit-Nobel Group were interested. Among these projects were the erection of explosives plants in Argentina and Brazil. Furthermore, I wanted to gain a general impression of the business, political and economic situation, especially from the point of view of industrialization and of nationalization tendencies.

3. After my return to Germany, and during 1937, a report was prepared on my trip to Latin America entitled:

"I.G. Concern Report on My Trip Through Latin
America August-December 1936"
by Dr. Max Ilgner.

This report was not written by me personally but was compiled by my co-workers in the Office of the Commercial Committee and the Economics Department, on the basis of my and my fellow-travellers notes, experiences and observations.

4. I do not remember the exact circulation of this report, but

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I do know that I released the report for distribution. I do not know exactly who apart from the I.G. people got the report, but I assume with certainty that it was distributed along similar lines as my report on East-Asia.

5. On 14 April 1947, Mr. Otto Verber showed me a photostatic copy of a typed report with the title "I.G. Concern Report on My Trip Through Latin-America, August-December, 1936 by Dr. Max Ilgner, and the sub-title, "General Part and Observations in the Various Countries". Each of the double sheets of the 135 pages is marked IV/15 in the upper left-hand corner. The formulation of the paragraphs shown to me represent the trend of my conversations with the official German agencies during my Latin-America trip. The following are excerpts from this report which was prepared by my associates in 1937 on my orders:

" 3. General Remarks Regarding Business of the
I.G. and I.G. Concern in Latin-America

I. I.G. Concern within the framework of the
German position in the Latin-America countries.

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Germany's position in the Latin-American countries is at present growing. This development is aided by a series of factors in Germany's favor. First of all, the German element has been particularly well preserved among the numerous inhabitants of German origin in the different countries, especially in Brazil. As a result of the strengthening of the position of National Socialist Germany in the field of foreign policy, increased prestige was naturally secured in South America too. In addition to this, Germany's regaining strength has also intuitively awakened sympathetic feelings in those countries which themselves are striving to strengthen their own position in the world....."

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V. Defects Observed and Suggestions Designed to Eliminate Them.

Before going into matters in respect to which I should like to make suggestions specifically concerning ourselves, I wish to refer to a few defects regarding the manner in which German firms generally proceed in Latin-America. Incidentally, I have already referred to all these defects in my memorandum "Promotion of Export within the Framework of the Four-Year Plan", which has been sent to the managers of the sales combines. At this time, I shall merely touch upon the topics:.....

The general impression which may be gathered reveals that Germany's export industry is not as yet fully aware of the vastness of the task which has been placed before it.

1.) Lack of knowledge of the markets

I have already referred to this both in my speech before the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and in the Preface to my Report on East Asia. It appears to me that many more trips of the leading men are necessary, especially to those countries (West Coast) to which only a few have been up to now. It was just when visiting our organizations on the West Coast that I gained the impression that the agencies there were feeling rather neglected in that respect.

.....

VI. I.G.-Verbindungsbeamten (Zafi (Central Finance Department) Confidential Agents (Verbindungsbeamten) and Their Assistants

1.) Definition of the term I.G.-Verbindungsbeamten

Agreements to establish Zafi-Confidential Agents were made when, following the collapse of the Oesterreichische Kreditanstalt and the devaluation of the English pound sterling including the currencies which at that time adhered to the pound sterling, it became necessary to secure more rapid and thorough information

about the general

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currency and foreign exchange relationships and the difficulties to export resulting from them. Since at that time it was to be expected that these difficulties with all their consequent phenomena would gradually extend all over the world, corresponding preparatory measures were started, i.e. Zafi Confidential Agents were appointed for the other countries of the world too, as long as six years ago.

These appointments were at that time made with the concurrence of the managers of the sales combines with a view to selecting from among all I.G. representatives in each country, the one who on account of the type and size of his business had the clearest picture of the overall economic situation of his country and who at the same time also had good connections with the agencies of importance to his functions. The duties of the Zafi-Confidential Agents were selected with the same viewpoint in mind, since it was necessary to have these functions attended to continuously and uninterruptedly (leave of absence, sickness) as is the case in the managements of the various agencies. In the course of the ever growing difficulties, the cooperation between the Zafi-Confidential Agents and the Berlin Organization of the I.G. improved more and more, and worked out so well that finally it developed into the same relationship as exists between the managers of the various agencies and their respective sales combines.....

Actually the concept of Zafi- Confidential Agent has not been appropriate for quite some time, since the corresponding functions were assigned to all the sections of the Berlin Organization, that is not only to the Central-Finance Department, but also to the

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Political-Economic Department, National Economic Department and chiefly also to the Secretariat Department II (now the Office of the Commercial Committee), which controls the work of the functions in question of the Zafi Confidential Agents. Consequently, a corresponding decision was made at the meeting of the newly organized Commercial Committee, as follows:

"It has been agreed that the I.G. Foreign Organization in view of the ever increasing tendencies toward world industrialization, needs personalities to act as contact men in important places abroad, who, because of their knowledge of the situation and their position are able to appraise the development of their own country correctly and to advise the Administration at home accordingly. For this reason the Commercial Committee deems it advisable to give more attention to the previous institution of "Zafi

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Confidential Agents", who have been very active in this direction and who in the future shall expand their activity in their capacity of "I.G. Verbindungsmann".

2.) The Functions of the I.G. Verbindungsmann.

a) Special Functions

aa: * * * * *

bb: * * * * *

cc: * * * * *

dd: * * * * *

ae: Current Reporting

The Berlin Organization has worked out a questionnaire for each country for the regular monthly reports of the I.G. Verbindungsmann. The questionnaire contains those essential questions which cannot be answered at home on the basis of other documentary information. The questionnaire speaking covers the following fields:

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- I. Politics
- II. Economic and Financial Policy
- III. Private enterprise.
- IV. Press.

The request for these monthly reports is primarily based on the desire to receive regular information about the most important matters, and particularly to prevent that more time than absolutely essential is taken up because of voluminous general reports, by pointing out in great detail what are actually the most important questions.

ad: Centralization of Donations

With regard to donations which concern all the I.G. agencies equally as for example, aid to German schools, German hospitals, German cultural communities and similar organizations, it is expedient in the interest of preserving a uniform policy that these donations be proposed in each instance not by individual agents to their sales companies, but discussed there on the spot by the I.G. Verbindungsmann with the other heads of these agencies and the corresponding official and party offices and then submitted to the Office of the Commercial Committee in the form of a comprehensive proposal within the framework of the current correspondence. This office in its turn shall arrange everything necessary in agreement with the Office of the Central Committee.

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b) General Functions

aa) Maintenance of contact with all appropriate Offices.

I have already reported that the Anglo-Saxon agencies are better informed on general questions than we are. It is

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equally important to I.G. as such to have a generally well-informed office in each country, since, in spite of our decentralized sales organization, we are after all considered as one concern by the Government offices.

Therefore, permanent contact with all German, foreign and national Government, semi-official and private economic offices, becomes necessary, especially also with the heads of large rival enterprises and the banks in the countries in question.

An adequate social position is required for the carrying out of these functions; in this respect, the Americans and the English agencies are on the whole also superior to ours. As I have already mentioned, it is actually only the pharmaceutical sales machine which emphasizes such things and makes it possible for its traveling employees to become members of influential clubs, in order to form the necessary connections. Naturally this is especially necessary in the case of the I.G. Verbindungsleute.

In this connection, the possibility of procuring memberships at reduced rates for our traveling employees in the automobile and other national clubs in their respective countries through the German Clubs is being considered at the present time. This would also be beneficial in many respects for the business itself.

bb) Instructions to the other representatives

It is the duty of the I.G. Verbindungsleute to acquaint the other

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representatives with the general problems and important information, insofar as they might be of interest to them in their own business.

cc) Observations of tendencies toward industrialization

Such an undertaking is the logical outcome of repeated statements made previously. Nevertheless, I am making a special point of this since one cannot proceed cautiously enough in this field. Even the smallest scrap of information, which sometimes might appear immaterial to the I.G. Verbindungsleute, could prove of importance to us at home, especially if we had already obtained identical or similar information from other places and we made use of this communication in some way to confirm or supplement that received previously.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6701
 Conf'd

dd) Observation of activities of the large foreign concerns

Whatever applies to tendencies towards industrialization in general - with respect to national groups as well - applies, naturally, primarily to the large enterprises of our competitors in the countries in question. It is the duty of the I.G. Verbindungsmann to inform us immediately and with the utmost precision of each measure and step, especially those taken by Dupont and I.C.I.; these reports shall be supported and supplemented by the carbon copy of that part of the agent's current report which deals with the general situation and which is forwarded to us in each instance by each sales combine. Only in this way can we at home get a complete picture of all that is taking place in the country concerned. On the other hand, it is therefore equally imperative that the I.G. Verbindungsmann should be informed of everything which occurs in his country as far as it is known to us. This is already being done. It is not

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possible to expect the I.G. Verbindungsmann to supply us with precise information if he do not give him all possible help so that he may be fully informed. Besides, it is necessary that the I.G. Verbindungsmann be informed of all the essential changes in the I.G. and in the I.G. Concern as well as of important political-economic developments in Germany.

Since all this information which has been discussed in the previous chapters is processed immediately by the Berlin organization and communicated to all the interested offices of the I.G. and of the Concern, an information system is provided which covers the entire concern and functions speedily. This proves especially effective in the way of a properly productive cooperation between the various I.G. and Concern offices.

3.) The assistants of the I.G.-Verbindungsmann

4.) Registrar of the I.G.-Verbindungsmann and their Deputies in Latin-America

VII. Support of external German interests abroad

1.) General assistance

2.) Making available of general experience

This chapter too belongs within the framework of the above mentioned statements, it is obvious that a concern such as I.G. with such a comprehensive and extensive world organization and with an adequate operational set-up, which is made possible only by the very large turnover, necessarily has at its disposal a great deal of experience which is not easily equalled by the official agencies. On the other hand,

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however, the information from all the firms which reaches these agencies places them in a position where they are able to form a more complete picture of the situation as a whole, which in turn indirectly benefits the various firms. The American and the English with their Consular Service, their Trade Commissioners and other facilities are ahead of us in this field.

It is gratifying, however, to note that in recent years the cooperation between the German offices - I was able to observe this during my entire trip - has become closer and stronger from year to year; especially collaboration with the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP is developing more and more favorably. It is a well known fact that in the beginning the ideas of the said organizations did not always coincide in this respect; it is therefore so much more gratifying that, as I had occasion to observe particularly during my Latin-American trip, this state of affairs has become a thing of the past.

As in the case of our leading men abroad and this also involves a special function of the I.G. Verbindungsmann who have the duty to communicate to all official and semi-official agents in the field of economics (commercial attaches, economic specialists of the Nazi Party and officials of the Chambers of Commerce) their general experiences as far as these are not of a confidential nature, from the point of view of our concern's interests, the Berlin Organization of the I.G. is also duty-bound to keep the Government and Party agencies in Germany as well as the economic associations informed of the real situation, and up-to-date basing such information on material received from abroad. To have seen in the past that this friendly collaboration has proved mutually helpful on many occasions.

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3.) Aid to German cultural institutions

The point of view that the support of German cultural organizations is of interest to economic affairs has become more and more prevalent. Cultivation of the German language, commercial courses in the respective countries conducted in German, exchange of young business men and students, and in general the esteem attained by Germany through its cultural agencies in the country in question (German school, hospital, German university, etc.) do benefit the export merchant in the end.

I have indicated in the section "Matters Involving Donations of General Interest" that it is expedient that all the matters concerning the concern as a whole be handled centrally by the I.G. Verbindungsmann in agreement with the other managers of the agencies and that proposals relative to same be sent home.

4.) German automobiles

5.) German Newspapers

A raising of the standard of German newspapers abroad, which may be expected to bring about an increase of the number of readers, will facilitate the work of giving information on Germany and, at the same time, will counteract the propaganda directed against our export methods and against our success in obtaining new markets, especially on the part of the U.S.A. and England. On the other hand, the advertisements inserted by German firms in German newspapers thereby acquire a greater value because they are read by a larger number of persons; it goes without saying that the publication of these advertisements in the German papers is

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the duty of all German firms as it is absolutely indispensable for the economic stability and above all for the further successful development of the German newspapers abroad. Furthermore, it would be advisable if the various agencies voted from time to time on the allocation of propaganda advertisements and thus on the whole acted in a uniform manner.

I have carefully read each of the 12 pages of this Declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that in this statement I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Dr. Max ILGNER
Dr. Max ILGNER

Munberg, 14 April 1947

Seen to and signed before me this 14th day of April at Munberg, by LDr. Max YLNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Otto VERBER
Otto VERBER
A.G.O. Number A - 444385
Interrogator
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 6701.

DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Max ILGNER, after having first been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

On 29 June, 3 July, and 7 July, 1945, I made statements about members of I.G. who at the same time held positions in the Government, in the Party and other public institutions. I have made these statements in my own handwriting and the facts stated therein are true according to the best of my memory, knowledge, and belief. The text of these statements which I have now consolidated in one statement is as follows:

I.G. Officials in Positions of the State, the Party, and Public Life

I. Positions within Germany

A. Positions of a General Nature

1. Academy for German Law: SCHMITZ, v. KNIERICH.
2. Labor Front: Main liaison man in his position as "Hauptbetriebsfuehrer" "Chief Plant Leader" for I.G., Dr. SCHNEIDER, Assistant to Dr. SCHNEIDER, Dr. BERTRAMS. Official representatives of the Labor Front in I.G.: The Hauptbetriebsobmann ZEH and the Betriebsobmaenner of the various plants. In order to advise Dr. SCHNEIDER for his meetings with the representatives of the Labor Front, meetings of the Betriebsfuehrer of the various plants took place. The Hauptbetriebsfuehrer was a special position in I.G. based on the law for the regulation of labor and on special direction of the Gauleiter of Hesse.

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3. Foreign Office: v. MALTZAN, formerly of the Foreign Office. During the war for some time he was again called into the Foreign Office for the armistice negotiations with France. Later on he was again with I.G.
4. House of German Art: SCHMITZ, Chairman of the Vorstandsrat.
5. Ministry of the East: Dr. PRENTZEL, during the war Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat (Chief War Administrative Counsellor). Dr. SCHILLER, Agricultural Advisor, also Sonderfuehrer (Special Leader) in the Eastern territories.
6. O.K.W. Abwehr - Foreign Countries: Dr. OECKEL served for some time as a Sonderfuehrer.

7. O.K.W. Abwehr - Germany: Because of his position as Chief Abwehr Officer (Hauptabwehrbeauftragter) Dr. SCHNEIDER was I.G.'s main liaison on Abwehr questions. His organization within I.G. for this function was the Bureau A with Dr. DIECKMANN on the technical side, and Dr. v.d. HEYDE, later Dr. RUDIGER, on the commercial side. In addition, in all I.G. plants and enterprises there were Abwehr officers whose main concern was works espionage; and, later on, especially during the war, wherever applicable, the preparation of reports about the internal situation in the plants and the passing on of reports from abroad. The position of Chief Abwehr Officer was a special one of I.G. and the nomination through I.G. was made at the suggestion of Abwehr O.K.W. which had to give its consent.

8. Reichstag: SCHMITZ, guest member.

B. Technical Positions

1. Reich office for Economic Development and Plenipotentiary-General for Special Questions of Chemical Production (Gebechem): Professor Dr. KRAUCH, responsible for the development of certain kinds of chemical production: Buna, gasoline, nitrogen, and originally also light metals. KRAUCH took over with him a large number of I.G. employees from the various I.G. enterprises, among them RITTER, KIRSCHNER, BAASCH, von SOIRON. Besides that he had at his disposal advisors working in an honorary capacity from the firms of the chemical industry (from I.G., for example AMBROS, BUERGEL, BUETEFISCH, v.d. BEY,

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GAJEWSKI, MUELLER-CONRADI, SCHNEIDER, WURSTER.)

2. Armament Ministry: Section Chiefs (ring leader) AMBROS, BUETEFISCH, WURSTER, and possibly also BUERGEL.
3. Reich Air Ministry: Dr. MOSCHER, originally general director of WORMAG, later on of WORMSK LETTFABRIK, in which I.G. had a 1/3 participation (I.G. representatives on the Aufsichtsrat were BUERGEL, ILGNER, HAEFLIGER, and v.d. BEY as building manager.).

C. Economic Positions

1. Reichsbank: Committee on Currency, SCHMITZ chairman.
2. Reich Group Industry: Advisory Committee, Engerer Beirat SCHMITZ member.
Committee for Exhibitions and Trade Fairs, von SCHNITZLER, chairman.
Committee for Africa and Russia, W. R. MANN, chairman.

Committee for Southeastern Europe, Hungary and Rumania, ILGNER, chairman; REITHINGER, member.
Committee for East Asia, WAIBEL, chairman.
Committee on Currency, KRUGGER.
Committee for Taxation, SILCHER.
Committee for Insurance, KUPFER.
Committee for War Damages, HOYER.

3. Ministry of Economics: Oil Department, E. R. FISCHER, during the war Ministerialdirigent. Purchase of Molybdenum, and Tungsten, MEYER-KUESTER, probably with a mandate for these purchases. Working Committee for Foreign Trade questions (of the Reich groups Commerce and Industry) ILGNER REITHINGER.

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Works commissioner for Aussig-Falkenau (Munich Agreement, 1936), KUGLER.

4. Military Economy Staff: THOMAS, KRUGGER, v.d. HEYDE, KLEE, the first two as reserve officers.
5. Advertising Council of the German Economy: v. SCHNITZLER, W. R. MAHN, UHL.
6. Economic Group Chemical Industry: Member of Praesidium, TERHAAR, WURSTER as deputy since 1943. Enlarged Advisory council, GALEWSKI, TERHAAR, ILGNER, OTTO SCHNEIDER, v. SCHNITZLER, WURSTER. Ost-Chemie-Gesellschaft, Manager during the war, W. PASSARGE. Southeastern Committee: ILGNER, GARTINEAU, REITHINGER.
7. Economic Group Mineral Oil Industries: BUETEFISCH, Economic Group Chief.
8. Economic Staff 'East' PRENTZEL, (Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat)(Chief War Administrative Counsellor) SCHILLER (Sonderfuehrer)(Special Leader), both as members of the Army during the war.

II. Positions in Occupied Countries

A. Poland

Works Commissioner for the Polish dye factories: SCHOENER, SCHWAB.

B. France

Navy: von TIRPITZ as a Navy Officer attached to Admiral SCHUSTER for supervision of dock installations.

C. Norway

Reich Commissioner v.d. BAY, attached for problems of the chemical industry.

D. Military Commander Italy

TER MEER, attached to General Leiers for the chemical industry.

III. Allied Countries

A. Roumania

Air Force: RINGAR attached to General GERSTENBERG for air defense of the oil fields.

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Conclusion

As the I.G. representatives in all large enterprises throughout the world were also amongst the leading representatives of the German colonies there, many of the general economic and organizational positions, such as Presidents of Chambers of Commerce, Chairmen of School Societies, and Chairmen of German Clubs were filled by I.G. representatives. In all these countries, I.G. was a member of the German Chamber of Commerce.

The functions which I.G. representatives held within the Foreign Organization of the Party in the various countries are not mentioned in this report.

Furthermore, those functions which I.G. members carried out for the Abwehr abroad but which did not occupy all their time are not mentioned.

In the following institutions which, however, are not party organizations or offices of public life and which existed continuously or only temporarily (F-Kreis) (Circle of Friends) 1933-1934) officials of I.G. took part as follows:

1) Circle of Friends of HILMAR

This was a group of leading economists. As far as I know, BUETEFISCH was introduced into the Circle by KRANEFUSS of the BRABAG; they were together in that company. BUETEFISCH decided himself to enter this Circle, but as far as I know at the same time, the Chairman of the Vorstand, SCHMITZ, knew about it.

2) F-Kreis

This was to advise the Ministry of Propaganda during 1933-1934. Leading personalities and people who were well acquainted with economy in foreign countries took part in it. BOSCH

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and SCHMITZ knew about it.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6713
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I have carefully read each of the 7 pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them, and I declare herewith under oath that in this statement I have told the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Dr. Max Ilgner
(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this 2nd day of April 1947 at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Max ILGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Otto Verber
OTTO VERBER

U.S. Civilian, AGO No. A-444385
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6713.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M. P. No. 34079

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6649
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Max ILGNER, after having been duly warned that false statements on my part render me liable to punishment, herewith declare the following under oath, voluntarily and under no duress:

I have known Dr. Hermann NEUBACHER since the year 1932, when I made his acquaintance in his capacity of Head of a timber co-operative society which was closely connected with the Austrian social-democrat trade unions. I heard of him again when after having served a sentence for illegal national-socialist activities in Austria he came to Germany, and CLODIUS of the Foreign Office and/or WILMOJSKY of the Central European Economic Association suggested him during my absence (South America) to my deputy Dr. KRUEGER for employment at my office Berlin N.W. 7. After my return to Berlin I granted this request, and NEUBACHER was employed with Berlin N.W. 7, and the plan was that he should at first undergo a training period with the different departments of N.W. 7, the B.d.K.a. and the Vowi (Economics Department), in order to work later on in connection with the I.G. business in South-East Europe. I remember that during a lunch of the International Chamber of Commerce in Berlin in 1937 he asked me to tell the former Austrian Federal Chancellor STERNWITZ who sat beside me, that SEYSS INQUARDT, whose name I heard for the first time on that occasion, had been in Berlin. Immediately after the German troops had marched into Austria, NEUBACHER was appointed Mayor of Vienna by GOERING. When shortly afterwards I stayed in Vienna in the course of negotiations pertaining to the acquisition of the chemical plants of Skoda-Wetzlar and to the organization of the Donau-Chemie A.G., NEUBACHER helped me by seeing to it that RAFFELSEBERGER, the Commissioner for Private Enterprise showed us every consideration. In this way he did not only help me, but also the other members of the I.G. who were in Austria for that purpose. Later on during the war he was appointed Ambassador in South-East Europe, and his attitude towards the I.G. was always friendly. He kept in touch with the I.G. agencies in South-East Europe regarding matters that could be of interest to the I.G.

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There was no difference between the legal responsibility of the deputy and the regular members of the Vorstand. There existed a difference as regards activities and salary. The Central Committee of the Vorstand can be considered as the nucleus of the Vorstand and it was a fact that the Central Committee had a special responsibility in matter of decisive importance, discussed many problems by themselves, and only submitted

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5649
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them later on to the Vorstand for approval. On the whole one can say that the Vorstand including the Central Committee was the leading and responsible body of the I.G. Farben-Industrie.

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this affidavit and signed it personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and signed them with my initials and I herewith declare under oath that this statement contains the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. Max ILGNER
signature

Sworn to and signed before me this 30th day of April 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Max ILGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Otto VEREER
Otto VEREER U.S. Civ. AGO-# A-444385
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

14 June 1947

I, Julia KERR, Civ. No. Military Permit 030099, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-5649.

Julia KERR
Civ. No. Military Permit 030099

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Max ILGNER, member of the Vorstand of the I. G. Farben and director of the I.G. office in Berlin NW 7 from 1926 till 1945; having been duly warned that false statements on my part render me liable to punishment, herewith make the following statement under oath, voluntarily and under no duress:

PERSONAL HISTORY

1. I was born on 28 June 1899 in Diebelsheim/Hessen, as the son of Emil ILGNER, an officer, who died in 1943. I attended the preparatory school in Dusseldorf and left high school in 1914. From 1914 to 1916 I attended the Main Training Establishment for officers' candidates in Berlin-Lichterfelde, as in accordance with a family tradition, I was to become an officer. From 1919 till 1922 I attended evening courses at the university of Frankfurt. In 1922 I passed an examination and obtained my diploma as a trained merchant and in 1923 I graduated as doctor of political sciences.

2. During the first world war I served with the 83. Fusilier-Regiment for about one year. In January 1919 I joined the volunteer troop Dusseldorf, whose task it was to crush communistic and sparteistic revolts. In October 1919 I was discharged from active army service and worked as an apprentice and employee with the Metallgesellschaft Frankfurt/Main. At the same time I obtained my college education as mentioned before. Up to 1934 I held various positions with the Metallgesellschaft, the Rheinische Kreditbank and Dr. Herbert LICHNER in Stockholm.

POSITIONS WITH THE I. G. FARBEN.

3. From 1 January 1926 till 6 May 1945 I was employed without interruption with the I. G. Farben A.G., or with Leopold CASSELL & Co., Frankfurt/Main respectively, one of the firms that preceded it and which was merged into the I. G. Farbenindustrie in 1925. In 1926 I went to Berlin for I. G. Farben and there I founded, in 1930/31, the Central-Financial Administration, which was called "Zentr". In 1937 I founded the Economic Department which at that time was called "Archiv". Thereafter I also founded the office of the Commercial Committee, called "LAKA" which originally had several other names. In June 1934 the department for political economy was also incorporated in my organization.

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These "four" represented the main departments which had the designation I. G. Farben Berlin NW 7. I was Director of this enterprise from 1926 until 1945 without interruption. In 1929 I was awarded the title "Director" of I. G. Farben. In 1934 I became deputy member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farben, and in 1938 I became a regular member of the Vorstand. In

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about 1932 I became a member of the Commercial Committee of I.G. Farben. I was also a member of the I. G. Farben Purchasing Commission (since 1936), and member of the Committee for South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia and the East.

INCOME

4. From 1932 till 1945 I received salaries ranging from Reichsmark 80.000 to 115.000 including a royalty in view of my being a member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farben since 1934.

POLITICAL ATTITUDE.

5. In 1933 I joined the National Socialist Motor Corps as an active member. In 1932 or 1931 I also joined the German Labor Front. In 1937 I became a member of the NSDAP; my number was 5382346. In August 1933 I was awarded the title of "Wehrwirtschaftsführer".

MILITARY SERVICE AFTER THE END OF THE WORLD WAR

6. In 1934 I took part in a military manoeuvre, even before the treaty of Versailles and its military regulations had officially been repudiated in 1935, and before military conscription had been introduced. This I did at the invitation of General MICHEAU, who made the arrangements. I served from 2 July 1934 till 21 July 1934 with the 4th Cavalry Regiment. Later, from 1 June 1937 till 21 June 1937 I was trained for the job of company commander, and from 12 June 1938 till 1 August 1938, and from 22 August till 2 October 1938 I served with the 6th armored regiment as a lieutenant.

PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

7. During the years from 1936 to 1945 I have made very many business trips, sometimes of very long duration, to almost every country in the world, except for Australia, the Near East, Russia, Portugal, Spain, Africa, Alaska, Paraguay, and the West Indies. I visited all the important countries of the world in which the I. G. Farben had their own representatives or representing agencies. I made these many journeys for business reasons, but at the same time I attempted to counteract the antipathy against Germany which prevailed in many countries since 1933.

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For example, I visited the Scandinavian and Baltic countries in 1933. In Oslo I was invited for lunch with the chief of the press department and a number of Norwegian Newspaper men. I told the journalists to come to Germany and to see for themselves the conditions in the Third Reich. Some of them wanted to see GEBELLS or a concentration camp. In my capacity of Vice-President of the Automobile-Club of Germany I suggested that all these

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people should be invited to Germany by the Automobile Club and that they should be shown everything. This was done.

8. During the time I was away on business trips I necessarily received much important information concerning business tendencies, also in relation to political economy. I became an expert on foreign economic questions, and enlarged my knowledge of foreign transactions and international conditions very considerably. My travel reports on my two great overseas voyages had a wide circulation. From 1934 till 1935 for instance, I made my trip to the Far East. I believe that over 200 copies of this report were sent out. LAUBERS wrote to me that I should prepare a copy for HITLER personally, and that the most important pages should be underlined in red. I asked the competent East Asia adviser in the economic department of the Foreign Office what he considered important. I put the same question to an official of the "Leander" Department of the Ministry of Economics.

Major BLOCH of the Counter-Intelligence Department of the OKW congratulated me on this report and stated that it had roused so much interest within this organization that it was being duplicated for their own official use. Below I have given a list of my most important journeys during the years from 1926 till 1945.

9. In the late summer of 1928 I undertook my first trip to the United States of America, as assistant of Prof. FLECHTHEIM, and in connection with the foundation of the American I. G. Chemical Corporation which was then founded in 1929. During the second part of my travels in the United States in 1928 I assisted Prof. Wichard von HELLENDORFF, a well-known expert on international Economics, who was a member of the Aufsichtsrat of the I.G. Farben, and who had been sent to the United States by BOSCH in order to study the activities of the National Industrial Conference Board, since BOSCH intended to found a similar institution in Germany.

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(This institution was founded later under the name of "VOWI" being an extension of the "Archiv" with the Berlin IIG 7 organization. In connection with our studies of the activities of the National Industrial Conference Board we visited a number of economic institutes and statistical organizations in the United States; the main purpose, apart from the study of all pertinent questions, was the establishment of mutual connections with a view to an exchange of statistical and economic material between these institutes and organizations and the "VOWI" of the I. G. Farben. These connections were later kept up by the statistical department of the Chemisch, Inc., New York, which the I. G. Farben maintained by means of a retaining fee.

My brother Rudolf W. ILGNER was in charge of the statistical department and later became Vice-President of this firm.

(Page 4 of original, cont'd)

A close connection with regard to economic questions was established and relevant material was exchanged with the National-Industrial Conference Board. A similar contact was made at that time and also during the following years with other institutes and statistical departments, at first with the statistical department of the National City Bank in particular. In the spring of 1929 I travelled to the United States for the second time, this time as assistant of Geheimrat Hermann SCHMITZ. During this trip the actual foundation of the American I. G. Chemical Corporation took place, and I became one of its Vice Presidents and a member of the board of directors. In 1931 and 1932 I went to the United States again, but only in order to deal with current financial matters.

10. During 1931 and 1932 I was, together with other economists, member of a circle which made suggestions to the Brüning Government "concerning first measures to be taken in order to restore German economy". To this I must add that in 1932 prior to the fall of the Brüning government, I had, together with Prof. NOELLENDOERFF, two conversations with FUNK, to whom Prof. WAGNAR had introduced us, with regard to these suggestions and the WAGNAR plan (money and credit reform). WAGNAR was a close friend of SCHMITZ and was closely connected with the I. G. Farben. This was at the time when the above mentioned circle of Economists, in which I was a collaborator, was greatly concerned about whether the Brüning government would have the power to carry out the economic reforms which Brüning, as well as we, deemed necessary.

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The above mentioned circle of economists therefore suggested that - since there was a possibility of the Nazis coming to power - we should discuss this question with FUNK who at that time was acting as HITLER's liaison officer to industrial circles in Germany. At the instigation of WAGNAR, and arranged by him, two discussions took place between FUNK, von NOELLENDOERFF and myself. During the first meeting I explained to FUNK the above mentioned suggestions, and during the second meeting which NOELLENDOERFF attended, FUNK told us that he and his party friends considered our suggestions sound, and that they agreed with them in principle. FUNK suggested that I should join the Nazi Party which, however, I refused to do.

11. In view of my knowledge of America and my connections with the United States I was asked by Dr. DIEBOLD in the spring of 1933 whether I would be willing to accept the presidency of the association Carl SCHUMER in Berlin. Ever since 1929 I had already been a member of the Carl SCHUMER-Memorial Foundation in Philadelphia.

(Page 5 of original, cont'd)

12. In the summer of 1933, Dr. FUNK, at that time Under-Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, asked me, together with other business men, amongst whom were DIEHL of the Kali-Syndikat, J.C. FISCHER, Reichskreditgesellschaft, WINTERFELD, SIEGEL and others, to place myself at the disposal of the Propaganda Ministry as an expert on foreign countries. Our task was to advise the Propaganda Ministry, and we attempted to introduce fair publicity methods of "come and see" instead of the prevailing clumsy and partly immoral propaganda methods. I have already drawn up several reports on the activities of this circle of experts for the Propaganda Ministry, and also on the activities of the organization Carl SCHUMER.

13. In 1933 I took a prominent part in conducting a trip through Germany which the Automobile-Club of Germany had arranged for foreign visitors, and we showed them the German industry after the Nazis had assumed power. This trip had already been planned by the Automobile-Club of Germany in 1932. We made a film of this trip, which at the invitation of the foreign Cartel Clubs and of the Automobile-Club of Germany of which I was one of the four vice-presidents, was shown to the participants and to leading personages from industrial circles of the respective country.

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Those who took part in the trip were given the opportunity of seeing with their own eyes the actual conditions prevailing in the various plants of the German industry after the NSDAP had come into power. This trip was made in automobiles through the German industrial districts.

14. In 1933 or 1934 I was appointed plant leader in accordance with the German law for the regulation of national labor. In 1937 I voluntarily joined the NSDAP. Originally I had intended to join the NSDAP already in 1933, but I did not do so as I considered beneath my dignity to queue up.

15. In spring 1937 I gave a lecture on industrialization at a Meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce, and based it on the experiences I had gathered in Latin America. In summer 1937, at the congress of the International Chamber of Commerce, I spoke on the methods used in Germany's foreign trade. At the beginning of 1938, at the Institute for World Economy at Kiel, I gave a lecture on the subject "Increase of exports by participation in World Industrialization", in which I reported on the experiences I had gathered during my trips through the South-East of Europe, East-Asia and South America in particular. At Vienna, in 1940, at the Annual General Meeting of the Economic Association of Central Europe (Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschafts-Tag) I again spoke on the same questions, giving special prominence to South-Eastern Europe and Roumania, and again in 1943 at Bukarest during industrial conferences. All these speeches were based on the results of statistical, economic and historical investigations carried out by the VOWI, which proved that an intensification of industry simultaneously brought about an increase in the buying power of a country's population, which eventually benefited foreign trade and in this way the economy of the whole world.

16. In summer 1937 I suggested to several members of the German group of the International Chamber of Commerce, that through the mediation of the German Foreign Club, which had replaced the Automobile Club of Germany, we could arrange a meeting of foreign economists and business men, in connection with the Kiel-week 1938, in order to discuss questions of foreign trade. This time the circle of foreigners was much smaller and limited to real experts on world economy.

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The main purpose of this conference was to clarify the question of methods used in German foreign trade, and it took place in order to determine the foreigners' attitude with regard to these methods. Already in 1934 during the "Kiel-week" a meeting had been arranged by the German Automobile Club. This function, however, was organized on a much larger scale, was of an entirely different character and served a more general purpose, similar to the trip in 1933, when we made a tour through the German industrial districts. In the late summer of 1938 I was appointed Vice President of the Economic Association of Central Europe, of which Freiherr von HILKESKY was the President.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

17. In 1941 I became President of the South-East and the Hungary Committee of the Reich Group Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie), and in 1942 I became President of the Committee of Experts on questions of Financing Industries in Roumania, which was officially appointed by the Ministry of Economics, though its activities were the same as those of the South-East Committee of the Reich Group Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie). During the war, apart from my work as an executive in the I.G. Farben, I mainly dealt with questions relating to the South East, and also with the light metal problems of the Norsk-Hydro-Quacilscoff A.G. and the Nrdisk Lettmetal at Oslo. This gave me cause to take trips to Oslo, Stockholm and Paris. I went to Paris in the autumn of 1941 together

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with the President for the Norsk-Hydro, Herrn Marcus VALLENBERG sen. and the deputy Generaldirektor of Norsk-Hydro, Herrn Bjarne ERIKSEN, in order to hold a conference with the French shareholders of the Norsk-Hydro, who were represented by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-bas. During the war I continued to conduct negotiations with the Banque de Paris, Banque de l'Union Parisienne, the Societe Generale and the Banque Indosine with a view to founding a Financing Syndicate, which had already been planned before the war and, according to information received from the German Ambassador in Paris, had already been approved in principle by the French Government in 1938. This "Association financiere" was meant to serve or simplify the financial needs of the I.G. in France.

18. In 1943, RUM, through the mediation of the Reich Groups Trade and Industry (Reichsgruppen Handel und Industrie) called together a circle of Experts in Foreign Economic Questions, which I was also asked to join, and which consisted of several representatives of commerce, industry and banking. The task of this circle of Collaborators was to advise the Ministry of Economics on matters of foreign trade.

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TRADING COMPANIES

19.

<u>Name - place</u>	<u>Period of membership</u>	<u>Position</u>
American I.G. Chemical Corp., New York	1929-1933/34	Vice-President 1929 and Member of Board of Directors
Chemische Werke, Hamburg	1932-1934	Deputy Manager (1934)
Buna-Merke G.m.b.H. Schkopau	1939-1945	Manager (1939)
Deutsche Gasolin A.G. Berlin	1939-1945	Member of the Aufsichtsrat (1933)
Stickstoffsyndikat GmbH Berlin	1930-1945	Member of the Verwaltungsrat (1934)
Deutsche Ueberseebank, Berlin	1937-1945	Member of the Aufsichtsrat (1937)
Oesterreichische Kreditanstalt, Wien	1938/39-1945	Member of the Aufsichtsrat (1938/1939)
Dynan-Chemie AG., Wien	1938/39-1945	Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat (1944)
Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau, Aussig	1939-1945	Member of the Aufsichtsrat (1939)
A.G. Dynamit, Bratislava	1939/40-1945	Vice President (1941)
Ipari Robancanyag, Budapest	1942-1945	Member of the Verwaltungsrat (1942)
Prima Societate SAR, Bukarest	1943-1945	Member of the Verwaltungsrat (1943)
Norsk Hydro-Kvaellstoff	1941-1945	Guest of the Styre (1941)
Nordisk Lettmetall, Oslo	1941-1945	Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat (1944)

ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE GOVERNMENT

20.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Period of membership</u>	<u>Position</u>
Circle of Industrial Leaders (Leader Circle) with the Ministry of Propaganda	1933-1934	Member
Working Committee for questions of Foreign Economy of the Reich Groups Commerce and Industry (Reichsgruppen Handel u. Industrie)	1943-1945	Member

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ORGANISATION OF TRADE AND COMMERCE

21.

A. Reich Group Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Period of membership</u>	<u>Position</u>
Committee for South-Eastern Europe	1941	Chairman
Committee for Hungary	1941	Chairman
Committee of Experts on questions of financing industries in Roumania	1942	Chairman

B. Economic Group Chemistry (Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Period of membership</u>	<u>Position</u>
Extended Advisory Council (Beirat)	1937 or 1938	Member
Committee for South-Eastern Europe	1942	Chairman

CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS

22.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Period of membership</u>	<u>Position</u>
International Chamber of Commerce	1931-1945	Delegate of the International Committee for Foreign Trade and Currency matters 1937
Economic Advisory Council to the German-Dutch Association	1936	Member
Economic Association for Central and South America	1933-1934	Member of the Vorstand (1933-1934)
German-Norwegian Chamber of Commerce	1938-1945	Member of the Praesidium (1941)
German-Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce	1931-1945	Deputy Chairman of the Vorstand (1934)
German-Mexican Chamber of Commerce	1933-1934	President (1933-1934)
German-American Economic Association	1929-1945	Member of the Praesidium (1934)
Economic Association for Central Europe	1931-1945	Advisor (1931) Vice President (1938)
Institute for Market Research	1929	Deputy Member of the Supervisory Council (1935)
Institute for World Economy Kiel	1938	Member

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Association for Commercial Training	1930	Member of the Vorstand
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ASSOCIATIONS AND CORPORATIONS

23.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Period of membership</u>	<u>Position</u>
Association Carl SCHURZ, Berlin	1933	President
Carl SCHURZ Memorial Foundation, Philadelphia	1929	Member
German-French Corporation, Berlin	1931	Member
Eastern-Asia Association, Hamburg	1934	Member
German-Swedish Corporation	1927	Member
Union for the far East, Berlin	1934	Member
German-Japanese Corporation, Berlin	1934	Member
German-Italian Scholarship Foundation, Berlin	1934	Member of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium)
German-Hungarian Corporation, Berlin	1941	Member of the Vorstand
Hungarian-German Corporation, Budapest	1942	Honorary Member
German-Romanian Corporation, Berlin	1942	Member of the Vorstand
German-Bulgarian Corporation, Berlin	1932	Member of the Vorstand
China-Institute, Frankfurt/Main	1935	Honorary Member
Wilhelm FELSCHNER Foundation, Berlin	1935	Member of the Supervisory Council (Kuratorium)
Association of Berlin Merchants	1932	Member
Hausbuecherei, Hamburg	1937	Honorary Member
Bulgarian Colony, Edinstvo	1926	Honorary Member (1941)
Swedish Colony, Berlin	1931	Member

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Julia KERR, No. 20185, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-6699.

Julia KERR
No. 20185

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6699
CONTINUED

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<u>Name - Place</u>	<u>Time of Membership</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Union of Former Cadets	1926	Member
Union of Former Members of Fusilier-Regiment 39	1926	Member
Union of Former Members of the 4th Regiment of Foot-Guards	1926	Member
Freikorps Kameradschaft Luetzow	1936	Honorary member
German Officers' League, Berlin	1927	Member
National Association of German Officers	1927	Member
Association for Breeding and Testing German Race Horses, Berlin	1929	Member
Tiergarten Riding and Driving Association	1928	Member
Professional Group of German Dobermanns	1928	Member
Hessian Hunting Club	1928	Member
Association for Ancient Weapons	1942	Member
Society of the Friends of Klachau (hunting society Styria, Austria)	1940	President.

Societies and Clubs

24.

<u>Name - Place</u>	<u>Time of Membership</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Automobile Club of Germany, Berlin	1931-1934	Member of the committee of representative 1931, vice-president 1932
The German Automobile Club ("D.D.A.C.")	1933-1934	Vice-president
Imperial Yacht Club, Kiel	1934	Member

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6699
CONTINUED

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

Foreign Club, Berlin	1934	Member
Civil-Casino, later Herren-Club	1931	Member
von Dirksen Foundation	1935	Member of the board of trustees
Jeckoy Club	1931	Member
Rotary Club	1933	Member
Bankers Club of New York	1928	Member

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<u>Name - Place</u>	<u>Time of Membership</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Manhattan Club, New York	1928	Member
American Automobile Club	1936	Member (during Olympia Games)
Royal Swedish Automobile Club	1932	Member
Royal Norwegian Automobile Club	1933	Member
Royal Danish Automobile Club	1933	Member
Swiss Automobile Club	1933	Member
Royal Italian Automobile Club	1933	Member
Royal Hungarian Automobile Club	1932	Member
Baltic Automobile Club	1933	Member
Hungarian Touring Club		Member
Brazilian Automobile Club	1936	Member (during my journey to Latin America)
Argentinian Automobile Club	1936	Member (during my journey to Latin America)
Chilian Automobile Club	1936	Member (during my journey to Latin America)

(page 12 of original, cont'd)

25. I myself never made larger contributions than those demanded by the Party, except for the German Hunters Union, to which I paid annual contributions for the Winter Relief Fund of the German Hunters Union at my residences in Berlin, Bayk (Mark Brandenburg) and Tauplitz (Austria). These payments amounted to a few hundred Reichmarks annually. Moreover, I had annual payments of RM 1,000.-- to 2,000.-- made by the Society of the Friends of Kladchau, a private hunting society, to the Winter Relief Fund of the German Union of Hunters. As factory manager of the Berlin I.G. plant N° 7 I also made annual payments to the Winter Relief Fund and the Red Cross, which in each separate case did not exceed RM 2,000.--. Moreover, during the last years of the war I paid RM 2,000.-- every year, at least 3 to 4 times, to offices of Main Office I of the Waffen SS through SS Standartenführer Dr. EICHMAYER, director of the Nitrogen Syndicate, Berlin. I made these payments, because I received the necessary gasoline, tires and repairs for the

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cars of my plant from these SS offices. Moreover, the SS offices transported coal for the I.G. Berlin N° 7 and helped with regard to transport when my office was moved to Central and Southeastern Germany in 1945. My organization I.G. Berlin N° 7 also made annual payments to the Air Force hospital in Berlin during the war, as well as the usual payments to the German Labour Front.

26. Naturally, I.G. Farben as a whole made large annual donations or contributions to the Nazi Party and its various organizations, such as in particular the "Adolf Hitler Foundation of German Economy", Winter Relief Fund and the Red Cross. I shall make no further list of these contributions and limit myself to the organizations which I mentioned before. I.G. Farben paid annual contributions to all the public organizations listed in paragraph 24, except those organizations of which I was a member for private reasons. I think that after 1931 about RM 25,000.-- were paid to the Central European Economic Congress. The purpose of this organization was the promotion of economical relations and intercourse between German private firms and the economy of the Southeastern countries. In this connection German industry tried to help to increase the agricultural production of these countries, so as thereby to increase purchasing power of the entire country. An annual contribution of about RM 10,000 was paid to the Carl Schurz Society. I think that annual contributions of about between a few hundred and a few thousand Reichmarks were paid to all the associations and societies which are mentioned in Paragraph 23. These contributions were decided upon by the Central Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., presented to the Vorstand and approved by the latter.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6699
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Distinguitions

27. (a) Iron Cross, 2nd Class (World War I)
(b) Meritorious War Cross, 2nd Class (World War II)
(c) Masson Medal for Bravery (World War I)
(d) Cross of Honor for Front-Line Fighters (World War I)
(e) Austrian War Commemoration Medal with swords (World War I)
(f) Commander's-Cross with star and swords of the Saxony-Ernestini House Order
(g) 1st Class of the Badge of Honor of the German Red Cross.

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- (h) German Olympia Badge of Honor, 2nd Class.
- (i) Royal Bulgarian War Commemoration Medal (World War I)
- (j) Large Officers' Cross of the Royal Bulgarian National Order for Civilian Merit
- (k) Officers Cross of the Bulgarian Order of St. Alexander (4th Class)
- (l) Hungarian War Commemoration Medal (World War I)
- (m) Commander's Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit
- (n) Commander's Cross of the Order of the Crown of Italy
- (o) Commander's Cross 2nd Class of the Royal Swedish Order of Vasa.

JOURNEYS ABROAD FOR I.G. FERRI

23.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Country</u>
1923	Italy, Switzerland, England, U.S.A., France
1929	France and U.S.A.
1930	France and Switzerland
1931	France, U.S.A. and Switzerland
1932	Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Poland, France, and U.S.A.
1933	Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, France, Switzerland
1934	Norway, Denmark, Holland, Hungary
1934-35	Italy, Egypt, British India, Burma, Ceylon, Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, Philippines, China, Japan, Siam, Indo-China.
1935	England, Holland, Switzerland, Italy
1936	England, Holland, France, South and Central America, U.S.A.
1937	Holland, Belgium, France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy
1938	Norway, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia
1941	Norway, Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, France, Sweden, Bulgaria
1942	Norway, Sweden, France, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria.

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Country</u>
1943	Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France and Belgium.
1944	Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6699
CONTINUED

(page 15 of original, cont'd)

I have carefully read through each of the 15 pages of this affidavit and countersigned it in my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials, and I herewith declare under oath that I have told the pure truth in this declaration to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. Max ILGNER

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of April 1947 at Nuernberg by Dr. Max ILGNER known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature

Otto VERBER

U.S. Civilian AGO 444 385

Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 June 1947

I, J.B. ROBINSON No. 026 073, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6699.

J.B. ROBINSON

No. 026 073

CASE NO. 6 - TRIBUNAL VI

PROSECUTION

Document Book No. 18

English



CASE 6 - TRIBUNAL VI

PROSECUTION

Document Book No. 18 non - existent



MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CASE 1-1
Prosecution Document Book No. 19

English



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I.G. Farben Case - Count I/O

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Trans- cript
NI-5380		Secret minutes of meeting of Experts Committee on raw materials questions, 26 May 1936, with Goering, Koerner, Schacht and the defendant Schmitz present.		1
PS-1301 (USA-123)		Collection of documents concerning Germany's economic preparation for war including secret minutes of meeting of Council of Ministers with Goering, Blomberg, Dr. Schacht and Col. Loeb present, concerning stock piling of raw materials and stating that all measures have to be considered from the point of view of an assured waging of war.		32
NI-10306		Affidavit of State Secretary Koerner, of 29 August 1947, on Krauch's appointment to his various offices on Goering's staff.		82
NI-8707		Affidavit of Dr. Erich Gritzbach, of 14 August 1947, on Krauch's connection with the Four Year Plan.		84
NI-6525		Affidavit of Krauch, of 22 April 1947, on government and economic positions held by him.		83
NI-5030		Letter from Albert Voegler to Krauch of 10 August 1933 asking him to give information to State Secretary Milch of the Reich Air Ministry.		86
NI-4710	138	Letter from Krauch to State Secretary Milch, of 14 September 1933, giving a memorandum on the German motor fuel situation stating that a Four Year Plan is necessary for the extension of production.		87
NI-7123	90	Memorandum of 15 September 1933, concerning discussion in the Reich Air Ministry between officials of the Air Ministry and the Army Ordnance Office at which the difficulties of military rearmaments are discussed. Milch approves enlargements of production at Bitterfeld, approved "a new electron-metal finishing plant", and refers to General Hockelberg		92

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in:	
			Document Deck	Trans- cript
IX-7123 (cont'd.)		"a memo" of the I.G. Farben (Dr. Krauch) concerning the expansion of raw materials bases (with particular reference to oil) and suggested a joint energetic approach to the competent agencies in this matter.		
IX-5933		Letter from Krauch to State Secretary Milch of 16 August 1935, on French process to produce synthetic gasoline.		
IX-5932		Letter from Krauch to Milch of 20 December 1935, thanking him for the hospitality he received from the Air Ministry and relating Bosch's report to the Central Committee of I.G. on the impressions gained.		
IX-5911		Minutes of Meeting of Technical Management, of 13 July 1936, stating that Dr. Ritter and Dr. Eckell left the V/W in order to join the staff of the Foreign Exchange Commission.		
IX-4838		Memorandum of I.G. Farben, Frankfurt Sales Combine Chemicals, of 2 November 1936, to defendant Kuehne, Leverkusen, containing excerpt from Minutes of a conference between defendant ter Meer and Weber-Andreas on request by Pleiger on Keppler's staff for an expert.		
IX-5591		Report of Keppler, of 16 December 1936, on his activities, in second week of December 1936, showing report by defendant Buetefisch "of the Office of German Raw Materials and Synthetics" on planned oil plants.		
IX-5391		Minutes of meeting of technical management Hoechst, of 15 November 1937, showing demands from Four Year Plan on I.G. Farben for technical experts.		
IX-4956 (Schacht Exhibit 48)		Memorandum of Hitler, Summer 1936, concerning the tasks of the Four Year Plan 1936.		

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Trans- cript
EG-416 (WMA 835)		Secret Minutes of Council of Ministers, of 4 September 1936, with Goering, Blomberg, Schacht, Koerner, Keppler and Lt. Col. Loeb present. Goering, reading Hitler's memorandum on the Four Year Plan, states: "All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war."	132	
NI-7439		Excerpt from "Voelkischer Beobachter", official party newspaper, of 9 September 1936, containing Hitler's speech announcing the Four Year Plan.	134	
NI-4471		Minutes of Conference on oil program of the Government held at the Farben building, Berlin, 6/7 October 1936, with representatives of the Raw Materials Staff, Ruete-fisch, and representatives of other firms present.	133	
EG-373		Lecture delivered by General Thomas before the Reich Chamber of Labor, 24 November 1936, stating: "Gentlemen, the Four Year Plan is military economy at its purest".	141	
EG-2071		Decree of 18 October 1936, concerning the execution of the Four Year Plan, appointing Goering Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.	7	
EG-7884 (WMA-881)		Report of speech by Minister of Economics Funk, held on 14 October 1939, emphasizing the importance of the Four Year Plan for the economic preparation of war.	20	

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 11-5480
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF CONSUL FOR WAR CRIMES

Top Secret State affair
Record of the meeting of the
Advisory Committee about Questions of
Raw-Materials on 26 May 1936, at 4 o'clock.

Chairman: Minister President General GOERING
President of the Reichsbank and provisional Reich
and Prussian Minister of Economics Dr. SCHACHNER
Reich Minister of Finance Count SCHUBERT v. RICHTHOFEN,
Prussian Minister of Finance Prof. Dr. FORSTNER,
Lieutenant General, Chief of the Wehrmacht Office,
State Secretary in the Prussian Ministry of State,
Commissioner for Economics of the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor,
Supreme President, Gauleiter
Governing Mayor, Hamburg
Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff
State Councillor Ministerial Director in the
Prussian State Ministry
Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry of
Economics
Chief Superintendent of Mines, Ministerial
Director in the Reich Ministry of Economics
Director of the Reichsbank
Director of the Reichsbank
Rebert
L. GOERING Chief Consultant (Generalreferent) in the
Reich Ministry of Economics,
Dr. TRENDLENBURG
State Secretary in temporary retirement
Fritz HYSSEN
State Councillor
Geheimrat, I.G. Farben A.G.
Dr. SOGE EISEN
Dr. SPRINGOWITZ
Director General, Hoesch Bros., Dortmund
Director General; United Steel Works A.G.
Director General, Central German Steel Works A.G.
Oskar B. SCHULZ,
Dr. REINER,
Director, Economic Group for Machine Construction
Prof. AGELING
Institute for Research into Economic Cycles
Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry
of Economics
Ministerial Councillor in the Reich Ministry
of Economics
Economic Group for the Chemical Industry
Chief Government Councillor in the Reich
Ministry of Finance
REIFFER Office
REIFFER Office
Major, Reich Ministry of War and State for
Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange

Beginning of the conference at 16.13 hrs.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 5380
CONF'D.

Prime Minister GOERING:

Thanks everybody for appearing. Since export matters were discussed in the last meeting, a survey of the raw materials situation will be given this time. Sworn stenographers have been employed in order to provide all the gentlemen with transcripts.

Cooperation requested in this way, that if gentlemen do not want to speak at once, they will submit their ideas and experiences briefly in writing.

The chief purpose is the connection with actual practice. He emphasizes that the whole meeting is strictly confidential, and that everything, above all the figures given, will be treated as a State secret. The participants are responsible that any notes do not fall into the wrong hands.

Min. Dir. RUELBERG states that the stocks of raw material shrank to 1 - 2 months, while they were sufficient for 5 - 6 months in the beginning of 1934. The use of raw material can be explained firstly by the revival of industry since 1933, and secondly by the sharp increase in armament.

Quantity in millions of tons		Value in milliards	
1932	1935	1932	1935
33	47	4,6	4,16

Total imports

Imports:

Industrial, raw and semi-processed
Materials

22	40	1,7	2,1
----	----	-----	-----

In the spring of 1934 planned management was begun in order to equalize raw material stocks and raw material deficiencies in some places.

The new plan of September 1934 to place all imports under supervision brought an increase of the importation of industrial raw materials of vital importance with a decrease in the importation of manufactured goods.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-5380
CONT'D.

The domestic raw material economy was improved by the activity of the newly organized supervisory offices, by collecting waste-material, increasing home!

(Page 3 of original)

production, introducing substitute material and substitute metals. The raw materials which are available to us only through imports are classified according to imports as follows:

- 1.) Textiles
- 2.) Non-ferrous Metals,
- 3.) Iron and Steel
- 4.) Cellulose
- 5.) Hides and Furs
- 6.) Mineral Oils
- 7.) India Rubber
- 8.) The industrial fat supply.

<u>Cotton</u>	Stock on 1. 4. 34	70 000 tons
	1. 4. 35	25 000 tons
	1. 4. 36	21 000 tons

Average monthly consumption: 33 about 31 600 tons
April 36 about 23 600 tons

This decrease in consumption was attained by reducing the amounts consumed to 60 percent.

The reduction of working hours made necessary by the reduced quantities could be kept at 42 hours per week because of the necessity for mixing in cellulose wool which amounted to 5% at first and was now 16 - 20%.

As the present stock of cotton is only sufficient for 1 month - considerable remnants must be left in the interest of keeping an assortment - a further restriction of consumption to 23 000 tons per month is provided for.

Imports from the USA had to be reduced from 80% to 20% as the necessary cash in foreign exchange was not available. This loss in imports could be made up for by imports from trade agreement countries such as

(Page 4 of original)

Brazil, the East Indies, Turkey, Belgium (Congr region), so that at present the demand is 80% covered.

For export and special purposes e.g. tires, 4 000 tons are required monthly, as mixtures can only be used in domestic fabrics, but not for army use and export.

<u>Wool:</u>	Stock on 1. 4. 34 (Wool and worsted)	71 000 tons
Value 2800 Mk. per ton		
	on 1. 4. 35	53 000 tons
	on 1. 4. 36	43 000 tons

2. Monthly consumption:	1934: before rationing	10 000 tons
	1936:	8 400 tons

Reduced consumption was achieved by shortening working hours and quantities, and by voluntarily using a 10 to 30% mixture of reclaimed wool and cellulose wool. In the autumn of this year 30 000 t will be required, which will presumably be received from South America, Chile and Argentina, by the trade agreement system. Nevertheless, we must count on a considerable deficit, which makes it necessary to allot 30 to 50 millions in foreign exchange for September and October. The annual production of German wool amounted to 5 200 tons in 1936.

Imports for 1936: 15% against foreign exchange in cash
85% by clearing system.

In wool also no mixins is to be ordered for army use and export, which gives us an irreducible share of cash foreign

exchange for 1 500 tons per month.

Cellulose wool: Total production: 1933 1934
4 000 tons 7 000 tons
1936 May
60 to 70 000 tons

Since about 400 000 tons are required annually for cotton and wool, the production of

(Page 5 of original)

about 60 - 70 000 tons of cellulose wool makes it possible to save about 1/6 of these foreign raw materials. By investing in new machines the production might be increased to 90 000 tons per year. In order to sell the cellulose wool we are endeavoring to make further use of cotton mixtures and to produce more goods from cellulose wool.

The mixed goods are difficult to export, as their quality is under suspicion, and they are mostly liable to a very high duty as silk goods, because of their similarity to silk.

Rayon: Domestic production: 1934 1935
37 000 tons 44 000 tons
1936
about 60 - 70 000 tons ...
Wool: Stock on 1.4.34..... 7 300 tons on 1.4.36....
10 400 tons

It was possible to secure this favourable stockpile through a trade agreement with Italy, which must be named as the only source of supply. The cultivation of hemp is increasing, but the area under cultivation provides only 1/10 of the demand.

Area under cultivation; harvest

	1933	1934	1935	1936
210 hectares	210 tons			
360 "		360 tons		
4 000 "			2600 tons	
5 000 "			about 5 000 tons	

Flax and flax-tow. Stock on 1.6.34 11 900 tons
on 1.4.36 4 000 tons

The difficulty of procurement comes from differences of trade policy with Russia and Lithuania and other foreign sources of supply are very few. Therefore, the quantity of flax and flax-tow has been ordered reduced (20% of the state of supply of 1934/35).

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Domestic flax cultivation is being revived, whereby we

hope to save a considerable amount of foreign exchange and
also change over from cotton goods to linen goods.

Area under cultivation: 1934 3 000 hectares, 1935 23 000
hectares,
1936 50 000 hectares

Domestic production: 1934 Straw-flax - 27000 t - 5 400 ton
long fibre and tow
" " " " 1936 " " 30 000 t -

Min. Pres. GOERING: Asks what percentage of German needs
is covered by domestic flax cultivation.

Min. Dir. RUEHLING: replies that domestic needs would be
covered if the harvest were good.

Minister SCACHT: regards the flax question as favourable.
He emphasizes that an increase of flax
growing would probably make a gap
somewhere else, since not only new
areas are being cultivated.

Min. Pres. GOERING: Does not consider these difficulties
important under certain circumstances.

Min. Dir. RUEHLING: mentions that cultivation has been made
easier by two types of machines, which
produce a fibre that can be spun from the
green dried flax in one operation.

Min. Pres. GOERING: That makes the product cheaper too. The
value of linen fabrics ought to be brought
home to the Public.

Min. Dir. RUEHLING: reports that hard fibres are mostly used
for binding thread; but 9 000 tons in the
value of 3 mill. RM are lacking for this
year. By collecting the used fibres we
have for a considerable saving.

Stock on 1.4.1934 10 000 tons, on 1.4.1936 8 000 tons

Min. Pres. GOERING: Where do we get this fibre from?

Min. Dir. RUEHLING: The sisal fibre mostly comes from the
Philippines, from Manila, from Germany, from
East Africa and Mexico.

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Reference is made to the utilization of used ends of binding
thread.

Jute: Stock on 1.4.1934 31 000 tons, on 1.3.1936
14 000 tons

Daily demand in the beginning of 1934 10 000 tons, reduced
today to 7 000 tons. We receive jute from British India

through the compensation system. As the agricultural demand for sacks (especially for the time of the sugar campaign) is still endangered, the used jute sacks will be rationed. Jute sacks will be replaced by paper sacks and the jute material will be mixed with paper thread and wood fibres.

Metals.

Copper. Stock on 31.3.1934 104 000 tons, on 31.3.1936
32 700 tons

Average monthly consumption: 1933 18 000 tons
1934 before the be-
ginning of rationing 25 000 tons
1935 after establishing
the supervisory 27 500 tons
1936 (1st quarter of
the year) 21 300 tons

By an early regulation of consumption and by using substitute materials, such as aluminium and zinc, the domestic demand was reduced, but the savings were used up by army and export (for which substitutes could not be used).

Min. Pres. GOERING: How great is the German output of copper?

Min. Dir. REIBERAG: Production from German area

Monthly average 1934 2 100 tons 1936 2 200 tons

As the production could not be increased, we changed over from the importation of finished metals to the importation of pre-materials which are more favourable to us with respect to foreign exchange, and

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which we receive from the trade agreement countries in the form of ores, waste pyrites, etc.

Imports of finished copper:	Blast furnace production
January 1935 6 500 tons	(Refinement)
July 1935 3 000 tons	12 700 tons
December 1935 1 900 tons	17 000 tons
	18 000 tons

Min. Pres. GOERING: How high is the monthly demand this year?

Min. Dir. REIBERAG: At present it amounts to 21 300 tons.

Lead: Stock on 31.3.1934 75 000 tons, on 31.3.1936
24 000 tons

Average monthly consumption: 1934 before the beginning
of rationing 13 500 tons 1935 after establishing
the supervisory offices
17 500 tons 1936 (1st quarter of the year)
18 500 tons

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-5380
cont'd.

Though the domestic consumption was reduced by prohibiting its use, this is offset by an increased consumption due to the needs of the Armed Forces.

Available metal content of the German ores:

1935 4 500 tons, 1936 5 000 tons, 1937 5 800 tons

Zinc: Stock on 31.3.1934 67 500 tons, on 31.3.1936 16 000 tons

Average monthly consumption:

1933 11 000 tons, 1934 15 000 tons, 1936 (1st quarter of the year) 19 000 tons

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Obtainable Metal Content of ores:

Monthly average:

1935	9 400 tons
1936	10 700 tons
1937	14 000 tons

Any increase seems hardly possible.

Minister President GOERING: Asks why an increase is not possible.
Says that he has been somewhat differently informed.

Commissioner for
Economics KEPPLER:

With reference to the manganese deposits of the Augusta Victoria mines he thinks it would be possible to increase production to 30,000 tons a year.

Min. Dir. RUELSBERG:

Tin:

Stock on 31 March 1934 3400 tons
31 March 1936 1400 tons

Average monthly consumption:

1935	1300 tons
1934 before the beginning of economic management	1400 tons
1936 (1st quarter of the year)	1100 tons

The domestic consumption is restricted by regulations of consumption and bans on use, but this is equalized again by Wehrmacht requirements.

Production from German ores:

1935 and 1936 - insignificant
1937 probably - 34 tons

Nickel:

Stock on 1 April 1934	1700 tons
1 April 1936	1900 tons

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. VI-538C
Cont'd

Average monthly requirements:

1933	540 tons
1934 before the beginning of economical management	780 to
1936	900 to

the increase in consumption in spite of
the regulation of use is due to Wehrmacht
requirements.

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Production from German areas:

1935 and 1936 ..	insignifi- cant
1937 monthly	65 tons

Aluminium:

Stock on 31 March 1934	8 600 tons
31 March 1936	9 600 tons

Average monthly consumption:

1933	1 300 tons
1934	4 300 tons
1936(1st quarter of the year)	7 600 tons

German production (monthly average)

1933	1 600 tons
1934	3 100 tons
1935	5 800 tons
1936(1st quarter of the year)	7 350 tons

A further increase is expected.
Because of the restrictions of use, Aluminium and its alloys are
being used to an increasing degree instead of metals which must
be used sparingly, in particular, copper, tin, brass.

Importation of Non-Ferrous Metals

1935 in all for 240 million RM, 20 millions monthly. The payments
were made as follows:

20%	= 4 million RM. through cash in foreign currency and bills of exchange payable against merchandise.
35%	= 7 million RM. with Treasury Trustee credits and open credits urgent credits (Sofortkredit).
45%	= 9 million RM. in trade agreement transactions with trade agreement countries.

Steel and Iron industry:

Annual production of crude iron and crude steel:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-5380
CONT'D.

Crude iron:

Crude steel:

1932 =	5,3 million tons	7,2 million tons
1936 =	14,5 million tons	18,0 million tons

Minister SCHACHT:

Crude iron production was tripled and steel production increased two and a half times.

Min. Dir. RUELBERG:

Raw materials for the steel industry:

Stocks (iron girders, ores, waste and dross) on 1 April 1934 4,5 million tons iron

pure iron ores on 1 April 1936

2,7 million tons iron

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Without imports this stock is enough for 2,3 months, but since there must be a month's stock available for keeping the smelting plants in operation, the reserve is enough for 1,3 months.

Manganese:

Stock on 1 April 1934	1,4 million tons
1 April 1936	1,2 million tons

The slight drop is due to the greatly increased activity in collecting scrap iron and the greatly increased of crude iron for open-Hearth Furnaces.

These stocks will last 1,4 months.

With respect to the alloy ores (Manganese and chrome ores) there are stocks available for 3-4 months. In the case of Wolfram Molybdenum and Palladium ores for high alloy steel there is less than one month's supply in stock.

Consumption figures per year:

	1932	1933	1936
Iron girders	7,5 million tons		30 million tons
Scrap iron	3,8 million tons		10,5 " "
Alloy ores		229 000 tons	535 000 tons

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-5380
CONT'D.

Requirements supplied from domestic sources
(raw materials for steel)

<u>annually:</u>	<u>Ores:</u>	<u>Scrap:</u>
1932	1,3 million tons	3,2 million tons
1935		8,3 million tons
1936 (estimated)	6,6 million tons	

The high figures for scrap can be explained by the law against exporting scrap, by the growing yields of scrap in our own plants, and by the increased collecting activity in Germany.

Requirements supplied from foreign sources:

Ores (waste)	1932	4,1 million tons
	1935	16,5 million tons

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CONT'D

Import came especially from trade agreement countries,

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such as Sweden and France.

From Sweden :	1932	1933	1934	1935
	(in million tons)			

	1.7	2.3	4.8	5.5
--	-----	-----	-----	-----

From France :

	1.1	1.6	2.0	6.1
--	-----	-----	-----	-----

A decrease in imports from France has to be expected for 1936 due to the liquidation of the trading agreement; on the other hand an increased demand from Sweden is guaranteed.

Scrap :

Requirements supplied from foreign sources

1932	1934	1935
------	------	------

99.000 to a year, 500.000 to a year, 276.000 to a year

The decline in scrap imports is explained by the strict execution of the laws against export in the trading agreement countries, such as France and Belgium.

Summing up, the following amount of foreign currency in cash is needed each month:

For ores	1 million Rf
" scrap	1.4 " Rf
For manganese ores	0.24 million Rf
" alloy ores	1.0 million Rf
	3.64 million Rf.

Min. Pres. GOERING : asks if something can be said about the increase of iron production from domestic ores.

Min. Dir. HUGENBERG : We have smelted the following domestic ores :

1932 1.3 million tons a year

1936 6.6 million tons a year

Minister SCHACHT : Emphasizes that one particularly important question is whether we undertake primarily to smelt the ores, for example, of the Eisener-Mette, or whether less good ores, such as the Salzgitter or Deger ores.

Min. Dir. KUEBLING : Compares the import of ores from abroad and the use of domestic ores :

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	<u>Domestic ores</u>	<u>Foreign ores</u>
1932	1.3 million	4.1 million
1936	6.6 million	15.5 million

Minister SCHACHT: The ratio has improved from 4:1 to 3:1.

Min. Dir. RUELBERG: Stocks on hand of skins and hides.

1934 for 5 months
1936 for 2,7 months.

The quantitative assignment today has been to 80%; we intend to reduce it to 60% in order to have a sufficient amount of stock for 3,5 months.

Restriction to 60% on 1 April of this year has been ordered; the domestic production covers 50% of our requirements, but not for all varieties, especially not for all the varieties of fine leather which are important for export. Perceptible stagnation of calf-leather imports due to the decline in calf-leather imports from France during the liquidation period. Likewise, difficulties due to the congestion of trade agreements accounts with South American firms in deliveries of wild animal skins 95% of hides and skins are imported from trade agreement countries. Through requirements are assured, likewise with regard to tanning agents.

Cellulose:

Stock on 1 April 1934	37,000 tons
1 March 1936	72,000 tons
Monthly consumption	
1934	72,000 tons (average)
1936	87,000 tons (February)
Total imports	
1934	144,000 tons
1936 (estimated)	155,000 tons

Only bleached cellulose can be used in the fiber materials industry. Greatly increased demand because of the increased production of artificial fibres. Requirements for 1936 estimated at 155,000 tons, of which 95,000 tons come from German production, 14,000 tons from imports.

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Requirements for 1937 are estimated at	
150,000 tons from which domestic production	
there would be	135,000 t
Imports about	10,000 t

The German capacity in 1936 was substantially increased by the establishment of new cellulose plants, special mention might be made of the plant in Wolfen with an annual production of 30 000 tons, which was started in the middle of 1937.

The quality of bleached cellulose produced is

being increased by the establishment of new bleaching plants. It is hoped that it will be possible to make the same amount available for export in 1937. The exportation of cellulose was endangered by the greatly increasing production of artificial fibres.

Petroleum (stocks)

	31 Dec, 34	31 Dec. 35	30 April 36 193 estimate
light motor fuel, including filling station stocks	495,000 tons	447,000 tons, und 115,000 tons (for military purposes)	495,000 tons
<u>Diesel-Oil :</u>	129,000 tons (without filling stations)	176,000 tons	141,000 tons
<u>Fuel oil :</u>	74,000 tons	46,000 tons	60,000 tons
<u>Lubricating oil:</u>	301,000 tons	302,000 tons	310,000 tons und 36,000 tons (for military pur- poses)

Average monthly consumption :

light motor fuel	145,000 tons	167,000 tons	200,000 tons, 216, 000
Diesel oil	57,000 tons	79,000 tons	95,000 tons
Fuel oil	44,000 tons	48,000 tons	50,000 tons
Lubricating oil	29,000 tons	34,000 tons	36,000 tons

Imports :

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Distribution of imports from different countries

	1934	1935
USA	5,6 %	8,4 %
Rumania	16,1 %	36,8 %
Russia	14,3 %	12,3 %
Elsewhere in America	30,4 %	15,6 %
Iran	11,7 %	11,4 %
		(together with Great Britain)
Great Britain	2,6 %	
Peru	10,0 %	3,0 %

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. FI-5386
(CONT'D)

90% of the payments in 1935 were made by the trade agreement or compensation system 10% by foreign currency in cash.

Domestic Production per Month.

	1934	1935	1936	1937 (approx.)
light motor fuel in % of total production	59,000 t 40%	75,000 t 45%	100,000 t 50%	135,000 t 62%

The great increase in the domestic prod was achieved in spite of a considerable rise in consumption due to motorization and air travel. It should be emphasized that the domestic production of high grade gasoline and heavy gasoline after January 1937 will presumably meet all domestic requirements.

	1934	1935	1936	1937
Diesel oil in % of total consumption	5,400 tons 9,5%	6,000 tons 8%	9,100 tons 9,5%	

Min. Pres.
GOERING

How are the figures for 1937?

Min. Pres.
RUELSBERG

The figures are not yet available; but there is little prospect of increasing production. The completion of the refineries is proceeding slowly and with delays, since everything is still in a state of flux.

Min. Pres.
GOERING

But surely the present system could be expanded.

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So as to increase production. Is a substantial increase considered generally possible?

Min. Dir. RUELSBERG : Denies this and points to the efforts of the Diesel oil office.

Min. Pres. GOERING : Finds 9,5% much too little and considers an increase absolutely necessary.

Min. Dir. RUELSBERG : Believes that an increase can be chiefly obtained by converting to the FISCHER-TROPSCH process. This process normally yields a certain amount of gas oil, most of which has been converted into gasoline by cracking, because this is financially more profitable. The process can be so arranged as to yield considerably larger quantities of gas oil. A greater amount of gas oil would be produced but building such installation is re-

converting present ones. But this is far from being enough. Things would be made substantially easier if — as already mentioned — the UHIS and LOTT process were more extensively set up. Installations with an annual capacity of 30,000 tons are to be built for both processes. There is possibility, which experiments have confirmed, that a diesel oil suitable for use could be produced by mixing the FISCHER-TROISCH and UHIS-LOTT products.

Min. Pres. Goerling: Finds, that Ministerial Director RUMPFELBERG also considers it possible to increase domestic diesel oil production. Now he draws attention to the fact that in time there will be a steadily increasing conversion in aviation, too, from light gasoline to diesel oil. Importance must be attached to the greater increase of domestic diesel oil production. When the process has been made clear, it will only be a question of constructing the necessary installations.

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Inspector General

of Kinen Schlattmann: So far Brown Coal-Heavy-oil has been used to a considerable extent for hydration. Heavy-oil production was increased this year to 8000 metric tons. This heavy-oil has to a certain extent so far been cracked for diesel-oil and Gasoline production. Tests have shown, that Brown Coal-Heavy-oils, slightly refined, may be used in diesel motors, to a great extent. It must be pointed out; that the present Hydration-plants constructed for processing tar, will have to be converted to Brown Coal - procedure in this respect, has now been concluded by I.G.Forthen.

Min. Pres. Goerling: Complete cessation of oil imports is to be reckoned with, therefore home-production must be prepared for this eventuality.

Min. Dir. Ruelberg: Home-production in fuel-oils:

1934	1935	1936
18 700 t	20 000 t	21 000 t

as a
percentage of
total
consumption
38 %

42,3 %

42 %

Min. Pres. GÖRNING: Enquires about production for 1937

Min. Dir. NÜLLING: States, that no estimate is yet available

Min. Pres. GÖRNING: Enquires whether an increase in home-production is possible.

Min. Dir. NÜLLING: States, that no increase worth mentioning can be counted on.

Deputy-Plaintiff:

Reuter: The increase in fuel-oil will be extraordinarily large next year. The Navy is the main consumer. Next year the increase will be much larger than the present consumption.

Inspector General of Mines

SCHLITZ: Points out, that an increase in production and other procedures. As from 1935 the Plaintiff-Deputy REUTER, counts on a fairly large increase; he believes that Germany will be able to cover its fuel-oil demands to a great extent.

(This is of original)

Min. Pres. GÖRNING: Called attention to the fact, that this question is especially important to the Navy and that he had discussed it with the Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor.

General-Deputy

REUTER: Points out, that the oil was of special interest to tankers which were, at present, operating with foreign fuel-oils.

Min. Pres. GÖRNING: Mentions, that in the Navy, there is very little confidence in German fuel-oil. Requests report on lubricating-oil.

Min. Dir. NÜLLING: Home-production of lubricating-oil:

	1934	1935	1936
	5 400 t	5 700 t	6 300 t
as a percentage of total consumption	16,6 %	17,1 %	17,5 %

Min. Pres. GÖRNING: With lubricating-oil the regeneration of used-oils plays a part. To what extent is it utilized?

Inspector General of Mines

SCHLITZ: Reports this amount as a whole. The figures mentioned are how far we have produced and quantities of lubricating-oil from our crude-oil. This is partly due to the fact that our crude-oil is unsuitable for good lubricating-oil.

Min. Frau. Goering: Has used this oil him-self. The regenerated used-oils has proved itself exceptionally well. But it has proved that speculation immediately raises prices for used-oils quite remarkable figures have been computed which might possibly be attained by suitable propaganda.

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Inspector General of Mines:

Schlattmann: State, that 5 % has been mentioned to him which would be quite a lot in relation to our consumption, or rather to our shortages. Intends to follow this matter up.

Min. Frau. Goering: Mention that is secretly transferred money to a firm for the refining of used-oils 3 years ago, and that the quality attained was very good.

Inspector General of Mines:

Schlattmann: Stresses, that to day very much oil is still being thrown away. He raises the point, that the quality of the lubricating-oil production can be improved considerably by recently acquired knowledge of American processes for refining oils. The Lube-production has been concentrated more on German oils. Similarly, the Machine-Firms have been induced to use German-oils in order to have suitable machinery for German oil on hand in the A-case (A-Fall). Meanwhile, the main-supply must be provided by synthetic production. Synthetic-oils have proven themselves to be of equally good quality as foreign oils.

Min. Frau. Goering: emphasizes that in the A-case (A-Fall) we would not, under certain circumstances, get a drop of oil from abroad. With the thorough motorization of army and Navy the whole problem of conducting a war depends on this. All preparations must be made for the A-case so that the supply of the wartime-army is safe un-der.

Min. Dir. Mueller: Total imports for 1936 (estimated)
155 Million RM
Light-fuel-oils 1.1 million metric tons-
to Million RM
For the year 1937 still higher demands are to be reckoned with, so that at least the same amount of imports must be expected, whereby the quote of foreign cash currency will be raised.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-5396
cont'd

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Rubbers:

Stock		Consumption (monthly average)
1932		3 800 metr. tons
1933		4 700 metr. tons
1934 April	17000 metr. tons	5 700 metr. tons
1935 "	6300 metr. tons	5 500 metr. tons
1936 "	4000 metr. tons	5 000 metr. tons

In Giant-Tire production restriction were necessary as the foreign raw-rubber material content was particularly high.

	1935	Jan.- March 1936
Payment for Rubber	46,7 Million RM	12,1 Million RM
of this in foreign currency	26,5 " "	8,1 " "
as a percentage	58%	65 %

For tires a restriction to 90 % of the comparable period from July 1st 1933 to June 30th 1934 was imposed, this corresponds to 2800 metric tons for tires.

To cover the requirements for motorization under present development conditions, we really need 120 % of the comparable period 1933/34, that is 3 000 metric tons. If one adds the requirements of the remaining rubber production with 2 800 metric tons, we ought to import 5 800 metric tons per month compared to an actual monthly average of 5 000 metric tons. This would correspond to an additional expenditure of 1 000 metric tons or 900 000 - 1 000 000 RM which would have to be raised at the present rate of foreign-exchange.

The use of regenerated materials amounts at present

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to 1 000 metric tons per month and is to be increased during the course of the coming year to 2 500 metric tons. For this purpose a number of regeneration plants are to be erected. Our own synthetic rubber fabrication and present production capacity amounts to 55 metric tons per month and will from September amount to 120 metric tons, and will be increased from February 1937 to 250 metric tons.

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Synthetic-rubber (Buna), can be added to all products but involves a considerable increase in price, therefore Synthetic-rubber (Buna) can hardly be added to export products. (Ratio of 1:5 for soft and hard-rubber products.

Min. Pres. Goering: Enquiries, what kind of programme for Synthetic rubber production is planned at home for the coming years, whether a sharp rise in production will come about if this has been refrained from as account of the price.

Economy plan tentatively

Keweler: Factories are under construction, technical improvements are expected, it is to be hoped, that the work in progress will bring about changes which will cheapen production. Special hope for certain American processes.

Gen. Dir. Dr. Schmitz: agrees to this, method adopted after thorough discussion in order to utilize experience in other factories.

Min. Pres. Goering: indicates serious import reductions in the A-case (A-Fall) through which price probably will retreat. Rubber is our weakest point.

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Minister Schacht: Not with regard to the amount of foreign-currency necessary. Also with oil, home production develops rapidly. The non-precious metals and ores play a more important part in relation to foreign-currency.

Min. Dir. Eichelberg: The industrial fat supply is closely linked to food economy. Raw-materials for both are uniformly supplied by the Reich Grain-Board and the Reich Food-Ministry. The import of oil vilseed and blubber is in question. For 1936 the industrial fat-supply needs oil and fat to the amount of 143 Million RM. This includes a home-production of 19 Million RM. The Raw-materials to be imported, demand an approximate expenditure of 72 Million RM cash in foreign currency and 52 Million RM from countries with which we have a clearing - account. There is a pronounced shortage of linseed-oil because the procurement of linseed from Argentina was considerably hampered by clearing-exchange difficulties. This year 100,000 metric tons less of linseed-oil have been imported from the Argentine than last year.

Minister Schacht: Here imports depend on what Argentina can take from us, whether it is in a position to take the counter-value in industrial-woods.

Min. Pres. Goering: It has been stated that we were forced to take goods principally from countries which are our main clients. If the frozen-meat contingent is raised are we prepared and in a position to do so.

Minister Schacht: In this question England plays a very large part as she is a main-creditor of the Argentine and has a special-contract with Argentina. The Argentine is not free to make decisions. At present the position is thus we have very large debts to the Argentine on our clearing-account and the Argentine (that is, the Government and not the business-men) have asked us, not to draw so much raw-materials from the Argentine before more goods are taken from Germany and the Clearing-account has been somewhat decreased.

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There is at present a very large demand for feed-grains by the Reich Food Ministry which imposes an extraordinary burden upon us. We have a number of barter-transactions with the Argentine, in preparation. The obligations of the Backset-clause are a constant hindrance to us.

Min. Pres. Goering: Enquiring whether in spite of this we could not plant linseed in Germany also; he states that he is convinced, that it could be cultivated in quite different quantities if our farmers and agriculture be more versatile.

Min. Dir. Luecke: The Reich Grain-Board will require 15,000 metric tons of linseed with 5 Million Mark of Foreign-currency. For-reaching currency will be effected through the Central-Agency with soap, lacquers and paints of the Chemical-Technical-Industry. Soap has been checked out by the addition of home-produced fillers, introduction of synthetic materials etc. with only a 32% oil-content.

<u>Stock on hand:</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>
Soap: for 4 months,		for 3 months,	for 2.2 months
Lacquers, Paints			
and Linoleum for 6 "		" 1.5 "	" 1.3 "
Chemico-Techn.			
Industry for 12"		" 1.5 "	" 2.7 "

The materials required by the Chemico-Technical Industry are supplied principally to the war-industry. In comparison to the demand of other industries they are, in quantity, so small, that they can be covered.

Min.Pres.GOERING: Enquires, whether, in the case of soap, its production from coal had been considered. The coal-soap, tested by him, had been very good.

Economic-Plenipotentiary
of the Fuehrer
KEPPLER:

Ruhr-Chemie in conjunction with HENKEL of Dues-seldorf, has built experimental-plants, which were now to be put into operation. Capacity 15 000 metric tons per year. The process seems to be promising. Soap is produced as a by-product of the FISCHER-TROPSCH Gasoline synthe-sis HENKEL intends to produce up to 50 000 metr tons. The same basic items are needed as in the process for the production of lubricants and gas-oils.

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Attention is called to the quality of the oil from the Ruhr-Chemie for DIESEL-Aeroplane plants. The oil is not more expensive than gas-oil. This process is said to be economically feasible.

Minister SCHACHT: With this new processes, questions as to taxation-relief and subsidies always arise. With HENKEL and DIESEL it is possible that this would not take place.

Min.Dir.RULBERG: Home-supply of Glycerin covers demand, export requires authorization.
Summary: All raw-material stocks have been depleted considerably. The present level should not be lowered. The scarcity of raw-materials, qualities and sortings, is, even now, making export-business, and similarly the satisfaction of the Wehrmacht demands, difficult. Stock-depletion 1935 at least 400 Million Mark after a large drop had already taken place in 1934. In order to maintain the exports and armament-activity at the level of 1935, raw-material to the amount of at least 400 Million RM more than in 1935 will have to be imported.

Min.Pres.GOERING: Enquires, whether with a large demand and high rate of employment a scarcity in stock did not always result, whether an increased demand did not prevent the accumulation of a larger stocks. FORD proves this by figures.

Generaldirector
FLICK:

Considers this opinion generally as correct. Even without Foreign-exchange and raw-material difficulties the plants would have had smaller stocks on hand than in 1932, for at that time stocks were built up in the first place before the decision to discharge was made.

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Min. Pres.
GOERING:

Raises the question as to what extent rationed raw materials have been worked up into ready-made articles which are used in Germany. Says that frequently material is used for goods, which could be made of other material just as well. In this way a certain stock of rationed raw materials will be created.

Minister
Schacht:

Points out that there are no reserves available of the kind we had in 1914 because production has been restricted for a long time and for 2 years we have been using substitute materials in many cases. Stock maintenance must be considered from the point of view of the entire national economy. Ford's view is right if one is able to fall back on one's suppliers at any time. In the event of an increase turnover in his automobile business Ford needs a larger stock, but just like the big warehouses he can supplement his stock at any time because he can ask his suppliers to keep an adequate stock. In general, the total volume of supplies in stock increases with the size of the demand.

Min. Pres.
GOERING:

Agreed with the statement about substitutes and would like to know if the import of raw material has declined.

Minister
SCHACHT:

The latter has increased enormously.

Min. Pres.
GOERING:

Even if substitutes were used, nevertheless substantially more raw materials have been imported and processed in the last few years than formerly. These must still be available in some form or other.

Staatsrat
TRYSSER:

The depression years ought not to be used as a comparison. In recent years we had imports amounting to RM 12 milliards, which now have sunk to RM 4 milliards.

Minister
SCHACHT:

In comparison with 1926 the importation of raw materials has declined enormously, in comparison with 1932 it has increased.

(Page 26 of original)

Min. Pres.
GOERING:

They cannot be compared with each other.

Director
LANGE:

Because of our distressed condition the stocks of the retail and wholesale dealers are smaller than formerly. Against this it must be considered, that everyone was making an effort to lay up as large a stock as possible for himself because he was afraid he would not be able to make deliveries later on. It is hard to draw a balance between these things.

22

Staatsrat
TRYSEN: Certainly, in 1934, every dealer was trying to acquire private reserves. At that time they certainly were larger than they are today. Substantial stocks of raw materials are certainly not available any more and stocks cannot be replenished any more either. Of course there are war reserves in both gold and metal.

Minister
SCHACHT: Total German imports of raw materials amounted to
7.2 milliards in 1929
2.5 milliards in 1935

Min. Pres.
GOERING: Can it be shown statistically to what extent stocks are still available in Germany?

Prof.
WAGEMAN: Declares, that he does not have access to those figures, but believes they may be procured from the supervisory offices and from the Reich Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Reichsamt). He adds that a boom is characterized by particularly large stocks, that stagnation sets in, and the depression then breaks out because of too large stocks.

Min. Pres.
GOERING: This is just the contrary of what has been said up to now.

Minister
SCHACHT: Points out that given an unrestricted market and unrestricted payments we would have an immense stock of raw material because of the boom. What Professor WAGEMAN says holds absolutely true for normal conditions.

(Page 38 of original)

It is now impossible to satisfy our demand for raw materials and this results in a lasting state of deficiency.

Director General
Dr. SE. I. GOLUM: Heavy industry had larger stocks in 1932 than in 1936. In 1936 stocks would be smaller than in 1932 in the event of complete freedom of foreign exchange, because for sales reasons stocks are a drag on the market during a business slump. Theoretically it is true that in times of good business there ought to be larger stocks available.

Minister
POPITZ: Agrees with this. Both questions are meaningless for the moment because it is not possible to buy enough.

Min. Dir.
RUHLER: Reports that RM. 400 millions more worth of raw materials would have to be imported in 1936 than in 1935, presupposing an equal demand prices of raw materials have risen in the world market. They are still rising. With an average increase of

import prices by 13% and total imports amounting to 4 milliards there results a further increase in imports of 400 millions, so that altogether RM 100 millions more than 1935 would be necessary in order to be provided for, assuming a demand equal to that of 1935. Increased import prices are not counter-balanced by increased export prices. Export prices have fallen. Moreover the Minister for Foods is asking an additional 160 million mark especially for the supply of fat.

Complete survey:

a) additional imports for consumed stocks	RM 400 millions
b) additional demand because of price rise	RM 400 millions
c) additional demand for food	RM 160 millions
Total additional extra demand	RM 960 millions

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Minister
ECACET:

States that exports ought to be 25% higher, but will not rise more than 13%.

Min. Dir.
MUELLER:

Explains that in the event of a 13% rise in import (about 400 millions) we will have a reduced revenue in foreign exchange of about 170 millions to dispose of, because the Russians had to repay 230 millions in 1935 and only 50 millions in 1936. Thus, compared with an additional demand of 960 millions for imports, there are at best 230 millions additional receipts for export, so that an additional demand for 700 million mark remains for 1936.

Min. Pres.
GOERTEL:

Mentions that the desire for general information about the raw material situation has been satisfied by this. He emphasizes their importance for questions of increased export and the supply of substitutes for raw material. The lack of 700 millions is a heavy burden. Relief is to be sought primarily by increasing exports, then by increasing the production of raw material, increased use of substitutes, reconversion in the use of materials and salvaging old material, moreover the appraisal of manufactured goods as reserves for raw material, increase of agricultural production in the most critical direction and the coordination of divergent efforts. The question of motor fuel appears very unfavourable from the point of view of foreign exchange, but offers many possibilities for improvement as an immediate

measure. In agriculture the harvest yield is a great factor of uncertainty. This year however there is reason to hope for relief through a good harvest. It is also worthwhile at first to carry out improvements which are not very noticeable and to examine the present organization for mistakes.

After everybody has been given this survey the gentlemen are asked to cooperate in the work of

(Page 29 of original)

The situation is not to be regarded as something fixed and unchangeable, but as a starting point for new measures to be taken, at the head of which is export. Proposals in all branches are expected from those present. Questions concerning domestic raw materials and substitute materials are emphasized again. It is emphasized that at any moment we might be confronted with a situation of unparalleled seriousness, which we must be in position to deal with.

Everything has to be regarded from these points of view. The speed of movement must under no circumstances be impaired, on the contrary, even the interests of the factories themselves should be relegated to the background. An appeal is made to the idealism of industry. If perhaps great risks have to be taken now, nevertheless there is reason to expect that they will also someday have correspondingly great results. The establishment of Germany's liberty to trade comes before all else. The fate of the individual plant is immaterial just now. After overcoming the present difficulties, ways and means will also be found to save the individual plants from collapse. In conclusion, those present are asked if anybody still wished to make a statement

Prof.
WAGNER:

Proposes to distinguish between an immediate program and a program lasting several years. The increase of export seems to him to be a long-term program.

Min. Pres.
GOERLIG:

That is right. But export is precisely one of the things he wants included in the program of immediate importance. Substitutes and the reorganization of agricultural production are a long-term program.

Min. Pres.
GOERLIG:

Fluctuation of prices, stagnation of sales and

(Page 30 of original)

changes in currency may alter the situation very quickly. He knows that many complaints are being

voiced by French and Czech representatives (Skoda) about the German competition which is making itself felt everywhere. The case of the de luxe train of the Shah of Persia is mentioned as an example of how one ought not to adopt a passive attitude in export matters. In this case the initiative was taken by the domestic architect while the car firm was still hesitating. Such lassitude in exporting should be opposed. It is urgently necessary to include the increase of exports in the program scheduled for immediate execution.

Rea. Duvernois- Promises an immediate proposal for the export
Meister program in a short time. The possibilities for
ZROOGMANN: an increase in exports through successes in 1934/35 are at present not regarded as unfavourable.

Min. Pres. Points out once more that the reason for this
GOERING: discussion was the desire to make the different gentlemen more familiar with the problems so that they can occupy themselves with them and look for ways to cope with the situation.

Staatsrat Reports that in the eighties of the last
THYSSER: century the Queen of England summoned a special commission to study the difficult economic situation. The report was sent to him from America. He recommends the preparation of a similar report on the German situation.

Min. Pres. Proposes that another meeting should be held for
GOERING: asking counter-questions and in conclusion expects proposals from the gentlemen present which he then intends to submit to a special commission for further consideration. This commission should have access to the statistical offices.

(Page 31 of original)

Its task should be not only to report on the situation but also to develop proposals as to how we can recover from the present situation.

Min. Pres. Asks Provincial President KOCH if he wants to
GOERING: say anything more about the export question.

Provincial Replies, that he is not prepared to do this.
President

KOCH:
Minister Wants Herr KEPLER to say some more about zinc.
BOHACHT:

Economic is more optimistic about the zinc question than
Commissioner Ministerial Director RUEHLING.
KEPLER:

Chief Mining
Superintendent

SCHLATTMANN: explains, that 14,000 tons could be counted in 1936, supposing it technically possible to extract the metals to the highest degree of efficiency. With the exception of lead and zinc at Auguste Victoria there are no substantial deposits of lead, zinc and copper known which have not been exploited. Difficulties exist at Auguste Victoria, the elimination of which being provided for. The openings have not been carried very far, but perhaps it might be possible to produce 10 tons of ore per day for the next 5 years. But hardly more than that. It might be possible to practise robbing methods in some places, as has already been done for a long time in Upper Silesia. The Harz deposits are to be developed with the support of the Minister of Finance to an annual production of 40,000 tons of zinc and 20,000 tons of lead. The first 10,000 tons will be ready in October of this year at the latest. In the Rhineland and Westphalia the development in general is completed. According to our estimates our needs are thereby approximately guaranteed with the exception of the quantities for contracting foundries (Lehnhaette). In case of war a higher production may be enforced, of course.

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A systematic increase would involve considerable technical requirements, which it is estimated would take 1 1/2 to 2 years to carry out and which would endanger our metal reserves. As in the case of petroleum, it is necessary to save everything for a crisis by preparing the necessary capacity of production.

Min. Pres. Strongly advocates saving everything for the crisis
GOERKE: (Ernstfall) but adequate preparations for exploitation must be made.

Chief Mining
Superintendent Preparations for the crisis were already made year
SCHLATTMANN: ago.

Min. Pres. refers to our own extraction from German ores,
GOERKE: Ieper and Selzgitter ores. He says what really matters is not what may be profitable and convenient but what will alleviate our situation as regards foreign exchange. He asks that it be made clear as to what extent these ores can be utilized.

Chief Mining
Superintendent
SCHLATTMANN: States that this question is clear now up. The essential thing is to dress the ores in such a way that they can be smelted. This point is

debatable. The silicic acid content is causing difficulties. It is calculated that the pig-iron would cost from 20 to 24 mark more per ton, but that must be overlooked in case of emergency. All measures must be prepared in such a way that we relieve our foreign exchange situation and are prepared in the event of war.

General Director

FLICK: Agrees with this, but points out that the problem is primarily a question of costs. The whole subject is not a short-term program. A perceptible relief cannot be expected for about 1 1/2 to 2 years.

(Page 33 of original)

Dr. SEHLIG-
WOLFF: Adds that it is not only a technical-economic question, but that we are obtaining national reserves with these ores, as for instance the manganese deposits in Siegerland. They should only be worked insofar as is absolutely necessary.

Min. Pres.
GOERING: Agrees with this. The important thing is to make it possible to convert to domestic production and smelting in the event of "Case A" (Fall-A).

Economic
Commissioner
KIEHLER: Shares Chief Mining Superintendent SCHLUTTMAN's opinion that we can make ourselves self-sufficient in zinc. He refers to the fact that the Salzgitter and Deger ores constitute a reserve of 3 millions tons.

Min. Pres.
GOERING: A program lasting several years is of no use for the case "A". The fall in the currency of our ore suppliers has made the prices about 30% cheaper as against peace. What is necessary in connection with our ores is not to confine ourselves to small experiments but to pass over to large-scale operations, otherwise we will not have any production reserves in the event of "Case A" (A-FALL).

He agrees with Dr. SEHLIG-WOLFF that the Salzgitter and Deger ores should be worked first of all, while saving the manganese deposits.

Min. Pres.
GOERING: Closes the meeting; and thanks the gentlemen for their participation.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, John HOLIFSON, AGO X-046350, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. FI-5330.

15 April 1947

JOHN HOLIFSON,
AGO X-046350.

E F D

3a

ERRATA SHEET

Page 5 of translation (page 6 of original) of Document No. NI 5380
should read:

Domestic production

1934 Straw-flax 27 :00 t - 5 400 t long fibre and tow
1936 " " 200 000 t -40 000 t " " " "

Page 13 of translation (page 15 of original) of Document No. NI-5380
should read:

Domestic Production per Month

	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u> (approx.)
light motor fuel: 59 000 t		75 000 t	100 000 t	133 000 t
in % of total				
consumption	40%	45%	50%	62%

Page 14 of translation (page 17 of original) of Document NO. NI-5380
2nd paragraph of translation last sentence was omitted and should read:

The basic material is available in unlimited quantities.

Errata sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. HOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. A-444412

- END -

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(page 1 of original)

Financing of the armament

The following explanations take as their premise the fact, that the execution of the armament program is by its speed and extent the mission of German policy, that everything else therefore must be subordinated to this purpose, unless the neglect of other questions would endanger the main goal. Even after 16 March 1935, the difficulty continues to exist, that one cannot attempt the influencing of the German people by propaganda for support of the armament, without endangering internationally our position. The financing of the armament program, already almost impossible, is being made especially difficult by that.

Further, another prerequisite must be presented. The printing press can only be used for the financing of armament to the extent which the maintenance of money value allows. Each inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials, and increases the prices within the country; thus it is a snake, which bites its tail. The fact that our armament had to be camouflaged completely until 16 March 1935, and for the biggest part even afterwards, has led to that, that the printing press has already been made use of at the start of the armament program; whereas it would have been natural to put it at the final point of the financing. Of the 3775 millions in the portfolio of the Reichsbank plus 244 millions set aside in bills of exchange - total of 4019 millions, the bills of exchange to finance armament represent 3374 millions (status of 30 April 1935). The Reichsbank has invested most of the German war sums, available to its administration and belonging to foreigners, in armament bills of exchange. Thus our armament has partly financed with the property of our political opponents. Also used for the financing of the armament program were the 500 millions RM, which came together through the Reich loan placed at the savings banks in Jan 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the armed forces: fiscal year 1933/34 RM 75 millions, fiscal year 1934/35 RM 110 millions, fiscal year 1935/36 RM 250 millions.

The sum of the deficits of the budgets increased since 1928, according to the estimate 1935/36, up to 5 to 6 billions RM. At present this total deficit is already being financed by short-term credits from the money market. Thus it already burdens in this amount the possibilities of use of the public market for armament. The Reich Minister of Finance is justified in saying in his budget explanations: "Since an annual deficit..... is an impossibility permanently, since one cannot count with certainty on an increased tax income, covering the deficit and other previous debts; since on the other hand only balanced budget offers a secure basis for our great future task in the armament policy, fundamentally and consciously a budget policy must be followed, which will solve the problem of financing of armament by organic and planned decrease of other expenses, not only from the point of view of income, but also of expenses, that means saving."

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-15
----- cont'd. -----

(page 1 of original, cont'd.)

How urgent this demand is can further be construed from the fact that an unending number of tasks were attacked and are in the process of execution by state and party, all of which cannot be covered by the budget but by subscriptions and credits, which must be raised besides the regular taxes by business. This simultaneous existence of various budgets, which however all serve a more or less public purpose, present the greatest obstacle to the gaining of a clear picture of the financing possibilities of armament. A whole series of ministries and numerous agencies of the party have their own budget in addition to their share of the Reich budget, and thus accordingly income and expense possibilities, which, although they are based on the financial sovereignty of the state, are not subordinated to the control of the Minister of Finance and thus also not to the control of the cabinet, exactly

(page 2 of original)

as in the field of politics, the too far reaching delegation of legislative authority to individuals in Germany has led to the condition of many states within the state, thus the condition of parallelism and divergence (Nebeneinander and Gegeneinander) of numerous state and party agencies has absolutely a disastrous effect on the financing possibility of armament. If in this field, no concentration and no unified control is introduced finally, one must fear the worst for the solution of the almost impossible task of financing of armament.

Thus the following tasks result:

- 1) A commissioner must at first determine all sources and incomes, which are derived from Reich, State and Party funds, as well as from profits of public or party enterprises.
- 2) Then, a commission, appointed by the FUERER must investigate how these funds were used up to now, and how much can be taken from these funds in the future from their present purpose, and made available to the financing of armament.
- 3) The same commission has to examine the assets of all public and official party organizations, how the assets have been invested, and to what extent these assets can be utilized for the financing of armament.
- 4) The Reichsministry of Finance is to be commissioned to investigate the possibilities of an increased tax income by the introduction of new taxes or the increase of existing tax rates.

The financing of armament previously by the Reich Bank was a necessity under the existing political conditions, and the political success has proved the correctness of this action. However now, other methods of financing of armament must be attempted under all conditions. With that, all not absolutely necessary expenses in other fields must be refrained from, and the entire, actually small, financial power of Germany must be concentrated on this one goal, the financing of armament. Whether the financial problem will succeed with this method of approach, is as yet doubtful, but without such concentration it will fail with certainty.

(page 3 of original.)

Memorandum

9.III.1936

on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht.

The simultaneous throttling and blocking of foreign sources of liquid fuel has caused an increasingly critical situation of supply of the German market since the beginning of the year 1936.

This situation calls for a description of the serious effects on the preparedness for action of the Wehrmacht and of the extraordinary measures which necessitate a decision in this matter.

The supply of the Wehrmacht is based on the home production, the reserves which can be made available in case of mobilization and the foreign imports which still for some time must fill the present gaps of supply.

I. The German production.

The anticipating measures taken during the last 2 years by the Reich Cabinet to increase the home production of fuel, will not bring about an essential improvement of the supply situation during the current year because of the time required for factory construction and the uninterrupted increase of demand, but cannot bring an appreciable relief until the year 1938. The list in enclosure I of the requirements in case of mobilization and of the supply of these requirements by production, as well as the graphs added to the other enclosures, show the influence to be expected from the German production on the entire supply.

The expanding German production favors mainly light fuels, especially fuel for airplanes, and in addition, oil for airplane engines. As to the other kinds required by the Wehrmacht in case of war, we cannot expect any improvement for the time being; as to heating oils it may be anticipated that the situation will deteriorate. The development of new processes (Ube and Lott), the extent of which will shortly permit an opinion, offers certain possibilities of auxiliary supply which do not appear on the graphs, because the extent of the production possible until 1938 cannot yet be foreseen.

The inadequacy of the supply on the basis of home production is a fact which cannot be eliminated during the next 2 - 3 years, even with the greatest efforts and in spite of the planning started for additional expansion of production.

II. RESERVES.

To assure the requirements of the Wehrmacht it becomes necessary to bridge the supply gaps by reserves. For the first period of mobilization the Wehrmacht relies on the reserves of business, especially of great importing corporations, which also in peace time consider stored reserves for about 3 months as indispensable for smooth distribution.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS 1301-PS
cont'd.

(page 3 of original, cont'd.)

The Wehrmacht ought to be enabled to count on the amount of these reserves remaining constant.

Beyond that the Wehrmacht accumulates its own reserves in large storage houses so that considerable national reserves will be available as buffers in case of supply difficulties.

III. Dependence of the overall supply on imports.

The obstacles to importing encountered to a large extent during the last weeks, and which have been brought about by an accumulation of economic-political events in foreign trade.

(page 4 of original.)

endanger not only the maintenance of industrial reserves but also the continuation of the storage policy of the Wehrmacht. They shake the very foundations of the motorization program of industry and consequently also of Wehrmacht mobilization of mechanized vehicles to the extent planned for the case of war.

In particular large gaps have been opened:

- 1) due to the Russian prohibition of exporting petroleum, by which the benzol-association supplying about 20% of the German market got into considerable difficulties.
- 2) due to suddenly considerably increased demands of the Rumanians who offer fuel only in exchange for foreign bills proper (Bardevison) and/or at greatly increased prices in marks. The contribution of Rumanian imports to the supply of German requirements was 40 % during the last year. The firm Alex which contributes 11 % to the German market has already been forced, due to the obstruction of Rumanian deliveries, to decrease its business considerably and will face a close-down of its market supply if relief is not procured before June 1936. Due to this reduction of imports similar stoppages are to be expected by the other great organizations of distribution during the same period.

IV. Means to secure the supply.

In considering how to meet the situation the following devices are unbearable for the Wehrmacht:

- 1) Reduction of mechanized traffic because this would, in addition to precarious economic and psychological effects, bring about a throttling of German motorization, which in view of the requirements of the Wehrmacht in case of war, would be a shock to mobility and supply of replacements.
- 2) Just as undesirable is to be considered the diminishing of reserves. The industrial reserves constitute the basis for mobilization, which has to rely on firm figures which remain about constant. As a decrease of reserves has already started, the further development in this direction is to be counteracted immediately. Aid from the reserves of the Wehrmacht cannot be granted because these modest quantities being ultimate reserves cannot be diminished under any circumstances.

Consequently, only the following means are to be considered:

- 1) Conceding to the Rumanian demands of paying imports in marks on a considerably raised price-basis.
- 2) Additional payments in foreign bills proper (Bardevison) of imports from Anglo-Saxon countries.
- 3) Investigation to what extent an improvement can be achieved by accelerating or expanding the facilities for German production.

The first course has been followed by the authorization to negotiate new contracts on the basis of the Rumanian demands. Adequate and punctual delivery to the market,

(page 4 of original, cont'd.)

however, is not yet assured hereby.

Re.2.) Foreign bills (Devisen) for the minimum of the indispensable import requirements can probably be obtained only by reduction of import of other necessities. The narrow limits of the presently assured raw materials for armament do not allow for a decrease of such imports which are indispensable for the Wehrmacht. In particular we cannot do without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wehrmacht for current procurements.

Re. 3.) As a result of investigations made, essential changes cannot be expected at a date within sight.

(page 5 of original.)

V. Uniform management of the petroleum industry.

During the last few months the Wehrmacht has repeatedly emphasized the unavoidable call for a uniform and planned steering of the entire German petroleum industry. The present dangerous situation of the German fuel industry puts this necessity again into the spotlight. The lack of stern guidance in the present moment must lead to severest damages to the public and the defense of the country. The duty of a management according to plans of the petroleum industry must be in the first line to avert the permanent threat to mechanized traffic and the preparedness of the Wehrmacht for action lying in the extensive dependency on forces outside of the German sphere of control.

Enclosure 1 to "Memorandum on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the 'Schmecht'" of 9 March 36.

	Req. requirements		Supply of requirements by production	
	1936 t/Jahr	1938 t/Jahr	1936 %	1938 %
Light fuels for car engines	9.00 000	1 530 000	43	41.5
Light fuels for airplane engines	11 460 000	600 000	39	61.5
(ill-ible), Fuel oil	670 000	1 260 000	11,6	22
Heating oil	8.0 000	1 200 000	30.6	22
Lubrication oil for car engines	20 000	150 000	22.5	23
Lubricating oil for airplane engines	33 000	55 000	-	22

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-FS
cont'd.

(page 6 of original.)

IIIc Needed raw materials 4/28/1936
(with consideration of the program for the supply of
ammunition, amounting to 300 million marks (Mil.R.M.)
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937 - 12 months)

supply needed, submitted to
G. i. Min. (letter of 1/13/36)

copper	547	t/month	(without plate VIII)
lead	2330	t/month	" " "
zinc	3100	t/month	" " "

supply needed, considering the 200 Mil.-plan.

copper	5850	t/month	(without plate VIII)
lead	3350	t/month	" " "
zinc	4220	t/month	" " "

Therefore the additional need amounts to

copper	450	t/month
lead	1020	t/month
zinc	920	t/month

Raw materials needed by parts of the Armed Forces
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937)

copper	4530	470	175	175	5250
lead	2750	280	300	20	3350
zinc	2420	160	240	1180	4000

Secret

Raw materials needed by the armed
forces during the years 1935 and 1936

<u>raw materials</u>	<u>need. 1935</u>	<u>t/month 1935</u>
<u>Iron and steel</u>		
Iron ore Fe	13	20
manganese ore Mn	7	4
chromium	5 G	30
	5 G	86
wolfram		15
niobium		8
vanadium		1
tantalum		0.5
silicon	4.3	250
<u>Non-iron metals</u>		
copper	7 500 1)	4 470
lead	6 500 2)	3 580
nickel	275	174
tin	150	37
zinc	3 100 3)	1 830
aluminum	2 720	1 900
antimony	55	25
cadmium	10	0,62
mercury	20	12
cobalt	10	3

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TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
cont'd.

(page 6 of original, cont'd.)

Note: 1) for cables 2100 t/month; starting on 1 Apr.36
possibly only 6000 t/month, including 2100 t/
for cables;

(page 7 of original,)

Note: 2) for cables 4200 t/month; starting 1 Apr.36 7800
t/month which means 5800 t/month for cables;

3) from this amount: sheet-zinc in the limits
of the quota of the Association of zinc-
rolling-mills 340 t/month; starting 1 Apr.36
possibly only 2700 t/month including
sheet-zinc.

<u>Raw materials</u>	<u>need. 1936</u>	<u>t/month 1935</u>
<u>Leather goods (economy)</u>		
skins and pelts	1 300	1 400
natural tanning matter	800	850
<u>wood</u>		
special foreign timber	170	15
<u>grain, fodder & further</u> <u>agricultural products</u>		
linseed	1 500	1 900
<u>coal and salt</u>		
of these: 1500 t/month to produce the aluminum needed by the armed forces.		
oil coke (and pitch coke)	1 700	1 300
<u>various goods</u>		
diamonds, amounting to 1/2		
value of RM. 15 000/month		11 000 RM
cumc	200	160
wine	10	15
magnesite	1 200	1 000
<u>rubber and asbestos</u>		
rubber	250	150
asbestos (asbestos)	100	70
<u>fat for industrial purposes</u>		
glycerine	165	120
<u>petroleum oils</u>		
gas for plant engines	7 000	4 000
light fuel for motor vehicles		
	3 000	1 500
lubrication oil f. plant engines	700	200
lubrication oil f. motor vehicles	500	150
gas-oil, (diesel)	7 500	1 200
heating oil	15 000	4 000

	Fuel for motor- ized vehicles	Fuel for airplanes	Gas-oil for naval	Situation w/o fuel		Oil for motor vehicles	Oil for air- plane engines
	Index cost of fuel	Index cost of fuel	Index cost of fuel	Index cost of fuel	Index cost of fuel	Index cost of fuel	Index cost of fuel
Total need of the U.S. and foreign t/year	36 30 145,000	36 30 80,000	36 30 130,000	36 30 50,000	36 30 150,000	36 30 50,000	36 30 15,000
Production in entire Reich-territory t/year	100,000	100,000	200,000	200,000	10,000	--	--
Missing quantity t/year	110,000	50,000	130,000	200,000	55,000	50,000	1,000
New planning	700,000	500,000	700,000	?	10,000	10,000	10,000

4/1

PAGE 9

Berlin, 19 May 1938

Copy

Prime Minister General (Generaloberst) Goering
Raw material and Foreign exchange staff
Top secret
To the Reichsminister of war
Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg

Enclosed, a record of the conference of the council of ministers of 12 May 1936 in the afternoon is forwarded.

By order
/s/Loeb
Lt. Col. in the General Staff

Top Secret

Record
of the council of ministers on 12 May 1936 1700 hours

Chairman: Prime Minister General GOERING
Reichsminister of War Generalfeldmarschall von BLOMBERG.
Reichsbank President and acting Reich and Prussian-
minister for Economy Dr. SCHACHT.
Reichsminister of Finance Graf Schwerin von KROSICK
Prussian minister of Finance Prof. POPITZ
as the recording secretary Lt. Col. in the General Staff LOEB

Minister Schacht: shows the development up to now when two years ago, the decision for rearmament was made, it was decided to carry out the financing mainly outside the means of the Reichsministry of Finance. This meant the commitment of the last reserve from the very beginning. A decision which did not seem without hazards. The memorandum of 3 May 1936 says the same thing.

In the course of the last two years, the program was increased more and more in its extent and speed. Thus the requirements to the Reichsbank were increased steadily. It would be necessary to create, as basis for financing, a steady, prosperous economy, and therefore renounce the execution of other, partially irrational ideas and aims of the party. The psychological prerequisite was not disturbed by the party as such, but by many individual groups of the party, again and again: personal attacks against Dr. Schacht and thus against the economy followed. Dr. Schacht has emphasized again and again, that one must follow a cultural and legal policy, which will leave economy alone. However one must not describe it as greedy and selfish from the beginning.

Also money theories of the most variable kind have been published repeatedly, thus causing anxiety for the economy; to counteract this was practically impossible, as the propaganda machine of the party did not permit this. Despite all this, Dr. Schacht continued to work, because he stands with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he fully recognizes the basic idea of national socialism and because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be considered irrelevant. Previously, approximately 11 billions marks besides the budget have been raised for rearmament and reemployment without shaking

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1301-PS

----- continued -----

the ratio of exchange and currency; the rate of interest could be lowered.

The Fuehrer has repeatedly emphasized in personal talks and cabinet meetings, that the speed of rearmament must be kept up until the spring of 1936. This was agreed to and carried out.

Prime Minister Goring: has never heard about this time limitation.

Minister Schacht: The main question for the further execution of the program is how much money can be gotten out of business. Some 2 billion can be consolidated annually by long term loans; 8 to 9 billion cannot be asked for; the possibility of making.

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available depends on the development of the money market. Full concentration of the money through the Reichsbank is necessary.

If the Reichsbank should have to issue more notes than could be born by the currency, one must reach back to other factors.

Dr. Schacht will never be part to an inflation; the Fuehrer also has decided in this sense. The danger of such a development is imminent. If a road is to be taken, which contains this danger, Dr. Schacht would like to drop out on time, so that he does not disturb the new course.

Dr. Schacht considers it impossible, that prices can be fixed by the state, if the same money policy is continued.

Prime Minister Goering: What is the basis of currency with the Reichsbank.

Minister Schacht: This question has nothing to do with the gold standard. It is a question of something ineluctable, to recognize the time of which must be left up to a fine sensitivity. If by a surplus of money, the danger of devaluation of the mark exists, the state can and must take action from the financial side by taxes etc. Considering the material factor, it must be determined, that we are dependent for numerous goods on foreign countries. Even small percentages as a whole have considerable effect. In many cases, the necessity for import is caused by trade political relations; therefore the raw material situation may not only be viewed and attacked from the production within Germany. The foreign relations must not be decreased all of a sudden. For instance the negotiations with Canada and Brazil were carried out on this basis.

Prime Minister Goering: When substitutes (ersatzstoffe) are sufficient in quantity, we shall no longer need the import, which presents us such difficulties.

Minister Schacht: In a series of cases, to be able to carry out the import, work from within Germany was utilized for compensation, for instance tankers for oil import corporations.

However it is especially required that nothing be said about intentions and measures of this field in public, so as not to aggravate the importers.

Prime Minister Goering: If the Fuehrer has expressed himself in this direction, he did it to counteract the increasing pessimism in the country in respect to this field.

Minister Schacht: In any case, all anxiety must be prevented. Foreign exporters have already shown less readiness to deliver against certificates of foreign exchange, since they apparently have no more confidence in the cashing of these certificates.

Prime Minister Goering: Our raw material situation is generally known to the world. The article published in the papers on 25 April 1936 did not contain anything secret. Actually the confidence abroad should have been increased by this publication, because generally the opinion was held

abroad, that Dr. Schacht was protected by the Prime Minister against the party.

Minister Schacht: The situation at present is thus:
Some 64 million marks are already claimed by reimbursement. He must buy especially crude rubber and textiles; we have practically no crude rubber. Cellulose wool is not an adequate substitute, especially not for export goods. The necessity for the closing down of manufacturing plants will soon result from this accordingly.
It must be decided whether the available gold should be all spent at the present speed or whether it should already be slowed down.
Swedish Ores are still available for about 3 months. The export to Sweden becomes more difficult, and thus the import possibilities decrease.

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Prime Minister Goerring: is of the opinion that our export to Sweden continues, so that one can further count on import.

Minister Schacht: The raw material supply of Germany amounted at the beginning of the war to a value of about 7 to 8 billions; now it is less than 1 billion.

Prime Minister Goerring: has heard repeatedly, that export business was refused by the Reichsminister for Economy. In the future, the departments will be caused by him to re-examine our overrecess; perhaps then it will work differently than until now.

Minister Schacht: Increase of our export appears improbable in the near future. Further obligations arise through the Foreign Office, the Reichsbank, Post Office, Navy and other agencies; soon the consular service cannot be paid any more.

The time will come, when we will have no longer any reserves of either raw materials or foreign exchange at our disposal.

Prime Minister Goerring: If we have war to-morrow, we must help ourselves by improvisation. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case, then we must be ready to create the pre-requisites for that in peace. The accountant described could have also been presented, in his opinion, in the meeting this morning.

Minister Schacht: Publication is recommended for only the smallest circle.

Prime Minister Goerring: It is necessary to inform the people, required or the exception.

Minister Schacht: In his opinion only the ministers, not the state secretaries. In addition, each department must be called in individually.

Prime Minister Goerring: The psychological pre-requisites for the correct approach to the work must be created everywhere. The actual work is done by the state secretaries and the experts. In the future one must go much more into detail; confidence in the workers employed in this is absolutely necessary.

Prime Minister Goerring: summarizes the explanation of Minister Schacht: in short, demands on the raw material can no longer be covered; only 54 million marks are still available.

Minister Schacht: declares that besides these 54 million Reichsmarks in the private banks, there are about 72 million left with the Reichsbank.

Prime Minister Goerring: continues with the summary:

The shortage of raw material is known in its extent. A considerable increase is no longer possible, in the opinion of Minister Schacht.

Minister Schacht: The production of raw materials within Germany gives the limitation there, when an increase of prices of export goods creates it.

Prime Minister Goerring: One can separate requirements within Germany and export. Even the smallest details are important. The following appears necessary:

PAGE 11 Cont'd

- 1) Increase of export despite all difficulties.
- 2) The raw material coverage within Germany.
- 3) The possibly necessary resettlement of workers and food fundamentals for the execution of all measures.

These problems all affect each other, so that the participation of all departments is necessary.

Appropriate example: Position of the farmer, who does not utilize the available possibility of intensification of fertilizing, because the capital lost is not bearable for him in case of bad harvests. In such a case, the risk lying with the weather must be partially taken from the farmer by a special organization.

The Reich Ministry of Finance must also be consulted greatly in reference to the regular budget, re-allocating a thirdness in all fields belongs to this program.

Minister Poser: The final conclusions made by Dr. Seyditz are clear and convincing, under the condition that the bases for these conclusions are correct. That

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must be examined. It must be determined again, whether the principles, according to which the present raw material and foreign currency policy has been carried out with such a big success, are unalterable and correct.

The time when warheads and inflation is feared is unclear; actually it is already here, even if it has a bearable extent.

An increase of export cannot be expected with the present system. However it is to be examined, whether there is not a better system. The basis of the present economic policy is deflationary. However it appears impossible to integrate the deflation into an actually existing inflation. It must be discussed whether forced economy of export is to be continued.

It is to be examined further, whether the power for rearrangement can be drawn out from the remaining economy. In no case can the condition arise, that the Reichminister for Finance and the Reichminister for Economy with the responsibility for the providing of funds to each other.

The difference between 2 billion Reichsmarks, which the Reichsbank believes to be able to raise on a long-term basis, and the 8 to 9 billion Reichsmarks required for current needs, cannot be covered by taxes. Therefore the following suggestions:

- 1) The raw material situation, which can be solved comparatively simply, must be attended to at once by a special committee.
- 2) Ill-considered criticism of the export situation, as to be in a scientific manner.

Minister for Finance: Economy of foreign exchange in detail is necessary. In fact, small things that have a part. Small saving is necessary in expenditures within Germany. In contrast to Minister Forster, he is of the opinion that measures for saving must be taken over more and more by the national budget. Expenses above this budget are to be covered.

- a) long-term consolidation of currency and 2 billion marks.
- b) to short-term bills of exchange and similarly.

The financing has succeeded up to now by these two means.

However for the future, the short-term bills of exchange are no longer to be negotiated, so that floating of the Reichsbank with 1000 bills will show an increased printing of banknotes as consequence.

Minister Forster: In fact, printing of bank notes is only necessary if the money is absolutely necessary for payment of wages among other unavoidable things.

Minister for Finance: The decisive question for that is, whether inflation would actually become a printing of banknotes to this extent. He does not believe so. The inflation of prices observed so far was not caused by monetary reasons, but can be limited from increase of prices for raw materials and agricultural products. That can cause a great deal of inflation.

Prime Minister Goebbels: does not believe that so inflation would happen from the monetary side.

Reserves which in a state with a parliamentary government would probably bring about inflation, do not have to have the same results in a totalitarian state.

Important for this is the application of an appropriate propaganda, so that the co-operation of the propaganda minister, organized by the Fuehrer, is of great importance.

PAGE 13 cont'd

Minister Schmidt: gives a summary of the holdings of bills of exchange in the Reichsbank at present:

4,383,000,000.-- bills of exchange

3,731,000,000.-- of which are in 15 bills of exchange

3,200,000,000.-- 1170 bills of exchange are deposited in clearing accounts. More than 5 billions in bills of exchange are deposited thus, that they can be presented immediately in case of disturbances of the money market, caused by any measure.

Therefore any disturbance must be prevented under all conditions.

Prime Minister Goering: agrees to be the "shield" for the measure of financial reform, so that no disturbances would happen.

The regular budget is to take over the current expenses of the armed forces, but not the costs of the reconstruction.

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Minister Lohse: It is to be examined whether the regular budget cannot be relieved from interests and amortization quotas of advance drawings. Even the observing of the international bank law cannot prevent the using of these recognized necessary measures in this direction.

If the economy is started by increased export, naturally the circulation of money will increase and with that the possibility of further financing.

If the money, which had to be put into circulation, is only used for payment of wages, no inflation can take place.

Prime Minister Goring: orders:

- 1) Determination as rapidly as possible of the basis of payment.
- 2) Beginning of the execution work in the realm of raw material production within Germany.
- 3) Examination of the question of the export system.

In the next conference, contemplated for Friday afternoon, the examination of the export system is to take place.

First under his chairmanship (Goring's) the ministers Dr. Brüning, Graf Helldorf, von Helldorf and Prof. Dr. Lohse will consult each other. Then, immediately thereafter, the suggestions voiced there are to be discussed by a board of experts. The following were named for this board:

By Minister Scheidt:

Reichsbank Director Adolph
Reichsbank Director Hilbert
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schmidt

By Minister von Blomberg:

Dr. Hildebrandt

By Minister Lohse:

Dr. Hilgert
Dr. Schmidt

Further

Reg. Bürgermeister Hilgert
Prof. Hilgert

and others, who will be appointed by the Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Goring: states that he can expect and demand discipline from the party, so that the protection of the individual auditor, called, is guaranteed.

Close of the conference: 1910.

Summary of the Two Related Situations

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Item	Quantity	Unit Price	Total	Remarks
Total requirement for the above items	1000	1.00	1000.00	
Less: Inventory on hand	500	1.00	500.00	
Net requirement	500	1.00	500.00	
Estimated cost			500.00	
Actual cost			500.00	
Variance			0.00	

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
cont'd.

(page 15 of original.)

Prime Minister General Goering
Raw Material and Foreign Exchange Staff
Berlin, 30 May 1936
Bohrstr. 68-70
Telephon 4 20043

Journal No. /36 (initial) BG th 2/6
(initial)

Rubber Stamp
Top Secret

To the

Reichminister of War
Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg

Berlin

Enclosed, a report of the conference of the council of ministers of 27 May 1936, is forwarded.

By Order
L.S.
Lt. Col. in the General Staff

1 Inclosure:

Top Secret

Copy of meeting of Minister on 27 May 36,
at 1130 o'clock.

Chairman: Ministerpräsident Generaloberst Goering;
Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Reichsbankpräsident und kommissarischer Reichs- und
Preussischer Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Schacht
Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Preussischer Finanzminister Prof. Dr. Lohse
Recording Secretary: Lt. Col. in the General Staff Loh

Prime Minister Goering: The two sessions of the board of experts held so far have brought forth interesting discussions. Naturally, opinions frequently disagree. The experts are invited to state their concepts in writing.

Today, discussion concerning the question of substitute material. What objections are made to the production of war raw materials within the Reich?

Minister Schacht: Principally there is nothing to object; a solution of the raw material problem by self-producing is absolutely necessary and agreed with, theoretically.

Difficulties are encountered with regard to:

1) serious monetary strain because of investments. Providing money by taxing capital is impossible. Circulation of money can not be increased beyond a certain amount. Previous measures executed correctly and without danger to monetary value. Further increase seems precarious; matter of confidence. This point of view alone, however, not determining; possible that funds could be drawn from industrial profits.

2) special scruples, regarding the cases where prices for substitute (Ersatz) material are far beyond world-

(page 15 of original, cont'd).

market prices, and therefore the products cannot compete. (for example: tires made from Buna). Adjustment would further increase the excise tax on exports. Inflation cannot be chosen, as this would immediately upset the state's budget.

It must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany which are economically favorable; for other raw materials ready reserves for the case of mobilization (Schacht). Especially clear is the situation of flax; the complete covering of the requirement is possible; however not with hemp.

Certain raw materials for war must be stocked.

These viewpoints are recognized and followed by the Reich ministry for Economy. The execution is mainly dependent on the question of funds. Therefore, necessity to save in all fields, to make saved funds available for investment.

Prime Minister Goerring: All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured wage of war.

Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in peace in certain

(page 16 of original.)

amounts.

It is to be attempted to use cheap imported raw materials for export purposes, expensive raw materials from within Germany. In cases where the price differences are small, probably creation of a settlement is preferred.

Minister Schacht: This settlement can be carried out either by compulsory fixing or by a price settlement by the state of the expensive raw materials.

In any case, price supervision must be introduced again.

Minister Lipitz: Fixing of the burden of increased prices on the consumer is possible when the difference is only small.

The other possible method is sales monopoly or wholesale monopoly of certain goods.

Minister Schacht: It is recommendable not to influence individual, large fields, for instance textiles, by prices; but to concentrate funds for the monetary substitution of other fields of raw materials.

Minister von Krosigk: The question cannot generally be judged theoretically, but only practically with the use of individual examples.

Prime Minister Goerring: At first, the specially urgent petroleum question is to be treated.

General agreement to that.

Minister von Krosigk: Present experience is that the beginning of new methods of sale or price guarantee by the Reich results thus, that soon now and cheaper production methods are found. This recommends a not too

(page 16 of original, cont'd.)

sudden expansion of production.

Prime Minister Goerring: Waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. Plan of the Reich forestry office for the utilization of wood is ready. Import of timber must be cut down in any case; strongest demands on German forests to be preferred at present and can be advocated.

It is to be decided, whether at the beginning, a risk bonus over 6% profit is to be granted.

Minister Schacht: turns against higher profits than 6%.

Guarantee of interest-bearing is to be preferred, and must be sufficient.

Minister von Krosigk: discusses the advantages of the amortization program.

Minister von Peritz: In contracts many times rapid cancellation is contemplated.

Minister Schacht: At the beginning more consideration is recommended, later stronger concentration, with profit sharing by the Reich.

Minister Peritz: requests that the cancellation periods be re-examined by a special committee.

Prime Minister Goerring: The summary is to be prepared for the next committee meeting about:

- 1) Inventory of German Raw Material possibilities.
- 2) Form of the present Goerdecree.
- 3) Mobilization requirement.
- 4) How shall raw materials be handled? Especially clarifications whether production within Germany is to start already in peace or whether the stocking of reserves is more important.

Subject of petroleum also can be considered concluded, therefore is to be handled immediately.

In the next council of Ministers, discussion of the agricultural question, when Minister Lamm and State Secretary Backe present.

Minister von Blomberg: In the fuel industry it is to be decided whether conversion to solid fuels should already be carried out in peace, or whether, as in France, it is to be prepared for the mobilization case. If possible and recommendable, increased use of tar coke (Schwelkok), no diesel oil for railroads.

(page 17 of original)

Prime Minister Goerring: Economy also absolutely necessary and to be insisted on in other fields of raw materials.

Minister von Blomberg: Examines as an example substitution of heavy metal by light metal (for instance cans of aluminum): general increase of the use of glass, especially for aerial bombs, maybe also for grenades; use of plastics for wire fields, even as far as transmissions. Certain hopes can be set on China.

Therefore prevent political estrangement. Careful advances in the approaching of Japan necessary, at present the recognition of Manchukuo would be disastrous for Mr. Klein's current plans in China.

Prime

(Page 17 of original cont'd)

Prime Minister Goring: Common front of China with Japan against Soviet Russia can probably be produced.

(in green pencil) I did not express myself so specifically in/

Minister von Helldorf: Japan is doubtful as a factor of military power.

Prime Minister Goring: Furthermore, the danger of Japan's turnabout always exists.

Results of the China affair cannot be viewed clearly because of the unclear inner political situation.

Minister Schacht: Always has supported the attempts of Mr. Klein, because he especially hopes for food raw materials from China.

Minister von Helldorf: recommends further collaboration with the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft, with whom the Reich Ministry of War had very good experiences. At its head is the scientific authority; other imminent changes for solution proposed by the party unbearable.

Minister Gutz: Resignation of Geheimrat Bosch is possible for this post, when his resignation from the IG is possible.

Minister Schacht: General complaints about the deterioration of German science; this is also harmful for export, since the missing replacement limits the execution of German engineering missions abroad and thus German orders from abroad.

Minister Gutz: Seconded these complaints. Actions by the party which remove the most important people is unbearable. Explanation by examples.

In the liberal arts, the consequences are not being felt immediately; all the more so in the natural sciences. If service etc. should be limited to the first two semesters of study, then full time and freedom for scientific activity.

Prime Minister Goring: In Russia then, difficulties are partially removed. Influence of the liaison staff not always fortunate. Role of Professor Wagner.

Gets to discussion a taking over of a Spanish tin source, which is being offered from the Swedish side.

Minister Schacht: Basically in agreement, particularly when in a partnership enterprise German achievements will result by deliveries of machines.

Prime Minister Goring: Asks Minister Schacht to conduct negotiations in this spirit during his visit in Belgrade relative to Yugoslavia in the near future.

Minister Schacht: the copper mining in Yugoslavia must take place by excluding the French, who sell copper for foreign exchange only.

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(page 17 of original, cont'd).

Prime Minister Goering: During the next ministerial session, the investigation of the problems in the agricultural sector has to be conducted in such a way that direct statements of Minister Schacht/Minister Darré should be made about the single problematic issues.

End of the session 13 o'clock.

Fuel-supply Situation
(1st draft of a plan for solution / 27 May 1936)

	Light vehicle fuel Price	cost of fuel	Airplane fuel Price	cost of fuel	Gas oil Price	cost of fuel	Production of fuel	cost of fuel
	36	39	36	39	36	39	36	39
Total requirement Army, Navy and Industry	2,000,000	1,600,000	20,000	60,000	200,000	1,500,000	200,000	1,200,000
Production in the entire Reich in industry tons/year	1	1,300,000				200,000		200,000
Deficit from requirements of mobilization tons/year		50,000				1,080,000		500,000
To be covered by conversion of substitute fuel						200,000		200,000
See survey new plants		950,000				350,000		350,000
Proposal for solution	3 Fischer plants of 300,000 tons each by the end of 1937		4 75-Pott plants of 200,000 tons/ year each by end of 1937		2 Fischer whole Pott or distilling plants of 210,000 tons/year each			
Costs	90 million RM		100 million RM		370 million RM			

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1301-PS
----- Continued -----

Copy of draft

Top Secret

31 August 1936

The Reich Minister and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces

(Gen. R. M. Min. u. Ob. d. M.)

No. 2001/36 Top Secret "H"

4 copies

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Air Ministry

3rd copy - Reich

Ministry for Finances

4th copy - Presi-

dent of the Reichsbank

- 1) To the
Reich Minister of Air and the Supreme
Commander of the Air Forces General Goering
Berlin "H"

Dear General Goering!

The negotiations conducted until now in the
commission for foreign exchange and raw materials which
is under your leadership, have, already shown the neces-
sity of dealing also with the financing of the armed
forces there also. I believe the time has now arrived
that the commission should take up the treatment of
this problem.

In a preparation of such a discussion I suggest
the following:

I. Overstepping of the 1936 budget.

It has been proven, particularly from the decree
issued 7 March 1936, that the sum of about 30 billions
of M which was provided for the Wehrmacht for 1936
is not sufficient.

1. Additional expenses in the army are needed in
first place by

- a) the remilitarizing of the Rhineland
- b) the fortification of the Rhineland
- c) the setting up of all the 36 divisions
already by 1 Oct 1936
- d) the speeding-up of motorization, particu-
larly the establishment of 4 fully motorized
infantry divisions.
- e) the necessity of markedly increasing the
reserve ammunition because of the increased
number of divisions.
- f) industrial preparations in a great variety
of fields

2. In the navy the required faster increase of personnel, the building of a 4th entry to Wilhelmshaven and the rearmament of Helgoland cause additional expenses.

3. Air Force

a) According to an order of the Fuehrer, the setting up of all-air force units has to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936 which at the time when the budget for 1936 was made, were planned for later years only. Special additional expenses are caused by the creation of sufficient ground force personnel.

b) In the air force the first introduction of new types has to take place in 1937. Therefore the required industrial preparations have to begin in 1936.

It follows that an additional sum of at least 3,8 billions of RM will be needed by the Wehrmacht for 1936.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1301-PS
Continued

Of this about 1 billion RM is allotted to Army and Navy together. In the case of the Army and Navy, the execution of the orders and, in consequence, the deadlines for the payments of the deliveries lagged quite considerably behind the placing of the orders. Therefore it can be assumed that these 1 billion RM will not be needed in cash before 1 Apr. 1937. However, the orders for these 1 billion RM have been placed and in the fiscal year 1937 these 1 billion RM will also be needed in cash.

In the air force the additional expenditures amount to 2500 millions RM. Here the execution of the orders from the budget funds of 1936 as well as of the orders for the additional requirements is in full progress. The 2500 millions RM for the air force have to be made available in the fiscal year 1936.

As yet it cannot be ultimately settled whether the introduction of the two years' service will lead to further additional expenses.

II. Requirements for 1937

The preparatory works for the budget of 1937 have not been concluded. At present the requirements for 1937 are estimated to be for

1. the army	6,5 billions RM
2. the Navy	1,2 billions RM
3. the air force	6,0 billions RM
Total	<u>13,7 billions RM</u>

(Page 20 of original)

Besides these 12.7 billions RM about 600 millions RM will be needed for the Reich defense requirements of the civilian departments.

III. Permanent requirements

According to a recently conducted survey, the component of the armed forces will have the following permanent requirements after the rearmament is completed:

1 Army	8.6 billions RM
2 Navy	3.75 " "
3 Air Force	2.52 " "
	5.607 billions RM

At present it is hardly possible to make an accurate estimate of the permanent requirements. In the case of the Army it is very likely that the amount for the permanent requirement will be considerably raised.

Later I will submit further material, particularly a statement about the requirements for the years until the completion of the rearmament, as soon as the necessary inquiries are concluded.

I submitted copies of this letter to the Reich Minister for Finance, and to the President of the Reichsbank.

Yours,
Heinrich Hitler!

1. To the Reich Minister for Finance

Reichsminister

2. To the President of the Reichsbank Dr. Schmidt

Reichsbankpräsident

Copy (of 1)

For your kind information

4. 11

Chief of the Reichswehr

signed P

Remarks:

1. Dr. P. V. Wolf has given the letter addressed to General Göring to Lt. Col. H. H. H. on 31. Aug.
2. I have personally handed the letters 3 and 4 to the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schmidt, and to the Reich Minister of Finance, Count H. H. H. on Aug. 31.

signed .

Copy retained for
H. H. H.
Ministerial Council
30.8.36.

(Page 21 of original)

initialed 'Homburg')
initialed: X 2/7 (Heitel)

President SCHUBERT called me to his study at 1000 and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War:

Schubert returned from the Fuehrer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program proposed by the Fuehrer.

The Fuehrer wants to speak at the war convention (tentative) about economic policy, and wants to emphasize there, that we now want to get free with all our energy from foreign economic production in Germany.

Schubert requests urgently, that the Reichminister of War warn the Fuehrer from this step.

If the Fuehrer expresses in front of the masses in Germany, he will receive a great amount of applause from the audience, but with it he will bring failure to the entire commercial policy. There is only one thing in our needy position: the production of exports. Export against foreign countries however, will show contrary results.

To have reverses in the field of trade until the middle of next year, there will not be large counts in the field of war or. In the process in the field of trade is having great difficulties.

If we now shoot out our missiles abroad, to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transition period.

Also, it must always be pointed out that foreign materials are at present still too expensive to be used for export, and export plans unless further export possible.

If the foundation of the people is not to be weakened, the Fuehrer must refrain from his plan.

President SCHUBERT concluded, that he again requests urgently to listen to this warning, and that he forwards it to the Minister of War, as he will not participate in the economic conference.

Thema 2/ (in blue pencil)

(Translator's note: the following is written in pencil in the original)
Added in his manuscript:

"The mission will be almost impossible, since there is no more possibility to obtain it by means of export."

English statement-- and the war production is a mess.

4. Export without interference from foreign countries.

Can't file?

Spec of document 1 is ---

"Without of document not sufficient. Backin: for foreign and navy and now principle is absolutely necessary."

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1801 -10
continued

(page 22 of the original)

File No. 100 1801 11 100
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Minutes
of a conference in the Reich Ministry for Economy
on 3 Sept. 1936

Chairman: Ministerialdirektor Sprnow)	Reichsministerium für Wirtschaft und die verwandten Bereiche der Reichsregierung
Present: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Landwehr)	Reichsministerium für Währung und die verwandten Bereiche
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Wittke)	
Generaldirektor Dr. Michels)	
Major General)	Reichsministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forstwirtschaft
Generalmajor)	
Regierungsrat Dr. Wismann)	
Intendanturrat Dr. Wismann)	Reichsministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forstwirtschaft
Dr. Col. Bloch)	Reichsministerium für Luft und Verkehr
Col. Witting)	
Major General)	
Ministerialdirektor Schirmer, continued from last meeting)	only during the conference on economy
Min. Wismann)	

Subject:

- I. Possibilities of allotment of foreign exchange to the armed forces and economy.
- II. Summary report.

1. After extensive study of the connected documents, the Reich Ministry for Economy has agreed the principle that only goods which are essential for the production of goods for foreign exchange should be exported. Therefore and additionally need for foreign exchange should be for the export of the export of 3 million marks with the supervisory board for foreign exchange. Furthermore the allotment of foreign exchange to the armed forces for best fibres must be increased from 10 million marks to 17 million marks.

Intendanturrat Dr. Wismann has reported on the need of the armed forces of textiles and leather in the year 1937, which are increased considerably from the requirements of the year 1936 (see enclosure). To fulfill these armed forces requirements, foreign exchange is necessary in the following amounts:

Group of goods	Additional foreign exchange requirements of armed forces requirements in million of marks
1. Wool	34
Woolen & wool (Woolen)	3
Woolen wool	3.75
2. Silk	0.55
3. Best fibres	0.35
4. Cotton	1
5. Leather	12.5
Total	55.00

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(Page 22 of original- cont'd)

Accordingly, the following overall picture results:
Amount of cash foreign exchange necessary previously for the expenses
of command and for the covering of requirements of the Armed Forces.

500 million marks

Amount of cash foreign exchange necessary for the needs of export.

143 million marks

Additional requirement of cash foreign exchange necessary for the
Armed Forces.

145.6 million marks

Available amount of cash foreign exchange

140 million marks

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II. Aluminum.

Report on the requirements of aluminum of the Armed Forces are contained in the summary given to the Reichsministry for Economy on 29 Aug.

Major Grimsch explained that the Reichsministry of War did not renounce the limitations of the allotments of aluminum to the general industry, as it was said in the letter of the Reichsministry for Economy of 21 Aug 1936, but that the demands for full delivery to the Armed Forces for the programmatic rearmament, especially of the Air Force, will be kept up.

The Reichsministry for Economy considers the full delivery to industry urgently necessary also in the interest of the Armed Forces, since by a 'stranglehold' installations important to the Armed Forces (power issues) would also be affected immediately, and one could therefore count on an increased requirement of copper and thus of foreign exchange.

The administration of aluminum by the supervisory board for base metals is being absolutely refused by the Reichsministry for Economy.

General Director Behrner reports that the negotiations for the import of 1000 tons of aluminum from Switzerland against delivery of German clay and pitchcoke are favorable. Also, the payment of processing taxes is to be done with clay. However, the import of these 1000 tons is distributed over 6 to 7 months.

1000 tons more can be obtained in a comparatively short time from the Aluminum Ltd from Canada. The negotiations for this are still in process.

Behrner reported that the stocks of aluminum in the plants is so high that he, in case the Reichsministry for War should agree to a temporary decrease of the stocks, could guarantee full delivery for both the Armed Forces and industry until the opening of the new plants in Toeging and Bitterfeld.

Lt. Col. Ilgen consents that the stocks be decreased temporarily.

The Reichsministry for Economy orders that the supervisory board for base metals first determine by revision the exact size of the stocks of aluminum for the Duren Metal Works and the combined Light Metal Works (Vereinigte Leichtmetallwerke).

However, if difficulties should arise in the delivery to the Armed Forces with aluminum, then the Reichsministry for Economy is ready to take up negotiations again.

AM (initials in pencil)

Enclosure

Table and further requirements of the Armed Forces

Raw materials	Requirement in the year 1936 in tons	Requirement in the year 1937 in tons	Required additional cash for foreign exchange requirements in millions of marks
sheared wool	7 200	16 152	24
wool scrap (Reisswolle)	1 000	4 900	3
concoings	11	12	-
chair wool	-	260	0,75
wool from tanned hides (Gerbstwolle)	761	1 636	-
silk	23	72	0,5

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1501 - IS
----- CO. 10 -----

(page 23 of original cont'd)

cocoons *	72	72	-
silk yarns *	48	48	-
(*figures by Reichministry for air)			
cotton of which quality	8 600	16 200	-
cotton fortires and shelter halves (-gilt)		about 4 000	4
cotton scraps	560	835	-
artificial silk	310	670	-
cellulose wool	1 080	3 150	-
cleaned flax (Schwingflachs)	3 600	4 800	-
flax scrap	7 070	10 500	-
jute	2 100	2 100	-

(Page 24 of original)

Raw materials	Requirement in the year 1936 in tons	Requirement in the year 1937 in tons	Required add. cash..
soft hemp and hard) fibers)	1 100	1 600	0,25 (**)
of which hard fiber		about 200	(**) for 400 tons soft
black leather	11.000	24 000	hemp and 200 tons
skins for uppers	7 100	13 900	leather and 200 tons
tanned leather		4 100	
leather for soles		9 500	22,5 (***)
			(***) for 22 500 tons
			hides corresponding
			to 11 200 tons leather
Total			15.00

It must be considered in the calculation of the foreign exchange requirements for the upkeep of the export of woolen goods, that the wool industry cannot stand more than a 10% decrease of the present amount, if it is to retain its export capability. Instead of Australian wool, one must reach back to about 50% of the available South-African wool for the exports. The wool available through the limitations of value of the clearing agreement is entirely used for export. The calculated amount of foreign exchange and the most urgent requirement within Germany of 12 million marks only applies under the condition that there are until the end of September still 2 million marks in cash foreign exchange available.

One can count for the requirement of the armed forces on an amount of 10 000 tons raw wool, based on existing agreement. 24 million marks in cash foreign exchange are required for the additional amount of 8 152 tons with the price basis of 3 000 marks per ton.

Insendanturraat Michhoff explained; that a decrease of the demands for quality for the armed forces is no longer desirable. Already 20% cellulose wool is being earmarked for uniform cloths, and a mixing of 30% scrap wool for overcoats.

The amount of foreign exchange of 4 million marks for quality cotton

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(page 24 of original, cont'd.)

is therefore necessary, because one cannot count any more on the hitherto existing compensating transactions--especially with Egypt after circular 237.

The amount of foreign exchange allotted for export of 17 million marks for the supervisory board for best fibres is distributed as follows:

10 million marks for jute
5 " " " Sisal
1 " " " Hemp

The production of hides in Germany is reported as 140 000 tons per year. Even with the basis that the consumption of leather within Germany is decreased to a minimum, the 22 500 ton hide, corresponding to 11 200 tons leather for the Arab horses, can only be procured with cash foreign exchange (22 million marks).

The raw hide requirement is determined individually with consideration for the time required to tan the individual types of leather.

PAGE 25

(in pencil) TOP SECRET!

Conference at General Field Marshal Goering's at 1000, 14 Oct 38,
in the Reich Air Ministry

(in pencil): Attention H.G.

General Field Marshal Goering opened the session by declaring that he intended to give directives about the work for the next months. Everybody knows from the press that the world situation looks like and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the way which he will overcome with utmost energy and ruthlessness.

The amount of foreign exchange has completely dwindled on account of the preparation for the Czech Interprise and this makes it necessary that it should be strongly increased immediately. Furthermore, the foreign credits have been greatly overdrawn and thus the strongest export activity - stronger than up to now - is in the foreground. For the next weeks an increased export was first priority in order to improve the foreign exchange situation. The Reich Ministry for Economy should make a plan about raising the export activity, by pushing aside the current difficulties which prevent export.

These gains made through the export are to be used for increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the export activity. He received the order from the Fuehrer to increase the armament to an enormous extent, the air force having first priority. Within the shortest time the air force is to be increased five fold, also the navy should get armed more rapidly and the army should procure large amounts of offensive weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go, especially fuel, powder and explosives are moved into the foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads.

To this comes the Four Years' Plan which is to be reorganized according to 2 points of view.

In the Four Years' Plan in 1st place all the constructions which are in the service of armament are to be promoted and in 2nd place all the installations are to be created which really spare foreign exchange.

The substitutes produced by the Four Years' Plan are to be brought rapidly into circulation. The Reich Ministry for Economy and the other agencies should make suggestions by the beginning of November for rapidly increasing the introduction of the substitutes. The import of materials for which we have substitutes has to be drastically curtailed.

General Field Marshal Goering enlarged then upon the main problem of the session: How can these requirements be fulfilled,

... is faced with unheard difficulties. The treasury is empty, the industrial capacity is crammed with orders for many years. In spite of these difficulties he is going to change the situation under all

(page 25 of original cont'd)

circumstances. Memoranda were of no help, he desires only positive proposals. If necessary, he is going to convert the economy with brutal methods in order to achieve this aim. The time has come when private enterprise can show whether it has a right for continued existence. If it fails, he is going over to state enterprise without any regard. He is going to make barbaric use of his plenipotentiary power, which was given to him by the Fuehrer.

All the wishes and plans of the state, party and other agencies who are not entirely in this line have to be rejected without pity. Also the ideological problems cannot be solved now, there will be time for them later. He urgently cautions against making promise to the workers which can not be kept by him. The wishes of the labor front come entirely into the background. The industry has to be fully converted. An immediate investigation of all productive plants is to be initiated in order to determine whether they can be converted for armament and export or whether they are to be closed down. The problem of the machine industry has the first consideration in this respect. There is no place for printing and

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laundry machines and other machines of that kind, they all have to produce machine tools. In the field of machine tools the priorities of the orders are to be investigated, and wherever possible, increase in productive capacity is to be introduced. It follows without saying that work has to be conducted in 3 shifts.

It remains now to decide who is going to carry out this task; the state or the self-administrative industry. He requested a proposal from General Director Langer for the methods to realize these plans. He warns all agencies, particularly the labor front, price controller etc. from interfering with these proposals in any way. He is going to proceed ruthlessly against every interference on the part of the labor front. The labor front would not receive raw materials and workers for its tasks any more. Similarly all other party requirements have to be set aside without consideration. Foreign workers can continue being employed except in the particularly secret sections of the enterprise. At the present time the plants should not be burdened with unnecessary demands, such as athletic fields, casinos or similar desires of the labor front. Measures proposed by the labor front have to be submitted to him for approval.

Raw materials and power are to be subjected to accurate management. Similarly the distribution of men has to be organized in an entirely different way than it has been done until now. The retraining did not function; all agencies failed. The recruitment of the youth into the industry will be organized by him on a very large scale. Large state apprenticeships are to be created; besides, the plants will be obliged to hire a certain number of apprentices. A retraining of hundreds of thousands of people will have to take place. Much more work will have to be performed by women until now. Above all, the young women have to be employed much more. Work periods of

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(Page 26 of original cont'd)

eight hours do not exist any more; wherever necessary, overtime is to be performed, double and triple shifts are a matter of course. Where the workers will protest, as in Austria for example, General Field Marshal Goring will proceed with forced labor; he will create camps for forced labor. The Inner Front should not carry false special ideas among the workers. It is a fact that one generation has driven the cart into the mud through the mating of the workers and by being guilty of not having shot these workers on the spot. Therefore we had to put the thing in order again.

Much is to be done at once in the field of transportation. The Ministry for Transportation should submit a request about the construction of rolling stock and about other requirements. The branch-canal near the Hermann Goring Works is particularly important. It cannot continue that the Armed Forces interfere with the car park. If that will continue, he will make a decision, because it is impossible that the people should starve on account of it.

In the agriculture it is of importance to employ foreign workers. Similarly the problem of the agricultural machine has to be prompted. Of particular importance is the erection of storckhouses.

The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goring counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia, Czech and Slovakia could become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Reppner.

In the 2nd part of his discussion General Field Marshal Goring took up the Jewish problem. The Jewish problem had to be tackled now with all methods, because they have to get out of the economy. However, the wild bustle of commissars as it developed in Austria has to be prevented under all circumstances. These wild actions have to cease and the settling of the Jewish problem should not be regarded as a system of providing for inefficient party members. Thereupon Ministry Councillor Fischbeck was allowed to speak. He revealed that in the beginning there were 25 000 commissars in Austria. Today there are still 3 500 who are useless almost without exception. In Austria the

(page 26 of original cont'd)

party is of the opinion that Aryanization is a duty of the party and that it is connected with the recompensation of the old party members.

In Austria there is still a total of 2 billions of Jewish property. The large enterprises are being bought up by the Control Bank; it is difficult to oust the Jews from the small industrial enterprises.

(page 27 of the original)

General Field Marshal Goering took a strong stand against the opinion that the Aryanization is the duty of the party. It is the duty of the State alone. However, he could not release foreign exchange for shipping away the Jews. In an emergency situation ghettos should be erected in the individual large cities.

State Councillor Schaefer cautioned against more lenient methods in the fight against the Jews; Jewish labor units should be established, then the people would emigrate of their own accord. State Councillor Neumann warned and expressed the opinion that one should use more precaution in this matter, particularly in Austria.

Whereupon the meeting was quite surprisingly closed by General Field Marshal Goering without giving everyone wishing to speak an opportunity to do so and without making decisions.

EG

ERRATUM

The last paragraph of page 27 of Document

1301-PS is hereby corrected to read as follows:

"Whereupon the meeting was quite surprisingly closed by Field Marshal Goering without giving everyone wishing to speak an opportunity to do so (one dass die Vertretung erfuellt wurde) and without making decisions."

This correction is made by WILLARD W. SMIDMORE, Lt.(Jg)
WCR, 351300.

(page 28 of original)

Material
for the Conference with Goering
on 25 Nov. 1938
(General Keitel Brig.Gen. Thomas)

Wild

27 Oct 1938

For the consideration of the assignment of tasks to people, state and the Armed Forces, judging of the requirements of raw materials, especially steel, appears necessary.

This is shown as follows, as it can be judged from here. The inclosed summary shows that one must count, according to the Fuehrer's directives, on a steel requirement for armament production, which amounts to

1.06 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on, that is, it must be increased by about 48% of the present contingent. Added to this requirement are the increased demands of the Four Years' Plan, the demands of export and the amount necessary for the upkeep of the production machine of German economy in the amount of

1.83 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on; thus this results in a total requirement of

2.9 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on, against which there is only a monthly production of
at present 1.8 million tons monthly.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out, that with the increased use of steel, an increased use of the already scarce nonferrous metals is necessarily coupled; the latter also are closely associated with the procurement of foreign exchange.

The increased rearmament of the armed forces must further effect deeply the supply requirements of the armed forces, especially munitions and fuels. Therefore, it must be expected that the future requirements of the armed forces will exceed the present plans (accelerated program for powder and explosives, fuel program), which will have an increase of the steel requirements not yet planned as result.

Secret

Summary
of the Iron and Steel Requirement of the Armed
Forces and Industry tons per month

	Contingent of the IVth quarter 1938	Contingent of the Ith quarter 1939	Requirement from 1 Jan 1939 on	Contrast to the contingent of 1st quar- ter 1939
I. Armed Force	534 333	573 133	106 300	515 167
II. War economical organization of German Industry	306 600	306 600	13 500	306 900
III. Export on case is possible to reach the stage of beginning of 1938	380 000	360 000	550 000	170 000

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	Contingent of the IVth quarter 1938	Contingent of the Ist quarter 1939	Requirement from 1 Jan 1939 on	in contrast to the contingent of Ist quarter 1939
IV. Upkeep of the production machine of the German in- dustry.	582 800	582 800	582 800	-
V. Other requirements	83 500	83 500	83 500	-
Total	1 937 233	1 926 633	2 918 100	- 992 667

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Inlosure 1

SECRET

Summary

on the Iron and Steel Requirement of the Armed Forces

	tons per months			
	Contingent of the IVth quarter 1938	Contingent of the Ist quarter 1939	Requirement from 1 Jan 1939 on	in contrast to the contingent of Ist quarter 1939
Army	300 367	266 000	525 000	-259 000
(for fortifications)	(86 667)	(85 000)	(165 000)	(+ 80 000)
Navy	78 000	74 000	140 000	- 66 000
(for "Gruenewiese")	(-)	(-)	(35 000)	(+ 35 000)
Air Force	16 400	191 133	247 500	+ 156 137
(for fortifications)	(15 333)	(15 000)	(15 000)	(-)
which communication measures (Wass- bahnen)	39 566	42 000	175 000	-133 500
(for increased exten- sion of the which railroad)	(-)	(-)	130 000	(-130 000)
Armed Forces Total	584 333	573 133	1 087 500	-515 167

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Chief CMW

55a 40 38 top secret
1157/38 top secret

7 Dec. 1938

Top Secret 7 copies
7th copy

(in pencil)

To the State Secretary Neumann

Received Copy without receipt

K. 12 Dec. 38

Documents for the conference at Field Marshal
Goering's on 13 Dec. 1938 with Supreme
Commanders General Keitel, Neumann
Koerner, Gen. Thomas.

To

the Supreme Commander of the Army)	
the Supreme Commander of the Navy)	one
the Reichs Marshal of the Air Force and)	copy each
Supreme Commander of the Air Force)	

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
authorized me to inform the Supreme Commander of the
following:

The strained financial situation of the Reich make it
necessary that for the rest of the current fiscal year
38/39 the expense of the Armed Forces, which in the last
months under the strain of extraordinary circumstances
have undergone a very considerable increase, should be
lowered again to a level which would be tolerable for
some time.

It will be at the discretion of the Supreme Commander to
decide what measures should be taken for this purpose
according to the priorities in the armament program.
According to the Fuehrer's request

ARMY (the equipping with arms will have first priority,
(the providing of ammunition and the building of
(fortifications for the army will be considered in
(second place only.

NAVY (the building of ships, of ports and docks have first
(priority over all other requirements, also over
(that of providing ammunition.

AIR (the equipping with arms will have first priority,
FORCE (the providing of ammunition will have to be
(considered in second place only.

If necessary, the initiation of new enterprises
will have to be delayed, the execution of current enter-
prises and orders will have to be distributed over a
longer period of time. The allotted quota of raw materi-
als which will be decreased starting 1 Jan 39, will also
compel us to - certain extent to do this. It has be
achieved that

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1301 - PS
continued.

in the Army

in the Navy

in the Air Force

during the period from 1 November 1938 to 31 March
1939 (end of the fiscal year) not more than

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1501-PS
----- CONT'D -----

(Page 30 of original cont'd.)

(Army): 3.7 billion rub.
(used until now 4.5)
(Navy): 650 million rub.
(Air Force): 2.5 billion rub.

should be expended in the form of cash and delivery treasury scrips.

It is not yet definitively established how much can be allocated for the next fiscal year 1939/40 in the form of cash and delivery scrips. At present, the branches of the Armed Forces cannot expect greater quotas than the following:

5.2 billion rub. for the Army
1.4 " " for the Navy
4.9 " " for the Force

signed: Kaitel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1001-PS CONTINUED

(page 31 of original)

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SS & SO 18 K
1157/18 K

Top Secret
Copy

For information illegible signature

to
The Chief of the Air Force
The Chief of the W 3th

Chief of the War Industry Staff
Adjutant

1 March 1944

Draft

To the adjutant's office of General Field Marshal Goerink.

On behalf of Brig. Gen. Thomas I request an appointment for a conference for the general before the departure of the General Field Marshal on following urgent subjects:

1.) The branches of the Armed Forces--particularly the Navy--submitted requests for additional amounts of non-ferrous metals and of steel. General Thomas requests instructions what attitude he should take in regard to this question during the absence of the General Field Marshal.

2.) The General Field Marshal has to make decisions in 2 matters concerning foreign policy.

Illegible
Captain.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 1001-PS

15 November 1944

I, WILLIAM EVANS SMITHSON, Lt. (jg) USNR 391830, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and French languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1001-PS.

WILLIAM EVANS SMITHSON
Lt. (jg), USNR
391830

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AFFIDAVIT

I, PAUL KOERNER, having been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. I was Under-Secretary of State of the Prussian Ministry of State from April 1933 to 1945 and from 1936 to 1945 Under-Secretary in the Four Year Plan and permanent representative in all business matters of the Four Year Plan.

2. Before the creation of the office for German raw and synthetic materials (Amt fuer Deutsche Roh und Werkstoffe), Goering requested Albert Voegler, an industrialist with whom Goering was at that time in close touch, to suggest to him a man who would be suited to take over the chemical sector in that office. After Voegler had discussed the matter with Karl Bosch and other individuals, he suggested Krauch for this position. One of the reasons for this was that Krauch already in the first World War had accomplished a large construction task, namely the construction of Leuna.

3. In the office for German raw and synthetic materials, which was later incorporated into the Four Year Plan, Lt. Col. Loeb drew up the big planning of the construction project to be carried out. Approximately every three months he had to submit to my office, the Office of the Four Year Plan, a so-called report of activities, from which we could see whether the progress made coincided with his planning. In the course of the year 1937, I recognized, from these reports and figures which I received from various experts (Sachbearbeiter) that a certain disparity existed between the planning and the execution. I also frequently received direct reports from one construction department or another regarding difficulties which had arisen and had not been eliminated by Loeb. When one such report reached me in connection with a construction project in the mineral oil side, I requested Loeb to come to me

(Page 2 of the Original)

and asked him for an explanation. Loeb, who stubbornly stuck to his plan, although in actual practice it proved impossible, was not in a position to provide a satisfactory solution. I then had Krauch come to me and at this discussion, which took place at about the end of 1937, Krauch indicated to me that he disagreed with the whole style of the Loeb planning. He made constructive suggestions and made an excellent impression. When I informed Loeb of this, that I had had a discussion with Krauch and that now the matter would be put right, he was furious.

At this discussion with Krauch I suggested to him that he could at all times count on my help and assistance and that he could come to me without hesitation, if he had any kind of difficulties. Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1938, Krauch reported to me and said that Loeb's work showed essential errors, that he adhered far too rigidly to his plans (which in the meantime were generally referred to as Loeb's bible) and that huge differences had arisen between the planning and actual facts, which was causing him great anxiety. I thereupon let Krauch explain the whole matter to me in full detail, which he did in a very realistic manner and by producing the correct figures.

I then went to Goering, submitted the whole matter to him and received instructions from him to bring Krauch to him. At first, however, Goering summoned Loeb and me to him at Karinhall where he confronted Loeb with the things which I had made clear to him on the basis of my discussion with Krauch. Loeb, however, could not be convinced and insisted that his figures were correct. Then Goering said he would summon Krauch and him together in order to clarify the matter.

(Page 3 of the Original)

Shortly thereafter the dramatic discussion at Karinhall between Goering, Loeb and Krauch took place, at which I too was present. Krauch presented his views in greatest detail, logically and objectively and clearly proved thereby that Loeb was wrong. Goering said to me after this meeting that Krauch had made an excellent impression on him and wanted to give him extensive powers for construction of the chemical sector. This he also said to Krauch and asked him if he would work out a suggestion of the necessary powers which he would have to have in order to take over the further construction of the chemical sector as Plenipotentiary General.

Shortly thereafter Krauch submitted to Goering his suggestions in connection with the powers required by him. On receipt of these suggestions I received from Goering the order to draft the formal decree by which these powers could be conferred upon Krauch with his appointment as Plenipotentiary General for Chemicals (GBCHEM).

A conflicting point existed in the field of powder and explosives manufactures, which until then fell under the jurisdiction of the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt). Keitel was of the opinion that the Wehrmacht must retain the responsibility in this field. Krauch, however, then sought energetically that also this field be transferred to him, as the inter-relation between the production of products for the powder and explosives field, and that of products for other purposes, did not permit of such separate handling. Goering then suggested that Krauch and General Becker of the Heereswaffenamt work out a plan for the solution of the question. Krauch and Becker agreed that powder and explosives would henceforth be dealt with by General Becker, but that Krauch, within the framework of the Plenipotentiary General for Chemicals (GBCHEM) would receive powers for controlling also this field, that is, that Krauch would regularly have to be informed by General Becker of the progress in this field and any differences arising were to be settled with him.

(Page 4 of the Original)

The plan worked out by Krauch, which was discussed in greatest detail at the meetings with Goering at Karinhall and which was known as Karinhall Plan, K-Plan or also Krauch-Plan, was then made the basis for the further development in the chemical field and replaced the plan described in Loeb's bible.

I have carefully read the 4 pages of this affidavit, signed them with my own hand. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and declare herewith under oath that this is the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Paul Koerner

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-10386
Cont'd. -----

Sworn to and signed before me this 29th day of August 1947 at Nurnberg
by Paul Koerner, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Arthur T. Cooper
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. D-434534
Interrogator
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Esther GLASMAN, ETO No. 2353, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is
a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-10386.

Esther GLASMAN
ETO No. 2353

E N D

-- TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 9737 --
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR AR CRIMES

-- AFFIDAVIT --

I, Dr. Erich Gritzsch, residing at Rucke bei Puckoburg No. 39 (English Zone), having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, declare herewith of my own free will under oath and without coercion as follows:

I entered the Reich Civil Service in 1924 as consultant in a department of the "Press Department of the Foreign Office". In the middle of 1932, I was transferred to the Prussian State Ministry as Chief of the Ministers' Office (Ministerbüro) and was appointed Ministerialrat. When Bracht left on 30.1.33, Vice-Chancellor von Papen took me over in the same capacity and function. At Goering's wish, I continued to retain this post when he took office in April 1933, first as personal consultant, later as chief of the Staff Office of the Prussian Minister-President and of his other civil offices. In 1936, I became Ministerialdirigent and, in 1938, Ministerial director. My official tasks included the maintenance of the connections with all offices and with persons who had business with Goering in connection with his tasks in the civil sector.

So far as I could observe from the standpoint of my own position, Goering had officially comparatively little to do with industry during the years 1933 to 1936. This was changed with Hitler's so-called Declaration of Military Sovereignty in 1935, in connection with the extension of Aviation and the building-up of the Luftwaffe (Occupation with the Aircraft Industry and its Contributory Industries). Connection with the industry increased considerably with the planning activities of the then Major Loeb on the Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff in the Air Ministry at the beginning of

(page 2 of original)

1936. It became comprehensive after the announcement of the Four-Year Plan in October 1936.

So far as I can remember, I made the personal acquaintance of Carl Krauch and Hermann Schmitz of the I.G. Farbenindustrie on 12.1.37, on Goering's birthday. Both of them called on that occasion, according to my recollection, to offer congratulations. It is within my knowledge, however, that both Krauch and Schmitz were already in touch with Goering in 1936 through his occupation with the Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff and the Committee of Experts on Raw Materials.

On the recommendation of Carl Bosch, who had a conversation with Goering on this subject, Krauch was given an appointment in the Four-Year Plan. I was not present at this conversation myself, but was informed about it shortly afterwards, either by Goering, or by Goerner. From the beginning of his activity in the Four-Year Plan onwards, Goering kept up very close official relations with Krauch. Goering esteemed Krauch as an expert of international repute. His sympathetic personality and the sure way he had of recognizing difficulties and of mastering them appealed to Goering particularly.

(page 2 of original cont'd.)

So far as Goering was personally concerned in the Four-Year Plan, he always had Krauch with him at all big meetings and consultations, as also, for example, in the "little Cabinet" - certain discussions of experts accepted. Besides this, Krauch, both before and during the war, often had individual discussions in Berlin and also in Marinhall, mostly with Keerner present. Except for special purely representative social obligations, Goering did not maintain social intercourse with Krauch.

Schnitz almost invariably appeared with Krauch on congratulatory visits on Goering's birthdays, on which occasions they jointly presented a gift in their own names, mostly an artistic object (picture or sculpture). The cost of these gifts varied from RM 40,000 to 70,000.--. Often

(page 3 of original.)

Krauch requested no further indications as to what present would please Goering.

The purely business side, the tasks, execution and control of the Four-Year Plan, took place in the so-called General Council (Generalrat), which - unless for special reasons Goering conducted it himself - was regularly presided over by Keerner. Up to the outbreak of war, these General Council meetings as a rule took place weekly. During the war, they were held more irregularly. After the establishment by Speer of the "Central Planning Board" they were mostly replaced by meetings of certain bodies or sub-committees. Krauch was always present at the meetings of the General Council - if only on account of his wide field of activity. His opinion carried great weight in this body, as also with Goering, and also of course with Keerner. Keerner was very much impressed by him and often expressed his gratification at being able to call so eminent an economic leader (Wirtschaftsfuehrer) as Krauch, his "colleague". This was a much ridiculed, crooked description, since it was well known that Keerner unquestionably recognized Krauch's authority. Thanks to his comprehensive knowledge of the subject, Krauch easily carried his standpoint in essential matters. He also opposed mistaken conceptions and exaggerated demands, even when they came from the highest quarters. Among other things, he made it clear that the Four-Year Plan was based on false conclusions. He substituted it by his own, the so-called Krauch Plan, which was formed after numerous discussions in Keerner's office and then in Marinhall with Goering, and was eventually realized.

It was well known and also very much criticized that Krauch employed many I.G. people in his staff of co-workers. Goering never raised any objections to this. It was only on the highest levels that the personnel policy

(page 4 of original)

interested him. He found it perfectly proper and suitable that Krauch should have specialist workers at his side; where these came from and the fact they were mostly composed of I.G. people, interested him not at all. I can perfectly well recollect such remarks by Goering. He was interested in essential results; that these lay in Krauch's hands was for him the best guarantee.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9767
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original cont'd)

It certainly cannot be brushed aside that the official inclusion of a number of specialists of the I.G. in the Four-Year Plan may have and there have brought advantages or benefits to the firm. My position was not close enough for me to have acquired any detailed knowledge.

Generally regarded, the work of the I.G. at any rate furthered the Four-Year Plan in every respect.

It was generally well known that the I.G. had excellent connections with the key ministries, such as the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Food and, later on, with the Institution of the Four-Year Plan. The general political line, which aimed at absolute self-sufficiency, was therefore well known to the I.G.. The Four-Year Plan was to effect the accomplishment of this self-sufficiency. The aim and object of the Four-Year Plan was undoubtedly the determination to make Germany independent of foreign countries, to press forward the re-arming, in order that Germany -- as the Government constantly emphasized -- should be free and independent of abroad to carry out her resolutions, even in the case of war. Participation in these endeavors offered the I.G. the prospect of good business, i.e. good earnings and, furthermore, the possibility of expanding their works and discoveries through State assistance, in short to extend further their business sphere.

(page 5 of original)

I have carefully read through the four pages of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I hereby declare under oath that in this declaration I have stated the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. ERICH GRITZBACH
Dr. ERICH GRITZBACH

Sworn to and signed before me this 14th day of August 1947 at
Munich by Dr. Erich Gritzbach, known to me to be the person
making the above affidavit.

Signature: LESTER T. COOPER
LESTER T. COOPER
U.S. Civilian, ACC number D 434534
Interrogator, Office of Chief
of Counsel for War Crimes
U.S. Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ANNE MARTIN, ETO No. 20144, hereby certify that I am a duly
appointed translator for the English and German languages; and
that the above is a true and correct translation of the document
No. NI-9767

ANNE MARTIN, ETO No. 20144.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Professor Karl Krauch, after having been duly warned that I make myself liable to punishment for false statements, herewith declare under oath voluntarily and without having been subjected to duress the following:

1. I was born on the 7th of April 1887, I was educated at the universities of Giessen and Heidelberg, where I passed my examination in 1911 and graduated as Doctor of Natural Science. Afterwards I became assistant at the Chemical Institute of Heidelberg University where I remained for another year. At the end of 1912, I went to the Main Laboratory of the Badische Anilin- and Sodafabrik where I worked as a chemist and in 1913 to Dr. Mittasch's Laboratory for Ammoniac Experiments where I was employed in the factory carrying out synthetic Ammonium experiments. In 1914 I was called up. In 1915 the Badische Anilin- and Sodafabrik had me classified as indispensable and I went to the Nitrogen factory at Oppau as a production assistant. In 1917, Bosch engaged me as technical director in the high pressure plants at the newly erected Leuna Works. At the request of Bosch, I returned to the Nitrogen factory at Oppau in 1920 as deputy technical director in order to start up some new plants there. After the big explosion in 1921, I directed the re-building of the factory and was then appointed Chief Technical Director of Oppau. On the 19. December 1925, I was appointed deputy members of the Vorstand of the I.G. On the 15. August 1929 Bosch made me chief of Sparte I (Nitrogen and Gasoline). In 1930, I joined Goering's Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency which had just been set up, and was put in charge of the Research and Development Department. When the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency was absorbed into the Office of the Four Year Plan I retained the same position in the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics. This office was later renamed Reich Office for Economic Development when it came under the Reich Ministry of Economics as a result of the reorganization of the Reich Ministry of Economics and of the Four Year Plan. In July 1938, I was appointed Plenipotentiary General for special Questions concerning the Production of Chemicals within the Four Year Plan. In May 1940 I was elected chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the I.G. as successor to the

(page 2 of original)

deceased Professor Bosch. In 1942, I was appointed acting chief of the Reich Office for Economic Development in the place of Dr. Czimatis who had been called up.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6525
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I remained in these posts until the end of the war.

2. I was a member of the NSDAP from July 1937 onwards,
Member of the NS Flying Corps since from 1938,
Member of the German Labor Front and member of the
National Socialist Welfare Organization for the
People (NSV).
In 1938, I was appointed Military Economic Leader
(Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer).
3. Member of the Central Committee from 3. March 1933,
Full member of the Vorstand of the I.G. in 1934,
Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of I.G. in 1940,
Deputy Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Fordwerke A.G.,
Cologne,
Deputy Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the A.G. fuer
Stickstoffduenger in Knappsack, district Cologne,
Member of the Vorstand of the Braunkohlen und Benzin A.G.
(Brabag) in Berlin, and, after having resigned from
the Vorstand, member of the Aufsichtsrat of this company.
Member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Deutsche Gasolin A.G.
in Berlin,
Members of the Aufsichtsrat of the Braunkohlenprodukte A.G.
in Berlin,
Member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Steinkohlen Bergin A.G.
in Berlin,
Member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Internationale Bergin-
Kompanie, The Hague,
Member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Continentale Cel-
Gesellschaft,
Member of the Advisory Council (Beirat) of the Economic
Group Chemical Industry,
Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the Gesellschaft fuer
Landeskultur G.m.b.H., Halle,
4. Manager of the Ammoniak-Werk Merseburg G.m.b.H., Merseburg,
Chief of the sub-department Fertilizers in the Economic
Group Chemical Industry.
5. Member of the German Academy for Aviation Research,
Senator of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft
Professor (Ordentlicher Honorarprofessor) of
Chemistry at the Berlin university,

(page 3 of original)

Honorary Member of the Association of German Chemists,
Honorary doctor of Heidelberg university,
Senator of the Lilienthal Gesellschaft,
Chairman of the Gesellschaft der Freunde der Universitaet
Heidelberg (Association of Friends of Heidelberg University)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6525
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Member of the Academy of Sciences in Halle/Saale,
Member of the Helmholtz-Gesellschaft.

6. Holder of the Leibnitz gold medal.

During the war, I was awarded the Distinguished Air Raid
Protection medal first class and the Knights' Insignia
to the War Merit Cross.

I have carefully read each of the three pages of this affidavit
and signed them with my own hand. I have made the necessary
corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my
initials and declare herewith under oath, that I have stated
the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature : Carl Krauch

(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this twenty second day of April 1947
at Nuernberg by Carl Krauch, known to me to be the person making
the above affidavit.

Signature : J.P. Chamatz

U.S. Civilian ETO 402
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, NO. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6525.

(signed)

John Frobury
p.p. Victoria ORTON
NO. 20 129

- 3 -
- E N D -

85

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5930
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Albert Voegler
Director Dr. Krauch
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Ludwigshafen a/Rh.

Dortmund
P.O. Box 211
10 August 1933 R
(handwriting) K. Krauch, Sasnitz
Copy H.8.33.
H.

Very respected Mr. Krauch,

In an interview which I had with Staatssekretär Milch of the Reich Air Ministry, Berlin W 3, Behrenstrasse 68 - 70, dealing in the first place with questions of materials for iron and steel, there was also a detailed discussion concerning questions of motor fuels. As far as I was in a position to do so, I informed the gentleman about the present position and the possibilities. But Mr. Milch had the urgent desire to get more detailed information on this and I have undertaken to request you to get in touch with Mr. Milch at the first opportunity. I should be very much gratified if you could do this soon, since this seems important to me, the more so having regard to our recent interview. If I also should happen to be in Berlin we could perhaps arrange to call in Mr. Milch together.

With friendly greetings
your devoted servant

/s/ Voegler

(Note in handwriting)

on 16.8. phoned Sec. Voegler. Interruption
of vacation not necessary. But Dr. V.
requests early mention of firm so that he can
take action.

Copy to:
Eng. Dir. Krauch
Eng. Dir. Bosch
Dr. Saus
... Management
Dr. Fahrenhorn
Dr. Pier
.....

four
handwritten words illegible.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947.

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5930.

.....
HERBERT RODECK, No. B397499.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. VI-1713
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES.

(Translator's Note:
Stamp: Registered)

(Translator's Note:
Stamp: _____

Folder

Handwritten: Miscellaneous. Reich Air.)

Ministry

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten: M)

To: State Secretary MILCH
Air Ministry
Berlin
Behrenstr.

14 September 1933

Dear State Secretary:

(Translator's Note: Handwritten, Not with copy)
Marginal Note

I take the liberty of mailing you enclosed an exposition about the German motor fuel economy, which we have compiled after an exhaustive study of the situation on the German motor fuel market. The text deals solely with the manufacturing aspects, taking into consideration also the capital investments and the possibilities of providing employment. We did not discuss in detail the problems of selling and distribution, because they had already been thoroughly dealt with elsewhere.

In order to arrive at a clear-cut production program, the exposition concerning the expansion of manufacturing facilities has been based on a Four Year Plan. It will, of course, be easily possible to accelerate the speed of this expansion so as to reach the production target in a shorter time. For the time considered an increase of production from indigenous raw materials up to about 1.6 Million tons is planned, taking into account that about 500,000 tons are at present being produced in existing works. On page 13 of our exposition we have itemized the additional production of about 1.3 Million tons according to the various manufacturing processes. We have tried to include all possibilities of an extension of production. There is no need to adhere rigidly to this division. It is, for example, quite possible to more or less replace the contemplated increase in the production of crude oil and of low temperature lignite-tar.

(Page 2 of original)

To State Secretary MILCH, Air Ministry, Berlin.

14 September 1933

through the direct hydrogenation of lignite and bituminous coal. This would give us the advantage of enabling us to start from an assured raw material basis and of independence from by-products. On the other hand it also makes it possible to direct the manufacturing processes so as to satisfy the variable demands of the motor fuel market for gasoline, gas oil and lubricating oils.

On page 16 and in Annex 14 we have discussed the necessary capital investments for the planned extension and the effects on the provision of employment. It was mentioned in the conference held on the 13th of this month that an increase of the German production by 2 Million tons would necessitate a capital investment of about 600 Million Marks. In our calculations we set down 400

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. WL-1710
Cont'd

Million Marks for 1.3 Million tons. For the 700,000 tons not yet accounted for, about 200 Million Marks would then have to be invested in factories to produce hydrogen from coking gas and in existing power sources, which figures agree with our estimate. Of course, these figures can be considered only as an approximate basis, because investments will always depend on local conditions. The number of workers employed should be computed so as to count those that will be engaged in the production of gasoline from its basic material proper, while a not inconsiderable number would work in the machine and steel industry. Not figured in are those workers who, through the production process, would indirectly again be led back into employment; according to careful estimates, this number amounts to at least 75% of those directly employed.

As far as hydrogenation is concerned, we have worked for quite some time on the production of suitable aviation gasoline. We can now state that, according to the conditions of technical methods, it would easily be possible to produce aviation gasoline as well as lubricants suitable for airplanes, by German production. At this time, the Lufthansa is making exhaustive tests with our gasoline.

(Page 3 of original)

To State Secretary MILCH, Air Ministry, Berlin.

14 September 1933

I hope to have given you basic data for an expansion of the German motor fuel economy in this exposition. If there are any points arising out of this matter which require additional elucidation, I should be glad to furnish you with further verbal information.

Yours very respectfully

(Signature) Signed: C. KRAUCH

(Page 4 of original)

23 July 1935

(Translator's Note:

Stamp: _____

Folder

Handwritten: Miscellaneous

" "R.L.M." (Reich Air
Ministry)

To: State Secretary E. MILCH,
Berlin W 0
Behrenstr 65-70

(Translator's Note: Illegible Initial)

Dear State Secretary:

Please accept my thanks for your kind letter of the 23rd of this month. I received it somewhat belatedly, since I was away from home for a few days during my vacation, and therefore it was not possible for me to reply to you before today.

I am very glad that you and the gentlemen of your entourage are pleased with what we were able to show you in Oppau and Ludwigshafen. It is only a pity that the time at your disposal was so short. I was very happy that you gave us this opportunity to discuss all questions pertaining to German aviation. I believe

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. WL-4715
Cont'd

that this is the best method to further our work to guide it correctly. Apart from this, I think that we may derive various benefits from the personal acquaintance made between the gentlemen of your entourage and our men who work in these particular fields here.

I noticed with interest from your letter that you have had the opportunity of discussing the questions dealt with in Oppau with General GOERING as well, and that he intends to invite me for a personal conference in the near future. For the appreciation of our work of

(Page 4 of original)

which this bears witness, I would like to thank you most sincerely already today, dear State Secretary. I anticipate your further communications as to when the proposed visit is to take place.

I subjected the data concerning the invention of Mr. MAKHONINE which you sent me to a preliminary examination. The claims of the inventor sound fantastic, and I have for the moment strong doubts as to their accuracy, particularly on account of the fashion in which this invention is being advertised in France, vividly reminding me of some cases of inventions offered us from France, which upon closer examination proved to be frauds. In fact, the protracted efforts of Mr. MAKHONINE to induce the various authorities to accept his inventions have actually been described in France as the "MAKHONINE Scandal". I am now about to have the data more closely studied and am also having investigations made as to how far the inventor has become known in scientific literature, and I then shall take the liberty of submitting to you a proposal for further action in this matter.

At present we can put at your disposal as educational and training material for the Luftwaffe, the charts listed in the enclosed Index. Although these charts are mainly meant for the automobile engine, the same as that shown on it essentially applies also to the aero-engine. Will you kindly let us know how many copies of these charts you require, and to which offices we are to send them.

I suggest the provisional appointment of our Dr. RITTER as liaison officer to your G-offices.

I remain, with many kind regards and Heil Hitler,

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) C. KRAUCH

(Page 6 of original)

DER STAATSEKRETAER
der LUFTFAHRT
(State Secretary for Aviation)

Berlin, W C
Behrenstr. 63/70
Tel: A 3 Flora 0047

23 July 1935

TO: Direktor Dr. C. KRAUCH
I.G. Farbenindustrie
Ludwigshafen/Rhine

Dear Dr. KRAUCH:

To begin with, I would like to thank you specially for the friendly reception you gave us in Oppau. All participants were deeply impressed by the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4715
Cont'd

informative talks and demonstrations given then there. I myself have immediately informed General GOERING, who is also particularly interested in questions of this nature. As soon as he has finished his summer vacation, he plans to ask you to come for a leisurely visit to Karinhall in the Schorfheid, in order that he too can discuss with you the long-range viewpoints. In his capacity as Reich Game Warden he is specially interested in the lumber problem.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Marginal Note: Extract of letter to Dr. SCHMITZ (Para. 2 of Original)).

Enclosed I am sending you documents about a French non-combustible fuel, about which I had already heard quite a lot many years ago. The experiments, however, apparently were a failure in France, some claim for technical reasons, while others assert it was due to consideration for the mineral oil companies. It is impossible to determine which version is true.

The inventor MAKHOMINE wants to approach Germany by way of the Adjutant to Minister GOERING. Before we do anything in this matter I would like to transmit the material to you, and to leave any further action up to your judgement, which appears to me the best way on account of your expert knowledge.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten: 3 enclosures. Note is Dr. ENDRINIS: Rapp.pres. a la chambre des Deputes - (Report presented to Chamber of Deputies). In addition to this notes according to this printed matter, Headline: Motor Fuel C H. With excerpt of 11 November to Dr. G.M. 25 July.)

(Page 7 of original)

I repeat again my two requests which I expressed at our visit:

- 1.) Assignment of a liaison officer to our G-office.
- 2.) Provision of educational and training material for the Luftwaffe, with respect to the various projects of the I.G., and of course, only to the extent as it is suitable for training purposes for officers and enlisted personnel.

In case you find an opportunity, please extend also my greetings to the other gentlemen. I remain, with many kind regards and Heil Hitler,

Ever yours,

(Signed) E. MILCH

I.G. LUDWIGSHAFEN
Technical Department

(Translator's Note: Handwritten: CM)

TO: Dr. C. MUELLER
SUBJECT: Educational Charts.

We can put at your disposal the following charts:

1. Manufacture of Gasoline
2. Manufacture of Leuna Gasoline

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4718
Cont'd

3. Carburetor breakdowns
4. Glysantin (Anti freeze) Educational Chart and also Driving Manual.

(Signature) WILKE

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-4718.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

Copy

Discussion in the Reich Air Ministry on 15.9.33

TOP SECRET

Present: Lt. Gen. v. Beckelborg
Lt. Col. Thomas
Lt. Col. Stud
State Sec. Milch
Colonel Meyer
Lt. Col. Winter
Major (ret) Wagner
Captain Joschneck

} Ia A (Armament Office Dept. A)
}
} L.I. (Air Ministry)

1. Procurement Order 33/35 of the L.I. (only fighter aircraft).
Lt. Col. Winter presented briefly the Procurement Programme already known to Ia A, and emphasized that the present programme represented the 1st stage of the rearmament of the Luftwaffe. The target of the final rearmament to be aimed at was not yet fixed, but it could be reckoned approximately that this rearmament would in five years reach three times the position of the 1st stage (1.10.35).

For the rest, the L.I. would regard the two yearly periods (1.10.34 and 1.10.35) of the 1st stage as a whole. If therefore the requirements specified for the 1st yearly period were not reached in individual procurement areas, i.e. by 1.10.34, the delivery of the remainder for that year could take place in the 2nd yearly period, i.e. by 1.10.35.

L.I. requested, however, that, as soon as enquiries were concluded, they should be furnished with a statement of the deliveries to be expected up to 1.10.34 and the position in regard to manufacture at this date (Ia B (Armament Office, Dept. B) in conjunction with Ia XI (Armament Office Economics?)).

With regard to the st.H.G. (Machine Guns) 08/15 for the 1st year, it could be stated that these were already available, whereas for the same H.G. of the 2nd year, H.G. 08/15 would be taken from stocks and would have to be suitably mounted.

State Secretary Milch expressed the desire that the completion of the construction of the H.G. 17, which is later to replace the H.G. 08/15, should be accelerated as much as possible (Ia Prw).

Lt. Gen. v. Beckelborg requested that Ia A be informed as soon as possible as to the intended full programme of the Air Rearmament and also as to the required monthly replenishment figures, as the framework of the preliminary manufacturing preparations would be materially dependent on these. This was promised.

(Ms.: To be filed 2550)

Lt. Gen. v. Beckelborg then expounded the difficulties which existed in the different fields of procurement and the intended remedies.
(Ms.: 26/9 2646)

(page 2 of original)

State Secretary Milch expressed his agreement with the proposals to bring in new firms for the manufacture and especially approved the installation of a new tube rolling mill, of the enlargement of production at Bitterfeld and of a new electron metal finishing plant on the basis of Magnesium-chloride. This applied also to the manufacturing preparations for Thorite which would become necessary when it was pointed out the high costs which would be incurred for manufacturing preparations. State Secretary Milch declared that the necessary means would be made available.

With regard to the very high replenishment requirements in electron metal bombs it was pointed out on the part of L. A. that the manufacturing preparations would presumably necessitate the creation of a number of new electron metal works and probably even new electric power plants which could not be maintained by peacetime orders.

L.L. reserved its decision on this point and intended at first, so far as stocks and replenishment possibilities in E.-bombs permitted to secure confidence of supply through stock reserves and possibly to provide for an expansion of production only in 1941.

State Secretary Milch requested that L. A. should examine whether another metal with a basis of German raw material could not be used instead of electron metal for the incendiary bombs. (In Pw).

For the safeguarding of replenishments in Explosives for the C-bombs L.L. declared its agreement with stockpiling of Tri. and Telucl. For the extension of the Telucl basis, further steps should be initiated by the L.L. and Rv. Min. (Reich Ministry of Economics) as soon as possible, in conjunction with the "New Order" for fuel oil economy (L. A. -?Armament Economic Office?).

L.L. requested to be kept currently informed of the intended manufacturing preparations and costs incurred.

2. Manufacturing preparations in fields reserved to the L.L.
L.L. has entrusted Dr. Dames (Prüf. & Forschungsgemeinschaft Vereinigte Stahlwerke und Siemenswerke) with the working out of a plan for securing the finishing of certain semi-finished products and semi-finished parts (for instance, aircraft-frame-tubing from steel, crankshafts and so on).

(page 3 of original)

On completion, the plan will be sent to L. A.

3. Securing of Fuel Oil.
State Secretary Milch handed to Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg a memorandum of the I.G. (Dr. Krauch) concerning the expansion of the home raw materials basis and suggested a joint energetic approach to the competent agencies in this matter. It would be necessary to appoint a commissar for carrying out the necessary steps.

Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg promised examination of the memorandum and joint action (L. A.).

(page 3 of original cont'd)

4. Decision concerning development and procurement of Aircraft
Radio Apparatus.

As a result of detailed representations by the L.H. to the effect that the radio apparatus was less an information apparatus for the Luftwaffe than a navigation instrument, the further development of which in this direction was of vital importance to the Luftwaffe, Lt. Gen. v. Bockelberg expressed his agreement that aircraft wireless apparatus should be developed by the L.H. in closest touch with Ma A.

L.H. expressly promised exchange of results and the closest collaboration (liaison officer of the In 7). Ma A to continue to be responsible for the procurement of aircraft wireless apparatus, and the Construction Control of the L.H. to take charge of delivery.

(Signed) v. Bockelberg.

Ma A
No. 1246/33 G.K. Ma M

Copy

20 Sept. 33

To the Chief <u>Ma B</u> (Ordnance Office)	}	against personal receipt
Dopt. B		
To the Chief <u>Ma Prw</u>		
To the Chief Chief Eng.		
To the Chief <u>Ma N</u>	}	I
To the Chief <u>Ma M II</u>		

The preparations for procurement and manufacturing preparations are to be continued with vigour.

Re No. 1:

After conclusion of the enquiries instituted, will Ma B in conjunction with Ma M report to me as soon as possible concerning the intentions with regard to the effecting of the procurements and

(page 4 of original)

of the manufacturing preparations (together with statement of the costs).

Will Ma Prw report to me as soon as possible regarding the possibility and means of testing another metal instead of electron for incendiary bombs.

Re No. 2:

On receipt of the plan of Dr. Domes, report will be made through Ma M, in conjunction with Ma B and possibly Ma Prw through Ma M.

Re No. 4:

Ma M will arrange for supplementary written confirmation of the agreement arrived at, which has received the full approval of the Minister.

(Signed): v. Bockelberg

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7123
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 July 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7123.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-5933
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dr. KRAUCH

16 August 1935

Stamp: Folder
Various "H.L.M." "

Handwritten note: Original with
data to Dr. KRAUCH
16.8.35

State Secretary E. MILCH
Berlin W 8
Behrenstr. 68-70

My dear Mr. State Secretary,

I refer to my letter of 29.7.1935, in which, inter alia, I informed you of my present opinion concerning the Nakhonine-Process and promised to have the data more thoroughly checked.

So far as we could ascertain, there are three French patents of Nakhonine in this field:

The PP 632 036 describes a process by which heavy oils, tars or coal are split up into light oils so that the starting material is compressed by mixture with a suitable gas, for instance hydrogen. The splitting up is effected through the increased pressure and the heat resulting from the compression.

The quick-boiling constituents obtained are liquified by condensation.

Similar processes for obtaining motor fuels have already been suggested, but have so far not been successful in practice.

According to PP 594 248 and 605 309, heavy oils, vegetable oils, lamp oils should immediately before their introduction to the motor be converted into quick-boiling constituents.

(page 3 of origin-1)

The starting material, possibly under increased pressure, is transformed by a kind of cracking process to steam, whereby any impurities are left behind. The distillation product is either in the form of steam or after liquifaction, mixed direct with the combustion air and transferred to the cylinder. The mechanism for the conversion of the heavy oils can be built direct on to the motor, from which the waste heat can then be used for the heating of the starting material. According to the memorandum that was handed over to you by Herr Rittmeister A.D. LASOLE, the process described therein exactly corresponds to the discovery set down in the two last mentioned Letters Patent.

(Page 2 of original cont'd)

This therefore concerns a kind of heavy oil carburetor in which the propellant material is converted only in the quantities as and when used by the motor, into lower boiling, easily ignitable form. According to the statements of the Letters Patent, as well as the report submitted to the Chamber of Deputies (Deputierten-Kammer), the fuel reaching the motor has a boiling point not higher than that of a gas oil. The uses claimed for it in the latter report are however according to our experiences not borne out in practice.

Literature concerning this process includes also the following:

Autotechnik 1925, No. 8, page 10 and
Autotechnik 1926, No. 13, page 11

Similar carburetors have often received praise in recent years, but as is well known have in no case

(page 3 of original)

been found in practice to be usable. All these attempts have failed owing to the fact that propellant fuels that are not easily vaporised cannot be transformed by simple cracking mechanisms, such as hotplates and the like, into stuffs which are sufficiently volatile to arrive in the cylinder without condensation. It has always been shown that the thinning of the lubricant thereby caused leads to the premature wearing out of the machine. The driving qualities always remain unsatisfactory, as with a throttled motor and especially when running empty, the necessary temperature for cracking is not available. We studied these proceedings thoroughly during the year 1929, when the Societe Internationale du Catalex, Paris, offered us their process, which is in essentials similar to the Makhonine invention.

In France, very much attention has been given to gasoline substitutes in case of war and, in point of fact, most of the proposals have concerned the utilisation of heavy oil in carburetor motors, or the production of gaseous propellant furls in wood or cokegas generators. The French Government has, so far as we are informed, had all these inventions thoroughly tested for their practical usability. It is therefore not astonishing if the Makhonine-process has also been most carefully investigated by the military authorities. As however it has evidently not yet been introduced, it may well be assumed that the experiments carried out were in the end not satisfactory.

On the basis of the material available

(Page 4 of original)

I would summarize my opinion concerning the Process offered to the effect that no practical importance is to be attributed to the Melkhonine invention. I do not think that this matter is worth following up any further. Should the inventor, however, submit you any further data, I shall be pleased to have these tested.

With many friendly greetings and Heil Hitler
I am, Yours very truly

(signed) C. KRAUCH

/Handwritten note/:

2. Annexes to:

(Following words in French text):

1. Report presented to the Chamber of Deputies under No. 5864 by M. SARRAS Deputy, in the name of the Commission of Sales and Speculations on the Melkhonine Carburettor.

(End of French text)

2. Term of Office of Rittmeister A.D. FUSOLE, 3.6.35

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947

I, Victoria CORTON, 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. MI-5933.

Victoria CORTON
20 129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5932
CONTINUED

Staatssekretär
E. Milch
Berlin W 8
Behrenstr. 66/70

File
R.L.H.
(Reich Air Ministry)

20 December 1935

Very respected Secretary of State!

Upon my return to Ludwigshafen I have an urgent desire again to thank you for the extremely friendly reception and hospitality on the part of the gentlemen of the Ministry of Aviation which we were privileged to experience in connection with our inspection trip of 16 and 17 December.

On the 18th Privy Councillor Bosch made a report to the Central Committee of the I.G. concerning his impressions on this trip. In this connection Privy Councillor Bosch emphasized how strongly the many new things which we were privileged to see on our visit to you impressed him, above all the excellent spirit which animates the Air Ministry. Needless to say Privy Councillor Bosch thus expressed my heartfelt sentiments and I should like to assure you that this visit has made the relationships between the I.G. and the Air Ministry still more intimate and sincere.

After the holidays I shall look up Colonel Wirsner in order to develop the cooperation still further and to speed it up as much as possible.

Permit me to send you my best wishes for Christmas and the New Year. I remain with many friendly greetings and Heil Hitler

Your devoted servant

/s/ Karl Krauch.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947

I, HERBERT ROBECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-5932.

.....
HERBERT ROBECK, No. B397499.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-59
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Files dealt with

Minutes of the meeting

of Technical Directors in Frankfurt/Main-Hochst on 13 July 1936.

Those present were Messrs: Hermann
Lautenschlaeger
Jacobi
Krauszlein
Roth
Steib
Fehrle
Hagenboecker
Landers
Tampke
Hirschel

Gebhardt (part of the time)

.....
Messrs. Diekmann and Pfundler were transferred to the Vermittlungsstelle
in place of Messrs. Ritter and Eckell, who have gone to the Staff of
the Foreign Exchange Commissioner.

.....
(page 4 of original)
.....

(Initial) H

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 May 1947

I, BERYL C. BERNICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a
true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-5911.

.....
BERYL C. BERNICK,
No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4638
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, FRANKFURT (MAIN) 20
Sales combine chemicals
(Verkaufsgemeinschaft Chemikalien)

Management department chemicals.

Frankfurt a/M., 2 Nov. 1936

Rubber stamp:
Management department
Leverkusen
4 Nov. 1936

Director Dr. Kuehne, Leverkusen

Extract from memorandum on the discussion with Herr Dr. ter Meer
on 29 Oct. 1936, by Herr Weber-Andreas.

1) ter Meer had been notified by Haefliger that Herr Pleiger had asked for an all-round chemist. ter Meer recommended that Herr Pleiger be told that it was not possible to release a chemist with all-round training (such as trained by I.G. for the Office of the Technical Committee). Moreover a man of this type would not satisfy Herr Pleiger's requirements, because Herr Keppler's activity would chiefly cover the fields of oil and geophysics. Keppler's office is in constant touch with Henkel and Sunlight who could make specialists available, suitable for this type of work. Haefliger told me later on that he would draw Herr Keppler's attention to Herr Dr. Bernhard who is a specialist and devoted heart and soul to I.G. The important thing for us, of course, is not to have a man selected who would work against I.G. for personal reasons.

Initialed: Ke

Initialed: Oh.

Signed: Wa + Ph.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAULRA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4638.

Arthur MACNAULRA
No. 20191

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8591
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Ministerpraesident Generaloberst GOERING
Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan

The General Expert for German Raw Materials
and Synthetics.

Berlin W 8, 16 December 1936
Telephone: A 6 5861

MS:17/12 Mt.
Stamp: Top Secret.

To:
Ministerpraesident KOEHLER, Economic
Group Distribution of Raw Materials,

Berlin W. 9
Lennestr. 9

President of Provincial Government, Gauleiter
WAGNER,
Reich Commissioner for Price Control,

Berlin W. 8
Wilhelmstr. 62

Secretary of State BACKE,
Economic Group Food,
Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture,

Berlin W. 8
Wilhelmstr. 72

President Dr. SYRUP,
Economic Group Allocation of Labor,
Reich Institute for Unemployment Insurance
and Provision of Employment,
the

Berlin-Charlottenbu. 11
Hardenbergstr. 12

Lieutenant Colonel LOEB,
Office for German Raw Materials and
Synthetics,

Berlin W 8
Behrenstrasse 68 - 70

Counsellor of State NEUMANN,
Economic Group Foreign Currency,
Prussian State Ministry,

Berlin W 8
Leipzigerstr. 3

Please find enclosed a copy of my official diary for the week
7 December to 12 December 1936.

Certified Copy:
Signature: Kunze
Secretary.

Signed : KENTLER.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8591
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

W. KEPPLER

Official Diary

for the week 7 - 12 December 1936.

.....

8 December:

.....

Page 3 of original)

.....

Dr. BUETEFISCH of the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics reported on the mineral oil works, the erection of which is, for the time being, only projected.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 July 1947

I, Beryl BESWICK, Civ. No. D-427 459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8591.

.....
Beryl BESWICK
Civ. No. D-427 459

103

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. 100
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Minutes

of the meeting of Technical Directors in Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst

on 15 November 1937.

Those present were Messrs: Hermann
 Lautenschlager
 Jaehne
 Kraenzlein
 Bockmuhl
 Jacobi
 Roth
 Staib
 von Bruening
 Fehrle
 Hagenboecker
 Hilcken
 Hirschel
 Krauss
 Lenders
 Lange (Initial) H
 Moeller
 Renzenberger
 Tempke
 Dorn (part of the time)

(Files dealt
 with)

.....
 (page 2 of original)

.....
 Hermann learnt from the Vermittlungsstelle W, that the Office desires a specialist for solvents. Hoechst is the best place from which to obtain such a man; it is proposed to nominate Moeller. Von Bruening will first speak to Gorr, then Hermann to Mr. Meer.

.....
 (page 6 of original)

.....
 Kraenzlein reports on a meeting in the Office on paper-bonding (replacement of celophony with synthetic products).

(signature) Hirschel.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-50
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 May 1947

I, BERYL C. DESICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI-5891.

.....
BERYL C. DESICK, No. D 427459

Pv.

DOCUMENT NO. NI - 4955
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES

(PAGE 1 of the original)

Schacht Exhibit Nr. 48

DEFENSE DOCUMENT BOOK
SUPPLEMENT

HJALMAR SCHACHT.

Submitted by
Dr. Rudolf Dix
Attorney-at-Law

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(Page 2 of original)

The Political Situation

Politics is the leadership and the course of the historical struggle for life of the nations. The aim of these struggles is the maintenance of existence. Even the ideological struggles have their ultimate causes and receive their most profound impulses from the aims of existence determined by the national character of the nation. But religions and ideologies are always able to give to these struggles a particular bitterness and thus confer upon them a strong historical impressiveness. They leave their imprint upon the history of centuries. Nations and countries living within the boundaries of such ideological or religious conflicts cannot seclude or exclude themselves from the events. Christianity and the migration of nations have determined the historical course of centuries. Mohammedanism has shaken the Orient as well as the Occident likewise during half a millennium. The Reformation has driven the whole of central Europe within the sphere of its consequences. The individual countries were not able to exclude themselves from the events - either by cleverness or by a sought for indifference. Since the outbreak of the French revolution the world drives with a continuously increasing pace, towards a new conflict, the extreme solution of which is Bolshevism, essence and goal of which is the elimination and the displacement of the hitherto leading social classes of the humanity by the Jewish crowd throughout the world.

No nation will be able to avoid or keep from this historical conflict. Since Marxism - through its victory

(page 2 of the original) cont'd.)

in Russia - has established one of the greatest bases
as a base of operations for its future operations. This
question has become a threatening one. A concrete offen-
sive design, based on an authoritarian ideology, opposes
a democratic world which is ideologically split.

The means of military power of this offensive design
are rapidly increasing from year to year. One should
compare the assumptions of the military circles of 10 or
15 years ago with the actually created Red army of to-day
in order to realize the dangerous extent of this deve-
lopment. One should consider the results of a further
development within 10, 15 or 20 years in order to have
an idea of the conditions which would then occur.

(Page 3 of original)

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal
in open court and then only that portion actually sub-
mitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en
audience publique et seulement la partie réellement
versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veröffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht
(Tribunal) in öffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen
Teil, welcher tatsächlich zur Beweisführung vorgebracht
wurde.

Übersetzung in russischer Sprache

.....

(Page 4 of the original)

Germany

Germany will have to be regarded, as it always was, as the focus of the occidental world against the Bolshevistic attacks. I do not consider this as a joyous mission but unfortunately as a severe difficulty and burden upon our national life, resulting from our disadvantageous position in Europe. But we can not avoid this destiny. Our political position results from the following:

Presently there are only two nations in Europe which can be regarded as being firm against Bolshevism; Germany and Italy. The other nations are either disintegrated by their democratic way of living, infected by Marxism and therefore designed to collapse within the discernible future, or ruled by authoritarian governments, the only strength of which are the military means of power, which means that; due to the necessity of protecting the existence of their leadership against their own people by the forcible measures of the executive power, they are unable to utilize these forcible measures outwards for the protection of the nation. All these nations would be unable at anytime to wage a war against Russia with any prospect of success.

Generally, besides Germany and Italy, only Japan can be considered as a power resisting the world peril.

It is not the aim of this memorandum to prophesy the moment at which the untenable situation in Europe will reach the stage of open war.

(Page 4 of the original, cont'd.)

I want only to express in these lines my conviction that this crisis cannot and will not fail to come, and that Germany has the duty of securing her existence against this catastrophe, with all means and to protect herself from it

(Page 5 of original)

and that this obligation gives rise to a series of consequences concerning the most important tasks ever imposed upon our nation.

For a victory of Bolshevism over Germany would not lead to a Versailles Treaty but to a definitive annihilation and even to an extermination of the German nation.

The extent of such a catastrophe cannot be estimated. As in general, western Europe (Germany included) would experience after a Bolshevik collapse, the most horrible catastrophe humanity has known since the disappearance of the nations of antiquity. With respect to the necessity of warding off this danger, all other considerations must be relegated to the background as completely unimportant.

Germany's Defense Capability;

Germany's defense capability is based upon several factors. As the first, I would like to emphasize the inner value of the German nation in itself. The German nation politically well-led, ideologically strengthened and militarily well organized represents certainly the world's most valuable resistance factor today. The political leadership is secured by the National Socialist Party, the

(Page 5 of the original, cont'd.)

ideological unity has been promoted since the victory of National Socialism to an extent never reached before. Based upon this consideration, it must be deepened and strengthened more and more. This is the aim of the national socialistic education of our nation.

The military exploitation shall be accomplished through the new army.

The extent and the pace of the military exploitation of our strength cannot be too large or too rapid.

It is a major error to believe that on this point

(page 6 of Original)

any compromise or comparison with other necessities of life could come into being. However much the entire aspect of life of a nation should be a well-balanced one, some one-sided shiftings to the detriment of other, not so vital tasks, must be undertaken at certain periods. If we do not succeed in developing the German army, within the shortest period, to be the first army in the world with respect to training, setting-up of units, equipment and above all also in the spiritual education, Germany will be lost. Here the basic principle is that what was neglected in the months of peace cannot be made up for in centuries. Thus, all other desires have to be unconditionally subordinated to this task.

For this task means the life and the preservation of life, and all other desires - however much they might be comprehensible in other periods - are unimportant or even dangerous to the continuation of life and therefore are to be rejected. Posterity will not ask us some day according to which methods, considerations or opinions valid today we have carried out the rescue of the nation, but if we have carried it out. And it will be no excuse some day for our downfall if we refer at the time to the infallible methods which, unfortunately, caused our ruin.

Germany's Economic Situation

Just as the political movement in our nation has only one goal, the preservation of our existence, i.e. the securing of all spiritual and other prerequisites for the self maintenance of our nation, so the economy has also, only this identical goal. The nation does not live for the economy or for the leaders of the economy, for the economic or financial theories, but finance and economy, the leaders

(page 6 of Original cont'd.)

of the economy and all theories have to serve exclusively this struggle for the maintenance of our nation.

(page 7 of original)

But Germany's economic situation - briefly summarized - is the following:

- 1) We are over populated and our country does not yield the food we need.
- 2) If our nation has 6 or 7 millions unemployed, the food situation will be improved as a result of the non-existing purchasing power of these people.

It makes a difference of course if 6 millions people have 40 marks to spend in a month or 100 mark.

It shall not be overlooked that this is a matter which concerns itself with one third of those people who have to earn their living, which means converted with respect to the entire population that, through the national - socialistic economic policy, approximately 20 million people gained an increase in their standard of living from a maximum average of 50 marks a month to at least 100 to 120 marks. This means an increased and comprehensible rush on the food market.

- 3) But on the other hand if there is no increase of food, a high percentage of the nation must be gradually withdrawn from the body of the nation, as valuable factor, as a result of undernourishment. Therefore the most important task of our economic policy - despite the difficult food situation - is to see that the prerequisites for normal consumption are created through the incorporation of all Germans into the economic process.
- 4) Insofar as this consumption concerns items of general utility, it can be effected to a large extent by an

(page 7 of original cont'd.)

increase of production.

Insofar as this consumption affects the food market, it cannot be satisfied from the sources of the internal German economy. The reason is that the output of numerous products can be increased without difficulty but the yield of our agricultural production can no longer be substantially increased.

(page 8 of original)

Likewise it is impossible for us to produce artificially or otherwise to replace single raw materials which we do not process in Germany.

- 5) It is however of no importance to state these facts again, and again, i.e. to state that we need food or raw materials; what is decisive is to take those measures which can bring a final solution for the future and a temporary easing-up of conditions during the transition period.
- 6) The definitive solution lies in an extension of our living space, i.e. an extension of the raw materials and food basis of our nation. It is the task of the political leadership to solve this question at some future time.
- 7) The temporary easing-up of conditions can be found only within our present economy. In this instance, the following must be stated:
 - a) Since the German nation will be increasingly dependent upon imports for her food, and likewise certain raw material also have to be supplied from abroad under all circumstances, all efforts have to be made in order to render possible this importation.
 - b) The increase of our own export is theoretically possible but actually not very probable. Germany does not export

(page 8 of original cont'd.)

to a political or economic vacuum, but into greatly disputed areas. Measured on the scale of the general international economic depression, our export trade has fallen - not only not more - but less than that of other nations and countries.

However, since the food import as a whole cannot be substantially reduced but rather rises, a balance must be found by other means.

(page 9 of original)

- c) If it is however impossible to utilize certain currencies assigned for the purchase of raw materials for the import of food if the other branches of the German economy are not to receive an annihilating blow. But above all it is absolutely impossible to do this at the expense of the national armament. I must reject here with the utmost vehemence the conception, according to which a limitation of national armaments, i.e. a limitation of the production of weapons and ammunition can bring about an "enrichment" in raw materials, which eventually could be profitable to Germany in case of war. Such a conception is based upon a complete misunderstanding - to put it mildly - of the task and military requirements lying before us. Because even a successful saving of raw materials attained for instance through a limitation of the production of ammunitions, means only that we pile up these raw materials during a peace period in order to manufacture them only in case of war, i.e. we deprive ourselves of ammunition during the most critical months and we have instead the crude copper, lead or perhaps iron. But in this case it would be still better if the nation enter the war without having a single kilogram copper on stock.

(page 9 of original cont'd.)

but with well supplied ammunition dumps, than with empty ammunition dumps but so-called "enriched" raw material depots.

War makes possible the mobilization of even the last metal supplies. For this is then not an economic problem, but a question of will exclusively. And the national-socialistic leadership of the nation will have the will and also the determination and the severity necessary to solve these problems in case of war.

Much more important, however, is to prepare for the war during the peace. But moreover the following has to be stated in this respect:

(page 10 of original)

There is no preparation whatsoever of raw materials for the war nor is there any preparation of foreign currencies. It is often tried today to so present the situation that Germany entered the war in 1914 with well prepared quantities of raw material. This is a lie. No country is able to prepare in advance the quantities of raw materials required for a war if this war should last longer than, let us say, one year. But should a nation ever be in a position to prepare those quantities of raw material for one year ahead, then its political, military and economic leadership merits hanging. For they are already stocking up the available copper and iron instead of turning out grenades. But Germany entered the World War without any supplies whatsoever. The apparent peace time supplies which were available at this time in Germany were more than commensated for and devaluated by the miserable war supplies of ammunition.

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(page 10 of original cont'd.)

Besides, the quantities of war material required for a war are so large that an effective preparation of stocks for a long duration has never been realized in history

As far as the securing of supplies by means of accumulation of foreign currencies is concerned it is obvious that:

- 1) War can devaluate at any time foreign currencies as far as they do not consist of gold.
- 2) there is no guarantee at all during the war of realizing the transformation even of gold into raw materials.

Germany still during the World War very large currency assets in numerous countries. But for these assets our wise leaders of political economy were not able to supply Germany with sufficient quantities of fuel, rubber copper and tin. It is a ridiculous nonsense if somebody asserts the contrary. For this reason, and in order to secure the food supplies of our nation, the following compulsory tasks result:

It is not enough to establish from time to time a raw material or

(Page 11 of original)

German currency balance, or to speak of a preparation
of the war economy during peace time, but it is necessary
to provide all those means for peace time food production
and all for warfare, which can be secured through human
energy and activity. Consequently I draw the following
conclusions for a final solution of our vital necessities:

1. Parallel with the military and political armament and mobilization of our nation, must occur the economic one and this in the same tempo, with the same determination and if necessary with the same ruthlessness. In this measure the interests of individual gentlemen cannot play any part. There is only one interest, and that is the interest of the nation, and only one conception, which is that Germany must be brought politically and economically to the point of self-sufficiency.
2. For this purpose, foreign currency must be saved in all those fields where needs can be satisfied by German production, in order that it may be used for those necessities which under all circumstances can be satisfied only by imports.
3. In this sense, the German fuel production must now be developed with the utmost speed and brought to its definitive completion within 18 months. This task must be handled and executed with the same determination as the waging of a war; since on its solution depends the future conduct of the war and not on a stockpile of gasoline.
4. The mass production of synthetic rubber must be organized and secured with the same rapidity.

(page 11 of original-cont's)

The affirmation, that the procedures might not be quite determined and similar excuses must not be heard from now on. The question under discussion is not whether we will wait any longer, otherwise the time will be lost, and the hour of danger will take all of us under its hand. Above all, it is not the task of the government.

(page 12 of original)

economic institutions to rack their brains over production methods. This matter does not at all concern the Ministry of Economics. Either we have today a private economy, then it is its task its brains over production methods, or we believe that the determination of the production methods is the task of government; then we do not need the private economy any longer.

2. The question of production costs of these raw materials is also of no importance, since it is still more profitable for us to produce expensive tires in Germany and utilize them, than to sell theoretically cheap tires, but for which the Minister of Economics cannot grant any foreign currency, which therefore cannot be produced because of the shortage of raw materials and consequently cannot be utilized. If indeed we are obliged to build up an internal economy in the autarkic sense and we are obliged to do it, since the problem will certainly not be resolved through lamentation and the recognition of our needs for foreign currency - then the price of raw materials, individually considered, does not any longer play a decisive part. Furthermore, it is necessary to increase the German iron production

(page 12 of original- continued)

to its utmost limits. The objection, that we are not able to produce a similarly cheap raw iron with the German ore which contains 26% of iron, as with the Swedish ores containing 45% of iron etc. is of no importance, since we were not asked what we would prefer to do, but what we can do. The objection, that in this case all German blast-furnaces will have to be transformed is also unimportant, and above all it does not concern the Ministry of Economics. The Ministry of Economics has only to set the tasks of the national economy, the private economy has to fulfill them. But if the private economy considers itself unable to do this, then the national-socialistic state will know by itself how to resolve the problem.

(page 13 of original)

Besides, during 100 years Germany did not have any foreign iron ores. Even before the war, more German iron ores have been processed than during the time of our worst decline. Nevertheless, if we still have the possibility of importing cheaper ores, then it is all right. The existence of the national economy and especially of the conduct of war must not depend on this.

It is furthermore necessary to prohibit the distillation of potatoes into alcohol. The fuel must be gained from the earth and not from potatoes. Instead of this we have the duty to utilize any possible free farm area for the purpose of feeding humans or animals or of the cultivation of fibrous materials.

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(page 13 of original continued)

Furthermore it is necessary to make the supply of industrial greases independent of the imports within the shortest time and to meet it with our coal. This problem is resolved chemically and it actually cries for its realization. The German economy will understand the new economic tasks or it will show itself incapable of existing any longer in this modern time during which the Soviet state builds up a gigantic plan. But then not Germany will be ruined, but only some economists. It is furthermore necessary to increase the extraction of other ores, without considering the cost, and specially to increase the production of light metals to its utmost limit, in order to find a substitute material for certain and other metals.

Finally, it is also necessary for the armament, to utilize if possible already at this time those materials which will have to be and will be used in case of war instead of the precious metals. It is better to think over and resolve those problems during peace-time, than to wait for the next war, and to undertake only then, within the framework of the numerous tasks, these economic actions and methodological experiments.

(page 14 of original)

In short; I deem it necessary that now with iron determination a 100% self-sufficiency be attained in all those fields where it is possible and that in this manner not only the national supply with these most important raw materials will become independent from foreign countries, but that thereby the foreign exchange will be saved which we need in peacetime for the import of our food. I want to emphasize in this connection that I see in these tasks the possible economic

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(page 14 of original continued)

mobilization there is, and not in a limitation of armament industries in peace time for the purpose of saving and accumulating raw materials for war.

In addition however, I deem it necessary to carry out at once a re-examination of the outstanding foreign exchange claims of German industry abroad. There is no doubt that the outstanding claims of our industry today are quite enormous. And there is also no doubt that this is to conceal partly the abominous intention to own for all eventualities certain reserves abroad which are thereby removed from internal seizure. I see in it a deliberate sabotage of national preservation or the defense of the Reich, respectively, and I therefore deem necessary the passage of two laws by the Reichstag.

- 1) a law providing capital punishment for industrial sabotage and
- 2) a law making Jowry in its entirety answerable for damages done to German industry and thereby to the German nation by individual members of this criminal group.

The only fulfillment of these tasks in the form of a several years plan, making our national economy independent from foreign countries, will make it possible to demand sacrifices of the German nation in the field of industry and food. For then the nation has a right to demand of its leadership to which it gives blind recognition, that it tackles these problems also in this field with

(page 15 of original)

unheard of and resolute work and does not only talk about them, that it solves them and does not only register them:

(page 15 of original continued)

Almost four precious years have passed now. There is no doubt that we could be completely independent from abroad already today in the field of fuel, crude rubber and partly also iron ore supplies. Just as we produce 700,000 or 800,000 tons of gasoline at the present time we could be producing three million tons. Just as we produce several thousand tons of rubber we could already be producing 70,000 or 80,000 tons per year. Just as we increased our iron ore production from 2½ million tons to seven million tons we could process 20 or 25 million tons of German iron ore and if necessary also 30 millions. One has had enough time now to find out what we cannot do. It is now necessary to carry out what we are able to do.

I herewith set the following task:

I. The German Army must be ready for combat within
4 years.

II. The German economy must be mobilized for war within
4 years.

This is to certify that this is a true copy of a document found in the files of Speer's ministry.

(sgd.) D. I. J. GOODE, Capt. -

D. I. J. Goode, Capt. GS.

E. P. E. S. F. I. L. T. (Br)

Certified True Copy of Translation

DR. JUR. HERBERT KRJUS

Professor of Jurisprudence.

Muenberg, den 4.6.1946

(page 13 of the original)

Albert Speer

August 22, 1945.

Adolf Hitler's memorandum concerning the tasks
of the Four Year Plan - 1936

This memorandum was given personally to me by A.H. in 1944, with the following statement:

The lack of understanding of the Reich Ministry for Economics and the opposition of the German Economy against all, large scale plans induced him to elaborate this memorandum at Obersiebenbrunn.

He decided at that time to carry out a Four Year Plan and to put Goering in charge of it. On the occasion of Goering's appointment as the official in charge of the Four Year Plan he gave him this memorandum. There are only 3 copies, one of which he gave to me.

Goering was appointed (through decrees in the Reichsgesetzblatt) as the official in charge of the Four Year Plan October 18th 1936, so that the memorandum might have been originated in August 1936 approximately.

My secretaries Edith Hugiera and Annemarie Kampf made this transcript in my office, for my archives in Nurnberg.

(Signed) Albert Speer

(page 17 of the original)

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

J'certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministère Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 April 1946.

Ich bestätige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Übereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers

" A Certified True Copy "

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E n d .

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-416
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Secret Reich Matter.

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting (Ministerret) of

4 September 1936, 12 Noon.

Chairmen: Ministerpresident Generaloberst Goering
Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Reichsbankpresident und kommissarischer Reichs- und
Preussischer Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Schecht
Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwering von Krosigk
Preussischer Finanzminister Prof. Dr. Popitz
Staatssekretär Koerner
Wirtschaftsbeauftragter des Fuehrers Keppler
Ministerialdirektor Staatsrat Neumann
Stabsratsfuehrer des Reichsbruernfuehrers Dr. Reischle
Keeper of the minutes: Lt. Col. Loeb of the General Staff.

- - - - -

Min. Pres. Goering:

Today's meeting is of greater importance than all previous meetings.

At the last cabinet meeting of 11 August 1936 it was agreed that supplementary material was needed in order to make it possible to reach a decision.

Meanwhile now trouble has arisen, especially in connection with non-precious metals and rubber; even the Fuehrer has been drawn into this affair.

In the discussion of 1 September 1936 it was established that any trouble must be avoided before the Parteitag (Party Meeting), Geh. Rat Allmers had no authority for the letter in which he speaks of a 2-3 working week for the automobile industry. On 1 September 1936 temporary measures for the period lasting until the middle of October, when a decision will be reached, were ordered and are to be carried through.

In the same meeting special attention was called to our unpaid claims upon foreign countries which are presumably higher yet than the reported claims. Thus it is stupid to rack one's brain because of a few million marks. But an examination must be made in order to find out whether the claims reported as bad cannot really be collected.

Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Fuehrer has been reached; in case of war they are not a reliable backing in any case.

Certain persons have been asked for memoranda on the basis conduct of economy. So far only one was presented by Dr. Goerdeler and it is absolutely useless. In addition to many other erroneous thoughts it contains the proposal of considerable limitation of armaments.

In this connection it should be stated that the authority of the Col. General refers to the "insuring of armaments" which must rather be sped-up than slowed down.

The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Col. General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution thereof.

It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable. That Russia has done in the field of reconstruction, we, too, can do.

Just what sort of risk it is, that our industry is afraid of, compared to the risk in the field of foreign affairs which the Fuehrer runs so continuously?

The Fuehrer is going to have a memorandum issued concerning the financial angle of this problem.

Research on the problem of increasing exports, e.g., has shown that fundamentally new ways can hardly be found. It will not be possible to create a balance of foreign exchange merely by means of export. The "New Plan" of the Reichs-wirtschafts-minister is acceptable in its basic features - but it can be improved in details.

The Colonel General reads the memorandum of the Fuehrer.

The Colonel General is responsible for the execution of the tasks outlined in the memorandum.

If war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the present moment. They are, therefore, to be taken.

Two basic principles:

1) We must strive with greatest energy for autonomy in all those fields in which it is technically possible; the yearly amount of foreign exchange savings must still surpass that of the first proposal of the raw materials and foreign exchange staff anticipating a savings of 600 million Reichsmarks.

2) We have to tie over with foreign exchange in all cases where it seems necessary for armament and food.

In order to provide for foreign exchange, its flow abroad must be avoided by all means; on the other hand, whatever is abroad must be brought in.

The Fuehrer is going to speak very soon to the industrial leaders and expose to them his fundamental thoughts.

In view of the power of the State the necessary measures can definitely be carried through. Frederic the Great, to whom reference is being made from the most diverse sides, was in his financial behaviour a strong inflationist.

Through the genius of the Fuehrer things which were seemingly impossible have become a reality in the shortest time; last example: introduction of the two-year service law and recognition on the part of France that we need a stronger Wehrmacht than France herself. The tasks now ahead of us are considerably smaller than those which we have already accomplished.

All those measures which can be carried through with internal German money are possible and should be carried out. Through them the requirements of industry and food supply needing foreign exchange must be pushed into the second line.

All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.

The execution of the order of the Fuehrer is an absolute command.

End of meeting: 1300.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO EC-416

21 November 1945

I, Marie-Louise Acton, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. EC-416.

Marie-Louise Acton

Southern German Edition
Issue No. 254
49th year of publication

Southern German Edition
Munich, Thursday,
10 September 1936

VOLKISCHER BLICK

Watchword for the "Party Congress of Honor"

National Socialism vs. Bolshevism

Four Year Plan for the German Economy

The Fuehrer's Proclamation.

Now then, since the National-Socialist State is not willing, under any circumstances, to place restrictions upon the growth of its population, but, on the contrary, is determined to increase this all the natural fertility of the nation, we are compelled to consider and to reflect upon the future consequences of this development. It is not possible to effect any appreciable increase in the produce of our soil, and an appreciable rise in exports can hardly be reckoned with within the near future.

It is, therefore, the task of the National-Socialist State and of its economic leaders to thoroughly examine this problem, in order to determine what essential raw materials, fuels, etc., Germany is capable of producing herself.

The resultant savings in foreign exchange must then in future be used to provide an additional safeguard for our food situation, on the one hand, and for the purchase of such materials as cannot be produced here under any circumstances, on the other.

I am introducing this proposition, to-day, as the new 4 year program. In 4 years, Germany must be entirely independent of those foreign materials and products which can somehow be realized through German skill, through our chemical and mechanical building industries, and through our mines!

Once re-armament has been accomplished, masses of workers will be released; these will then be absorbed by this huge German raw materials industry and thus find employment of value to the national economy. We hope, by these means, to achieve a re-newed increase in national production covering many fields and, particularly, within the circulatory system of our economic body, so that our receipts from exports can be set aside, above all else, for the procurement of food and for raw materials we should still be lacking.

I have just issued the directives necessary for accomplishing this gigantic German economic plan. They will be executed with true National-Socialist energy and pluck.

Irrespective of this plan, however, Germany cannot renounce her desire for a solution of her colonial demands. The German people's right to live is as essential and important as are the rights of other nations!

I know, my fellow Nationals, that this new program represents a gigantic task; however, even now scientific solutions have already been found in many fields, production methods are being put to test and have, in part, already been determined and established. Thus, it is now only a question of what our energy and determination can do toward the realization of this program. As National-Socialists, we have never acknowledged the existence of the word "impossible", nor do we want to enrich our vocabulary with it, for the same reason, in the future.

Four years from now we will render an account to the nation again of the enormous task we have undertaken to safeguard its subsistence, i.e. its life and its independence.

- - - - -

Consequently, after discussing the matter with the Reich Minister of War, I have taken steps to have the two year period of service introduced into our Army without delay. I know, that our young Germans will submit to this order without even batting an eyelash. Germany's present-day leadership has a right to make this demand of German men, for all of us at one time served not only 2 years during peace time but four years in the greatest war of all times. And we did that for Germany, for our people, for our German native land. And the National-Socialist Movement has struggled for 15 years and has demanded the utmost of its adherents in sacrifices, in order to save Germany from the bolshevistic enemy and foe within.

Our love for our people, and our willingness to fight, to the very last, for freedom and independence constitute the ties that bind us to all these peoples who obey the same impulses. Germany may consider herself fortunate in the knowledge that her internal and external peace is maintained and secured by her own power. The more turbulent the world about us may turn the stronger will become the loyalty of the German people to her National-Socialist movement, to which she owes her historical resurrection. The more, too, will the people recognize and admire the vigorous leadership inherent in the Party, the same leadership, which rescued it from its own raggedness and transformed it into a proud, self-confident people; the same leadership which has removed the symptoms of inner dissolution; the same leadership which, at the eleven hour, pulled together the nation for the purpose of showing her how to gain mastery over her political, cultural, and economic problems.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT NI-8459
CONTINUED

The more the skies surrounding our fatherland begin to turn red in consequence of the world-wide bolshevist revolution, National-Socialist Germany will with even greater love and devotion back up its Army, to which we owe the finest and proudest traditions of our people.

It was this same Army that once trained us, from which all those of us sprang who later established the Party, the SA, SS, and the NSKK. It gave us the men with whom we built up our first Storm Troop Units, the guards of our movement. Once again, and throughout the years to come the young sons of our people shall belong to it (the Army) for a two-year period of service, so that they may acquire the strength and the tenacity to fight for the independence and the freedom of the Fatherland in order to secure the protection of the German nation.

The fact that I am in a position to make this announcement publicly on the occasion of the 8th Reich Party Congress leads me to glance back, with a deep feeling of happiness, upon this the proudest of all achievements of national-socialist state-ship and national-socialist military organization (Salute turn). Once again, one generation after another will make this noblest of all sacrifices that could be asked of any man.

By taking this step, the German people, in the year 1936 and in the fourth year of the national-socialist regime, have also brought to a close the period of historical dishonorableness.

Long live the national-socialist movement, long live our national-socialist Army, long live our German Reich!

"End"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, E.J. Hinchliffe, M.P. 026034 hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-8459.

7 July 1947

E.J. Hinchliffe
M.P. 026034

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4471
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNS L FOR M.R. CRIMES

(handwritten) B 1920

(Copy)

Conference on the Government Oil Program held in Berlin on
6 October 1936 at 15 hours and on 7 October 1936 at 10 hours
in the Leanderbank.

The following gentlemen attended:

Dr. POTT, Chairman,	}	from the raw materials staff
Dr. WELER		
Dr. EUBERFISCH,	}	I.G.
Dr. OTTENS) only on		
?) 6 October		
Dr. RUFERTI	}	Bochum Associations
von FARBOU) only on		
5 October		
Dr. FISCHER, gasoline	}	Head of the Economic Group Motor Fuels Manager of the Economic Group Motor Fuels
Dr. ZIERVOGEL		
Dr. JOST,	}	Scholven Hydrogenation Works
Dr. LUTHER		
Dr. MARTIN)	Ruhr gasoline
Dr. BROCKE)	Ruhrcoel A.G. - Stinnes
BOLKE	}	Hoesch
Dr. WEITZMILLER		
Dr. KNEPPER,	}	G.E. (Gelsenkirchener Braun- kohlen ?) A.G. (only on 7 October)
Dr. BRUNDI,		
Dr. SCHMIDT,		
Dr. MUELLER)	Krupp

POTT and WELER recall the Raw Materials Staff program for the Ruhr,
first stage of development:

205 000 tons gasoline produced by high pressure hydrogenation

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-4471
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

100 000 tons coal distillation tar

200 000 - 250 000 tons of Fischer gasoline from
distillation coke obtained in
connection with the distillation.

Messrs POIT and REIBENFISCH consider that the program should be carried out, if possible, by voluntary construction work. The "Braunkohle" have also had their task assigned to them.

(page 2 of original)

One believes that it will be possible to get along there without a new "Braunag". The I.G. is supposedly present at today's conference in an advisory capacity only.

The question as to whether Fischer gasoline can be obtained only in conjunction with coal distillation, is discussed in detail. It is certain that 100 000 tons of coal distillation tar should be made available as fuel oil.

REIBER points out that the amounts of distillation coke accruing in this connection can be used in other ways as well (water gas/hydrogen production for I.G. hydrogenation, generator gas production, metallurgical purposes etc.), so that within the 250 000 tons of Fischer gasoline planned for, certain amounts could also be obtained on the basis of high temperature coke.

DOYLE particularly stressed the fact that the voluntary aspect of construction must, under all circumstances, be provided for in place of central plants in which the individual plants would have to participate only in accordance with their capital according to a certain code.

The question of gasoline quality was also dealt with in detail (see file note on Munich). MARTIN points out that nowadays most gasolines with a trade mark also do not correspond to the requirements noted by ELLER and that, moreover, there is an American guarantee for gasoline to be obtained by cracking.

On the other hand, it is unambiguously established that the new will no longer deviate from its 3 requirements:

1. $d = 0.735$,
2. Octane number 52 - 53,
3. good keeping qualities.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

POTT points out that the question of quality would play an important role particularly when once the total gasoline requirements are covered by ~~mass~~ production. Then, in his opinion, only the best qualities, i.e. hydrogenated gasolines, would be preferred, and at higher prices. This must be taken into account, in order to avoid mis-investments at the very beginning.

(page 3 of original)

RUFERTI confirmed this by pointing out that today already Scholven gasoline brings 3 pfennigs and more per liter more than Bräsig-Fischer gasoline. But also as a Benzol-Association, we would have to place a value on producing only gasoline with high density high anti-knock qualities, in order to be able to maintain the additional cost of benzol with respect to gasoline.

FISCHER makes the same statements. Moreover, he states that the total plan is not adjusted to meeting peacetime requirements, but to the requirements in case of mobilization. The Army could then use only ~~two~~ fuels: best gasoline-benzol mixture, and for aviation, only anti-knock gasoline and gas oil (Gasöl), respectively.

At this stage of the negotiations, BUETEFISCH pointed out that a second stage of development is planned both for the Ruhr and for the whole German mining industry, regarding which we would probably be informed 8 days later, with a total of 24 months allowed for construction work. This plan provides for:

2,8 million tons of light motor fuels in all (i.e. production from plants already finished, planned and still to be built, including benzol and alcohol)

1,4 million tons of fuel oil,

1,5 million tons of Diesel oil

and several hundred thousand tons of lubricating oil.

A further 400 000 tons of distillation tar and about 700 000 tons of gasoline are intended for the Ruhr alone.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI- 4471
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

(The distillation tar program for the entire Reich provided for the following amounts for the first stage of development :

- 100 000 tons of distillation tar for the Ruhr,
- 100 000 tons of distillation tar for Silesia,
- 50 000 tons of distillation tar for Berlin,
- 50 000 tons of distillation tar for Saxony,
- 20 000 tons of distillation tar for Hamburg).

Getting word of the subject we were told on 7 October that only the amounts of gasoline intended for the first stage of development - i.e. 500,000 - 550,000 tons - and 100 000 tons of distillation tar or heating fuel, respectively, in all would be required from the Ruhr. The production of Diesel oil and lubricating oil will be transferred to lignite ;

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4471
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

(the Fischer-synthesis will make available for the production of lubricating oil only the corresponding fractions within their entire gasoline program).

All those present agreed that a production of 1.4 million tons of fuel oil on the basis of coal distillation is not possible without disorganising the coal and coke market. POTT expresses himself particularly strongly against this idea. If distillation coke were to be delivered at the same price as the original coal, one would have to get about 12 - 14 Reichsmarks for distillation tar. For this price, however, synthetic fuel oil could also be produced.

MUELLER points out that in his discussion with the Raw Materials Staff, he had, for his part, considered it to be impossible to provide the 400 000 tons of distillation tar first requested for fuel oil purposes, without upsetting the market for solid fuels and if Fischer gasoline were to be made only in limited quantities. He said that thereupon he worked out his proposal for 200 000 tons of distillation tar for the whole Reich, and submitted proposals which would have provided for an easy integration of distillation coke produced in this way into the motor fuel economy (- which is doubted by POTT). It would be another matter if, for instance, the larger power plants distilled their boiler coal themselves. This is, however, also not possible today without considerably increasing the price of fuel. But the problem is being given further consideration.

* and fuel
oil

POTT then cast doubts on the particular usefulness of distillation coke for obtaining water gas.

MARTIN and MUELLER, however, confirm that distillation coke, if only it is sufficiently firm, is at least equal, as has been shown, to high temperature coke in the case of normal water gas production. No one is considering, at the present time, using distillation coke for the direct production of gas ready for synthesis.

POTT is of the opinion that in the long run, lean fine coals would have to be used for producing very cheap water gas (??). It would be too much of a waste to use gas coal for the production of

(page 5 of original)

distillation coke for these purposes.

In order to avoid upsetting the fuel oil question, which is coming to the fore more and more, Fischer proposes possibly making available only the amount of fuel oil which can be

* by unlimited introduction of distillation,

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

produced cheaply, i.e. not over 8 Reichsmarks. (200,000 tons from coal tar and lignite tar as well as 200,000 tons of coal distillation tar.) The remainder required in case of mobilization is to be stocked by cheap purchases. The current needs of the Navy which exceed the 400,000 tons that are then available at a good price, should also be covered by inexpensive imports in peace-time.

In reply to MUELLER, BUETEFISCH also stated that this distillation program of the New Materials Staff had arisen by simple multiplication of the statements made by MUELLER in what he had worked out. Moreover, it is now also being investigated whether these quantities of fuel oil, required in the event of mobilization, could not simply be secured by keeping plants, presently out of operation, (as stand-by plants) ready for production. (Those present pointed out that such plants could hardly be used in the case of mobilization unless previously tested and then kept in good repair). The construction of new gasoline plants is also under consideration, in order possibly to secure alternate production facilities permitting a switch-over from gasoline production to the production of - naturally expensive - fuel oil as desired. MARTIN points out, that in this case coal, the basic raw material for this purpose, will have to be made available at very low cost.

FISCHER recommends that, as soon as possible, (representatives of) lignite and coal (interests) voluntarily submit as soon as possible, suggestions of their own regarding the production of required commodities. Thereupon, negotiations with regard to financing should be taken up immediately with Dr. SCHACHT. Matters which are already in the final stage of development, should be taken up at once, in order to forestall government intervention.

In the course of the discussion as to the fastest and simplest method of doing this, MUELLER suggested that the chiefs of the subdivisions (Fachgruppe) Mining (Knopper) and Motor Fuels (FISCHER, Deputy FOIT) co-operate closely on 7 Oct. in order to discuss further measures in closest association. But above all

(page 6 of original)

the entire program would have to be submitted to this small committee without any gaps.

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

On 7 October, when the meeting was resumed, KNEPPER agrees in principle to a close co-operation of both economic groups in this matter. In regard to the various processes he points out that the Ruhr continues to be interested, now as before, in the Fischer process because of its large consumption of coke, it being understood, of course, that the problem of quality must be settled first. His own company, for instance, would be willing to produce up to 150,000 tons of Fischer gasoline, if capital would be made more easily available.

The distillation processes will be abandoned, because, for instance, more fuel oil can be produced, and at smaller costs, according to STINNES (under the Stinnes process ?) (KNEPPER's error!). Moreover, in the name of G.B. (Gelsenkirchener Braunkohlen ?) A.G., he rejects any participation in such jointly operated plants. The morning conference was interrupted for an hour at 10.45, because POTT, KNEPPER and FISCHER had a conference with Dr. KRAUCH on the same subject.

We were informed of the following results of this conference:

1. KNEPPER will call a meeting of the various subsection representatives of the economic group Mining for Wednesday the 14 October to discuss the proposals.
2. The Ruhr has to produce a total of only 500,000 - 550,000 tons of gasoline (hydrogenation and Fischer gasoline) and 100,000 tons of fuel oil.
3. The entire plan will be forwarded to KNEPPER on 9 Oct. 36.
4. The Raw Materials Staff would like to receive our proposals in approximately 8 days.
5. In about 8 days POTT is expected to make a statement as to whether and in what quantities up to 100,000 tons of fuel oil can be produced from other material than distillation tar.

To ensure rapid progress, the following committees are set up ad hoc within the economic group Motor Fuels for the Ruhr:

(page 7 of original)

- a) Main Committee: POTT, chairman
BUTTERFISCH,
MARTIN,
SCHMIDT (G.B.(Gelsenkirchener Braunkohlen?)A.G.
WELLER,
JOST.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

- b) Sub committee MUELLER, chairman (drafted for the main
 Distillation: committee)
 LUTHER,
 SCHMIDT,
 WEITENHILLER.
- c) Sub committee
 plant costs: BUETEFISCH,
 BROCHE.
(A statement of the plant costs should be forwarded as soon
as possible to the parties interested in high pressure
plants).
- d) Sub committee
 hydrogenation apparatus:
 BUETEFISCH,
 BROCHE,
 JOST.
(This committee shall examine above all whether and to
what extent pipe space can be substituted for high pressure
space).

POTT in his capacity as deputy chief of the economic group
Motor Fuels will immediately call a meeting of the Ruhr mines,
to be held at B.V. (Bochumer Verbaende?) Bochum on 12 Oct. at
16.00 o'clock, on which occasion he intends to give a broad out-
line of the program of the Raw Materials Staff. At the same time
all present will be asked to consider the question whether any-
body is willing to volunteer for construction. The main committee
will convene the same day at 14 o'clock in order to define the
aims as clearly as possible at this time already. Shortly there-
after the main committee shall then inform the Raw Materials Staff
to what extent the program intended for the Ruhr will be executed
voluntarily, and shall simultaneously recommend that plants which
fail to volunteer their co-operation, be compelled under law to
produce the quantities which may still be lacking.

The distillation committee will convene at KRUPP
Administration Headquarters on 9 Oct. at 10 o'clock.

(page 8 of original)

(In the course of a discussion about the "Uhde Process"
("Uhde-Verfahren") POTT pointed out that this process, in his
opinion, constitutes nothing but a Bergius process, refined by
Pott-Broche, which is subject to patent regulations. MARTIN
explains to what extent we are engaged in the testing. MUELLER
points out that in view of this fact we are speaking only of
proposals of Uhde.

Essen, 8 October 1936.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4471
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, Civ.No. B-397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4471.

Herbert RODECK
Div.No. B-397499

Chief of the
Military Economic Staff
of the Office of the Wehrmacht

Berlin, 235
Dankelstrasse 27
Telephone: Local calls, 11 lines
Long distance calls, 11 lines
August 31 91.

24th November 1936

Lecture
delivered on 24 November 1936
before the Reich Chamber of Labor.

I have for two reasons acceded with particular pleasure to the wish of Dr. Ley that I address the Reich Chamber of Labor on Military Economy:

1. The Reich War Minister is particularly concerned that, especially in your circle, the fundamentals of Military Economy should be known so that you should acquire a picture of how the soldier views the connection between Wehrmacht and economy.
2. I, as Chief of the Military Economic Staff desire to explain to you what tasks the German Labor Front has to fulfill in Military Economy, having pointed out in an article in the Wehrmacht number of the Leitender Illustrierter Zeitung (i.e., Illustrated News), which will appear in the next few days, that the German Labor Front has great tasks in this connection.

(page 2 of original)

The conception of MILITARY ECONOMY is a coinage of recent years and has lately been introduced into many countries. I do not think, however, that in any State its meaning is so clearly and comprehensively perceived as here in Germany. To bring these thoughts before you and to explain them is the object of this lecture, and I shall give you these explanations by providing answers to the following four questions in the course of the lecture:

1. From what conceptions did Military Economy develop?
2. What do we understand by Military Economy?
3. Why is this Military Economy especially necessary for Germany?
4. What tasks and what demands does Military Economy impose in particular on the German Labor Front?

(page 3 of original)

I shall begin with the first question: From what conceptions did military economy develop?

There are two fundamental points which have forced upon us the idea of military economy:

TRANSLATIONS OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. 33-373
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

- a) The experience of the Great War, combined with the effects of the Versailles Peace Treaty
- b) The view of National Socialism on the duties of the individual and the public towards the State.

Allow us to make some remarks on these two points.

Each of us who served at the front during the great World War returned home with two insurmountable and unforgettable impressions:

1. with an appreciation of the splendid manner in which the military mobilization organization of the German Staff functioned at that time

(page 4 of original)

and a still greater admiration for the courage of the German soldier, who, whether young recruit or old reservist, heroically stood his ground in east or west or wherever he was placed.

This happy memory has, however, a sad counterpart, namely the breakdown in the spiritual and material care of the fighting army out of the homeland as a consequence of the inadequate military-economic preparation of the German people for this great international struggle.

Think back to the enthusiasm of the people at the outbreak of war, to the splendid manner in which mobilization was accomplished, to the smooth efficiency with which the troops were marshalled, to the fine arrangements of our regiments during the advance, remember the courage of the young recruits at LORRAINE, the tough and heroic tenacity in trench warfare, and the enthusiasm, when the order came:

(page 5 of original)

"Over the top again for a breakthrough offensive" and in spite of all that - the war was lost.

The battles were won, but the outcome of the war was defeat, and why? Just because the military-economic preparation, which is necessary for a modern war and which gives support to the fighting army, was insufficient or was totally neglected. We can assert indisputably that in the last count, it was not the material of the Allies that won the war, but that the German soldier emerged as unqualified victor from the material battles. His victories were nullified, however, because all the measures, which we today group under the heading of military-economy, were not recognized by the Government at that time, or were introduced too late.

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Let us also think back here to the development of the individual phases which led to the unhappy end, to the ammunitions crisis of the winter of 1917 to the initial and difficulties of the winter of 1915, on the "Swede turn" winter of 1916, to the lack of rubber and gasoline which was

TRANSLATIONS OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT 14-00-373
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beginning to be felt, let me recall that the then War Ministry, led, because of the lack of steel, to develop let's say tanks and munitions and that many military undertakings had to be carried out in order to increase our foundation of fuelstuffs and raw materials.

And finally, let us remember the spiritual collapse, which was induced by the shortages of fuelstuffs and which finally led to the grainness of the Revolt of 1918.

All this shows us a logical development and a proof that there was then missing what we today call military-economic preparation.

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The world has progressed 20 years since then, and with it, the realization of a fighting force and the comprehension of the conduct of war. We live in the age of motorization and mechanization and in the age of total warfare. And total war demands, in the realm of military-economy, considerably more than did the world war. The total war of the future leads back to the beginnings of war-making. In those days, in the times of our forefathers, the whole people was involved in the war. All fighting men were in the field, and the entire possessions of the whole people, their land, their houses and their family fortunes were devoted to the war. Today - in the war of the future - it will be no different. The total war of the future will, as in earlier times, be a war of the whole nation against another nation and the entire fate of the whole nation.

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will be more clearly evident than ever before. Once this has been recognized, it falls to three things are necessary to the soldier, for the successful conduct of such a war: a strong fighting force, high morale throughout the whole nation and a strong economic system.

This realization formed the initial starting-point for the realization of the theory of military-economy. To realize it, however, and, in fact, to make practical use of it, was, for us soldiers, at first only possible in small ways and in secret. It was the victory of the National Socialist Revolution and the assumption of power by the Führer which first gave to the soldier the prerequisite for the actual utilization of the experience gained in world war, experienced or important for the whole people. The condition necessary for this was the existence of an authoritarian government, which recognized and accepted the necessity for a national defense, and a

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Government which included economy within the framework of national defense and assigned to it political tasks, and which it in the execution of these with constant regard for the interest of the State.

Moreover, the need existed for a force which would reshape the whole attitude of the business men towards the State and sever economy from a world of liberalistic ideas which knew nothing whatsoever of all the duties and tasks imposed by military-economy.

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I come now to the answer to the second question: what is military economy?

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If the fundamental idea of military economy is to be properly understood, it must be made clear that 3 factors go to make up a military policy:

The fighting force, the economic system and culture.

A fighting force formed without regard to economic questions must in the long run come to grief just as must an economic system which lacks military protection, and both, the fighting force and the economic system, will collapse if they are not permeated by a culture which appeals to each fighting man and each citizen playing his part in the economic system as of sufficient value to warrant the sacrifice of his blood and his possessions. Otherwise we, as a nation of central Europe cannot survive when the peoples of the outer boundaries of Europe and only the uttermost concentration of all forces can offer to the new Germany, as once to the

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Prussian Frederick the Great, the prospect of survival and success. The economic system may therefore not be sacrificed to the fighting forces; nor the fighting forces to the economic system, nor can either of them renounce culture. Everything belongs together, everything must be directed with a firm hand and in this fundamental idea lies the conception of military-economy.

Now what is Military Economy?

Military Economy is not a form of economy, it is no mere department of a considered idea, it is not a one-sided affair of military interests. Military Economy is the designation in leading the direction for the economic activity of all citizens. It is a political concept. It no longer has anything whatsoever to do with the theoretical doctrines of a typic economic science. It is not

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an epoch which can be succeeded in turn by another, because it expresses the expediency of all happenings in the economic sphere for the interest of the life of the State, expediency perceived purely in the light of reason, and, in the present situation, is therefore best suited to the furtherance and, above all, to the ensuring of the well-being of the State. It is military economy in the comprehensive sense of the word. It is economy directed by people of political character and, accordingly, the expression of the highest ideological attitude towards the State.

From this it follows that a fundamental change must occur in the economic life. At one time, the term economy was understood to mean a State within the State, because it was then that the economic system was a decisive factor in the material well-being of the State. It was thus admitted that the losses of such an economic system were stronger than the political losses.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT HL 35-773
CONTINUED

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of a State. The inadequacy of this attitude was evidenced in various States, and most notably in Germany. In such an economic system, there was no room for our State concept of talley. It recognized the value of this concept only when it was possible to conceal profits from this organization called the State. Whether this attitude be described as Liberalism or Capitalism is immaterial. The fact remains that in all earlier economic epochs the business man led an individual existence, the aim of which was his own well-being, regardless of other considerations, and which was based upon the opinion that the accumulation of money or securities meant wealth and that this wealth belonged to him alone. If an event, such as, for example, a war then broke in upon this state of affairs and attacked this supposed wealth, or if an invading enemy failed to show the slightest respect for this

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wealth, then for the first time it was noticed that something else existed in the world, something called the State.

Military economy therefore constitutes the theoretical and practical break with the past as far as economy is concerned. Economic materialism must be replaced by altruistic idealism. This however in no way signifies the rejection of personal initiative and ambition. This new attitude towards the State should, rather be viewed in the economic life precisely as the conception of honor, in that if the soldier desires victory in order that he may be rewarded, but for love of his country, and desires it even at the cost of his own life. This is what military economy requires of every German wage-earner - whether white-collar worker or soldier, whether citizen, factory hand or farmer, whether merchant or craftsman, artist or scientist.

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Military economy, therefore, is not an exceptional state of affairs but a new form of peacetime economy which, in the same way as total war, takes stock of all resources of the nation even in peacetime and directs them with a view to increasing military preparedness. Not only business and industry are asked to pursue this new goal. All walks of life and all other fields of knowledge, history, geography, science, particularly chemistry, and, last but not least, the technical professions are taking part in fulfilling the same task - to strengthen the military potential.

The ultimate aim of military economy is the safeguarding of the nation. Where this aim cannot be brought into line with economical and profitable production, the latter must take second place.

Military economy has much in common with planned economy, but they are not

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the same. Military economy is based on planned directions, given by the Government to business and industry but it does not require that the State should take the place of a business-man or an industrialist. In Russia military economy and planned economy are identical. The Fuehrer has given his opinion about this question quite clearly on several occasions, the first time in his great speech before the Reichstag in March 1933, in which he mentioned the recognition of private property. In that speech, he decided clearly in favor of promoting private enterprise to the utmost and against an economic bureaucracy organized by the State as a divergent means of safeguarding the economic interests of the nation. This does not preclude, in the sphere of armaments, the setting up of a few model firms, run by private enterprise, but controlled by the State down to the last detail, in order to use them as price regulators and as experimental stations.

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The State directs industry in accordance with national and military-economic principles and submits its problems to it; industry solves the problems on its own responsibility and on the basis of private enterprise, while acting in accordance with the aims of the government. If industry is oriented in this way along military economic lines, it will fulfil its difficult task.

I have defined military economy in broad outline, and am now going to state briefly what the problems are which it will have to solve. They may be summarized under three headings:

1. Direction of peacetime economy according to military economic principles,
2. Preparation of war economy,
3. Preparation of economic warfare.

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I do not propose to-day to go into these three points in detail, but I should like to state that these problems have to be examined from every aspect of human life, for example, the food situation
raw materials
industry

(page 18 of original cont'd.)

Finance
Trade and Transport
Employment of Labor
Propaganda
and many other aspects.

All these questions crop up again and again in the three problems I have mentioned. For a successful solution, central direction is necessary.

These short explanations will be sufficient to prove the all-encompassing character of military economy.

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Gentlemen, we now come to the third question: why is military economy so particularly important for Germany?

Before we examine Germany's situation in detail, let us look for a minute at the present world situation. What do we see?

The hope one could perhaps cherish in the past, that the political tension between the nations would relax in future by way of an economic reconciliation - that hope has disappeared.

If we look at the world we see that side by side with the political tension the economic tension has increased. On the one side there are countries with gigantic natural sources of raw materials and stocks, and on the other side countries entirely lacking in raw materials. Some countries have enormous gold stocks, while others are emptying their last gold reserves in order to purchase urgently needed raw materials; in one country the arable area is so small that it is quite impossible to feed the population on the products of its own soil, while there can feed the population of a whole continent. Vast colonies belonging to one nation - absolute wealth if you will - another country is a debtor to many others, another country is the creditor of almost all the others;

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the value of foreign currencies rises and falls, and all this is not a natural phenomenon. I could give many more examples of the complex economic picture which prevails on our planet.

And if we look, in mind, the struggles for political and cultural power which have been fought by Bolshevism, Fascism, National Socialism, democracy and authoritative movement, we can see only one salvation: to be prepared. To be prepared means everything, and that goes for us especially. If we scan German history we find again and again that our German Fatherland, because of its position in the heart of Europe, has become the arena for the bitterest struggles of the neighboring countries. If we think back to the first German Reich, to the days of the Great Elector, to the military excursions of Louis XIV, Frederick the Great's heroic struggle, the world power of Napoleon reaching down to modern times - this and again we see rivers of German blood being spilled for the preservation of the life and the unity of the German Nation. And if we examine this historical fact from the purely military point of view we must admit that all this was quite natural. Germany is surrounded by European great powers and lacks the protection of natural frontiers.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT RG.10-317
CONTINUED

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Neither great mountain ranges, nor wide rivers, nor a definite line protect the German borderlands from sudden military attack.

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The heart of Germany is well within/ of the air forces of the neighboring countries. Germany has no outlet to any of the five oceans and can quickly and easily be cut off from overseas supplies. Germany is too thickly populated and unable fully to feed her population from the products of her own soil. Our natural sources of raw materials are, to a great extent, situated in the borderlands; we lack many war-essential raw materials. Nor do we possess colonies, nor have we hoarded stocks of gold. But in spite of that, we have got to be prepared. Prepared - by pursuing a sound military economy and by taking good, by diligence and energy, by the organization and the moral strengthening of our people, and by material by increasing our war-economic power, all that which has been denied to us owing to the geo-political situation of Germany in the world.

Some time ago I was asked by a foreign military attache: why do you indulge in the luxury of the Four Year Plan and why do you rush headlong into these unnecessary exactions? I was able to reply briefly and to the point: because you force us to do so, and don't want to give us what you possess in your country, and what every country needs to preserve its place in the world.

Gentlemen, the Four Year Plan is military economy at its purest.

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Let us rejoice and be thankful that the Fuehrer is making use of the well-tried energy and capacity for hard work of Colonel-General Goering to close this gap in our military economy. Let us confess openly and honestly that Germany's military economic position is not ideal. Nor must we underestimate the difficulties which arise from this fact. But it is this knowledge which compels us, more than any other country, to apply military economy and make our dispositions accordingly. It is every soldier's duty to face unflinchingly all dangers and to act quickly and energetically. And if they don't want to sell copper to us, then we will make our own ammunition and manufacture our equipment from other materials. German technicians and German chemists will eventually succeed in producing economically fuel and rubber from German coal. And if need be, we shall tighten our belts as well. The task of our organization will be to shape and direct German industry in such a way that it can provide us with the same advantages as other countries possess, for example England and the United States, because of their secure military position, and without their having done anything to attain them.

I am glad to state that the organizations of industrialists as well as those of traders and craftsmen have assured us of their collaboration towards this aim, and have already achieved satisfactory results.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. EC-373
CONTINUED

(page 23 of original)

We shall have to direct Trade and Transport already in peacetime in such a way that, if war should come, they may from the very first day, fulfill the tasks which are necessary if a nation involved in a total war is to be kept supplied.

Gentlemen, I am not going to give you any more details, but will conclude with the following remarks:

Military economy, as we as soldiers demand it, is Germany's present necessity. It is not only part and parcel of the National Socialist idea of the State; it is an inescapable necessity, created by Germany's unfavorable geo-political and military economic situation, and made even more imperative by the behavior of our former enemies.

These are the reasons which contain the answer to the question why military economy is particularly necessary in Germany.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947

I, VICTORIL ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. EC-373.

.....
VICTORIL ORTON, No. 20129.

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REICH LEGAL GAZETTE
(Reichsgesetzblatt)

Part One

Published at Berlin on 19 October 1936, Nr. 96

Decree for the execution of the Four-Years' Plan
dated 18 October 1936.

The realization of the new Four-Years' Plan as proclaimed by me at the Party Meeting of Honor ('Parteitag der Ehre') requires a uniform direction of all powers of the German nation and the rigid embodiment of all pertinent authorities within Party and State.

I convey the execution of the Four-Years' Plan to Minister-president Generaloberst Goering.

Ministerpresident Generaloberst Goering will take the necessary measures for the fulfillment of the task given to him and, in this respect, has authority to issue legal decrees and general administrative regulations. He is authorized to hear and to provide with instructions all authorities, including the Supreme Authorities of the Reich, and all agencies of the Party, its formations and affiliated organizations. (Dienststellen der Partei, ihrer Gliederungen und der ihr angeschlossenen Verbände).

Berchtesgaden, 18 October 1936

The Fuehrer and Reichchancellor
ADOLF HITLER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Nancy E. Fenstermacher, AGO A-422786, hereby certify that I am familiar with the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation.

/s/ Nancy E. Fenstermacher
AGO A-422786

End

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. PS-3324
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL CONT'D.

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well prepared.

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(Page 63, Line 6 to Line 20)

One can evaluate correctly, what the Four Year Plan means for the economic preparation of war, only when one considers, that the Four Year Plan does not include only the food and raw material economy, only the entire industrial economic life, but that it also includes foreign commerce, money and foreign-exchange economy and finance, so that the entire economic life and production in Germany is authoritatively determined and executed by this plan. Although all the economic and financial departments were harnessed in the tasks and work of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of Generalfeldmarschall Göring, the war economic preparation of Germany has also been advanced in secret in another sector for well over a year, namely by means of the formation of a national guiding apparatus for the special war economic tasks, which had to be mastered at that moment, when the condition of war became a fact. For this work as well all economic departments were combined into one administrative authority, namely under the general plenipotentiary for economy, to which position the FUHRER appointed me approximately one and a half years ago.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. PS - 3324.

3.1.46.

I, A. Fländreau, Civ., 046305, hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document NO. PS 3324.

A. Fländreau
Civ., 046305

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MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CA-1
Prosecution Document Book No. 20

English



Case 6
I.G. Farben
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I.G. Farben Case -- Count I/C

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Transcript
EC-244 (USA-641)		Secret letter of Reich War Minister of 22 February 1937, signed Blomberg to Hitler, on delimitation of the jurisdictions of the Four Year Plan (Goering) and the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy (Schacht),		1
NI-5637		Article by Colonel Beutler, of May 1943, on military economics and armament offices, in secret publication "Military Economic News", stating: "The military economic effort now found its strongest expression in the development of the Four Year Plan, in which the strong personality of Reich Marshal Goering helped the will of the military economy finally to win through".		3
NI-5746		Minutes of Mail discussion No. 88, 7 December 1937. Defendant Gattineau reports that Keppler wishes to obtain the figures and reports obtained by Dr. Neubacher.		7
NI-051		Speech held by Goering on the execution of the Four Year Plan before industrialists on 17 December 1936, stating: "Our whole nation is at stake, we live in a time when the final battle is in sight, we are already on the threshold of mobilization and we are already at war. All that is lacking is actual shooting."		15
NI-5955		Affidavit of State Secretary Koerner of 24 January 1947, on Goering's speech with Bosch and Krauch among other industrialists present.		16
NI-4192		Minutes of meeting of the enlarged Farben Committee, of 22 December 1936, stating that Schnitzler gave a "highly confidential report" on Goering's and Hitler's speech of 17 December 1936.		17
EC-107		Secret letter of January 1937 of Reich War Minister to Dr. Schacht on agricultural mobilization.		18

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Transcript
NI-4706		Chart of the Four Year Plan and its Main Departments, 18 December 1936.	21	
NI-4706		Table of organization of the Four Year Plan, Office for Raw Materials and Synthetics, 1 August 1937.	22	
NI-10036		Affidavit by Dr. Hagert, of 25 July 1947, showing I.G.'s share in the plant expansion of capacity and investments under the Four Year Plan in the chemical field.	3	
NI-10036		Affidavit by Dr. Hagert, of 25 July 1947, showing I.G.'s share in the plant expansion of capacities under the Four Year Plan for the period October 1936 to May 1937.	26	
NI-5620		Minutes of the meeting of the technical management of Hoechst, 11 January 1937, showing discussion by I.G. Farben, that projects of the Four Year Plan be amortized in less than 10 years.	34	
NI-6700		Article by Col. Loeb in review "The Four Year Plan", January 1937, on "Tasks of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials".	4	
NI-8500		Letter of Col. Loeb to State Secretary Backe, of 30 October 1937, including report on the results of the work of the Four Year Plan during the first year.	38	
NI-8803		Memorandum of conference held on 16 June 1937, on iron and the iron quota system with representatives of the Four Year Plan, Air Ministry and other authorities present. Krauch participating in discussions on iron situation with special view to armament "of the enemy".	45	
NI-1200		Announcement by Goering in review "The Four Year Plan", February 1938, pointing out that the most intensive concentration of all political, military and economic forces ordered by the Fuehrer lead to the reorganization of the Four Year Plan and the Ministry of Economics.	55	
NI-130		Excerpt from Voelkischer Beobachter, 6 February 1938, announcing appointment of leading officials of the Four Year Plan to all key positions of Ministry of Economics.	58	

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Transcript
NI-523		Table of Organization of the Reich Ministry of Economics 1938.		57
NI-8799		Report of the Reich Office for economic development on production plan for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, 9/10 June 1938, concluding that "in order to reach more rapidly the level set for mobilization" is possible only by "rigid coordination" and "granting of special powers."		73
NI-6766		Interrogation of Carl Krauch, 29 April 1947, incorporating interrogations of September 1945, stating that Dr. Bosch, Chairman of the Vorstand of Farben tried to see Goering in June 1938 and that Krauch informed Goering that the Four Year Plan was based on wrong figures.		11
NI-5637		Letter of I.G.'s Dr. Embros to Krauch, 27 June 1938, suggesting, upon Krauch's request, a new agency with new powers of decision, concluding: "If German rearmament is to proceed with the necessary speed and on national principles, what we need is that we should deal with one single responsible office."		11
NI-8830		Secret memorandum of Reich Office for Economic Development, 30 June 1938, containing accelerated plan for explosives, powder, intermediates and chemical warfare agents.		11
NI-8041		Secret memorandum concerning the "accelerated production plan" for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, emphasizing that "this accelerated plan can be put into effect only if there will be an entirely new and rigid concentration of planning and execution by one single individual". Reference to a separate memorandum concerning the necessary conditions and powers, 30 June 1938.		11

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Trans- cript
R-140 (USA 160)		Minutes of Goering's speech to airplane manufacturers at Karien Hall, 8 July 1938, stressing the tension between Germany and the other powers and stating: "I am still missing completely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives to New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there."		118
NI-8800		Secret document of Reich Office for Economic Development containing "Military economy new production plan" of 12 July 1938 for mineral oil, rubber, light metals, gun powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents.		131
PS-2353		Manuscript of General Thomas "Basic facts for history of German war and armaments economy", showing cooperation between Four Year Plan and Military Economic Staff of OKW, undated, and describing the "Karien Hall Plan", for which Goering "had put General Director Dr. Krauch of the I.G. in charge of its completion."		135

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. DG-244
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Volume 94-4

The Reichswehrminister
and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
WfstG.O.Nr. 599/37 g.K.Ia

Berlin W. 35
February 22, 1937

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

"My Fuehrer!

"The plenipotentiary for war economy is to be considered under your instructions as laid down in the Reich Defense Law of May 21st 1935 a Supreme Government Authority (oberste Reichsbehörde). You have appointed Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht as head of that organization.

"The President Dr. Schacht has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as plenipotentiary for the time being since in his opinion there is existing a conflict between the powers conferred upon him and those of Col. General Goering. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed.

"For purposes of clarification may I point out that in my opinion there is no overlapping in the realm of economic mobilization between the work of Col. General Goering as head of the Four Year Plan and that of the plenipotentiary for war economy.

"The Four Year Plan has as its object, with regard to economic rearmament, to clear all bottlenecks within this program now, i.e. in time of peace. Especially the proposals to secure Germany's own needs for ore, fuel and rubber are of greatest significance from the point of view of a war economy.

"The plenipotentiary on the other hand is entrusted with the task of preparing the existing economic forces of Germany for the event of war and to exploit these forces in the most useful way for the people and the army, should war break out. It is a matter of course that the two organizations should keep each other informed about all transactions made by either one of them. Since moreover the basic directives for the preparation of economic mobilization coincide with my office any controversy between the plenipotentiary and the head of the Four Year Plan can easily be avoided.

"If you, my Fuehrer, agree with my view regarding these jurisdictional questions, it may be possible to induce Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht, whose co-operation as plenipotentiary for preparation of war is of great significance, to resume his former activity."

Signed: von Blomberg

c.t.l. Signature illegible

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-244
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-244

I, LEO LOEB, civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. EC - 244.

LEO LOEB

Attached slip:

NOTICE :

"The Military Economic News" is intended only for the offices of the Military Economic Organization. It may be desirable for reasons of expediency to pass on individual articles or notices to higher level offices.

It is forbidden to pass on the copies themselves.

(page 1 of original)

SECRET ! This is a secret matter in the sense of Article 89 of the German Criminal Code (Edition of 24 April 1934). Misuse will be punished according to the regulations of this law, so far as other Penal Regulations do not apply.

MILITARY ECONOMIC NEWS

for the Offices of the Military Economic Organization

Berlin, 26 May 1943

No. 5

Contents : From Military Economy and Armament Office (Wirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt) to Military Economic Staff (Wirtschaftsstab). By General-Staff Colonel Bautler, Chief "Stb (Abroad). - Traffic Problems in the Military Economy. By Colonel Bernich, OKM (High Command of the Armed Forces) "Stb. - Performances of the Wehrmacht Procurement Command (W.E.K.) in action. - Construction and scope of activities of the Tyre Office. - Notes from the Military Economy of France.

FROM MILITARY ECONOMY AND ARMAMENT OFFICE (WIRTSCHAFTS- UND RÜSTUNGSAMT) TO MILITARY ECONOMIC STAFF (WIRTSCHAFTSTAB)

Development and Present-day Tasks / By Col. i. Gen. Staff,
Chief "Stb (Abroad)

The leading office in German Military Economy underwent some considerable time ago a far-reaching transformation. It is interesting on this occasion to stop and observe the growth and development of this

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

office. Only from such an observation can a real understanding of the present reorganization be obtained and its performance within the military-economic framework be appreciated.

The Military Economy (Wehrwirtschaft) or, as it was then called, the War Economy, is a child of the first world war. Previous to 1914, there were no preparations for it, and the ideas that arose here and there with such an aim in view probably led to discussions but not to deeds. This circumstance contributed essentially to the fact that the War Economy in the first world war came only very slowly into action and had to go through many teething troubles. Despite all this, the performance in the war-economy field from 1914-1918 remains admirable, even if this work did not lead to the goal.

For this was unfortunately the case. It is certainly not too much to say that we won the battles in 1914-1918, although we lost the war itself. That we did lose it, was predominantly because of economic reasons. We were at that time crippled by hunger and the lack of raw materials and productive capacity, the more so as the German sphere of influence in the first world war was not so extensive as in the war in which we are at present engaged. Despite Versailles and the restrictions which the German Wehrmacht suffered under this Diktat Peace, the thought was never extinguished in the hundred-thousand-man army that this was only a passing phase.

The goal remained the restoration of freedom of armament and its application. Behind this stood the Will, unexpressed, but consequently all the firmer, to revise the Peace of Versailles.

It was a matter of course in the quarters concerned with this matter that the question must likewise arise of including the very important field of military economy in this hoped-for rearmament. For this reason, preparations were carried out already in the twenties in the Army Ordnance Office, which, modest as they were, still formed a cell out of which one day a German military economic organization should again develop and in fact actually has developed.

The possibility of working freely again also in the military economic field, was prepared through the National Revolution of 1933. The decisive step, which was taken on 1 November 1934, was the transfer to the Wehrmacht Office of the then newly formed small military economic department of the Ordnance Office. Simultaneously, the then Chief of Staff of the Army Ordnance Office, General-Staff Colonel Thomas, took his place at its head. The field of activity that lay before the then created military economic staff was a vast and unworked field. It lacked not only all legal and organizational preparation, but also, above all, the ideological foundations on which it must be built. Many who worked in it in those days will still remember, for example, the lively discussions in the effort to clarify the terminology of the new field of work, for example the definition of the terms "Wehrwirtschaft" (military economy), "Kriegswirtschaft" (war economy), "Luftungswirtschaft"

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

(armament economy), etc.

From the very beginning, it was clear that the building up of the German military economy could not take place in secret. The military economic activity intruded into the competences of nearly all the higher State authorities. It demanded from the various branches of the Wehrmacht that they direct their efforts strictly to this task also. Above all was it necessary to gain the interest and finally the active collaboration of the Economy itself. The first step had to be to create the legal basis for the work at the ministerial level and to arrive at a clear cut division of the work in the realm of the higher Reich authorities, which at the same time would ensure collaboration. It was not easy, either, to carry into effect the division of tasks between the new Wehrmacht Office and the Ordnance Offices (Waffenämter) of the three branches of the Wehrmacht. Organizationally, it involved the building up of offices sufficiently suitable and capable to take over the preparation of an economic mobilization - at least in the realm of armament economy (Rüstungswirtschaft). Finally, outward connection with the organization of the Economy (Wirtschaft) was sought and found. It was essential for this that the term "Wehrwirtschaft" should become known and its significance also understood by the Economy.

(page 2 of original)

It took years of work until the activity of the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) was generally recognized and understood. It must be remembered that, during the same period, the Economy was faced with other great tasks - one has only to think of the elimination of unemployment! - and that these tasks often appeared more immediately urgent than the preparations for a war, which at that time was not considered to be very probable. It was the Anglo-Italian conflict over the Abyssinian war in which was debated the question of sanctions that first aroused attention.

The result was an ever increasing interest in the military-economic work in civilian departments, as well as in the Economy itself. German Rearmament itself proved to be an important factor in the preparation, especially of the armament economy. It created the productive capacity that today supports the armament economy in war. The military-economic effort now found its strongest expression in the

development of the Four-Year-Plan, in which the strong personality of Reich Marshal Goering helped the will of the Military Economy (Wehrwirtschaft) finally to win through.

There is no room in this article to go into the immense amount of detailed work performed by the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) and the Armament Inspection Centres and Armament Commands. It is sufficient to state that this work stood its trial by fire when the war broke out in 1939. Armament was carried out according to plan in the military sector and produced in the scheduled time the results expected of it.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-5667
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts from document No. NI-5667.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20129

Records of Daily Staff
Meeting, No. 88

Managing Department
v.M./Ri.

7 December 1937

Present: ILNER (temporarily)
KRUGGER
FRANK-FAHLE
DATTINEAU
PASSARGE
HELFERT
TERMLER
J. COBSEN
SCHWARTZ
KARSTEN
v. REISTEN (Secretary of the Meeting)
DIHLER
RONG
PLATZER

A. Preparation of the Agenda of the K.A.-Meeting (Kaufmannischer Ausschuss-Commercial Committee) to be held 10 December 1937.

The individual points of the agenda are thoroughly discussed.

B. I. Managing Department.

2.) HEISSMANN/CLAUSS.

Herr Dr. HEISSMANN has asked that letters of introduction be furnished to Dr. CLAUSS, who is leaving for the U.S.A. at the end of December for the purpose of writing reports for several German papers. The Managing Department has been instructed to attend to this matter. Additional introductions through the V.O.S. are contemplated.

(page 2 of original)

FRANK-FAHLE suggests that Dr. CLAUSS be asked to call and take leave of ILNER and himself before his departure.

3.) Remarks to Minutes No. 78.

A file note of the Managing Department referring to ILNER's marginal notes to the above minutes is available.

4.) Donation for Chinese Students.

In connection with ILNER's suggestion to make additional funds available for the relief fund for Chinese students, over and above the donation of 1,000.00 which was proposed by Kommerzienrat MIBEL in the K.A., it is stated that in the meantime a letter has been received from the Z.A. (Zentral-ausschuss - Central Committee)- bureau proposing that a donation of 5,000.00 be made to the German Red Cross in China.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

5.) Prestige Advertising of the I.G. in Newspapers.

In this connection ILGNER intends to make the suggestion in the K.A. that no prestige advertisements be placed abroad, but only specific propaganda (Bayer, Agfa, etc.) be made. As for Germany, ILGNER is of the opinion that the placing of prestige advertisements should be done by the Z.A.-Bureau in co-operation with the information office.

(page 4 of original)

III. 5.) Tungchi University/Shanghai.

From a marginal note, made by ILGNER on a memorandum, it is noted that the data referring to the Far East is being collected according to countries, and is being regularly forwarded to Dr. KENTHIGAN, Dr. v. THOMPITZ and Dr. ALGNER.

(page 6 of original)

V. 5.) -----

A.I.T.: GATTINEAU reports about a desire on the part of Herr KEFFLER to have the figures compiled by Dr. NEUBACHER placed at his disposal. As there are no such compilations, GATTINEAU is to inquire whether Herr KEFFLER is referring to Dr. NEUBACHER's reports, and if he wants to have these placed at his disposal.

VI. Economic Department.

1.) CRUP's Reports.

Report is made regarding the articles written by Herr CRUP since his return from Germany. With reference to the information furnished by us, PLATZER states that VOMI (V.lks-wirtschaftliche Abteilung - Economics Department) only supplied generally known information.

Regarding the weekly V.wi-reports, PASSADGE points out in this connection that he cannot accept any responsibility for the contents of these reports, as they are not brought to his attention prior to their completion. PLATZER asserts that these reports are most carefully checked by V.wi regarding the advisability of reported matter, with full acceptance of responsibility.

(page 7 of original)

sgd.: ILGNER.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Julia KERR Civ. No. 030 099, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-5746.

Julia KERR :
Civ. No. 030 099.

(Page 1 of orig.)

5. Confidential Industry I up to March 1939

(Page 2 of orig.)

R/Dr.

Ministerpräsident Generaloberst Goering

on the
Carrying out of the Four Year Plan.

Speech in the large assembly hall of the Prussianhaus on 17 Dec. 1936.

After a short survey of world politics and the dangers of Bolshevism and World Revolution Goering declared among other things the following:

The old economic laws no longer have the same meaning. There are not natural laws in economy, there are only those made by man. They are inventions of mankind intended to deal with the various circumstances. Today, things have become reality which a few years ago still seemed utopian.

We must allow the worker to have his share of the spiritual values even though we cannot improve his material position as rapidly as desired. Wages are not yet as high as we might wish them to be. It is evident that the incitation (Wirkung) and imitation of decades still have their repercussions on the German worker. One cannot only accuse the German Labor Front of occasionally employing Marxist methods; there are also employers who still use capitalist methods.

Concerning the economic aspect of the Four Year Plan, the severe effects of the blockade which we did not have sufficient means of counter-acting must not be forgotten. Wise economists declared before the war, when there was wangling about contributing to our armaments, that the economy could support 1.2 but not 1.4 billions. The bill due to the insufficient war preparation was then presented

(Page 3 of orig.)

on the battle-fields. During the World War 160 billion marks were activated. Today the situation is as difficult as it was then.

There are no doubts as to the stability of our currency. The German nation will not be subjected a second time to the horrors of inflation.

There are two difficulties in the way of rearmament:

- 1) The raw material and food supply;
- 2) The lack of workers.

We have to fill warehouses with raw materials and food just as the King of Prussia did in the Seven Years' War. Our daily bread must be guaranteed at all costs; it is more essential than guns, and shells. I enjoy the Fuehrer's entire confidence and I have far-reaching authority. I have full power over German money, but unfortunately, not over foreign exchange. Here my work must begin.

Thereupon Goering read out what the General Council (Generalrat) for German raw materials and industrial materials reported to wit, among other things greatest possible use of the economic resources of the individual industrialists ((Unternehmen)). Private initiative. The economy should make suggestions.

10

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Coming to the export question he mentioned complaint which had come to him saying that the export industry often came to grief because of the existing regulations. He repeatedly said that if a profitable export business was to be carried out then every regulation must be circumvented in order to guarantee its success whatever happened. (Laughter) He who risks a lot must also have a corresponding profit. But the general interest must always remain decisive and discipline must be observed. Business matters, especially, in connection with the export industry could not be handled in a rigid manner. It is not always possible to follow hard and fast rules. If somebody can bring me ten car-loads of copper for which he has to pay 40 % above the world market price, then he should do so.

(Page 4 of orig.)

Goering then spoke of questions concerning the exchange of experience among the plants and the training of replacements. Not nearly enough was being done to train apprentices. Serious attention must also be paid to the training of specialists and to the problem of retraining. Then he came back again to the importance of export. If the inclusion of export orders in the production process was necessary and if that meant a delay in the fulfilment of Four Year Plan orders or armament orders then timely notice of this should be given to the right offices and departments. It is quite possible that orders for the Wehrmacht and for the Four Year Plan may conflict with export orders. Reference is made to grading according to degree of urgency.

When it was suggested that I strangle the building market and that I issue a decree prohibiting the construction of private buildings, I refused this. To prohibit means to agree to bureaucracy doing everything. That would be senseless. I am against such prohibitions. If urgent building must be undertaken somewhere then the Gauleiters are responsible to me to see that sufficient workers and material are made available. I shall issue urgency and priority scales which can be interpreted differently according to the regions.

Again Goering came back to export questions and declared that all export orders do not have the same importance and do not all procure for us that which we need. That is why export orders do not have absolute priority over domestic orders and here too a sliding scale of priority must be set up. It can well be that an export order comes first, some other time a Wehrmacht or Four Year Plan order is more important. One should call the office here. Matters must be treated in an elastic manner.

As a certain amount of muttering resulted from these statements, Goering continued: You, gentlemen, must decide for yourselves what is more important.

The raw material industry must achieve a greater output.

(Page 5 of orig.)

It must become more efficient.

I am always hearing objections such as this: What will become of my commitments once we have finished rearming? Gentlemen: We can never develop our industrial capacity as much as would be necessary to be sufficiently armed for every eventuality. In any case our capacity will be much too small. The conflict towards which we are heading is going to require a gigantic amount of effort and efficiency. No end can be seen to rearming. Victory or defeat alone are decisive.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

If we win the economy will be sufficiently repaid. One cannot act here according to the book-keeping method of profits and losses, but only according to political needs. Costs must not be calculated. I demand that you do everything and that you prove that a part of the wealth of the nation has been entrusted to your care. Whether or not the near investments can be written off is a matter of complete indifference. We are playing for the highest stakes. What could be more advantageous than orders for rearmament?!

As regards the domestic raw material supply give your engineers orders so that every foreign raw material will be replaced by a native one as far as this is at all possible. Industry must set an example and pave the way in collecting waste material. It is a question of life and death to exploit the German minerals. Whoever has knowledge of an iron ore field or some other mineral field and does not put it at our disposal commits treason. What have not neighboring countries managed to get out of their soil. The history of our country teaches us that formerly German soil yielded many more raw materials of the most varied sort. In many ways we have come a long way from that either for transportation reasons or because of world market competitive prices which are lower than domestic costs. I have given the order for old books, to be looked into. The National Geological Institute and other Institutes have been entrusted

(Page 6 of orig.)

with geophysical investigation. Work is being done day and night. Every particle of domestic raw material is important. Imagine what would happen if Swedish ores no longer arrived because they possibly got into Jewish hands!

I want to build up national stocks of foreign ores. I want to negotiate with foreign suppliers and suggest ten, maybe twenty year agreements. I am ready to give long term guarantees. We cannot get all the ore we need from domestic sources. The business may not fail because of the price. The decisive factor is that raw materials are obtained.

Do not think, gentlemen, that I do not know about all your contracts. I have a good intelligence service. I know where wranglings go on because of one cent more or less per ton. Secure for yourselves the raw materials even if you should suffer loss. I am ready to help along. Any quantity is worthwhile.

A big company told me that it owned 5300 iron ore mining privileges but that the exploitation of the same should precede that of a bigger and better iron ore field. That is madness. Whoever cannot decide himself to start exploitation must sell his property so that others can do so. And anyway, go about your work like a hog (Trüffelschwein) which pokes its snout into everything to find the choice bits. (Much laughter). The objection that in mining domestic ores two blast furnaces are necessary instead of only one, is not tenable as far as I'm concerned. It is here a matter of welfare of the entire German nation and not of one individual enterprise.

For centuries we have lived in Germany from German iron. I shall have companies founded to further examinations of German soil. Every week I shall have Reports submitted to me on new openings.

(Continued)

(Page 7 of orig)

If it should ever happen that there might not be any ore deliveries, then the plants may not be shut down. That's why we have to start timely exploitation of the German minerals. I appeal to your patriotic sentiments and to your intelligence.

Goering then spoke of the extraction of mineral oil, and of his serious worries in connection with the caoutchouc supply. When he assumed office he saw to it that the automobile factories received enough so that we could work normally again. I have taken out guilder and pound credits. I kneel before foreigners, I take the Four Year Plan confoundingly seriously.

Later on Ministerpraesident Goering spoke about the German lumber industry and about the increased cutting down of trees at home, and also about agriculture and the necessity of lowering the prices of fertilizers.

He then came to the question of mining equipment. Formerly seams were prepared for five years, now they were prepared for two. In his opinion as many possibilities of preparation should be created as possible. Coal will have to be used for an unconceivable number of purposes even as a substitute for fire-wood, so that great raids on coal must be expected.

In the further course of the speech Goering again talked about building. Iron must be saved in constructing building. Steel frames—work, for instance for office buildings, could no longer be permitted. Non ferrous metals must also be saved. The production of aluminum must be vigorously driven forward.

In connection with export he declared that export possibilities must be exploited to the greatest possible extent. The big firms could no longer afford to lower their originally indicated export prices, in the course of negotiations, by 30, 40, 50 even 60 % as has several times been the case. Lowering the price made a bad impression as it could be seen that a fair price was not intended.

(Page 8 of orig.)

in the first place. He would favor firms with an active export business, in the allocation of raw materials.

In the question of wages it was remarked that the aims of the Price-making commissar were: stable wages, stable prices. Workers could not be given notice, without his consent. This he wanted to prohibit. But where it was necessary to do more work than before, this work would have to be done. In principle he intended at some later time to pay the workers for Sunday just like civil servants and employees. But for the moment he did not expect any firm to make an exception. Today workers may not yet receive payment for Sunday work.

He protested against the senseless removal of specialized workers. That was especially unbearable where a plant was mentioned on the urgency list. He intended to have workers' families, perhaps 100,000 brought into the Reich from Sudeten Germany. But then they may not be sent away again.

The workers must work over-time wherever this was urgently necessary and be paid for it. If France, as a result of the 40-hour week, is threatened with the loss of its powers of competition,

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

then we must increase our exports more than ever.

He wanted to permit women to work again in the factories because the day was coming when female workers would be urgently needed. The necessary machines should be brought into the country so that women might be won over to machine work.

As for procuring foreign exchange he declared that every possibility would have to be made full use of to obtain credits abroad. It was a duty to get as many long term foreign loans as possible.

After this he spoke about the limitation in the production of iron and said: I will not

(Page 9 of orig.)
limitations

insist upon the 10 and 15% if Franco-German companies operate mines in Germany and if through relationships with Frenchmen it should be possible to obtain more iron ore.

In general savings in foreign exchange should be made by handling exports and imports in German ports and not in foreign ones.

And now followed statements on the production of electrical energy. Every village and every city would eventually have to again exploit its own hydro-electric plants, so that if a large plant should be destroyed by a bomb, it would be possible for small plants to be linked together. Concerning gas supply over a long distance he said that large plants were dependent on gas. The existing small gas-works, however, should not be eliminated. Here, too, consideration must be given to linking together and obtaining the highest possible results just as in the production of electrical energy.

As for the relationship to the Reich Ministry of Economy was concerned, this ministry would continue to bear the full responsibility. He had only called in a few sub-department chiefs (Referenten). These would supply the Reich Ministry of Economy with the necessary directives.

To close his speech Goering demanded that all economic forces be harnessed to the utmost. Selfishness must step into the background. It is a question of the life of our people. We are living in times which proclaim the last great struggles and conflicts. We are already in a state of mobilization and in a state of war, except that no guns are being fired yet.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-051
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. NI-051

24 September 1947

I, Richard ANSCHUTZ, No. D 145 339, hereby certify
that I am a duly appointed translator for the English
and German languages and that the above is a true and
correct translation of the Document No. NI-051.

Richard ANSCHUTZ,
No. 145 339.

Declaration under Oath

I, Paul Keerner, at present in Nuremberg, after my attention was called to the fact that I am liable to punishment if I make false statements, hereby state under oath voluntarily and without duress as follows:

1. On 17 December 1936 Hermann Goering delivered an address in the large meeting room of the Fraunhofen, to the leading industrialists and economists; this address lasted about an hour. Immediately thereafter Adolf Hitler spoke.
2. All of the leading personalities of the totality of German industry and economy, altogether about 100 persons, were present for this address, among them also Dr. Bosch and Dr. Krauch, as the representatives of I.G. Farben.
3. The above mentioned session is the only one of this type which I recall.

I have carefully read over the entire page of this declaration and have personally ascertained it, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting, and considered it true with my initials and hereby declare under oath that I have in this declaration stated the whole truth, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Paul Keerner.

Sworn to and signed before me this 24th day of January 1947 at Nuremberg by Paul Keerner, present at Nuremberg, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Paul H. Katscher
Paul H. Katscher
U.S. Civilian, T-1506/1,
Office of Chief of Counsel of War
Crimes, U.S. War Department

OFFICIAL OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947

I, HERBERT ROSECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5955.

HERBERT ROSECK, No. B 397499.

No. 189

M i n u t e s

of the meeting of the enlarged Farben Committee of
22 December 1936

The following persons were present:

Dr. v. Schnitzler
Maivol
Muehlen
Wiegand
Wolff

Dr. ter Meer
Dr. Seidel
Dr. Walther

v. Bruening
Kohler
Dr. Kuepper
Wigandt

of the Central Agency (Zentralstelle f. F-Abkommen)
for Farben Agreements:

Eckert

C. v. Weiberg re item 2a
Kraus " " 3

(Page 2 of the original)

1. Statements of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor as well as
of the Minister President General (Generaleoberst) Goering about
the Four Year Plan on 17 December 1936 in Berlin

Herr v. Schnitzler gave a highly confidential report
about the statements made by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
as well as by the Minister President General (Generaleoberst)
Goering on 17 inst. in Berlin concerning the tasks of the
German Economy in the execution of the Four Year Plan.

.....

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4192
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, G.W.GARRAND, Civ. D 143692, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4192.

28 April 1947.

G.W.GARRAND
Civ. D 143692

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EG-167
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

The Reichs War Minister
and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

WStb G.C. Nr. 209/37 R.K. II L.

January 1937

(Transl's note: stamp)

Top Secret matter

5 copies
3rd copy.

Re: Agricultural mobilization

To the President of the Board of Directors
of the Reichsbank
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht
Attention: Min. Dir. Mohlthau
Berlin

The purpose and task of the agricultural mobilization is to diminish all the effects of war on agriculture which cause a reduction of crops and livestock, or, in other words, to prepare individual farms for war.

In principle, we consider that this mobilization should originate from the farm itself and that therefore the centre of the organization should be the farm.

The meeting of the economic committee of the Commission for ensuring food supplies, on 11 January 1937, the result of which is Professor Dr. Zürn's report director of the Institut fuer Landwirtschaftliche Betriebslehre (Institute for the study of Agricultural operations) brought some clarification of the matter. In principle, I agree with the plan described in it. Moreover, in another connection, at two local conferences on 19 and 22 January 1937 convened by the General Plenipotentiary, special to food, with the Kreisbauernschaft (District peasantry) associations Wittenberg and Naum, it was possible to get an idea of the capacity of these sub-divisions of the Reich food estate as to agricultural operations.

(Page 2 of original)

It is at present beyond my competence to suggest in whose hands it would be best to place the agricultural mobilization. It is full responsibility as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht at war, forces me to make some specific suggestions on the agriculture organizational mobilization. (Transl's note: handwritten alteration: first crossed out version: "to make certain demands from....")

1) Inquiries from the farms are the basis for the files of mobilization organization. The first need is therefore to put the mobilization in the hands of that organization which vouches for the most reliable investigations.

2) The war conditions demand immediate adaptation; the second need is therefore: execution of inquiries on farms within the shortest time, evaluation of these files and adaptation of agriculture to the demands made on it.

3) The most important need is the suitability of the people

in charge of this organization. I mentioned before that the centre of the organization is the farm or a group of farms, therefore a number of people. In order to accomplish their task, the men in charge have to possess mature and sure knowledge. Knowledge of local conditions and peacetime instruction are necessary provisions for this. How can we choose those men who can expect drafting in case of mobilization or in the course of the war, for the difficulty of their task increases with the duration of the war and a change of the person in charge is not advisable, either at the outbreak of

(Page 3 of original)

war or in the course of the war. The power they will get to help them in the accomplishment of their difficult task cannot be compensated by central offices. Suitability of character is therefore as important as experience and technical knowledge. These foremen (Obleute) appointed formerly for the "Hilfs" (Eastern Aid Program), older farmers with organizational experience, seem to be the right type for such a responsible task.

4) Cost: question of finance: the use of honorary officials.

5) Examination of the question of maintaining secrecy of the preparations for mobilization in a realistic way, both with regard to the enemy and with regard to our own people, from whom particularly great sacrifices have to be demanded in the event of war. Exaggerated secrecy however will render the agricultural mobilization more difficult.

With regard to the importance of the food situation in wartime, I ask to be allowed to take part in the organization of the agricultural mobilization.

J.A.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. CALYNSKI, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-167.

DOROTHEA L. CALYNSKI,
MF 34079

Minister President Generaloberst
G e r m a n y

Commissioner for the four year plan

1b

Dr. Keppler
Planning & execution of the
manufacture of
industrial fats

Minist. Presid.
KOEHLER
Baden
Distribution
of raw mater.

Dr. Hunsfeldt
Dr. Syrup
Labor-
Allocation

State Secretary
BACHNE
Agricultural
products

Ober President
Gaulleitor
Jos. Wagner
Price control.
Foreign
Exchange
matters

Colonel of the General Staff
L O E B
Office for German raw &
synthetic materials

I

Major Dr. Zeimotis
Power economies
Organization
Locations
Miscellaneous

III

Dr. Krauch
Research
&
Development

II

Major v. Henskork
Mineral oils controls
at the same time,
execution as under
main department IV.

IV

Execution of
contracts, etc,
Main Departments
immediately
subordinated to
Colonel Loeb

V

President Lange
Financing

Dr.
Weller
mineral
oils

Dr. Krenner
Hotels

Dr. Kiel
Wood and
cellulose

Dr. Ulrich
Textiles, Chemistry

Pleiger
Dr. Rhein-
lander
Metals

Kochl
Textil.

V.
Monvey
Wood

Dr.
Eckell
Chemistry

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, John FOSHERY, Civ. STO No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. NI-4708.

18 August 1947

JOHN FOSHERY
Civ. STO No. 20179

End

CHIEF OF OFFICE OBERST d. GEN. ST. LOB

AUTEROOM: MISS GEBRDT 2000-2001

PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR THE FOUR YEAR PLAN
OFFICE OF GERMAN RVM AND SYNTHETIC MATERIALS
15 AT L. AUGUST 1937

CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR DR. CZIMATIS

AUTEROOM: MISS BREMER 2025

ADJUSTANCY PERSONNEL
MATTERS OF OFFICERS AND
OFFICIALS GENERAL MATTERS
OF THE OFFICE REGISTRY
MOTOR POOL QUARTERS.

CONSULTANT FOR SPECIAL
PURPOSES
ASS. DR. MUELLER 2294
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS
ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WHICH REVEALS MATTERS
SPECIAL COMMITTEES.

PRINCIPAL BUDGET
ORGANIZATIONAL BREAK-DOWN
ISSUANCE OF BUDGET DIRECT
BRIEFINGS OF PAY MASTER
SUPPLY ROOM.

GENERAL OFFICE CHIEF
BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS
RECEIPTS.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Dr. III
Dr. Krauch

Print by Hand

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Dr. Ritter 2005

AUTEROOM: Betha 2009

MAIN OFFICE III

RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT

TECHNICAL OFFICE

Richter 2228

Group III₁
Hpt. (E) D. BESCHNIDT 1005

GROUP II₁
O.R. Rat MANTEL 1304

GROUP II₂
Dr. KREMER 2154

GROUP II₃
Dr. HABIL POHLAND 1144

GROUP II₄
Dr. BAUR 1041

GROUP II₅
Dr. BAUR 1041

GROUP II₆
Dr. BORN 1246

ANTER: Fr. Eisenbeise 1144

ANTER: Fr. Deimling 1101

ANTER: Fr. Werner 1170

ANTER: Fr. Bolz 1211

ANTER: Fr. Uppenkamp 1027

ANTER: Fr. Uppenkamp 1027

ANTER: Fr. RUSS 1144

GENERAL
QUESTIONS
INVENTIONS

MINERAL
OILS
COAL

IRON AND
NON-FERROUS
METALS STONES
AND EARTHS.

CHEMISTRY
II
(INORGANIC
CHEMICALS).

CHEMISTRY
II
(ORGANIC
PROLIFERARY
PRODUCTS
FOR AMMUNITION
AND EXPLOSIVES
ORGANIC
CHEMICALS)

TEXTILES

WOOD
CORK
PAPER

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1a

1b

1c

2c

2a

2b

2c

3c

3a

3b

3c

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10035
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Affidavit.

I, Dr. Werner Hagert, at present living in Hiltchenbach, Westfalen, Gerberstrasse 163, employed from 1937 - 1939 in the Mobilization Department of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, having been duly warned that I am liable to punishment for false statements, herewith declare the following, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. I have been shown the "Project of General Planning" (Vorhaben der Gesamtplanung) published by the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics, and dated 27 May 1937 and 1 February 1938. These documents are marked EC-242 and NI-6769.
2. The Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics was the nucleus of the Four Year Plan and defined for German Industry the construction plans under the Four Year Plan.
3. Guided by the "Projects of general Planning" of 1937, I have established the extensions projected within the Four Year Plan of production capacities for all chemical products which were envisaged in the Plan for I.G. and for the rest of the German Industry. Furthermore, I have established, from the same source, the amounts to be invested in the extension of production capacities; where figures for 1937 were not available, I have taken the figures from the 1938 "Projects" as a basis. In these cases, I have marked the item in question in the following table accordingly.

In the table, I have considered as belonging to I.G. all those works which are either works within the I.G. combine, or were operated by I.G. and lastly, all those firms in which I.G. had a share of capital exceeding 30%. In these cases, the works are counted as belonging entirely to I.G.. If the share amounted to less than 30%, I have stated only the percentage of the share belonging to I.G.. Those stand-by plants and factories

(page 2 of original)

in the case ^{on} which no decision had been reached as to which firm should construct and operate them, have not been included in the table. The total amount of money which was to be invested, within the chemical sphere, amounts to RM 177 million.

The result of my examination is shown in the following table. The first column gives the products, the second the extension of production capacities intended to fall to I.G., the third the extension of production capacities intended to fall to the remainder of the German Industry. From the fourth column, the amount needed to finance the extensions of individual production capacities can be seen, from the fifth, the amount to be expended by the remainder of the German Industry for his purpose. The sixth column shows I.G.'s share in the financing of the total German construction plans for the products in question, expressed as percentages.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-10035
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Products:	Extension of Production Capacities in 1,000 tons per year		Amounts to be Invested in Million RM		I.G.'s share in the Total German Program expressed as %
	I.G.	Rest of Germany	I.G.	Rest of Germany	
Cellulose as primary product for textiles	36	20	13,5	7,5	64
Cellulose wool	29,5	74,1	32,33	27,2	54,7
Magnesium	-	-	13	-	100
Fatless Detergents	60	-	57	-	100
Synthetic Tannins	29,5	-	23	-	100
Sect, Coal-Gas-Sect	-	-	16,5	0,1	99,5
Guts, in million metres	93,3	123,3	1,3	0,35	60
Caoutchouc	96	-	694	-	100
Carbide Spirit	93	-	60	-	100
Mineral Oils					
a. Completed Plant	357(*)	82,5	(*) 91,24		
b. Projects under construction	900	572,5	437,5	348	55,7
c. Projects under Consideration	1029	144,5	520	75	67,4
* Sulphuric Acid in SO ₃ (Contact Process)	217,5	233,8	21,5	23	48,2
* (Chamber Process)	-	56	-	2,50	-
Soda	131	432	7	23	23,3
Caustic S.	30	109,6	3,65	13,35	21,5
Highly Concentrated Nitric Acid					
(without Mohr.)	6,5	-	11,2	-	100
Caustic Soda, electrolytic	93,9	20,9	30	7	62
Chlorine	63,6	22,6			-
Dechlorination of Lime	30	60	23	28	50
Cracking Plant for Ethylene	10,5	14,6	27	27	50
Primary Ureania and Ethanol	57	-	60	-	100
* Ureania	75	-	10	-	100
* Extension of Carbide	90	1,6	6	0,12	98
* Ethylene	17,4	-	10	-	100
* Primary Products for Buna and Synthetics	6,6	-	3,06	-	100
* Primary Products for Chemicals	36	-	7,22	-	100
* Respirator Charcoal	1,1	-	0,4	-	100
* Primary Products for Explosives:					
Diglycol	29,6	-	70	-	100

(page 3 of original)

Products:	Extension of Production Capacities in 1,000 tons per year		Amounts to be Invested in million RM		I.G.'s share in the Total German Program expressed as %
	I.G.	Rest of Germany	I.G.	Rest of Germany	
carried forward:			213,66	582,62	
*Primary Products for Chemical Warfare: Thiodyl	23	-	13,5	-	100
*Primary Products for Explosives: Pentacrythrite	3	4,8	1,5	16	47
*Primary Products for Synthetics with Carbide as Base	29,94	-	17,61	-	100
*Primary Products for Synthetics with Ethylene as Base	15,65	-	6,23	-	100
*Diluted Nitric Acid	10,6	41,3	4,6	1,45	76
*Phenol and Cresol	14,4	20,4	0,63	13,07	6
*Sulphur	4,5	62,3	0,55	7,45	7
*Plants for Processing of Nitrogen	6	2	5,4	1,3	80
Acetic Acid	18	-	15	-	100
Carbon Disulphide	22,8	63,3	2,02	3,58	36
High Grade Cellulose for Linters	9	27	5,5	12	31
Casoline	-	9	-	1,17	-
Soft Coal Low Temperature Tar Extraction	50	434,5	12	202,1	5,6
Synthetic Lubricants	1,5	6	2,5	4,0	33
Bituminous Coal Low Temperature Tar Extraction	-	49	-	15,7	-
Other Mineral Oil Products	0,36	55,3	0,3	6,0	1,4
Methyl Alcohol	-	9,2	-	6,25	-
Spirit from Sulphite Waste Liquor	-	6,2	-	2,25	-
Resin Production	-	20	-	0,72	-
Resin Extraction	-	2,2	-	0,7	-
Medicaments	-	-	-	1,15	-
*Glazing Phosphate	-	4	-	0,3	-
*Sodium Silicate	-	-	-	-	-
fluorine	-	0,92	-	0,23	-
			2333,90	876,04	

* Statistics taken from the 1933 Plan.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-10035
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

As can be seen from the comparison of the totals recorded in columns 4 and 5, I.G.'s share in the total of money to be invested in the above chemical products amounts to 72,7 %. If mineral oils are excluded from the table given above, as being not a strictly chemical product, I.G.'s share in the planned strictly chemical total investments amounts to 35,7 %.

I have read each of the four pages of this statement carefully and signed them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them myself and herewith declare on oath that I have stated, in this affidavit, the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(page 4 of original)

Signature: Dr. Ing. Werner Hagert
Dr. Werner HAGERT

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of July 1947 at the Palace of Justice, Hamburg, Germany, by Dr. Werner HAGERT, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 July 1947

I, WALTER K. GIERSKI, ETO 20145, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. HI-10035.

WALTER K. GIERSKI, ETO 20145.

-4-
"END"

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10035
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES

ERRATA SHEET

Page 2 of the English translation of the document No. NI-10035
the figure for "Cracking Plant for Ethylene" should read:

.....
Cracking Plant	18,5	18,5	27	27	50
for Ethylene
.....

Errata sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. A-444412

- END -

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AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Werner HIGERT, at present living in Hilchenbach, Westphalia, Gerberstrasse 168, employed from 1932 to 1939 with the Mobilization Department of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having been warned that I am liable to punishment for false statements, herewith declare voluntarily and without coercion:

1. I have been shown the "Projects of General Planning" ("Vorhaben der Gesamt-Planung") published by the Office for German Raw materials and Plastics, dated 27 May 1937. The document is marked DO-261.

2. Page 27 of this document is headed "Survey of Financing Measures by the Office for German Rawmaterials and Plastics for the Period from 23 October 1936 to 20 May 1937, inclusive." From this survey the following can be seen:

The amounts to be invested within the Four-Year-Plan by the office for German Rawmaterials and Plastics during the period from 23 October 1936 to 20 May 1937 came to a total of 959,162,000.- Reichsmarks.

In the following table I have analyzed this amount in such a manner that for the various fields of industry the first column gives the amounts pertaining to chemicals, and the second the amounts invested in non-chemical enterprises. This then shows the following:

	Total in Billion Reichsmarks	
1. Shipping	-	1,5
2. Power	51,65	-
3. Mineral Oils	573,689	-
4. Research and Development	0,176	0,176
5. Iron, non-Ferrous Metals	-	39,273
6. Textiles	70,949	-
7. Wood	-	40,75
8. Chemicals	177,775	-
9. Explosives	3,4	-
	877,639	81,699

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10036
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

For the chemical side of the Four-Year-Plan, therefore, during
the period mentioned, Reichsmarks 877,639,000.--

were spent, and for the non-chemical
side, 31,699,000.--

It follows that the projected investments for chemical production
amounted to 91.5% of the total investments to be made under the
Four-Year-Plan. As can be seen from the other affidavit sworn
to by me under today's date, and marked Document No. NI-10035,
the share of I.G. in the investments for the chemical side of
the Four - Year- Plan amounts to 72.7%.

It follows that 66.5% of all amounts to be spent under the
Four-Year-Plan for the entire German industry during the period
from 23 October 1936 to 20 May 1937 were to be used for I.G.-
Farbenindustrie projects.

I have carefully read each of the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit
and signed them with my own hand, have made the necessary
corrections in my own handwriting, and have countersigned them
with my initials, and I herewith declare under oath that in this
affidavit I have stated the whole truth to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Werner Hagert

Dr. Werner HAGERT

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of July 1947 at the
Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Werner HAGERT,
known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30 140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 July 1947

I, Walter K. GALEWSKI, ETO 20 145, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and
that the above is a true and correct translation of the
document No. NI-10036.

Walter K. GALEWSKI
ETO 20 145

Minutes of the

Meeting of Technical Directors, held in Frankfurt/Main Hoechst
on 11 January 1937

Those present were Messrs.: Hermann
Jacobs
Krauszlein (part of the time)
Leutenschlaeger
Jacobi
Pfaffendorf
(Initial) - H Roth
Staub (part of the time)
Engelbortz
Fehrlé
Hagenboecker
Linders
Hoser (part of the time)
Hirschel

Hermann announced the transfers of the following chemists:
Schneider (Zahn's Laboratory) and Lang (FZW Laboratory)
transferred to the Pharmaceutics Department as works chemists;
Jahn (Plastics Laboratory) was transferred to the Acetic Acid
Department as laboratory chemist and Petri (Main Laboratory West)
to the Indigo Department as works chemist. In addition, arrangements
had been made whereby Hermann III (Pharmaceutics Department)
would be transferred to the Indigo Department after 3-4 months;
Stroock (Main Alizarine Laboratory) to the Experimental Room,
and Fink (Experimental Room) to the Analytical Laboratory, should
the need arise. A decision would be taken later on the transfer of
Fitzly (FZW Laboratory) to the Acetic Acid Department.

Hermann drew attention to the fact that the erection of the
Glycerogen plant must be effected with all possible speed.

Hoser announced two letters from the Central Accounts Department,
on the subject of the sums written off during 1936 to meet costs
of depreciation of short-lived equipment.

Hoechst intended to adopt the following procedure:

- a) The amortization of the new plants which were to be put into
operation only in the course of January-February 1937 was to
be commenced as early as 1936.
- b) The sums written off for depreciation of short-lived apparatus,
which, in 1936 had been charged to special experiments or new
fields of operation,

(page 2 of original)

were to be entered in the " Short-Lived Apparatus " ledger.

- a) The factory Accounts Department would make these entries without altering any previous balance of accounts.
- c) Wherever book values from previous years still appeared in the " Short-Lived Apparatus " ledger, they would be written off completely in 1936.
- d) The equipment of the experimental rooms was to be considered as " short-lived " apparatus and was to be finally written off in 1936.

The Chemical Committee had suggested that all projects connected with the Four Year Plan should be written off in less than ten years. The projects under consideration for the Middle Rhine works combine would be discussed.

The estimates of costs which were submitted were approved, subject to the following modifications:

Item 27 Air Raid Precautions RM 3,600.- At first only 2 windows were to be fitted with black-out equipment. Thus the estimate would be reduced to RM 900.-

Item 33 Washeries and Showers in S 90 RM 28,000.- Jachno would examine this item.

Item 34 Washeries and Showers in Ch 66 RM 6,100.- Jachno would examine this item.

Item 49 Blue Aniline Dyestuffs Five Bank Roller Mill RM 14,700.- Investigations were to be made to establish whether larger units could not be set up.

Item 52 Nubilos A 3 RM 65,000.- This item would be postponed for the time being, until the results of the experiments in Hainkur/Krause-Apparat were available. This would be in three weeks' time.

Item 55 A 4 Monster Press RM 11,500.- + 5,900.- The need for the setting up of a Monster Press was to be examined.

Item 114 (Biebrich) Plant for the preparation of sulphuric acid. Hoechst would give the benefit of its practical experience. For this purpose, Staib would get into contact with Biebrich.

(page 3 of original)

The following were provisionally approved :

Item 42	Methyl RM 3,300 + 750.-
Item 66	Cantan RM 32,000.-

In addition, the following estimates were approved :
Ethylacetate, 2 reserve pumps RM 2,900.- (Repair)
Knapsack, extension of the nitrogen of line silos 3 -RM 640,000.-
The estimate for Gersthofen - repair of roof and increase of height of building - had been reduced and was approved.

In the Hoechst Works there were several alcohol distillation plants (reclamation). Hilcken and Hatz would conduct investigations to discover whether the reclamation of alcohol could be effected in one single place.

For Meer's letter on the making available of engineers for the Buna Works was dealt with by Jachno.

Information was given on the contracts concluded by I.G. during the last few months.

Hermann gave a report on the meeting of Sparte II, held on 5 January 1937. The possibility of producing phenol from chlorobenzene was to be examined more closely from the technical point of view.

Grinn reported that the Office for Raw materials and Synthetics was preparing for several meetings (to deal with explosives and poison gases, substitute leather and tannin, resins and lacquer, stones and earths, mineral oils).

As 90-95% of the employees of Mainkur and Gersthofen were at present working 48 hours per week, a 48 hour week would be introduced in these works for a limited period, as long as orders in hand demanded it. A 48 hour week would be worked in Offenbach during January and February 1937.

The 48 hour week as a general principle was as yet not in question as far as Hoechst was concerned, since 58% of the works staff in the dyestuffs plants were still working a 46 hour week.

In a letter to Siedler of Griesheim, Professor Jander had asked for support in the establishment of his laboratory. His request could not be complied with.

On the occasion of his visit to Vordingen,

(page 4 of original)

Hagenboecker would inspect the acetylation plant.

Pfaffendorf reported on the last monthly conference of the Office of the Technical Committee.

Roth gave a report on the conference held at the headquarters of the Monopoly Administration Office, on the subject of the alcohol contract; a ten-year sales guarantee was provided for.

Fehrle informed the participants that, with the help of the old plant, a 50% increase in acetic acid ester production could be carried out at a cost of approximately RM 25,000.

In addition, Fehrle reported on a traffic accident, in which a young workman was killed by a Reichspost car on one of the factory lanes. The factory administrative authorities were to set up "Drive Carefully" signs at all danger points on the factory lanes.

Lautenschlaeger made a report on contracts concluded with Professor Hofferich of Leipzig on ascorbic acid and with Honorary Lecturer Hofmann of Dusseldorf on adrenal gland preparation.

Difficulties had been encountered in the procurement of Monier-iron. Gebhardt would report to Hermann on the situation every four weeks.

Signature : Hirschel

14.1.1937 Ki.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

31 July 1947

I, Daryl C. BESHICK, D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5899.

Daryl C. BESHICK
D 427459

Colonel of the General Staff Fritz Loeb:

Tasks of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials

Our fatherland is poor in natural resources: in no important field except coal are the deposits at present accessible sufficient to cover our own needs. Germany is no "country of the sun", its climatic conditions are not sufficiently good to provide nutritional and raw material plants in quantities corresponding to the density of its population. The dependence on foreign imports resulting from this situation is oppressive in peace time, can be dangerous in an emergency.

However, Germany is rich in men who seek and find ways to make up for things which nature has denied us by employing their scientific knowledge; it is extremely rich in manpower and in its people's zest for work which enable it to realize the possibilities which have thus been created.

Above all it has a Fuehrer and a form of government which guarantee that things which are recognized to be vital for the State will be put into effect.

It is therefore natural that the raw materials policy of our fatherland has inevitably to be shaped by the situation as outlined above.

This cannot be achieved by means of a state-controlled economy which would manifest itself in a chain of government-directed enterprises laboring under its well-known disadvantages and dangers. Full utilization of private enterprise is a natural consequence of the basic attitude of National Socialism toward the delegation of responsibility to the individual citizen and towards problems of private ownership.

What is necessary however is a centralized control of these forces, as we cannot afford to wait until these things mature in the course of economic development as is usually done. This control has to operate both in the industries as well as in the collaboration of the highest state authorities and the Party.

The tasks of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials are clearly defined and can be reduced to the following simple statement: It is responsible for the quickest possible elimination of our fatherland's dependence on foreign raw materials wherever this is possible in the present situation.

The limits of this activity can only be determined through rational and clear-headed consideration of the facts. This centralized control shall not be burdened by natural resources which are inaccessible, plants which do not thrive in our country, and chemical processes, the results of which are valueless or entail fancy prices.

All other obstructions will have to disappear before the clearly recognizable needs of the country and before the unbending determination of the country's leaders who are responsible for its welfare.

(page 1 of original cont'd)

It is erroneous to say that we relinquished our proper place in world trade. On the contrary, we shall endeavor to increase the total volume of our export trade by becoming independent in many spheres of the fluctuations and arbitrariness of the world markets; we shall thus become economically stronger and in order to make up for our increased export trade we shall import larger quantities of those products and goods which we consider suitable for importation. It must further be considered that world opinion has accepted without opposition many cases in which countries have ruthlessly and one-sidedly, therefore to their own final ruination, exploited the possibilities inherent in their climatic conditions, their natural resources or the manpower of their population. It was this which produced the phenomena of economic dependence on foreign countries which we shall in our case reduce to reasonable proportions.

Should anyone object that the measures necessary for this would result in changes of equilibrium which would constitute a danger to the entire economic life owing to the speed at which it is intended to carry them out, it might be mentioned that it is fully realized that much of the industry would be burdened with an increased amount of work. But we are also convinced that this work for the welfare of our country will gladly be taken on by those economic leaders who are fully entitled to bear this honorable title. We shall endeavor to lessen this burden to the greatest possible extent by discussing all projects in good time, fully and publicly, with the economic circles concerned, thus making these tasks truly cooperative.

As to the objection that the measures planned cannot be carried out for financial reasons, it can be said that they are either economically sound to begin with, or will be made so through appropriate measures by the state. Thus the natural and justified demands of economic practice will be satisfied. A resolute government must however refuse to let itself be influenced, or worse still, hindered in the execution of its duties through unproven and unprovable economic and financial theories.

Lastly ^{loss} of efficiency through lack of cooperation on the part of the various government offices which would prevent the concentration of all available forces on the aim in view will on no account be tolerated. The character of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan is a guarantee that these difficulties, which would employ many valuable men to the full if these tasks were to be carried out under other forms of government, will not make themselves felt.

The work of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials will be directed according to these basic principles, details of which will be currently reported in this periodical.

The first report on the tasks of this Office will not be concerned with these details. However, it seems necessary at the present moment to discuss a few decisive basic principles, knowledge of which is essential in order to understand the methods of the new office.

It needs more time than we have available in order to achieve the theoretically possible optimum in all fields. The economic and technical development of civilized nations has attained a speed which is without precedent in history. We therefore believe that never before was the dictum of the Field Service Regulation of the proud and unbeaten pre-war army more applicable than now: Omission and neglect are a graver fault than a mistake in the choice of means.

(page 1 of original cont'd)

The great responsibility which the far-reaching effects of the measures in hand entail, results in the necessity of eliminating the danger of mistakes in the choice of means, as far as it is humanly possible.

(page 2 of original)

The section "Research and Development" of the office, which was formed for this task, consists of men who, having been appointed while enjoying the confidence of the respective groups of specialists, offer the best assurance conceivable for factually and objectively counselling their superiors who have the responsibility of making decisions. But beyond this, the whole German race was summoned by Generaloberst Goering to cooperate in the necessary intellectual efforts preliminary to the great new task. So far thousands of fellow Germans have already responded to this call. And even though, as is to be expected under the circumstances, the preponderant majority of the proposals is not suitable for utilization in practice, the fact that a noteworthy number of new ideas can be introduced fully repays the great amount of work which must needs be applied in this field.

Furthermore, it has been clearly demonstrated that the gigantic intellectual forces, which are embodied in the higher institutions of learning, in the public and private research foundations, in the institutes of the most varied type, are urgently aspiring, out of their own inner consciousness of responsibility, to a systematic fixing of goals, which will make it possible for them to make their capabilities effective in a direction which will not serve the needs of personal self-expression but the welfare of their fatherland. The new office has undertaken the task of pointing out these goals. The results which have already been attained in this direction thus far, justify the hope that one will succeed in effectively engaging all of the valuable forces, hitherto often latent, in effort toward the one great goal.

In the practical effectuation of the knowledge thus gained it will be necessary, as has already been mentioned, to make structural changes in the economy here and there. It will be necessary to constitute this new arrangement not only, to be sure, from the viewpoint that in each case as few changes as possible will be made in the situation as we found it. On the contrary, the multitude of new tasks will frequently provide the possibility of transforming conditions which have developed unnecessary tension and resulted in futile situations into new forms, without hurting the individuals involved. The circles of German economy, to whom these considerations apply above all, have already been informed about this and have demonstrated the expected understanding of it. If it should prove necessary to take measures in further economic fields, they will be discussed in due time and confidentially with the participating integrated parts of economic life.

The achievements of the Reich Office for Industrial Planning ("Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung") which in its many years of not always properly recognized activity has attempted to assemble the facts necessary for the proper evaluation of the various basic factors, will in every individual instance have their due effect.

But in conclusion the following determination seems to have particular significance: all branches of the economy which are participating in the new order are, in the front line of our country's battle in its struggle to become independent of external influences. Thus they are an essential constituent part of the security of the State.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6709
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

This must be taken into account, for one thing, in shaping its external form. Even though we no longer need to fear that an enemy on foot will step on German soil, we must, nevertheless, in accordance with the theory openly expressed everywhere in foreign countries, take into account that a military dispute will commence with a surprise attack of enemy air war forces on our country without the warning of a declaration of war. We must so arrange it that such a surprise attack will not be able to paralyze us in fields which are important for existence and for carrying on war. The measures necessary for this are an added obligation to which the plants of the Four Year Plan are subject in the same measure as the plants of the immediate armaments industry.

Furthermore, in all pertinent fields we shall no longer permit the patent protection granted by the German Reich to an individual or a firm to hinder the actually desired extent of effectiveness of an invention. We believe that the economy which has been enlightened in this direction can make extensive license agreements which will take account of the general weal just as it does of the well-earned demands of the individual.

In addition Generaloberst Goering will demand that the plants which originate and continue under his leadership utilize the possibility of taking into account, under the New Order, viewpoints of social welfare to the utmost degree. We know that under certain circumstances it is often very difficult so to rearrange an old place of employment which originated under outdated circumstances that the workers will, in their leisure time also, be in externally agreeable surroundings. But there is no new plant of the Four Year Plan which will not endeavor to realize the requirement "improvement of the working place" ("Schonheit der Arbeit") in the conceivably most perfect form.

But in order to compensate for these burdens the plants of this sector - subsequent publications will give continuous information as to magnitude which this sector will assume - have not only the inner consciousness of occupying the leading position in the sense of the folk community. Beyond this they will enjoy the special protection and the special care of the state already for this reason, that their welfare will be of decisive interest to those who run the state.

The directing of the development outlined above will be, on order of Ministerpraesident Generaloberst Goering and in cooperation with the remaining business groups of the Four Year Plan, through the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics. The fulfillment of this task is extremely simple in view of the uncomplicated and clear goal which has been set, if all of the forces concerned in the cooperation unite in one direction for the work which serves only the welfare of our fatherland.

We shall attain this goal, since our Fuehrer and his plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan will smooth the paths to that goal for us.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION 18 June 1947

I, ARTHUR MACHIMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6709.

ARTHUR MACHIMARA, No. 20191

-4-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8590
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

MINISTER PRESIDENT GENERAL GOERING
Commissioner for the Four
Year Plan

The Chief of the Office
for German Raw and Synthetic Materials

(handwritten:) No. 1458/37 top secret
(S.H.)

(handwritten:) WC-15 St L-2046/37
Berlin, 25 November 1937
Behrenstrasse 68-70
Telephone: A 2 Flora 0048

(stamp:)
TOP SECRET

(handwritten:)
40
to be filed
Vo 9 Dec.

Dear Mr. Under Secretary of State,

Enclosed herewith please find copy of the report on
"The results of the work done during the first year of the
Four Year Plan", dated 30 October 1937, for the information
of Minister President General GOERING.

1 Enclosure

Heil Hitler !
(signature)
Colonel of the General Staff

(handwritten notes:)

Ministerial Director (name illegible)	}	was submitted to Ministerial Director M. (initialled:) W. 3 December
Ministerial Councillor DITRICH		for notice Noted D. 5 December
Ministerial Director WALTER		Noted W. 3 December

(initial:) B 2 December

(rubber stamp:)

Section Nutrition
Received: 9 December 1937
Journal No.: top secret
(S.H.) 52/37
To be submitted for
resubmission:
Filed away: 10 December
Initial

(page 2 of original)

MINISTER PRESIDENT GENERAL GOERING
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan

The Chief of the Office
for German Raw and Synthetic Materials

C o p y

Berlin, 30 October 1937
Behrenstrasse 68-70
Telephone: A 2 Flora 0048
(handwritten) WC - 15

(stamp:)
TOP SECRET

Results of work done during the first year of
the Four Year Plan.

At the close of the first year of the Four Year Plan
I submit the following report on the work done during this year
and what further development may be predicted.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

1. Tasks assigned.

- a) The order given to this office in the form of a directive was to see to it, under its own responsibility, that Germany was freed in the shortest possible time from the necessity of importing those raw materials in the field of industry which we can obtain, produce or replace with other equivalent materials inside Germany.
- b) The translation of this directive into practical details concerning the assignment of tasks and their execution was left to this office.
- c) As an added factor, such an acute shortage of raw materials, especially iron, made itself felt in the course of the year that at times the rate of progress dropped to less than half of what would otherwise have been possible and provided for.

2. Origin of the Overall Plan.

To Minister President General
GOERING

- a) Ascertaining requirements for peace and war. The difficulty here is determining the increase of peacetime requirements in advance and the impossibility of obtaining definite mobilization figures from the Reich Ministry of War and the Commissioner General.

(page 3 of original)

- b) Ascertainment of immediately practicable ways to meet this demand fully or in part without resorting to imports. In this connection, closest possible cooperation with the Reich and party offices concerned and in particular with the industrial economy which cannot be dispensed with in carrying this out.
- c) This brought about the over-all plans of 15 October 1936, 10 January 1937, and 27 May 1937 which were conservatively drawn up and constantly developed further (compare paragraph 7. e)).

3. Execution of the over-all plan by sections and chief consultants (Hauptreferate).

Final results are available up to the end of September 1937. The balance of 1937 can be estimated with sufficient accuracy to render possible a comparison with the preliminary estimate of the over-all plan for 1937. Enclosure shows this comparison in the various special fields.

4. Total result.

(handwritten notes:) On the whole, the measures put into practice by this office in 1937 resulted in savings on imports and additional proceeds from export to the amount of RM 367 million as against 1936. The preliminary estimate of RM 464 million (over-all plan of 27 May 1937) is being exceeded, as it includes approximately RM 100 million (proceeding from drying installations, etc., according to directions given by the Reich Food Estate) which, although the preparatory work has been done, will not take full effect until 1938, and have not been counted in the over-all plan for 1938.

But increased demand! ?/
 Quite wrong! ?/
 instead of RM 100 million 16 million at the most.

The fact that this result was achieved despite the shortage of raw materials mentioned in paragraph 1.c) is due in part to higher yields from constantly improved processes, and moreover shows the caution which was followed in making the estimates for the over-all plan. Considerably more could have been achieved, had more raw material been allocated. The consequences of the shortages will be considerably more serious for 1938.

(page 4 of original)

The total crude steel consumption of the installations controlled by this office in 1937 had an import value of RM 27.2 million, and an export value of RM 152 million obtained through direct iron exports. The correlation between the plants and installations under the Four Year Plan and direct iron exports ^{were} referred to by this office whenever the opportunity presented itself.

For other raw materials no total annual figures are available for 1937. Collectively, they are certainly lower than the corresponding iron figures.

5. Financing.

480 projects were completed amounting to RM 1,150 million, of which 200 million came from Reich and budgetary funds. Still in progress are 33 projects amounting to RM 510 million. Total: RM 1,660 million. The difference as against the RM 2,870 million allowed by the over-all plan is due to the fact that many projects do not need to be financed by this office.

Financing presents no difficulties.

6. Propaganda, Press.

This office conducted an indispensable campaign - which grew in intensity as the task developed - for the purpose of enlightening the general public about the measures taken in the field of industry. Lectures at meetings held by the Party, the economy and scientific professional associations, articles in the press, especially in the monthly magazine "Der Vierjahresplan", sponsoring of all important exhibitions which have any bearing on the various special fields concerned, and preparation of three special travelling exhibitions.

The attitude of the press is thoroughly cooperative; articles and notices dealing with the activities of the office are steadily increasing.

Even the foreign press is showing the greatest interest.
(page 5 of original)

7. Measures for further development.

- a) Working out the inventive activities which have been most strongly stimulated by the suggestions of the General. Total number received during the last 12 months about 16,000, of which about one half was completely worthless, about 7% practical as such; 500 to 600 suggestions which have actually been tried out.
- b) Systematic commencement of research by assigning tasks directly to governmental and private research offices; the ones particularly efficient and worthwhile to be singled out as "Institutes of the Four Year Plan". The fear that the influence of this office might be disturbed by the establishment of the Reich Research Council (Reichsforschungsrates) has so far not materialized.
- c) Elaboration of the widely dispersed statistical and scientific materials on raw material-flow-charts and rawmaterial balance for all fields in any way important. In this way - for the first time - a clear survey will be made of the fundamentals of the economy from the point of view of rawmaterial, and the possibility created of a systematic guidance in peace and war adapted to any circumstances. This makes it possible to solve the Plenipotentiary General's most important task.

(page 5 of original cont'd)

- d) Final summaries of the more important special fields, reports concerning this to the economy and authorities for use as a guide to the Four Year Plan, publication in a periodical issued by this office.
- e) Constant development of the over-all plan. The next edition planned for the beginning of 1938 will deal with all fields going out from the point of view of theoretically complete self-sufficiency (comp. conference note of 6 August 1937, number 3.c).

(page 6 of original)

8. Review of the situation.

(handwritten:)

Praise to the
Fuehrer

apparently ?
could have been
predicted !

- a) The course of the first year has proven that the basic ideas of the Four Year Plan are feasible for the industrial economy and therefore justified.
- b) In so far as the actual increase in production of hitherto imported raw materials does not show up fully in the foreign trade balance, it is apparently (handwritten:) a case of an increase in consumption. The recognition of this can only lead to a further acceleration of the expansion program, which is thoroughly possible if enough material is allocated.
- c) Taking a long view of the matter the intensified reconstruction of the industrial economy will not be limited by questions of finances or materials, much less by the lack of goodwill on the part of industry or the absence of fitting solutions. It is only the available manpower in Germany, which sets us an insurmountable limit, which perhaps will soon be reached. (Comp. conference note of 6 August 1937 No. 3.b). The office is devoting particular attention to this question.
- d) The constitutional position of this office within the Reich authorities is still extremely unclear. In spite of that the most important prerequisite for the fulfillment of our task, full control over the economy, has been created. Outwardly this can be seen for instance, from the fact that to date 1300 factories, plants, or factory enlargements were carried out or taken care of by this office in connection with the plan, that the number of daily visits lies between 250 and 300. The present situation with all its defects serves the cause better than would any organizational change, which would tear apart these connections which have been so laboriously created.

(handwritten:)
Premonition!

(page 7 of original)

(handwritten:)

PLEIGER!

- e) The main reason for being able to carry out our task is the concentration of all matters concerning the industrial economy in one office which can take in at a glance the manifold connections and bring them into harmony with one another. Any exclusion of subordinate matters does not help this office, but results in additional, unpleasant work, since the concentration has to be brought about somehow as far as the actual work concerned.
It is not the desire to unite as many departments as possible within the office, but my earnest concern at not being able to carry out the task assigned to me which causes me to make the urgent request to refrain from any further division of the responsibility of industry for the Four Year Plan.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

(handwritten:)

Hungry for power!!!

On the contrary, the proper solution seems to me to be the expansion into the Reich Raw Materials Office for direction in peace and in preparation for the tasks of waging a war.

- f) The road taken since the announcement of the Four Year Plan for the industrial economy will lead to our goal. There is no reason for changing the direction of our march.

Signature

Colonel of the General Staff.

(page 8 of original)

Enclosure to the letter of the Chief of Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials of 30 October
(stamp:)

Top Secret

Results of Carrying out Over-all Planning in Individual Fields in 1937

Special Field.	Savings in imports in Mill RM as proposed in the over-all plan	Value of the prod. increase in 1937 as compared with 1936 in Mill. RM	Remarks
a) Textiles	128,8	129,4	Achieved in full.
b) Base metals	20,7	18,1	Delays within the field as a whole essentially fulfilled.
c) Iron and steel x)	46,7	9,6	Entirely inadequate. Besides difficulties with the material itself the reason lies in months of organizational confusion. It is to be hoped that the production plan of the Reichswerke "Hermann Goering" will gradually fill the gap in comparison with the amount called for in the over-all plan.
d) Fatless detergents	-	-	-
e) Tannins	0,3	-	The plants did not start operation until the end of 1937 or the beginning of 1938 because of insufficient material allocation.
f) Soot	1,0	-	as in e)
g) Sausage skins	6,5	2,6	Lack of acceptance by wholesalers consumers because further possibility of foreign sources incorporated in trade agreements.
h) Rubber, reclaimed	11,3	11,5	Affected to a particularly large extent by the scarcity of iron for the construction of buna installations, made up for by increase of reclaimed rubber.
i) Paste	-	4,0	Reconversion could be carried out faster than was originally planned; completion of the installations was hastened in consideration of the need for rye paste.

(page 8 of original cont'd)

Special Field	Savings in imports in Mill.RM as proposed in the over-all plan	Value of the prod.increase in 1937 as compared with 1936 in Mill.RM	Remarks
k) Casein	5,4	2,0	Delayed completion of the installation because of lack of iron, which had a particularly strong effect in connection with the seasonal fluctuations in the dairy economy.
l) Mineral oils	24,6	39,7	Increase in German domestic oil production through drilling program has made good progress. In spite of delay in construction the quantitative result of synthetic production has become more favorable because of increased exploitation.
m) Chemistry on wood basis x)	32,5	5,6	To the 5,6 mill.RM are to be added 32,2 mill.RM, which are cited separately as export surplus under column t) (Total value of the production increase 37,8 mill.RM).
n) Wood			
o) Foodstuffs	185,5	85,6	Conditions were created for import savings through dehydration plants, etc. cited by the Reich Food Estate, result of about 100 mill.RM expected in 1938.
p) Waterways, harbor construction	-	-	-
q) Shipbuilding program	0,2	0,7	-
r) Barter materials	-	-	The savings in imports which have undoubtedly been obtained have not yet been calculated.
s) Machine tools, machine parts xx)	-	20,9	The number has been ascertained through exact investigation in cooperation with the Economic Group for Machine Construction. It is chiefly accounted for because the increased demand of industry could be met by extending capacity without having to increase the imports which otherwise would have become necessary.
t) Chemistry (wood) Increased proceeds from exports xx)	-	32,2	Increased exports of paper and cardboard having become possible through better conservation of commercial timber in the forests. Shift to German types of wood, especially use of fir wood in the paper and cellulose industry. Increased use of scrap paper in interest of wood conservation.
u) Machine tools, mach. parts, excess in proceeds from export xx)	-	5,2	Increase of exports through extension of capacities.
Total	463,7	367,3	

x) including additional program

xx) not yet proposed in over-all plan of 27 May 1937; measures were instigated by this office.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, John B. ROBINSON, No. X-046 350 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-8590.

John B. ROBINSON
No. X-046 350.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 11-024
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

"THIS IS AN UNOFFICIAL COPY"

5. Confidential-Industry I

up to March 1939

(page 2 of original)

Iron-Scarcity and Iron-Rationing
for replacing the current wear and tear and for the
purpose of new constructions.

M i n u t e s

of the meeting held on 16 June 1937 in the Haus der Flieger at
Berlin.

Present: Generaloberst Goering in the chair:

for the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan:

Staatsrat M a u s m a n n

Ministerialrat G R A Z A C H

and others,

for the business group Raw Material Distribution:

Ministerpräsident K o e h l e r

Special commissioner K e p p l e r

from the Air Ministry:

General U d e t

from the Office for German Raw- and synthetic materials:

Oberst L o e b

Dr. K r a u c h

Kapitän C o u r c o u t h e r

Herr G e i s t

Herr P l e i g e r

from the Reich Commissariat for Employment Service:

Präsident Dr. S y r u p

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-024
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

from the Reich Ministry of Economy:

Oberberghauptmann Schlattmann

from the Supervisory Office for Iron and Steel:

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Kiegel

and also the following:

Gau leader Suckel, Thuringia,
and Gau economic adviser,

for the Coal Mining and Iron-Industry:

Borbet
Bulle
Buskuchl
Goerens
Kellermann
Maulick
Ernst Poentgen
Reichert
Hermann Roehling
Scheer-Hennings
Voegler
Vasemann
Winkhaus
Wisselmann

GOETTER held a preliminary address of some length stating more or less the following:

There are several factors that led to the scarcity in iron. The first mistake was made by myself when I asked each individual agency in need of iron to report its requirements. The figures

(page 4 of original)

with which we were inundated were absurd. The requirements of the Armed Forces alone amounted to more than 675,000 tons monthly. The total requirements amounted to 2.8 million tons monthly i.e. the production capacity was surpassed by 800,000 tons. Many requested double the amount they required. In addition there was the hoarding, furthermore the retaining of stocks and the like.

The second mistake was that, impressed by the enormous demands, we carried out rationing to the minutest detail. As an old soldier I should have told myself that this was bound to go wrong. We intended to do things in another way and base it on the quantity available. In the normal way the best idea in this respect would have been to base the iron distribution on the principle of priority. But owing to the tremendous extent of iron consumption these priority-declarations led to a bottleneck. These priority certificates piled up mountain high and could no longer be dealt with.

In theory rationing is all right but in practice it is extremely difficult. It led to a slowing down of the work. I am thinking of an order of the Reich Ministry for Economy which proves this. The consequence was that every official responsible for the armament industry refused to deliver material to the factories. This is as far as mistakes were made on our part.

Now the mistakes of the other side. The high demands were mentioned already. Some got out of it by saying that there is no iron available. In the iron processing industry the lamentations about the lack of iron became so loud

(page 5 of original)

that it appeared to me to be unfounded. Surely, we do not produce any less iron than formerly. If there actually existed a shortage of iron, not so many workers could have been employed. The actual hours of work in industry have increased everywhere. A proof that ~~there was~~ less but more iron was processed.

Of course the programs have been enlarged. A gun factory that produces within a certain period and with the aid of its equipment only 100 pieces cannot comply with the demands for double the quantity if its equipment does not correspond to it. According to my findings the armament plants received sufficient iron. In future it will be possible to cut down the demands of the ammunition sector. As for my office I have come to the conclusion that before clamoring so much for iron, one should first ascertain whether one is in the position to make use of it all in the manufacturing process. I am going to send out an official, vested with special powers, in order to examine and find out the reasons for these complaints.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-084
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

With regard to the buildings for the armed forces we are faced with a different problem. I shall propose an intermediate solution to the Fuehrer: wherever it is necessary to erect buildings, the people are to be housed first in huts.

Why do we need such a lot of iron? The whole world is hungry for iron. It is a profitable business in export. Only little expenditure is needed to achieve the quickest sales imaginable. Not only does this refer to the export of semi-finished goods but also to crude iron. The demand from abroad is largest for these products.

(page 5 of original)

By exporting semi-finished goods Germany does not receive as much foreign exchange as by supplying goods which require more labor. It would be ideal if the export of semi-finished goods would stop altogether, and only finished goods would be exported. There is no machinery for which we cannot find a market in the world. But there is very little profit in it, if we take into account the expenditure for foreign exchange which is required for the import of foreign raw material.

With his voice raised Goering continued: At a moment like this we cannot export one third of the whole iron production. (Approval from the representatives of the various authorities). Naturally it is convenient to stick to this form of export, however, we must increase our endeavors in examining all the goods that are being exported in order to find out whether we cannot increase the export in another field.

Things must be considered as a whole. One ton of semi-finished goods sent abroad yield approximately RM 100.- in foreign exchange. However, if we use one ton of iron and work it up for the erection of plants for the Four Year Plan then I find in most cases that four to five times, even six and ten times the amount of foreign exchange is saved. And that is the object of the Four Year Plan.

Goering reportedly raised his voice, calling out: Anybody can sell the German iron. To-day I could sell abroad the entire iron production including the processing.

It was my opinion right from the beginning that its purpose is not the distribution of the available iron, but to achieve an increase in the production, i.e. to produce what we are in need of.

(page 7 of original)

In surveying the measures of my initiative, I find that until this day I have always made provisions for the fact that additional iron and iron ore can be produced in Germany. Immense success has been achieved in this respect. From General Franco I secured the 1st bit from Spain. After the occupation of Bilbao I shall carry away the ore from there, regardless of whether it belongs to the English or not.

It would be far better off, if the German industry had not refused to produce iron from German ore. GOERING continued excitedly: It is wrong; I shall proceed ruthlessly and issue laws to increase the procurement of ore from German soil to the utmost capacity. It is indifferent to me how the ore deposits are discovered, whether by divining rods or other means.

Neither is it decisive what costs are incurred in the production of iron. With regard to these matters, everything that has been neglected during many years must be made up for now, so that we may overcome the shortage of iron.

First of all the capacity of the foundries must be expanded. With regard to the processing of iron, we are already ahead of the U.S. The foundries however, will have to produce some 100,000 tons per month additionally. Wealthy England with her dominions has even a greater shortage of iron than we. It was not a simple matter to get hold of whatever came within our grasp, against the rush of England, France, Czech-Slovakia, who fell upon the iron stocks of the world.

It must be noted at all costs that with regard to the prices of iron ore no experiments can be made. Now we have to swallow the bitter pill and pay higher prices.

(page 8 of original)

The foreign countries are blackmailing us. When we no longer need to make purchases abroad, no day, then let the foreign entrepreneurs go bankrupt. They deserve it for their present blackmail.

I consider the following facts to be of importance: If I wish to raise the amount of milk produced by a cow, I have to give her more food. The same applies to the iron industry. I have to give the foundries iron ore for their current requirements, in order to obtain more iron. The iron must primarily be supplied where it is most needed in order to produce more in the future. These requirements precede all others, namely that of the Four-Year Plan, etc. The second most important fact is, which has to be considered with respect to the iron surely, are all the same level, namely Schwarzwald, Four Year Plan and export. The Four Year Plan will contribute towards creating the necessary basis for a quick rearmament. With out foreign currency, however, I cannot carry out the Four Year Plan a hundred per cent.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. HI-004
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

With respect to the Wehrmacht, these plants, which or whose the manufacture of which takes a long time - construction of warships - must be considered primarily and supplied with iron at all costs. No delay is admissible in this connection. The same applies to naval guns and other large-caliber guns, and also for machine installations, which facilitate an expansion of our gun manufacture. These too have the priority as far as supplies are concerned. There is a ton of iron of the greatest value with the Wehrmacht, the Four Year Plan for export? Can not foreign currency be saved? I examine this problem, I shall appoint men who are capable of planning. With respect to the export of semi-finished products, we are compelled to export to a certain degree

(page 9 of original)

if we are to say for the import of other goods, for instance iron. I am not in a position to say if Sweden wants semi-finished products in return for her iron. Certain other trade agreements, however, can be thrown overboard without giving them a second thought, except in the case where the export of semi-finished products brings vital import goods in return. In this connection a tactical trade-political struggle must be carried on in order to convince the country desirous of getting our semi-finished products, that it can get finished products in return. At the present time, for instance, South Eastern Europe can no longer get semi-finished products in return for her grain.

I shall have this question examined into its final effects. Rising, his vice GOERING continued: With out imperative economic and political reasons I am no longer going to supply foreign countries with semi-finished products.

The import of iron will have to be increased. There is a disadvantage, with regard to shipping space. I shall empower someone to allocate the entire German and foreign shipping space according to importance. The shipping space is to be utilized to its full extent. I am glad to say that this is already being done with respect to the iron import from Sweden, but the iron demands have to be provided for it elsewhere too.

I shall instruct the Supervisory Office for Iron and Steel that not even a single ton of iron which we are able to obtain, is to be squandered due to the bureaucratic attitude. I do not care whether any official regulations are violated. As much iron as possible has to be procured. However, I cannot obtain enough iron to meet the demands for iron.

For this reason distribution must be made. However, I wish to cancel it as soon as possible and to allow quotas to certain

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-054
CONTINUED

(page 10 of original)

categories only, namely Four Year Plan, Mohrwecht and Ex. vi;
perhaps also some smaller consumers who do not require large
quantities, in order to eliminate possible friction. Everything
else, however, I should like to leave to some other distributing
organization, which is in a better position to make the ad-
justments. I request the opinion of those present in this connection.

As far as scrap is concerned, everything possible has been done,
but still more has to be achieved. I am going to call a Gesamter
meeting and to name those organizations which can help in the
procurement of scrap. I shall furthermore authorize somebody to
travel through the Gaus for the purpose of enforcing the directives
for the procurement of scrap. I am convinced that we could obtain
sufficient iron if everyone were to make the greatest effort to
procure scrap iron and also to think of replacing the iron.
During my journeys I was glad and angry at the same time; to see
that here and there old rails had been used as fences along the
roads for kilometers. The same is often the case at the railroad
stations. Benisters have been made from the best rails. One must
think of the small items and their collection, from the h-b-nail
to the 1.5.1.1.1.

In conjunction with this, the following must be considered:
where can iron be saved? The architects are already more careful
to save iron than formerly. This task has to be tackled with an
ardent energy, even with aggression.

As far as Germany is concerned, I shall take this matter
partially into my own hands. I shall see to it.

(page 11 of original)

that everything is done on a large scale. In Hoss there is an
iron mine, the property of a railroad official. After the law
had been issued, he pretended that he was going to invest some-
thing in it. Probably his intentions were not bad and he was not
trying to be obstinate, he probably acted like he did because
he did not want to incur the risk. Even our greatest business leaders
are dominated by such ideas. How easily they say that from a business
viewpoint he cannot foresee what the future holds, and that he
might easily be left empty-handed when the re-armament was
strong enough, and then all the misery would start all over again.
I found this mentality even in the leading circles. In that case
it is no wonder that the apolline amorals follow the same
trend of thought.

However, nobody who has the slightest idea about politics must
realize today that this is not a passing boom, but that every-
thing is being done to make this prosperity permanent. Not
only that, but gigantic constructions are planned for decades to come!
The project published in Hamburg is evidence of that. Then there
is the political will to achieve this, regardless of who will

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT M. M. 11-084
CONTINUED

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

success of the Fuehrer's day. Even then, this mighty task would need to be completed. However, what will be in five hundred years, I cannot say. As far as it is humanly possible to judge, I can assure you for the next generation, that you will not have to regret what you invest today. Just think of the large absorbing capacity for iron in China with her 400 million people. There, just like in South America, the railroad system is not sufficiently developed by far. Should it not be possible to make also the desert Sahara fertile? From the time when first succeeded in melting iron by chance, it will forever be the most important of metals; that is my strongest conviction. In view of the efficiency of our workers, the iron products will be in demand all over the world. As far as the deposits of iron are concerned, the entire North German sphere has not been completely searched by far as yet, nor has the East. With regard to copper we have already discovered some deposits. It sounds quite erroneous, but I am fully convinced that we shall succeed in our task, if today every single person connected with these matters, would cooperate with the same passionate zeal as I. One must always keep the whole in view. Our road is ascending, believe me.

When we refer to allocation of quotas, we consider it a temporary measure only. However, in the field of production living power must be applied, so that more may be achieved.

I now request you, gentlemen - since it will hardly be possible for all of us verbally - to draw up a memorandum of a few pages in telegraphic style with your proposals. It is a question of the further production, of distribution etc. However, I do not want a memorandum from the viewpoint of your own plant, but from the viewpoint of Germany. I am specially interested in the following questions: Where does a shortage of iron actually exist? Where, on the other hand, is there an overabundance? What do people individually plan to do in the near future with regard to the production and smelting of iron? Here the ore - and the coal mining industry have to cooperate. I am asking the gentlemen of the armament industry to tell me, whether they are really not getting any iron to carry on the armament, or whether they must have higher quotas.

(page 13 of original)

If one follows up the development, one finds that in 1935 and later the number of man-hours has increased from March to April and then to May. It is the same with the daily working hours. The curve of the employment index is rising to such an extent that many factories are already doing overtime.

Those who are complaining most about the shortage of iron are the manufacturers. Here, it is said, workers had to be dismissed. To my surprise I found out that these factories are doing overtime (laughter). The responsibility must again be distributed correctly. Only then will it be possible to allocate iron according to the highest priority where it is needed.

Then the discussion turns to the stocks in hand. You tell me that you have less ore? I am telling you that there must be a quicker flow of scrap metal at the blast furnaces. Here the lapse of time is very long. Rotation could greatly be speeded up. Then more iron could be produced.

The iron industry must be freed from the grasp which holds it in its grip.

The natural flow of the material must be reestablished. This has been impeded by many small quota holders. The most important consumers must know what they can count upon.

An avalanche of form-numbers and paper forms have been necessary up to now. This must be stopped. I have to save paper, too. If here and there some parts are missing, e.g.,
(page 14 of original)

note for the completion of plans, or copper pipes for this part, then I am already thankful and it will not be necessary to write hysterical letters that the whole air armament is impossible.

I could give the name of some one whose statement has been taken down as who has submitted a figure about his consumption of iron which is too high. If one needs some 4,000 tons one should not ask for another 4,000 tons as a safety margin. Otherwise the result will be higher consumption instead of economy.

Export policy leads to helping the enemy's rearmament. I am thinking, for example, of heavy plates which are used in the foreign armament industry.

Then GABING starts reading from a document, but partly with such a low voice that only fragments can be clearly perceived. Obviously they contain suggestions of the author of the memorandum, as follows: He wants the following:

1.) restriction of the export of semi-finished products, and foreign currency can be saved with far less quantities. Therefore

2.) promotion of the export of finished products. One should try to establish a link connection with the recipient. The export of finished products always involves an export of substitutes too.

3.) "The rigid mechanism of international trade agreements must be eliminated."

With his voice raised, GABING then goes on:
I want to underline this three times: "It is essential."

(page 15 of original)

the responsibility if the manufacturer tries to put the blame on official authorities that the export of rolled iron is not to be restricted, I think this incredible. Then he continues in a quieter voice: Foreign prices are particularly attractive at the present time. Here the egoism of private enterprise is obvious.

But we are dependent on foreign countries for our iron ore supply. The Swedish example alone shows: If there should occur a general strike for three months, it would have a disastrous effect on our iron industry.

Then the memorandum contains the following suggestions:

4.) "A special plenipotentiary will be appointed for the control of production. He will issue the necessary regulations for the winning of ore and to the various iron works regarding the production program. He will also be responsible for supplies."

5.) "Army orders shall be suspended for six months."

No, that cannot be done at all; I hereby cancel it. Up to now it has been impossible to get figures from the Government as to how much iron is being used on their behalf. If I would have these figures, I could easily stop the shouting.

This is a decisive fact for me. I cannot leave it to the individuals to decide how much iron will be needed in future; the guiding principle will be how much was used during the past year.

(page 16 of original)

GÖRAN then reads on:

6.) "Report on the development of stocks in hand."

7.) "Consideration of the trade in the supply of the medium and small consumers."

8.) "Penalties."

9.) "Economy in building."

I quote an example to you of an architect who had estimated a consumption of iron which was far too high. I did not like his second design either, and only the third one which he submitted, provided for a 50% reduction in the consumption of iron.

10.) "Steel girder construction" must be restricted in favor of other building methods. Reinforced concrete will also take the strain if it contains less iron."

11.) "Public enterprise in building must be more severely restricted. Building plans must be more closely adapted to the speed of iron production."

Gentlemen, I ask you to submit your proposals in telegram style to me in the shortest possible time.

Now the MR. HÄG again raises his voice:

You must multiply what you have done so far. If ore deposits are at your disposal, then do not only drill holes but also shafts. Even the winning of small mines must be carried out. In respect to ore smelting, too, more must be done. I am already resolved of having a very large plant built under my personal supervision. I do not

(page 17 of original)

also whether the plant will belong to the state, or whether it will be built by you and then belong to you. The last objection to the winning of German ore must be removed. We must do it. Until these preparations have not been made, none of you will sleep peacefully. In Spain and Sweden the political situation is in the balance. It may have disastrous consequences for the German iron industry. The winning of German ore should have started a long ago. Now, at this twelfth hour, it has to be done. Where it is not done, we shall take away the ore from you and produce it ourselves.

(page 18 of original)

The Discussion.

which takes not one hour, is opened by Gaudeliter 2/10, FL of Thuringia. He complains passionately about insufficient supply of iron for the Schlar Gewerkschaft and charges iron trade and iron industry that they prefer doing simpler transactions. It even happened that iron allegedly supplied from Luxembourg had proved to be of German provenance. Soon there would be dismissals of workers. It was bitterly disappointing that in spite of code numbers and priority certificates one could not get any iron.

GIFRING does not let himself be influenced by these statements and demands very calmly that it should first be stated how much iron had been used at that plant during the last year. During the last year enough iron had presumably been supplied. It could only be a fault in the organization. He brought, for the following quantities were available:

- 21 000 tons of raw steel for the production of arms and instruments, full production of which is intended,
- 33 000 tons for the production of ammunition,
- 25 000 tons for the building of war ships.

All this had been fully allocated. All told it was 127 000 tons. To this were added 22,000 tons for the building of barracks, aerodromes, and similar things. All this had been allocated. Perhaps the Government had used too much iron for building purposes.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-336
CONTINUED

(page 19 of original)

UFT blames the second directive pursuant to Ordinance No. 100 as the Air Ministry had wanted to use the requirements of private enterprise for supplementary supplies, but could not do so, because of the carrying-out regulations. Apart from that it was not possible to process material that had no quota number. However, the latter were received too late.

Again GORING very calmly remarks that working hours in aircraft production had, however, increased.

UFT replies that some of the 2 cm gun factories were 100% GORING: In that case I would suggest stopping the whole quota system.

ATHELA explains that he did not favor the quota system, but there had to be some way to prevent government demands from rising to immoderate heights. It had been impossible to fulfill the Government demands: the quota plan was therefore inevitable.

GORING replies that the Government would have been able to cover its requirements even without a quota system.

ATHELA quickly retorts very pointedly that the Government itself had been unable to find out how much iron it consumed last year. The quota plan is an attempt to bring some order into iron distribution; every rationing system always was inconvenient and unfortunate. He was only responsible for the quota system.

(page 20 of original)

Whereas sub-distribution was the task of the central agency. Large-scale consumers had decided in favor of it. Schneider-Baumgarten was the spiritual father of these ideas. The distribution agencies were not the only ones who were to blame. The Government was to be blamed much more. It was outrageous because it had received iron in excess of its allocation under the quota plan.

ATHELA confirms that; it is true that the quota holders had used more than their iron allocation. He mentions the erection of barracks, for which large quantities of iron were used without a quota number being provided. In the case of fuel, rather steel was involved of which only 40,000 tons were produced last year, for which only 10,000 tons were frequently received in insufficient quantities. If quota holders would be satisfied with their allocations, iron distribution would right itself within 6 months. Of course, it is impossible to meet regular requirements fully when dealing with extended production programs.

ATHELA thinks a bottleneck was created by including pre-quota orders, which had to be carried out and delivered along with the others; thus it was impossible to comply fully with the quota number regulation.

ATHELA confirms that deliveries without quota number had been excessive. The criticized second directive aimed at the prevention of hoarding. It is unfortunately impossible to satisfy private demands. This is regrettable, particularly from the point of view of trade and the small-scale consumer.

A second Air Ministry representative explains that they could not afford to disregard the situation, even in the case of

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minute, and complains that in spite of the quota system there was not enough iron.

ACEMER: It will be possible to obtain a clearer picture by the end of the month, once figures of Wehrmacht requirements and supplies are available.

SALICUT continues his heated attacks:

GOERING: None of you can squeeze blood out of a stone. If you want 3 million tons and only 1.5 tons can be produced per month, we cannot hold anybody responsible for the discrepancy; distribution agencies had allocated adequate iron supplies to the Wehrmacht, but the latter had taken still more without quota numbers; and yet it fails to send full supplies to its firms.

FERNBERG: There is not much more to be added as regards the question of the quota system. Herr NEUBAUER intimated that the old orders should be cancelled. This was only done in part. When the Wehrmacht prepared their May quota calculations, they were still delivering old orders from March and April. They were therefore unable to fulfill the May quota as in that month they were still handling deliveries for old orders. The second directive will remedy this.

Industry believed that all orders for private requirements should also be cancelled. This was not done. It was thought that the orders would not need to be cancelled if the percentage was cut. Consequently the Steel Works Association has orders for 500,000 tons of iron for requirements of private enterprises alone. If delivery is 500,000 tons per month, my orders will have to wait 3 months. The Steel Works Association is unable to give earlier delivery dates. A way must be found soon to assure better supplies for private requirements.

(page 22 of original)

GOERING interrupts: Let Herr FERNBERG explain clearly whether he is against the quota system.

FERNBERG replies that government applicants should be given a quota, and perhaps also one or the other private applicant, such as shipyards and vehicle builders. Everything else, however, should continue to operate on a free supply basis, especially machine construction; they should have distribution by the Steel Works Association. The latter also then determines its standard requirements for aircraft, and for other things.

Whether the quota system as such is right, can be decided only after a certain observation period, because it is impossible to forecast all the consequences.

For export he has received 2 different orders, in the conference of 6 May. The first order, SCHACHT rules that the iron industry is to export approximately 100,000 tons per month. I was opposed to this, because only 10 to 15,000 tons can be exported at present prices. The object of the second order at the time was to supply the processing industry at a rate enabling it to increase its exports. I first began to increase our direct export in May. According to the first directive this was reversed. Today we assign for export only the quantities authorized by you. We are not trying to increase this export. I ask you: is that right?

TRANSLATION OF LOGUMENT No. HI-334
CONTINUED

(page 23 of original)

GOERING: It still remains a fact that at present, crude and semi-finished products constitute the large proportion of $1/3$ or, according to value, $1/4$ of the iron export.

SCHESSGEN replies: 300,000 tons per month semi-finished export is not amount to $1/3$, but only to $1/6$ of the monthly production of 1.8 million tons. The rest is spent on indirect exports. We shall export less in the iron-producing industry.

REICHMANN: Within the total iron export quota, indirect export has priority over direct export.

SCHESSGEN: Let me finish: Meanwhile the Reich Ministry of Economy issued the directive to curtail direct export by 15% in favor of indirect export. We will comply with this. We thus have 10,000 tons less per month, which go to indirect export. The bulk of this will have to be raw iron; export of refined products, like wire and strip iron, on the other hand, we are unfortunately unable to curtail. (The meaning of following sentence taken from the mimeograph copy of the German shortwave broadcast is unclear: (Yesterday, I understood Colonel Loh to say that of a total of 305,000 tons steel (without cast), they have in addition cut the 6,000 tons for another reason, namely to ensure better supplies for the replacement of requirements of the forestry and mining industry.) If this is carried out, you will have to free me from my responsibilities concerning the procurement of foreign currency. I am unable to discuss this any further.

Iron shipments to the so-called enemy countries, such as England, France, Belgium, Russia and Czechoslovakia only amount to 30,000 tons. This does not help the English sufficiently to maintain their armament program. Compared with last year, the English have greatly increased their export. However, we have now limited England, Belgium, France and Luxembourg to an export quota. If we were now to make strict export curtailments, then the world

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would feel the shortage of that iron, and Belgium and Luxembourg would try to increase their exports and obtain war supplies in return. They would thus slip out of our control, while at present we are in a position to stop them from exporting more than 30%.

There is no doubt that in the long run it would be impossible, if we were to forgo our export possibilities. The (International Iron and Steel Association's) new limitation starts on 1 July. But if we reduced production to 1.5 million tons, leaving only 100,000 tons for exports, this would mean a real emergency in the long run.

GOERING: But you have to limit that if we use iron for the four year plan building operations, we save foreign currency.

SCHESSGEN: I believe, but I first want to read the memorandum on which the figures. It is easy to obtain results different from the actual facts. We are prepared to do everything to promote indirect export.

REICHMANN: I could cancel the entire export in favor of the armament. But that is the result? Armament would have much to fear in 1935, but I would then probably have to introduce trade

limitations. We would probably be short of copper and chromium. Sooner I shall be responsible in the last instance. We must have a Germany independent, and also the foreign currency situation. We must arm. For both objectives I need foreign

(page 25 of original)

currency. But we do not have enough iron. The quantity would be even greater, had we not made efforts for months to increase production. Enough complaints were already received in April, I cannot say that a general dismissal of workers was necessary.

He then began to speak, in order to summarize the results of yesterday's conference, attended by representatives of the mining and iron industry.

Iron production capacity is insufficient. The following was set up as a plan: Iron requirements remain at 10,000 tons. In addition there is scrap from home production and dismantling, 100,000 tons in the quantity mined as per plan 2, according to the agreement with the industrial circles concerned.

Thus have a future capacity of 24 million tons crude steel and in addition

	0.2	"	"	cost
annually therefore a total of	27.0	"	"	
monthly total roughly	2.3	"	"	

Iron requirements for the erection of the factories are divided among the iron ore mining and foundry industries. All of them agree that the quota for replacements is insufficient to maintain the present output. These replacement and maintenance requirements must be kept up. Add to this current requirements for quantities not delivered in the last few months, and for which no quota allowance was made. There are furthermore extensions of requirements. Excess demands total 3,000,000 tons (300,000 million).

The quota system is to be interpreted as follows: determine actual political requirements. Iron production receives a little, therefore production will drop again. It must be it incumbent upon the quota holders to work the soil themselves, in order to obtain the iron quantities they require; in other words to take their share of iron mining, and thus to surrender their portion of their quota. This means a 20% cut in the share of

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each quota-holder in the distribution of the 300,000 tons. If this is not achieved, production will come to a standstill.

He then complains that the mines have not received enough iron. They had been sent to the mines, having increased production by 20%. They had received only 37% of the quota, and in the last few days, allocations under the new quota were as low as 10%.

He then states that mining is not a priority claim on supplies. Pressure would have to be brought to bear on the quota holders so as to obtain iron wherever possible. This is difficult, as the economy would need to make a 20% cut in the requirements. Many were merely looking for a spot in which they might invest their money, but iron certainly did not serve this purpose.

He then suddenly closed the meeting after the discussions had lasted for 3 hours.

(The meeting was held in the morning.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-304

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

March 1945

We, BETTIE JOCE SMITH, LEO A. HENRY and HENRY MCLEOD SMITH,
hereby certify that we are duly appointed translators for the
English and German languages and that the above is a true and
correct translation of the document No. NI-304.

pages 1 - 6 BETTIE JOCE SMITH
13 - 15 ETO No. 20146

" 7 - 12 LEO A. HENRY
ETO No. 20147

" 16 - 23 HENRY MCLEOD SMITH
ETO No. 20148

- 17 -
" Enc " "

THE FOUR YEAR PLAN

Magazine for national-socialist economic policy with official communications of the trustees for the Four Year Plan,

Minister President General Field Marshal Goering

Publisher: Dr. Erich Gritzbach - Editor: Dr. Kurt Petersen,
Fram Eher, succ., Inc., Central Publisher NSDAP, Berlin SW 68

Sequence 2

2nd year

Berlin, February 1933

The most intensive concentration of all political, military and economic forces, ordered by the Fuehrer and assembled in his hands, insistently demanded dictatorial measures that would ensure a homogeneously directed economy. By incorporating important duties of the Four Year Plan into the Ministry of Economic Affairs and thus bringing about a complete reorganization of the Ministry which is of the greatest importance for the national economy, the chief prerequisite for these measures has already been fulfilled. Henceforth the various departments of the Four Year Plan, together with the reorganized Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs and all the other agencies concerned, form a homogeneous whole, under the primary direction of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Thus, as never before, the complete development of all economic forces is made possible. Their unrestricted operation under a centralized direction makes certain the achievement of the lofty goal of the Four Year Plan: the freedom and independence of the nation.

(signed) HERMANN GOERING

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ERMA S. UIBERALL, AGO No D-150096, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No NI-1280.

ERMA S. UIBERALL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT NO. KL-135
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Translation of excerpt from "Voelkischer Beobachter" No. 36, dated
5 February 1938, page 2, columns 5 and 6

Conclusion of the reorganization of the Ministry of Economics executed by the Plenipotentiary General of the Four Year Plan.

INB (German News Agency), Berlin, 4 Feb.

On the basis of the powers which the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor gave on 26 Nov. 1937 to the Plenipotentiary General of the Four Year Plan, Prime Minister General Goering, for the reorganization of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics, the following new organization comes into effect.

The field of activity of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics is divided into five main departments, to which the Central Department is added.

Main Department I.

Industrial Section: German raw and synthetic materials.

To this belong:

Department I (general questions; planning)

Department II (industrial matters relating to trades)

Department III (chemistry)

Department IV (mineral oils)

Main Department II

Mining, Iron, Power

To this belong:

Department I (mining)

Department II (iron)

Department III (power)

Main Department III

Economic organization, trade, handicrafts.

To this belong:

Department I (Economic Organization)

Department II (industrial police - Gewerbepolizei)

Main Department IV

Money and credit matters

Main Department V

Foreign trade, foreign exchange, export.

To this belong:

Department I	(office for various countries)
Department II	(foreign exchange matters)
Department III	(export)

Subordinate to the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics there are further:

1. The Reich Office for Economic Development (research, planning, execution of the Four Year Plan). To this belong:

Department I	(Research and development)
Department II	(Planning and execution)

2. The Reich Office for Soil Research (amalgamation of the former geological regional office).
3. The Reich Commissioner for utilization of scrap material.

In the course of this reorganization the following appointments and changes in personnel takes place:

Appointed:

Member of the Reichsbank Directorate BRINKMANN, as Under-Secretary of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics;

Former Under-Secretary of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics ROSE, as Under-Secretary for Special Tasks,

Former Ministerialdirektor SARNOW, as Ministerialdirektor for Special Tasks,

Air Force Major-General LOEB, as Head of Main Department I (formerly Chief of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials at the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan),

Army Major-General VON HANDELSEN, as Head of Main Department II (formerly Plenipotentiary General for Iron and Steel at the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan),

Statist SCHUBERT, as Head of Main Department III (formerly, Head of the Central Office for the Four Year Plan at the German Labor Front), by appointment as Ministerialdirektor; President LAUBE z.D., as Head of the Internal Department (Hausabteilung) (formerly Departmental Chief at the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials), by appointment as Ministerialdirektor.

Major, (retired) VON JAGWITZ, as Head of Main Department V (formerly Head of the Commercial Group for Foreign Trade at the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan), by appointment as Ministerialdirektor.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-135
cont'd. -----

General Staff Major Dr. Ing. CZERNIS, as Head of the Reich Office for Economic Development; Engineer KEPTLER, as President of the Reich Office for Soil Research (with the rank of Under-Secretary), (formerly Chief Expert for German raw and synthetic materials for the Four Year Plan).

There were further appointed:

Ministerialdirektor WOLFF, as Ministerialdirektor for special tasks at the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan; Ministerialrat MICHEL as Head of Department I of Main Department I, by appointment as Ministerialdirigent; Ministerialdirigent RUELBERG as Head of Department II of Main Department I; Ministerialrat MUELT as Head of Department III of Main Department I, by appointment as Ministerialdirigent.

Ministerialdirigent VON KERNSTERCK, as Head of Department IV of Main Department I (formerly in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials); Bergrat GUEEL as Commissar of Department I of Main Department II (formerly in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials), by appointment as Ministerialrat,

Ministerialrat BURCKE as Head of Department III of Main Department II, by appointment als Ministerialdirigent,

Ministerialrat GOTTSCHECK as Commissar of Department I of Main Department III, by appointment as Ministerialdirigent,

Dr. EBERHARDT KOEHLER, as Head of Department II of Main Department III, formerly in the Central Office for the Four Year Plan at the German Labor Front, by appointment as Ministerialrat,

Ministerialdirigent SEITZ, as Head of Department I of Main Department V; Ministerialrat LINDNER, as Head of Department II of Main Department V, by appointment als Ministerialdirigent,

Ministerialrat DR. SCHLOTTERER, as Head of Department III of Main Department V (formerly in the Commercial Group for Foreign Trade at the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan), by appointment as Ministerialdirigent,

President of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce for Niedersachsitz, KEMPEL, as "Generalreferent" of the Under-Secretary of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics (formerly in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials); Ministerialrat KOEHLER as Reich Commissar at the Berlin Stock Exchange,

WOLF as Ministerialrat of the Oberregierungsrat at the Reich Commissar for credits,

Regierungsrat MARTINI as Oberregierungsrat; Dr. KRUUCK as Head of Department I of the Reich Office for Economic Development (formerly in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials); Major Dr. Ing. GEIST as Head of Department II of the Reich Office for Economic Development (formerly Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials),

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-135
cont'd. -----

Regierungsrat RECHENBERG as Press Secretary of the Reich and Prussian Economic Minister (formerly Press Secretary in the Press Department of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan).

Temporarily retired;

Inspector General of Mines SCHLATTNER and Ministerialdirektors WIEBECK and POHL in the Reich and Prussian Economic Ministry.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ESTHER GLASER, ETO 2353, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document NI-135.

ESTHER GLASER
ETO 2353

Reich &
Prussian Economic
Ministry
MINISTER FUNK

Ministerial Office
Pers. Ref. O.R.P. Walter
" " K.R. Kellus
Press Ref. Eichenberg
Adjutant: SS-Sturmführer
Schredler

State-Secretary: Brinkmann
a.b.V.O.R.P. Bergmann
Gen. Ref.: Kehr, President
of the Chamber of Commerce &
Industry IL HD Lausitz

State Secretary Posse
for special tasks
Ministerialdirektor
for special tasks: Sarnow

Central Dept.
Chief: Min.
Dirigent
Dr. Föttenborn

Main Dept. I
Industrial Dept.
German Raw &
Synthetic material
Chief: Dr. Föge
a.b. Gen. LEB

Main Dept. II
Mining-Iron-Jewel
Control
Chief: Army Major Gen
von Hünicken

Main Dept. III
Economic regulation
Commerce and trade
Chief: Min. Direktor
Staatsrat Schmeier

Main Dept. IV
Currency & Credit
Affairs
Chief: Min. Direkt.
Pres. (ret.) Lange

Main Dept. V
Foreign trade &
currency export
Chief: Min. Direktor
Maj (ret.) v. Jagwitz

Dept. I
General questions &
Savings: Chief: Min.
Dirig. II HUCHO
Special Industrial
Reports: Chief: Min. Dirig.
III WEIMING
Chemistry: Chief: Min.
Dirig. Dr. IV
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V HUCHO

Dept. I
Mining: Chief: Ministerialrat
Gabel
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Power Control; Chief:
Min. Dirig. Dr. HUCHO

Dept. I
Economic organization
chief min. dirig.
GATTSCHICK
II
Trade police. Chief: Ministerialrat
Dr. Bernhard Kuchler

Reich Commissioner
at the Berlin stock
exchange
Ministerialrat
Dr. KOTHEER

Dept. I
Reports on countries
Chief: Min. Dirigent
SPITTA
Dept II
Foreign currency
Chief: Min. Dirig.
Dr. Landwehr
Dept III
Promotion of expert
Chief: Min. Dirig.
Dr. Schleier.

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE

REICH AND PRUSSIAN MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS ARE :

I.

REICH OFFICE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Research, planning & Execution
of 4 Year Plan.

Chief: Major (retired) Dr. Engineer
Czimetis

I. Dept.

Research & Develop.

Chief:

Dr. Kramch

II. Dept.

Planning & Execution

Chief: Major Dr.

Engineer

Geist

2.

REICH OFFICE FOR GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Co-ordination of former land
geological institutes

Chief: President with rank of
State Secretary
Engineer Koppler

3.

THE REICH COMMISSION FOR UTILIZATION
OF SCRAP MATERIALS

ZIPGLER

(Page 2 of original)

The following changes in the present table of organization have been announced in the meantime:

1. Central Department: Chief: Ministerialdirektor ILLNER.
2. Permanent Deputy to the chief of the Main Department V Ministerialdirektor Major (retired) von Jagwitz is Ministerialdirigent Dr. Schlotterer.
3. Due to the transfer of Major Dr. Eng. Goist to the Reich- and Prussian Economic Ministry, the following temporary arrangement has been made: Department 2 of the Reich Office for Economic Development has been divided, so that Dr. Bauer is responsible for questions of planning; these duties will be carried out in several referents (among them Dr. Eckell: anorganic and organic chemistry; Dr. Bonaus: gasoline, oils and synthetic lubricants).

TRANSLATEE'S CERTIFICATION

I, FREDERICK L. GILFISKI, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-523.

FREDERICK L. GILFISKI,
NY 34079.

END

Reich Office for Economic Development

Compilation

of the Production Plan

for

Powder,

Explosives,

Chemical Warfare Agents,

including preliminary products

State as of 10.6. 1938

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. HI-8799
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

(Handwritten)

No. 90

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26 Sep. 38

Top Secret

Department F
of 9/10 June 1938

Department P

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(page 3 of original)

Dept. P 9 S
" P 9 S

Berlin, 9/10 June 1938

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Compilation
of the Production Plan

for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, including preliminary products.

The graphs show the present position in all fields. The figures refer to the capacities of the plants which will be ready for production on the dates shown in the graphs.

Present difficulties of delivery considered, the completion datelines can be met. It will only be possible to accelerate the execution of the production plan if (as in the mineral oil and rubber sectors) a tight, uniform construction-procedure is applied and all these installations are accorded priority for their orders (compare the special memorandum).

The present plan does not include the Ostmark capacities.

It can be expected that 1,500 tons per month of nitrocellulose and/or diglycol powder as well as 1,000 tons per month explosives (hexogen) will have to be produced.

Details of the plan may be gathered from the surveys. The measures to be carried out in the sectors may be summed up as follows:

(page 4 of original)

1. Explosives (compare sheet 1)

	<u>Tons per month</u>	<u>Explosives</u>
Plants already existing	6 300	Trinitrotoluene
	60	Nitropenta
	385	Picric Acid
	5	Ethylene Diamine
		Dinitrate
	600	Trinitroanisol
<hr/>		
Total	7 350 tons of explosives per month	

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Measures : Completion of plants definitely proposed and/ or those which are under construction:

	-	Trinitrotoluene
Reinsdorf	75	Nitropenta
Krucznol	150	"
Malchow	200	"
Wolfrats- hausen	500	"
Malchow & Dornitz	155	Picric Acid
Wolfrats- hausen	70	" "

Total 1 150 tons of explosives per month

Newly planned as of 1938

Project I T	1 200	Trinitrotoluene
" II T	1 200	"
" III T	1 200	"
" Dia I	500	Ethylene Diamine Trinitrate
" Dia II	500	" "
" H I	1 000	Hexogen
" H II	1 000	"
" H III	1 000	"
" H IV	1 000	"

Total 6 600 tons of explosives per month

(page 5 of original)

Remarks: On the question of new hexogen explosives :
Research and development, as well as production experiments in plants to be especially constructed for experimental purposes will require so much time that the first large enterprise should not be expected to start operating before 1942.

It will be appropriate for the construction of the plants to be so developed that merely ammonia and methanol will be required as raw materials and that formaldehyde as well as hexamethylene tetramine will be produced by them. Highly concentrated nitric acid and ammonium nitrate, needed for the hexogen pouring mixtures, would also have to be produced in the hexogen plants.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Facilities for highly-concentrated nitric acid and formaldehyde are included in the plants. Nitrogen and methanol requirements are contained in the total requirements.

2. Preliminary Products of Explosives (compare sheet 2)

a) Toluene- facilities now available for tons per month²
2,000 toluene, pure

Measures: Completion of planned distillation facilities, particularly in the Ruhr, as called for by the plan for explosives. 2,650 toluene, pure

Total : 4, 650 toluene, pure

b) Primary Nitrogen

for hexogen (K⁺)

Tons per month

Total 4, 800 as NH₃

All requirements can be considered completely covered by H-plants on hand.

c) Methanol

for nitropenta and hexogen (SH ⁺⁺)

tons per month

Total 7, 200 as methanol

All requirements can be considered completely covered by the plants on hand.

* In order to be on the safe side when planning, the K-process was assumed to require more nitrogen than the SH-process.

(page 6 of original)

d) Ammonium nitrate

as a diluent for pouring mixtures

tens per month

Total

14,400 Ammonium nitrate

Requirements can be met by conversion in the fertilizer industry.

Measures: Examination and/or preparation of drying installations, etc.

3. Powder

a) NC-Powder

Capacity

	Tons per month	Powder
existing plants	1 800	NC-powder

Measures: Completion of plants definitely scheduled and/or plants being constructed at

Buche 1	200	"
Buche 2	200	"
Ebenhausen	460	"
Doerwerden	900	"

As per New Schedule:

Northern or Central Germany	500	"
Bavaria	500	"
Northern or Central Germany	300	"

Total: 4 060

NC-Powder

b) Nitrodiglycol and Nitroglycerine powder

N-Diglycol

Existing Plants 3 200

Measures: Completion of plants definitely scheduled and/or plants being constructed at

75

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. 111-5799
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

	<u>Tons per month</u>	<u>Powder</u>
Torgelow 1	500	
" 2	500	
Berlitz	1 000	
Duenberg 2	400	
Hohensaten	1 100	
Muchldorf	1 100	

As per new Schedule:

Lausitz forest	1 000
Gruenau forest	1 100
Southern Germany	1 050
Northern Germany	1 000
Central Germany	1 050

Total	13 000	N-Digl. powder
-------	--------	----------------

SH-process, requiring more methanol than the K-process, was provided for the same reason.

(page 7 of original)

Preliminary Products for Powder.

Sheet 4a shows separately the quantities of highly concentrated acids required for explosives and powder.

<u>c) Nitrating Gases (real cellulose)</u>	<u>tons per month</u>
existing plants	4 220 Nitrating Gases
<u>Measures:</u> Completion of scheduled plants and/or plants being constructed as called for by the plan for powder	4 580
As per new planning details still to be determined	2 200
Total	11 000 Nitrating Gases

b) Diglycol (compare chemical warfare agents)

Existing plants	500 Diglycol
-----------------	--------------

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Scheduled or being expanded at:

	Schkopau	550
	Huels	600
Now planning	Trostberg	500
	Sauerland	350

Total : 2 500 Diglycol

At the same time ethylenic chloride, as base material for ethylene diamine dinitrate explosives, is a by-product of these plants.

Nitrogen (compare sheets 4a, 4b, 4c)

Requirements of the Nitrogen basis are made up of various parts:
Highly concentrated acid (highly concentrated nitric acid of 99% HNO_3)

for nitration of explosives, except hexogen and nitration, in powder production, of cellulose and diglycol and/or glycerin.

Ammonia for hexogen and ammonium nitrate

Sheet 4 a shows separately the requirements of highly concentrated acids for explosives and for powder.

(page 8 of original)

a) Highly- concentrated acid

Sheet 4 b shows the total requirements of highly-concentrated acid and supply on hand, together with the expansion plan.

	Tons per month	HNO_3
Capacity of existing plants	23,000	

Measures: Completion of plants definitely scheduled and/or plants being constructed at

Mehlbeck-Dabsen	5,200
Langelsheim	5,600

Scheduled

Project Doberitz II	4,000
" X (Reserve)	4,000

41.800 HNO_3

as highly-concentrated acid

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

Remarks: Highly- concentrated acid for hexogen is being produced in the hexogen plants themselves and was included in drawing up plans for these plants.

b) Total quantity of nitrogen,

Sheet 4 c shows the total requirements of nitrogen to be made available in the form of primary ammonia. Because of the existing fertilizer nitrogen basis, these H-quantities can be considered secured.

Measures: It will be checked whether the construction of a nitrogen basis for Bavaria and Austria is deemed appropriate for the purpose of assuring the mobilization supply. From the viewpoint of raw materials its construction is not deemed urgent as yet.

(page 9 of original)

5. Sulphur (compare sheet 5)

for powder and explosives as Smoking Sulphuric Acid (Oloun) (in t SO₃).

The total requirements consist of oloun demands for
a) Explosives (Tri, picric acid and trinitroanisol)

Measures: ~~Oil~~ recovery (according to Speich) must be introduced on a planned basis into the existing trinitrotoluene plants. Consumption of fresh oloun (Frisch-Oloun) will then be reduced from

10,800 tons per month

to 1,500 tons per month

b) HC-Powder

Because of the rinsing processes an unavoidable complete consumption takes place after nitration. The required oloun may be considered as available.

c) Nitroglycol powder.

For the time being, consumption is as listed in sheet 5, with the waste acid going to other industries as diluted sulphuric acid.

Measures: A check must be made (in single cases of each powder factory) to see whether here, too, oloun recovery (according to Speich) can be introduced.

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

Through the recovery of oleum in the trinitrotoluol production the greatly increased explosives and powder program can be carried through also later on, with provision for the same oleum quantities as they are already needed now. The introduction of regeneration also for N-Diglycol powder permits further saving and thereby sulphur and/or pyrites is possible.

(page 10 of original)

6. Chemical Warfare Agents (compare sheet 6)

a) Mustard gas (Golbkrauz)		<u>Tons per month</u>
capacity already existing		400
<u>Measures.</u> Completion of plants		
definitely scheduled at		
	Huels	800
	Trostberg	1 000
(by the oxol process)		
as per new Schedule		
	Sauerland	1 900
	Teutoburger	
	Forest	1 500
(Long-distance gas pipe line is		
the ethylene basis)		
	Salzgitter	2 200
(Ethylene basis of coked		
gases)		
(By D-process)		
Total		7 800

The development of the D-mustard gas process which economizes raw materials must be given priority. Development of direct hydrogenation of acetylene must also be completed.

Production of the chlorine quantities needed will be an incidental to the mustard gas plants, by means of electrolysis plants pertaining to them.

Sulphur may be considered as assured in the framework of the production program.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. HI-8799
CONTINUED

(page 10 of original, cont'd)

b) <u>Li-Salt</u> (Chloracetophenone)	<u>Tons per month</u>
capacity already existing	135
<u>Measures:</u> Completion of definitely scheduled installations at Hahnenberg	600
Total	735

The various raw materials may be considered available.

(page 11 of original)

c) <u>Lvsine oil</u> (Blaukreuz; blue cross)	<u>Tons per month</u>
existing facilities	180
<u>Measures:</u> completion of definitely scheduled plants at Hahnenberg	400
New schedule Project A 1	180
Total	760

The various raw materials may be considered available.

Measures: for arsenic, production expansion at Rathhausberg (Styria) must go hand in hand with requirements.

Final Remarks.

It is the opinion of experts that the production increases of the above plan, can be carried out under present conditions. An essential reduction in the construction period in order to reach more rapidly the level set for mobilization is only possible if there is rigid coordination in carrying the plan through and granting of special powers (compare special memorandum).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, H.C. KNUTH, AGO X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. HI-8799.

H.C. KNUTH
AGO X 046355

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6768
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Interrogation of Carl KRAUCH on the afternoon of
29 April 1947 by Mr. CHARMATZ.
Also present/ Annelie Aigner, German Court Reporter.

Q. Mr. Krauch, you are aware that you are still under oath?

A. Yes.

Q. First of all I shall hand over to you the rest of the affidavit on the development of nitrogen- and gasoline-production. Will you please peruse it carefully, make the necessary corrections in ink and then sign it. In addition, I shall give you the two records of the evenings of 21 and 22 April. Will you please read them through?

A. (Mr. Krauch reads the affidavit and sign it.)

Q. Mr. Krauch, we have already discussed briefly yesterday the fact that you were interrogated several times in September 1945 and that records were made of these interrogations. We are concerned now with an interrogation of 20 September 1945 on your position in the Four Year Plan Organization, an interrogation of 27 September 1945 on the Vermittlungsstelle W and mobilization plans, a further interrogation of the same date on Buna, and an interrogation of 28 September 1945 on your professional activities and your work in the Four Year Plan Organization. All these records, which are written in English, are signed by you with your own hand, and bear the following note: I have read this record of interrogation and I swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glazer (Messr. Glazer and Purcelle) are true. I give you the photostat copies of the original documents and request you to read them through and confirm that they are a true and correct rendering of the interrogation under oath which took place at that time. Furthermore, I ask you to confirm by appending your signature and the date to the back of this photostat copy, its truth and correctness. Please read it carefully and let me have comments, if any, in the form of a statement.

(signature) Krauch

(page 2 of original)

A. (Mr. Krauch reads carefully the photostat copies of the interrogation shown to him and signs his name and the date on the back.

(page 2 of original, cont'd.)

The records submitted to me reproduce the interrogations conducted by the representatives of the Frankfurt CIC at my home in Falkengesaeess nr. Behrfelden in Odenwald in September 1945. Since I speak very little English and the conversation took place in English, I was asked some questions after the interrogation, which I had to answer in German and which were then translated by the interpreter. Furthermore, towards the end of the interrogations, I had to write a fairly long memorandum in which all the questions which had been dealt with previously were discussed again. This was then translated by my secretary into English. One week after the interrogations, the same gentlemen came to see me again, accompanied by a Mr. Ritschin. These discussions lasted one day more. Of these, too, a record was made by the gentlemen concerned. Again, during this discussion, the entire matter was discussed in general terms. When reading the records of these interrogations I noticed a few points which could cause misunderstandings. On page 1 of the interrogation of 20 September 1945 I mentioned that the Reichsbank financed the extension of the factories engaged in work for the Four Year Plan. The negotiations for financing this project were, in fact, conducted by the Ministry of Economics.

On page 2 I was asked about the so-called mobilization plans. I mentioned that I had heard the expression "mobilization figures" for the first time in 1938 during the meeting at which I was appointed Plenipotentiary General. Goering asked me about the peace-time production figures for the various products. Then he wanted to know the mobilization figures, the proposed works production-figures in case of war. I answered that I assumed that these figures were the same as the peace-time production figures, since gasoline and nitrogen were needed in war-time.

Signature: Krauch

(page 3 of original)

just as much as in peace-time, and that the output of the plants would thus continue to be the same. It later transpired that this assumption of mine was wrong as far as nitrogen was concerned, because after war broke out, the I.G. received a telegram from the Ministry of Economics to the effect, that their works at Ludwigshafen and Oppau were to close down at once in accordance with the mobilization plan, thereby cutting down the I.G. nitrogen production by half.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6768
CONT'D.

(page 3 of original, cont'd.)

- Q. But Ludwigshafen and Oppau were in fact not closed down?
- A. The I.G. concern lodged a protest with the OKW against this decision of the Reich Ministry of Economics. It turned out that this decision had been made, because it was assumed that the French would attack the factory. It was then decided to wait until this eventuality actually arose.
- Q. For how long did they wait? For how long was production suspended?
- A. With the approval of the OKW, production continued, but the official decision not to close down the factory was not made until several months later.
- Q. Were Ludwigshafen and Oppau in fact ever closed down for a single day?

- A. No. But there was a telegram to the effect that they should be closed down.

From the record dated 27 September, page 2: The Liaison Office (Vermittlungsstelle) which was responsible for forwarding to me inquiries from the Ministries, was set up in 1930, when the customs negotiations with the Ministry of Finance were reaching a crisis, and was managed by Krastel, a businessman. In 1932 the name "Vermittlungsstelle" (Liaison Office) was mentioned officially.

- Q. What do you mean by mentioned officially?
- A. It appeared on organizational charts.
- Q. But this Liaison Office was your office, i.e. the office of Mr. Krauch, Chief of Sparte I?
- A. Yes, the Liaison Office had nothing to do with other Sparten.

(page 4 of original)

In 1935, separate offices were set up for other Sparten, those of Ter Meer and Gajewski, and called "Vermittlungsstelle W".

Afternoon of 27 September, page 2: As early as 1936, Schneider took over unofficially the management of Sparte I, and became my deputy in order to relieve me of work.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NL-C
(Cont'd)

Page 2: I was asked whether Dr. Bosch maintained towards me all the time the same friendly attitude as during the period of my activity in the Four Year Plan Organization. He whole-heartedly approved of my activity there but always thought that I had too much work and that I should delegate more of it to others.

During the same interrogation, the importance of the Liaison Office was discussed. The Liaison Office is to be regarded only as a subordinate of the Sparten management, which was in no position to take any decisions or answer any inquiries independently.

That is all.

I have carefully read the 4 (four) pages of my interrogation of 29 April 1947, made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my own hand and I herewith declare under oath that this record is a true rendering of my interrogation.

Munich, 1 May 1947

(signature)	Carl Krauch
/t/	(Carl Krauch)
(signature)	J. P. Charmatz
/t/	(Interrogator)
(signature)	Annelie Aigner
/t/	(Court Reporter)

(Fifth Page of original)

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Document continues in English):

Interrogation of Karl Krauch

20 September 1945
Thursday AM 10.30 to 11.

- Q. What is your name?
- A. Karl Krauch
- Q. What is your profession?
- A. Chemist.
- Q. What position do you hold in I.G. and other concerns?
- A. Chairman of the board of directors of I.G. Farbenindustrie, and I was also second chairman of the American Ford Company.
- Q. Is that the Ford Works in Cologne?
- A. Yes. This was in 1940.
- Q. What position did you first hold with respect to Goering's Four Year Plan?
- A. I was in Rohstoff and Devisenstab. Later, it was named Reichsmotoren Wirtschaftsaufbau.
- Q. So that it was merely a change of the name, of what you were in charge?
- A. Yes. That was merely a change of the name.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-G
(Cont'd)

- Q. That took place in 1936?
- A. Yes. That was about 1936, I should say. That was the business of the money that was coming to the Reichsbank. Reichsbank has only to do with the industrial building of the plants and not with money.
- Q. Now, will you describe to me what your duties consisted of with reference to your first job with the Four Year Plan?
- A. I was the manager of the department of research and development. In the Rohstoff und Devisenstab, I had to look for new processes, to build up raw material in Germany which had to be imported before. To give you an example, there was benzine, buna and artificial silk and artificial fibre, etcetera.
- Q. Will you give me the reason for your employment by Goering, and the reason that Dr. Bosch and the I.G. allowed you to go in 1936?
- A. That was a question I had talked over with Major Loeb. That was in the first place, a question of unemployment. We had to do with the building up of new plants in order to employ as many unemployed workers in Germany as we could. We built up motor roads, and we had no benzine for the motors. Then, we had no business for the workers. Then he said if we are doing this towards the rearmament and thus employing so many workers, we are only working in the so-called "dead-money" business. We were asked whether we had any new processes that could be built up at this time, any new factories and laboratories to employ these workers.
- Q. What was Dr. Bosch's reaction with reference to the request for your services?
- A. He said we had helped the Bruening Government with this unemployment question and that now we must do the same thing for the new government. The second thing was, as you may know, the intention of the National Socialistic government, about the big concerns. You know, the point of the party program now published, the smashing of the concerns, in the first place, that of I.G. Farbenindustrie. May be they would make some theoretical things, today this and to-morrow another, and the end will be the destroying of our big chemical industry without this nonsense. If you sit at that place, perhaps you can avoid such nonsense as this.

(Sixth Page of Document)

- Q. At that time that Dr. Bosch realized that the Nazi Party might want to destroy I. G. Farbenindustrie, did he likewise realize that the Nazi Government was heading towards war?
- A. Surely not. In the circumstances, he said to me that it is much better that they are going to industrial consumption, rather than to build airplanes and engines of war.
- Q. In other words, Dr. Bosch realized that until that time, the Nazi machine had been making airplanes, U-boats and other re-armaments. He felt that your contribution could be directed towards an industrial program?
- A. Yes.

- Q. Putting it a different way, in 1936, it was clear to you and I.G. Farben that the German government at that time was in the process of rearmament?
- A. Yes. They were talking quite openly about the rearmament program.
- Q. Was it clear to you that when they desired to use any new processes that you had let us say, Buna and Hydrogenation, that those commodities were a type that could be and would be necessary for the conduct of the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. During the time that you worked for Goering, what was the exact nature of your relationship with I.G., insofar as keeping them informed as to what your activities were, and what the activities of the Four Year Plan were?
- A. I was talking with the I.G. people about the processes we needed in the Four Year Plan.
- Q. Did you keep in as close touch with them as you had before you took this job? Were you in constant contact with them?
- A. No. I made my separation between my business as Vorstand member, and between my business with the men of the Four Year Plan project. If we had to build hydrogenation plants with both the I.G. process and the Fischer process, I would talk with I.G. people about their process and not about Fischer's process, and I talked with the Fischer people about their, and not the I.G. process.
- Q. With respect to I.G. Farben, when, in your opinion did the business necessities of the Wehrmacht become the most important function of Farben?
- A. In the beginning of the war.
- Q. Isn't it true that with the beginning of the Four Year Plan, that a greater proportion of Farben's business actually was Wehrmacht business, that is, business which had to do with getting oneself in readiness for whatever program was intended by the powers that be?
- A. Most of the consumption of the hydrogenation plants or the artificial plant of Buna was going to the peace consumption. With the beginning of the war, most of them were going to the OKW (OberKommando der Wehrmacht).
- Q. Are you acquainted with the so-called MOB plan?
- A. Yes. But the first I heard about this, was in 1938. It was at the time I was General bevollmaechtigter fuer Chemische Industrie.
- Q. Were these plans actually drawn up first in 1934?
(Seventh Page of Document)
- A. I don't know that. Those were made up very secretly at first.
- Q. Was it necessary for all I.G. plants to prepare such a plan in the event of war?
- A. No.

- Q. When did this so-called MOB plan go into operation?
- A. If you say 1934, it must be perhaps in that year. It was more likely in 1938. I had nothing to do with the plan. I had to do only with the research and development. Then I had to the whole thing as General Bevollmaechtigter fuer Chemische Industrie (G.B.F.C.)
- Q. In 1938 you assumed a more important position in the operation of the Four Year Plan. Will you describe the new operations which you took over at that time?
- A. As I told you yesterday, it was may be in June 1938 that Dr. Bosch was asking me in Berlin if he could see Goering. He said to me there is great big talk about war. If they are going to war, Germany is lost. I was going then to Staatssekretar Koerner and asking him to arrange for Dr. Bosch's visit to Goering. He asked me what would Dr. Bosch tell Goering, and I told him quite openly what Dr. Bosch said to me. And then he was going to Goering. Two days later, he said "I am sorry but Goering has no time, and we cannot have this conversation at this time." Then I told Koerner that I had knowledge now of the figures that are given to the government about building up of the production of the Four Year Plan. Figures about the production of gasoline, of Buna, of artificial products, etcetera, which show what we are going to do in 1938 and 1939. I know that these figures are wrong. I was talking a week before with Major Loeb about these figures and I told that there is great danger in giving at this time wrong figures to the Government. It may be possible if one deciding man knows about those wrong figures and he is thinking about war, he would decide against it. If he knows we are not independent in the war he would decide against war. That is a great danger in the wrong figures question. Then Koerner told this to Goering. Goering said to me the next day: "You have given other figures than we have in hand? I told him the same thing I had told Koerner that it is a great danger to give out wrong figures, and I know quite well the production of all the plants of I.G. The production is not so high as the Four Year Plan men have given to Goering. I had asked about these figures, therefore, I had nothing to do with the figures. It was only by accident that I had experience about those figures.
- Q. Whose figures were they?
- A. Major Loeb made these figures.
- Q. And he showed you these figures?
- A. No. I have found some things wrong with these figures. They were included in a report which had to do with certain processes which was to examine. In that examination, I noticed the figures on production which were contained in the report.

(Eighth Page of Document)

- Q. Now, did you at that time inform Dr. Bosch of the wrong figures?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And as a result of your informing Dr. Bosch of the miscalculation, Dr. Bosch desired to see Goering?
- A. No. Dr. Bosch came before. Then I told Dr. Bosch that they are working with the wrong figures.

- Q. Did you know why Dr. Bosch felt that Germany was going to war and felt that they would lose if they did so?
- A. They were talking a good deal about this in the newspapers, etcetera. Hitler was talking in the Saargemund. Chamberlain and Eden was talking in London, all driving at the same thing. Even Russia was talking about it.
- Q. After your first talk with Goering, at which time he said that your figures were different than those which were given to him, what took place in connection with these conversations with Goering?
- A. Goering said: "I will talk with Keitel about the figures, and the next day, you will have to come over and we will talk again". The next day, he said: "I have talked with Keitel who said that our figures are right. Much work has been done in the building up of the plants". He said he was calling for production of explosives for two years so high, and now they had the production so high. I said to Goering that those figures are wrong. I know the production of nitrogen and other raw materials for the plants that make explosive. And I can say they can only make so much explosives. And then Goering said to me: "Now, I have confidence in your figures". Then maybe three or four days later, I had to come to Goering's place and he said to me: "Now, you will have to make a survey of all the production for the future. If I want to know about the figures I will call on you. In order that you can have the figures from the industry or from OKW, I nominate you to General Bevollmaechtigter fuer Chemische Industrie".
- Q. Were all your conversations with Goering held in Karon Hall?
- A. No. It was held about eighty percent of the time there, and about twenty percent of the time it was held in Berlin. I had to go to either place wherever he happened to be, either Karon Hall or Berlin. Karon Hall is about an hour ride from Berlin.
- Q. Now as a result of your finding out that the figures submitted to Goering were erroneous ones, you were appointed as the man in charge of several sections in the Four Year Plan, in 1938?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was it not your job to see to it that expansion of productive capacity and facilities, under the Four Year Plan?
- A. Sure. I had to see that the production was not that was promised. I had to go to these people and find out why they did not come up to the production standard set for them.

(Ninth Page of Document)

- Q. When did he come to tell you that?
- A. In June of 1938.

"I have read this record of interrogation and I swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser, are true."

(signed) Dr. C. KRAUCH
/t/ (name)

(written) Chairman of the Board
/t/ of Directors
Position in I.G.

Interrogators:

(signed) Bernard Glasor

Witnesses:

(Tenth Page of Document)

Interrogation of
Mr. Krauch

27 September 1945
Thursday 1; to 4.00 PM

Q. When was the Vermittlungsstelle W. formed, under whose leadership did it originally operate, and what were its original purposes?

A. As far as I remember that was my "Anregung". Many people of the government were asking I.G. for information. They would ask the people they knew personally in I.G. to give them such information and frequently, a man of the commercial field in chemistry would be asked about dye stuffs, and such person in I.G. would give them an answer. The answer was wrong. People of the hydrogenation were asked about financial questions. They didn't know anything about financial questions. Then I gave to I.G. the thought to nominate one man of Sparta I (hydrogenation, nitrogen), one man of Sparta II, (pharmaceuticals and dye-stuffs,) and one man from Sparta III (photography and textiles) to act as a liaison office. They should not be important men, but such men who were responsible for these questions. Then this Vermittlungsstelle W., that was the name given it, was called to the attention of the government, and then the people of the Finance Ministry, would go, in regard to financial questions over nitrogen, to Vermittlungsstelle W. If they wanted to know of Sparta I---, "How much is the output of nitrogen in the year 1935 or 1936." Then Dr. Schneider came to the Vermittlungsstelle W. and answered the question.

Q. What year was the Vermittlungsstelle W. formed?

A. I think that must be in 1932. I had many discussions with the Bruening Government about hydrogenation, and they were asking me very many questions. I spent the whole month in Berlin waiting for questions of this sort. And then I said I must have a representative in Berlin sitting and waiting only for questions. The same thing occurred with Drs. ter Meer and Gajewsky.

Q. You indicate that you had occasion to speak with the Bruening government concerning questions of hydrogenation. Was not the Vermittlungsstelle W., as we use the term, specifically formed in 1934, rather than in 1932?

A. I had to do with the Bruening government in 1932. The Vermittlungsstelle W. was my job in an unofficial way. Then I sent a man to Berlin for answering all the questions, and then that organization was more and more organized. That may be officially in 1934. It was officially

in 1934, and first in 1932, unofficially. The Bruening government was not asking so many questions of the I.G. because one man of the board of directors of I.G. was later Minister of Economics in the Bruening Government.

- Q. After the Nazi government came into power in 1933, did the basic functions of the Vermittlungsstelle W. change in any way from the kind of service rendered in 1932 to the Bruening government?
- A. In no way. It was quite the same way they had to work as before.
- Q. Isn't it true that with the creation of the German army, in 1933, the Vermittlungsstelle W. performed many important duties with respect to orders received from the Wehrmacht, which made its functions different than they were in 1932?

(Eleventh Page of Document)

(Page 2 " ")

- A. That is possible with the rearmament and increase of the German army. That was quite a big question to industry. There may have been more questions to the armament industries, like the Krupp works, etcetera. They were all going over to the Vermittlungsstelle W. Before that there was a small army and then a big army came about. The question became more and more intense.
- Q. Is it not true that beginning late in 1933 and 1934, and from that time onward that, when the armed forces wanted to do business with the I.G., that instead of going to the individual plants, they went to the Vermittlungsstelle W?
- A. Yes.
- Q. At our last interrogation, I asked you concerning the so-called "Kriegsspiele". Was that one the first operations which came within the functions of the Vermittlungsstelle W?
- A. That came under the functions of the Vermittlungsstelle W by order of the OKW. Yes.
- Q. What part did the Vermittlungsstelle W. play with respect to the drawing up and submission of the so-called MOB plan, for the various I.G. plants?
- A. If the O.K.W. asked questions about MOB plan, they went thru the Vermittlungsstelle W. to the works. They asked the Vermittlungsstelle W. to give the questions to the Leuna Works, and the Leuna Works answered. The Vermittlungsstelle W. was only the intermediary. The Vermittlungsstelle did not exercise initial judgment.
- Q. With respect to the MOB plans for the nitrogen plants, would the plan pass through the Vermittlungsstelle W. before going to the various plants producing nitrogen? Didn't the Vermittlungsstelle W. as a central collecting point, develop a single policy for the nitrogen production which was presented to the high command in the event of war?
- A. For example, nitrogen. We had a plant in Leuna, Leverkusen and so on, and we had Sparta I. The Vermittlungsstelle W. would ask Leuna a question which only concerned the Leuna Works. Any question in connection with the whole nitrogen field went to the Sparta I office.
- Q. Where was the office of Sparta I?

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- A. That was my office, in Ludwigshafen.
- Q. If the O.K.W. were requesting an overall mobilization plan in connection with the production of nitrogen, they would go to the Vermittlungsstelle W. and then the Vermittlungsstelle in that case would get in touch with the office of Sparte I. Who drew up the MOB plan for nitrogen?
- A. The name of the MOB plan came to me in 1937. We were only asked about nitrogen production in particular years, say, 1932, 1933 and 1934.
- Q. When were you first requested by the Nazi government to submit to it plans which indicated your productive capacity in the event of war?
- A. I don't remember that talk in the year 1933 or 1934 regarding the production about war. They only asked how high is our production from year to year. That was in war the same thing as in peace. And with gasoline it was the same way. We should make in peace and war as much gasoline and as much nitrogen as we can manufacture. Then they asked if we could make poison gas, and I.G. answered yes, but we will not do it. This was either in 1936 or 1937. That was no business for us, and I.G. declined to do this.

(Twelfth Page of Document)
(Page 3 " ")

- Q. When did the Nazi government first start to obtain the figures on your production and when did the Nazi government first inquire about your productive capacity?
- A. For benzine, in the year 1933, Godfrey Fyler was asking me these questions. He was the first man connected with the Nazi party government who asked me questions about production figures.
- Q. Do you state then that, between the years 1933 to 1935, to your knowledge as head of the Vermittlungsstelle W., and Sparte I, that there was no specific request for a program which would be put into effect in the event of war?
- A. No, there was not, insofar as I know.
- Q. Was there any time between 1935 and the time when you saw the official mobilization plan in 1936, that the Nazi government requested such a program in the event of war, from I.G. Farben?
- A. Not to my knowledge insofar as I know?
- Q. Therefore you state that until you saw the official plan for mobilization in 1936 that you knew nothing about such a plan?
- A. No.
- Q. When in 1936 did you see the official plans of the O.K.W. for war mobilization?
- A. In July, 1936, on the day I was nominated for the General bevolmachtigter fuer Chemie.
- Q. At that time, I assumed there were production figures for the chemical industry included in the MOB plan?

A. Yes, there were!

Q. Where and from when did you suppose the government collected such figures?

A. They may have been from the man of the explosive sector. You know that I.G. was producing nitrogen which you understand could be converted into explosives or into fertilizer.

Q. At that time, there must have been included figures on buna and hydrogenation since they are very strategic war products. From whom did the government receive these figures?

A. The Vermittlungsstelle or Reichsstelle fuer Chemie. The O.K.W. was asking how is our production in buna, and now quite secretly from us, they said in the MOB plan for Buna in 1936, so much and in 1939, so much. We didn't make such buna in 1936.

Q. Who was Mr. Koppler?

A. He was State secretary, first in the Ministry of Economics and later on state secretary for the foreign office of v. Ribbentrop.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and I swear that the answers I have given to the questions of Messrs. Glaser and Purcell are true."

(signed) Dr. C. KRAUCH
/t/ (name)

(written) Chairman of the Board
of Directors
Position in I.G.

Interrogators:

Witnesses:

(signed) Bernard Glaser

John J. Purcell

(Thirteenth Page of Document)
(Page 1 " ")

Interrogation of
Dr. Krauch

27 September 1945
Thursday 4 to 5 PM

Q. In connection with the production of buna, how long has I.G. been in continuous contact with the military?

A. 1936.

Q. Information at hand indicates that as early as March 1935, the Wehrmacht had indicated to I.G. that it was in favor of the construction of a 2500 ton buna plant?

A. Yes.

Q. Certainly at that time the government was very concerned about your production of buna, but I take it that you mean didn't have continuous contact with the Wehrmacht concerning buna until 1936?

A. I had constant connections with the government about buna since I was.

in the four year plan. That was in 1936.

- Q. The question was not directed as to whether you had contact with the Wehrmacht but whether I.G. Farben had continuous contact with the Wehrmacht concerning the production of buna since 1935?
- A. The Wehrmacht was asking about buna from 1933 since they know that we were working on buna. But some of the other companies were working on this too. I told you that we discussed buna with Standard Oil as early as 1930.
- Q. In connection with the construction of certain of your buna plants in 1936, didn't the military authorities guarantee that they would make the purchase of all your production?
- A. I don't remember that. We had to talk about guaranteed prices with the Minister of Economics. That had nothing to do with the O.K.W. The same applies to the gasoline question.
- Q. My question was, didn't the government and or the military agree to take up if necessary, all of the production of the buna plants which you built?
- A. Yes, they did. I.G. was guaranteed against loss.
- Q. Wasn't very clear to you at that time in 1935 and 1936 that since the government guaranteed you against loss, that they were prepared to use all your production in the buna field?
- A. Naturally so, yes. You have always to think that buna was the product of the four year plan. The four year plan was against unemployment. We had to make new production plants for employing all the workers, and the I.G. paid the money to build the plants. But it did not have the money to pay out losses. We must have a guarantee for the product of the factories we build with our own money. I personally would do quite the same thing, i.e.: to ask the government, if I invest my money, to guarantee the price.
- Q. An inference which has to be taken is that I.G., because of the government program, felt that it was prepared to finance its plants, but that since it was the government's wish that I.G. produce this product (buna), that I.G. should be free from loss?
- A. Yes. That is what I mean.

(Fourteenth Page of Document)
(Page 2 " ")

- Q. Didn't it become apparent to you first in 1935, when the Wehrmacht exhibited great interest in your buna, and later after you assumed your job with the four year plan in 1936, to increase the chemical capacity of Germany, that the Nazi government was on the road to war?
- A. I had the feeling that they were going to war, as Dr. Bosch told me in June, 1938, and that was when I went with the wrong figures of Loeb to Goering and said to him we can't go to war because the figures are all wrong. We will lose the war on this basis.
- Q. When the wrong figures which you submitted to Goering were corrected to the extent where they reached the level that Keitel earlier believed they were, then you must have believed that they were going to war?
- A. I must say today, yes.

- Q. At that point, what steps were taken by I.G. similar to the one which Dr. Bosch attempted to take in June 1938, when he went to see Goering, to try to halt the Nazis from going to war?
- A. I have answered this question before. We did nothing officially, but unofficially various people of the I.G., were talking to different men of the government. I was talking every month and saying that this is an impossible thing. They were always talking about the Weltanschauung. There is a capitalistic Weltanschauung on the English side..... If we had a war maybe we would have conquered the other people, the French, and so on, but the question of the Weltanschauung is not solved. You cannot convince others about nationalistic ideas. The United States will go its own way. You cannot solve Weltanschauung except in the spiritual way, that is, to sit together with the people and to talk about this, but not to solve this question with war, with power and so on.
- Q. When did Dr. Schneider succeed you as head of Sparta I?
- A. At the moment, when I became Chairman of the board of directors. There was a meeting of the board of directors at the time Dr. Bosch died and then I became chairman of the board of directors and Dr. Schneider became leader of Sparta I.
- Q. When you accepted the chairmanship of the board, did you give up Sparta I?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. What was the attitude of Dr. Bosch until he died about your dual position both in the four year plan and as the head of Sparta I?
- A. Dr. Bosch still had the same friendly feeling for me. He did not approve. There is too much work for you he told me. I was ill every month you see, and Dr. Bosch would say that it will come again, that I would break down, and that did come about on the date of the war, my physical breakdown.
- Q. Did your relations with Major Loeb always continue on the same good plane?
- A. No they did not.
- Q. Didn't he object to the fact that you were on the I.G. board?
- A. At the first time, he agreed with me and then later, people of the Nazi government went to Major Loeb. They said we cannot stand the fact that a member of the I.G. is sitting in this place. You must have a real Nazi official in this place. And then Loeb told me about this, and I said to him that I would be very happy if he would relieve me. Then came, in 1938, the wrong figures I mentioned before.

(Fifteenth Page of Document)
(Page 3 " ")

- Q. Did you succeed Major Loeb? Did you take his place in the four year plan?
- A. No. Mine was a new position. He went to the Wirtschaftministerium. He was serving as under-secretary of state, and then was succeeded by Major Cimatis.
- Q. Originally, when the Vermittlungsstelle was formed, which Sparta

was the most active one?

- A. I think the most active one was the Sparta I which dealt with nitrogen and gasoline, and then Sparta II, which was the buna field, and lastly, Sparta III, which was not very active.
- Q. Do you recall in what year I.G. Farben had to first get a clearance from the Wehrmacht as to the location of its new plants? When did Farben first start to clear in terms of Military location and dispersion of its plants?
- A. We had in Germany a so-called Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung, and this had to pass upon the erection of new plants. They said, in this place you do not have enough workers, in this place you are too near to the frontier. All sorts of questions like these came up. On this place there are too many other plants. You have to go to another place.
- Q. And that organization of the Nazi government came into operation when the Nazis did in 1933?
- A. At that time.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and I swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Messrs. Glaser and Purcell are true."

(signed) Dr. C. KRAUCH
(signature)

(written) Chairman of the Board
of Directors
(position in I.G.)

Interrogators:

Witnesses:

(signed) Bernard Glaser

(Sixteenth Page of Document)
(Page 1 " ")

Interrogation of
Professor Krauch

26 September 1945
Friday 11 to 12: AM

Q. When were you first associated with I.G. Farben, Professor Krauch?

A. In 1912 with the Badische Aniline Soda Fabrik.

Q. At that time you were a chemist?

A. Yes that is in the laboratory work.

Q. How long did you continue doing purely laboratory work for Badische Aniline Soda-Fabrik?

A. I was doing laboratory work in the Badische Aniline Soda Fabrik Works until 1914, and then I was a soldier in the world war I. I came back at the beginning of 1915. At that time, since the German government had decided to build up a nitrogen plant near the Leuna works and to prepare the construction of this work, they asked me to come back since I had found a way to purify the gases from certain impurities, and this process I found in the laboratory was very important for the success of the nitrogen process. To give you an example, the purifying

of the natural gas process costed about twenty pfennig per kilo, and with the process, I found in the laboratory, you could do this process for a half pfennig. And then Dr. Bosch knew about this, that I have found this process. He was always following my work in the laboratory coming to me nearly every day and seeing what I had made. And then the last days before World War I, I discovered this process. It was the idea of the German government to increase nitrogen production and to build up a new factory. Dr. Bosch went to the military government and said "I must have Dr. Krauch back to work out this process." This work took about a year in the technical, middle technical and final technical steps. And then they made plans for the construction of the new plant at Louna. This was in April, 1917. And then I was assigned by Dr. Bosch to Louna.

Q. In what capacity?

A. In charge of the technical works in Louna.

Q. How long did you remain as head technical man at Louna?

A. Until 1920, and then I went back to Ludwigshaven. Dr. Bosch wanted some changes made in the layout figures, and he wanted me. I was made the technical manager for the plant at Oppau.

Q. When did you have your mysterious accident at Oppau?

A. In September, 1921.

Q. Do you know what the cause of this was?

A. Not even to this day. There were Englishmen working and somebody in the United States were working on the question of the cause of the explosion. They didn't find any cause for this. But the only thing we do know was that the blasting or explosion was caused through the blasting in the Silo.

Then it was Professor Krauch's duty to build up the plant.

Q. After you had completed ^(seventeenth Page of Document) the reconstruction of the Oppau plant, did you then become the head of it?

A. Yes. The plant was reconstructed in a relatively short time. In a quarter of a year the plant was running again, and then Dr. Bosch made me a director in December 1921, the day after the plant was running.

Q. In 1926, you became a member of the Vorstand?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you remain a member of the Vorstand before you were made the head of Sparta I?

A. I was a member of the Vorstand until 1929, and in this year I made a suggestion to Dr. Bosch to institute the Sparten. Then he said: "Well, you are the man to head Sparta I."

Q. You remained the head of Sparta I, until 1940, at which time you became chairman of the Aufsichtsrat and were succeeded by Dr. Schneider as head of Sparta I?

A. Yes.

- Q. Will you tell me when you joined the Nazi party and what the circumstances were?
- A. It was at the beginning of 1937. A small party official came to my home in Heidelberg. He told me: "Your name is on the list of the Gauleiter." "Some days later you will receive an identity card. I never suggested to the party that I become a member."
- Q. How did it happen that when you took your position with the four year plan in 1936, they didn't insist that you become a party member at that time?
- A. They were very reserved against members of the I.G.
- Q. Can you explain to me in detail the nature of your relationship with I.G. Farben after you first accepted in 1936 your job as the head of the Research and Development Section of the Four Year Plan?
- A. I was working mostly in the same way as before. When I was not sitting in Ludwigshaven, I was sitting in Berlin more, and if the people of Sparta I would like to talk with me they went to Berlin, and I was working with them in the same way. It seems to me every week I was visiting one of the plants of Sparta I to see the laboratories. That was my hobby. I was not going so much to the meetings. Before I had to go to meetings, but now I asked to be excused. I am not a friend of big meetings. I preferred to go to the laboratories and talk with the chemists about new inventions, and not to sit down at a big table and hear all this talk and talk for days and days. Perhaps I am too nervous for this sort of thing.
- Q. You did however, continue to perform your functions with respect to Sparta I?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I assume also that you continued to keep in touch with the top personalities in Farben, such as Dr. Bosch, Dr. Meer, Schmitz, Schneider, Gajewsky?
- A. Yes.

(Eighteenth Page of Document)
(Page 3 " ")

- Q. Your relationship with the top figures of I.G. Farben continued the same as it had been before?
- A. Yes, as far as possible for me to do so.
- Q. Although your functions insofar as Sparta I was concerned remained the same, did you however, continue to keep in touch with the big overall problems of I.G.F. during that time as you had in the past?
- A. I did have however more contact with the commercial questions before and the questions with respect agreements with other foreign countries. Nevertheless I continued to have contact with Standard Oil and I.C.I. All the questions going that way were my special business. The I.G. people said to me: "You have the best contact with the men of the Standard Oil and I.C.I., and you have to continue this business of collaboration."

Q. And that was between 1936 and 1940 also?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any marked difference between the period 1936 to 1940 and the period 1940 to 1945 with respect to your continued close relationship with the high personalities of Farben, and also its policy?

A. From 1940 on, it was different.

Q. Please explain that.

A. I was in 1940 Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat and not working so intensively in personnel questions, and questions of commercial contracts and so on. I was informed as chairman of the board of directors by Hermann Schnitz in commercial questions, and on all important technical and policy matters. People were always running to me since I was considered an expert and could help them on the technical questions.

Q. To what extent were Schnitz, Schneider and Bosch and ter Meer informed of the nature of your activities in the four year plan?

A. Only as it was the business of the I.G. Farben, and what it had to do with the four year plans. There were other competitors of I.G. Farben coming to me and I could not tell them (Farben) what the other companies were doing. It would not be proper to do that.

Q. I can understand that as being good business ethics. Did you have occasion to inform your close colleagues in I.G. Farben as to the general nature, the overall goal of your work in the four year plan, what your target was, in the real sense?

A. That I talked over with Geheimrat Schnitz with the reference to long range goals of the four year plan. I had talked with Dr. Bosch while he was alive much more concerning matters of the four year plan.

(Nineteenth Page of Document)
(Page 4 " ")

Q. Did you discuss these matters with Dr. Bosch as president of the firm and as a close personal friend?

A. Yes. Particularly, the latter.

"I swear that the above interrogation has been read by me and that the answers given by me to the questions of Messrs. Glaser and Purcell, are true."

(signed) Dr. C. KRAUCH
(signature)

(written) Chairman of the Board
of Directors
(Position in I.G. Farben)

Interrogators:
(signed) Bernard Glaser
John J. Purcell

Witnesses:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6768
(Cont'd)

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6768.

JOHN J. BOLL,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO A-444412.

END

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

Intermediates Group

201

Herr Direktor Dr. Krauch

Dr. A/Kr. 27 June 1938

In compliance with your request we give you our personal impressions of the development of the program for the manufacture of chemical warfare agents and explosives in Germany.

A.)

Since at present German industry is over-burdened by the many projects of the Four-Year Plan and also by the increase in exports, we request that in future industry should deal only with

one

fully responsible, competent office for matters relating to new projects for the army.

This office must be able to make decisions regarding

- (1) over-all plans for chemical rearmament,
- (2) contractual regulation and financing of the projects,
- (3) allocation of building materials and labor (Arbeitsinsatz).

What is lacking at present is co-operation between the Reich Office for the Development of Economy and the Army Wehrmacht Offices, and we give you below a few typical examples:

1) Building up of Diglycol stocks:

The Reich Office, for understandable reasons, is urging the laying in of stocks of Diglycol now, in June, whereas the Army Ordnance Office is reluctant to do this. As late as April, for instance, the productive capacity of the Belfon plant was reduced by about half and the purchase of the production of Ludwigshafen was stopped entirely.

(page 2 of original)

2) Diglycol Plant at Schkopau:

Since last year the Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials, now the Reich Office for the Development of Economy, has been negotiating with I.G. through the Frisia Holding Company regarding the construction of a Diglycol Plant at Schkopau. Negotiations were drawn out because of the financial part of the scheme and because of questions of ownership concerning the real estate to be transferred. In the meantime, however, we have received the impression that the Reich Office has no right whatever of disposal over public means, which means therefore, that only the Army Ordnance Office, which constantly emphasizes its rights in this matter, has any jurisdiction to do this. It is for this reason that we conducted the negotiations, which will presumably be concluded in a few days, with the

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Army Ordnance Office and not with the Reich Office.

The situation now is that the plant for preliminary products at Schkopau, which was provisionally built with I.G. funds, will be completed in a few weeks, but - as we have already stated - negotiations are still being carried on regarding the sector dealing with the processing of ethylene oxide into di-lycol.

3) Army Ordnance Office Plant at Trostberg:

On the other hand, however, the Army Ordnance Office has been working on the final stage in the production of poison gases at Trostberg since 1937, although even today it is still not clear what process is used in the production of the preliminary products, and it may be years before one knows how much work the final stage will entail, and all this at a time, when, as is known, there is such great scarcity of materials.

A remarkable fact is that the Reich Office is striving to bring about the merging of the stand-by plants with the existing factories, whereas the Army Offices often prefer the plants to be constructed "out in the green meadows". Even so, we are of opinion that in most cases this does not meet the requirements as regards camouflage; moreover the speedy construction of the plant is always fraught with great difficulties and requires far more materials. This is especially the case where a new power system has to be installed.

Then we come to the actual contracts, and more especially the financial side, we always find the slowness of the formalities a great disadvantage. The result is that today industry has to tackle most projects on the basis of preliminary decisions.

(page 3 of original)

As for the problem of the allocation of materials and the correct allocation of labor (Arbeitsinsatz), we would point out that it is not enough to allot quota numbers; what is required is that there should be a definite plan, in other words priorities should be better applied. Today the bottle neck is no longer the scarcity of iron, but the work load in the German machine factories. Surely more progress can be made by carrying out a few projects rapidly than by dragging along laboriously with many new projects, as is very often the case at present. We need hardly mention what a heavy burden this "rush to meet deadlines" puts upon our construction offices, and, above all, the financial effects of this halting method of construction. In addition, there are the control offices which interfere with the distribution of salvage materials. It falls mainly to private enterprise to deal separately with these authorities too.

separate B.)

Also as regards the/competencies of the Reich Office and the various Wehrmacht offices in the field of research, we are equally in the dark.

Actually, the real advances in the field of chemical warfare agents and explosives should come - as is the case in other countries - from the industrial research laboratories. Industry is in the best position to

(page 3 of original cont'd)

judge as to the supply of raw materials and technical processes. It is, therefore, sufficient (it may even be an advantage) if the official agencies confined themselves to reviewing results, financing experiments and issuing directives for further research.

(page 4 of original)

But as mentioned under (1.) at present we do not know which of the many official agencies is really competent.

In the Army Offices tests are supervised by officers who, unfortunately, return to active service after a while, so that there is no degree of permanency. The permanent civilian specialists cannot remedy this great disadvantage, for in the organization as it exists at present they do not possess the necessary powers.

In our opinion, for what it is worth, rearmament in the field of chemical warfare agents is inadequate and has to all intents and purposes remained at the 1918 level. Only during the last few months have attempts been made to apply technical advances to the old chemical warfare agents/under the driving force of industry, especially of I.G., to develop new types (Compare mixed mustard gas, N-mustard gas, etc.).

(page 5 of original)

In the interest of our defense, therefore, we consider it expedient to set up the following organization at once:

A single responsible office must be created on the pattern of the English Ministry of Defense (englisches Verteidigungsministerium) which decides all questions pertaining to

research;
planning,
financing and contractual settlements

and

supervises the putting into operation and

which is acknowledged to be the voice of the army and of all competent Reich Ministries.

This office should set up a board of trustees (Curatorium) composed of responsible representatives from the Army, the Reich Ministry of Finance, the Reich Office for the Development of Economy as well as from Industry, which will act as a preparatory committee to work out recommendations and submit them for decision, in the same way as the "Defense Council" during the world war.

This council would guide research and determine planning, particularly the sequence of the projects.

The "Defense Ministry" would then make arrangements for the financing and contractual settlement through the Ministry of Economics. The putting into operation, the supply of raw materials, allocation of labor (Arbeitseinsatz), regulating of tariff questions etc. would be effected through the Office of the Four-Year Plan, in other words, by the Reich Office for the Development of Economy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI5687
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original)

If German rearmament is to proceed with the necessary speed and on national principles, what we need is that we should deal with one single, responsible office.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

3 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5687.

.....
VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

Dept. F 98
Dept. P 98

Berlin 30 June 1938

Stamp : Top Secret

4 copies
4th- copy

The accelerated Plan.

Detailed survey.

The basic idea underlying the acceleration of expansion is the increase, wherever possible, of the output of plants already in existence, by means of simple and relatively economical expansions, and not merely by establishing new plants "in clover".

The accelerated plan differs radically from the version dated 9/10 June 1938 in the following points:

Explosives: Enlargement of four existing Trinitrotoluene plants with a total capacity of 1 600 tons per month.
Advancement by one year of the Hexogen plants, subject to successful outcome of current development work.

Gun powder: Acceleration of projects so far planned.

Preliminary Products: Immediate commencement of increased Toluene production by the expansion of the Benzene distillation plants.

Chemical warfare agents: Advancement of the commencement of technical D-mustard gas experiments, not to take place as planned, only after the completion of the Huels plant, but in another location. Consequent advancement by approximately one year of the Teuteburger Wald and Sauerland plants.

(page 2 of original)

1. Explosives (see page 1)

	<u>Tons per Month</u>	<u>Explosives</u>
Plants already in existence	4 300	Trinitrotoluene
	60	Nitroperoxide
	385	Picric acid
	600	Trinitroanisole
<hr/>		
Total:	5 345	Explosives
<hr/>		

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Measures to be taken: Completion of plants definitely planned or under construction. Preparation of Clausthal and Hessisch Lichtenau for operation.

	<u>Tons per Month</u>	<u>Explosives</u>
Clausthal	1 000	Trinitrotoluene
Hessisch Lichtenau	1 000	"
Reinsdorf	75	Nitropenta
Krucol	150	"
Malchow	200	"
Wolftratshausen	500	"
Malchow and Doeritz	155	Picric acid
Wolftratshausen	70	" "

Total : 3 150 Explosives

<u>New plan as of 1938</u>	<u>Tons per month</u>	<u>Explosives</u>
Increase of capacity of Clausthal, Hessisch Lichtenau, Krucol, Elsnig by 400 tons per month each	1 600	Trinitrotoluene

(page 3 of original)

	<u>Tons per month</u>	<u>Explosives</u>
Project T	1 600	Trinitrotoluene
Project D I	2 000	"
	500	Ethylendiaminodinitrate
Project D II	500	"
Project H 1	1 000	Hoxogen
Project H 2	1 000	"
Project H 3	1 000	"
Project H 4	1 000	"

Total : 6 600 Explosives

Final total production capacity goal for explosives about 17 000 tons.

Note:

Included in the plan are several products (Hoxogen, Ethylendiaminodinitrate), for which technical development work is still necessary before the construction of large plants is possible. The experiments concerned which are already underway, must be promoted by all means at our disposal.

(page 3 of original, cont(d)

2. Preliminary products for explosives (see page 2)

a) <u>Toluene</u>	Present capacity	<u>Tons per month</u>
		2 000 Toluene

Measures to be taken: Completion of distillation plants planned with a capacity sufficient to meet the demands of the explosives plan

	2 700 Toluene
Total	4 700 Toluene

b) Primary Nitrogen
for Hexogen (K⁺)

	<u>Tons per month</u>
Total:	4 800 as NH ₃

The requirements may be considered to be fully covered by the existing Nitrogen-plants.

+) In order to be on the safe side as far as planning is concerned, it is assumed that the K-process consumes more nitrogen than the SH process.

(page 4 of original)

c) Methanol

for Nitropenta and
Hexogen (SH⁺)

	<u>Tons per month</u>
Total	7 200 as Methanol

The requirements may be considered to be fully covered by the existing plants.

d) Ammonium nitrate

as filler for casting mixtures

	<u>Tons per month</u>
Total	14 000 Ammonium nitrate

The requirements can be covered by conversion with ⁻ⁱⁿthe fertilizer industry.

Measures to be taken: The statement of the demands of the explosives industry is to be accelerated in order to facilitate the necessary arrangements in connection with the manufacture of ammonium nitrate.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

3. Gunpowder (see page 3)

		Capacity	
a) NC-(Nitrocellulose?) Powder		Tons per month	Powder
Existing plants		1 800	NC(Nitro-cellulose?)- Powder
<u>Measures to be taken:</u>			
Completion of plants definitely planned or under construction			
	Buche 1	200	"
	Buche 2	200	"
	Ebenhausen	460	"
	Doerverden	900	"
<u>New Plans:</u>			
	North or Central Germany	500	"
	Saxaria	500	"
	North or Central Germany	300	"
Total:		4 860	NC(Nitro-cellulose?)- Powder

4) SH-process consumes more methanol than the K-process.

(page 5 of original)

b) Diglycol powder or nitroglycerine powder		Capacity	
		Tons per month	Powder
Existing plants		3 200	diglycol powder
<u>Measures to be taken:</u>			
Completion of plants definitely planned or under construction.			
	Torgelow 1	500	"
	Torgelow 2	500	"
	Bonlitz	1 100	"
	Duenberg 2	500	"
	Hohensaten	1 100	"
	Huehldorf	1 100	"

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(page 5 of original, cont'd)

New plans:

Forst Lausitz	1 000	"
Forst Gruenau	1 100	"
Southern Germany	1 050	"
North Germany	1 000	"
Central Germany	1 050	"

Total :	13 200	Diglycol powder and nitro glycerine powder.
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Preliminary products for gun-powder.

a) Nitrating craps (Refined cellulose) Tons per month

Existing plants	4 200 nitrating craps
-----------------	-----------------------

Measures to be taken:

Completion of plants planned and under construction in accordance with the gun powder plan	4 800
--	-------

New plans:

Details still to be decided	2 200
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Total:	11 200 nitrating craps
--------	------------------------

b) Diglycol

Tons per month

Existing plants	500 Diglycol
-----------------	--------------

Measures to be taken: Completion of
plants definitely planned or under
construction

carry forward	500 diglycol
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(page 6 of original)

	brought forward	500	diglycol
Schkopau	600	"	
Huels	600	"	
Trostberg	600	"	
Wolfen Extension	200	"	
<hr/>			
Total:	2 500	diglycol	

At the same time these plants produce ethylene chloride as a base for ethylenediaminedinitrate.

4. Nitrogen (see page 4a, 4b and 4c)

The demands for the nitrogen base are composed of several items
Highly concentrated acid (H₂SO₄) (highly concentrated nitric acid of 98-99% HNO₃)
 for the purpose of nitration in the production of explosives with the exception of Hexogen, and the nitration of cellulose and diglycol or glycerine in the case of gun-powder.

Ammonia

for Hexogen and ammonium nitrate.

Page 4a indicates the requirements of highly concentrated acid for explosives and gunpowder separately.

a) Highly concentrated acid

Page 4b indicates the total requirements of highly concentrated acid and the supply available to cover these requirements together with the plan for expansion.

<u>Capacity of existing plants</u>	<u>Tons per month</u>
	23 000 HNO ₃

Measures to be taken: Completion of plants definitely planned or under construction.

	Mohlbeck-Imbsen	5 200
	Langelshain	5 600
<hr/>		
<u>New plans:</u>	Project Doberitz II	4 000
	" X (Reserve)	4 000
<hr/>		
	Total	41 800 HNO ₃

(page 7 of original)

Note: The highly concentrated acid for Hexogen is produced in the Hexogen plants themselves and is included in the planning of these plants.

b) Total Nitrogen-requirements:

Page 40 indicates the total nitrogen requirements to be prepared in the form of primary ammonia. The availability of these quantities of nitrogen may be considered assured on account of the existence of the fertilizer nitrogen production center.

Measures to be taken:

Investigations are being conducted to determine / whether the establishment of a nitrogen production center for Bavaria and Austria in order to ensure supplies in the event of mobilization, is advisable. Its construction is not as yet urgent as far as raw materials are concerned.

5. Sulphur (see page 5)

for gun-powder and explosives as concentrated sulphuric acid (in tons SO_3).
The total requirement is composed of requirements for concentrated sulphuric acid

a) Explosives (Tri, picric acid and Trinitroanisol)

Measures to be taken: The concentrated sulphuric acid regeneration equipment (Seich's method) must be installed in the available trinitrotoluene plants. The consumption of fresh concentrated sulphuric acid will then be reduced from the maximum requirement of 13 600 tons per month in 1939 to 1 800 tons per month!

b) NC-powder

As a result of the rinsing process after nitration, the consumption of all available supplies is inevitable here. The concentrated sulphuric acid required may be considered to be available.

c) Dipyracol powder

For the time being, consumption is as mentioned on page 5, and the waste acid is turned over to other industries as diluted sulphuric acid.

Measures to be taken: The possibility of installing concentrated sulphuric acid regeneration equipment is to be examined (a separate examination to be conducted for each individual gun-powder factory).

(page 8 of original)

As a result of oleum regeneration in connection with the Tri production it is possible to carry out, at a later date, too, the very appreciably increased gun-powder and explosives program as far as the required quantities of concentrated sulphuric acid are concerned. The introduction of the regeneration process into the manufacture of diglycol powder has made a further saving of sulphuric acid and consequently of sulphur or pyrite possible.

The question of concentrated sulphuric acid is still being investigated in detail.

6. Chemical warfare agents (see page 6)

a) Mustard gas (Yellow cross) (Gelbkreuz)

	<u>tons per month</u>	
Present capacity	600	mustard gas
<u>Measures to be taken: Completion of plants</u>		
<u>already definitely planned</u>		
Huels	600	"
Trostberg	1 000	"
(Oxol process)		
<u>New plans:</u>		
Armondorf extension	400	"
Sauerland "	1 900	"
Tutoburger Wald "	1 500	"
Salzgitter - "	1 800	"
Total:	7 800 mustard gas	

Note: It is necessary to proceed with the utmost speed with the direct mustard gas process in accordance with which the large plants are to be built because the dates specified depend on the completion of this project.

b) W-Salt (Omega Salt)

	<u>Tons per month</u>
Present capacity	135 "
<u>Measures to be taken:</u>	
<u>Completion of plant definitely planned</u>	
Hahnenberg	600
Total:	735 W-Salt

The raw material supply has been assured!

(page 9 of original)

c) Arsine oil (Blue cross) (Blaulkreuz)

	<u>Tons per month</u>
Present capacity	180
<u>Measures to be taken:</u> Completion of plants definitely planned	
Hahnberg	400
<u>New plans</u> Project A	180
<hr/>	
Total:	760 arsine oil

Note: The expansion of arsenic production on the Rathausberg
(Austria) must be carried out to meet increased requirements.

.....

CERTIFICATES OF TRANSLATION

11 July 1947

I, Beryl C. BESWICK, D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8839.

Beryl C. BESWICK
D 427459

- 9 -
"END"

11N

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NZ-8841
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

in quadruplicate
..... Copy

30 June 1938

Stamp: Top Secret

Summary of Plan for stepping-up Production of
Powder and Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents,
Including primary Products.

The previous summary of 9/10 June 1938 described in fullest detail the expansion program; dead-lines for completion take into full consideration the difficulties of delivery as so far experienced.

Today's memorandum concerning the same production plan, but speeded up, of 30 June 1938 has examined possibilities for utmost acceleration and summarizes its findings. The first part of the memorandum gives a complete review in order to set off the difference between the planning contemplated heretofore, - as of 9/10 June 1938 - and today's stepped-up planning of 30 June 1938.

The second part of the memorandum shows in detailed review the individual fields, giving a list of the measures to be carried through.

It must be stressed here with particular emphasis that the expansion plan for speedier action can be put into effect only with the help of a fundamentally new and strict concentration of planning and execution in one hand.

The conditions and powers needed incidental thereto - which appropriately applied concern also other products important for military economy - are set forth in basic outline in a separate memorandum.

It is proposed to show individually the measures to be taken immediately in order to assure the accelerated expansion in the field of powder, munitions and chemical warfare agents.

(Transl's. note:

Handwritten notation:)

No. 40 received 28 September 38

(page 2 of original)

1.) <u>Explosives. Facilities for</u>	<u>17,100 tons per month</u>
<u>ultimate capacity</u>	
presently on hand	5,400 tons per month
to be readied, for start of	2,000 tons per month
production	
under construction and/or	
definitely planned	1,100 tons per month
new planning	8,600 tons per month
	1,600 tons per month
	(expansion)

In the field of explosives an appreciable capacity expansion by way of synthetic explosives (hexogen, ethylene, diaminedinitrate) is not possible for the time being. The research and development work covering this field must by all means be supported, to permit carrying into effect the program as outlined. Since before 1940 the beginning of operations in the first large-scale hexogen plant cannot be expected, immediate expansion of capacity must go by way of trinitro toluol. It is possible to step-up the tri-capacity of 5,300 tons per month, at present, (4,300 tons per month to be available for immediate use) to 9,900 tons per month. 1,600 tons per month (expansion at Kraemmel, Hessisch-Lichtenau, Clausthal, Zlanig) can be completed by the end of 1938; the remaining 2,000 tons per month (project C) by the beginning of 1940.

Basic prerequisite for the above is that these projects be treated as top priority and that constructing firms be given assistance in every respect. In order to permit meeting the above dead-lines a decision on the part of competent authorities by the middle of July 1938 is necessary.

Expansion of toluol distillations can keep pace with the required speed. An immediate decision and placing of contracts with the firms which will execute building is also a prerequisite.

2.) <u>Powder:</u>	<u>Facilities for</u>	
	<u>ultimate capacity</u>	<u>18,100 tons per month</u>
presently on hand		5,000 tons per month
under construction and/or		
definitely planned		6,600 tons per month
new planning		6,500 tons per month

(page 2 of original; cont'd.)

Speeding-up the powder program is exclusively contingent on cutting-down of the time needed for building. The same

(page 3 of original)

general prerequisites apply, as already stipulated, for explosives. The diglycol needs can be satisfied in the required measure by systematic expansion.

The same also holds true for nitrating crabs.

3.) Chemical Warfare Agents.

a) Mustard Gas Facilities for
ultimate capacity 7,800 tons per month

presently on hand	600 " " "(200 as a reserve in Ludwigshafen)
under construction and/or	1,600 tons per month
definitely planned	5,600 " " "(400 expansion Ammendorf)
New planning	

The way for Mustard Gas production, from the technical viewpoint and that of raw materials, is that by way of the direct process which proposes 5,200 tons per month. Up to this time, however, tests relative thereto did not go further than the scale which the technical school provides; the first large-scale experimental station is to be erected at Huel, for 200 tons per month of D-Mustard Gas, and will not be ready for a start of operations until the spring of 1940.

Therefore, before one can proceed to build the Mustard Gas installations additionally proposed, based on the direct process (Direktverfahren) the experimental plant in Huel, as covered by present planning, must be in operation. This is the key factor for the establishment of the proposed 5,200 monthly tons of Mustard Gas, based on the direct process.

It should be investigated, however, whether by erecting facilities in a plant which is already in operation - in Schkopau, for example - it would not be possible to start operations at a much earlier date than the spring of 1940 scheduled for the D-L. - Experimental plant proposed for Huel, in which manner the work on constructing the D-L large-scale plant could be undertaken at an advanced date.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

From a raw materials standpoint alone, i.e. as regards procuring the needed ethylene, the situation is clear since we are amply covered for the ethylene needs of the remaining establishments in terms of coking plant gases available in different places.

From the foregoing remarks it is therefore evident that

(page 4 of original)

the most important point for the procurement of the huge quantities of mustard gas by way of the direct process is to organize experimental and development work immediately and on a far-reaching scale, building on the experiences of organic chemistry's big industry and enlisting the help of the best heads working there.

b) <u>Arsenic Oil:</u>	<u>Facilities for</u> <u>ultimate capacity</u>	<u>760 tons per month</u>
presently on hand	100	" " "
under construction and/or planned	400	" " "
now planning	180	" " "

The expansion can be considered technically assured. The output facilities for arsenic (in Austria) permits expansion in needed measure. Stockpiling should possibly also be provided for.

c) <u>W-Salt</u>	<u>Facilities for</u> <u>ultimate capacity</u>	<u>735 tons per month</u>
presently on hand	135	tons per month
under construction and/or definitely planned	600	tons per month

The expansion can be considered assured, technically speaking and from the viewpoint of raw materials.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI - 8841
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, H.C. KNUTH, Civ., USA AGO No. 048 355 hereby certify that
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of the
document No. HI-8841.

H.C. K N U T H

Civ., USA AGO No. 048 355

PAGE 1

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-140
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

The Reich Air Minister
and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
Aide-de-Camp
Major Conrath

Berlin, W.8, 11 July 38
3. Leipziger Str.
Staff Headquarters
Telephone 12 00 44

Staff HQ - Dent II No. 134/38 secret

S E C R E T

To

General Udet

Enclosed I transmit a copy of the shorthand minutes on
the conference with the airplane manufacturers on 6 July 1938
at Berlin.

(Signed) Conrath
Major

1 Enclosure.

Dr. Hagelin/3a

Conference
with the Gentlemen of the airplane industry
at Karinhall
8th July 1938, 1130

Field Marshal Goering:

Gentlemen: May I first welcome you here and express my satisfaction that we have come here together again to discuss our problems. Today I invited you into the country, in order to have you later on as my guests, thus giving expression to the feelings of solidarity between us.

Before we start our discussions I am in duty bound to commemorate here too the man who, being one of you, always was among the first to press for the development of German aviation and of the German Air Force. It is a grievous loss which the aviation industry has suffered through the departure of your member, Mr. Hellmut Birth.
(Those present rise from their seats.)

I thank you.

Page 2

Gentlemen: The situation today does not differ from that which existed at the time of my last address, except perhaps for the fact that it is even more serious today. You are aware that today it is no longer Germany on whose attitude the continuance of peace depends. It is Czechoslovakia who threatens the peace like the sword of Damocles. We do not know what will happen. But you are aware, Gentlemen, that, in case something happens there, Germany will not be able to be disinterested. As long ago as May it became manifest that raving individuals of Czechoslovakia thought the time had come to provoke Germany while hoping that such provocation would start a world war, in which one side was probably to consist of France and England, Russia, America as the main forces, while Germany perhaps assisted by small countries interested in areas of Czechoslovakia on the other side. They hoped to catch just the last moment when conditions were still favorable enough to overwhelm Germany. We have not been provoked, and probably the other side also was to anxious for peace after all to allow further provocation. There can be no doubt that England does not wish for war nor does France. As to America, there is no certainty on this question. The economic situation of America is hopeless. Therefore the Americans might hope to do big business again by providing all the munitions for the enemies of Germany, while not themselves actively intervening for the time being, but by dispatching many airmen at least as volunteers.

Page 3

The Jew furthermore agitates for war all over the world. So much is clear: Antisemitism has risen now in every country as a logical consequence of the over-increase of the number of Jews in these countries, and the Jew can expect salvation only if he succeeds in letting loose a general world war. If I mention the Jewish agitation for war, I have a good reason to do so, since the Jew who dominates the bulk of the world press is in a position to use it for psychological propaganda.

With regard to England too, we have to acknowledge the existence of some, I don't want to say, readiness for war, but of a certain feeling of the unavoidability of war which is wide spread. To be added is the fact that wide circles in England

take this stand: the last thing we are prepared to bear was the incorporation of Austria, but we are not ready to allow any further enlargement of Germany's power. Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Romanian oil wells etc. Moreover since there are democratic countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At present the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our policy best, since in this case we could put the entire responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.

Briefly, gentlemen, this is what is happening on the political plane. In this circle, however, we have less to do with politics. I told you these things only in order to provide some background. What we have to discuss are the conclusions which have to be drawn, especially with regard to the Air Force. Everywhere we observe indeed immense preparations for mobilization, and I expect nobody to become frightened to death. If I judge the preparations for mobilization which are undertaken by other nations by their press publications, in which these countries, I dare say, shoot their mouth off, one might feel inclined to get the jitters. But if they write there: "England is to produce within the next year so and so many thousands of first line planes of which so and so many will be ready a month, France will build this and that, Russia is now again to produce another 100,000 planes and to train so and so many airmen", then think of the difficulties which we have to overcome and translate what we have into a democratic system, and then you will be able to make a correct guess. I am perfectly convinced gentlemen, that what we can produce of new goods within a year, England is able to produce with the utmost pains in two, perhaps three years. This is how I judge the situation, taking into consideration the establishment of factories etc.

You heard tell stories about the English shadow factories. But what happened in fact? These people did not even complete the conversion of their existing factories, let alone the erection of shadow factories, the essence of which is that they are not working today, but may be switched on tomorrow. And how far have they gone with their second great project for the motor-or-plane industry which this Automobile King Duffield has set up? The latest report is this that this Honourable Lord now has made up in his mind, and almost decided where he will build these shadow factories, therefore in the best possible case has chosen their location. You know now much it takes to build a big factory, and I think, it cannot be done in such a hurry. If on the one hand they introduce the 40 hr week or even go down to 35 hours a week, and on the other hand we are working 10 or 11 or 12 hours a day instead of 8 hours, then this discrepancy must at the end favor the men who work longer, and work is what matters for results.

But still we have to keep in mind that from the long term view these people too certainly will have some results, and before all that England and France do not stand alone on the opposite side, but are always in a position to draw upon the immense reservoir for raw materials in America.

If I compare the Air Forces of the principal countries which may become our enemies (by which I always mean England and France), I am bound today:

we have done marvellous work indeed! In 1933 we were at zero, today, 1938, at the end of the year, Germany will have a complete first line strength equal to that of England's strength plus.....Thus we are superior in quantity, too, and as to quality we are equal, even superior. This is an enormous success. It is a miracle that we were able to do it.

And here you deserve great credit, gentlemen, for having succeeded in establishing factories from nothing, and finally producing in them planes and motors which are equal today and partly superior.

Page 7 Altogether, I consider the German Air Force as being ahead compared with the English as well as with the French. Our task is, not only to keep, but also to increase this advantage. For if it comes to the decision, we shall again be opposed by a great multitude, considering the world reservoir at the disposal of the enemies. We have to endeavor, therefore, to increase our advantage, at least in the air, by producing highest quality and at the same time in enormous masses, and I am firmly resolved to take every measure which can and will provide us with permanent superiority in the air.

Page 8 It is for this reason that I have to approach you again, gentlemen, with a demand to provide loyally and passionately those conditions which will allow me to increase that advantage. I am aware that there are great difficulties, and one of these difficulties consisted and still consists in the so-called shortage of raw materials. Gentlemen, shortage of raw materials! 'Indeed' everyone has less iron than he needs. But if you come to think of it that we now manufacture almost 2,000 tons of raw iron a month, then that is something immense. We are today producing more iron than France and England combined. Only our needs are so immensely great. The same applies to aluminium. I increased our requirements for aluminium under the Air Ministry plans, later in the frame of the Four Years Plan, from 32,000 tons a year to 150,000 tons a year as of today, then after the end of this year 180,000 tons, and by the end of 1939, to 268,000 tons. And even this will not be quite enough. Now you can roughly estimate, if you compare the aluminum quota at the disposal of the rest of the world, how much they can produce from aluminum. Although one should not forget that there are many cases where we are forced to use aluminum, while other people can use other materials owing to their richness in raw materials. Yet much has been done also with regard to raw materials, and if I just altered the contingents again and allotted to the Armed Forces 500,000 and lately even 550,000, possibly even 600,000 tons, these are also enormous figures.

We shall make it alright. What matters is only that everybody knows he has to be careful, that material is short, but that the manufacture must not be impeded. Everything often depends on the right distribution of materials, in order to balance temporary shortages and prevent stoppages of work. Moreover the demands often are for much more than is really needed or is said to be needed.

Now, if I touch once more on the political problem, this is because you felt the consequences of the political situation in the increase of the program, and that we have to request that everybody do his best, and that all our labor supply must be used. We are fully embarked on the way to mobilization-capacity and shall not be able for years to deviate from it; on the contrary, we may have to increase our speed under certain conditions until we reach full mobilization capacity.

Page 9

Gentlemen, please consider the far reaching consequences; you ought to be aware that the smallest faults and omissions cannot be caught up with, and repaired, if we work with such speed. I have to ask you therefore to be in a state of the greatest readiness. It is the fate of Germany which is at stake. Your job is not to be politicians. But if you sometime have a quiet half hour to ponder on the history of the era after the world war, you will become convinced that, in case a combination of powers today would succeed a second time in overwhelming Germany, the end of the Reich would be there. These people have been forewarned now, they know what a Germany totally prostrated can create anew, if the only remains united. This is what they have learned, and they will act accordingly.

Gentlemen, the following is my personal belief: Wherever the conflagration may begin - if then Germany must go to war - this will be the greatest hour of destiny ever since there has been a German history. And the possibility of victory indeed exists. It depends solely on our own power, on the manner in which we mobilise that power, and on the degree to which everybody is resolved to do his bit, convinced as he is that afterwards every individual will experience personally the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the situation. Believe me, Gentlemen: once Germany has again lost a new War, it will be no use for you to go and say: Yes I did not want this war, I was always opposed to it, moreover I was opposed to the system and never wanted collaborate with it. You will be dismissed with scornful laughter. You are Germans: the others don't care two hoots whether you wanted to collaborate or not.

Page 10

We have to see things as they are. The situation being what it is, I believe there is still a 10% to 15% possibility for a relatively small scale action, but I am convinced that a 80, 85, 90% chance exists that a greater disaster will occur anyhow, and that we shall have to fight the great battle of which I am not afraid. The only thing that matters is that we shall not collapse again. What matters is that everybody knows: Victory can be ours only if we work to an immensely higher extent. We have to replace by men everything the other side has more in raw materials. This is why the determination of every single German has to be much stronger than that of the enemy in question. And the determination of a nation that knows its very existence is at stake, will necessarily be stronger than that of people who are only half resolved and only go along in the war and the agitation, etc.

Those are not phrases, gentlemen. For God's sake do not understand them as nationalistic blusterings, you would do me a great injustice. I am passionately convinced that everything I tell you is an absolute, gigantic truth. I am truly of the opinion: we shall not be able to save our fatherland unless we stake all our passions.

Believe me, gentlemen, I have now learned during these years, what it means to bear continually the responsibility for a nation. If you are concerned about your work, this is indeed a grave responsibility. But what it means if a man is aware that on his own counsel, decision, judgment, and deliberation lastly depends the fate of the nation, this is beyond your im-

Page 11 agination. You may be certain, seldom indeed do I have any other thought in my mind. Actually I have to force myself to think of other things; all the time my thoughts are circling around one thing; when will war come? Shall we win? What can we do? I assure you, gentlemen, it is hour after hour that I ponder: What can we do? I am well aware that there are still infinitely more things we could do. I am aware that many things are not yet ready, I am aware of the many obstacles in our way, and I am very sorry that I am unable to do everything as quickly as I would like. I wished, however, I might be able to say later on with regard to the task which has been given to me: Well, every preparation which a man can make has been made by us. It is a bad thing if a man has to confess, when the battle has started: Damn it, you could have done this before. This responsibility rests heavily on me, you may believe me.

This is why I again beg of you with all my heart, gentlemen: Consider yourself an industry which has the duty to create an Air Force which is most intimately connected with that Air Force. Do understand that all personal interests take second place. What does your work mean compared with the fate of the nation? What value have after all the considerations which will often occur to you: Well, what are we to do afterwards, if now the capacities become so much inflated? Would it not be better to go a little more slowly in order to distribute the work better? Such thoughts would prove nothing - don't take this amiss, gentlemen, but an extremely petty character. What does it matter, if there will come a day when you have to manufacture chamber pots instead of planes? That is of no importance if there is only now a chance for Germany to win the struggle.

Page 12

For if I spoke so far briefly of the fate which would befall us if we lost the war, I may be allowed now to mention what will happen if we win it. Then Germany will be the greatest power in the world, then it is Germany who dominates the world market, then will be the hour when Germany is a rich nation. For this goal, however, we have to undertake risks, we have to stake our bet. This is why I once again demand of you: all the questions ruminating in your heads, all ideas of external or internal importance, any doubts whether you can obtain higher prices, whether you might make insufficient profits, etc. all this is perfectly beside the point. What matters is only this: What is the production of the works; how many motors are being made and in what time, and of what quality are these motors and planes? Only this is important. And even if you know what you are doing now may mean that within three years your firm will collapse, you will have to do it all the same. For if Germany collapses, who will dare to tell me to my face that his shop will go on? Out of the question! If only this fact would be understood by the whole of the German economy - although the dictate of Versailles in 1918 should indeed have been a good teacher to them - and if all would understand that nobody here exists by himself, but that everybody stands and falls with Germany's existence! It does not matter if someone says: I disapprove entirely of the National Socialist system. I don't care, let him disapprove, it is still the system which at this moment decides Germany's fate. This is why he has willy-nilly to cooperate. Therefore I repeat once more: only that nation which stakes everything on its armaments and draws all consequences from this fact, will be able to continue its existence.

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Gentlemen, I have no reason, and this is gratifying to me, to complain of the airplane industry but to praise, to acknowledge, and to thank. You went my way on the whole, though at the start one or the other did not quite catch what it meant

and you did really wonderful work, in some factories quite extraordinary things were done. Thus just with regard to the airplane industry I have no reason for complaints, thank God. Just this fact permits me to say, especially as it cannot happen in this industry, not for a second, and I mean second, would I hesitate - as I proved with regard to another matter - to intervene at once and to confiscate at once the whole business in case I should come to the conclusion that he does not understand that he can see the world only under the toilet-seat perspective of his own enterprise, and cannot look further. Such a fellow is a neller do well. That fellow must go. By a stroke of my pen he would lose his business and his property. But as I said before, and I am very gratified to state this once again, that the airplane industry performed quite excellent work.

But, gentlemen, we must not rest on our laurels, our performance must encourage us to perform still more. If I said some moments ago that the raw material situation is and will remain difficult, the situation regarding labor supply is perhaps still more difficult. This is by no means surprising. Imagine, in 1933 we had almost 7 million unemployed, and today the greatest problem of Germany is where to find enough workers to complete the most urgent tasks. I believe, a leadership which led to such results has some justification for its existence. If today some degree of prosperity exists in other countries, if for instance a country like Sweden is in excellent circumstances, then it is very wrong if this country scoffs on Germany, since it is indebted for its prosperity to nobody but Germany and her re-armament. Anyway this labor supply problem is difficult indeed. It was with difficulty that I made decided on the law enacted recently, a law which intervenes to a truly enormous extent in the freedom of movement of every individual. If a worker can be told today you are finished here, pack up your things and start tomorrow at such and such a place, this means indeed quite something! I despite this fact I resolved to issue this law, you ought to be able to comprehend how difficult the situation is, but also that we shall dodge no issue. As long as there are any chances of balancing the situation, I shall take these chances.

As for the airplane industry, here again of course the most difficult problem is that of providing skilled workers. But we have devised means and ways to attain our goal.

(An admonition follows on the training of as many apprentices as possible).

Page 16 Beyond this, gentlemen, I want you to be perfectly clear, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier you can make clear proposals on this to me, the earlier you know yourselves what you want, including the changes in personnel, what people you want to get rid of, and what people you want to have, the earlier you will be all right, and the less danger there will be of work being held up. If you act in this way, we should be able to apply in time to the Inspectorates for Recruiting for deferments on the basis of your claims, so that the moment mobilization starts, everything will have been arranged already. You will then be in a position to know: when mobilization starts, so-and-so will be taken away, but you will also know who will replace him. I should like to have this arranged almost by names. I want every man and woman to know: on the first, the second, the third day of mobilization I shall have to do this and that, so that the order of events will not be: the airplane industry will be allotted a certain number out of the bulk of available labor, etc., and then the allotments will be altered four or five times. No, this will have to be done

from the beginning, by names. I want the airplane industry to take again the first place and go ahead by appointing a special employee in each factory who has nothing to do but to make the arrangements for mobilization, so that every shop knows accurately: I shall lose so-and-so, he will be replaced by so-and-so. But with regard to those people who cannot be spared by any means you must apply for deferment already, so that I can order their deferment. If this is being done accurately and executed carefully, you will see what a help that will be. For it is quite clear: there will be a great to-do the day of the mobilization, and every man will then have to know what he will have to do. And with regard to juvenile labor, to apprentices, I want you to make your decisions also with regard for the mobilization; it might be advisable to accept already many more apprentices than you would accept normally.

(Some remarks follow on the reorganization of the Air Ministry and the appointment of Udet)

Page 18 At this point I want to prevent the spreading of a fairy tale in case it should exist. If you'd think that since I have so much to do, I am more or less above things, do not trouble them and let them know what is going on, you are mistaken; first of all I am seeing the Chief of the C-Office once a week if not more frequently, and I can assure you that nothing of importance is being ordered, really nothing which has not been discussed with, and agreed upon by me first. No sample is dispatched, no order given without my consent, I decide personally upon each piece to be delivered on the basis of these conferences. Every
Page 19 measure, therefore, which the Chief of the C-Office takes, has been previously discussed in conference lasting many hours.

You knew of the new method which General Udet wishes to apply. This method naturally calls for sacrifices. They are necessary however. For what is it which matters? We must have, firstly the best types, secondly as few of them as possible. Thirdly, types which can be built within a short time, which can be built in good quality, and which can be built cheaply. This is, I believe, the result of planning for almost a year. For it has been almost a year since I started the deliberations which led to the method we wish to apply now.

It goes without saying, gentlemen, we shall communicate to you the demands which we have with regard to the machines we want. You shall have a chance to build that machine in free competition. Then we shall have to decide what machine it is which suits us. And this today is often very difficult to decide. Often we had to ponder very long when we had to decide between two types. Either machine had its advantages, the one these, the other one those. If one has to choose between two machines of which one of them. If both machines are good, this is difficult.

Page 20 And if we chose one, and refused the other, this in many cases did not mean that the one refused was not good; perhaps it was just as good, but some small advantage of the chosen machine tipped the scale after we had considered everything.

But I cannot allow the manufacture of several types. I am well aware of the objections to this opinion. They have been known to me already since the last war.

Page 21 One should not create monopolies, and I don't want to do so. I never asked you, gentlemen, to work in your construction offices in a given direction, i.e. to do everything by order, but there you are free, and every firm is free to produce some-

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thing better at any moment. But if I made up my mind after the most thorough deliberations and discussions with all responsible people, to choose the bomber, which is to be the backbone of the Air Force, which is to be produced in greatest numbers, then I have the duty to arrange that this type is also produced in the shortest possible time. Gentlemen, the kind of licensing method which we had so far, was never very pleasing to me, for we were forced to acknowledge that a series of accidents - to mention a minor detail - was caused for the following reasons: that with the firms which had licensed things did not quite fit in some place, something stuck, and they gave it one more little jerk, and the part just got in; by such methods tensions were created which later had fatal results. It cannot go on like it did so far, that we say we gave them the license, and let the firm construct and fit the licensed parts. If we have now chosen a certain type, the firm which developed this type carries the central responsibility for the construction and the completion of this type, even where part of the work is done by licensed firms. And the other firms shall produce this type until another type appears in our factories which may perhaps have been constructed by a different firm and which may replace the older type. But the firm which has developed the type chosen by me is responsible to me for the following: That firstly it will be provided the gizets (Vorrichtungen) drawings, materials and everything else which is necessary, in order to deliver at the end of the manufacturing process the same type in every factory. And this, gentlemen, is the more important because I no longer order: you, please produce license 88, and the other produce the so-and-so license, but I shall tell you: You produce nothing but the right wing, you nothing but the left wing, you nothing but the slider appliance, you the rump, etc. and at the end everything must fit together. And if I proceed to produce the highest possible number of planes, then, gentlemen, you will have to understand that everybody has to march in step. For these small parts are to be produced in various places, and then they must fit and the firm which developed that type will be responsible to me that they do fit. Not the greatest profit ought to matter for you, but before all your mere work and better results. There can be no doubt about that.

Gentlemen, I am aware that there are quite a number of objections against this method. But there are objections against every method. But if I balance the advantage and the disadvantages, taking into due consideration that for the time being this is the right way, which is bound absolutely to bring superiority over the enemy, and I should like to add here over the democratic, the leaderless enemy, for in England it is possible that Lord Ruffield says any plane will be built, if I am not to produce the plane which I want then I shall not produce at all. Yes, such things he can say in England, but not in Germany, thank God, and I only hope he says such things: may God preserve him in this condition. In such a case it goes without saying that one day he will fly around at the front with the most varied types. This is just what will make him inferior. Since we are provided with the principle of organization, I really would be quite insane if I did not organize these powers and make use of the chance which fate allowed me to have.

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Page 26

Above all, gentlemen, and you will remember that I told you this already in 1933, if you are planning for a new type, the serial manufacture of the current type must not be disturbed by it. Never! These two tasks must be entirely separated from each other. For I know the difficulties inherent in the development of a new type. If I allow this work to interfere, at any stage, with the manufacturing of the serial type, then disadvantages to the serial type are unavoidable. Therefore, full separation must be provided and care must be taken that the serial manufacture never suffers from the work for new development, and neither must the new development be hampered by serial production. For you are fully aware how important it is to develop the new types. It is always decisive that a plane which has been constructed, must be flown as soon as possible. For not until it has been flown, and with which calculations were made are flown, does a basis for further development really exist.

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Gentlemen, if later on a history of the German Air Force and its development is written, the writer will call the step which General Udet made with regard to the Ju 88 and in which we followed him a magnificent action undertaken by the German aviation technique. This is perfectly clear to me. This is why I ask you again to forget your personal ambitions for the benefit of this greatest task of all. You may well be proud, gentlemen, that today we are already in a position to entrust industry with such a task. For I hope I may be sure without any reserve that after adopting this system, even if you were sorry that you had to do it, you will work for it loyally, and that our work will not slacken or be hampered by some dislike on your part - to be careful in my expression. I hope I may rather be convinced that you will tell yourselves, well, I should have preferred a different way, but since the decision was made, there is only one thing: to take up this method with all the power and force at my command.

I mentioned already how glad I am to be able to express my deep satisfaction with what you have created up to now. What is it that we have brought about? We have succeeded in changing a small airplane industry which barely existed with a few types, which was not in a position to keep step with modern development, which had to stop production altogether for some years, etc., into an efficient airplane industry of our very own without foreign patents, foreign licences, and by using exclusively tools of our own. In then came the reorientation which was completed in a single year, moreover the production of modern planes, produced now already in serial types. I believe, gentlemen, we can be proud of the way which the airplane industry has traversed, and this is just what entitles me to trust you and to request of you what I had to request today.

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(More admonitions follow to obey orders.)

And finally one more thing. You will not be able to fulfill your duties unless you have a staff which collaborates enthusiastically, and workers who are fully prepared to assist in your task, and I beg of you, consider your workers your colleagues, men by whose intensified zeal alone you will be able to reach your goal. Provide me with this great joy as well, that I may be able to call the German airplane industry an example for the right treatment of the workers. We shall not be able to solve our great problems and to use all this capacity for work unless the worker feels that he is indeed valued at his

Page 30 full worth and treated as a member of the team. On the other hand, gentlemen, you must not close your eyes with regard to certain nihilistic plans if such should become evident. Less than anywhere else can we afford in the airplane industry to allow propaganda hostile to the state. For whose does verbal propaganda and action begin? True, if I address the Forces, I have of course to deny every time that sabotage ever occurs. For if I did not do so, if I would allow such considerations to be seriously considered by the Forces, I should shake and undermine all their confidence. The Forces must not even start such considerations. But your duty, gentlemen, is to take care of it that ideas of sabotage etc. disappear entirely from the brains of your personnel even should the individual not agree with our State of today. It is here that we have to be very careful so that nothing can happen for this is where, as I said before, the confidence in your products stands or falls.

Page 31 If I finally touch the problem of female labor, this is because I am of the opinion that we have to tackle the problem of female labor again in case of mobilisation. Gentlemen, here you must use your brains. A woman is not a man, and it is not enough to say, instead of 500 men, I now employ 500 women, and at this or that place, a worker is a worker whether man or woman. You will have to calculate rather: if you have to lose in case of war this or that number of men, but may receive this or that number of women, you must today already make all preparations for making your factory suitable for female labor. Not in your industry but in another industry I noticed the other day the following: Owing to a reorientation 90 women had been taken on. In the whole factory there was not a single lavatory for women. This isn't the thing. This may be a small matter, simply nobody have to think of the difference. You must establish separate wash-rooms and other things. One cannot simply put the women into the men's wash rooms. One has to acknowledge when women come to work, there must be preparations for them.

Page 32 One thing is clear, in general you cannot ask as much from a woman as from a man. There are certain spheres where the opposite applies, but working in a factory is not one of them. Above all you must be clear on where you can use female labor at all, and where this would be impossible. Accordingly, you must make your arrangements in case of mobilisation. This goes without saying. And I imagine that, if things like the one mentioned before are done right, the dreaded sudden decrease of work need not occur at all, and that I won't have to wait for months for the curve to go up again. Gentlemen, I think I have opened my heart enough. As to certain details you know already from the conference with Udet. I only need to know whether you (to General Udet) wish to add anything ('no') or whether everything has been discussed.

Gentlemen, I have still one thing to ask. I think it goes without saying that everything which I told you with regard to the political situation and preparations for mobilization has to remain entirely among ourselves. This goes without saying, and I need hardly add anything. I chose the participants for this address in such a way that I am entitled to trust entirely their discretion. I should not like to experience the same disappointment which I had when I invited the German industry to the Horrenhaus, when the contents of my speech were already known in a wider circle the same evening.

Later on I shall confer with some gentlemen in order to receive from them some information on certain things. The air tents industry is informed. The same applies in general to the airplane motor industry. Here the main task will be to produce Mercedes "G Ols" in large numbers. As to EKV I put great hopes on the future air.....as an enormous step forward. Until then the most intensified production of the present type has to be continued of course. Junk 211 also has to be produced with the great intensity. Moreover I hope that the motor industry too will not rest content with the fact that they have produced a good motor, but I ask them to prepare and further new developments.

Page 33 Gentlemen, here again I should like to give some advice. In our branch, in aviation and production for the needs of an air force, you cannot attain much without some imagination. This is the sphere where many new developments and inventions can be expected to appear and where one thoughts and not to say: but this is impossible! Rather you ought to travel into thin air over and over again, and tell yourselves: here it is, where there must be room for imagination, where my ideas must go on a long voyage. I hope, this is my private wish and dream, a miracle will happen. I still hope that I am shown some day a motor or a weapon or a plane or a bomb, the qualities of which will be fantastic. I still hope for something which has the same importance in the struggle with the enemy as had the needle gun in the war of 1870-71. If I had such a needle gun (to use a metaphor) against an enemy who has nothing but muzzle-loaders our advantage naturally would be great. With these remarks I wish to express my sympathy with boldness in experimenting. I still am not yet in the possession of the stratosphere bomber which overcomes space at a height of 25 and 30 km. This problem has not been solved yet in the sense that practical use is possible. I still am lacking rocket motors which would enable us to effect such flying. I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there. Thus you see, gentlemen, there is still a large field for your work, and what matters is only how high you aim, you will have success in the same proportion.

(Some final, unimportant remarks follow)
Admiral Lohs answers in the name of the industry.
Page 36 I want to thank you also for the remarks in which you acknowledge that we did our best. You, Field Marshal, today opened our eyes to the seriousness of the situation, and you gave us directives in those units and in that direction; and it will naturally be a matter of honor for us to march cheerfully that way. I am of the opinion that our airplane industry will be able to fulfill it without any friction provided it gets the semi-fabricated goods and there will not be too much alteration of plans.

(The remainder of this speech contains some cautious allusions to a dictatorial attitude taken by Udet, otherwise there is nothing of importance.)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. R-140
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. R-140

20 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, Tec 5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. R-140.

GOETZ MAYER,
Tec. 5, 33812169.

Reich Office for Economic Development

Top Secret!

Military Economy New Production Plan
of 12 July 1938

Sectors: Mineral Oil
Rubber (Buna)
Light Metals
Gunpowder and Explosives,
Chemical Warfare Agents
and Preliminary Products

see enclosure

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(page 4 of original)

Reich Office
for Economic Development

Berlin, 12 July 1938

Division F
Division P

10 copies
8th copy

Military Economy New Production Plan
of 12 July 1938
for the sectors:

Mineral oil
Rubber
Light metals
Gunpowder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents.

The goal for the new production plan was set by the Generalfeldmarschall on 30.6.1938 in Karinhall. The following basic conditions should be observed for the individual sectors:

1. Mineral oil: Development according to the planning thus far will be only slightly delayed in the case of a five months' reduction of the steel quota from August to December 1938 inclusive.

The new plan begins with an increased quota as compared with the first half of 1938, beginning with 1939. In order to carry out the mineral oil plan approximately 110,000 tons per month of steel — rolling mill or casting weight — will be required until the middle of 1942 (as compared with 60,000 tons per month thus far). The plan is adjusted to the attainment of the target for 1942/43 established by the Generalfeldmarschall.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

Mobilization target	Aviation gasoline	3 million tons per year, hitherto 1 m.t.y.
	Automobile gasoline	4 million tons per year, hitherto 2.6 m.t.y.
	Diesel motor fuel	2 million tons per year, hitherto 2 m.t.y.
	Heating fuel	4 million tons per year, hitherto 3.5 m.t.y.
	Lubricating oil	0.83 million tons per year, hitherto 0.65 m.t.y.

The plan provides for making stand-by plants available on a larger scale. Even under normal conditions these plants are to be already partially in operation;

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the products produced in them beyond the normal requirements are to be stored for the mobilization requirements. In this way it would be possible to decrease the number of stand-by plants, which involve big capital outlays and require large quantities of materials.

2. Rubber: Development according to the planning thus far is continuing practically according to schedule; the quota will be only slightly restricted because of the saving of steel which is to continue for five months.

Beginning in the autumn of 1939 construction work on Buna Plant III will begin, and as from the end of 1940 there will be a further expansion from 94,000 tons per year to 120,000 tons per year capacity, either by the expansion of Buna II and III or by the erection of a fourth Buna plant. This expansion is possible for the next years, including 1942, with retention of the current steel quota of about 11,000 tons per month for Buna.

The plan is adjusted to the target for 1942/43 established by the Generalfeldmarschall.

Mobilization target Buna 120,000 tons per year, hitherto 70,000 tons per year.

3. Light metals:

a) Aluminum: Expansion according to the planning thus far is proceeding according to schedule. The quota established therefore will not be restricted by the saving of steel which is to last for five months. Further expansion will occur according to the new planning, which contains the following important points as compared with the plan thus far:

1. Exchange of 15,000 tons per year of aluminum of the Wehrmacht requirements (particularly fuses) for 10,000 tons per year of magnesium.
2. Expansion of Teeging, Lenz, Bitterfeld and new construction of a plant for an additional 15,000 tons per year (possibly more) supplied by waterpower from the Inn, since a quick expansion of energy is possible there.

The mobilization target of 273,000 tons per year will be attained by the end of 1941.

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b) Magnesium: The mobilization requirements according to the old planning amounted to 31,200 tons per year, in accordance with the planning of 31.12.1937 26,000 tons per year. According to the present planning of 12.7.1938 the magnesium mobilization requirements by the exchange of aluminum are increased by 10,000 tons per year to the mobilization target 36,000 tons per year.

These requirements remain permanently covered in the period 1939/40 by supplies in stock, by full utilization of the facilities which still exist at the present time, and by new construction of a plant for 2,000 tons per year. The process which is to be provided for the new plant, presumably a thermic one, will be decided on in 1939, depending on how good the plants going into operation at the end of 1938 prove to be. The construction of mobilization stand-by plants could be undertaken in connection therewith. In case of mobilization the time required for development of the planned additional mobilization plants of 15,000 tons per year would be bridged over by the available supplies.

4. Gunpowder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents:

Development thus far is, according to the existing plan, via the quota of the Army Ordnance Office. Only a part of the preliminary product plants were taken care of thus far by the Reich Office (Reichsstelle). The new plan of 30.6.1938 provides the utmost acceleration of all building projects of these sectors, including the preliminary products. Beginning immediately it starts with increased steel requirements of approximately 10,000 tons per month, which will attain a special peak of about 40,000 tons per month in the year 1940. The gunpowder and explosives plan can be achieved by the middle of 1941, the chemical warfare agents plan by the beginning of 1942.

Mobilization target	Gunpowder	17,900 tons per month
	Explosives	17,100 tons per month (incl. additional amounts: 35,000 tons per month)
	Chemical warfare agents	9,300 tons per month

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Preliminary Condition for Carrying out the New Military Economy Production Plan:

Investigations thus far show that the new plan can be carried out in principle. The necessary amounts of energy as well as the required additional coal production must be created by 1942/43 by systematic development.

However, a preliminary condition is an increase of the steel quota from the beginning of 1939 in the quantities evident from the comprehensive chart (approximately 100,000 tons per month more for the next three years). For the sector gunpowder and explosives the increased amount of steel must be made available immediately.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

A further preliminary condition is a basic special full authorization, according to which this executing office (Stollo) retains for the individual project the possibility of having its steel delivery take preference over all other deliveries (except munitions and direct Wehrmacht equipment) and of providing the necessary engineers, chemists and workers at the expense of less important projects.

If the two preliminary conditions cannot be fulfilled, then the carrying out of the military economy new production plan of 12 July 1938 according to schedule is not possible.

Details concerning the new production plan and its steel requirements (thereby also the financial requirements) are evident from the attached chart.

As a supplement to the present summary compare the file "Enclosures" (Anlagen) with individual representations of the sectors.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-8800.

HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499.

Basic Facts

for a

History of German War and Armaments Economy

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To c): In the initial stages of rearmament, the raw material requirements for the supply of the branches of the Wehrmacht could be fully satisfied. It soon became clear, however, that the necessity of giving an initial impulse to industry and the completion of the various big Government projects connected with that necessity demanded so great a quantity of raw materials that the raw material requirements of the Wehrmacht could no longer be fully covered. Therefore, the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) started on an exact calculation of the raw material requirements for the supply program and undertook, in collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Economics, the calculation of raw material deliveries which could be made each year. Both results were arranged in easily understandable charts and submitted regularly to the

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inner Government circle. During this work which proved of great importance for the progress of armaments it was soon realized that the supply of raw materials would have to be rationed, and also that extensive measures would have to be taken to ensure a wider basis for the supply of raw materials.

The quota system for raw materials proved itself completely during the first years of rearmament, and it was only necessary to change it, in war time, because the branches of the Wehrmacht could not manage on the raw material quotas allotted to them, on account of new Fuehrer orders and increasing demands, and therefore overdraw considerably and without authorization their raw material quotas. But it can be stated here that the Military Economic Staff succeeded in directing the Wehrmacht programs efficiently during the rearmament period. The Military Economic Staff had, however, to struggle hard for years with the Reich Ministry of Economics because of the small raw material allocations to the Wehrmacht and the great raw material consumption of the rest of the industry. Details will be given in the description of the individual war years.

To d): The execution of the production programs of the Wehrmacht branches, i.e. the development of industrial plants for increased production in the event of mobilization (Mob-Fall) had to be

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directed and controlled by the Military Economic Staff because here, too, considerable overlapping occurred. Particularly the development of factories for preliminary and semi-finished products which were of importance for all three branches of the Wehrmacht, and of raw material plants necessitated clearly defined directions. In close collaboration with the Four Year Plan, the Four Year Plan (Translator's note: Probably intended to be "Military Economic Staff") carried out a notable amount of constructive work. On the whole, the work was distributed thus; the Military Economic Staff ascertained the requirements of the Wehrmacht branches for their mobilization program, consolidated them and calculated the corresponding figures for raw materials needed, and then, working on the basis of the existing sources of supply, formulated further requests for the enlargement of raw material bases. The actual constructive work was then done by the Four Year Plan, whilst the Military Economic organization, on its part, had to integrate the requests arising from the building program of the Four Year Plan into the procurement programs of the Wehrmacht branches. Special mention must be made, in this connection, of the broadly conceived development of the bases for fuel production, the gunpowder and explosives program, the increase in the production of light metals, the establishment of synthetic rubber production, the exploitation of iron ore deposits in the Harz mountains, the use of ores

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with a low iron content, the increase of cellulose wool production and the application of synthetic materials. In the interests of historical truth, however, it must be mentioned here that, since 1930, all these projects had been requested by the former Economics Staff of the Army Ordnance Office, but that they could be effected only to a very limited extent because the necessary means were not made available by the Government. Not before Goering, then General Field Marshal, was commissioned on the 12 October 1936 to carry through the second Four Year Plan, was the broadening of the raw material bases begun on a generous scale, as demanded by the Wehrmacht.

The Military Economic Staff assisted in preparing for mobilization with particular vigour as far as mineral oils were concerned. Beginning in 1935, the Military Economic Staff demanded of the Plenipotentiary General for Economy the concentration of all matters pertaining to fuels in the hands of a Commissioner for Fuels whose full time job it should be to expand the German mineral oil basis, to increase imports, to complete the installation of a network of fuel tank depots and to make the required number of conveyances available. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy refused the request to create this new post, as he thought that sufficient provision had been made for this task by delegating the matter to Oberbergshauptmann (senior governmental mining official) Schlottman in the Department for Mining of

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the Reich Ministry for Economics. Although it is to be appreciated that Oberbergbauminister Schlotmann did further the installation of the Braunkohle plant (Braunkohlen- und Benzin A.G.-Anlage),

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the rest of the demands of the Military Economic Staff remained far behind schedule until the Military Economic Staff itself took over the preparatory work by establishing a planning staff and planning teams, and in collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Economics accelerated the preparations for mobilization. Later, by order of Minister President Goering, the Raw Materials and Foreign Currency Staff took over the development of the bases for mineral oils.

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XII.

Co-operation with the Four Year Plan.

The formulation of a Several-Years-Plan had first been suggested, as early as the winter of 1933/34, by the former Chief of Staff of the Army Ordnance Office, Lt. Col. FUCHS who, in a memorandum to the Reich Minister of War, explained the reasons for the indispensability of planning in all armament matters and proposed the formulation of a Five Year Plan

- a) to carry out the requirement projects of the three Wehrmacht branches within the re-armament plan and
- b) to build up systematically food and raw material production as the foundation for the defense of the Reich.

(Unfortunately, this memorandum can no longer be found). The memorandum had been submitted, at that time, to the Fuehrer by the Reich Minister for War.

The next impulse to plan home defense measures systematically came in 1935 as a result of the development of the raw material and foreign exchange situation. The precarious food situation in Germany had necessitated the spending of a considerable amount of foreign currency in 1934/35 in order to make up the great deficiencies in food supplies for the German people. This loss of foreign exchange was bound to encumber the economic situation in the long run and thereby also the process of re-arming. Then, in March 1936, the Minister for Food again approached the Minister for Economics with far-reaching demands for foreign exchange, the

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latter, in an outspoken letter, refused to make further amounts of foreign currency available and demanded a thorough examination of the entire situation as to foreign exchange, raw materials, and food supplies by a person delegated to this task by the Fuehrer (for copy of the letter to the Reich Minister of Food see appendix XII,1). In April, following a conference of ministers (for report see appendix XII,2), the Fuehrer ordered the Minister President of Prussia, Goering, to investigate, and take all measures necessary for the improvement of the raw materials and foreign exchange situation. As a working basis, for this project Reich Minister Dr. Schacht submitted on 23 April a memorandum on the present position of raw materials and foreign exchange (see appendix XII,5).

Acting upon this order of the Fuehrer, General GOERING announced his plan for accomplishing this task at a conference of ministers (see enclosure XII,4) and ordered the formation of a Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange which started work in early May 1936. Lt. Col. IGEB was appointed Chief of Staff, and GOERING asked the Army High Command to delegate Colonel THOMAS for this task (see appendix XII,5).

It was the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency which laid the foundations for the subsequent work of the Four Year Plan.

The planning ordered by Minister President GOERING was concerned primarily with procuring foreign currency for financing re-armament as well.

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as with clarifying the raw materials situation in order to safeguard the progress of armament production. The main problem for both tasks was the procurement of further amounts of foreign currency. There were considerable differences of opinion about the method to be employed to this end between the Minister President and the (Translator's note: Reichsbank President) President Dr. Schacht. A report of the Conference of Ministers of 12 May 1936 on this question is attached as appendix XII,6. These conferences led to the conclusion that exports had to be increased considerably in order to make further amounts of foreign currency available, for the purchase of raw materials, and that the Reich Minister of Food had to be forced to secure the food for the German people without using, as up to the present, considerable amounts of foreign currency.

The 15th (Military Economy Staff) supported most energetically the German efforts for the increase of exports against the contrasting opinion of the Schacht branches, perceiving clearly that increased exports were necessary even if the smooth progress

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of armament production were disturbed hereby in some respects for a short time.

The co-operation with the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange was so arranged by 'Stb, that 'Stb determined the quantities and the kind of raw materials lacking, and the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency undertook the task of taking the necessary steps for their procurement.

When it became increasingly clear that great gaps existed in the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials and that they were becoming more and more dangerous, the Fuehrer took the decisive step of proclaiming the Four Year Plan at the Reich Party Rally 1936. By decree of 16 October 1936, Minister

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President GOERING was entrusted with the execution of the Four Year Plan, charged with the uniform direction of all the energies of the German People, and authorized to complete the strict centralization of all departmental competences in Party and State. An important sector of the economic preparations for war was started by this action.

The work of the Four Year Plan fell mainly within four spheres:

- a) in controlling German foreign exchange transactions,
- b) in directing the measures for attaining self-sufficiency with regard to food,
- c) in taking the steps necessary to improve our raw materials situation,
- d) in directing the employment of labor for armament production and other public projects.

Minister President GOERING defined these duties in a meeting of the inner council of ministers on the 21 October (see appendix, File note, WTI, 7).

The great significance of the work of the Four Year Plan for armaments production led to close collaboration between the departments of the Four Year Plan and the 'Stb. The scope of the problems to be solved was increasing steadily so that soon an Office for German Raw Materials and Synthesis under the direction of Colonel LOEB was built up from the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, and encompassed the following departments:

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1 Dept. Overall Planning and Statistics

Chief: Major Dr. Czimatis.

1 Dept. Mineral Oils

Chief: Major von Haemskerk,

1 Dent. Research and Development

Chief: Dr. Krauch.

1 Dept. Finance

Chief: President Laro,

and the main special sections

Iron and Metals under Mr. Fleigor

Textiles under Mr. Kehrl

"ood under Forestry Commissioner
 (Forstmeister) von Homloy

Chemistry and Rubber under Dr. Eckell

Gunpowders and Explosives under Major Zimmer.

The cooperation between the departments of this office and the "Stb was very close and had gratifying and positive results. But the "Stb had always to be on guard against overzealous and ambitious department heads who might tend to plan individual projects of the most widely-differing type on a scale out of proportion to the limitations of the whole armament production. The "Stb, with clear practicality, reduced these plans whose scope was frequently vastly exaggerated to fit the basic framework. The "Stb paid special attention to mineral oils and supported with great energy all efforts to increase the production of synthetic mineral oils. The establishment of this fact is particularly important for the further increase of armament production since the Wehrmacht branches

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and later the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions were always inclined to rate the expansion of the mineral oil industry second only to their own armament projects. At every opportunity, therefore, the NSDAP emphasized that in a future war the production of mineral oil would be one of the decisive factors in gaining the victory, and that the production of the necessary fuels might well be more important one day than the manufacture

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of arms and munitions.

The development of the actual fuel producing plants was, according to the directives issued by the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, the concern of the "Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials" which, in 1938, was transformed into the "Reich Office for Economic Development". As this office was subordinated to the Ministry of Economics, the responsibility for the development of the mineral oils industry returned after long meanderings to the Ministry of Economics, a process not at all beneficial to the overall development. If at that time a full-time Commissioner for Fuels had been appointed, as demanded by the "Stb", the result of the preparations for mobilization might possibly have been even more successful.

The "Stb" was concerned only superficially with food production, since the Army Administration Office (Heeresverwaltungsamt) had been charged by the Reich Minister for War with safeguarding the interests of the Wehrmacht with the Minister of Food even before the department "War Economy and Armaments" had been established. As, furthermore, the "Stb" and the Chief of the Army Administration Office at that time, General KAMPF, and his

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principal subordinate, Ministerialdirektor FIECKER, were working in close co-operation, and as all questions pertaining to the Wehrmacht were being handed over by the Army Administration Office to the "Stb" to be dealt with there, it was not necessary to change the departmental administration in this respect. In so far as general questions of the Wehrmacht clashed with food procurement problems, the civil authorities concerned, the Army Administration Office, and the "Stb" worked in collaboration.

In the course of the war, the collaboration between the War Economy Organization and the Four Year Plan has become increasingly closer.

Less satisfactory was the collaboration between Minister President GOEBBES appointed by the Fuehrer as Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, and President of the Reich Bank Dr. Schacht appointed by the Fuehrer as Plenipotentiary General for Economy. Correspondence attached as appendices XII, 8 and 9, reflects the different opinions. The divergences led in 1938 to President of the Reich Bank Dr. Schacht being relieved of his office as Plenipotentiary General for Economy and replaced by Reich Minister Dr. Funk.

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The WStb succeeded in building up, up to the beginning of the war, a staff of expert personnel and therefore the "Foreign Countries" Departments of the WStb and of the Economic and Rearmament Office (W. R. A. O.) proved to be an excellent source of intelligence not only for the Wehrmacht, but for other Reich authorities and also for industry.

The second task consisted of contacting the sources of information and in creating the necessary transmission channels for the purpose of compiling the data wanted about the war economy of the respective countries. This was particularly difficult, because an order of the Fuehrer prohibited intelligence work (abwehrmassige Erhebungen) in various countries, e.g. Italy. The main sources for the work done by the "foreign countries" department of the WStb were:

1. the official statistical publications of the foreign countries large quantities of which were at our disposal until shortly before the outbreak of war, and the statistics published by the Reich Statistical Office.
2. The economic publications in the various countries.
3. German and foreign daily press (in the "foreign countries" department of the WStb approx. 50 daily newspapers and more than 100 periodicals are regularly being analyzed).

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4. The industrial manuals.
5. Investigation reports and treatises published by institutions at home and abroad, as for instance

the Institute for World Economy at Kiel university,

the Hamburg World Economy Institute,

the German Institute for Economic Research (Institute for Research into Market Fluctuation),

the Guelin Institute,

the Reich Office for Research into the Nature of Soil (Bodenforschung),

the Departments for National Economy and the archives of large German industrial combines like I.G., Siemens, Deutsche Bank, Reichs-Kreditgesellschaft, Metallgesellschaft etc.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. PS-2353
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6. Industrial maps of industrial enterprises, authorities and universities.
7. Reports of the German military, naval and air attachés with the German diplomatic representatives abroad.
8. Reports of the German Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Economics, Reich Ministry of Finance, Reich Ministry of Food and Reich Bank.
9. Exchange-groups (Austauschkommandos) of officers with foreign armies.
10. Monographs by military and economic experts at home and abroad.
11. Consultations with experts on agriculture, industry, commerce and transport.
12. Reconnaissance trips of suitable personalities to foreign countries, (Col. THOMAS' trip to Russia, Major Metzky's and Dr. Kieckhefer's to England, Lt.Col. Berlinton's to USA, etc.).

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13. To an especially large extent the information gathered about foreign Military Economy by Intelligence (Abwehr) and reports from the "Foreign Armies" department, from the special staff WK (Commercial and Economic Warfare, Handels- und Wirtschaftskrieg) from the General Staffs of the Army and the Air Force and the Supreme Operational Command of the Navy (Admiralstab der Kriegsmarine) who were in charge of intelligence concerning the purely military situation in foreign countries.

With all these departments, closest contact was maintained which led to almost daily consultations especially with the Intelligence department ("Abwehr").

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The preparations for the mass production of munitions had been developed, during the re-armament period, only to the extent that the existing machinery was used for the supply of the current requirements and of the initial equipment for the Armed Forces on mobilization. This was in no way sufficient. The Wehrmacht and the Army Ordnance Office had, therefore, stressed, in numerous memoranda, during the re-armament period, the weakness of our armament

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production as far as munitions were concerned, but had been always put off with the reply that the production facilities needed for mass production in war-time could be made available only at the end of the re-armament process. Furthermore, the false conception was frequently encountered that munitions could be made in any small machine shop and on any lathe, just as had been done in the world war 1914/18. No notice was taken when the Army Ordnance Office pleaded that modern machines were indispensable for up-to-date production of munitions.

The increase of the production of gunpowder and high explosives had been started as a large scale operation. On the recommendation of the HStb, General Fieldmarshall GOERING had ordered, in 1938, the draft of a plan for the production of gunpowder and high explosives and had put Generaldirektor Dr. Krueck of the I.G. in charge of its completion. This plan was drawn up on 12 July 1938 as the so-called "Kerinhall Plan". It provided for the establishment of production facilities for 12 000 tons of gunpowder, 19 000 tons of high explosives and 4 000 tons of poison gas per month up to the 1 October 1940. The capacities, up to the 1 October 1941, were to amount to:

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Gunpowder	18 000 tons
High Explosives	24 000 tons
Poison Gas	8 000 tons per month.

As the result of innumerable difficulties, particularly owing to lack of foreign currency for the purchase of machinery, deficiencies in the allocation of raw materials and shortage of labor, the construction schedule as planned by Dr. Krueck could not be adhered to, so that at the outbreak of war, the target figures had not been reached.

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History has, probably, few examples of a country adjusting its economic powers even in peace time to the necessities of war with as much forethought and planning as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two world wars. Organized military economy and the work performed in the pre-war period has undoubtedly been of such great advantage to Germany's conduct of the war against her adversaries that already the latter have not infrequently deemed it necessary to imitate measures in their own countries which they previously had criticized or ridiculed. Publications in enemy countries have frequently given convincing proof of that.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. PS-2353
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 June 1947

I, John FOSBERY, No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts from document No. PS-2353.

John FOSBERY
No. 20179

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CASE NO. 6
Prosecution Document Book No. 21

English



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK XXI

I.G. Farben Case -- Count I/C

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Transcript
NI-7424		Secret document entitled excerpts from "Measures based upon the Order of 15 July 1938 for the execution of the military economic new production plan", 18 July 1938.	1	
PS-1436		Conference between Goering and OKW, 16 July 1938, discussing "relative positions of OKW, Four Year Plan, Plenipotentiary for Economy, Reich Ministry of Interior". Goering stated: "The Four Year Plan's function consists in preparing the German economy for total war within four years It is intended to appoint further Plenipotentiaries General for mineral oil, for gunpowder and explosives and possibly for power.	3	
EC-273		Letter of Goering to all Reich Ministers and the Prussian Finance Minister, 16 July 1938, announcing "the political situation, particularly the necessity of the Four Year Plan and the readiness for mobilization compels me, regardless of all objections, to appoint so-called General Plenipotentiaries for various fields of special importance."	8c	
EC-270		Letter of Keitel to State Secretary Koerner, 21 July 1938, suggesting General Becke, the Head of the Army Ordnance Office, be appointed Plenipotentiary General for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, if Goering considers it necessary to appoint such a Plenipotentiary."	11c	



Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Transcript
NI-8840		Secret letter of Krauch to State Secretary Koerner, 22 July 1938, refuting arguments brought forward by General Becke on 21 July 1938 and stressing that industry is willing to take upon itself greater responsibilities in the field of rearmament. Krauch also states that a special organization for the extension plans "already exists in a German industry ready for action and in my staff of the Reich Office for Economic Development. As the result of my verbal instructions the industry has already begun with the work".		21
NI-8707		Memorandum of Reich Office for Economic Development stressing complaints by industry concerning the lack of acceleration in the expansion of powder and explosive program and complaints by industry of insufficient fixity of purpose as to the developmental work for mobilization. New rush plan of 13 August 1938 worked out by military economic staff of the OKW, Army Ordnance Office of the OKH and Krauch, providing an additional increase of production capacity for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents.		19
NI-8873		Minutes of meeting of Patent Committee of I.G. Farben, 15 June 1938, showing relationship between I.G. and Krauch in his capacity as head of the Reich Office for Economic Development.		280
NI-8752		Protocol of I.G. Farben Mail discussion meeting No. 110, Berlin, 14 July 1938, showing Krauch informed I.G. Farben concerning government matters.		30
NI-8701		File of Reich Office for Economic Development containing report of Krauch of 19 August 1938 covering measures taken in execution of the new military economic production plan for the time from 1 to 15 August 1938, stating that Krauch, General Becke and General Thomas drew up a draft for Goering's order concerning the execution of the rush plan and for the cooperation of Krauch with OKH and OKW. This report also shows long conference with Dr. Ley, Head of the German Labor Front, and that Ley appointed Dr. Schmeer as liaison officer with Krauch.		35

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book	Transcript
NI-8917		File of the Reich Office for Economic Development containing "order for the execution of the new military economic production plan and the rush plan" which was "entirely entrusted to Dr. Krauch", 22 August 1938.		48
NI-7835		Secret memorandum of Department RO of the Military Economics and Armaments Staff of OKW on development of the production plans for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, 15 July 1940.		58
NI-4193		Affidavit of State Secretary Koerner stating that Krauch was present at the meeting of 14 October 1938 at the Reich Air Ministry, 4 March 1947.		621
EC-332		Top secret activity report by Krauch made to the General Council of the Four Year Plan, giving a detailed picture of German rearmament in the field of powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents, rubber, gasoline, oil, and light metals, 29 April 1939. Krauch gives a picture of the political situation and ends: "If action does not follow upon these thoughts with the greatest possible speed, all sacrifices of blood in the next war will not spare us the bitter end which once before we have brought upon ourselves owing to lack of foresight and fixed purpose."		63
NI-6783		Minutes of conference of the Technical Committee Bureau, 8 May 1939, with Struss reporting on a special meeting of Sparte I on 28 April 1939, in which Krauch decided that Dr. Schneider would act as his deputy in the direction of Sparte I since Krauch's activity in the Reich Office for Economic Development absorbed all his time.		10
NI-1237		Letter of General Plenipotentiary for construction planning Dr. Todt to Reich Labor Minister, 31 August 1939, giving special priority for workers for the "Krauch Plan".		11
NI-1526		Secret list of Krauch of plants of the "rush plan" to be continued in case of war, 5 September 1939.		112

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book Trans- cript
NI-8796		Report of Krauch as of 15 October 1939 on execution of new military economic production plan of 12 July 1938, showing that Krauch had given a complete report on the execution of the above plan in case of mobilization.	139
PS-1457		List of files of General Thomas, Head of Military Economics and Armament Office of OKW, covering period 1935-1942, undated.	145
NI-7570		Minutes of conference with General Thomas on 17 November 1939 re increase of steel and iron quotas for the Krauch Plan, 21 November 1939.	155
NI-7132		Decree of Goering re reorganization of the Reich Office for Economic Development and appointing Krauch acting Chief, 5 December 1939.	176
NI-820		Letter of Reich Ministry of Economics signed Kehrl to Krauch on delimitation of functions of the Reich Office for Economic Development and Plenipotentiary General for Special Tasks of Chemical Production, 30 March 1942.	178
NI-4952		Affidavit of Dr. Ehrmann, Deputy General Manager of Economic Group Chemical Industry, on "Office Krauch", its influence and that about 90% of its honorary officials were I.G. Farben men, 13 March 1947.	184
NI-2879		Letter from Lammers to Funk with file note by "Reichskabinettrat" von Stutterheim, on denunciations of the allegedly unlimited hegemony of I.G. Farben through the Reich Office for Economic Development, 17 August 1942.	20
NI-7474		File containing minutes of meetings of the General Council of the Four Year Plan between 20 December 1939 and 24 June 1941 with Krauch amongst others present.	188
NI-4714		File note from I.G. Farben files describing the code words "Krauch" and "Speer" for war important transports, 13 April 1940.	227

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7424
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Berlin 18 July 1938

(Stamp) Top Secret

Excerpts from:

Measures in accordance with order dated 15 July 1938 for the execution of the new military economic production plan.

Chemical Warfare agents and diglycol:

18. Commission given to I.G. for immediate expansion of diglycol production at Ludwigshafen to attain output of 500 tons per month, this being the provisional solution of the stockpiling problem. What little funds are required, and the necessary steel supplies, are to be provided immediately. Storage tanks to be installed when Army Ordnance Office has agreed on sites.
19. Commission given to I.G. for increase of production capacity of Diglycol plant at Wolfen to 500 tons per month by means of modification in accordance with the latest improvements developed in Ludwigshafen. Assistance by means of allocation of materials and rulings on priority at engineering works.
20. Commission given to I.G. to speed up construction of diglycol plant at Schkopau. Preliminary orders have already been given to I.G. by Army Ordnance Office.
21. Promotion of the construction of diglycol plants at Huelo and Trostberg. Commission for execution has already been given by Army Ordnance Office.
22. Assistance to I.G. by means of allocation of materials for the collection of sources of ethylene in the Ruhr district, now being carried out privately by I.G., in order to prepare the ground for an increased production of ethylene oxide, if required, in case of mobilization.
23. Commission given to Cyanamid company for the expansion of the Ammendorf plant to attain production capacity of 500 tons per month by means of construction of a further Oxol tower. Final arrangement for deliveries of ethylene oxide by Schkopau.
24. Commission given to I.G. for operation of Oxol apparatus at Ludwigshafen to produce 150 - 200 tons of Oxol per month, this being the provisional solution of the stockpiling problem. Storage tanks required, to be installed after discussion on sites with Army Ordnance Office.
25. Immediate commission to I.G. for commencement of experiments on large scale production of direct mustard gas. Construction of experimental apparatus at Ludwigshafen for production of ethylene from coking gases and (handwritten passage, (two words), illegible).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7424
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original cont'd)

Strongest possible support to direct-mustard gas experiments.
Commission given to I.G. for immediate erection of experimental
station and large scale production experimental plant at Schkopau
(instead of Huls as planned).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 August 1947

I, ARTHUR MACNAMARA, Civ.No.20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is
a true and correct translation of document No. NI-7424.

ARTHUR MACNAMARA, Civ.No.20191.

Business transacted at conference with Generalfeldmarschall Goering at Marinhall on 16 July 1938.
OKW without No. Berlin, 18 July 1938.

Rue I.C.
(Major Herch)
made by
Oberstleutnant
Hedler

W1 Rue.
I. Goering
vol. 17-2

GFM (Generalfeldmarschall) Goering formulated the requirements or guiding principles for further projects in the field of economic mobilization as follows:

- 1) Questions of Command and relative positions of OKW, Four Year Plan ("FYP"), Plenipotentiary General for Economy ("PGE"), Reich Ministry of the Interior ("RMI"):

a) The Wehrmacht's responsibility shall be limited to armed warfare only. Within these limits OKW shall issue orders and make claims. It is in the nature of war that the interests of the armed forces should take precedence and override all other consideration.

b) The Office of "PGE" is not an end in itself but has been created for the sole purpose of rendering war economically feasible. The Office of "PGE" is not subordinate to the OKW, but its work shall be subject to Army direction.

OKW will state its requirements; it will be up to "PGE" to meet these requirements to the very best of their ability, without questioning their relevance. Should he be unable to meet them he will inform the OKW which will seek the Fuehrer's decision when fundamental issues are involved (the Fuehrer wants to make as few decisions as possible).

The "PGE" will only start functioning on outbreak of war. "X-Fall" will be carried out without "PGE". In time of peace his activities are limited to working out the legal basis for a war economy; it is the task of the "FYP" to solve its practical problems.

c) The "FYP" function consists in preparing the German Economy for total war within 4 years. The Commissioner for the "FYP" has unrestricted powers which he can delegate if necessary to specially appointed Plenipotentiaries General (e.g. General von Hammerstein). It is intended to appoint further Plenipotentiaries General for Mineral Oils, for Gun Powder and Explosives, and possibly for Power.

OKW is responsible for requirements of the armed Forces.

In the event of "X-Fall" and during the War, "FYP" will be continued with special emphasis on projects essential to the War effort (production of Buna, Ore, Fuels, Explosives etc.)

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Work on less important projects, such as Main-Danube-Canal, will be discontinued. The co-ordination of the tasks of the "PC" and the "FYP" in war-time must be prepared.

d) The "RMI" is in charge of administration. Proposals with regard to the co-operation between "PC" and Administration at intermediate level ("Mittelinstanz": i.e. Regierungspräsident) to be submitted to the Fieldmarshal on 1 August.

2) Guiding principles for future tasks.

Mobilization preparations have to be speeded up.

a) Closest co-operation between the offices concerned necessary. Squabbles about individual responsibility will cease forthwith. When Germany's fate is at stake there is no room for departmental jealousy.

b) Present situation does not admit of basic changes of organization e.g. in armament factories.

c) Greatest possible emphasis to be laid on measures producing results almost immediately.

d) Apart from preparing the German mind for total war, the following tasks are to be given priority:

(page 2 of original)

The preparations for the mobilization of the entire population, further for the prevention of a decrease in production of certain, particularly important factories in case of mobilization.

3) Armaments Industry.

The question, whether it is at present expedient to carry out the division of agency between the Wehrmacht and the "PC", can be shelved for the time being, pending a future decision, since

- a) the "PC" has no experienced staff
- b) at the moment, the situation makes change impossible.

The Fieldmarshal demands that further squabbling over factories shall cease immediately. No more factories to be declared armament factories, but "PC" to permit Wehrmacht, without demur to continue to place orders for mobilization work with factories essential for the war effort. Members of the Wehrmacht to have access to factories essential to the war effort to carry out the necessary inspections in connection with these orders, in the same way as representatives of "PC" have access to armament factories.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

4. Mobilization of the entire population in war time.

a) National Registration Cards - Employment Records.

No decision was made on this point. Special report on the subject by "FG" and "RMT" at the beginning of August.

b) Emergency Service Decree- Compulsory Service Decree.

The Decree of the Four Year Plan relating to the mobilization of labor dated 22 June 1938 is considered as sufficient for the time of stress ("Spannungszeit") and X-Case. Publication of Emergency Service Decree and Compulsory Service Decree can be deferred for the time being.

c) To prevent a decrease in production in case of mobilization.

Special measures to be taken to prevent a decrease in production of particularly important factories, Gun Powder and Explosives factories, Air Force factories in case of mobilization.

If necessary, the Wehrmacht will, to start with, have to manage without the workers from these factories for the first few weeks of mobilization.

Measures have to be taken at once to expedite the replacement of workers called up from the essential war factories by the Wehrmacht in case of mobilization. In this connection

- 1) The Wehrmacht will send lists of the armament factories and their most important supplier firms to the Reich Institute, stating the number of additional labor required in case of mobilization.
- 2) "FG" will submit lists of factories essential to war effort and of firms to be closed down.
- 3) Both will submit lists of the plants which have to keep up their production in case of "X" ("X-Fall"), e.g. Supply-, Gun Powder - and Explosives Factories. (* Translator's Note: Assuming "beiden", Page 2 of original, article 4, paragraph c, subsection 3., to be a typing error for "beide". No other interpretation would seem to make sense.)

President Syrup is to submit pertinent proposals by 25 July. Preparations are to be made for the use of prisoners of war in agriculture.

d) Overall distribution (? "Uebergordnete Verteilung") of the entire population.

(page 3 of original)

The protest raised by "FG" against the decree of the (K/ L of 22 June was not discussed any further. The decree therefore

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

remains in force.

5) Program of the Four Year Plan.

The achievements of the Four Year Plan have so far been unsatisfactory in all respects from the point of view of the war effort, owing to lack of co-ordination.

Position in the gun-powder and explosives industries positively catastrophic owing to departmental rivalry.

Drastic acceleration of "FYF" necessary for the production of the following:

- | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| a) Gun-Powder and Explosives | b) Fuels | c) Aluminium |
| d) Buna | e) Supply of Ore. | |

II. Ruling on current questions.

1) a - c

d) All public building to stop completely with the exception of the most important buildings of "FYF" (Explosives and Gun-Powder).

2) Supply of additional manpower.

- a) The workers required for the construction of the West-wall and for the speeding up of the rearmament program must be made available under all circumstances. Export should not suffer, if possible, nor the buildings of the Four Year Plan for gun-powder and explosives or the Hermann Goering works. Building for the German Labor Front (Luegen) and of the Adolf Hitler Schools may be stopped completely.
- b) Requests for additional manpower to be met gradually. All requests by firms for additional manpower to be examined on the spot. (If a firm manufactures both machine-gun accessories and chandeliers, the manufacture of chandeliers must be discontinued first, before application is made for additional manpower).
- c) The guiding principle with reference to the provision of additional manpower is still, that priority should be given to measures which take effect immediately. Fortifications in the East to take second place.

3) Reichsbahn.

- a) The demand of the Wehrmacht that railroad traffic should be curtailed as far as extra trains are concerned has been approved by the Fieldmarshal. The Labor Front is expected to concentrate on strength rather than joy.
- b) Additional allocation to the railroad can not be made before 1 October 1938.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

4) Reich Defense Decree.

GFI approved the suggestion that the law should be brought in by OKW. Submission to be expedited.

III. For Action.

- 1) Submission of plans for the organization of "FG" at medium level.
"FG" to take responsibility; OKW, "FII" involved.
- 2) Wehrmacht Requirements of Gun Powder and Explosives from "FYP".
- 3) No more factories to be declared armament factories after 1 October 1938.
- 4) Measures to ensure adequate supply of labor for armament and other factories essential to war effort in case of mobilization.
- a) Lists of armament plants and supplier firms.

(page 4 of original)

- b) Proposals in concurrence with Reich Institute.
- c) Expedite forwarding of the decree OKW/L II on the allocation of personnel in war time.
- 5) Increase of the steel quota for the Wehrmacht. a) - c).
- 6) Provision of additional manpower required at the moment by means of investigation in factories.
- 7) Speedy submission of the Reich Defense Decree by L.
- 8) Proposal for organization of transportation in the light of war economy of medium and higher level.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 June 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document Nr. 1436-PS.

Leonard LAWRENCE
No. 20 138

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC -278
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES.

Ministerpresident
General Field Marshal Goering
Plenipotentiary for the Four
Year Plan

Transl. Note:
Handwritten Number 124

Berlin, 16 July 1938.

Transl. Note: Stamp.
Top.
Secret Reich Matter

St. M. Dev. 1008 Rs.

Transl. Note: Stamps: WStb ? I
21 July 1938
12 1
No. 2219/38

Wehrmacht - Supreme Command
21 July 1938
WStb.

(handwritten notes): KRAUCH
In Margin: 2 illocible initials
21 July

40 copies
3 rd copy

The political situation, particularly the necessity for speeding up the execution of the Four Year Plan and the readiness for mobilization compels me, regardless of all objections, to appoint so-called General Plenipotentiaries for various fields of special importance; thus, for example, I have already appointed Generalmajor von Henncken as General Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel control. The General Plenipotentiary act on my direct orders and therefore are covered by the fullpower I have been given by the Fuehrer. They are entitled to take any measures in special fields assigned to them and to provide all authorities and offices with the instructions necessary for this. These instructions are to be carried out immediately, for they are given on my orders. I therefore request all supreme Reich authorities to see that the General Plenipotentiaries not only meet with no resistance, but that every possible supports is given them.

The fields for which I will appoint General Plenipotentiaries, and the persons in charge of them will be announced in the near future. Objections to instructions, orders and measures of the General Plenipotentiaries are to be addressed to me. I emphasize, however, that these objections will not have any postponing effect whatsoever and that the instructions, orders and measures issued are to be put into operation immediately regardless of contrary opinions.

Only thus will it be possible to execute the orders of the Fuehrer. The General Plenipotentiaries are acting under my immediate orders, or under those of my permanent deputy, and they are therefore in their field not subject to any instructions from other authorities.

(Page 2 of original)

Any other functions beyond this order are not touched.

I request you to inform the subordinate offices about these instructions immediately.

Signed: GOERING.

Transl. Note:
Goerings seal

Certified:
Signature: KRUEGER
Admin. Secretary.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079 hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-278.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO No. 34079
U.S. CIVILIAN

END

II

9

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC # 279
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

The Chief
of OKW (Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht)
W Stb W Nr. 2270/38 g %

Transl. Note:
Handwritten Note: Berlin W 35 21 July 38
Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel: 21 81 91

(Please quote above ref Nr., Date and summary of contents
in your reply.)

Transl. Note: Draft:
Handwritten Note: Illegible Initial.

4 copies:
Copy No. 1 State Secretary Koernor
" " 2 Na A.
" " 3 W ?
" " 4 draft

To be handed
To State Secy Koernor
personally illegible Initial

File under: Top level organization.
Dispatched: 25 July 1938. Go.

Dear State Secretary,

I have just learned from Artillery General Becker
that the General Field Marshal is already supposed to have
proposed a specific person as General Plenipotentiary
for the production of powder, explosives and war-gases.

It do not have to be mentioned here where the
responsibility for the lack of powder and explosives. The
production of powder and explosives can be considered
as the most important task for the supply of the Wehr-
macht. Within the entire economy, this production is
the responsibility and is under the supervision of Ar-
tillery-General Becker.

I do not suppose that such a particularly important question, which concerns the Wehrmacht almost exclusively would be decided without providing an opportunity for me to give my opinion.

Should the General Field Marshal consider it necessary to appoint a General Plenipotentiary for powder, explosives and war-gases, I would suggest the appointment of Artillery-General Becker.

However, should the General Field Marshal have another person under consideration for the position in question, I request that I be given an opportunity for a personal talk with the General Field Marshal.

Heil Hitler.

Yours very truly

(Initial K - KRITEL)
2 July

Transl. Note:
Handwritten note:
Copy to OKH
(Wa A)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dorothea L. GALENSKI, ETO No. 34079 hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. EC - 279.

DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI
ETO NO. 34079
U.S.CIVILIAN.

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6640
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(IS.:) Dr. C. Krauch

(MS.:) Version as despatched

Berlin W 9,
Saarlandstr. 123, 22 July 1933

(Rubber Stamp:) TOP SECRET

Dear Under Secretary,

In connection with the points set out by General Becker in his letter of the 21 July, 1933, I would comment as follows:

Ad 1) Gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents can be considered practically the sole concern of the Wehrmacht only from the point of view of the consumer. From the point of view of the manufacturer, however, they represent an inextricable part of the productions of the chemical industry, which are strongly interwoven one with another, so far as processes are concerned.

Ad 2) Any decision regarding the utility of gunpowder, explosives etc. is of course entirely a matter for the Wehrmacht, as is also the processing of gunpowder and explosives to produce finished munitions, as well as their disposal and storing. The idea of allowing the testing and delivery conditions to be prescribed by the industry has never been contemplated, nor indeed of detaching from the province of the Army Ordnance Office (N.O....) anything belonging to the sphere of the testing and finishing of munitions. On the other hand, the development of the processing and creation of these materials is the concern of the industry.

Ad 3) Even although apparently a proportion of the preliminary products for the Mob. production of gunpowder, explosives etc. can find no direct utilization in peacetime conditions and therefore can only be supplied by standby plant, nevertheless the source of these products is, after all, in the normal productions of the chemical industry. The fertilizer nitrogen basis becomes at once, by its export decline in the case of mobilization, the backbone of the whole of the nitric acids and of ammonium nitrate. The latter again will be produced by the conversion of plant manufacturing, in peacetime, special kinds of fertilizers. This applies particularly to the whole of the ethylene chemistry, which is inextricably bound up through di-glycol for gunpowder and the chemical warfare agents with the entire industry of the coking plants and mineral oil syntheses. The more recent developments in plastics especially show possibilities of the greatest scope for ethylene chemistry also in peacetime economy. Only the closest coupling of peace economy production with products of military importance can ensure the highest utilization of military-economic energies, which result, however, is not to be achieved by the construction of standby plants which are detached from their parent industry

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-2240
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

and can never be put into production for peace time industry. These reasons especially make it essential to deal with the problem of chemical production as a whole in order to seek out ways of finding peace time utilization for those preliminary products for which at present none exists. Only a complete survey of the whole requirements of the chemical industry can make this possible.

The comparison made by General Becker with armament manufacture does not correspond with the conditions of chemical production. Armament manufacture can be compared with the manufacture of munitions, since both entail a purely mechanical process. The production and refinement of steel corresponds with the manufacture of chemical products. The Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) does not however claim the supervising of steel production and refining.

The Army Ordnance Office represents for munitions and implements, - its own peculiar sphere of work - the sound principle of having every possible ironworking industry in case of mobilization engaged in the manufacture of implements and ammunition.

I follow the same principle in the sphere of military-economy as applied to chemical industry. The interwoven processes of production that have to be used there, however, require a precise knowledge of the interrelation of chemical processes. The productions important for military purposes, especially gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, cannot without injury be torn from their connection, as Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) wishes.

The collaboration of forces within the chemical industry does not signify any breaking away from the Wehrmacht, but rather does it denote the application of the best available energies of Chemistry as a whole, not merely of the explosives section of the industry, to the realization of the target of requirements set by the military.

Ad 5) The former Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics has, at my request, as far back as the end of 1936, repeatedly directed the attention of the Wehrmacht to the urgent necessity of stockpiling. Already at that time, for example, I requested that considerable quantities of Toluene be stocked up for existing explosives factories. Measures taken to increase the production of Toluene had then for result that the producers could not dispose of their products to the explosives factories, as the latter had no orders for manufacture, and finally the increased production had again to be cancelled, because their warehouses were over-full, as arrangements had not been made at the right time to provide tanks for stockpiling. The same is true of Diglycol and Oxol (as preliminary product for mustard gas), where the few plants that existed were only put to work for stockpiling on my insistence in March/April 1937, or, indeed, were partly only then made capable of producing (Lamendorf, Wolfen).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-3840
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, con'd)

I also subsequently repeatedly pointed out, as advisory technical expert, the possibilities of technical and raw materials extension.

(page 3 of original)

Ad 6) The Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) has always evinced great interest in the possibilities of increase as emphasized by me.

The insufficient results actually obtained seem to me to be attributable to the lack of push on the part of the agencies hitherto concerned.

The fact is that the following manufacturing possibilities exist for gunpowder and explosives:

<u>Gunpowder</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Production possibility in tons per month</u>
Plants ready for production	5	5,700 by Autumn 1938
New constructions or extensions	9	6,400 by Autumn 1940
	17	12,100 against a requirement of 17,900 (Hindenburg-program)

Explosives

Plants ready for production	11	7,600 by Autumn 1938
New constructions or extensions	3	500 by middle of 1939
	14	8,100 against a requirement of 17,100 (Hindenburg-program)

I have laid down the Hindenburg program as a basis for comparison of the results reached, because in the major campaigns of 1918 the peak consumption in one month almost reached the actual quantities required under the program.

In my view, the Hindenburg program only represents the lowest limit of requirements, since in the World War neither flak nor bombs played anything like the role which they have today.

Furthermore, it is known to me that countries abroad, especially England and America, have been working intensively for the last two years on the extension of their chemical warfare agents basis.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8840
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

U.S.A. provided for a production of 100,000 tons p.a. in 1919 of chemical warfare agents, chiefly mustard gas. Against these figures, we have a production today of about 10,000 tons p.a., i.e. one-tenth.

In this time we have not approached during the last two years the measures necessary for utilizing for these purposes the available home possibilities in raw materials.

The countries abroad are mostly providing for requirements far in excess of the quantities in manufacture at the end of the war.

(page 4 of original)

With regard to the reproach that the Four Year Plan has postponed the construction of the plants for preliminary products, it is to be stated that, for example, the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics in the middle of 1937, urgently took up the construction of 4 Pentaerythrite plants, without the necessary means having been first placed at their disposal. Up to today, no "H.V." means have been made available for the erection of these Reich-owned plants. How far the granting of these funds by the Finance Ministry may possibly have been prevented from other quarters cannot be ascertained. The taking over of these preliminary-products factories by the Army Ordnance Office (H.V.A.) was effected, because the building firms had to be paid the sums advanced at long last and the H.V.A. placed at their disposal the necessary means.

Further with reference to the Plants producing chemical warfare agents mentioned, it is to be stated that the Thiodiglycol plant in Trostberg was not started, because there were no means made available and because, moreover, a process was about to be completed which would reduce the cost of the plant by about 25 millions and would also greatly simplify the working (Acetylene-Hydrogenation instead of the Acetaldehyde ethylene alcohol method hitherto employed).

This simplification of the process will at the same time effect a considerable saving in building time, which will almost cancel out the delay mentioned by General Becker.

Ad 7) The discussions which have recently been held with the responsible persons of the branches of the industry concerned in the extension have revealed that the method proposed by me will be particularly effective in achieving an acceleration of the production increase and that the delays that have occurred hitherto have been entirely due to red-tape and not by any means to the excessive demands made on these firms. The firms concerned are willingly prepared to assume the responsibility themselves for the quickest possible rush execution, in which of course they must be accorded the State assistance I have proposed.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-0240
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

I cannot therefore share the fear expressed by General Becker that my intervention might cause a delay in the extensions and new constructions already started by the Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.). On the contrary, my negotiations with the authoritative representatives of the industry up to date have confirmed that a similar acceleration can be effected in the building program initiated by the H.W.A. which will of course be continued. The industry has already undertaken to devote its best abilities to the carrying out of the task I should set them. The more strongly initiative is restricted by official interference, the more will the interest taken in it fade out. It will not do to doubt from the very beginning the enthusiasm of the honest men to be found in industry no less than elsewhere,

(page 5 of original)

doubts which commonly serve as justification for such interference.

Ad 8) As already stated, the production of gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents are chemical processes. They cannot therefore be treated as distinct from the rest of the chemical industry.

I should of course act in the closest cooperation with the H.W.A.

Ad 9) The training of the service personnel has of recent years, since the existence of the first stand-by plants, been undertaken by the firms themselves and they have always had to complain of lack of sympathy on the part of the military authorities for their technical and material demands.

As a matter of policy, stand-by plants which must be erected should, wherever possible, be linked with factories engaged on peacetime production whether already in existence or about to be built. The questions of supplying the necessary personnel and of constant preparedness in case of mobilization will then be much more easily and safely solved. It is precisely that ever growing shortage of suitable man-power which forces us to adopt such measures.

In principle, I should like to add in comment on the statements made by General Becker that in the National Socialist State the responsibility of the individual producer must be raised to the highest level. Neither the chemical industry nor the equally important gunpowder and explosives industry are undertakings which set up production installations to order, in accordance with Scheme F: they endeavour, on the contrary, from a sense of responsibility fulfil the tasks set to the best of their ability. If it is demanded that these works carry on production only under constant supervision and in accordance with detailed directions, almost the whole of the chemical industry, together with its supplier firms, must be placed under the same control.

This is bound to give rise to a constraint which has in fact been observed adversely to affect development in latter decades, particularly in the explosives industry. The new processes for the production

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8040
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

of explosives, as well as the solution of problems of raw materials in the gunpowder and explosives industry, spring almost exclusively from the resources of the rest of the chemical industry. The explosives and gunpowder industry must therefore not be hermetically sealed off, as has hitherto been done by the military authorities, but they must be incorporated in the framework of the chemical production of Germany, as a whole.

(page 6 of original)

The method hitherto used and which General Becker wishes to maintain has not led to its goal and can not be retained, because it takes away responsibility from the industry and cripples its initiative. The aim, on the contrary, must be to arouse initiative, to give scope to the industry for self-development and to encourage responsible and independent action.

It is the task of the military authorities to make their requirements as to quantity and quality; it is the task of the industry to fulfil these requirements in the shortest possible time by the processes of manufacture and by the utilization of all the technical possibilities. It is not the task of the industry to determine how many guns will be required by the Wehrmacht and how much gunpowder and explosives will be necessary for them, and it is just as little the task of the officers to prescribe in detail the processes of the method by which this purely chemical-technical aim is to be attained.

It is not necessary to create a special organization for the realization of the extension plans, as General Becker believes. This already exists in a German industry ready for action and in my staff in the Reich Office for Economic Extension.

As the result of my verbal instructions the industry has already begun with the work.

There results therefore a clear division of duties between the Army Ordnance Office and my province of work:

The military-economy for the chemical industry delivers to the Wehrmacht the products required, i.e. gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents and in the course of their production plans erects the necessary plants.

The Army Ordnance Office (H.A.) tests, controls and procures, as hitherto, but without concerning itself with the erection of manufacturing plant for chemical products. The whole question of the processing of ammunition, explosives and chemical warfare agents, as well as all questions concerning the manufacture and stockpiling of munitions is exclusively the task of the H.A.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6840
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

It should be considered whether, for the fulfillment of special tasks, the chief of the Army Ordnance Office should not be accorded special authority for the procurement of munitions and implements.

The clear division of tasks seems to me to offer more than anything else the guarantee for a fruitful collaboration with the Army Ordnance Office.

(page 7 of original)

The soldier will indicate to the technician what military requirements demand of the German economy and the technician will do his best by adaptation of the technical possibilities to achieve this aim.

In the extension plan approved by the General Field Marshal and ordered to be carried out, the aim is already prescribed. The best technical way for realization is only to be found in thorough collaboration with and confidence in the industry concerned.

The ideas of private enterprise feared by General Becker are bound to be eliminated by the fact that the necessary means are always available to prevent abuses. For this reason, I have selected my staff principally from the industry concerned and for eighteen months have trained their minds to these tasks in order to anchor in the industries concerned the principles of national-economy here represented.

The conversation between General Becker and myself showed that there was full record between us so far as the material aim was concerned. The measures instituted by me received his practical approval and it was arranged that a specially qualified officer of the Army Ordnance Office should be appointed as liaison officer.

Heil Hitler !
Yours faithfully,

signed C. KRAUCH

.....
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, Leonard LARSENCE, No. 20136, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6840.

Leonard LARSENCE
No. 20 136

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8797
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Ms. 3X 1 copy)
1 copy) Names illegible
1 copy to Ritter

Berlin, 8 August 1938

Reasons which up to the present have hindered the Industry from speeding up Production of the Gun-Powder and Explosives Plants.

The Industry complains of the absence of a clearly-defined Program for:

- a) Construction of new explosives and gun-powder plants for Mobilization requirements
- b) supply and Stockpiling

As a result of these observations, the Industry believes that the Army Ordnance Office (H.W.) does not possess in detail the necessary general picture of the possibilities of the German Chemical Industry and the raw materials situation.

Example: In spite of the fact that the Benzine Association (Benzolverband) has for years been indicating the possibilities of an increased supply of Toluene, the Army Ordnance Office has made no use of this. It is only recently that the Army Ordnance Office has shown an interest in the construction of a new Trinitrotoluene plant and requested the explosives factories to build up stocks of Toluene. (The new-military-economic production plan includes the construction of a new plant with double the capacity of any hitherto, in use, as well as the enlargement of 4 Trinitrotoluene plants.)

The Industry complains of the lack of acceleration of the expansion up to date and has the feeling that the Army Ordnance Office is not completely convinced of the necessity for it. Otherwise, it must have been possible for the Army Ordnance Office to have speeded up the urgent construction project as far as gun-powder and explosives were concerned, on its own authority, by exercising powers similar to those now required for and applied to the new Plan.

According to the present methods of the Army Ordnance Office, the erection of the plants proceeds in accordance with strictly defined regulations, which leave the Industry charged with the erection, very little freedom of action. For example, even when plants of similar form have already been erected several times in other places, tenders must be obtained from three contractors each time and an intricate process for the placing of the order observed.

(page 2 of original)

Basically, it is the trustee-relationship of which the Industry feels the lack. This applies as much to the construction of new plants as to the general setting of the target for the expansion and development as a whole. Only if the Industry is accorded that confidence - which its many years of service may be deemed to have earned for it - can it apply itself with all the means at its disposal to the attainment of the goal set without having constantly to be burdened at the last moment with sudden unforeseen tasks which can then naturally be carried out only with exceptional difficulty.

The Industry also suffers from a certain mistrust evinced by many authorities, which think that it, the Industry, is trying to increase the number of orders only for reasons of profit, instead of being grateful to the Industry for pointing out, in the fullness of its own experience of the subject, the deficiencies which exist and the means of making them good.

As far as the supply system is concerned, the fact that the orders placed are always relatively small and are divided up into correspondingly small periods is felt to be a serious defect. With a large-scale production program, it would be possible to provide the various sections of the Industry with orders running without interruption over a number of years, until the desired point in the supply program is reached.

A farther irksome interruption in the distribution of orders is caused for the Industry by the observance of the financial year, at the beginning of which orders come in batches, whereas during the last three months the production plants are often very little used.

The Industry complains of insufficient application to the purpose in hand as far as development in connection with the Mobilization Project is concerned.

Example: Hitherto the large-scale production of ammonium-nitrate for the Mobilization Program as a result of the conversion of fertilizer-salt plants (Duengesalzanlagen) has been possible only for one particular quality (68 G)

The Industry indicated these possibilities two years ago and produced samples. Even now, however, no decision has been given by the Army Ordnance Office, as to which sample should be used in the event of Mobilization.

(page 3 of original)

Furthermore, there is an absence of application to the purpose in hand as far as the question of the casting mixtures (Gussmischungen) is concerned), which application is of the greatest possible importance to the Mobilization Project.

(page 4 of original)

Stem: secret

Rush Plan dated 13 August 1938

Summary of Contents:

Introduction

Necessary Towers and Material Supplies
Fundamental Ideas underlying the Rush Plan

Detailed Descriptions (Survey outlines) Page

Comprehensive survey of the Rush Plan
for Gun-powder and Explosive 1

Graphic Survey of the Rush Plan
Total Production of Explosive and
Gun-Powder 2

Detailed Survey - Total Production of
Explosives 3

Detailed Survey- Preliminary Products for
Explosives 4

Detailed Survey - ^{Total/}Production of Gun-Powder
and Preliminary Products 5

Detailed Survey - Nitrogen for Gun-Powder
and Explosives, Highly concentrated acid
Requirements 6

Detailed Survey - Nitrogen for Gun-Powder and
Explosives, highly concentrated acid total
Requirements 7

Detailed Survey - Sulphur in the form of fuming
sulphuric acid for Gun-Powder and Explosives 8

Detailed Survey - Total Production of Chemical
warfare Agents 9

Summary: Steel requirements
Financial backing required

Non-ferrous metal requirements

Summary: Plant and building man-power
requirements.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT M. NI-8797
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

12 copies
11th copy

13 August 1938

Rush Plan of 13 August 1938

for the production of Gun-Powder, Explosives and
Chemical Warfare agents, including preliminary products.

1)

The present Rush Plan, as compared with the accelerated production plan of 30 June 1938, represents an additional increase in production capacities for gun-powder, explosives and their preliminary products.

In the opinion of the authorities concerned as well as of the industry for which the plan is drawn up, the maximum increase possible will be effected under the Rush Plan by the autumn of 1939.

The details of the Rush Plan have been adjusted and full agreement reached between

O K W (WStb) - (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces -
Military Economy Staff)

O K H (We A) - (High Command of the Army - Army Ordnance
Office Dept. A)

Dr. KAUCH

The present Rush Plan is from now on the common foundation for further procedure for all the authorities concerned,

By the end of 1939, the capacity will have been so far increased under the Rush Plan that the highest German production capacity achieved in the World War will, in effect, have been reached in all fields:

Gun-Powder approx. 13,250 tons per month, equalling the highest level of production reached by Germany in the World War: (13,000 tons per month)

Explosives approx. 13,600 tons per month " "
(without diluents " "
or fillers) (14,000 tons per month)

Chemical warfare agents approx. 1,900 tons per month " "
(3,000 tons per month)

(now, however, including approx. 55% ground contaminating gas - mustard gas, against approx. 14% in the World War.)

(page 5 of original cont'd)

The Implementation of the Rush Plan will only be possible if very special (war emergency) powers are granted to the authority responsible for its execution.

1)

Preceding plans are as follows: -

- a) Summary of Production Plan for gun-powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, including preliminary products of 10 June 1938.
- b) Summary of an accelerated Production Plan of 30 June 1938 for gun-powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents.
- c) Draft of a Rush Plan of 13 August 1938.

(page 6 of original)

Necessary Powers and Allocation of Material:

- 1) The orders placed by the construction firms (trustee firms) with the suppliers (especially in connection with apparatus and iron construction) must be given priority over all other orders (including export orders) 1).
- 2) Orders for the Rush Plan should be given a special code number or code word, the meaning of which must immediately be imparted to the ironproducts industry etc.
- 3) A special quota of Iron must be made available immediately by the withdrawal of quotas from other consumers:
The following are essential

for last quarter of 1938 105,000 tons (=35,000 tons per month)
for 1939 130,000 tons per quarter (=43,400 tons per month)
has/

The OKH (Army Ordnance Office Dept. A) at present available for the purpose of the increase in the production of gun-powder, explosives, and chemical warfare agents and preliminary products up to April 1939, 10,000 tons per month - 30,000 tons per quarter. On the assumption that this quota will be available for the financial year 1939/40 and ensuing years also, the following will still be required in addition:

For the last qtr. of 1938 75,000 tons (=25,000 tons per month)
For 1939 100,000 tons per year (=33,400 tons per month)

These quantities of steel must be placed at our disposal immediately according to plan.

- 4) Money must be provided on request as follows:

for last quarter of 1938 105 million RM (=35 million RM monthly)
for 1939 130 " " RM per quarter (=43,4 million RM monthly).

So far, 120 million RM per financial year, 30 million RM per quarter have regularly been at the disposal of the Armament Office of OKH for this purpose. On the assumption that this sum has been provided for the financial year 1939/40 and the ensuing years, the following will still be required in addition:

for the last quarter of 1938 75 million RM (=25 million RM per month)
for the year 1939, 100 million RM per quarter
(=33,4 million RM per month)

(page 6 of original cont'd)

- 5) Non-ferrous metal requirements have been calculated only for the Plan as a whole. They are comparatively small and their fulfillment will not present any difficulties.
 - 6) Man-power requirements for the construction work amount to approximately 18,000 men for 1938. In 1939, requirements will increase to a maximum of 23,000 men, to decrease, towards the end of 1939, to 14,500 men.
-
- 1) The Rush Plan involves only a small fraction of approximately 3% of the total output of German industry. Crude steel production in 1937 amounted to about 19.8 million tons - 13.8 million tons cast- and rolled steel products, or finished machinery and apparatus. These quantities, merely 13.8 million tons were therefore manufactured by German Industry in a year. The Rush Plan demands approx. 400,000 tons in a year, i.e. about 2.9% of 13.8 million tons.

(page 7 of original)

Fundamental Ideas underlying the Rush Plan:

- 1) The increase, wherever possible, of the output of firms already in existence by means of simple expansions which can be carried out at a relatively small cost. (Not merely to establish new works "in clover").
- 2) The acceleration by all possible means of the experiments still to be carried out in connection with technical development (Hexogen, Ethylene-diamine-dinitrate, D-Mustard, etc), the necessary preliminary to the construction of major plants. This would make possible the giving of priority to the production plants.
- 3) Gun-Powder - Acceleration of plant construction already under way, immediate construction of new gun-powder factories which will make possible the attainment of the maximum output of which the gun-powder industry is capable.

Explosives - Immediate enlargement of 4 existing Trinitrotoluene plants, immediate construction of further new Tri-plants, to render possible the full exploitation of raw material (Toluol) facilities. Maximum possible expansion of the Benzene-Toluene - distillation plants of the coke works. Construction of new Toluene-Synthesis plants. Preparation of the new Trinitrotoluene plants so that in case of emergency they also can manufacture Dinitrobenzene. Installation of apparatus for fuming-sulphuric-acid regeneration (Speich method) in existing and in projected new Trinitro-toluene plants to cover the fuming-sulphuric acid demands. Where possible fuming-sulphuric-acid regeneration in the Diglycol-Gun-Powder factories also.

Priority for the first major Hexogen plant (K or SH processes) in the form of the immediate commencement of the construction of the plant for the production of Hexamethylene Tetramine on the site of the Hexogen plant to be erected later.

Increase of the Dinitro-benzene output capacities of the chemical industry (as fillers).

Chemical Warfare agents - Immediate construction of the major, technical D-Mustard gas pilot plant and of the Technical college in Schkopau, instead of in Huels, as originally planned. This will make it possible to give priority to the major plants

- 4) The Industry must embark immediately upon the training of factory hands for the plants working under the Rush Plan, in order that they may be able immediately to operate the plants as they become ready for production.

Investigations are continually being carried out, in conjunction with the Industry, on the exploitation of all possibilities in the field of gun-powder and explosives as well as that of Ersatz-explosives. The question of the utilization of the possibilities of the chemical industry for the production of Ersatz chemical warfare agents is also being examined.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8797
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, Beryl BERTICK, Civ. No. D-427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8797.

.....
Beryl BERTICK
Civ. No. D-427 459

EXCERPTS FROM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8973
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Ludwigshafen/Rhine, 30 June 1938 Br/Hr.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Minutes

on the

35th meeting of the Patent Committee on Wednesday, 15 June 1938, at the Administration Building, 52 Unter den Linden, Berlin.

Present:

of the Vorstand	Director Dr. v. Knieriem, as chairman
for the works combine	Upper Rhine Director Dr. Holdermann
" " " "	Middle Rhine Dr. Boil
" " " "	Lower Rhine Director Dr. Rodies
" " " "	Central Germany Welfen/Farben Dr. O.H. Weber and Dr. Brauns
" " " "	" Welfen/Film Director Dr. Mediger
of the Patent Department, Ludwigshafen	Dr. Braun as secretary

Agenda.

1. Statistics 1937 Reporter: Dr. Boil
2. Coordination of Law in Austria " Dir. Dr. Rodies
3. Law on inventions made by members of plant personnel Reporter: Dr. Braun
4. Jurisdiction of the Reich Patent Office Reporter: Dr. Boil
5. Retainers in England Reporter: Dir. Dr. Holdermann
6. Miscellaneous:
 - a. Patent attorneys in Brazil Reporter: Dr. Boil
 - b. Payments in foreign exchange, for translations Reporter: Dr. Boil
 - c. Submission of I.G. Progress Reports etc., to the Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau (Reich Office for Economic Development) Reporter: Dir. Dr. Holdermann
 - d. Membership in the German Working Association for Legal Protection to Trade and Copyright, registered association (Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft f. gewerblichen Rechtsschutz u. Urheberrecht e.V.) Reporter: Dir. Dr. Holdermann
 - e. Non-Aryan patent attorneys in Austria and in Czechoslovakia Reporter: Dir. Dr. Holdermann.

(2nd page of document)
(page 21 of original)

c) Submission of I.G. Progress Reports to the Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau.

Holdermann reports that one is generally of the opinion that internal I.G. reports should not be passed on to this office and that there is also no reason why certain information on things which are becoming generally known and which I.G. procures for itself in a particularly quick and comprehensive way should be passed on to that office which, naturally, would make it available to our competition.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8973
CONTINUED

(2nd page of document cont'd)
(page 21 of original cont'd)

Heldermann is given the assignment to obtain more detailed information and, in conclusion, to discuss the matter with Vermittlungsstelle II and Director Dr. Krauch.

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.....
.....

(Signature) Braun

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 July 1947

I, HERTA C. KNUTH, AGO X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-8973.

HERTA C. KNUTH, AGO X 046355.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 11-5752
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Records of the daily
staff meeting, No. 110

Management Department
Ke/Zsch.

14 July 1938

Present: KUEGER
PASSARGE
HELPERT
SCHWARTZ
KERSTEN
DIHLMANN
JACOBSEN
BOEHME (temporarily)
PLATZER
MUELLER
SILCHER.

On the Agenda: 1) Plans for using floorspace in the
New Building.

KUEGER asks Herr GATTINEAU or Herr TERNER, PASSARGE, HELPERT, SCHWARTZ, KERSTEN, v. MEISTER, DIHLMANN, PLATZER and BARNERT to get together as soon as possible for a first preliminary discussion as to how rooms are going to be distributed. Monday, 18 July, 1430 hrs. is fixed. BOEHME will forward groundplans of rooms to the gentlemen in question in time.

2) Africa Report/LANDMANN.

KUEGER has got a very favourable impression from a verbal report received yesterday from Herr LANDMANN (Bureau of K.A.) about his African Tour. He undertakes to speak to Herr Generalkonsul KALL about the suggestions which have before to be harmonized with GATTINEAU's ideas.

3) Konferenz of the D.G. Pressburg.

KERSTEN reports on the Vienna and Budapest negotiations as follows:

We have succeeded in signing an agreement between D.G. Pressburg, D.G. Troisdorf and I.G. on the abandoning of its Austrian interests by D.G. Pressburg, which provides for the sale of D.G. Vienna and Deutsch-Watzen, including their

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5752
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of original).

sub-participation, amongst which there are shareholdings in the explosive factories in Hungary and Roumania, to DaG Treisdorf and the I.G. All difficulties concerning the valuation of these participations have been overcome. The purchase price is paid in 25 annual instalments of 226.700.-- each. It will be charged to the account of the dividend due to DaG Treisdorf from DaG Pressburg, which makes it possible to avoid transfer difficulties. Authorization by the German and Czech authorities will be applied for.

In addition to that the acquisition of a 26 share in DaG Pressburg has been discussed with the Pester Ungarische Commercialbank. With permission of the Nationalbank this bank has accorded to Generaldirektor DEUTSCH (Hungary) a 30 day's option on condition that the I.G. agrees to the sale. Terms of payment provide for a purchase price of £ 16/10/0 per share, a first instalment of £ 6/18/- and four annual instalments of £ 2/8- each, as well as for a 3 1/2 % interest. In case the option cannot be used, e.g. because I.G. withhold their consent, the Pester Ungarische Commercialbank will offer the shares first of all to the I.G. before selling them to anybody else.

Preparation of the agenda for the K.A.-meeting in 15 July 1938.

1) Foreign currency and export situation.

FRANK-FAHLE will report on this subject.

2) International Nitrogen-Negotiations.

3) Internal Export Promotion.

KREUZER asks that FRANK-FAHLE should speak to Herr von SCHMITZLER, that this point be taken from the Agenda, because Herron KAPP, HAEPLIGER, KUELLER and HIGER will not be present at the meeting on 15 July. Director DEUTSCHER should likewise be informed accordingly.

(Page 3 of original)

4) Industrias Reunidas F. KATANAZZO, Sao Paulo.

5) La Celulosa Argentina, S.A., Juan ORTIZ.

Herr WEBER-ANDREAS will report on this subject.

6) Turkov.

Dr. FRANK-FAHLE will report on this point.

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(Page 3 of original, cont'd)

7) Reorganization of Sales-firms in British-India.

Report by Herr MEIER-ANDERAS.

8) Japan and Mandschukuo/Political Situation as regards Trade.

Report by Herr Kommerzienrat MAIBEL.

Moreover the following points are proposed:

Von ILGNER: "Appointment of the I.G. Liaison Men in China."

To replace von MEIER GADOW as acting I.G. Liaison-man: v. SCHUBERT.

Von FISCHER: "Report on the Ostmark".

KRUEGER asks to postpone a further point proposed by ILGNER "I.G.-Liaison man in Africa", till ILGNER is present.

B.I. Management Department.

1) Jubilee telegrams for the KALLIE and LEVERKUSEN celebrations.

KRUEGER agrees to the sending of telegrams of congratulation. For the rest it has to be found out by inside inquiries, who has been invited to the celebrations and who will take part in them. The Management Department must be notified accordingly.

2) Olympic Games 1940 Tokio.

Ø

3) Kryha-machines for I.G. Liaison-men in Tokio and Shanghai.

KRUEGER agrees to the purchase of two Kryha-machines for Tokio and Shanghai.

(Page 4 of original)

II. Legal Department.

1) Distribution List for circulars of a special kind. Ø

2) Jewish firms.

SILCHER reports about a conversation with Herr Dr. KRAUCH. Dr. KRAUCH has informed him that he has been told by competent gentlemen in the Reich Ministry of Economics,

(Page 4 of original, cont'd)

that the implementation decree III for the Reich citizenship Law will not apply to the I.G.; it is well known, that things are in good order in the I.G.

III. Bureau of K.A.

Notification of the Departments on gentlemen to be trained.

Before anybody is given information or training in a Department of I.G. Berlin NW 7, the Department Chiefs or the persons, who instruct the visitors, must receive directives, in what form and in what fields that instruction should be given. In particular it is necessary to state nationality, background and the kind of employment intended for the future.

IV. Central Financial Administration.

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V. Export Promotion Department.

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VI. Political Economy Department.

ø

VII. Economics Department.

On the Agenda: PLATZER reports on the conference with the Reichsbank economists which took place on Herr Direktor WALDECKER's invitation, where FRANK-FAHL first reported on the "Kieler Woche" and afterwards opinions on the currency question and possibilities of stabilising market conditions were compared and harmonized.

On the Agenda: Herr von HARBOU a short time ago reverted to his former dispute with the VOMI concerning the agricultural situation. KUEGER orders VOMI to revise their attitude and asks for a report.

VIII. Information Centre.

On the Agenda: PASSARGE asks for an article by LA DUEZ about his Africa Tour for the works newspaper.

(Page 5 of original)

IX. Administrative Departments.

On the Agenda: Complaints from offices making calls about failure of our telephone switchboard are on the increase. BOEHKE will examine the installation together with an expert from SIEMENS, possibly SIEMENS might instal an expert in our switchboard for four weeks. PASSARGE suggests temporarily to exchange four ladies of our telephone switchboard for four ladies from Frankfurt.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5752
CONTINUED

13 June 1947

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Robert HOFFMANN, Civ. No. 1876, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-5752.

ROBERT HOFFMANN
Civ. No. 1876.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. KI-579
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 152 of original)

6 Copies
4th Copy

Berlin, 5 October 1936

Top Secret

A Report on the progress of work in the period from 15 September
to 1 October 1936
the sub-sections of the military economic new production plan

The following special reports on the sub-sections give a general impression of the position. In those cases where particularly characteristic processes are of interest details have been given, as these are really noteworthy for an assessment of the situation as a whole.

For subsequent reports a new method of presentation is under composition, in accordance with which the building periods can be more clearly judged in relation to the expansion demanded and the operations actually achieved.

In the sections with a particularly high demand for special machinery (mineral oil and power) extensive inquiries into the production capacity of the supplier firms, and in some cases into their completion and extension, are in progress. In many cases bottle-necks could be overcome by the introduction of multiple shift methods, and here the main problem is that of obtaining experts.

Enclosures:

- A.) Sub-section: Mineral oil
- B.) " " : Rubber
- C.) " " : Light metal
- D.) " " : Gunpowder and explosives; chemical warfare agents and preliminary products.
- E.) " " : Power supplies.
- F.) " " : Questions of allocation of labor.

Distribution:

- 1st Copy: Staatssekretär Keerner
- 2nd Copy: Staatssekretär Neumann
- 3rd Copy: Dr. Krauch
- 4th Copy: Dr. Ritter
- 5th Copy: F
- 6th Copy: to department.

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A. Sub-section for mineral oil.

Position of the work as at 1 October 1938.

a.) General considerations and questions of method.

In order to be able to begin a steel distribution to the plants in accordance with the new military economy plan taking effect on 1 April 1939, it was intended to put into effect by about 1 October 1938 the plan for the construction of plants capable of producing a total of 2 million tons of steel.

We have succeeded in deciding on the technical methods for some of the building projects to be carried out for the high pressure hydrogenation process, as from the technical point of view no obscurities exist with regard to this process. The Hydrierwerk Oesterreich project is an exception to this. In this case it had not previously been possible to estimate to what degree the Ruette Lins of the Hermann-Goering Works will be ready to provide the Hydrierwerk Oesterreich with coal gas at a fixed date for the purposes of hydrogen production.

The extension of the Hulsheim plant for the requirements of the Fett-I.G. pressure extraction process will also probably have to remain in the Immediate Program (Sofortprogramm) as according to factory instructions all technical methods must be decided on at latest by 1 April 1939 by reason of the major experiments now in progress.

The discussions on the building projects in which the Fischer Synthetic method is used, were for several reasons not concluded until 1 October. Of the four plants envisaged for the first stage of the extensions, the Hoesch-Benzin GmbH. and the Braunkohle-Benzin A.-G. have announced that they cannot undertake the extension before sufficient technical experience has been gained in the existent plants. As the Schaffgotzsch-Benzin GmbH. and Intershall A.-G. (Insterkendorf) have refused the immediate extension of their Fischer plants for the same

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reasons, neither of these projects could be included in the "Immediate Program". Only the Ruhrbenzin A.-G. and the Chemische Werke Essener Steinkohle A.-G. have declared themselves willing to expand, but this could not yet be put into effect, since certain questions, above all that of the safeguarding of coal supplies, have not yet been satisfactorily cleared up.

The production of German mineral oil can be included in the first stage of expansion. This is based on the assumption that the current discussions in the Economic Group for the Liquid Fuel Industry on the proportionate participation of the German Mineral Oil Processing Industry in the processing of mineral oil will be concluded. The start of construction will not

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be endangered by a slight delay in these discussions, particularly as the relatively low expenditure of technical apparatus makes it possible to produce the necessary output capacity of 100,000 tons while still in the first stage of production.

Financial Regulations:

It can be said in principle that all the building projects for the first stage of expansion were delayed by the obscurities existing in financing thus preventing the preparatory work for the carrying out of the building. The firms have frequently informed the offices concerned that no delay in this respect can be tolerated and the orders for the projects must be given immediately. As no final decision could up to now be reached, however, delays of about eight weeks have already occurred in single instances, e.g., Hydrierwerk Poolitz. The question of finance for the Hosseling and Nordstern projects was of similar urgency; there it is a question of converting the buildings at present under construction by extending them and of undertaking immediately during the building alterations in the arrangements previously envisaged.

The total demand of the "Immediate Program" should be finally settled in a thorough discussion between the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reich Ministry of Finance, so that on the basis of a knowledge of the total demand the individual firms

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can be given a guarantee of the willingness of the Reich Ministry of Finance to finance their projects. Apart from this, the firms should obtain a definite assurance of economic guarantees from the Reich Ministry of Economics.

c.) Technical practicability.

The investigation into the practicability of the plan in a technical respect has revealed that by the time the plants named are completed, which according to schedule is by about the middle of 1941, high pressure apparatus, hydrogen compressors and all other technical installations of the industry can be put in readiness, with the exception of the major driving motors for the hydrogen compressors and the high pressure armatures. In both these departments the necessary release of workshop equipment in the major electrical firms or the supply in good time of machine tools must be effected with the help of special measures. In general it is essential that the orders for single hydrogenation works be put in a special priority class, thus preventing their being snatched by other firms with greater

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Berlin, 5 October 1938

Top Secret!

C. Sub-section for light metals.

Position of the work as at 1 October 1938.

a.) Building projects.

Seen as a whole, the new construction and extensions for the production capacity are progressing satisfactorily.

In single instances delays in individual deliveries have given rise to constantly recurring difficulties, mostly caused by the fact that the LKXP numbers precede the LKEX numbers. Here it is mostly a question of minor quantities of material, often only a few tons. In exceptional cases, which are particularly difficult ones, and then only when other solutions have been tried and have failed, an LP number will be made available with the agreement of the Wehrmacht.

In the past difficulties over cement could be set aside. Whether the building schedule is adhered to or not depends upon the further safeguarding of cement supplies before the start of the frost season. A way has been found to solve the difficulty arising from the unpunctual delivery of the standard transformers for the aluminum works Bitterfeld by SSN; this method permits of the introduction of aluminum-electrolysis without standard transformers and allows of a subsequent expansion.

An attempt will be made to bridge a time-lag in the delivery of gas pressure switches of the Allgemeine Electricitats Gesellschaft.

b.) Methods for the replacement of aluminum by magnesium.

After the favorable outcome of the malleability and processing experiments on magnesium alloy for fuses, the task of testing is now in progress. With reference to the introduction of magnesium into industry, the vehicle industry has been advised to erect foundries attached to their factories.

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It is thought that it might be possible to accelerate the introduction of magnesium by regulating and prohibiting its use.

c.) So far as can be judged from the present situation, the dates laid down by the new military economic production plan will be adhered to with a fair degree of certainty, so that the production plan will be fulfilled according to the size of the order. The basic condition is permanent control of the fixed dates and immediate intervention in every case of delay. This involves an enormous amount of work and many difficulties. The placing in readiness of power for the aluminum works is a basic condition (cf. Power).

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Berlin, 5 October 1939

Top Secret.

D. Sub-section for Gunpowder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents,
and Preliminary Products.

a.) General:

Today's discussion with all those concerned in the Building has revealed that the work for all the planned building projects has started according to plan.

The measures taken for the furtherance of the building project and for the elimination of difficulties have begun to produce results. It is to be hoped that the difficulties still in existence at the moment can be removed before long.

In order that the individual local building foremen should be able to intervene immediately, I have supplied them with passes.

After the recent strain in the sphere of transport, a noticeable relief has become apparent.

At the moment difficulties are being encountered in the supply of cement for the period 11 - 20 October. These, however, must be eliminated, whatever happens, for as much as possible of the construction work must be finished before the onset of the frost season. To ensure the supply, a special letter is being sent to General Inspector Dr. Todt with a request to make some increase in the cement quota for the Wehrmacht in favor of the Rush Plan (Schnellplan).

b.) Gunpowder:

The preliminary decisions for the construction have been made. The Army Ordnance Office is looking for a site for the remaining two projects.

c.) Explosives:

Discussions were held with the High Command of the Navy on the construction of

1. a plant capable of producing 200 tons of hexanitrodiphenylamine
2. A filling station for 1,000 tons of underwater explosive, consisting of tri and hexanitrodiphenylamine, with an addition of aluminum.

A wooded tract at Allendorf (Project Barbara) was selected as a site.

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Negotiations are in progress; steam, power and water supplies are to be arranged in conjunction with the trinitrotoluene plant.

The question of obtaining toluene was thoroughly investigated in conjunction with the Stb and Wfb, so that the real planning is complete in this case also. It will be submitted in the next few days.

With regard to the storage of large quantities of toluene (envisaged requirements for the year), the discussions with the parties interested will be continued.

d.) Chemical Warfare Agents and Preliminary Products.

Both projects - diglycol expansion in Melfen and Ludwigshafen - have been punctually completed.

The direct mustard gas experiments have been initiated.

The ethylene plant at Sodingen is under construction.

Work on the other plants is proceeding according to schedule.

The aluminum chloride and Isentin plant at Munsdorf will be run by the I.G. in conjunction with the Army Ordnance Office. Construction should be undertaken as quickly as possible.

e.) Nitrogen:

The additional acid (highly concentrated) reserve plant envisaged in the Rush Plan was located in Bavaria in a discussion with the Stb. In connection with this plant the project for a primary nitrogen plant for Bavaria was once more discussed.

A plan is in preparation by which methanol, formaldehyde and also in certain circumstances ammonium nitrate, can be produced in connection with the primary nitrogen plant.

f.) Smoke-producing acid and smoke-producing agents, decontaminating agents:

An elucidation of the requirements question has been initiated. Preliminary instructions were issued by the Army Ordnance Office for two smoke-producing acid plants.

g.) Cartridges for Signal pistol flares:

In collaboration with the Stb the position of the production potential was ascertained, whereby it was revealed that in the case of the most important equipment, namely flare cartridges, signal cartridges and whistle

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. II-5791
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cartridges, the requirements are covered to the extent of only 50 or 60 %.

As yet, no elucidation of the position with regard to naval and Luftwaffe requirements has been arrived at.

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(page 194 of original)

Secret!

1 - 15 August, 1938

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Dr. C. Krauch

Berlin, 19 August 1938

Report on the measures instigated for the implementation of the military economic now production plan for the period 1 August-15 August 1938.

A draft of an order for the implementation of the Rush Plan and for the cooperation of the offices concerned of the High Command of the Army (Army Ordnance Office) and OKW (IStb) was jointly agreed upon with General Becker and General Thomas.

The Rush Plan for gunpowder, explosives, chemical warfare agents and preliminary products was coordinated among the offices concerned and full agreement was reached through the complete acceptance of my proposals. It will be handed over by us jointly to the Generalfeldmarschall on 22 August.

The construction staff has started its work. It consists up to now of Dipl.-Ing. Schoen (previously leading Oberingenieur of the Schelven hydrogenation works) and Dr. Jhl (previously Betriebsleiter of the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke in Piestowitz) and also Herr F. Baasch for questions concerning the employment of labor.

A new, simplified system of allocating iron quotas ^{was} worked out with the Raw Materials Department of the Reich Economy Office. This system is founded on mutual confidence between the builders and ourselves. An individual stamp for each order is not required, but only brief lists of the requirements, grouped according to type.

Collaboration with Herr Praesident Syrup for the release and procuring of workers is already working satisfactorily. All the works in the new plan are exempt from having their workers taken for work in the West. In addition to this the Reich Institute for Unemployment Insurance and the Provision of Employment gave orders to the subordinate departments, according to which workers could be demanded for these constructional projects. Unfortunately, owing to the somewhat lengthy methods of the Reich Institute, the orders do not yet seem to have penetrated to the lowest level departments, so that in dozens of individual cases direct instructions from here will be necessary.

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Questions regarding rates of pay, accommodation and settlement will be dealt with in a discussion with Herr Min. Dir. Dr. Mansfeld of the Commercial Group for the Employment of Labor. It was agreed that all these questions be dealt with jointly by the Mansfeld administrative office and ourselves. A fundamental agreement on the problems of working conditions was aimed at.

On the subject of collaboration with the German Labor Front a discussion lasting several hours took place with Dr. Ley. The latter declared that he, as well as the German Labor Front, were ready to assist in the implementation of the new Plan. Dr. Ley commissioned Herr Staatsrat Schnoor or his deputy, Herr Klapper, as liaison man between the German Labor Front and myself. Opinions on the nature of the collaboration were likewise found to agree. At our suggestion, certain changes which may appear restrictive were made in the German Labor Front.

After a number of consultations with the head office of the Reichskraftwagenbetriebsverbandes, the difficulties which arise because motor trucks are taken away from individual building sites on orders from the higher offices of the Wehrmacht and the Party were removed. In the meantime all trucks needed for the building projects of the "Immediate Program" on the building sites are at the disposal of the building firms.

The accelerated execution of the orders received from the employers (Bauherrn) was achieved through Herr Staatssekretär Kocner's letter of 4 August, which in part constituted a blank form sent direct to the building employers, for their use or redirected by us to the supplier firms, if this is desired by the building employers in urgent cases. This method has previously proved very satisfactory.

According to the latest information from the building employers the difficulties in the supply of cement have been almost entirely eliminated, after a discussion had taken place between the Reich Ministry of Economics, the cement sales combines and the Reich Office for Economic Development on 11 August in the Reich Ministry of Economics, in accordance with which the Sales Combines will be given precise information as to the cement requirements and so will be better able to make arrangements and to apportion the requirements.

(page 196 of original)

In the discussions and negotiations with the building employers and the supplying firms, the mutual confidence, the responsibility, and at the same time greater independence of the industry will continue to be stressed as much as possible.

The overburdening of the employee apparatus of the firms by the lists, tables and other data of the most varied nature required by us will shortly be reduced to the minimum essential. The firms have previously been far too much occupied with making all kinds of returns, which simply remain in the record files.

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Special reports on the sub-sections.

Mineral oil:

1.) German mineral oil. In accordance with the alteration of the present state of affairs already envisaged in the report of 15 July to 1 August, a normal output of 335,000 tons of German mineral oil per year has now been included in the planning. When asked, Professor Bantz gave the information that the inquiries on the sub-section for the mineral oil industry have not yet been concluded. The question of the supply of lubricating oil on the basis of the new plan and the cooperation of the Economic Group in the extension of mineral oil processing was discussed with the Economic Group for the Liquid Fuel Industry.

2.) Refinement of Foreign mineral oil. The Shell Co. has demanded a full utilization of their capacity before giving permission for new refinement plants (Ebene project). The DAGF has promised to express an opinion as soon as possible on the project for Ebene expansion, together with the hydrogenation plant. Dr. Fischer, chief of the Economic Group for the Liquid Fuel Industry, has been commissioned to lead the way to an understanding between DAGF and Shell on this matter.

3.) Fischer Synthesis plants. The upshot of a discussion on 17 August with a representative of Hoersch-Bonzin was that the Fischer plants have so far failed to express an opinion in answer to our enquiry concerning the possibility of further expansion, as in their view the memorandum of the Rühr Mines on the coal problems embraced everything. The firms were urgently reminded to answer the questions set to them on 20 July.

Hintershell A.G. have stated that they do not intend to base the expansion of 75,000 tons per year on the Fischer process,

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but on the hydrogenation process. They demand assistance for the procurement of 35,000 tons of tar per year. As this quantity is not available, Hintershell A.G. were requested to test again the possibilities of a direct coal hydrogenation.

Concerning the Hamburg Gasworks, the Hamburg senate has given information on the company envisaged for the financing. The answers to various questions, such as an option on the land and agreement of the air raid precaution authorities, are still outstanding.

4.) High pressure hydrogenation plants. Gelsenberg has declared an expansion to about 80,000 tons per year as feasible.

Schölvén declares an expansion to 50,000 tons per year technically feasible and would be prepared to set up a further plant producing 200,000 tons per year.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. RI-5793
CONTINUED

(page 197 of original cont'd)

ASW-Essenhein states that investigations into technical and industrial questions have still to be carried out in conjunction with IG.

Rheinbenzin considers the expansion doubtful on the grounds of conservation of their coal stocks, but will investigate the project thoroughly.

Combine (Gemeinschaft) Lausitz: The propositions applicable to Lausitz will be investigated. Contact will be made immediately with Bubiag (Braunkohle u. Brikett A.G.).

5.) Silesian pit-coal section. On 15 August the sub-section for the pit-coal mining, Gleiwitz, stated their attitude, expressing themselves opposed in every respect to the further overburdening of Silesian pit-coal mining. An answer will be prepared and the matter investigated.

6.) Low temperature distillation of pit-coal, on the Ruhr. An answer was received on 13 August from the Ruhr district group, which, however, contained only a counter proposal for the mineral oil plan. An opinion on the problem of grades has still to be given. The comparisons made in the opinion between the Fischer and hydrogenation processes will be examined, and misunderstandings cleared up.

A memorandum on the low temperature distillation of pit-coal was sent in by Dr. Müller-Krupp on 17 August.

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7.) The high pressure cylinder plan was further tested as to its practicability. The number of parts to be produced by forging and by the alternative method "(winding)" was determined. The further steps arising from this were introduced: - extension of the DMH plant, determining of the supplier firms for forged and "wound" apparatus, for covers and flanges etc.

8.) The hydrogenation works at Gelsenberg and Scholven, recognized by the Wehrmacht as urgent, were supported by Herr Staatssekretär Keerner's special certificates of urgency, because the promised support from the Wehrmacht was not able to be put into effect owing to contrary regulations. The certificates of urgency were also used for other important building projects, e.g. plants for the low temperature distillation of bituminous coal.

9.) The erection of a workshop for the fulfilment of the high armature requirements during the extension period of the new plan was further promoted.

10.) The working out of a schedule for the erection of the works and the inquiry into the quotas of materials previously envisaged for the implementation of the new plan is in progress. This includes all plants for low temperature distillation and power stations not owned by the firm.

Bure:

Production: Difficulties in the delivery of materials and the employment of workers were removed.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. III-8791
CONTINUED

(page 198 of original cont'd)

Suitable full powers were given to the industry carrying out production, to enable it to obtain the punctual delivery of the equipment ordered.

A uniform price for Buna was fixed for the future to facilitate the introduction of Buna for civilian requirements and its processing.

Processing: The production program for Buna and the possibility of using Buna, now that practical experience has reached its present stage, for all other rubber articles apart from tires, was discussed with the chairmen of the branch groups comprised in the sub-section for the rubber industry.

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A program for Buna processing will be presented by the sub-section (Fachgruppe) by 15 September 1938.

Difficulties concerning materials (cement) met with in the erection of processing plants it was found could be removed, but the question of labor still presents difficulties. The motor vehicle tire factories' capacity to use Buna was tested by inspection and the firms were issued with authorization which would enable them to obtain punctual delivery of production installations from suppliers and subsidiary suppliers.

The switch over from natural rubber production to Buna production was decided on with the administrative offices concerned, and with the tire industry, and it was generally agreed that the first two sizes for motor vehicle tires should be 4,00 - 19 and 4,50 - 16 as from 1 September 1938.

The Buna processing industry (motor vehicle tire manufacturers) was ordered to submit immediately a program of adaptation for the processing industry in line with the new production plan for Buna.

Light metals:

The following difficulties have cropped up in connection with the expansion, which is otherwise running smoothly: The Lucnen Power station has lost personnel through the call-up, and in the Lucnen Power station of the Steinkohlen-Elektro-AG difficulties have arisen in the iron supply which will probably delay completion. A drop in production will not, however, result from this, as an attempt will be made to obtain power from other sources during the tiding-over period.

Lists of substitutes were discussed with the Wehrmacht. The experiments on the substitution of aluminum by magnesium were accelerated. Experiments on fuses have been initiated by the Wehrmacht.

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Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Preliminary Products.

From now on a discussion will be held weekly with the building employers, in which all undecided problems and difficulties will be discussed. (Time: Tuesday at 9 o'clock at my place, later at the various building sites each in turn.)

The following points have been clearly laid down in discussions with the building employers DAG, Deutsche Sprengstoff Chemie, Wessing and I.G. as a basis for the Rush Plan to be submitted to Generalfeldmarschall Goering on Monday, 22 August 1933.

- a) Site, capacity and completion date for the most urgent building project and extensions.
- b) Iron requirements for all the building projects. The building employers are already provided with check numbers and allocations of requirements up to 31 December 1933, and are in consequence beginning on their orders immediately.
- c) In the case of large orders with longer delivery periods the completion dates were pushed forward either by changes in the production schedule of the supplier firms or the cancellation of the orders and their re-allocation to firms not so fully booked.

Position of the individual building projects:

DAG reports:

Kruemmel extension: Planning work completed. The trees have been cut down, work on the foundations is in progress, roadways have for the most part been completed. Water, steam and power supply systems have for the most part been completed. All apparatus has been ordered.

Clausthal extension: Position the same as at Kruemmel, except that work on the supply systems is not so far advanced.

Hess. Lichtenau extension: The situation is the same as at Clausthal. The buildings for the presses are ready and the setting up of the presses has begun. The filling shops (Laboriergebäude) are under construction.

Duenenberg extension: Planning work completed. Sinking of foundations is in progress. Connections for steam, water and current are for the most part laid. Apparatus has been ordered.

Wolfratshausen new building: Surveying work is almost concluded. The laying of tracks has begun and equipment for the most part ordered. Tenders for the part to be built for the Deutsche Sprengstoff Chemie have been dealt with. Machines and apparatus have been ordered.

Allendorf new building: Terrain surveying is in progress, as also planning work. Apparatus has been ordered.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8791
CONTINUED

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Hohensaaten building project: A large part of the building work has been done. Part of the machinery has been assembled. The rail siding is ready, as well as the mines for steam and power.

Malchow building project: Some construction is in progress, as well as work on the roads. Fencing in is completed. A start has been made on the rail siding. The equipment is all ordered and partly ready.

Eberhausen new building: Although the order for the building work (Rush Plan) has not yet been given, the preparation of the rail siding, the building of the surrounding fence and roadways has already taken place, as well as the planting of trees and reforestation for camouflage purposes. About 30% of the buildings for the nitrocellulose section were built at an earlier date.

D.G. and DSC state:

Muchldorf building project: This is still in the first stages. Planning work is complete. Orders have been given for the construction of the rail connections and the pipe lines. About 90% of the equipment has been ordered. The negotiations with the building contractors have already resulted for the most part in the allocation of the orders.

Waser states:

Elsnig extension: The apparatus has been ordered. A start has been made on the foundations for the rail connections. The clearing of trees and sinking of foundations for the dinitrotoluene, trinitrotoluene and scrubbing plants are finished. The laying of concrete will be started. The surrounding fence is completely finished, and 30 % of the roads are also finished.

I.G. states:

The Ludwigschafen, Belfen and Amendorf extensions for diglycol and Oxol are proceeding according to plan and it can already be seen that the completion dates can be adhered to.

Huels, Schkeppau and Trostberg new plants.

(Ordered by the Army Ordnance Office.) Proceeding according to plan at the moment. The certificates of urgency issued by Staatssekretär Keerner have been used for this plant and have proved satisfactory.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 July 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-8791.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

(17th page of document)

January 1938

Ideas of a Chemical Warfare Agents Chemist on the Strategy and Tactics
of Chemical Warfare Service (Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg).

It is the purpose and the objective of every struggle to enforce superiority. This superiority can be achieved by physically effective means and by psychically effective means. In proportion as less brutal force and more mental-psychical means of coercion are being applied, the former will always be more effective and of longer duration. Among the means of combat we can observe the development from brutal muscular means of combat: arrow, spear, sword, followed by gun, rifle, explosives, to that of airplane, smoke and gas and coupled with war epics in the form of talks (Tyrtacus), the newspaper, the radio.

Of all means of war "gas" has more than anything else disturbed the souls of the "war chemists" in particular. In other words, it has the strongest psychical effect. This very fact also designs it to be strategically a main weapon. We now find in the war literature of the postwar period which deals with the war utterances, particularly those made by advocates of this combat type, according to which this weapon of modern age can be considered "humane" and even almost harmless.¹⁾

Statistics are being cited which corroborate this. Such reasoning constitutes a pacifist's theory on rampage, conceived of at the time, to obliterate the odiousness of having introduced such a form of warfare. Misinterpretation alone as to the nature of the new weapon is responsible for its wrong and ineffective application. The mind (Psyche) of the common man

1) Hanslian: "The Chemical War" 1937, volume I, page 252.
State Policy in its evaluation of the chemical means of combat.
(18th page of document)
(page 2 of original)

has better grasped the odium of the new weapon than the "specialists" themselves.¹⁾ The error made by the chemist specialist lies in his previous experience, and in the callousness of his inner imaginary world of which he could not readily and quickly free himself; just as little as the "officer specialist" - with the exception of a few "dreamers" who recognized the importance but without finding immediately the practical solution (Col. Bauer) - could at once properly appraise the new weapon. The "gas specialist", too, had to come into being after painful labor.

Going by his laboratory experiences Professor Haber when he invented the "gas swamp" held in his mind the suspension capacity of certain gases which are heavier than air. When the "gas swamp" was produced in the open, it wandered, became a gas cloud and, reduced in density and carried by the boundlessness of the atmosphere, moved on with ever increasing speed. Because this gas cloud, too, had a baffling effect, Haber turned away from the idea of the "standing" (stehend) swamp and pursued the phantastic "cloud picture" which, while optically it appeared gigantic, was physiologically - and much more even strategically - a mistake because at the main front most of the time the wind blow against own lines, and the gas weapon and the gas defense weapons devoured Germany's reserves of raw materials and manpower.

(18th page of document cont'd)
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The "front officer", however, used gas shells often without sufficient knowledge of the meteorological and tactical prerequisites. In such places, however, where smoke and gas were properly used whole armies fled, shaken by terror (Flitsch and Tolmein)²⁾. And Foulkes³⁾ caused the German Western Front - posted in the very pathway of the wind - to break down in 1918, with his constant gas raids and raids using phosphorus mines, without respite for the German soldier.

- 1) Fritz Haber, 5 lectures 1924, published by Jul. Springer, page 76. On the History of Gas Warfare.
- 2) See: "War without Mercy" by Col. Eugen Birchler, Division Commander and Ernst Ciani. Scientia A.G. Zurich VIII, page 173. Karfreit. Hanslian a.o. page 178.
- 3) Foulkes "Gas", The Story of the Special Brigade. 1934, page 334.

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(page 3 of original)

Unnoticed by us, it thus devoured the morale at the front and the front soldiers. - In Spain's Morocco war against the Riff Kabyles the Lost-bomb dropped from the airplane brought the war to a swift conclusion by infesting the villages scattered over the arid rocky and mountainous territory in the form of oases. - In the Abyssinian campaign the spraying of chemical warfare agents from airplanes, in conjunction with the dropping of bombs containing chemical warfare agents resulted in almost complete destruction of the unprotected armies of the Hogs. These latter examples demonstrate that the "swamp idea" was good but it was to be the irony of the world war that the suitable agent had to come much later only when for a long time already Haber had been trying to bring about the gas cloud idea and thus expending Lost mostly as "cloud". But even this shell cloud was not a cloud of considerable dimension because, had it been so, he again would have been able to achieve great successes. As it was, they constituted drops of spray coming down gently which, nevertheless, often silenced the enemy's artillery and thus achieved partial successes which again, however, evaporated too fast so that a lasting effect could not be obtained.

Once the strategist can at will create "swamps" from chemical obstacles he also will draw the enemy to the place where he wants him to take position for a battle; in other words, dispensing with the need for a territory having natural lakes and swamps, he can at any place suitable to him bring about a "Tannenberg" by force, with the added advantage to himself that such swamps made of chemical warfare agents and brought about by airplanes and tanks are not indicated in any military maps.

By the introduction of Lost, Haber's "swamp" idea shifted its point of attack from the lungs to the entire epidermis-covered surface. Today it can affect the eye, the nose, the pharynx, the lungs and the alimentary canal. On the other hand, the cloud idea became more severe by the introduction of more powerful volatile chemical agents and smokes and, technically speaking, by shifting from the spray process to the projector-shell process. However, there was a tinge of swindle about it

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(page 4 of original)

which served to discredit the whole gas weapon. It claimed more credit for itself than warranted by accomplishment. A handful of active carbon (Aktivkohle) and a bit of cellulose in the filter of an oxygen apparatus reduces it to a bugaboo. " The gas should be made more potent " some specialists said, " We must plug up the carbon or the smoke filter " advised others. " We are going to counter that by two handfuls of carbon and gas filters put up differently " retorted the opponents. The result of the chemical warfare along such lines has repeatedly supplied material for cartoons.

The war 1914/18 has shown that the strategist cannot achieve very much with a weapon which is dependent to such an extent on atmospheric conditions as holds true for the cloud gas. His inclination, therefore, tends much less towards the subject of physiological increase of potency of chemical warfare agents than towards making them independent of wind and weather and towards strict definition in their application. Therefore, the concepts of the closed, semi-closed and open space have been introduced to mark out the problem. Applied all of a sudden, in closed space, the gas can be 100% effective even with a good filter in an oxygen apparatus because its efficacy is adjusted to field concentration. Also in a semi-closed space (ravine, valley, forest) an effect can be expected; in an open space, there being no disturbance of air, gas and smoke in mushroom-shape (attack by mines), applied as a surprise measure and on a large scale can also be effective. The strategist will be able to obtain from any gas regiment information on " model cases " which were most carefully prepared and the efficacy of which is certain. The questions of concentration preservation of " gas and smoke clouds of mushroom-shape " with undisturbed atmosphere, as well as the questions pertaining to protection - in reference to gas-smoke sliding blankets as they have been used up to now, were not yet taken up although

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- 1) A new idea of Stoltzenberg according to which smoke of different properties, separate layers sliding one above the other, should be used.

(21st of document)

(page 5 of original)

to shadow out a territory by smoke and to enclose the gas in smoke of a different weight and of a varying phase promises a development. By such and similar advances into unexplored domains the permanent part to be played by gas will be established by the peace strategist in the contest throughout the course of battle at that point where the fast moving developments of the world war still permitted errors to occur.

Cloud gas of maximum concentration belongs into the first lines of the attacking front. When the infantry-man, the artillery, with guns in traveling position, the tanks and the anti-tank units advance for the assault it is not proper for the gas regiment to collect its empty containers and withdraw. Its place is at the very point where the enemy who possibly throw his gasmask away must be pursued, confused, attacked on a broad front and disabled to offer further resistance. Therefore, the tactician will put to action the truck which catapults gas cylinders,¹⁾ and the gas tank, together with the gas caterpillar mechanism (Gasgleitspinne)²⁾ - an intermediate mechanism between airplane and tank which after the attack brings Foulkes-Liven's clover-leaf-gas, phosphorus and flame-throwers to centers of resistance and to places where resistance must be cauterized so as to open the way for the infantry. All of this for the purpose of exposing the opponent to the fullest effect of the zone which spreads death, and not to turn it into areas where action lags and loses its power, similarly to what happened in the world war where the most potential zone almost entirely spent itself on No-man's land without any effect. Means of strategic warfare are light weapons, all of them have a specific weight which is somewhere near 1 whilst for ballistic reasons all projectiles must be made as heavy as possible and with increase in caliber, their use calls for railroads and good roads. Gas-glider

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- 1) According to Stoltzenberg's proposal a truck capable of cross-country travel, which, similarly to Liven's projectors contains 50 barrels which are being discharged consecutively from the truck itself. Each company has to have 4 trucks.
 - 2) According to Stoltzenberg's proposal a high-legged sledge equipment, approximately 20 m high, side length 5 m, propelled by 3 propellers. On top a boiler with gases for spraying. To be used between smoke screens.

(22nd page of document)

(page 6 of original)

and gas airplane can be used with equal effectiveness in swamp and shell-hole terrain, in snow and mud, sometimes with better effect even than in good weather. Gas gliders have the advantage over airplanes that they are not endangered by fog. Chemical obstacles created as a surprise move by tanks and airplanes assembled cause loss of time to the retreating enemy.

It is not the purpose of these lines to make detailed technical proposals. Their objective is reached if the basic attitude towards the gas weapon which is in jeopardy will be examined, and an appreciation given as it deserves. The basic requirement for this is, on the one hand, a highly efficient but resilient industry which knows how to mould the surplus forces of the country into a new weapon without deprivation to other weapons, and, on the other hand, an intellectually elastic chemical general staff for chemical raw materials which handles raw materials with aptitude and which is the product of intellectual human material which the man of the new Germany, trained in exact natural sciences, will supply to us. It is for this chemical general staff ¹⁾ to undertake the study of raw materials in terms of material substances and human material.

-
- 1) Concerning the chemical general staff additional explanations follow. It is subdivided into various departments of which the most important one is in charge of the home country, other departments handling work relative to non-German producer countries, England, Russia, France, United States, Italy and Japan, to examine parallel cases by means of comparative studies, and the effects in the case of a stand of opposition to German economy or of combination*in their relationship with the principal representatives of economy and their development will take place under their protection, in dependence upon them or with their sufferance.

*with it. The general staff will consider the smaller countries mostly

(23rd page of document)

Reich Office for Economic Development
(Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau)
Department F

Berlin, 21 July 1938

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(Stamp) TOP SECRET

Proposals mobilizing German chemistry for the
defense of the country.

Creation of a Chemists' Officers Corps.*

1. Taking the material value of the chemical weapon (chemical warfare agents and smoke) as a starting point adequate attention must be given to preparation for its use.
2. The chemical weapon is the weapon which as a type corresponds to German raw materials conditions and to the capacity of the German chemical industry.
3. Also from the point of view of its application the chemical weapon is typically the German weapon because it is a result of the special talents of the Germans along scientific-technical lines. Defamation which certainly exists is a sign of sentimental lack of discrimination.
4. The magnitude of chemical industry which within the frame of military economy expansion is to be broadened and, in part, to be created (mineral oil, Buna etc.) offers practically unlimited possibilities for the production of chemical weapons. These chemical syntheses with their by-products and their chemical possibilities altogether, which foreign countries will not carry into effect within the near future because the respective natural products - which to transform is not devoid of difficulties as should be remembered - are available to them in world markets, ensure a superiority for Germany which cannot be surpassed if she endorses openly the idea of the value of the chemical weapon and undertakes to utilize the inherent possibilities in a liberal manner.
5. If purposefully directed, the German chemical industry will be able to cope with all demands on it, carrying out the work of construction~~to~~ plan. Preparations which are under way for steering production and compensation promise to ensure the production of chemical weapons to a far-reaching degree, also in the case of mobilization.

*according

* is an addition to a memorandum of 5/8 November 1937.

(24th page of document)
(page 2 of original)

6. As far as military application of the chemical weapon is concerned necessary preparations have not yet been made to give due consideration to the idea of increased use of the chemical weapon.

It is therefore suggested:

7. To create within the Wehrmacht a Chemists' Officers Corps (for Army, Navy and Air Force) (on the same lines as the Medical Service Officers Corps). In it all chemists of the Wehrmacht will be united and, as reserve-officers, all chemists of economy and technical sciences. The young officers talented for natural sciences join this corps and carry on their studies in chemistry at a university or at a technical college. To young students and chemists the possibility is offered to join the corps as officers and to begin or continue their studies.
8. As front troop ("chemical troop") 12 regiments are being formed instead of 2 chemical units previously. Their enlisted men are recruited from workers and employees (laboratory workers) of the chemical industry.
9. Certain portions of other branches of the Armed Forces are given assignments according to a plan for duty in the Chemical Troop so that the idea of the chemical weapon will penetrate into the entire Wehrmacht.
10. The Chemists' Officers Corps will supply the leaders who will work to establish proper attention for the value and the application of the chemical weapon in the highest military commands.
11. Thus, in the course of several years, a force will be created in Germany which is not possible and does not exist in any other country of the world and which for the superior material of the German chemical weapon also assures its application in a superior manner.

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13 August 1938

Compilation of potentialities for the development of powder, explosives
and chemical warfare agents within the frame of the German chemical
industry

The diagram shows the existing facilities, combined for the total of powder, the total of explosives and the total of all ground-contaminating agents (Gelaendekampfstoff) (the other chemical warfare agents are of minor importance in terms of quantity).

Above it extends, on the one hand, the capacity increase according to the plan providing for speeding up expansion, dated 30 June 38 (section marked in green) and, on the other hand, the increase in capacity based on the "rush" plan (Schnellplan), of 13 August 1938 (section marked in dark red).

Carrying into effect the speed-up expansion plan just permits reaching the Hindenburg Program for all fields by 1942. For chemical warfare agent the quantity of mobilization requirements as reached is slightly higher than the production provided for by the Entente Program for 1919.

The diagram sections marked in pale red show the further expansion potential, from 1942 on, in regard to raw materials and technical possibilities

Achieving of the expansion goals experiences considerable acceleration by the introduction of the rush plan. If the rush plan were kept up, the capacity increase shown in the diagram could be reached already in the years of 1940, etc.

The detailed memorandum of 13 August 1938 summarizes the conditions, particularly the warlike powers needed for its execution.

As a result of the raw materials situation and because of the new development of synthetic explosives and of powder developments, possibilities for an increase as provided by the rush plan can also continue in later years. Also the development of ground contaminating agents (Lost) can be continued in like manner. Here, too, a development is on, which tends towards a simplified process.

An increase in the production of raw materials and auxiliary products can be obtained with the speed which a future extension plan demands.

A new expansion plan going beyond the present ultimate goal in case of mobilization could in our opinion result by the study of the following conditions: increased requirement of propellant charges (powder) for anti-air-craft ammunition or bombing ammunition (explosives) for the Luftwaffe, as against the requirements of 1918 (Hindenburg Program). The study of the use of the chemical weapon can also cause considerable shifting in the mobilization requirements.

(39th page of document)

Berlin, 22 August 1936

Order

for carrying into effect the New Military Economics Production Plan and the Rush plan (Schnellplan).

1. The carrying into effect of the Military Economics new Production Plan and of the Rush Plan ordered for the expansion of the plants producing powder, explosives and K-agents (chemical warfare agents) and their primary products is entirely entrusted to Dr. Krauch. He, therefore, is fully responsible for the execution of the program within the time set, and for procuring the means required incidental thereto (money, steel, building materials, labor, etc.).
2. The Production Plan is to be carried into effect in closest consultation with the Wehrmacht, the distribution of tasks, being as follows:
 - a) Program and planning: Dr. Krauch
In setting up the program and the planning the military points of view for which the Wehrmacht is responsible are to serve as a basis and its chemical and technical demands made by it are to be considered in largest measure.
 - b) Carrying through constructing: OKH (Armee Oberkommando - High Command of the Army) (Wa A) (Heereswaffenamt - Army Armament Office). Acquisition of land by "Montan", placing of orders, settling of accounts, collections, administration and rendering account for the funds allocated to Dr. Krauch (with the exception of non-military preliminary products).
 - c) Start of operation: by OKH (Wa A) as far as necessary from the military point of view.
3. To assure the closest possible cooperation between Dr. Krauch and the OKH (Wa A) the following measures are to be carried through:
 - a) Creation by Dr. Krauch of a Building Staff for which OKH (Wa A) delegates a permanent representative.
 - b) Assignment of a permanent representative of Dr. Krauch to OKH (Wa A)
 - c) Creation by Dr. Krauch of control agents (authoritative specialists) who, together with Dr. Krauch, are also at the disposal of OKH (Wa A) for control purposes.
4. For non-military primary products the Production Plan, properly adapted, is to be carried into effect in consultation with OKH (WStb); the assignment of mutual representatives takes place as the case arises

Enclosure: Outline on cooperation.

12 copies

copy

signed: Goering

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI 8917
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

25 July 1947

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-8917.

HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO X 046355.

Raw materials III c
File reference 66 b 2161/VI

Berlin, 15 July 1940

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Development of the production plans for gunpowder,
explosives and chemical warfare agents.

- 1) From the directions given by Generalfeldmarschall Goering on the basis of the memorandum of 9/10 June in Berlin, ensued the (MS:) (1)
"Karinhallplan" ("accelerated plan") of 30 June 1938, which had as its goal (middle of 1941): (MS:) (2)

17,100 tons of high explosives per month
14,400 tons of filler per month

Total of 31,500 tons of explosives per month
18,100 tons of gunpowder per month
9,300 tons of chemical warfare agents (up to the middle of 1942)

- 2) This planning was taken over into the "military economic new production plan" of 12 July 1938. (MS:) (3)

- 3) In view of the strained political situation in the autumn of 1938 and the demands thus created in the sphere of gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, it seemed desirable to extend and above all to accelerate the former planning. This was done in the (MS:) (4)
"Rush Plan" of 13 August 1938, which represented the maximum attainable under the conditions at the time. It provided for:

18,600 tons of high explosive per month
14,400 tons of filler per month

Total of 34,000 tons of explosive (by the beginning of 1941)
18,100 tons of gunpowder (by the middle of 1940)
9,300 tons of chemical warfare agents (by the middle of 1942)

For the implementation of this plan, which was meant as a final solution, Professor Dr. Krauch, as "Plenipotentiary General for special questions of Chemical Production" received special authority from Generalfeldmarschall Goering. The control was in Dr. Krauch's hands, execution was divided between the Krauch office, Army High Command (Army Armament Office) and OKW, and the

(page 2 of original)

close cooperation of these offices was ensured by the formation of a planning committee and a construction staff.

- 4) At the beginning of the war it was necessary for a time to concentrate on the projects nearing completion, as suggested in the "Implementation of the military economic new production plan of 12 July 1938 for mobilization". In accordance with this, in order to adhere to the (MS) (5) total planning there would have to be produced by the middle or end of 1940:

about 12,000 tons of high explosive per month
" 7,000 " " filler per month

Total of about 19,000 tons of explosive per month
11,000 tons of gunpowder per month
2,700 tons of chemical warfare agents per month.

- 5) By ranking the Rush Plan before all other projects except the aircraft and munitions program, we could draw up an amendment of the plan dated 1 September 1939, with the following production: (MS) (6)

13,785 tons of high explosive per month
13,100 " " filler and explosive substitute (German)

Total of 26,885 tons of explosive (by the end of 1940)
18,300 " " gunpowder per month (by the beginning of 1941)
5,500 " " chemical warfare agents per month
(by the middle of 1941)

- 6) The "Fuehrer's Demands", made in December 1939 in the sphere of munitions, then resulted in a requirement of

63,000 tons of explosive per month in all
25,000 " " gunpowder " "

As, however, such an increase of constructional scope and speed seemed impossible, only the following expansion was envisaged in the expansion order of the OKW of 12 December 1939/30 ^{approved} the Fuehrer: (MS) (7)

53,000 tons of explosive per month (by 1 October 1941)
18,000 " " gunpowder " " (by 1 October 1941)

(no decision was reached on chemical warfare agents)

(page 3 of original)

The special method employed in the subdivision of this order (later called the "Orange Plan" because of a preliminary draft (MS) (8) set out in orange) caused some deviations not recognized by the OKW and provided in detail for:

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

25,050 tons of high explosive per month (end of 1941/ beginning of 1942)	
19,100 " " filler per month (end of 1941)	
10,900 " " auxiliary explosives (common) (beginning of 1940)	
<hr/>	
Total of 55,050 " " explosive per month (beginning of 1942)	
18,970 " " gunpowder " " (end of 1941)	
11,960 " " chemical warfare agents per month (end of 1941)	

- 7) Because of difficulties connected with the supply of building materials, machines, workers etc., various slight alterations and postponements were made in the "Orange Plan", and expansion plans were established on a rather short term policy, which, however, had little influence on the general lines of the plan.
- 8) The Munitions Program demanded by the Fuehrer on 6 April 1940, for 1 October 1940, which contained considerable reductions in (13) (9) the Luftwaffe, resulted in a requirement for this date of 14,150 tons of gunpowder per month and 30,500 tons of explosive per month. The fulfillment of this requirement could not, in view of the constructional schedules envisaged in the "Orange Plan", be achieved by 1 October 1940, but was not to be expected before the Spring of 1941; this gap could be bridged by making use of stock supplies. Beyond this, however, measures had to be taken for the fullest exploitation of available plants and the far-reaching use of fillers and substitute explosives, as well as for the greatest possible acceleration of the plants under construction. The investigation into these questions and the introduction of the necessary measures was undertaken by a commission appointed by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, under the direction of the OKW, with the result that the expansion put forward in the "Orange Plan" should ensue with the greatest possible speed and reach a production capacity of:

(page 4 of original)

14,000 tons of gunpowder per month
32,300 " " explosive " "

The "Orange Plan" projects over and above this should be shelved pending a further decision. (This plan went from then on by the name "Fuehrer's decision".)

- 9) On the basis of experience of munition consumption in the Western theater of operations, which remained far below previous expectations, the Economic Armaments Office was commissioned by command of the Chief of OKW on 12 June 1940 with the establishment of new expansion goals for the Gunpowder and Explosives Rush Plan in collaboration with the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions. The final production total should correspond with the figures of the "Fuehrer's Decision" and should be reached by the spring of 1941. These explosives are

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7835
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

concerned, it should be possible to produce the entire quantity in high quality explosives. After the coordination of the various considerations, the final goals for expansion, with details of the plants still to be completed and those to be struck out of the planning, were laid down by a decree from OKW of 20 June 1940. (NS) (10)
The final goal, according to this, is an output capacity of:

19,115 tons of high explosive per month
15,440 " " filler

Total of 34,455 tons of explosive per month
15,135 " " gunpowder " "
8,960 " " chemical warfare agents per month.

(NS) Rosenberg 15 July

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 August 1947

I, Patricia WOOD, No. 20139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7835.

Patricia WOOD
No. 20139

- 4 -
"END"

61

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4193
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, PAUL KOERNER, at present in Nuernberg, after having been warned that I will be subject to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath, of my own free will and without coercion.

1. On 14. October 1938 a meeting took place in the Reich Air Ministry with General Field Marshall Goering. On this occasion the necessity of increasing export in order to improve the currency situation, the imminent quintiplication of the Air Force, the exact control of raw-materials and electricity, the solution of the Jewish question in Austria, and several similar subjects were brought forward by Goering.
2. Dr. BRAUCH was present at this meeting.

I have carefully read the one page of this affidavit and have placed my signature at the bottom of this page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting, and initialed them, and I declare herewith under oath that in this statement I have told the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten signature)

PAUL KOERNER

Paul Koerner

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, A.F. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4193.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
A.F. NO. 34079

WORK REPORT OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL
OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT FIELD MARSHAL GOERING, DR. C. KRAUCH, BEFORE THE
GENERAL COUNCIL (GENERALRAT).

(Translator's note: stamp) TOP SECRET, (Secret Reich matter).

(2nd page of original)

5 Copies

1. Copy Dr. Krauch
2. " Dr. Ritter
3. " Dr. Laur
4. " Dir. Hellmich
5. " Dipl. Ing. Harmening

Berlin, 28 April 1939.

(Transl. Note: Stamp: S E C R E T !)

(Transl. Note: All tons referred to in this document are metric tons).

Plan for the expansion of the T a u e r n - Power Plant.

After years of construction time:	3	4	5	6	9	15
Installation capacity in 1 000 kW	150	350	650	975	1 900	2 - 2 200 (finish)
Number of hours of operation	1 000	2 000	2 000	2 600	2 600	2 6
Capacity in millions of kilowatt hours	300	700	1 300	2 500	4 500	7 - 8 000

100 millions of kWh approximately 200 000 t of crude lignite)
100 millions of kWh approximately 60 000 t of bituminous coal) Same

(3rd page of original)

7 Copies

1. Copy Dr. Krauch
2. " Dr. Ritter
3. " Dr. Rittpeter
4. " Dr. Kranepuhl
5. " Dr. Neukirch
6. " Ing. Eheling
7. " Dr. Ahl/Rau

Berlin, 28 April 1939.

(Transl. Note: Stamp: S E C R E T !)

COAL REQUIREMENTS -

- *)
- The production of 1 kg Automobile gasoline requires 5,4 bituminous coal
- *)
- 1 kg Aviation gasoline requires 6,0 bituminous coal
- *)
- 1 kg fuel oil (I.G. Fett) requires 4,0 bituminous coal
- *) (without Hy-Gas-decomposition approximately 10% more coal required)

1 kg low temperature tar requires 14,5 kg
bituminous coal
(10,0 saving in coke)

1 kg Bauxite requires 20,5 kg
bituminous coal
(85% for power)

1 kg Aluminium requires 17,7 kg
bituminous coal
(8 1/2 % for power)

1 kg Magnesium requires 18,0 kg
bituminous coal
(2 1/2 % for power)

1 kg gun powder or
explosive
without preliminary products
(average number)
requires approximately
(Transl.note) Handwritten correction 4,8
0,4 kg
bituminous coal

1 kWh = 2 kg raw lignite = 0,6 kg bituminous coal,

10 000 kW installed consume approximately 160 000 tons of crude lignite
or 50 000 tons of bituminous coal
per year.

1 crude lignite = 0,3 bituminous coal

1 bituminous coal = 3,3 crude lignite

(4th page of original)

8 Copies

1. Copy Dr. Krauch
2. " Dr. Ritter
3. " Dr. Fehr
4. " Dr. Neukirch
5. " Dr. Altpeter
6. " Dr. Kronepohl
7. " Ing. Ebeling
8. " Dr. Ahl

Berlin, 28 April 1939

Consumption of Coal of the Establishments
of the New Military Economic Production Plan.

Statements in tons	1938		Final Target	
	Lignite	Bituminous : incl. coke	Lignite	Bituminous : coal incl. coke
Sphère				
Mineral Oil	16 000 000	1 700 000	45 300 000	23 700 000
Buna	250 000	15 000	4 000 000	1 030 000
Aluminium	5 940 000	335 000	6 950 000	770 000
Magnesium	770 000	-	2 150 000	-
Gun powder, explosives, etc.	360 000	240 000	3 120 000	600 000
T o t a l	23 320 000	2 290 000	61 520 000	26 100 000

*) Power for Buna III on the basis of lignite. (Lousitz or Sudetenland)

(5th page of original)

F 1
Ha./Schw.

29 April 1939.

Memorandum for the lecture at the General Council.

Military Economic Plan.
Elimination of bottlenecks.

For the purpose of eliminating bottlenecks in the industry manufacturing power plant equipment, an expansion has been started, the final aim of which is to increase the total capacity by about 40% and which on the whole will be completed by autumn 1940. These measures will have an effect on the following works:

1.) Construction of turbines and turbo-generators.

Expansion of the plants :
AEG Huittenstrasse Berlin
SSW Muehlheim
BBC Mannheim

shortly: Projected expansion, which will be put into practice

MAN Huernberg
Escher Wyss Ravensburg.

Increase of the machine capacity produced yearly from
2,2 Million Kw to 3,1 Million Kw.

2.) Transformers.

Expansion of the plants :

AGG Berlin-Schoeneweide
SSW Nuernberg 1. and 2. extension
BBC Mannheim 2. extension

(6th page of original)

Sachsenwerk Niedersiedlitz
Koch & Sterzel Dresden
Elin Wien.

Increase of the transformer capacity produced yearly from 5 Million kVa to 7 Million kVa.

3.) Boilers.

Expansion of the boiler factories :

Steinmueller Gummersbach
Duerr Ratingen
Walter Koeln-Dellbrueck
Babcock Friedrichsfeld.

The boiler capacity produced yearly will increase from 12,000 t/h to 17,000 t/h.

In addition to this, a program for standard boilers has been set up jointly by producers and consumers (WVK and VGB) with the aim of eliminating the variety in boiler construction and to limit them to a small number of fixed types. The introduction of the standard boilers is still causing certain difficulties, because the customers find it difficult to get used to relinquishing their particular wishes and because the suppliers of boilers are unwilling to give up their own constructions.

In order to facilitate the introduction it will above all be tried to settle the question of prices. For the time being, higher prices are demanded by the construction firms.

In order to eliminate bottlenecks in the construction of power plants, a number of measures have been initiated, in order to standardize auxiliary engines and other power plant equipments as well, to a great extent.

(Transl. Note: illegible signature)

(7th page of original)

Consumption and home production of motor fuels, rubber, light metals and textiles since the beginning of the Four Year Plan.

1. Mineral oil

The small increase in the production of Diesel oil is caused by the fact that before the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General, the first part of the mineral oil plan was in the first place aimed at the production of motor fuels of a lower specific weight in order to complete the so-called 18-Month-Plan.

The increase of the production of automobile gasoline from 1936 to 1938 is influenced by the conversion to aviation gasoline of the plants.

The home production does not comprise the refining of petroleum from abroad, which in the previous lists was entered under the production of light motor-fuels. For this reason, the home production is lower than in the other tables of the Four Year Plan. The figures are composed of the manufacture of German petroleum, hydrogenated gasoline, Fischer-gasoline, low-temperature gasoline.

2. Rubber

The extension of Buna manufacture was impeded by insufficient steel allocations and the excessive load on the fabrication industry.

3. Cellulose wool

The foreign exchange value of cellulose wool was calculated on the basis of the import costs of cotton and wool respectively, calculated for each single year, with consideration to the higher specific weight of cellulose wool and an expected 25% reduction of the

(8th page of original)

utility value in the mixture used at the present time.
For this reason figures of foreign exchange value result which do not rise in the same proportion as the figures of production.
The figures of the value in foreign exchange in the case of W-cellulose wool also contain the value of the increase of the home wool production.
The production increase as compared to 1935 has the following foreign exchange value:

for 1937	123,8 Million	(128,2 Million)	including production)
1938	213,5 "	(224,7 ")	from the refining of)
1939	314,8 "	(329,2 ")	foreign raw materials)

(9th page of original)

(Transl. Note: This and the preceding page both numbered as -2- in orig. document drafts)

mixture now used.
For that reason, figures of foreign exchange value result which do not rise in the same proportion as the figures of production.
The figures of the value in foreign exchange in the case of W-cellulose wool also contain the value of the increase of the home wool production.
The production increase as compared to 1936 has the following foreign exchange value:

for 1937	101,84 Million
1938	210,56 "
1939	319,43 "

(10th page of original)

8 Copies
2 copy

Berlin, 20/21 April 1939.

(Transl. Note: stamp: TOP SECRET

Handwritten Note: D r a f t)

WORK REPORT OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL OF
MINISTER PRESIDENT GENERAL FIELDMARSHAL GOERING FOR SPECIAL QUESTIONS OF THE
CHEMICAL PRODUCTION, DR. C. KLAUCH, TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL.

General Definition of Aims.

On 30 June 1938 the General Fieldmarshal at the meeting in Karinhof explained the outlines and targets set for the German production. The targets for military economic production were fixed for the spheres of

Mineral oil
Rubber
Light metals,
as well as for Gun powder, explosives and
Chemical warfare agents.

Mineral oil, rubber and light metals are definite and strictly defined fields of production. Gun powder, explosives and poison gases on the other hand only constitute the final products of complicated chemical synthesis which in their turn require a great number of important preliminary and auxiliary products. An expansion plan for gun powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents therefore affects the whole of chemistry and requires a corresponding expansion plan for the various branches of the chemical industry.

To illustrate the individual expansion of the construction work required, the increase of the individual production from the stand in 1938 until the final target is achieved, is shown in brief.

Mineral oil: an increase of capacity from 2,4 million tons (purely German production out of German raw materials

(11th page of original)

without refining) in 1938 to 13,8 million tons for covering the demand in case of mobilization, is demanded as the final target. The drawing-up of the plan showed that a capacity of approximately 83 million tons could be reached in 1942/43, and approximately 11 million tons in 1944. The target for the expansion which had been given earlier amounted to 5,5 million tons of all kinds of mineral oils.

Rubber: the production is to be increased from 5000 tons in 1938 to 120 000 tons annually as the final target,

Light metals: an increase from approximately 150 000 tons in 1938 to approximately 270 000 tons was demanded.

Magnesium: the target for expansion from approximately 13 000 tons to 26 000 tons is planned, which by the measures of exchange of aluminium in later developments was increased to 36 000 tons annually.

This means an increase : mineral oil : of 4,6, rubber : of 24, aluminium : of 1,7 and magnesium : of 2,8 times the production of 1938.

For gun powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents and their preliminary products a separate plan was developed which, after acceleration had again been ordered, showed the following targets:

Total of explosives from a capacity of approximately 5 400 tons per month to approximately 18 600 tons per month, that is a 3-5 fold

increase. These figures constitute the so-called pure explosives i.e. the highest quality of the organo-chemical product of nitrogenation. There are also additional products in the form of ammonia saltpetre so that the total production target is approximately twice as high.

Ammonia saltpetre is no problem as far as the quantities of raw materials required are concerned. It can be made available.

The target for gun powder constitutes an expansion from 5 000 tons per month to 18 000 tons per month and that means a 3-6 fold increase of times as much.

(12th page of original)

These expansion projects consist of a number of the most demand for highly concentrated nitric acid and the regeneration of turning sulphuric acid are also included in this expansion program.

In the field of chemical warfare agents, only mustard gas (lost), considered to be the most important chemical weapon of war, be mentioned here; the extension project for it pushed all those for other chemical warfare agents into the background. The expansion project rose from about 400 tons per month to 7 800 tons per month, which is a 19,5 fold increase.

When the plan was first drawn up, there were many who thought it exaggerated or impossible. A comparison with the quantities of the require supplies recognized abroad for the mobilization of a modern great power, serves best to demonstrate the rate of urgency of, for instance, the requirements for mineral oils.

The German expansion target figures for mineral oils are about 13,8 million tons as compared with the French mobilization requirements of about 13 million tons and the British mobilization requirements of about 30 million tons.

The requirements for fuel oil for the British Navy alone amount to about 12 million tons, i.e. nearly as much as the entire German mobilization requirements.

The rubber requirements of 120 000 tons per year are directly connected with the German motorization and thereby again with the mineral oil project. The consumption of crude rubber for England was, in 1938, already about 105 000 tons, for France about 60 000.

The light metals are of the greatest importance not only for the mobilization of the Air Force, but also for peace-time requirements for the replacement of scarce metals. After completion, target figures for aluminum will reach 250 000 t, this is half of the present world production and ten times the present British output. The output of magnesium will, after completion, amount to thrice the present world production.

(13th page of original)

The target for gun powder reaches the Hindenburg program, which, at the time of the World War, was regarded as supply target for the German Armed Forces. The figures of the Hindenburg program were not reached during the World War. The actual production was about 30% less at that time.

The present joint capacity of England and France is already as large as our target for the rush plan. Our information however, is not based on actual evidence of the output of gun powder and explosives, but we have

calculated these figures from the production figures for nitric acid, of which we have an accurate knowledge. The Allied output of gun powder during the World War amounted to 2,4 times the German output and to 1,8 times the figures of the Hindenburg program.

There is a similar position with regard to explosives. The present production plan is slightly higher than the Hindenburg program and about 30% higher than German production during the World War. The present capacity of England and France is already abt. 10% above our target figures and the Allied output of explosives during the World War amounts to 2,1 times the figures of our plan of extension, 2,3 the figures of the Hindenburg program and 2,9 times the German output during the World War.

The position of chemical warfare agents (mustard gas) is such that our target figures amount to 2,5 times the largest German production during the World War. The 1919 program of the "Entente" already provided for quantities which were 10% larger than our present target, which may be regarded as proof of the importance of the chemical warfare agents.

If one considers these comparative figures, one is forced to realize that the new production plan for military economy sketched above, which was demanded by the Field Marshal on 12 July 1938, presents the bare minimum for the safeguarding of the nation's economic military power in these most important departments of the raw materials Economy. (Measures necessary for the protection of the new production plan in the key industries such as coal, power, iron, have not been taken into consideration in this connection).

(14th page of original)

Before going into the details of the work of the different departments, we wish to give a short description of the means, such as steel, money and manpower which are required for its execution, as main bottlenecks of the expansion project.

Steel requirements.

(Transl. About the middle of 1938, the departments for rubber and light metals were already working in accordance with the expansion plan, various so that there was a supply about 35 000 tons of steel per quarter, illegible i.e. 12 000 tons per month for Buna, and about 21 000 tons of steel handwritten per quarter, this being 7 000 tons per month for light metals, marginal notes)

In 1938 the production of mineral oils required about 135 000 tons of steel per quarter i.e. 45 000 tons per month. This quantity had to be increased for the new expansion plan to about 360 000 per quarter i.e. abt. 120 000 tons per month.

For gun powder and explosives the ordnance Office accounted for a stepping-up of about 18 000 tons of steel per quarter i.e. 6 000 tons per month which for the rush plan had to be increased to 130 000 tons per quarter i.e. about 40 000 tons per month.

In the middle of 1938 the required steel for the production of gun powder and explosives was at once made available; for the production of mineral oils an adequate distribution did not take place until the third quarter of 1939, after the Field Marshal's express instructions of 9 February 1939 that the allocation be made in full.

The quantities for the rush plan have in the meantime been limited by the Armed Forces to 81 000 tons per quarter i.e. 27 000 tons per month.

since otherwise the mechanical side of the production of munitions would be unable to keep pace with the development of the production of gunpowder and explosives. Accordingly, the total requirements of all fields of production amount to about 500 000 tons per quarter, i.e. about 136 000 tons per month.

(15th page of original)

If one compares these steel requirements with the total capacity of the German steel production and manufacture of approximately 1.38 Million tons per month (rolling and casting weight), this expansion plan requires 12% of it. While these figures include the expenditure for the supply of power, it does not include those for the probably necessary extension of coal mining; the steel requirements for tank storage are included. With regard to the steel requirements for mining it should be mentioned that the mining division of the Reich Economic Ministry has estimated steel requirements of about 815,000 tons (or 83,000 tons per month) for bituminous coal and about 75,000 tons (or 6,300 per month) for lignite for 1939.

This figure for steel as far as present estimates are available will last until the end of 1942 for Buna, for light metals until the end of 1941, for ammunition and explosives until the end of 1941, for chemical warfare materials until the end of 1942, for mineral oil until the end of 1943.

Requirements for Metals not containing Iron.

The total requirements for metals not containing iron have also been estimated. They amount to a total foreign exchange outlay of around 60 million Reichsmark for the total installations for the plan. The outlays in copper, lead, aluminium, manganese are about equal to a month's requirements of the German economy (average 1937), in the case of molybdenum, nickel, wolfram, tin, cobalt, and chromium they compare with about from 2 to 2½ times of the monthly requirements in the case of mercury, the requirements for chlorine electrolyses of the rush plan are especially high and reaches 1½ year's requirements (about 1 300 t).

Financial requirements.

Financially the development of Buna and light metals does not represent a problem since private economy is doing the job and Reich credits for the Buna installations can be reduced from the rubber revenues.

For munition and explosive plants capital requirements of around 40 to 50 millions per month is necessary; this is derived from HW (Reichsverteidigung-Reich Defence) funds of the Reich

(16th page of original)

Mineral oil offers the gravest financial problem, for here a total capital of 5.8 billion is required, of which about 685 million are still needed for the year 1939, 1½ billion each for the years 1940 to 1942 incl., and the balance during the year 1943.

Manpower Requirements.

The following figures will serve to demonstrate the comparative extent of the manpower requirements for the construction sites:

	Midyear 1939	midyear 1940
Mineral oil	30,000	75,000
Burns	8,000	10,000
Light metals	9,000	6,000
outside current installations	4,000	7,000
Ammunition and explosives (Rush Plan)	39,000	30,000
Total	90,000	Total 128,000

The figures, however, taper off until the end of 1942, after which only for mineral oil the same manpower requirements of about 75,000 men are to be expected until the end of 1943.

Labor employed in the machine and apparatus manufacturing industry can be disregarded in this connection, since these are already at the moment working for other users of iron quota and therefore no increase occurs through this.

The requirements for plant personnel increase as follows :

		Midyear 1939		midyear 1940
in ref. to Burns	from	3,000	to	8,000
Light metals	"	3,000	"	4,500
outside current instal.	"	1,000	"	4,000
Mineral oil	"	7,000	"	45,000
Total		14,000	Total	61,500

and finally for mineral oil until the end of 1943 to 66,000 total 82,500.

For powder and explosives the employment figures in plants

(17th page of original)

would, in case of mobilization and peak production of all plants, grow from 12,000 by mid 1939 to 35,000 by mid 1940, to 52,000 by mid 1941 and to 60,000 by the end of 1941. It should be noted in this connection that the above figures can only be regarded as approximations. If one considers the fact that today already 30,000 workers are employed in the powder and explosive industry including the filling installations, the total labor in this field grows in case of mobilization to approximately 90,000 to 100,000 workers.

(Transl. Note: Following this brief and comprehensive review of the handwritten problems and of the means necessary for their solution we shall now briefly sketch the fields of work and what has actually illegible been achieved in them during the period from July 1936 up to marginal note) date.

(18th page of original)

M i n e r a l O i l .

The expansion plan of 12 July 1936 ordered by the General Field-marshal provided that the increased allotment of steel would become effective from the second quarter of 1939 on. It took quite a number of conferences and repeatedly renewed explanations of the situation however before the allotment of steel was really carried out.

It is self-evident that the postponement of the definite promise to distribute the steel has irretrievably retarded all preparatory work such as the preparation of orders by the construction firms.

When at the beginning of the year 1939 i.e. after half a year, still no definite steel allotment had been made, special compilations were drawn up to inform the General Fieldmarshal repeatedly about the loss of production the delay in the dates set which threatened to occur. On 9 February 1939 the definite order was given to make the steel currently available beginning with the third quarter of 1939. This new steel allotment which increased the current quota from 45 000 to 120 000 tons per month is based on the absolute correct point of view that the mineral oil quota should be increased at the expense of others who receive a quota, who are interested in mineral oil from the military economic point of view and not to graft any addition on this quota which could not be carried out technically.

Since the introduction of quotas in summer 1937 the mineral oil shows the following quantities :

June 1937	approxin.	27 500 tons per month	I. quarter 1938	50 000 tons p.
July 1937	"	62 400 " " "	II. " "	1938-47 000 " "
August 1937	"	60 000 " " "	III. " "	1938-40 700 " "
Sept. 1937	"	49 000 " " "	IV. " "	1938-43 000 " "
Oct. 1937	"	49 500 " " "		
Nov. 1937	"	49 500 " " "		
Dec. 1937	"	49 500 " " "		

(10th page of original)

I. quarter 1938	44 000 tons per month
II. quarter 1938	50 000 " " " (instead of the 120 000 tons per month demanded)

For the
III. quarter 1938 120 000 tons per month have further been promised.

The increase in the allocation beginning with the third quarter of 1938 is composed as follows :

The Air Force provides for this	20 000 tons per month
the Army	20 000 " " "
the Plenipotentiary General for Iron and Steel Control	30 000 " " "

and from the Czech quota 10 000 tons per month were promised for the plants in the Sudeten area.

At this point it can be stated frankly that at the beginning of the last half year the offices of the Reich Economics Ministry and the Plenipotentiary General for Iron and Steel Control as well as the Military Economy Staff did not show the understanding of the problems required by the importance of the mineral oils. At the end an attempt was once more made to reduce the steel allocation indirectly, by a method reminiscent of the Mercat of Venice because iron was to be delivered but not the red-steel which after all belongs to it.

Sometimes objections were raised that any way the other construction materials, cement and lumber, would not be available to such an extent. These doubts can however be countered with the reply that for thanks to the support of the Plenipotentiary General Dr. Todt these difficulties can be.

considered overcome.

(Transl. Note: Illegible handwritten marginal notes and alterations to par 2 and 3).

Bottlenecks in the delivery of machines.

A further objection which was often raised is that in some fields the delivery capacities of the machine-industry would not suffice, that especially high pressure containers high pressure armatures & electrical

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machines and turbines would constitute insurmountable bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks would probably occur if these questions had not been taken care of at the right time. They have, however, been the constant object of examinations. Where ever a remedy was necessary, corresponding measures were initiated so that here too the basic objections can be rejected. An interesting example are the so-called high-pressure coils where instead of the huge steel block which has to be forged a simple 6-8 mm thick and 60 mm wide steel band is wound from a big roll like the spool of a sewing machine, into a welded or forged thin-walled core tube of approximately 20-30 mm thick wall in many layers whilst simultaneously it is pressed by pressure and heat. Where previously 12 months were needed for the manufacture of a big high-pressure container of an inside width of 1000 mm and 18 m length, such a coil can now be produced with different machines from the present ones on a simple big lathe in four weeks work i.e. in a fraction of the time, not counting the time of delivery of the core tube. The present testing of the coils gives rise to the greatest hopes.

It is natural that such a great and comprehensive plan can be carried out only if all efforts are made and the good will is shown everywhere. Viewed from the technical side we cannot see any basic difficulties for its execution. The supply of coal is another thing. I am going to give the quantities required later. We are convinced that these questions, though admittedly difficult can definitely be solved if one proceeds purposefully, because they have to be solved. It would mean a declaration of bankruptcy if on that field of raw materials where it is rich and has superior possibilities Germany would declare its incapacity. If coal cannot solve its tasks

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the creation of the military economy of a big power is impossible.

However, the authorities handling the export must also show the way for reasonable cooperation. It might mean an almost irretrievable mistake if for instance the machines necessary for the completion of an oil plant exported for the gain of small amounts of foreign exchange whilst the multiplier of these proceeds is lost hereby through loss of production.

A few examples may be mentioned in brief:

1.) By inserting bigger orders for the Deutsche Maschinenwerke A.G. Duesseldorf for export to Russia, the taking into operation of the power plant Scholven retarded for approximately a quarter of a year. As a result of the lack of power the conversion of the plant to aviation gasoline can only be started after a corresponding delay. As far as foreign exchange is concerned this has the following results:

full production of automobile gasoline at Scholven	200 000 tons per year
full production of aviation gasoline " " "	180 000 " " "

A delay of a quarter of a year therefore means the loss of 45 000 tons of aviation gasoline instead of which 50 000 tons of automobile gasoline are produced. At an import price of 100.— Reichsmark per ton of aviation gasoline and 60.— Reichsmark per ton of automobile gasoline a loss of foreign exchange of

$45\,000 \times 100 - 50\,000 \times 60 = 1.5 \text{ million Reichsmark.}$

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results. The value of the orders from abroad which cause the delay is not known. It can, however, be estimated at approximately 10% of that amount according to the value of the raw materials.

2.) A case which could be settled by negotiations. The Siemens-Schuckert works stated in a letter of 22 February 39 that instead of the set of turbines I for the power plant of the Stettin factory a delivery of turbines to Rumania had to be carried out. The first to be delivered would have been the original set of turbines II the delivery of which would have been effected 2 months later. If one assumes - and this is justified to a certain degree - that the taking into operation of the whole plant would consequently be retarded 2 months, one would also have to reckon with 2 months delay in the production of 500 000 tons gasoline and 335 000 tons diesel oil annually by the Stettin plant

$$\frac{500\ 000}{12} \times 2 \times 60 - \frac{335\ 000}{12} \times 2 \times 40 = \text{approximately } 3,5 \text{ million R.}$$

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This is compared to an approximate delivery value of the order for Rumania of approximately 500 000 R.

It is expressly pointed out, however, that in this case negotiations have resulted in ensuring the original date of delivery of the machine I for Stettin.

3.) Delivery of high-pressure containers abroad.

At the end of 1933 the firm Krupp requested the release of approximately one third of its production capacity of high-pressure containers for deliveries abroad (Japan). A thorough calculation of the data showed that the release of these orders abroad would delay the establishment of certain plants for approximately 8 months. This delay would, calculated as regards aviation gasoline, have caused a total loss of 600 000 tons of aviation gasoline which corresponds to a foreign exchange value of 60 million RM. This was compared to a profit in foreign exchange from the export of high-pressure containers of approximately 12 million RM.

In the basic attitude of all authorities a pleasing accord has been achieved: now all authorities object to the release of high-pressure containers for export.

Occasionally the objection is raised that the Mineral Oil Plan considerably exceeds the normal demands of economy and thereby will lose its economic basis. The actual figures are as follows:

	Peacetime Requirements	Expansion Target	mob. capacity final target 1943
Amounts in million tons Reich Economics Ministry	1943 estimated	Kerinhell plan of 12 July 1935	State of planning: of 30 Jan 1939
Automobile and aviation gasoline	5.700	5.560	6.590
Diesel fuel	2.600	2.100	1.760
Heating oil	1.675	2.470	2.270
Lubricating oil	0.680	0.880	0.875
T o t a l	11.055	11.010	11.495

The final figures of the planning, however high they may appear

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above the present requirements, are not too high compared with the requirements which are to be expected for 1943. In this automobile gasoline and aviation gasoline are mentioned in a single sum because for these products an extensive conversion possibility exists. The gasoline plants, the production of which according to the state of 30 January 39 seems too high, can be partly converted to Diesel fuel, so that here too an extensive adaptation to the actual demands of economy (including the peacetime requirements of the Wehrmacht) exists.

The same applies to any possibly excessive production of fuel oil. It is quite possible to produce approximately 400 000 tons of Diesel oil instead of 500 000 tons of fuel oil.

The final figures for future requirements and future production are so close to each other that no danger of bad investments exists. The existing protection as to imports has to be kept up of course.

Thrust of the planning.
Filling peacetime
requirements.

The Mineral Oil Plan as it is according to conditions on 30 January 1938 after it was last revised is based on a special presupposition: Before all other objectives the Luftwaffe's requirements for aviation fuels have to be satisfied according to an express order of the General Fieldmarshal; consequently an aviation fuel plan complying with the requirements and the expansion plan of the Luftwaffe which provides an increase of the present capacity of 220 000 tons to 400 000 tons by the middle of the year, reaches 900 000 tons by mid-1940, 1.2 million tons by mid-1941, 2.0 million tons by mid-1942 and 2.6 million tons by the end of the year 1943, was developed together with the Luftwaffe. From the point of view of saving foreign exchange this procedure is also the most expedient one because the highest rapid increase of gasoline is at first replaced by German production. As against the normal gasoline with an import value of 65.— RM.

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which is supplied mostly against mutual accounting. Aviation fuel costs approximately 100.— RM per ton in ready foreign exchange and for self-evident reasons will not be available on the world market in nearly the quantities which we need in the next years. I can point out that the latest development work has shown extraordinarily favorable results with regard to the quality of aviation fuel so that at least we can keep abreast with the developments abroad if not even surpass it in some essential points as to quality. The same applies to the airplane engine oils which can also be produced in an excellent quality and the expansion plans in this respect are also being systematically developed.

Corresponding with the increasing importance of aviation gasoline is technically impossible to achieve any considerable increase of the automobile gasoline capacity in the next three years. The present capacity for automobile gasoline from German raw materials only of 1.46 million tons (including the refining of 1.9 million tons) increases up to the end of this year to 1.66 million tons (2.4 million tons, including the refining) then as a result of the conversion of some plants to aviation gasoline decreases slightly to 1.75 million tons and increases in mid-1943 to 1.95 million tons, to reach towards the end of 1943 2.9 million tons (3.6 million tons including the refining) out of purely German production. If peacetime conditions should

continue to exist in the future, the present plan of the Luftwaffe including the stockpiling will be fulfilled by the end of 1942 so that beginning with the end of 1942 a sudden increase in the production of automobile gasoline by conversion of the aviation gasoline plants to automobile gasoline can be effected. This would result in an additional current production of approximately 2 million tons of automobile gasoline if only the current peacetime demand of airplane gasoline of 1.1. tons were to be produced then. Here to the problem of the quality of the gasoline can be considered as solved, particularly as the production of tetra ethyl lead will be increased in such a way

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according to a definite expansion plan that sufficient quantities for the increase of the octane rate will be available.

In this connection reference must be made to the benzol situation. The total output of benzol is today 500 000 tons annually, the final objective being approximately 700 000 tons per year in accordance with the expansion of the coke factories including the Hermann Goering Works. From these approximately 50 000 tons per year Toluol have to be deduced, the final objective being approximately 70 000 tons per year which are obtained by distillation. Chemistry at present needs approximately 40 000 tons per year of aviation fuels and approximately 30 000 tons per year of benzol. (Transl. Note: Illegible handwritten notation). The requirements chemistry, especially for the Styrol production for Buna, will yet considerably increase from approximately 40 000 tons to 80 000 tons. The Toluol synthesis on the basis of benzol which is at present being developed will require approximately 20000 tons of benzol annually so that as the final objective instead of the present 300 000 tons per year approximately 500 000 tons per year will be available for motor fuel.

If chemistry should make still further demands, these will of course have preference over the use of benzol for engine heating purposes the more so because the hydrogenation of bituminous coal will create a new basis of the greatest extent for aromatic fuels.

The Diesel-fuel capacity does not show a noticeable increase of 250 000 tons until towards the end of 1940 then for similar reasons as those for the automobile gasoline production 1941/42 stays almost constant and only increases considerably between the end of 1943 and the end of 1945. From a capacity of 200 000 tons at the end of 1936, 1.5 million tons are reached at the end of the year 1943.

As far as the supply of fuel oil, which especially interests the Navy, is concerned, here too only a small increase in the next three years results. From the present production out of purely German raw materials only (without refining) of 330 000 tons (537 000 tons including refining)

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520 000 tons are reached in mid-1942. At the end of 1942 a great increase to 1.3 million tons, at the end of 1943 to 1.6 million tons and at the end of 1944 to 2.3 million tons of fuel oil capacity is reached.

The expansion plan for the production of lubricating oils comprises not only motor oils but also all machine oils. The present peacetime production including refining increases from 300 000 tons at present to 600 000 tons at the end of 1940, in mid-1942 to 720 000 t.

Expansion up-to-date and further increase.

Compared with this big expansion demanded for the next years an illustration of the expansion up-to-date of the German production is of interest :

	Total production from German raw materials (without refining)	Increase as against previous year
1932	796 000 t	
1933	830 000 t	34 000
1934	1 060 999 t	259 000
1935	1 279 000 t	190 000
1936	1 629 000 t	350 000
1937	2 070 000 t	441 000
1938	2 400 000 t	330 000 t
1939	2 750 000 t	350 000 t
1940	3 700 000 t	Expansion demanded 950 000 t
1941	4 500 000 t	800 000 t
1942	5 400 000 t	900 000 t
1943	6 300 000 t	2 900 000 t

The speed of the expansion is therefore now to be 2 or 3 times as much as that carried out during the last 3 years.

Towards the end of	Capacity reached	Capacity increase as against previous year
1937	approx. 2 200 000 t	-
1938	" 2 700 000 t	500 000 t
1939	3 500 000 t	800 000 t
1940	4 500 000 t	1 000 000 t
1941	5 350 000 t	Expansion demanded 850 000 t
1942	6 250 000 t	2 050 000 t
1943	10 000 000 t	1 000 000 t

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The production figures (not capacity figures) of the years 1938 - 1943 will be approximately the following :

Production from German raw materials (without refining)

Amounts in million of tons	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
airplane gasoline	0.09	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.7	1.1 *)
automobile gasoline	1.75	1.7	1.6	1.0	1.9	4.2
Diesel fuel	0.15	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	1.2
heating oil	0.30	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.3
lubricating oil	0.15	0.15	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5
Total	2.44	2.75	3.7	4.5	5.4	8.3

*) Partly conversion to automobile gasoline.

If one compares these results of the expansion plan with the requirement of peacetime consumption for which the estimates of the Reich Economics Ministry serve as a basis, the aviation gasoline is several times covered as the surplus quantities serve for systematical stockpiling until the end of 1942. For automobile gasoline the conditions are such that at present including the refining of foreign oils, approximately 70% of the demand is covered. If the peacetime consumption continues to increase approx. 10% per annum, this coverage is reduced to approximately 60%. Beginning with 1943 a full coverage from German production is possible; a surplus might even be available which could be used for stockpiling or else it will be possible to convert parts of some plants to Diesel fuel.

The steady 10% increase of the peacetime consumption of Diesel fuel the total production of which -including the refining- is at present covers up to 20% only will in 1943 be covered up to 50%.

As regards fuel oil, which is at present -including the refining- covered up to approximately 50%, the full peacetime consumption will be covered at the end of 1943 and beginning with 1944 a surplus will be available for stockpiling.

The peacetime requirements for lubricating oil can be completely satisfied by home production.

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Mobilization supply.

For the mobilization requirements the final objective shows the following situation. Considering the situation in case of mobilization one has to remember that the refining of mineral oils from abroad will cease and for part of them German mobilization mineral oil reserves will be used which will result in some shifting of production.
(Transl. Note: illegible handwritten marginal note)

As far as aviation gasoline is concerned, the requirements of the Luftwaffe of airplane gasoline capacities will be completely covered after the completion of the expansion. Stockpiling too can be carried out according to plan.

As far as automobile gasoline is concerned in 1943 a coverage of mobilization requirements of approx. 75% will be reached as against the present mobilization supply (out of purely German production) of approximately 55%.

The mobilization supply of Diesel fuel which today is covered only up to approximately 20%, increases to 50% in 1943 and 80% in 1944.

The mobilization supply of fuel-oil from current production is today covered up to approximately 15%; the coverage remains 17% until 1942, becomes 30% in 1943 and in 1944 reaches approximately 40%.

The present Mineral oil constitutes the maximum technically feasible under present circumstances until the end of 1943. For its execution tremendous efforts are necessary. Its result for securing the 1943 mobilization is the following:

- 1.) The Luftwaffe will be completely supplied; its plans for stockpiling will be completely carried out.

- 2.) With regard to automobile fuel, a current supply of up to 55% - 75% of mobilization requirements can be reached.
- 3.) The Diesel-fuel supply is between 25% and 60%.
- 4.) The fuel oil supply varies between 15% and 40%.

In other words: A shortage of automobile-fuel which cannot be alleviated by German production exists and

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even greater shortage of Diesel-oil exists and a gap, which at present cannot be completely bridged by any measures of the German production, exists of fuel-oil.

It is quite comprehensible that with the present situation on the field of mineral oils those who consider the Development Plan impracticable or who are always only stressing its difficulties and cost would do better to use their energy wasted in this way for a positive support of this work.

Raw material base coal.

The following figures may explain how far the German raw material base coal and German mineral oil participate in the extension plan explained.

The Ruhr has to supply 15 million tons of bituminous coal, the Saar 1.7 million tons and Silesia 6.0 million tons, that is a total of 23.7 million tons. A low temperature-coke surplus of 3.0 million tons has been already deducted from this quantity. After the final expansion the annual output of lignite will be approximately 18.2 million tons in Central Germany 4.1 million tons in the Rhineland, 7.7 million tons in the Sudetenland and 15.3 million tons in the Lusatia, that is a total of 45.3 million tons.

The demand is approximately 12% of the output of bituminous coal in 1938 and approximately 25% of the output of crude lignite in 1938.

German Petroleum in the Mineral Oil Plan.

As final objective in peacetime 250 000 tons per year of German petroleum shall be used for the Reich (Altreich) and 400 000 tons per year of German mineral oil shall be projected for Austria.

In case of mobilization German petroleum is to be used as an essential raw material reserve by the taking into operation of wells not used at present and by systematically increased drilling of those definitively rich oilfields which at present are not being exploited.

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For the moment the Work Community for the Production and Refining of petroleum (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erdölgewinnung und -verarbeitung) appointed by the Reich Economics Ministry has planned the following:
In the case of mobilization output is to be increased to approximately 1.435 million tons. At present this quantity can be processed in the plants available (plants within Germany and refineries) and will yield approximately the following amounts:

167 000 tons	of	gasoline
23 000 "		kerosene
316 500 "		Diesel fuel
396 000 "		lubricating oils *)
15 600 "		fuel oil
301 500 "		asphalt
8 500 "		paraffin
4 000 "		liquid gas
28 000 "		extract
35 000 "		coke

of the following composition in the individual case :

*)	43 500 tons of	spindle oil
	18 000 "	machine oil
	268 000 "	engine oil
	6 500 "	airplane oil
	9 250 "	steam engine cylinder oil
	11 500 "	transformer oil
	32 500 "	hub oils
	6 250 "	turbine oil

As the final objective of the military economic Production Plan the output of petroleum in case of mobilization can be increased to approximately 2 million tons per year because by then a number of refineries which at present are still being expanded, will be completed. Then probably the following main products will be manufactured :

1.) from approximately 3 million tons of petroleum in Northern Germany :

approx.	200 000 tons	of	automobile gasoline
	65 000 "		airplane gasoline
	114 000 "		kerosene
	234 000 "		Diesel fuel
	20 000 "		fuel oil
	500 000 "		lubricating oil
	220 000 "		bitumen
	36 000 "		paraffin
	23 000 "		coke

and a corresponding amount of asphalt.

The processing shall be done in such a manner that approximately 1.7 million tons of crude oil

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will be processed in purely German refineries and processing plants and approximately 0.27 million tons of crude oil will be channelled via the Ebnano works whereby the latter will have to supply materials for the hydrogenation plant of DAFG.

2.) From 400 000 tons of Austrian petroleum :

approx.	73 000 tons	of	automobile gasoline
	103 000 "		Diesel fuel
	131 000 "		fuel oil
	50 000 "		lubricating oil

For the time being the following refineries come into question for the processing:

Floridsdorf
Magyar
and a cracking plant the location of which
still has to be decided.

In the sphere of coal the Mining Department of the Reich Economics Ministry would have to influence the mining districts Ruhr and Silesia especially in such a way that any possible handicaps will be removed. Such handicaps consist for instance of the reluctance to have any changes take place with regard to coal sales which are necessitated by the introduction of processes such as the low-temperature distillation provided for by the Mineral Oil Plan and the economic results of which cannot at present be surveyed yet. The Mining Department would also further have to take precautions to ensure the increased requirements of coal due to deadlines provided for by the Mineral Oil Plan can be satisfied. If on the other hand the Reich Economics Ministry raises the objection that the miners necessary for this purpose are not available, it would have to be pointed out that there is still a considerable reserve in the export section, which, if not exploited for the home mineral oil supply will be of detriment to our economic assets and will mean "coal suicide". With regard to the correct utilization of the various kinds of coal and in the solution of the problem regarding types new methods would have to be tried under the leadership of the Mining Department.

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taken up, the application of which the syndicates and companies based on purely private economy would hardly accept voluntarily.

As great individual which tasks are necessary to the fulfillment of the plan the following shall be mentioned: utilization of the lignite from the region South of Leipzig and, in this connection, elimination of the opposition to the sale of coal fields belonging to the state of Saxon to industrial enterprises; negotiations of the Aktiengesellschaft Sächsische Werke (ASW) with the Deutsche Erdöl Aktiengesellschaft (DEA) have been going on since 1937 and today are still not yet definitely finished. To master the problems of the Mineral Oil Plan matters of this kind will have to be cleared up considerably faster.

The liberal exploitation of the Lausitz coal which it is not worth while low-temperature distillation requires a regulation of the whole water economy of this region in order to cover the great water requirements of the motor fuel works there.

A similar task which however was comparatively easy to solve, was the water economy for the motor fuel plant in Bruex in the Sudetenland. For further plants the use of water from the Elbe is not possible if no dams are constructed.

All raw material sources especially the coking gases which can be used for the mineral oil syntheses have to be made available as raw material for special fuels for the Luftwaffe. The coking gases will have to be made available up to approximately 10% of their total amount.

The oil-chalk and the oil-shale deposits shall be examined once more as to possibilities of their utilization.

Questions of financing.

It is furthermore absolutely necessary that the questions of financing and establishment of companies be carried out with the utmost acceleration. In the case

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of the hydrogenation plant Upper Silesia and the Sudeten plant it has not been possible as yet to obtain a clarification so that the Mineraloelbau-gesellschaft had to be ordered to start the construction as trustee in order not to delay the construction.

It must under no circumstances continue to take 2 months for an urgency declaration for a construction to be approved by the competent authorities. The same applies to questions of location of sites, for instance the DAPG hydrogenation plant and the cracking plant in Austria.

The question of the approval of payments to the construction firms with regard to the placement of their loans on the money market also took a long time before it worked. It must be pointed out that in the same way in which the branches of the Wehrmacht released steel from their quota for the mineral oil program they should also provide funds in corresponding amounts. Negotiations with this in view, in which the Luftwaffe will take over the financing of plants by advance payments to account of the future production are under way. At the moment the financing negotiation situation is as follows:

The financing of the Mineral Oil Plan from a special finance quota would have eliminated all difficulties from the very beginning.

The Reich Finance Ministry, however, decided in September 1938 that funds of the budget of the Reich cannot be made available for the Mineral Oil Plan. Since then it was attempted to give the builders the opportunity of taking up "bridging credits" by offering them finance guarantees. After the demands on the money market have also accumulated from other construction plans

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the Reich Economics Ministry tries to have the branches of the Wehrmacht participate in the financing in to as great an extent as possible. The first practical case of this kind is the Wolheim plant which is to produce fuel oil for the Navy. The High Command of the Navy, however, does not want to take the required amount of 25 million Reichsmark from its budget but wants to ask the Reich Finance Ministry for these funds. (Translator's note: above paragraph crossed out).

In the construction projects Bruck, Upper Silesia and Saxony too the Reich Finance Ministry had to take over the financing for the time being. With regard to the shortage of liquid assets available to the enterprises, one has to reckon with the fact that further projects cannot be financed completely from means of the money market, so that the Mineral Oil Plan will have to be financed from funds of the Reich budget to a considerable extent.

Limits of the Mineral Oil Plan

If Germany as a big power wants to secure the absolutely necessary supply of mineral oil the German economic area will have to carry out the Mineral Oil Development Plan which exists at present. As already pointed out this plan requires extraordinary efforts but it must definitely be considered as possible, and possible within the time set. It might also be possible that the plan can yet be extended at some points. The preliminary low-temperature distillation of lignite briquettes and also of coal will offer many an opportunity. The German petroleum or the utilization of mineral gases might perhaps also provide a pleasant surprise; but on the whole the Mineral Oil Plan will constitute a certain maximum limit as far as both labor and coal are concerned.

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of what the German economic area including the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be able to supply in the long run.

That in spite of the manifold difficulties its realization is to not Utopian can be realized when one considers the plants which definitely will be completed in 1938 and 1939.

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In 1938 there have been completed :

Plant	: Auto	: Air- plane	: Diesel	: fuel oil	: Paraff.	: Lubri- oil	: HK-ton	: SK-ton	: Bon- sol	: actual date of taking up operat.	: Date plan: mod according to Karinhall: plan of 12.7.38	: Delay in months
Heinitzgrube				1.6						1 Feb. 38:		
Eddoritz										1 Feb. 38:		
IE. Wilhelmsburg			2.5			5.50	4			1 Apr. 38:		
Offleben							12			1 May 38:		
Erkner Pitch cracking			1.3	2.5						15 May 38:		
Ruhland II	150*)			2.0			35*)			1 Aug. 38:		
Voelkocingen Toor				8						1 Nov. 38:		
Rheinpreussan II	21.6:		12	7.8	6.4					1 Dec. 38:	1 Aug. 38:	-4
Krupp-Benzin	47			7.5	4					1 Nov. 38:	1 Aug. 38:	-3
Kosag	1.5:		6.75	3.1						1 Dec. 38:	1 Oct. 38:	-2
IE. Ro. is							50			1 Dec. 38:	1 Jul. 38:	-5
Hirschfoldo							25			1 Dec. 38:	1 Jul. 38:	-5
Holton	50*)			2*)	5*)					1 Dec. 38:	1 Mar. 39:	-4
	270		22.6	34.5	15.4	5.5	(126)					

Total of finished products : 343 000 tons

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In 1939 there have been completed :

Plant	: Auto	: Air- plane	: Diesel	: fuel oil	: Paraf.	: Lubricant	: SK-ter	: Ben-	: Actual cr	: Date off	: Delay in months	: Karinhall plan of 12-7-38	: Date plan2)	: Delay in months
Drubon										1 Jan. 39				
Schulven II	75						15			15 Jan. 39				
Hoosch-Benzin	35				8					1 Feb. 39			1 Jan. 39	-1
Zeitiz I	85									15 Feb. 39			15 Nov. 38	-3
LEA-Rositz					1.5					1 Mar. 39			1 Dec. 38	-4
Essener-Benzin	50							7.8		1 Apr. 39				
Edderitz	1.4									1 Apr. 39				
Eurotenk	50		45	15						1 Jun. 39				
(refining plant)														
Gelsenberg	150							36		1 Apr. 39			1 Jan. 39	-3
Rhenania Expansion	6		8		60					1 Jun. 39				
Bochlen Teor	35						60			1 Jun. 39				
Brabag Bechlen										1 Jul. 39				
Schulven conversion	-200**	180**								1 Jul. 39			1 Jul. 39	-2
LEA Rositz III	3		6	3	1.5					1 Jul. 39			1 Apr. 39	
Oppen Tanel		4								1 Jul. 39				
Louis II	50									1 Jul. 39			1 Jun. 39	-1
Wintershall II	105*		20*							1 Aug. 39			1 Apr. 39	-4
Schaffgotsch	25				5			15		1 Aug. 39			1 Jun. 39	-2
Luotzendorf	13		8		4.5	35.5	25			1 Aug. 39				
LEA Rogis III										1 Aug. 39				
Libergen						6				1 Oct. 39				

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Plant : Auto : Air : Diesel : Fuel : Paraf. : Lubri : EK-tar : SK-tar : Ben- :
: : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : :

therefore there are to be expected for 1939 (without Winterhall) :

approximate capacity 588** 4 67 18 20.5 99 20
(388) (184) Diesel fuel Paraf. Lubri (103) (58)
Auto- Aviation oil EK-tar SK-tar Benzol
mobile Gasoline
Gasoline

Total of finished products : approximately 811 000 tons

*) Extension of existing plants to production capacity of 1939.

**) or a corresponding quantity of aviation gasoline after conversion of Scholven, Gelsenberg and Louisa.

- 1) Dates corresponding to the situation as it can be judged today.
- 2) The dates were based on the supposition that mineral oil would be granted very special priority.

As date of taking up operations that time is to be considered at which the first trial run of the plant concerned is carried out and the readiness for operation of the individual parts of the plant is ascertained.

It must be pointed out expressly that the plant can only be fully operated several months after this date.

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Reasons for the change of dates :

Dates were set by A 7 on the basis of the installation date plans of the builders.

1938

- 1.) Delivery of the Fischer-pressure-furnaces for new plants has been delayed due to lack of material and drafting of specialized workers in the autumn 1938. Delay in the delivery of turbo-compressors (lack of material, tin, etc.)
- 2.) HMA-Regis, Hirschfelde, Kosag: Delay in delivery of low-temperature furnaces by Lurgi
- 3.) Expansion of Holten: the plant was supplied on a priority basis in order to obtain results of a Fischer-pressure-plant as soon as possible.

1939

Hensch-Benzin: Finishing of the furnaces by Mannesmann delayed.

Zeitz: Requisition of construction material in autumn 1938. Shortage of laborers caused by drafting. Delay in the general delivery of materials.

Essener-Benzin: change of plan because pressure phase had to be added. Consequently delay of orders.

Gelsenberg I: Delivery of CO₂-washing by Borsig delayed. Large electric motors delivered late by Siemens.

Schöllen conversion: Siemens and Sachsenwerk engines delayed in favor of the Navy. Power plant Schlagerl & Eisen not yet finished.

Wintershall II: Engine delivery by Siemens deferred in favor of the Saar gas project Ludwigshafen and Bunn Schkopau.

Schaffersbach: General difficulties with materials. Experimental work in Ruhland for the purpose of reconstruction of the furnaces.

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As already pointed out, the Mineral Oil Plan has to cover the full supply of aviation fuels for mobilization and must already provide for stockpiling in times of peace. In all other fields the shortage will last even longer, especially as to Diesel fuel and fuel oil. Before 1943 special supply surpluses for the purpose of mobilization stockpiling are in no way to be expected.

Therefore the mobilization supply can only be fully and perfectly satisfied after stockpiling has begun i.e. in the year 1944/45. Even then stocks will only ensure supply for a certain time ; after the stock is used up, a shortage in supply will again arise because only the current production will be available.

Importance of the South East.

In other words, the economic area of Greater Germany is too small

to satisfy the military economic requirements as to mineral oil and the newly and successfully taken up contact with Southeastern Europe shows us the only and hopeful possibility to ensure supplies for the mineral oil economy completely for many years by securing this area by means of the Wehrmacht. Here the first and most important work program is the support of the drilling programs in Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia and the influencing of the mineral oil economy there. If in the next years we succeed in obtaining increasing quantities of finished products especially automobile gasoline and Diesel fuel from this area, we can first begin to replace the present import from other countries and then at last arrange systematic stockpiling in Germany.

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and finally consider using mineral oil from Southeastern Europe or distillate thereof as raw material in German hydrogenation plants and so almost double the profit as against the amount of coal used. The question of the transportation facilities is of special importance in this respect. The means of transport, whether railroads, ships or pipelines to be used mainly, have to be checked in each individual case.

As to the requirement for materials etc. for a pipeline to Rumania investigations have been made so far. The distance from Riga to Ploesti might be approximately 2,000 km. The Iraq pipeline may serve as a comparison: it has a length of approximately 1,900 km. -as far as known- over which approximately 4 million tons of crude oil are to be transported; for the construction of the pipeline a total of approximately 125,000 tons of pipes (66 tons per km) are supposed to have been used.

The possibilities which the Southeastern area offers in an ideal case for the easing of our mineral oil situation shall only be outlined briefly here. It is certain that the relief from the Southeastern area will not be effective immediately but only after a few years. For this certain investment and appropriate preparations in case of mobilization are necessary. By these prospects the present Mineral Oil Plan is not changed in the least; we can only add to it plans of hopeful technical possibilities and prospects. The processes included in the Mineral Oil Plan are so flexible that they will permit us the best utilization of the mineral oils of Eastern Europe at any time.

After having fixed the highest possibilities technically obtainable in the Mineral Oil Plan together with industry it will be the task of the next months, together with the Wehrmacht agencies and as we have

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already done with the Luftwaffe, to work out the supply and storage plans as exactly as possible and to use the time for the more detailed study of the expansion planning. The further great aim will be, beyond the Greater German area, in which we can fulfil the last demands of the military economy only with difficulty to take the steps for the planning for large areas and to develop a far-sighted plan together with the authorities which are working in cooperation with South-Eastern Europe the aim of which is the ideal mineral oil supply for mobilization of the Axis powers, to include the South Eastern European economic and raw material area.

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R U B B E R .

Until the solution of Buna synthesis by chemistry, rubber was a very important raw material bottleneck, because it is only produced in tropical zones and no area of the German-influenced sphere- such as South Eastern Europe- can produce it.

In comparison to the problems with which economy and technique are faced due to the expansion of mineral oil production, the raw material sphere of rubber can now be surveyed comparatively plainly and easily. Here there were two problems. After German chemistry had developed a technical large-scale process and had placed the substitute Buna at the disposal of the rubber industry, there was the question of constructing production installations. This is a chemical and engineering problem and can be solved with the necessary allocation of labor, steel and money. It merely depends on decision, on investments and finally on the construction time. As to what an extent the production of Buna is to be carried on.

In the second place there was the question of directing the new synthetic material into the various channels of industry, which until now had manufactured natural rubber, so that the problem of manufacture was soon equal in importance to the problem of production. In broad outlines we can say that both problems have practically been solved; the questions which are still undecided can safely be solved. The time of construction of the new installations is now the only decisive factor for the extent to which our rubber requirements will be covered by home production.

Consumption and requirements.

On account of the general increase and protection of

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the motorization after 1932, the consumption increased from 48 000 tons per year 1932 to 74 000 tons per year 1936, 90 000 tons per year 1937 and 100 000 tons per year 1938. We will continue to have to count on an increase, so that in 1940, approximately 120 000 tons, in 1943 about 140 000 tons per year must be expected as requirements in rubber.

On 30 June 1938 at Berlin, 130 000 tons were fixed as the target of mobilization requirements by the General Field Marshal.

As it was described in the beginning, the Buna-Expansion plan provides for an achievement of 120 000 tons per year capacity for the end of 1942. Thus, the German production will amount to 26 000 tons per year in 1939, in 1940 to approximately 48 000, in 1941 to 81 000, in 1942 to 103 000, in 1943 to 120 000 tons per year.

Until the start of full production, a certain gap will therefore continue to exist in the next few years, which, as before must be filled by the import of natural rubber. The requirements not covered will however decrease very much. While in the year 1939, 34 000 tons per year will still have to be imported, in 1940 there will only be 72 000, in 1941 44 000, in 1942 24 000 and in 1943 finally 20 000 tons.

Planning and further expansion.

The first previous plan provided for the erection of 4 plants for approximately 2 000 tons per month - 24 000 tons per year each for execution of the production project. With regard to the difficulties concerning material and labor, however, we consider that at the present time a quick

and simpler way to achieve this would be the enlargement of the two plants Schkopau and Huels which have been started, and which are to be increased to such an extent that the capacity of the Schkopau plant will amount to approximately 60 000 tons per year of Buna and the capacity of the Huels plant to approximately 40 000 tons per year of Buna, where, on the basis of the last agreement, the production at Huels will be converted to a variation of Buna, namely Levulken, on a larger scale,

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because, according to the available results, this has proved to be a technical advance with regard to the manufacture of Buna. Originally, it had been planned to execute the further extension of the Schkopau and Huels plants according to the so-called Reape-process, using formaldehyde and the butadiene synthesis, by which a simplification of Buna synthesis would have been effected. At the present time, the technical elaboration of this process is not yet advanced to such a degree that we can make the further expansion according to this process without the utmost risk and additional strain on the chemists and engineers. Therefore, at the suggestion of I.G. Farbenindustrie, the extension up to the fixed amount, for production of a total of 100 000 tons per year, according to the four-stage process will continue. That is also because in the meantime with regard to the four stage process too quite considerable further advantages were able to *) be effected in the performance of the apparatus units, so that from an economic point of view too no disadvantage in price policy arises to-day in the expansion according to this four-stage process. We however obtain the greatest assurance for a continuous and regular production with this process.

The extension planned further to 120 000 - 140 000 tons per year in the projected third Buna-plant, as the site for which Fuerstenberg (Oder) or a site in the Sudeten area are being discussed, and about the expansion of which decisions must be made in the first half of 1940, in order to achieve the production of 120 000 tons per year demanded by the end of 1942, can however most probably be effected with the application of the Reape-process. The development work is being

- *) for instance with 6 carbide stoves calculated for 24 000 tons Buna per year. According to present conditions, only four stoves are still necessary for 40 000 tons per year, at the same time also provides a possibility for diverting carbide for other purposes. It was possible to increase the exploitation of butadiene from 70% to 85%.

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carried on with the greatest intensity and according to I.G.'s opinion, promises to be successful after a further year's development.

Introduction of Buna into the rubber-manufacturing industry.

The work for the facilitation of the introduction of the Buna into the rubber industry has for the greatest part had the necessary results and has developed very satisfactorily.

Together with the industry, a detailed program has been set up for the manufacture of 100 000 tons of Buna per year at the end of 1942.

According to the opinion of the manufacturing rubber industry, the quantities which were planned for manufacture up to the middle of 1940, can already be manufactured safely according to the present state of development. By the end of this year, the rubber industry believes it will be able to take up quantities accruing above this too in future.

Buna in automobile tires.

In the course of the year 1938, the suitability of the 70% Buna tire for passenger cars was tested by large scale road tests and a very satisfactory result found. At an average speed of 90 km and full load capacity, the performance of the tested Buna tires in case of the top qualities have surpassed the performance of natural rubber tires by at least 25% on the average. In any case, all firms have reached the level of a good German natural rubber tire. In case of continuous strain for constant operation the Buna tire develops a higher temperature, which, however, is rendered unimportant to a great extent because of Buna's greater heat resistance.

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it makes expedient however not to drive with Buna tires at speed of more than average of 110-115 km per hour and to avoid temporary maximum speeds of more than 125 km per hour. It must be stressed expressly that this is a safety measure only so as first to get acquainted with the full reaction of the market caused by requirements because under all circumstances it must be avoided that a discredit occurs. A performance of 115 km per hour is, however, no discredit to Buna but the tire complies 95% with the requirement of all motor vehicles. It is not right to believe that these 5% at average speeds of more than 120 km per hour are decisive because one has also to consider that the pure natural rubber tire if it is strained to average speed of 130-140 km per hour its performance goes down to 20-30% of its proper performance at a speed of 100-110 km per hour. As far as the raw material is concerned and apart from the uneconomical additional fuel consumption at such speeds the present development of the motor vehicle industry toward ever increasing average speeds cannot be diverted and the Fuhrer himself made a statement to this effect this spring at the opening of the Automobile Exhibition. It is however possible to have the conviction that 1-2 years it will no longer be a problem to produce natural rubber tires and Buna tires of the same capacity at higher average speeds. The development of these works has been begun.

Within the next few days the driving tests with giant balloon tires, the outer cover of which is made out of Buna whilst the inner part is made of natural rubber, will also start.

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State of the production.

The increase in the production at Schkopau which was originally planned to begin January this year, became effective this March only, the delay being caused by disturbances in the compression plant arising from insufficient equipment of the workshop. It has however been possible to keep up the estimates originally given i.e. in May an output of 1500 tons per month and in June of 1800-2000 tons per month and in the following months an output of 2500 tons per month will be reached. In the year January to June 1940 an output of 3300 tons per month will presumably be reached and if Buna starts operating in July 1940 according to plan

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one could count on a production of approximately 5 000 tons per month, i.e. 60 000 tons per year beginning with July 1940. The further increase will then take place after mid-1941, i.e. after the termination of the further expansion stages at Schkeudau and Huesla, the construction of which has been begun, i.e. in mid-1941, beginning with July/August approximately, 8 000 - 8 500 tons per month i.e. approximately 100 000 tons per year of Buna will be available.

The extension of the Buna plant Huesla is progressing according to schedule. All the buildings necessary for the first stage of the expansion are already progressing.

Summary.

The problems of the raw material sphere rubber can in future too be solved by making use of the possibilities offered by the German raw materials (which is the more important as in this regard the Southeastern area and the remaining parts of Europe offer no possibility of alleviation.) The import of natural rubber mostly comes from the British production territory against payment of ready foreign exchange, to a smaller degree by way of clearing and from Brazil. Other sources of the world market play an

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insignificant role. The production of the auxiliary materials, such as soot etc. out of German raw materials is possible and is at present being worked out systematically in detail.

As far as rubber is concerned the military economic questions can be considered as solved by 1942/43. Moreover, there is a further possibility of increasing the output by utilizing the waste gases which are developed in the plants producing mineral oil in connection with the extension of the production of mineral oil. Later on the waste gases of the mineral oil plant which are now being extended will play a part.

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Light metals.

The field of light metals too is a strictly defined and self-contained field. It is the peculiarity chemical affinity of light metals that their production is to a very considerable extent a problem of the expenditure of power.

Therefore production of light metals simultaneously means making available power. As the production of light metals requires only a low consumption of steam and heat mainly for its preliminary materials, later power is to be considered as the typical source of energy for the future large-scale production of light metals.

The great importance of the light metals lies, as already mentioned earlier, not only in the sphere of the Luftwaffe and the construction of airplanes or vehicles respectively but also in the sphere of the substitution for any metals in short supply. In this connection one should remember the long distance power transmission lines made from aluminium instead of copper or the dioxided metal fittings as substitutes for brass. (Translator's note: this paragraph is crossed out in original).

Only magnesium can actually be called a purely German metal which is obtained from waste materials of the potassium industry and out of German Carnallite magnesite or dolomite. Aluminium is dependent on foreign countries because of its preliminary material bauxite. A far sighted stockpiling policy has fortunately caused approximately one and half years supply of aluminium in the form of bauxite to be stored in Germany. The close relations with the Southeastern space brought nearer the important bauxite deposits in Hungary and Yugoslavia and later also the Rumanian bauxite supplies which partly will yet have to be opened up so that with regard to aluminium too it is possible to speak of a secure position as far as military economy raw materials are concerned.

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On the whole the military economic problem of the production of light metals is dependent only on the decision of how far the production of light metals out of aluminium and of magnesium can be pushed with regard to its practicability.

Aluminium.

While at the end of 1933 an aluminium capacity of approximately 44 000 tons per year was reached in 1936 it already amounted to 104 000 tons, 1937 to 153 000 tons and at the end of 1938 to 192 000 tons. At the end of 1939 this capacity shall be increased to 204 000 tons per year according to the plan. In a steady further extension the final objective target set of approximately 250 000 tons per year will be reached in 1942 according to the plan.

The present equipment of the aluminium electrolyses with Soderberg electrodes makes the construction of new special anodes and oral factories superfluous and makes the partial re-use of the kryolith required as flux appear possible.

Special attention is paid to the importance of the utilization of scrap which in 1936 amounted to approximately 21 000 tons and which increase to approximately 55 000 tons by 1942.

As already pointed out, the very favorable development of the bauxite situation in Southeastern Europe makes the question of the utilization of German alumina for the production of aluminium less pressing, the more so as the efforts to make aluminium a "purely German raw material" will always be connected with heavy expenses and requirements of power.

Production with the increased capacity provided for in the Aluminium Expansion Plan was taken up according to schedule in 1938/39 at Launon, Bitterfeld and Teeging.

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Launon 1. Expansion 0 - 10,000 tons of aluminium per year
date set : September 1938
started : 15 September 1938

Launon 2. Expansion 10 - 21,500 tons per year of aluminium
date set : November 1938
started : 15 November 1938

Bitterfeld 3. Expansion 26 200 - 31 200 tons of aluminum per year
date set : November 1938
started : 20 November 1938

Tocring

3. Expansion 32 500 - to 40 500 tons of aluminum per year
date set : April 1939
started : 1 April 1939

Total increase of aluminum capacity since July 1938 until April 1939 :
34 500 tons per year.

The capacity necessary for the unprocessing of the alumina was also completed according to schedule.

Luonen 1. Expansion 0 to 40 000 tons of alumina per year which corresponds to approximately 20 000 tons of aluminum per year.

date set : December 1938
started : December 1938

Manganese

The extension in the period from 1933-1936 from a capacity of 1 800 tons per year to 17 700 tons per year was mainly necessitated by the requirements of the Luftwaffe.

In 1936 the production amounted to only 13 000 tons per year, so that a free capacity of approximately 4 700 tons per year existed. In the meantime our efforts to carry out a number of measures to use magnesium instead of other metals especially in the electric, vehicle and metal goods industries have been successful. Magnesium has also become quite useful synthetic for wehrmacht implements.

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part from its light weight it is easy to work and provides a possibility for producing finished parts in the pressure and gravity die casting process as well whereby even differences in the prices as compared with iron can often be bridged. At the end of the year 1938 the capacity and production had just been balanced so that by now the increase of magnesium capacity can again be considered.

The perfection of development work which has been begun in the meantime in the construction of vehicles and airplanes and also the probable requirements of the Volkswagenwerk for "Volkswagen" (people's cars) and small tractors, necessitate the further systematic expansion of magnesium production. As objective for the end of 1940 a capacity of 22 000 tons per year and for the end of 1941 a capacity of approximately 31 000 tons per year is planned.

The present electrolytic processes have meanwhile been transplanted by the so-called thermal processes (Adventlein: reduction of magnesite by carbon and I.G.: reduction of dolomite by silicon) so that after a successful continuation of the large-scale experiments which are being made at present and which promise a saving in investments and power, these new processes can probably be considered.

Starting exploitation of the princely which previously had not been

fully utilized was provided for in the planning for the period from December 1938 to February 1939.

Operation of the S t a s s f u r t plant was started in December 1938 according to plan with 4 100 tons of magnesium and operation of that part of H e r l i n s e n which previously had not been utilized was started in February 1939 with 500 tons of magnesium.

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Value of the German production.

In summarizing, it will be interesting to compare the value of the production of mineral oil, Buna and light metals to-day with their increase up to the target for the expansion. As far as mineral oil and Buna are concerned this value constitutes foreign exchange values in a certain sense. It is very difficult to appraise the value of the light metals. Here too, however the price on the world market shall be taken for comparison.

Mineral oil: present average value

Aviation gasoline	RM 100,- per ton
automobile gasoline	" 65,- " "
Diesel fuel	" 40,- " "
Fuel oil	" 30,- " "
lubricating oil from	" 300,- to RM 70,- per ton
at an average of	" 160,- per ton

The value of the German production amounts therefore to :

	<u>total in tons</u>			
1938	2 440 000	"	million RM	154
1939	2 750 000	"	" RM	186
1940	3 700 000	"	" RM	260
1941	4 500 000	"	" RM	340
1942	5 400 000	"	" RM	420
1943	8 300 000	"	" RM	552

Buna: Present average value of natural rubber - RM 0.90 per kg - RM 900,- per ton

The value of the German production amounts therefore to :

	<u>tons</u>			
1938	5 000	"	million RM	4,5
1939	26 000	"	" RM	23,5
1940	48 000	"	" RM	43,0
1941	81 000	"	" RM	73,0
1942	103 000	"	" RM	95,0
1943	120 000	"	" RM	108,0

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Aluminium: (53rd " ")

Price in Germany	1350 Reichsmark per ton
price on the world market	1150 " "

The value of the German production therefore amounts to

	<u>tons</u>		<u>million Reichsmark</u>	
1938	165 700	-		190
1939	195 000	-	" "	224
1940	200 000	-	" "	230
1941	225 000	-	" "	250
1942	240 000	-	" "	275

Magnesium:

price in Germany	1700 Reichsmark per ton
price on the world market	1600 " " "

The value of the German production amounts therefore to

	<u>metric tons</u>		<u>million Reichsmark</u>	
1938	13 000	-		20.8
1939	17 500	-	" "	28.0
1940	20 500	-	" "	33
1941	26 000	-	" "	41.5
1942	32 000	-	" "	51.

If of these values one adds only the mineral oil and Buna figures together that is the ones which are to be considered as having real foreign exchange value, the total value of the products of the military economic production plan amounts

in the year 1938 to approximately 158 million RM Increase as against
the last year in
million RM.

1939	209	" "	51
1940	303	" "	94
1941	413	" "	110
1942	515	" "	102
1943	660	" "	145

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S u p p l y o f P o w e r

Electric current-production in own and other plants.

Closely associated with mineral oil, Buna and light metals is expansion of the power supply necessary for them. The situation in this connection are briefly summarized as follows :

To give an idea of the relative amounts it should be mentioned that for instance a Buna plant of a capacity of 2 000 tons per month needs more electric current than all the households of Great-Berlin together.

The total requirements requested in the course of the realization of the new military economic production plan are the following :

Whilst already today for the fields of

mineral oil
Buna:

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light metals
ammunition and explosives

almost 10 million kWh
are consumed which correspond to an installation
capacity of 1.2 million kW
the further expansion of the plants planned requires
approx. a further 22 billion kWh
within the next 5 years
which correspond to an increase in capacity of
approximately 2.8 million inst. kW.

To give an idea of this :
Greater Germany produced 60 billion kWh
electric current in 1938
for which an installation capacity of 17 million kW
was available.

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The expansion of power supply demanded by the new military economic production plan amounts to approximately 560 000 kW installation per year for the next 5 years for all fields.

This expansion of 560 000 kW annually corresponds to approximately one third of the electrical capacity of approximately 1.6 million kW newly installed in Greater Germany last year.

The total capacity of the German turbine and generator plants amounted to approximately 2.2 million kW in 1938 so that approximately 450 000 kW were exported. (Transl. note : illegible handwritten notation)

The new military economic production plan therefore continuously requires 25% of the present capacity of the turbine and generator plants for the next 5 years. As basic point of view for the expansion can be considered: production of power with a minimum use of fuel, that is, with the greatest effect of fuel economy. Capital should be used as little as possible and therefore there should be as little work as possible for the plants producing the power.

These objectives are reached through combining power and heat in those factories which require high specific heat by utilizing high steam pressures and steam temperatures, by increasing the individual performances of the steam boilers and steam turbines, by series work in the construction of boilers (standardized boiler) and a number of similar developments. It is therefore natural that the powerplants for the industry of the new military economic plan produce and make available the big quantities required by making full use of this technical progress. (Translator's note : latter part of paragraph crossed out; handwritten note : Request?)

The high specific consumption of current also necessitates the utmost restriction in transmission loss.

The transmission of the current over long distances involves transmission and transformation loss and defraying of the interests from the capital required for the setting up of the lines.

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The current for the big plants of the chemical industry must be produced in the vicinity of the places of consumption. To enable this, the plants are erected near coal deposits and water power.

An important point of view was the utilization of coals of minor quality which up to now had not been exploited for boilers.

Extraordinarily big quantities of immature coal or sludge coal which up to now remained in the pits and coal fields as "waste" because they could not be sold on the market are nowadays transformed into electric power in the plants of the military economic plan of production. Coal mixed with clay was previously dumped or used as waste in the lignite regions of Northern Bohemia. From now on it will be used for smelting and together with the low temperature coke obtained in this way used for the production of electric power.

Mineral oil factories, Buna factories and most of the factories of the munitions and explosives group produce the electric power required predominantly by combining power and heat in their own power plants. In aluminum and magnesium factories such a combination is not necessary because of the low requirement of heat; they can use current from other plants and can be built near water power far away from coal deposits. Even for reasons of the speeded-up starting of operations they may temporarily use current generated by heat and transmitted over long distance lines they will, in the long run be mainly consumers of current generated by water power.

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In conclusion it has to be stressed again and again that the expansion of water power should be accomplished as quickly as possible. The works of the plan the operation of which will start in 1943 and 1944 could be supplied directly and partly indirectly with current, which would cause a desirable alleviation of coal requirements.

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Gunpowder, explosives, chemical warfare agents, preliminary products.

The work mentioned hitherto in the field of raw materials concerning mineral oils, rubber and light metals touch on the question of Germany's free disposal of raw materials and on the independence of the German economy and war economy from the world market.

The last vast field of work covering gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents including their preliminary products is a field which is self-sufficient as far as raw materials are concerned; it has never imported from foreign countries or been dependent on them. But nevertheless, these mass products of the chemical industry constitute key-matters of military economy, and unless they are exploited properly the military economic value of mineral oils, Buna and light metals as well as of the other raw materials decreases.

In this respect it was less a problem of the increase in

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production of the preliminary products, then the task of establishing a development target and deciding on extensive plans for the same, as was the task in the beginning and partly still is today.

Targets of the expansion up-to-date.

In the introduction the extent of the plan set up for development in the field of gun powder and explosives has already been described.

It will be of some interest to compare these figures again with the figures representing the capacity of the plants which existed at the outset of the World War and with the development during the World War itself.

At the beginning of the World War the powder producing capacity was 1,200 tons per month, the capacity for production of explosives 1,000 tons per month. It is a well-known fact that already in the very first weeks of the war, a serious lack of ammunition set in. Then immediately the construction of powder and explosives plants was begun and this steadily increased the production capacity right up to the end of war. The raw material difficulties in the field of

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nitrogen or nitric acid are well-known. Attempts were made to use make-shifts, substitute explosives (Dinitrobenzol and Chloratite) and to add nitrate of ammonia to the explosives. The Hindenburg program meant a 15-fold increase of powder production and a 36 fold increase of explosive production. In fact by the end of the war a 10 fold output in powder and a 24 fold output of explosives had been reached.

The powder and explosives production at that time was not the bottleneck at the end of the war, the difficulties lay in other branches of the ammunition production.

3,000 tons per month were reached as a peak in the output of chemical warfare agents (mustard gas *) but this was by no means sufficient to meet the demands of the front.

From 1934 on the extension of military powder and explosives plants was resumed. At that time only one factory existed: Reinsdorf.

At the end of 1936 and at the beginning of 1937 the Hindenburg program was again adopted as the target for development after it - the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials - had repeatedly assured the Army Ordnance Office and the Military Economy Staff that a program of this size could very well be put into practice if the basic raw materials were systematically secured.

In the period from 1934 until the middle of 1938, that is in 4 years, the Army Ordnance Office established the following production:

powder	5,000 tons per month
pure-high explosives 5,000t (including additional explosives	10,000 tons per month)
chemical warfare agents	700 tons per month

*) other agents of chemical warfare
are not mentioned in this context.

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that is in one year on average of

1,250 tons per month of powder
or 2,500 tons per month of explosives including extras
or 175 tons per month of chemical warfare agents.

The development and extension during World War I was much greater.
At that time the increase per annum was :

3,000 tons per month of powder
6,000 tons per month of explosives all together
(presumably including additions)
and 1,500 tons per month of "mustard gas" (only in the
last 2 years of the war).

Thus, during the years 1934 - 1938, in the field of powder and explosives
the rate of rearmament as compared with World War I, was only about 1/3,
in the field of chemical warfare agents only about 1/4!

Thus it was evident that German industry, even in a time and
under the extremely restricted conditions of that time, was able to
produce many times the output of former years. In the field of raw
materials too there were no basic obstacles for the realization of the
Hindenburg-program after 1938. Consequently, on the 13 August 1938, it
was possible to submit the so-called Schnellplan (rush Plan) to the
General Field Marshal as a joint suggestion together with the Army Ordnance
Office and the Military Economy Staff.

By exploiting every means available the rush Plan was succeeded
to reach the following development targets :

18,000 tons per month powder)	
36,000 tons per month explosives)	by the end of 1940
9,000 tons per month chemical warfare agents	by mid-1942

Present allocation of material.

The new rise in the production of powder, explosives and chemical
warfare agents which took place from that time on is characterized by the
increased use of material, which started immediately in the

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fourth quarter of 1938. While in the last quarters of 1937 and 1 April
1938 about 6,000 tons of steel per month were used by the Wehrmacht for
their development sphere this quantity decreased to 5,400 tons per month
in the second quarter, and to 3,500 tons per month in the third quarter.
From 1 October 1938, after the Rush-plan had been put into effect 30,000
tons of steel per month were allocated to plants, i.e. 5-8 times as much.
In the first quarter of 1939 the allocation was 35,000 tons per month.
From the second quarter on it was reduced to 27,000 tons per month as the
Wehrmacht held the opinion that with the other things which were necessary
for the manufacture of ammunition it would not be able to keep pace with
the increased production of powder and explosives. In consequence of this

(transl. note: reduction in the steel allocation the Rush-plan is undergoing
handwritten: a certain delay in meeting its deadlines, a delay which in
illegible some cases amounts to one and a half years.

marginal
notes)

Difficulties have arisen from the fact that the basic condition for the realization of the Rush-plan was that its demands were given the priority over all other inland orders. (Translator's note: handwritten remarks, illegible). At the outset orders were given the XP-number, just like the fortifications in the west, but this was changed and replaced later by the GS-number, effective from December. Through this shifting about considerable delay occurred in the meeting of deadlines.

Financing is done exclusively with the Reich Defense funds unless preliminary products are concerned, in which case the financing is done partly by industry.

Although the individual allocation of material is handled by the offices which have been in charge of the development scheme up to now, i.e. the Army Ordnance Office and the Military Economy Staff, a small staff of industrialists was set up to control deadlines and to supervise the work. This staff, in close collaboration with the (Transl. note: illegible various handwritten remarks in the text) other offices, is pushing ahead all questions concerning the construction of plants. Any difficulties which arise are being discussed jointly with all the firms concerned at the so-called "Bauberrenbessprechungen" (conferences of building contractors).

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(62nd " ")

(transl. note: Unfortunately the development scheme has to fight constantly against difficulties in the procurement of material and in questions concerning manpower and transportation. These were particularly great at the time when the fortifications were being built in the west. Thanks to the understanding and help of the Plenipotentiary General Dr. TOLT we are now in a position to consider our difficulties with construction material as overcome.)

In contrast to other fields of the Military economic plan in which the installations erected will constantly work, even in peacetime, the Rush-plan for powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents offers an additional problem of organization, since most of its manpower will only start operating the plants in the event of mobilization. The keeping ready of the chemists and workers of these plants is therefore a very special problem, which is being handled in excellent cooperation with secretary of state SYRUP.

In the Army Ordnance Office a special expert Colonel HERTMANN, has been appointed for the handling of these problems.

Due to the variety of the products and of the necessary raw and auxiliary materials this field of work is extremely intricate. Apart from the increase in production of the plants which make nothing but powder and explosives, which therefore produce the final product only, it involves the necessity of investigating the raw material basis and of partly developing that as well.

Besides the problem of manpower the most careful consideration must be given to the total readiness of these works for mobilization, and the problem of stockpiling preliminary materials must be taken care of especially.

The state of the expansion.

Since the beginning of the Rush-plan in August 1938 up to date the following construction projects have been completed :

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(63rd " ")

Installation	Seelichen	700 tons per month	NC-powder
"	Lietz-expansion	150 " "	" powder
"	Ueckermünde	300 " "	" pressed in plates
"	Torgelow I. expansion	500 " "	" Nitrocellulose
"	Reinsdorf	100 " "	" Pol-Powder
"	Kruemmel	150 " "	" Nitropenta
"	and 100 " "	" "	" Nitropenta
"	Hess-Lichtenau	1000 " "	" Hex gene (H)
"	Clausthal	1000 " "	" Trinitrotoluol
	(starting operation of the already finished plant)		

Increase 1938: 1,350 tons per month powder and 1,350 per month explosives capacity.

In the course of the year 1939 the following construction projects will be completed :

Installation	Torgelow 2. exp.	500 tons per month	Pol-Powder
"	Berlitz	1,100 " "	" "
"	Duenaberg	750 " "	" "
"	Hohensarten I	900 " "	" NC-Powder
"	Hohensarten II		
"	I. expansion	550 " "	" Pol-Powder
"	Kruemmel-expansion	400 " "	" Trinitrotoluol
"	Clausthal-expansion	400 " "	" "
"	H.-Lichtenau	400 " "	" "
"	Elsnig-expansion	400 " "	" "
"	Behlendorf-expansion	100 " "	" Hexogene (E)

Increase 1939: 2,400 tons per month powder and 1,700 tons per month explosive capacity.

By today the following total has been reached : 5,700 tons per month powder capacity corresponding to 32% of the final requirements and 5,700 tons per month explosives capacity corresponding to 41% of the final requirements.

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Installations finished until the end of 1939.

Installation:	Production:	Deadline in the Rush-plan	Deadlines actually met	Deadline delay in months
---------------	-------------	---------------------------------	------------------------------	--------------------------------

A) Explosives.

Reinsdorf	NP-extension (50 t per month)	1 Sept. 1938	1 Sept. 1938	-
Kruernol	150 tons per month NP	1 Sept. 1938	1 Sept. 1938	-
Hoss.-Lichtenau	100 tons per month Tri	-	1 Sept. 1938	-
Clausthal	1000 tons per month Tri	-	1 Jan. 1939	-
Elsnig	400 tons per month Tri-ex- pansion	1 Jan. 1939	1 July 1939	6
Clausthal	400 tons per month Tri-ex- pansion	1 Jan. 1939	1 July 1939	6
Hoss.-Lichtenau	100 tons per month Tri-ex- pansion	1 Jan. 1939	1 July 1939	6
Böttingen	100 tons per month Hexogene- E.	1 Jan. 1939	1 July 1939	6
Kruernol	400 tons per month Tri-ex- pansion	1 Jan. 1939	1 Sept. 1939	8
	100 tons per month H-Mexogene	1 Sept. 1939	1 Jan. 1940	4
Hoss.-Lichtenau	150 tons per month NP	1 Jul. 1939	1 Nov. 1939	4

B) Powder.

Seelichau	400 tons per month NC-powder- expansion	1 Jan. 1939	1 Jan. 1939	-
Torgelow	1000 tons per month Pol-powder	1 Apr. 1939	(NC = 100 tons (1 Apr. 1939 (powder = (1 Apr. 1939 (50% (Rest = (Remainder) (1 June 1939	
Berlitz	1000 tons per month Pol-Powder	1 May 1939	1 Jan. 1940	7
Ethenhausen	500 tons per month NC-	1 Jul 1939	1 Jan. 1940	6
Duenaberg	750 tons per month Pol-Powder	1 Sept 1939	1 Jan. 1940	4
Hohensaaten	550 tons per month Pol-Powder	1 Jul 1939	1 Jul. 1939	-

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At the end of 1939 the powder producing capacity will be 3,400 tons per month which corresponds to 4% of the final figure or 65% of the maximum production during World War I. The capacity in explosives will reach 2,450 tons per month, i.e. 52% of the final figure or 68% of the maximum production during World War I.

(Trans.Note: In spite of constant difficulties the delays experienced up to now have not been very considerable, since construction work approaching completion has been given priority as regards supplies.
margin)

By the reduction of the iron output to 27,000 tons per month and by a corresponding reduction of timber and cement supplies the production of the Rush-plan will nevertheless suffer considerable delays from 1940 on. As far as can be foreseen at present, the delay in the sphere of gunpowder production will - as has already been stressed - be as much as one and a quarter years in all. In the field of explosives there will be a delay of a year and three quarters, provided that the quantities of material which are being allocated now per month continue to be allocated steadily and regularly and that the plants can be operated smoothly by an appropriate assignment of manpower.

Work in research and development.

At this point, let us mention - without going into details - only a few problems of the work of research and development which were utilized here. Through the adoption of synthetic Diolwood instead of glycerine it has become possible to increase the development of gunpowder production in every respect. The other raw materials such as nitrogenous crops, solvents, nitric acid and sulphuric acid are also assured.

Development in the field of explosives provides new synthetic explosives (homogenes) which are built up from coal, water and air as raw materials, and which will presumably be used to a great extent.

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(66th " ")

The production of Toluol also, which as a by-product of the Benzol extraction has up to now been limited to a certain degree. It will soon, however, no longer represent a bottleneck when the process of chemical synthesis has developed in the way we hope. The development of steam regeneration as suggested by one of my honorary fellow-workers on the industrial side, makes it possible to increase the whole of the "Rush-plan" with a considerably smaller increase in the consumption of sulphuric acid.

The primary nitrogen plants we have at the moment serve as a sure basis for the entire requirements in nitrogen, in particular for Hoke nitric acid*) and ammonium nitrate. The new plant based on the cokery waste gases of the Herten Geopiric works in Ling will, in the event of mobilization, be in a position to cover the demand of the plants in southern Germany for nitric acid and ammonium nitrate and will thus relieve the strain on transportation to a considerable degree.

In the field of chemical warfare agents numerous projects which are well on the way to development have still to be finished. The ground-contaminating agent mustard gas is an agent which is especially adapted to the available German raw materials.

Possibilities for additional Increase of Production.

In summing up, it should be stated that the great possibilities which the German chemical industry has to offer our home defense

- *) An interesting illustration of how our export policy has strengthened the military power of England and France at the expense of our own, is shown by the case of Hoke- (highly concentrated) nitric acid. In the course of the past few years a German firm specializing in this product has set up plants in foreign countries and these have produced:

In France--	525	tes	of	Highly	concentrated	acid	
							per day
Poland	70	"	"	"	"	"	"
England	50	"	"	"	"	"	"
Total	645	tes	of	Highly	concentrated	acid	
							per day which corresponds to
							232,000 tons per year.

This is sufficient for the production of roughly
10,000 tons of pure high explosives per month
and roughly 10,000 tons of powder per month.

These plants were set up as early as 1934, but the peak deliveries were not until 1937/38.

The proceeds from the German port deliveries and the subsidies for construction amounted to only RM 6,700,000, for all these plants, so that the whole business may really be called an military economic clearance sale.

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as regards supplies of powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, cannot be sufficiently stressed. The present programs do not by any means attain the limits of what German chemistry can do when it is developed towards a definite end. Above all, the branch of this science which deals with chemical warfare agents has possibilities ahead of it in the growing field of basic German raw materials within the mineral oil plan in waste gases from the Hydrogenation process, and long-distance pipe gas (Ferngas) etc, possibilities which might almost be termed inexhaustible.

Necessity for a further increase of steel allocation for the Rush-plan and additional increase of production.

The following facts show already that the present slowing-down of the Rush-plan may be nothing but a short episode.

1.) The military demand for explosives and powder has, without doubt, greatly increased owing to the progressive development and vast increase of quick firing guns in all modern armies, to the unprecedented growth of the defense power through the mass-use of armor and concrete, and to the development of the Air Force (anti-aircraft and airwar) into a new large-scale consumer of explosives within modern army.

The consumption of ammunition in the German Army, therefore, in an action against an enemy equipped with modern arms would at least correspond to that of 1918 per unit. As it must be assumed that the military strength of the German nation will be drained as regards personnel, the total of the daily supplies needed by the army in ammunition, and thus in powder and explosives, will by no means be smaller than in 1918, but (Transl. Note:

handwritten addition: it must be) considerably larger.

In this connection a factor of particular importance must not be overlooked,

Even the decisive actions carried on in Spain on comparatively small points required, if each attack was to be successful,

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(6th " ")

the consumption of a quantity of ammunition in a few hours which could only be achieved by strict economy for weeks and months, along the whole of the front line. Thus the situation has not changed in this respect either as compared with World War I (Transl. Note: handwritten addition as might erroneously be concluded from the war in Eastern Asia).

During the German attack of 27 May 1918, as regards light artillery ammunition alone, a 4 days' supply for the entire field forces (over 200 divisions) was used in preparatory fire which lasted only a few hours along a 25 km front.

In addition to the consumption of the Army and Navy there has of late been a great consumption of powder and explosives by the Air Forces for anti-aircraft artillery (in all three branches of the Armed Forces and in home air-raid protection) and for bombs corresponding to the increased rapidity of fire, the amount of country to be protected and the increased loads carried by the planes. It is the Air Force in particular which will require the maximum of supply during the first days of the war and in any case many times more than the daily production. - The situation outlined here will probably apply to all modern armed forces.

2.) In the case of Germany there are additional factors which cause a larger demand for powder and explosives :

- a) The smaller the number of aircraft and guns, the greater is the need for ammunition in order to achieve the same results as are obtained with a superior number of weapons on the opposite side.
- b) Today as in 1914 the political and economic situation of Germany - a fortress besieged by the world - seems to require a rapid decision of the war by destructive blows right at the outbreak of hostilities. These naturally consume a quantity of ammunition every day which is far in excess of the war production capacity. Thus the Supreme Military Command has freedom of action only if the stores of powder and explosives are so large as to cover the demand of many consecutive actions.

The recollection of the decisive effect of the shortage of the ammunition which occurred from September 1914 onwards should cause Germany to exert herself to the utmost at the beginning of the war to make sure that in the range of her own ammunition capabilities she has absolute superiority over those of the enemy, for this may be decisive for the war.

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(6th " ")

(Transl. Note: handwritten
Note: New draft 50-60)

At least our aim should be not to expose the Command, as in 1914, to an intolerable dependence on a situation where there is a complete shortage of powder and explosives a situation for which

we ourselves are to blame. As the present production-capacity of France and Great-Britain already exceeds the final target of the Rush-plan, this plan by no means meets the needs of the Command.

Whereas our enemies from the very first day of the realization or presumably already now from U.S.A., will be assisted by supplies of powder, explosives and ammunition from the whole world, Germany will have to supply her allies with powder and explosives to a large extent, as their armament industry and supplies of raw materials are not sufficient for the requirements of a decisive war.

c) Without the documents which are only available to the German Armed Forces, it is impossible to compute any definite figures for requirements beyond these assumed and relative quantities. Nevertheless, some essential facts will lead to urgent conclusions, at least in outline.

- I. The maximum German production-capacity during the World War amounted to 14,000 tons of explosives per month in 1918. If the requirements in explosives of World War I are increased by 25% corresponding to the development of the fighting power because of the increase in population, this results in 17,500 tons per month. The increase in the consumption of ammunition caused by weapons becoming automatic means an addition of at least 100 per cent, which makes 35,000 tons per month. In addition there is the increased consumption of the Air Force, which can be assumed to amount to at least 1/3 of the two other branches of the armed forces. This makes the total requirements over 47,000 tons of explosives per month.
- II. On the whole I arrive at the same result even if I make my calculations on another basis: The current production of aviation gasoline makes it possible that in 1941 1000 aircraft will remain in the air for 6 hours daily. If 1200 of these are assumed to be bombers they can release 2,400 tons daily with 1,000 tons of explosives. Thus the current monthly needs of the Air Force in explosives would amount to 21,000 tons = 10,000 tons of high explosives for 20 raids per month. This figure seems to be correct, if we assume that the Air Force is exploited to capacity especially at the beginning of the war. It shows without any doubt whatsoever that the final goal of the "Rush-plan" to produce 19,000 tons of explosives per month simply does not meet the demands of the whole of the Armed Forces as the demands of the Army and Navy together will probably amount to 3 times the amount required by the Air Force, which would make a total amount of 57,000 tons per month for the Armed Forces for 1942.

This minimum need of roughly 50,000 tons per month which is sure to be further increased by the demands of our Allies, can only be met by a capacity of 16,000 tons per month in 1942. Even if by that time we should succeed in storing a supply for 6 months = 60 days of action, by setting aside about half of the production of the years 1939 till 1941 = 240,000 tons per month, after about 3 months there would again be a shortage of explosives as in the fall of 1914, which would paralyze the strategic freedom of action of the military command in its endeavours to bring about a decision (20 days of action per month), as the production-capacity would no longer be in a position to cover 1/3 of the demand.

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(70th " ")

3.) In spite of this very serious situation, the rush plan for the production of gunpowder, explosives and chemical weapons - as already emphasized several times - has been slowed down by the decree of 6 January 1939 in such a manner that the achieving of the final goal has been delayed up to 1 1/2 years. Beyond that an unbearable uncertainty has recently been brought into the development by the non-allocation of the required material for the carrying out of the slowed-down plan. As reason for the slowing down of the rush plan it was stated that the production of projectile cases cannot keep up with the production of gunpowder and explosives. In my opinion this decision requires an immediate reexamination and correction, because essential factors are not taken into consideration by it.

- a) The powder and explosives required by the German allies can not be supplied much more easily by stockpiling the surplus of the production which cannot be taken in by the shell factories then, in case of mobilization, from the war capacity which cannot even supply our own requirements. Italy's present capacity for instance is at the utmost 1,000 tons per month explosive and 100 tons per month gunpowder. Conditions in Spain and Hungary are equally unfavorable. Negotiations to that effect should be started as soon as possible.
- b) Powder, explosive and chemical warfare agents are for our allies especially valuable bartering materials against raw-materials. Furthermore it will be necessary to ask these of our allies who are in a not unfavorable condition with regard to labor (Italy) and raw material (Spain) now, to secure their self-supply for the case of mobilization to the greatest possible extent, because German capacity can support them in peace time only.
- c) The urgent necessity to utilize all possibilities to obtain supplies, because according to the experiences of the last war the full capacity of the production of explosives is much more endangered by sabotage and air raids than the production of the projectile case. During the last war for instance only a few individual factories for explosives in Germany could operate continuously without

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disruption caused by accident or sabotage.

- d) Powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents can be stored cheaply and without deterioration for an unlimited period and later, in the course of production of ammunition can be filled into the shell and tank cases. In case of war, each ton of stock equals 2,000 working hours saved, and that is the work performed by 200 workers in one day.
- 4.) Therefore it is important that
- a) all measures should be taken immediately in order to secure the carrying out of at least the slowed-down Rush plan.
 - b) Beyond that to carry out the Rush plan at its original speed as from April 39, there especially in view of the ammunition difficulties, it should be considered whether emphasis should not now be shifted to chemical warfare agents.
 - c) To start immediate production in all capacities which are ready.

- d) To build the required storage facilities immediately, and to accrue stocks or to hand them on to our allies.
- 5.) Besides that it should be considered whether, and in how far within the framework of the general raw material and labor situation, the possibility for an expansion of the Rush plan exists, as this seems to be necessary so that in case of mobilization the capacity will correspond to the requirements.

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(72nd " ")

Conclusion.

When on 30 June 1938 the objectives of the increased production in the spheres of work discussed here were given by the Field Marshal, it seemed as if the political leadership could determine independently the timing and extent of the political revolution in Europe and could avoid a rupture with a group of powers under the leadership of Great Britain. Since March of this year there is no longer any doubt that this hypothesis does not exist anymore. The economic war against the anti-komintern powers under the leadership of Great Britain, France and the USA, which has already been conducted secretly for a long time, has now been finally opened; as time passes it will become more and more severe.

In Wilhelmshaven the Fuehrer expressed his determination not to remain passive in view of this policy of encirclement which for the time being is economic and political but is aiming ultimately at military isolation.

I am of the opinion that from this decision the necessary conclusions will have to be drawn without delay for the economic sphere of the chemical industry as well. The following is a general outline:

Formation of a uniform wider economic bloc of the 4 European anti-komintern partners, which Yugoslavia and Bulgaria will soon have to join.

Within this bloc there must be a building up and direction of the military economic system from the point of view of defensive warfare by the coalition.

The bloc must extend its influence to Roumania, Turkey and Iran. The German-Roumanian political treaty will serve as a suitable example for the methods to be applied for the gaining of influence.

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(73rd " ")

The great importance of extending commercial relations with Russia is stressed by the gradual relocation of the German economic and export centres to the East and by the compelling necessity of utilizing the Ukraine (iron) in case of war.

The dependence of Italy and Hungary, and at present also of Spain upon our military economic support in nearly every branch of necessary supplies is known. This aid required has not yet been taken into consideration in the budget for 1942 of the quantities required for mobilization. It seems to me that from this the necessary conclusion must be drawn to extend - with the agreement of the coalition partners - the new production

plan for military economy to the other raw material production areas as well with the aim of securing the military economic autarchy of the anti-communist coalition.

On the one side we have Italy and Hungary depending entirely on German support. On the other side there is Spain with a favorable, not yet fully exploited raw material basis which is lacking sufficient development with regard to production equipment and which, if exploited immediately, could become a surplus supply area for the military economy of the coalition. Provided peace can be maintained Spain might offer Germany at least equally large possibilities for mutual economic penetration as far instance Rumania. However since communications with Spain are subject to naval supremacy in a considerable part of the Mediterranean Sea and therefore will remain an uncertain factor, the centre of development must be in Southeastern Europe.

The distribution of the spheres of interest between Germany and Italy would have to be made from the point of view of

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(74th " ")

the highest military and political utilization power for the coalition and at the same time in consideration of the scarcity of labor in Germany and the excessive high wage scale prevailing.

It is suggested that the following individual measures should be taken immediately :

A. Mineral Oil :

Planning an economy adjusted to wide areas for the combination of the German development plans with the possibilities of Southeastern Europe.

Speedy increase of Rumanian production by extending drilling activity.

Speedy settlement of the question of transportation to Germany and Italy (shipping tonnage, pipelines).

Conversion of German gasoline producing works which are favorably situated from a technical transport point of view for crude or topped (getopptes) Rumanian petroleum.

Building up a new gasoline producing installation on the basis of Moravian coal in order to shorten the transport lines for raw material and finished products in supplying Southeastern Europe.

Building of Italian installations in Albania and additional installations in Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

B. Buna .(artificial rubber)

Ascertaining the requirements of the allies.

Setting up of a Buna base in Southeastern Europe.

Conversion to Buna of those industries of the countries in question which are manufacturing rubber.

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(75th " ")

C. Light Metals.

The situation in regard to light metals is similar.

After ascertaining the total requirements of the allies, additional works should be built. In view of labor and transportation difficulties this should, if possible, be in Hungary and Yugoslavia.

D. Gunpowder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents.

As here no particularly large quantities have to be considered for transport and as the German raw material basis is sufficient for any quantity required, merely an extension of the German capacity has to be considered. This seems quite possible even with full coverage of labor requirements from Germany if only the gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents are exported but not the cases.

The export of explosives etc. is a useful exchange value for raw materials which we lack. The only difficulty in the expansion of production is constituted by the labor problem. (Here the limit is approximately 50 - 60,000 tons per month because it seems hardly possible to get more labor out of the total personnel available of the German people.)

All this planning can be realized within the necessarily short space of time only if leading men of the chemical industry are entrusted with its execution. They alone have the necessary experience in every branch, the required experts for the development (research, planning, expansion, production and transportation), the necessary influence in regard to the decisive factors in the foreign countries.

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(76th " ")

SUMMARY:

Summarizing the situation in the sphere of chemistry the situation is as follows :

Since the time when I was commissioned by the Field Marshal very satisfactory progress has been achieved towards the target set on 30 June 1938.

There was, in my opinion, some difficulty only insofar as it was caused by not quite reasonably accounted for deviations from the original plan of allocation of materials. Such deviations in my opinion lead to an unbearable spinning-out of the plan and should in future be subject to the explicit personal approval of the Field Marshal.

By the policy of encirclement manifested by the enemy a new situation is created :

It is essential for Germany to strengthen its own war potential as well as that of its allies to such an extent that the coalition is equal to the efforts of practically the rest of the world. This can be achieved only by new, strong and combined efforts by all of the allies, and by extending and improving the greater economic domain corresponding to the improved raw material basis of the coalition, peacefully at first, to the Balkans and Spain.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-232
Cont'd

If action does not follow upon these thoughts with the greatest possible speed, all sacrifices of blood in the next war will not spare us the bitter end which already once before we have brought upon ourselves owing to lack of foresight and fixed purposes.

E N D
- - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-232.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
ETO # 34079.

END

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6783
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 5 of original)

(handwritten)
To Director Dr. Jacobi, Mankur

(stamped) No. 117
Confidential

M i n u t e s

of Monday's conference of the TEA (Technical Committee) Office
on 8 May 1939.

Present: Struss, Hagge, Gorr, Hirschel, Jernecke, Schoenemann, Eisfeld,
Krolikowski, Koenig, Schnell.

Struss reports on the special meeting of Main Group I (Hauptgruppe) on
28 April 1939.

1. As Dr. Krauch's time is very much taken up by his activity in
the Reich Office for Economic Development (Reichsstelle fuer
Wirtschaftsausbau), Dr. Schneider will in future deputize for
Dr. Krauch, in the latter's capacity as leader of Main Group I
(Hauptgruppe) I.

(page 7 of original)

Tea (Technical Committee) Office. 12 May 1939.
Dr.Schn./Z.

(signature) Schnell

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 July 1947

I, Hannah Schlesinger, 20081, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant
with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and
correct translation of the document No. NI-6783.

Hannah Schlesinger
No. 20081

- 1 -

" END "

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Minister president General Field Marshal GOERING
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The General Plenipotentiary for Construction Planning
(General Bevollmaechtigter fuer die Regelung der Bauwirtschaft)
Generalinspektor Dr. Ing. TODT.
G.B. 5596
Berlin W 8, 31 August 1938
Pariser Platz 3
Tel.: 11 63 31

TODT's letter

(Translator's Note: Various Illegible
Handwritten Notations - Crossed-out)

To the Reich Labor Minister
Attention: Staatssekretaer Dr. SYRUP
Berlin SW 11
Saarlandstrasse 96

Re: Preferential labor allocation of workers being released to construction
projects in the field of plan "Krauch"

Within the next few days various construction projects in the Reich will no doubt have to be put back as not having absolute priority. Besides the constructions for air-raid protection, which I have already recommended for preferential labor allocation, I herewith request that workers being released be put at the disposal of the construction projects of the so-called plan "Krauch", for which I hereby lift the restriction on construction. The "Krauch" plan is at present in need of 13,000 workers. It is a question of about 100 construction projects. I have asked Dr. KRAUCH to submit to you without delay a list of the various construction projects, broken down according to regional labor offices, and I request you to send appropriate instructions to the Regional Labor Offices.

Trans. Note:
Semi-illegible
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Notes in
Margin:
via....
7a 3352/417/
MB
2/)

Heil Hitler!

(Signature) Dr. TODT. (?)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-1237.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

Prof. Dr. G. K. AUCH
Plenipotentiary General of the
Ministerpräsident
Generalfeldmarschall
GOERING
for Special Problems
of Chemical Production

Stamp: Top Secret

Berlin, 5 September 1939

6 copies
first copy

List of Express Project Plants, to be extended in
the event of an Emergency.

Subject: Powder and Explosives.

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
<u>Regional Labor Office Bavaria in Munich.</u>			
1	Plant for Explosives and preliminary Products	Ludwigshafen	I.G. Farben, Ludwigshafen
2	Explosives Plant	Bobingen b. Augsburg	I.G. Farbenindustrie, Bobingen
3	Plant for Preliminary Products	Schrobenhausen b. Augsburg	Hies, Berlin
4	Plant for Preliminary Products	Walden b. Augsburg	Hies, Berlin
5	PC-Plant	Kaufing b. Landsberg/Lech	DAG, Treisdorf
6	Powder Plant	Kaufbeuren	DAG, Treisdorf
7	Powder Plant	Ettringen	DAG, Treisdorf
8	Powder Plant	Reichhausen b. Ingolstadt	DAG, Treisdorf
9	Explosives Plant	Wolfratshausen b. Munich	DAG, Treisdorf and DAG, Berlin
10	Hardware Plant	Munich-South	DAG, Treisdorf
11	Explosives Plant	Alt-Getting	DAG, Treisdorf
12	Plant for Preliminary Products	Wrestberg	Deutsche Stickstoffwerke, Wrestberg und Oranien, Berlin
13	Powder and PC Plant	Kraiburg b. Muehlburg/Inn	DAG, Treisdorf and DAG, Berlin

(Page 2 of original)

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
<u>Regional Labor Office Brandenburg</u> <u>in Berlin</u>			
14	IC and Powder Plant	Hohenhausen b. Freienwalde/Orser	ISC, Berlin and DAG, Treisdorf
15	IC Plant	Friedrichswalder- Forst b. Havelberg	DAG, Treisdorf
16	Powder Plant	Gruenau/Dreitz b. Havelberg	ISC, Berlin
17	Plant for Preliminary Products	Deeboritz b. Rathenow	Wifo, Wirtschaftl. Forschungsgesell- schaft m.b.H., Berlin W 3, Pramsen- str. 17
18	Active Coal	Prennitz/Havel	Deutsche Aktiv- Kohlengesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.
19	Plant for Preliminary Products	Wildau b. Berlin	Hieg, Verein Holz- verkohlungsindustrie G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M., Weissenstr. 9/11
20	Powder Plant	Forst i. Lausitz	ISC, Berlin
21	IC-Fabrik	Christianstadt a. Pöber	DAG, Treisdorf

Regional Labor Office Hesse
in Frankfurt/Main

22	Explosives Plant	Allendorf b. Marburg/ Lahn	DAG, Treisdorf
23	Explosives Plant	Hausisch-Lichtenau	DAG, Treisdorf

(Page 3 of original)

Regional Labor Office "Central Germany"
in Erfurt

24	Explosives Plant	Eisenig b. Torgau	Wernig, Metallisch- chemische Spreng- stoff-A.-G., Berlin Lichtenstr. 25
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(Page 3 of original, cont'd)

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
25	Plant for Preliminary Products	Coswig	Vasag, Berlin
26	Powder Plant	Seelichenau b. Wittenberg/Elbe	DSC, Berlin
27	Wool Weaving Plant	Eilenburg	Deutsche Zelluloidwerke Eilenburg
28	Preliminary Products Plant	Wolfen b. Bitterfeld	I.G. Farben, Wolfen
29	Preliminary Products Plant	Stassfurt	Eggen (Kaliwerke), Stassfurt
30	Preliminary Products Plant	Magdeburg	Fahlberg-List, Magdeburg
31	Explosives Plant	Gutsen b. Magdeburg	DAG, Treisdorf

Regional Labor Office
Lower Saxony in Hannover

32	Preliminary Products Plant	Lippoldsborg	King, Berlin
33	Preliminary Products Plant	Bodenfelde	King, Berlin
34	Preliminary Products Plant	Saalze b. Han.	Riedel & Leon, Hannover
35	Preliminary Products Plant	Langelshelm	Wifo, Berlin
36	Active Coal Plant	Langelshelm	Deutsche Aktivkohle-gesellschaft Frankfurt a/M.
37	Powder Plant	Walsrode	Wolff & Co., Walsrode
38	Preliminary Products Plant	Leese b. Stolzen- au/leser	Orgacid, Berlin
39	Powder Plant	Liebertau b. Hohen-	Wolff & Co., Walsrode
40	Powder Plant	Doerforden/leser	Wolff & Co., Walsrode
41	Explosives Plant	Clusthal	DAG, Treisdorf

(Page 4 of original)

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
<u>Regional Labor Office Nordmark in Hamburg</u>			
42	Explosives Plant	Welchow i. Mecklenburg	DaG, Treisdorf
43	Hardware Factory	Wernitz b. Schwerin	DaG, Treisdorf
44	EC Plant	Boizenburg/Elbe	DaG, Treisdorf
45	Powder Plant	Dannenwalde i. Mecklenburg	DSC, Berlin
46	Powder Plant	Duenow b. Hamburg	DaG, Treisdorf
47	Explosives Plant	Ernstsdorf b. Hamburg	DaG, Treisdorf
48	Alkaline Cartridges Plant	Luebeck	Draupowork, Luebeck

Regional Labor Office Pommern
in Stettin

49	Filling Installation/Stettin for preliminary products		Chemische Fabrik-Union, Stettin
50	Powder Plant	Torgelow b. Stettin	DaG und DSC, Dynamit-A.G. Treisdorf b. Cologne Deutsche Spreng-Chemie A.G. Berlin W 8, Linkstr. 25
51	Warehouse and filling installation for preliminary products	Loecknitz b. Stettin	Orgacid G.m.b.H. Berlin W 8, Jaegerstr. 19

The Special Commissioner in the
Sudeten-German territories in Slesien

52	Plant for Preliminary Products	Aussig	Chemische Werke, Aussig
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Regional Labor Office Rheinland
in Cologne

53	Plant for Preliminary Products	Holten b. Oberhausen	Chemische Fabrik, Holten
54	Plant for Preliminary Products	Uerdingen	I.G. Farben A.G. Uerdingen
55	Explosives Plant	Schlebusch b. Cologne	DaG, Treisdorf

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cont'd)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1526
CONTINUED

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
<u>Regional Labor Office Westphalia</u> <u>in Dortmund</u>			
56	Preliminary Products Plant	Sodingen b. Borne / I.G. Farben, Sodingen i.W.	

Regional Labor Office, Vienna Branch, in Vienna

57	Explosives Plant	Ulmersfeld b. Linz/ Donau	DAG, Kreisdorf
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Regional Labor Office Central Germany
in Erfurt

58	Nitroguelidin	Piesteritz Bez. Halle	B. St. M. Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke, Piesteritz.
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(Page 5 of original)

Prof. Dr. G. V. RUCH
Plenipotentiary General of the
Ministerpräsident
Generalfeldmarschall

Top Secret

Berlin, 6 September 1939

GÖRNING
For Special Problems of
Chemical Production

5 copies
first copy

Regional Labor Office East Prussia:

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
Mineral Oil	1. Marienburg-Benzol	Marienburg/Cpr.	Stadtwerke, Marienburg

Regional Labor Office Silesia:

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
Mineral Oil	2. Fischer Plant Schaffgotsch- Gasoline	Odertal C/S.	Schaffgotsch- Benzin G.m.b.H., Gleiwitz 1, Schlossfach 296.
	2a. Hydration Works, Schlamm-Gasoline	(in handwriting)	

Regional Labor Office Brandenburg:

No.	Plant	Location	Firm
Mineral Oil	3. a) Fischer Installa- tion Bräug-Muh- land II-Sauer- mont b) Catalyza-Plant Pankow-Wald	Schwarzhof/ Leusitz	Braunkohle- Benzin A.G., Berlin C 2, Schinkelplatz 1.
	4. Refinery Erkner Parbel	Erkner b. Berlin	Chemische Werke A.G. Berlin W 35 Luftwaffenstr. 33 -36
	5. Neubrück-Benzol	Berlin-Neubrück	Berliner Stadt- Gaswerke, Berlin CC.
	6. Eberswalde-Benzol/Eberswalde	Eberswalde	Stadtwerke Eberswalde Abt. Gaswerk, Eberswalde.
	7. Gasoline-Recovery /Berlin-Weis- Plant: Holzberg-P. rlin /sensad. Active Coal	Berlin-Weis-	Standard Para- gasinfabrik Holzberg & Co., Berlin-Weissen- see, Geringstr. 37-38.
	7a. Construction Supervising enterprise	Berlin.	Mineralöl- Baugesellschaft GmbH, Berlin SW 61, Belle- Alliancestr. (Supervising all major projects in mineral oil)

(Page 5 of original, cont'd)

	No.	Plant	Location	Firm
<u>Light-Metal</u>	8.	Aluminium Plant	Lanta.	V&W, Berlin
	9.	Electrodes Factory	Berlin-Lichtenberg	Siemens-Planig-Merke AG., Berlin-Lichtenberg
	10.	Magnesium Foundry	Berlin-Ludow	Magnesiumgesellschaft, Paser, Berlin-Ludow, Kanalstr. 103.
	10a.	Magnesium Foundry	Berlin-Weissensee.	Siemens-Guss, Berlin-Weissensee, Franz-Josephstr.
<u>Rune Soot</u>	11	Rune Tire Factory	Kotschendorff near Furstenwalde.	Deka-Pneumatik G&H., Berlin O.

(page 2 of original) (handwritten): 52

Regional Labor Office Pommern (Pomerania):

	<u>No.:</u>	<u>Plant:</u>	<u>Location:</u>	<u>Firm:</u>
<u>Mineral-Oil</u>	12	Hydrogenation Work, Stettin I & II and Stettin Iso-Octane	Poelitz, near Stettin	Hydrierwerke Poelitz A.G., Poelitz near Stettin
	13	Refinery; Poelitz-Grease-oil	Poelitz near Stettin	In partnership; Deutsch Amerikanische Petroleumges. and Deutsche Vacuum Oel A.G., both Hamburg.

Regional Labor Office Nordmark:

<u>Mineral-Oil</u>	14	Refinery; Grasbrook-Bäckerei-extension, Grasbrook-Bleaching Clay and Boiler house	Hamburg-Grasbrook	Rhoneania-Ossag-Mineral-Oelwerke A.G., Hamburg 1, Alsterufer 4-5.
	15	Refinery; Rhonania-Ossag-Extension; Harburg-Bleaching Clay-extraction; Harburg-Biolcanu	Hamburg-Harburg	" "
	16	Refinery; Hamburg-Eurotank-Extension and Eurotank-transformation into ethylene.	Hamburg	Europäische Tank-lager & Transport A.G., Berlin W 8, Kaiserstr.33.
	17	Refinery; Ebano-Extension	Hamburg-Harburg	Ebanu-Asphaltwerke A.G., Hamburg 36, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21.
	18	Refinery; Heide-Topp-Plant	Hemmingstedt near Heide/Holstein	Deutsche Petroleum A.G., Berlin-Schönoburg, Martin-Lutherstrasse 61-66.
	19	Tornesch-Ethylene-Active Coal	Tornesch/Holstein	Brennerei & Chem. Werke G.m.b.H., Tornesch/Holstein.
	20	Wedel-Laboratory	Wedel/Distr. Pinnberg/Holstein	Deutsche Vacuum-Oel A.G., Hamburg 1, Sepphorhaus b.
<u>Buna-Seot</u>	21	Buna-Processing plant	Hamburg	Gummiwarenfabrik Phoenix A.G., Hamburg

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(page 3 of original) (handwritten); 53

Regional Labor Office Niedersachsen:

	<u>No.:</u>	<u>Plant:</u>	<u>Location:</u>	<u>Firm:</u>
<u>Mineral-Oil</u>	22	Refinery; Salz- bergen; De- parafining	Salzbergen (Hann.)	Wintershall A.G., Kassel, Hohenzol- lernstr. 39.
	23	Refinery; Oslebs- hausen-Extension	Bromen- Oslebshausen	Deutsche Vacuum- Oil, Hamburg 1, Semperhaus.
	24	Refinery; Mis- burg-Extension Misburg-Poly- merisation	Misburg near Hannover	Gewerkschaft Neue Erdoel-Raffinerie- Hera- Hannover, Hin- denburgstr. 27-29.
	25	Refinery; Doll- bergen-Extension and Extension II	Dollbergen/ Distr. Burg- dorf (Hann.)	Deutsche Gasolin A. Berlin-Charl. '83., Adolf-Hitlerplatz 7-11
	26	Cello-Benzole	Celle/Hann.	Staedt. Werke Celle, Celle/Hannover
<u>Buna Soot</u>	27	Buna-processing; tires and conveyor belt department	Hannover	Continental-Gummi- werke A.G., Hannover

Regional Labor Office Westphalia:

<u>Mineral-Oil</u>	28	Hydrogenation Works, Stinnes I Extension and Stinnes II	Bottrop/Boy	Ruhrroel G.m.b.H., Hugo Stinnes Werke, Bottrop-Boy, Westf.
	29	Hydrogenation Works, Hibernia Gasoline II and Hibernia Isocetane	Gelsenkirchen- Buer	Hydrierwerk Schol- von A.G., Gelsen- kirchen-Buer
	30	Scholvern-power Station-extension	Gelsenkirchen- Buer	Bergwerksges. Hibernia A.G., Gru- benverw. Herne/Westf.
	31	Schlaeser & Eisen Power Station- extension	Herten-Ian- genbochen/ Westf.	" "
	32	Blumenschel- Extension (Hydrogenation- Coal)	Rocklinghausen	" "

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-1526
CONTINUED

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(handwritten); 54.

No.:	Plant:	Location:	Firm:
33	Hydrogenation Works Gelsenberg I, III & Gelsen- berg Isooctane	Gelsenkirchen- Horst	Gelsenberg Benzol A.G., Gelsenkirchen Postfach 28
34	Dortmund-Hoerde High-pressure	Dortmund	Dortmund-Hoerder Ruetteneverein A.G., Dortmund, Postfach 866.
(Marginal Note: was altered; illegible)			
35	(whole part crossed out by handwriting; marginal notes are illegible)		
36	Hi-workshop Kaspe	Wagon-Kaspe	Friedr. Uhde, Ing. Suero, Dortmund.
37	Share-Echthausen- Extension (water- power station)	Echthausen	Wasserwerke f.d. noerdl. westf. Kohlen- revier Gelsenkirchen
38	Fischer Plant, Essen gasoline	Bergkamen/ Distr. Unna/ Westphalia	Chem. Werke Essener Steinkohle A.G., Ess. Schloessfach 169.
39	Fischer Plant, Koesch gasoline	Dortmund	Koesch Benzol GmbH Dortmund, Eberhardstr. 12
40	Fischer Plant, Krupp gasoline	Wanne-Eickel /Westphalia	Krupp Treibstoff- werke GmbH, Essen.
41	Fischer Plant, Victor gasoline	Castrop- Rauxel	Gewerkschaft Victor, Muenster/J, Stick- stoffwerke, Benzin- werke Castrop-Rauxel
42	Refinery: Rauxel- phenol-Cresol	Castrop- Rauxel	Ruetgers-Werke A.G., Berlin W 86, Luetzow strasse 33-35.
43	Refinery: Castrop-Rauxel- Tar distillation	Castrop- Rauxel	Gesellschaft f. Teer- verwertung, Duisburg- Meiderich.
44	Benzole, Augusto- Victoria-Extension II	Marl /Distr. Rockling- hausen	Gewerkschaft Augusto Victoria, Marl/Huels
45	Horne-Benzole	Horne/Westf.	Gewerkschaft d. Stein- kohlensbergwerks Fr.d. Gr., Horne/Westphalia.
46	Hansemann-Benzole	Dortmund- Hengedo	Gelsenkirchener Berg- werks A.G., Gruppe Dortmund, Dortmund, Katharinenstr. 9.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1526
CONTINUED

(handwritten): 55
(page 5 of original)

	<u>No.:</u>	<u>Plant:</u>	<u>Location:</u>	<u>Firm:</u>
	47	Heinrichs-Huetten-Benzole	Hattingen/Ruhr	Ruhrstahl A.G., Witten/Ruhr
	48	Detmold-Benzole	Detmold	Staedt. Gas- & Wasserwerke, Detmold
<u>Light Metals</u>	49	Alumina factory	Luenen	Vereinigte Alumi- niumwerke A.G., Berlin W 8,
	50	Coking process of Rauxel pitch		Verkaufsvereining, f. Teererzeugnisse
<u>Buna-Soot</u>	51	Buna factory	Huels near Marl	Chemische Werke Huels GmbH., Huels
	52	Power Station for Buna Factory, Huels	Huels near Marl	Steinkohle-Elektri- zitaets-A.G., Essen
	53	Gas soot factory	Dortmund	Russwerke GmbH., Dortmund
<u>Chemistry</u>	54	Nitrogen Extension plant	Castrop- Rauxel	Gewerkschaft Vik- tor, Castrop-Rauxel
	55	" "	Wanne-Bickel- Herne	Bergwerksges. Hibernia A.G., Herne i. Westphalia
<u>Regional Labor Office Rheinland:</u>				
<u>Mineral-Oil</u>	56	Hydrogenation Plant Rheinbenzin I & II	Wesseling near Koeln	Union Rhein. Braun- kohlen-Kraftstoff- A.G., Koeln
	57	Rheinbenzin for railroads	Wesseling near Koeln	Koeln-Bonner-Eisen- bahnen A.G., Koeln
	58	Rheinbenzin , power	Borrenrath near Koeln	Braunkohlen & Bri- kettwerke Roddergr- be AG, Bruehl Distr. Koeln
	59	Rheinbenzin, Over- land Power Trans- mission	Knapsack- Wesseling	Rhein. Westf. Elektr. zitaetswerke A.G., Essen
	60	Fortuna Briquettes (for Rheinbenzin)	Niederaussom near Koeln	Rhein. Aktienges. f. Braunkohle Bergbau & Brikettfabrikation Koeln.

(handwritten): 50
(page 6 of original)

No.:	Plant:	Location:	Firm:
61	Hydrogenation Plant Oppau; High Pressure Hydrogenation Experiments Oppau-Tanol " " By-products " -Wl-plant Refinery Oppau-Oil Experiments HA-plant Lu.	Oppau/Pfalz	I.G. Farbenindu- strie A.G., Wies- baden, Ludwigs- hafen/Rhein.
62	(Handwritten; crossed out; Marginal notes; Illegible)		
63	Thyssen Extension	Muehlheim/ Ruhr	Deutsche Roehren- werke A.G., Werk - Thyssen, Muehlheim/ Ruhr.
64	(Handwritten; crossed out.)		
65	Share-Muendelheim- Extension (Water power station)	Muendel- heim	Rhein. Westf. Wasser- werke GmbH., Muehl- heim/Ruhr, Schloss- str. 77.
66	Fischer Plant Ruhr-Benzine II & Ruhr-Benzin- supplement	Oberhausen/ Holtien	Ruhrbonzin A.G., Oberhausen-Holtien, Rheinland.
67	Fischer Plant Rheinpreussen II & Rheinpreussen- supplement	Repehen/ Distr. Moers	Steinkohlenbergwerk Rheinpreussen, Abt. Treibstoffwerk, Bomberg/Niederrhein
68	Catalyst Factory Ruhrchemie-Holtien- supplement	Oberhausen- Holtien	Ruhrchemie A.G., Oberhausen-Holtien
69	Refinery; Duessel- dorf-Calypsol- supplement	Duessel- dorf	Dtsch. Calypsol Ges. Nickel KG., Duessel- dorf, Kaiserswerther str. 55/57.
70	Refinery; Reisholz- Rhenania-Distilla- tion	Duessel- dorf-Reis- holz	Rhenania-Ossag Mine- raloelwerke A.G., Hamburg 1, Alster- ufer 4-5.
71	Refinery; Monheim- Bleaching Clay- extraction	Monheim/ Rheinland	Rhenania-Ossag Mine- raloelwerke A.G., Hamburg 1, Alster- ufer 4-5.
72	Refinery; Meiderich Oil Distillation	Duisburg- Meiderich	Gesellschaft f. Teer- verwertung mbH., Duisburg-Meiderich.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. VI-1526
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No.	Plant:	Location:	Firm:
73	Refinery: Duisburg-ter- distillery	Duisburg	Rudgers-Werke AG. Berlin W 35, Lutzow- strasse 33/35.
74	Thyssen 4/6/3/7 Benzol purifi- cation extension	Duisburg-Ems- born	Colsonkirchner Berg- werke AG., Gruppe Emsborn, Duisburg- Emsborn.
75	Dusseldorf- Benzol	Dusseldorf	Oberlapp, ermeister der Stadtwerke Duss- seldorf, Dusseldorf.
76	Benzol: Casthof-Rodenkir- chen-activated coal	Rodenkirchen Rhein	Chem. Fabrik Roden- kirchen, Ernst Osk. AG, Rodenkirchen/ Rhein.
77	Plant for re- extraction of Gasoline Koeln- Dellbrueck- activated Coal	Koeln-Dell- brueck	Radium-Gummiwerke GmbH., Koeln-Dell- brueck
78	Lahn-Fat acid extension	Wuppertal- O'Barren	Aug. LUEH & Co. GmbH., Seifen- u. Glycerin- fabrik, Wuppertal- O'Barren.

Light metals

79	Aluminiums orth Bergheim/ (Aluminium Kon- sult)	Bergheim/ Wirt.	Martinswerk GmbH. Bergheim/Wirt.
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Dung. Soot

80	Preparation of Dung	Leverkusen	IG-Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen
81	Gas soot plant	Walschleben b. Koeln	August WAGELIN, Wal- schleben b. Koeln.

Chemistry

82	Pressurized Benzol	Leverkusen	IG-Farbenind., Leverkusen.
83	Heavy pressing plant	Troisdorf b. Koeln	Dynarit AG. Trois- dorf b. Koeln
84	Pressing plant	Wahn b. Koeln	Elektro-Isolierwerk, Wahn b. Koeln.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. IT-1526
CONTINUED

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85	Pressing plant	Porz b. Koeln	MEYER & Co. AG., Porz b. Koeln.
86	Pressing plant	Essen	Presswerk AG., Essen, Schliessfach 605.
(page 8 of original)			
87	Crustic soda	Stolberg/ Rhld.	Kalichemie AG., Stolberg/Rhld.

Regional Labor Office Hessen:

Mineral Oil

88	Darmstadt- Benzol	Darmstadt	Oberbuergermeister der Landeshauptstadt Darmstadt, Stadt- werke Darmstadt, Darmstadt.
89	Frankfurt/Main Ethylization	Frankfurt/ Main	C. Erich WOLFE AG., Frankfurt/Main, Schillerstr. 28.
90	Weiskirchen Cokepit	Weiskirchen/ Taunus	Georg SCHUMPF Erste Sueddeutsche Coresin- fabrik Frankfurt/ Main, Bruchenburg- weg 101.

Light Metals

91	Argillaceous earth (Tonerde- aluminium)	Immenburg	DYMEKOFF-Portland- zementwerke, Immenburg
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Buna-Soot

92	Buna-tire plant	Fulda	Gummiwerke Fulda, Fulda.
92a	Buna-manufactu- ring plant (Verarbeitungs- anlage).	Hanau	Deutsche Dunlop- Gummi-Co., AG., Hanau.
93	Nitric acid	Koechst.	IG Farbenindustrie, Koechst.

Regional Labor Office Central Germany:

Mineral Oil

94	Lounswerk: Lignification plant Heckrath I, III u. extension;	Lounswerk	Armonickwerke Lorse- burg GmbH., Louna- werke b. Lorseburg.
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-1526
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

Leuna-Tinol-Vers.
" -P-52
Lubricating Oil
Leuna-T-Vers.
" -SS-903
Leuna-Grude-contrast

- 95 Hydration-plant Trooglitz b. Braunkohle-Benzin
Erbbag-Zeitz I u. II Zeitz A.G., Berlin C 2,
Schinkelplatz 1.

(page 9 of original)

- 96 Hydration plant Magdeburg- Braunkohle-Benzin-
Erbbag Magde- Rothensee A.G., Berlin C 2,
burg-extension Schinkelplatz 1.
- 97 Hydration- and Krump b. Luetz- Wintershall A.G.,
Fischer-plant kendorf Kr. Hassel
Wintershall I Quersfurt
u. II Luetzken-
dorf, Lubricating
Oil (Refinery)
- 98 Luetzendorf- Krump b. Motorfabrik Luetz-
Gt lyst Luetzendorf/ kendorf GmbH.,
Mersburg Krump-Geiseltal.
- 99 Coking plant Greitzschen- Verschen-Weissen-
Greitzschen- Kretschau b. folder Braunkohlen-
extension (Schwe- Zeitz A.G., Halle/Saale,
lerci) Brinzenstr. 16
- 100 Coking plant Weissenft- Kohlenveredlung
Rosag-extension Coelzau u. Schmelwerke A.G.,
and Rosag-con- Kr. Dessau Berlin NW 40,
struction Alexanderufer 8.
- 101 Coking plant (Schmelerei) Bitteritz Grube Leopold A.G.,
Bitteritz-Gasoline Kr. Dessau Bitterfeld,
refinement
- 102 Coking plant Nachterstedt M. Riobekische Kon-
(Schmelerei) b. Quedlin- tenwerke A.G., Halle/
Concordia-Wer burg Saale, Mersburger-
str. 155-157.
- 103 Coking plant Offleben Kr. Braunsch. Kohlen-
(Schmelerei) Helmstedt bergwerke A.G.,
Offleben-extrac- Helmstedt-Brachw.
tion of gasoline
- 104 Lignite: Luecheln/ Deutsche Grube A.G.,
Elise II Geiseltal/Gr. Halle/Saale 2,
conversion Mersburgstr.
155-157.

(Page 9 of original, cont'd)

105	Refinery: Dang-Rositz III	Rositz Kr. Altenburg/ Thuer.	Deutsche Petroleum AG, Berlin-Schoene- berg, Martin- Lutherstr.61-66.
106	Nordhausen- used oil distil- lory	Salza b.Nord- hausen	Spengemann & Co., Nordhausen(Harz)
107	Kerseburg-Benzol	Kerseburg	Stadtwerke Kerse- burg, Kerseburg.
108	Wittenberg- Benzol	Wittenberg	Elektrizitaets-u. Gasversorgung Wit- tenberg, Luther- stadt.
109	Motor-fuel Halle-Klitzsch.	Halle/Saale	Werke der Stadt Halle AG. Halle/ Saale, Riebeck- platz 1.

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Light metals

110	Aluminium plant	Bitterfeld	Aluminiumwerke GmbH., Bitterfeld.
111	Magnesium plant	Aken	Magnesiumfabrik Aken (IG Bitterfeld)
112	Magnesium plant	Stassfurt	Magnesiumfabrik Stassfurt (IG Bit- terfeld)
113	Magnesium plant	Heringen	Wintershall AG., Kassel.
114	Aluminium plant	Aken/Albe	Aluminiumwerke GmbH., Bitterfeld.

Gun Soot

115	Gun-fabrik	Schkopau	Gunwerke GmbH., Schkopau.
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Chemistry

116	Plastiziser Lecithin Ester Adipic Acid Phenol Oil Extraction of Phenol	Leuna	Ammoniakwerk Kerseburg GmbH., Leuna b.Kerseburg
117	Phenol plant	Rositz b. Altenburg	Deutsche Petro- leum AG., Rositz b. Altenburg.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-1528
CONTINUED

(page 10 of original, cont'd)

118	Nitric acid and Nitrates, Energy	Leuna	Ammoniakwerk Herse- burg GmbH., Leuna b. Herseburg.
119	Nitric acid	Wolfen b. Bitterfeld	IG Farben, Wolfen.
120	Electrolysis of Chlorine Magnesiumoxychloride	Bitterfeld	IG Farben, Bitterfeld.
121	Electrolysis of Chlorine	Bitterfeld- Escherndorf	Malichemie AG., Salzbergwerk Neu- stassfurt, Bitter- feld-Escherndorf.
122	Electrolysis of Chlorine	Escherndorf b. Halle	Th. Goldschmidt, Escherndorf b. Halle.

Regional Labor Office Saxony:

Mineral Oil

123	Hydriation plant Erzbag -Bochlen-exten- sion.	Bochlen Bz. Leipzig	Braunkohle-Benzol AG., Berlin C. 2, Schinkelplatz 2.
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-1526
Cont'd

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No.:	Plant:	Location:	Firm:
124.	Schmelerei Espenhain (Coking plant) ter I and II powerstation Espenhain Opening up of mines (Neuaufschluss)	Espenhain Bez. Leipzig	A.G. Saechsische Werke I.G. Saechsische Werke Dresden A 24, Bismarck- pl. 2
125.	Coking plant (Schwe- lerei) Boehlen-ter- ext.	Boehlen Bez. Leipzig	A.G. Saechsische Werke Dresden A 24, Bismarckplatz 2
126.	Coking plant (Schwe- lerei) Hirschfelde- tar II.	Hirschfelde b. Zittau/Sa.	" "
127.	Coking plant (Schwe- lerei) Deutzen-ter- ext.	Deutzen Bez. Leipzig	Niederlausitzer Kohlen- werke AG., Berlin W 9, Potsd. Str. 31.
128.	Coking plant (Schwe- lerei) Dag Regis III and Dag Regis-supplement Dag Regis Gas desulphuration (Entschwefelung)	Regis-Breitingen (Bez. Leipzig)	Deutsche Petroleum AG., Berlin-Schoene- berg, Martin-Luther- str. 61-66
129.	Lignite Dag-Regis New Opening up (Neuaufschluss)	Borna b. Leipzig	Deutsche Erdöl A.G., Zweig Niederlsg., Borna, Borna Bez. Leipzig.
130.	Lignite Otto Scharf New Opening up (Neuaufschluss) (Handwriting illegible)	Jaucha Kr. Weissenfels.	A. Riebeck'sche Montanwerke AG., Halle/Saale 3, Merseburgerstr. 155-157.
131.	Refinery (Neuaufschluss) Freital-Pot- Freital-Veltel.	Schappel/Sa.	Rhenania-Ossag Mineral- oelwerke AG., Hamburg 1, Alsterufer 4-5.
132.	Heissig- used oil - ext.	Dresden-Uebigau.	Mineral-Import Gerhard Heissig, Dresden-Uebigau, Bethelstr. 47 d.

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CONTINUED

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- | | | |
|---|-------------------------|---|
| 133. Gosag Benzol | Haidenau b.
Dresden | Gosag Gasversorgung
Ostsachsen, Haupt-
verwaltung, Haidenau,
Haidenau/Sa. |
| 134. Doebeln-Benzol. | Doebeln/Sachs. | Oberbürgermeister
der Stadt Doebeln,
Betriebsart d. Stadt.
Gas-, Wasser- und
Elektrizitätswerke,
Doebeln/Sa. |
| 135. Klaffenbach-
Ethylation. | Klaffenbach/
Erzgeb. | Erster Chem. Fabrik
Klaffenbach/Erzgebirge |
| 136. Plant for the re-
extraction of Gasoline
Flupol-Leipzig,
activated coal | Leipzig | Fluegel & Peltor,
Leipzig W 31. |

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- | | | |
|--|------------------|------------------------------------|
| 137. Plant for reextract-
ion of Gasoline
Flupol-Pausa
activated coal | Pausa i. Vogtld. | Fluegel & Peltor,
Leipzig W 31. |
|--|------------------|------------------------------------|

Chemistry

- | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|---|
| 138. Phenol plant | Niederau b.
Dresden | Ruetgerswerke AG.,
Berlin W 35. |
| 139. Phenol plant | Radeboul-
Dresden | Chemische Fabrik
Heyden, Radeboul-
Dresden. |
| 140. Sulphuric acid | Muldenuetten | Staatl. Muldenhuetten-
werke, Freiberg/Sa. |

Regional Labor Office, Bavaria

Min. oil.

- | | | |
|--|---------------------------|--|
| 141. Augsburg-Benzol | Augsburg | Stadtwerke Augsburg,
Augsburg |
| 142. Landshut-Benzol | Landshut-
Bayern | Stadt. Werke-Landshut,
Landshut/Bay. |
| 143. Plant for reextraction
of Gasoline: Schwabach b.
Activated Coal | Schwabach b.
Nuernberg | Nuernberg-Gummi
F. Hartmann KG,
Schwabach/Bay. |

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CONTINUED

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Lightmetal.

145.	Argillaceous earth (Tonerde Aluminium)	Ludwigshafen	Gebr. Giulini, Ludwigshafen.
146.	Aluminum plant	Toeving	VAG, Berlin.
147.	Electrode plant (Elektrodenfabrik)	Wittingen b. Augsburg	Siemens-Planierwerke AG., Berlin-Lichtenberg.
148.	Aluminum casting plant (Spritzgussanlage)	Muenchen	Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Muenchen.

Chemistry

149.	Oppanol B & C Adipic Acid	Oppau	IG Farben, Oppau.
150.	Large research plant Superpolyamide	Ludwigshafen	IG Farben, Ludwigshafen.

Research Labor Office, South West Germany.

Research

151.	Konstanz-Benzol	Konstanz	Direktion d. techn. Werke
152.	Heidenheim-Benzol	Heidenheim/ brenz.	Oberbuergermeister d. Stadt Heidenheim, Techn. Werke, Heidenheim.

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153.	Stuttgart-Benzol	Stuttgart- Gaistburg	Techn. Werke d. Stadt Stuttgart, Abt. Gas- kokerei, Stuttgart 13.
154.	Ludwigsburg-Benzol	Ludwigsburg Wittbg.	Stadt. Gas- u. Wasser- werk, Ludwigsburg, Stadtart 12.
155.	Pforzheim-Benzol	Pforzheim	Oberbuergermeister d. Stadt Pforzheim, Pforzheim.

(Page 13 of original, cont'd)

156. Motor fuel Tuebingen/Wrttbg. Oberbuergermeister d.
Tuebingen Klaergas Universitaetsstadt
Tuebingen, Tuebingen/
Wrtt.

Regional Labor Office, Ostmark

Min. oil

157. Refinery Raasdorf b. Wien Gemeinschaftlich:
Raasdorf-cracking plant Rhonania-Oessig-Mineral-
(Spaltenlage) for oelwerke u. Deutsche
petroleum plant Vacuum AG., Hamburg 1.

158. Leopoldau-Benzol Wien-Leopoldau. Gemeinde Wien, Staedt.
Gaswerke, Wien VIII,
Josefstaedterstr. 10.

159. Uniontown-Vienna- Wien Montan-Union AG.,
Ethylization Wien 1, Schwarzenberg-
platz 18.

Mineral

160. Aluminum plant Lend Salzburger Aluminium
Grub., Lend.

161. Aluminum plant Braunau-Ranshofen Vereinigte Aluminium-
werke AG., Berlin W 8.

162. Powerstation for Ebing/Inn " "
Aluminum plant Braunau-
Ranshofen.

in
hand-
writing 162a. Powerstation for Kirchbach/Tirol Tiroler Wasserwerke AG.,
Aluminum plant Innsbruck (Address
Toeging illegible)

Buna

163. Buna tire plant Treiskirchen Semperit-Konzern,
b. Wien Treiskirchen b. Wien.

Regional Labor Office, Sudetengau.

Min. oil.

164. Schwelerei Bruex-tar Bruex-Rosenthal Mineraloel-Bauges.r. b.H.-
(Sudetengau) Berlin SW 61, Belle-
Alliancestr. 7-10.

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OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CERTIFICATION OF PHOTOSTATIC COPY
OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

I, Mrs. Ewa OPEL, Research Analyst.
(name and official capacity)

do hereby certify that I have compared the attached photostat
with the original document described as:

BBH - 270

Date: 5 September 1939

Gen. Nature: List of high priority construction-plan to be
continued in case of war)

Re: Powder and explosives)

Folder: Geheime Reichssache! No. 5230 Volume I
Room 23 Building 2

that the said photostat is a true and correct copy of the said
original, and that the original is one of the documents located
in Ministerial Documents Branch, 16 Friesenstrasse, Berlin-Tempel-
hof.

12 November 1946
(date)

Ewa OPEL
(signed)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 May 1947

I, E.J. HINCHLIFFE, 026 034, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of the document No.
NI-1526.

E.J. HINCHLIFFE
026 034.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8796
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EXECUTION
OF THE NEW MILITARY-ECONOMIC
PRODUCTION PLAN OF 12 JULY 1938
(INCLUDING THE RAPID PLAN - SCHNELLPLAN - OF 13 AUGUST 1938)
IN THE EVENT OF MOBILIZATION (MOB-FALL)
STATE ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1939

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TOP SECRET

6 copies
1st copy

Execution of the new military-economic production plan of 12 July 1938, including the Rapid Plan (powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents and preliminary products) of 13 August 1938 in the event of mobilization (Mob-Fall)

State on 15 October 1939

Following the submission at the end of August of an implementation survey for the event of mobilization (Mob-Fall) in the fields of

Mineral oil
Buna
Chemistry
Light Metals and also Rapid Plan (powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents)

the following survey gives a picture of the latest developments in planning and implementation.

General

The basic principles for implementation in the event of mobilization have been retained in their entirety according to which the main stress is to be laid on those building projects which could possibly start supplementary production within one year. Long range projects have been postponed, for the present.

The whole iron allocation of the new military-economic production plan has been concentrated in a MAX allocation for the mineral oil, Buna, chemistry and light metals sectors and has been made

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

available by the Wehrmacht in sufficient quantities, for all practical purposes, in the same manner as have cement, wood and non-ferrous metals.

Allocation for the rapid plan (powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents and part of the preliminary products) is made through the Ordnance Office of the Army High Command.

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The other part of the preliminary products will be produced within the chemical sector.

The details of the following memorandum has been laid down with the concurrence of the Military Economic Staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW EStb), and the Ordnance Office of the Army High Command (OKW WaL), and there is complete agreement concerning the individual sectors and building projects.

A. Mineral oil

Construction of the large hydrogenation plants at Pöhlitz, Gelsenberg, Boehlen, Zeitz, Melheim will be accelerated. With regard to shipping it will be investigated whether, for security reasons its construction is to be continued on another site, for instance Lausitz, or whether it is to be exported, in its entirety to Russia against oil shipments. Owing to the steel situation the Silesian hydrogenation project will only be prepared for long-range deliveries. All Fischer plants that are almost constructed, especially Ruhland, will be completed speedily.

Cracking and Topp plants will be started immediately to process mineral oil and to adapt production to possible imports of crude oil from the East and South East: Topp plant Meide/Holstein and Ostmark. Further, extension of the lignite low-temperature distillation plant at Espenhain. Of the whole Bruox project, only the lignite distillation will be continued.

Construction of the hydrogenation plants at Gelsenberg-Gladbeck, Lausitz, the Bruox hydrogenation works, also of most iso-octane plants, except those working on a basis of hydrogenation waste gases, will be postponed. The Silesian iso-octane plant will presumably be started with an iron allocation from the Luftwaffe.

The Falkenau Fischer-plant will also be postponed.

The middle vertical column in the "mineral oil" graph shows the present mobilization production assigned to the plants for aviation spirit, motor gasoline, diesel fuel

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and fuel oil. The left-hand vertical column shows the proportions when production of aviation spirit is increased, the right-hand vertical column when production of diesel fuel is increased. Fuel oil production remains practically the same in all cases.

The estimate of German mineral oil production is shown in the diagram, bottom left.

B. Buna

All construction projects for the production of buna and carbon black will be accelerated. In view of the increased load on the processing industries owing to the change-over to tires and other articles made with a high percentage of buna or pure buna, all projects for the processing industries must be continued.

The "Buna" diagram shows the probable production plan on the basis of the expansion terms which can be accounted for at the present time. There is no graph for the projects in the field of chemistry. The relative extent of the expansion is merely by the material requirements.

C. Organic Chemistry, including Synthetics.

In view of urgent Wehrmacht demands new production of certain synthetics, particularly Oppanol and polyvinyl chloride will be started. Furthermore, phenol production will be increased and the expansion of pressing plants continued, in order to cover Wehrmacht demands and the increased demand for substitute synthetics in view of the scarcity of non-ferrous metal.

Production of toluol by means of high pressure synthesis in the Poeslitz plant, as well as synthetic production from benzene and methanol for the explosives program must be accelerated with all available means.

D. Inorganic Chemistry

Supplementary buildings for primary nitrogen and nitric acid

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production will be carried out. Construction of the Linz nitrogen plant, development of highly concentrated nitric acid and conversion of plants from ammonium nitrate of lime to ammonium nitrate will all be re-started; further, the supplementation of the production facilities of the Eastern Upper Silesian and Polish plants at Chorzow, Knurów, Byry and Mosice, as well as their amalgamation into one technical plant unit will be carried out.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Development of soda production will be continued and, in view of the chemical warfare agents program, production of elementary sulphur will be commenced. Supplementary production of sodium for the production of tetra-ethyl lead will be started.

E. Light Metals

Greatest possible acceleration of the development of magnesium and aluminum capacities is required for the new building program of the Luftwaffe and for substitute synthetics in the sphere of non-ferrous metals. Since the question of power supply from the public network has been clarified, it has been possible to formulate a plan for the development of light metals which indicates considerable increases for magnesium and aluminum by the 1 April 1940 and the end of 1940, respectively.

Since idle export machinery is not to be used in the new plants of light metal works, but is to supplement production of consumer goods, the construction of special power plants is unnecessary. Production of alumina, particularly in view of the danger to the plants in the West, must run parallel to aluminum production.

The diagram shows the development plan for magnesium and aluminum.

F. Powder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Preliminary Products, "Rapid Plan of 13 August 1938" (To be carried out with the Ordnance Office of the Army High Command - OKH WaA-)

The present over-all plan remains completely unchanged. Its focal point will be those building projects which are nearing completion.

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With regard to powder it is hardly possible that, by the end of 1940, production will exceed that laid down by the plan and, judging from the result of the Polish campaign, that will hardly be necessary.

Explosives production, however, particularly for bombs for the Luftwaffe must be increased considerably, as the experiences of the Polish campaign have shown.

For explosives a "Supplementary Mobilization Plan" to the "Rapid Plan" has been set up, which includes immediate construction of two large trinitrotoluol factories. The completion of a second large hexogen plant has been planned for the middle of 1941. Production of ammonium nitrate as an adulterant and of ammonal explosives must be increased considerably. Since hexogen is a particularly high-grade component for the manufacture of adulterated explosives, the production of dinitrobenzol, as a filler, must be supplemented, over

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

and above the facilities of the chemical industry freed for that purpose, by means of new buildings.

This measure would make it possible to cover the demand for explosives, which will presumably increase very rapidly, without having to impose limitations as to the quality of the explosives.

A large-scale program, which calls for a very sharp increase in L- (Lost) production, has meanwhile been formulated for the production of chemical warfare agents.

Accelerated completion was only possible by using the carbide reserves available at the nitrogen of lime plants at Trostberg, Piesteritz and Chorzow.

If the production plants for chemical warfare agents, after completion at the end of 1940, are utilized to the full, production of nitrogen of lime at Piesteritz and Trostberg will cease from that date and production at Chorzow will cease from the middle of 1941, for the duration of the chemical warfare agents production program.

One of our new projects is the production of "Perstoff" (Per-material?) and also of special materials on a limited scale.

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The first diagram shows the "Rapid Plan" of 13 August 1938 and the Supplementary Mobilization plan. The left-hand vertical column shows, separately, high explosives, fillers and auxiliary explosives (ammonal). The middle column shows the total production of explosives, in which part of the explosives have been included as pure, high explosives, in accordance with Wehrmacht demands. Most of the trinitrotoluol will be adulterated with ammonium nitrate in a proportion of 60:40. The greater part of the hexogen will be adulterated in the ratio 15% hexogen, 50% dinitro-benzol and 35% ammonium nitrate. In addition, ammonal (with 90% ammonium nitrate) is included as a finished explosive. The suggested mixture ratio will not produce "substitute explosives" but a full-quality combat explosive, which will fulfil all requirements.

The right lower side shows the plan for powder development and above it the development plan for chemical warfare agents.

The second sheet contains the development plan for the most important preliminary products of the Rapid Plan and Supplementary Mobilization Plan: Highly concentrated nitric acid (Vekosolure) ammonium nitrate, total nitrogen requirements, as well as the trinitrotoluol and methanol demands.

A separate diagram provides a survey of the material requirements and the present iron allocation for

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8796
CONTINUED

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- 1) The sectors mineral oil, buna, chemistry and light metals;
- 2) The Rapid Plan and the Supplementary Mobilization Plan.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 July 1947

I, John FOSHERY, No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts of Document No. NI-8796.

John FOSHERY
No. 20179

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1457 PS 7
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES

Index of Documents

1935

1. Memorandum on discussion between Col. Thomas and Reich Commissioner for Mineral Oils, Herr v.d. Dacken, on 2 Oct. 1935.

Col. Thomas points out the necessity of appointing some personality to handle the fuel question for the war economy in a chief official capacity.

1938

2. Letter by Chief of Armed Forces Staff (WStb) to Wehrmacht Administration (WFA / I) of 27 October 1938.

Indication of difficulties in the field of manpower management which have come up in the execution of the Austrian and Czech enterprise. Presentation of suggestions for further preparations for the mobilization of manpower.

3. Letter of Armed Forces Staff (WStb) of 27 October 1938 with suggestions on the points discussed at the meeting of the Reich Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat).

Special reference to the necessity of reinforcing the breadth of armament in the future by intensive development of armament. In addition, the necessity of renewing and increasing the Reich Railway equipment as well as cutting down the deficiency in Commercial motor vehicles (Nutzkraftwagen).

1939

4. Memorandum on discourse of General Thomas to Chief of Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) on release of the production plan (Fertigungsplan) on 2 September 1939.

General Thomas demands clear presentation of problem by the Fuehrer in order to be able to undertake strict guidance of the armament industry. Suggestion to issue a urgency regulation.

5. Minutes on discussion between General Thomas and Wehrmacht branches (Wehrmachtsteile) on 3 September 1939.

Informing branches of the Wehrmacht on the armament situation. In closing General Thomas warns the branches, the Wehrmacht not to go their own way but to collaborate

6. Discussion between General Thomas and the Branches of the Wehrmacht on 4 September 1939.

General Thomas emphasizes the necessity for quick supply of the most necessary machinery. Result: Formation of a machine-tools committee.

7. Memorandum on discussion in the Reich Ministry of Education on 5 September 1939 of the persons handling manpower utilization.

The thought of possibly using 16-18 year olds for service with antiaircraft weapons (Flak) etc. is most seriously resisted by the Reich Ministry of Education.

8. Order of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW)/Economic Armament Department (W1 Rue Amt) to the branches of the Wehrmacht on 7 September 1939 re: urgency regulation.

9. Order of (OKW)/ (W1 Rue Amt) to the Inspectorates of the Armaments department (Ruestungsinspektionen) of 15 September 1939, re: labor supply for war factories (W-Betriebe).

Instructions to the armament industry to give every possible assistance to firms in order to get the program started without delay. In this connection special efforts are to be made towards adjustments within factories.

10. Memorandum on discussion at General Thomas' on 17 September 1939 about the formation and tasks of a planning committee (Planungsausschuss).

In view of the accumulation of the program requirements, formation of a planning committee approved as necessary by the participating offices.

11. Memorandum on participation of General Thomas in conference at State Secretary Posse's on 3 October 1939 about war factories (Kriegsbetriebe) and conversion of industrial economy.

Since no official mobilization declaration took place, and therefore no planned mobilization measures are being started, special preparations are necessary to get armament started.

12. Minutes of Discussion of Inspectors (Inspektoren) on 12 October 1939.

Special instructions to the inspectors to keep in close touch with industry. Appeal to the inspectors to put forth all energy in order to accomplish armament.

13. Memorandum on discussion of iron and steel quotas for the Army held at General Thomas' on 21 October 1939.

Clarification of the question of an increase in iron and steel quotas for the branches of the Wehrmacht.

14. Memorandum on discussion held at General Thomas' with General Director (Gen.Dir.) Lippenberg on 25 October 1939.

Allocation of skilled labor for execution of the Ju-88 program. The Army was asked to release drafted skilled workers.

15. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with Minister Funk and State Secretary Posse on 2 November 1939.

General Thomas sets forth that the present manner of managing the war could not continue because the Wehrmacht gets neither the necessary experts nor the necessary labor. Minister Funk refuses to submit a memorandum on the situation to the Fuehrer.

16. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with economic representatives on 10 November 1939.

Clarification of question how medium and small plants could be used to greater extent for manufacture of armaments. Factories are to start negotiations themselves in order to get sub-contractors. General Thomas will issue instructions for the War Economy organization to collaborate with the Economy organization in regard to this question.

17. Supplement of the Department of Economic Armament (i Rue) to the war journal of 11 November 1939.

Detailed statement of reasons why war production did not get started as planned.

18. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with representatives of Commissioner for Economic Affairs (G.B.), Reich Ministry of Economics (R.M.), Reich Ministry of Labor (R.L.), State Ministry on 13 November 1939.

Proposals for expediting conversion from peace to war economy were discussed.

19. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with Prof. Krauch and Chief of Army Ordnance Office (H.A.) General Becker on 17 November 1939.

The matter of increase in iron and steel quotas for the Krauch Plan (Powder and Explosives) was discussed. Result: Memorandum to the Fuehrer is drafted for the purpose of inducing a decision on the future execution of the munitions program.

20. Treatise of Economic Armament Office (i Rue Amt)/Raw Materials Department (i Ro) of 25 November 1939 on extension of production of powder, explosives and diphosgene (K-Stoff).

21. Decree of Prime Minister General Field Marshal Goerring of 29 November 1939.

Re: Directives which aim at the all-out employment of all economic forces in the service of the defense of the country. These directives were issued at the instance of the Wehrmacht High Command (O.K.) / Economic Armament Department (i Rue Amt). See attached memorandum of 8 December 1939.

22. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with representatives of branches of the Wehrmacht on 1 December 1939.

Discussion of execution of a new munitions and mining program in accordance with an order of the Fuehrer.

23. Letter by Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) / Economic Armament Department (W.Rue Amt) to the armament inspectorates, of 4 December 1939.

Transmittal of a discourse held by General Thomas before the Reich Industry Group (Reichsgruppe Industrie) on 29 November 1939.

The address represents an appeal to industry to exert all efforts to increase armament. The armament inspectors (Inspektoren) and commanders are instructed on their part also to influence industry along the lines of the discourse.

24. Memorandum on discourse by General Thomas at the Chief's of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) on 4 December 1939.

The Fuehrer himself has come to see that the war cannot be kept going for a long time. The war must be finished quickly.

25. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with Prof. Krauch on 11 December 1939.

Discussion of the new powder and explosives program and of the mineral and aluminum production, especially the possibility of increased efficiency.

26. Memorandum on conference of General Thomas with representatives of industry on 18 December 1939.

In his presentation (see enclosure) General Thomas appeals to the industrialists to put their counsel and the use of all their facilities at the disposal of the armament program.

In the course of the discussion the industrialists expressed the wish for a centralized and clear leadership, because otherwise the government's demands could not be met or at least not at the fixed date. General Thomas on the other hand pointed out that the influence of the Ministry for Economic Armament and War Production was limited, because it lacked authority of command.

27. Memorandum on conference of General Thomas with representatives of the Army Ordnance Office on 22 December 1939

The question of insufficient production of munitions is discussed. Army Ordnance Office maintains that its demands for an increased steel allotment were not filled by the proper authorities.

1940

28. Record of inspectors (Inspekteur), conference on 8/9 January 1940

Directives to the ordnance inspectors (trans. note: Chief of an inspectorate) as to their effort to increase armament production, in particular the production of munitions which was of greatest importance.

29. Record of conference with General Thomas on 12 January 1940.

Discussion with its proper authorities on the attitude of the Army Ordnance Office in regard to the Fuehrer's munitions program. The munitions program of the HMWA (Army Ordnance Office) can not be realized unless another program is cut down.

30. Memorandum on discourse of General Thomas at the Chief's of the High Command of the Wehrmacht on 15 January 1940.

General Thomas submits proposals of the Ministry for Economic Armament for the increase of munitions production. Result: Order of the Chief of the Army High Command, Ministry for Economic Armament, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army on the munitions program of 19 January 1940 (see enclosure).

31. Decree of Prime Minister, General Field Marshal Goering to the Reich Minister of Economics of 19 January 1940.

In closest cooperation with the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ministry of Economic Armament (OKW / Wf Rue Amt) all measures are to be taken by the Reich Minister of Economics for the speediest possible increase in production of the machine tool industry. Decree at instance of the OKW / Wf Rue Amt.

32. Contribution of the Wf Rue Amt / W Rue (Jahr Ruestung) to the war journal of 23 January 1940

Report of the discussions of the Wf Rue Amt with the Army Ordnance Office on the increase in munitions production.

33. Contribution Wf Rue Amt / W Rue to the war journal of 24 January 1940.

Reasons are set forth why the preparations for mobilization of the Wf Rue Amt could not be extended to all those important firms which produce for the Wehrmacht during war.

34. Memorandum on the discourse of General Thomas at the Chief's of the Wehrmacht High Command on 25 January 1940.

Proposal by General Thomas to postpone temporarily those programs which were to take effect only in 1941 in favor of the program for 1940. The demand of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to carry out both sides by side is impossible.

The High Command of the Navy and the High Command of the Luftwaffe have already complained that they are not receiving enough manpower, raw materials and machines.

35. Memorandum on participation of General Thomas in the discussion with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army on 27 January 1940

In the future the Commander in Chief of the Army will refuse to accept orders from the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht--such as the one recently issued for the execution of the munitions program -- unless all necessary prerequisites for their execution in regard to the require raw materials have at the same time...etc.

General Thomas sets forth that the raw materials needed by the Army etc. cannot be put fully at disposal if all other programs (Air Force, Navy, Krauch Plan, etc) are to be carried out at the same time.

36. Decree of the Prime Minister. General Field Marshal Goering to the State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Labor, Dr. Syrup, of 30 January 1940

Through and understanding with the Plenipotentiary for Machine Production the Reich Ministry of Labor is to put at the disposal of the machine tool industry manpower for a considerably increased production. Decree at the instigation of the High Command of the Wehrmacht/Wi Rue Amt.

37. Memorandum on the discussion of General Thomas at General Field Marshal Goering's on 30 January 1940.

General Field Marshal Goering informs General Thomas that the Fuehrer has decided now fully to utilize our raw material reserves without regard to possible later war yet.

General Thomas recommends also to build up reserves of completed war equipment as experience teaches that completed war equipment on hand would always be used right away and be employed for new set-ups.

38. Decree of Prime Minister General Field Marshal Goering to the Reich Minister of Economics on 3 February 1940.

Not yet sufficient decrease in production and closing of plants in accordance with the directives of 29 November 1939. General Field Marshal Goering requests suggestions on how increased utilization of manpower still tied up could be achieved for the purpose of stepping up armament production. Decree at instance of the High Command of the Wehrmacht / HM Hwz Amt.

39. Decree of Prime Minister General Field Marshal Goering to the Reich Minister of Economics of 3 February 1940.

To investigate to what extent fuel production, the construction of the third Buna factory, the cell wool program (Zellwolle) and the newly instituted fats program could be put off in favor of the powder and explosive plan and of the increase in production of power and aluminum.

40. Memorandum of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command of 3 February 1940.

Request for steel and metals for the execution of the most urgent tasks for the period of 1 April until 30 September 1940 (at the instigation of HM Hwz Amt). Enclosed memorandum of Reich Minister for Economics to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command of 14 February 1940, according to which the requested amounts of metal are being made available almost without exception. It is pointed out however that the stocks will be exhausted within a short time after the requests have been filled.

41. Memorandum on the participation of General Thomas at the conference with General Field Marshal Goering on 9 February 1940.

General Field Marshal Goering points out: Greatest possible increase in armament production for 1940 in order that the war may be won this year. At the same time continuation of the program, which would be necessary for a more prolonged war. The Führer foregoes any stretching of supplies in favor of future years. Everything is to be applied up to the limits of productive capacity.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1457-PS
(cont.)

42. Order of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command to the branches of the Wehrmacht of 12 February 1940.

Directives regarding economical use of scarce metals in connection with the discussion at General Field Marshal Goering's on 9 February 1940. At instance of Wi Rue Amt.

43. Memorandum on the discussion of General Thomas with State Secretary Dr. Syrup and representatives of the Ordnance Offices of the three branches of the Wehrmacht on 27 February 1940.

Discourse by State Secretary Dr. Syrup on the status of manpower utilization.

General Thomas points out that by far too few plants were closed of those not essential for the war effort, a fact which was admitted to be true by the Reich Minister for Economics, personally. The Reich Minister of Economics is to issue orders forbidding production.

44. Memorandum on the discussion by expert advisors of the Wi Rue Amt in the Reich Labor Ministry, Deputy of the Fuehrer, National Socialist Women's Organization and DAF (German Labor Front) on the use of female labor, on 28 February 1940

Proposals of Wi Rue Amt on the utilization of reserve supply of female labor.

45. Order of the High Command of the Wehrmacht - Wi Rue Amt to the branches of the armed forces of 11 March 1940

The war program of the GbV (Reich Commissioner) for the Motor Transport Service is to be adjusted to the program for the German State Railways, freight cars, and locomotive production, thus it is to be considered first priority.

46. Minutes of the discussion of inspectors (Inspektoren) of 29/30 March 1940

Introduction by Minister Todt. Thorough discussion of matters concerning the increase in munitions production.

47. Order of OKW: Economic Armaments Office to the Armaments-Inspectorates, 11 April 1940.

Instructions to the Armaments-Inspectorates to support and further in every way the work of the workmen's organizations in munitions production, and in addition to maintain closest contact with the chairman of the munitions committees.

48. Order OKW/Economics Armament Office to the Armaments offices in the occupied territories, dated 13 June 1940.

Instructions for the economic exploitation of the occupied territories.

49. Order OKW/Economics Armaments Office to Army (Heer) High Command/Chief of Army Armaments Department (H. West.) and BdE., dated 20 June 1940, regarding continuation of the accelerated powder and explosives plan (Schnellplan).

50. Memorandum on the Discussion of General Thomas with representatives of the Chief of H. West. and of the Army Ordnance Office, on 20 June 1940.

Detailed discussion of the directives of the Fuehrer for the changeover in war production. In so doing, strengthening of the Luftwaffe and likewise of the Naval and U-Boat program. General Thomas brings out that this could be done only at the expense of the Army.

51. Memorandum of discussion of General Thomas with representatives of the OKM (Naval High Command) on 22 June 1940.

Detailed discussion of the changeover in war production.

52. Memorandum of General Thomas' Participation in the discussion by State Secretary, 24 June 1940.

General Thomas demands immediate execution of all current proposals in the UK and FI programs that are promised by General Fromm. Further, General Thomas demands the easing of the war economy by shifting orders to the occupied territories.

53. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with Representatives of the Luftwaffe, 26 June 1940.

Detailed discussion of the changeover in war production.

54. Order of the Chief of OKW/ Economic Armaments Office, 9 July 1940, to the Wehrmacht branches: regarding changeover of the Armaments Program.

55. Letter, OKW/ Economic Armaments Office to the Commanding Officer of the Luftwaffe (Op.St.L.) Operational Staff, 10 July 1940.

Reference to the many air attacks on power and lubricant production plants, wharves and traffic installations (in particular on the Dortmund-Ems Canal). The losses in oil and fuels have taken on proportions that give rise to serious anxiety. If Flak protection does not afford sufficient security, increased use of fighter formations is necessary. Further appropriate provisions are requested to be made.

56. Communication of OKW/ Economic Armaments Office of 15 July 1940 to Four-year Plan (Vier-Jähr. Plan (VWP)), Reich Ministry of Economics (RWM), Reich Ministry of Labor (RAL) Reich Ministry of Transportation (RVM).

Instructions to these offices on the changeover in the armaments program. In order to carry out the new concentrated programs in time, everything must be done on the one hand to adjust the raw materials and manufacturing industries wholly to the new urgent Wehrmacht-programs, and on the other hand to curtail ruthlessly any production not essential to the war.

The measures carried out heretofore for easing the manpower situation must in any case be continued, as otherwise the necessary manpower can not be procured.

57. Order OKW/ Economic Armaments Office, 15 July 1940, to the Armaments Offices in the Occupied Western Territories.

Instructions regarding the economic exploitation of the occupied territories Belgium and France, in accordance with Order OKW/ Economic Armaments Office, 13 June 1940.

58. Memorandum on Discussion of General Thomas with representatives of the Wehrmacht branches 15 July 1940.

General Thomas instructs the Wehrmacht branches regarding the changeover of the Armaments Program. On the part of the Wehrmacht the continuation of the closing down measure and especially the reexamination of all factories by the "Combining Out" Commission (Transnote: Curtailing Comm.) is required. Request for loyal cooperation between the Wehrmacht branches and the Economic Armaments Office and also for the closest gearing in of the Armaments sub-offices.

59. Memorandum on Participation of General Thomas in the Discussion at State Secretary Landfried's with State Secretary Dr. Syrup, General v. Panneken and Ministerial Director Schulze-Fielitz, 17 July 1940.

General Thomas requests, on the basis of the changeover in the Armaments program, the continuation of closing down and "combining out" measures by the R.W. (Economics Ministry) and the R.L. (Labor Ministry). Particular result: R.W. immediately gives appropriate instructions to its subordinate offices

60. Order of Prime Minister Field Marshal General Goering/OKW - Economic Armaments Office, 18 July 1940.

Establishment of a new priority system for the Armaments Programs by OKW/Economic Armaments Office.

61. Order of Prime Minister Field Marshal General Goering, 14 August 1940.

Instructions for the exploitation of the plants located in the occupied French territory. Order given at the instance of OKW/Economic Armaments Office.

62. Memorandum of Discussion of General Thomas with the Chiefs of the Ordnance Offices of the three Wehrmacht branches, 15 August 1940.

Discussion of the measures that are necessary in order to carry out the changeover in the armaments program. Establishment of new priority regulations necessary in order to insure the execution of the most important programs.

63. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas with Ministerial Director Schulze-Fielitz of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munitions, 18 August 1940.

General Thomas points out in all urgency that only the most rigorous measures in the utilization of manpower will be able to ease the tense situation. He stresses that the civilian sector must make more sacrifices than heretofore, and possibly further parts of the civilian programs may have to undergo curtailment.

64. Memorandum on Discussion of General Thomas at Minister Dr. Todt's, 22 August 1940.

General Thomas instructs the minister regarding the intentions of the Fuehrer in respect to arming the army. In so doing he points out especially the necessity of increased employment of women.

Minister Dr. Todt expresses doubts from a political standpoint, but agrees in principle that, if the war is not ended this Autumn, everything must be brought to bear, even the increased employment of women, to bring about a stepping up in armaments production.

65. Memorandum on Participation of General Thomas in the discussion at State Secretary Landfried's, RTM, 29 August 1940.

Discussion of the plan for an elementary decree of the Reichsmarshal for the orderly exploitation of the economy of the Occupied Western Territories.

General Thomas stresses that for the next half year the covering of the Wehrmacht's requirements would have to take precedence over all others.

66. Communication OKW/Economic Armaments Office, 29 August 1940, to the Wehrmacht branches:

Transmittal of the order of the Reichsmarshal for the orderly exploitation of the Occupied Western Territories for the German War Economy, 26 August 1940, with instructions for execution.

67. Order OKW/ Economics Armaments Office, 30 August 1940.

Regarding the Central Assignment Offices to be newly established, "France" and "Belgium and Northern France".

68. Minutes of the Discussion of Inspectors (Inspektour), 13 September 1940.

Instruction on the orders arising from the changeover in the armaments program.

69. Communication OKW/ Economics Armament Office, 21 September 1940.

Transmittal of the directives of the Reichs Marshal for his Order of 26 August 1940 for the exploitation according to plan of the Occupied Western Territories.

Directives issued at the inst. nec. of OKW/Economic Armament Office.

Absolute priority of Wehrmacht interests, especially of the immediate needs of the troops. Assurance of the most economical use of scarce metals.

70. Fuhrer Decree - Wehrmacht Administrative Staff (A.F.W.) - Economic Armaments Office, 23 September 1940, to the Wehrmacht branches regarding increase in armament production.

In collaboration with Economic Armaments Office.

71. Supplement of the Economic Armaments Office/Armaments Department, to the War Journal, 30 November 1940.

Report on the measures undertaken by the Economic Armaments Office in the field of the Manpower Utilization and the exploitation of the occupied territories.

72. Minutes of the Discussion of Inspectors (Inspektour), 11 December 1940.

Detailed discussion of the possibilities of a further shifting of assignments to the occupied territories for the purpose of stepping up the armaments program.

1941

73. Memorandum on discussion of General Thomas at Minister Dr. Todt's on 9 January 1941.

Thorough discussion of the possibilities for the acquisition of further manpower for armament. General Thomas again brought up the question of womenpower. Minister Dr. Todt, however, took the view that compulsory service for women could not be considered at present for political reasons, that everything, however, should be done on a voluntary basis in order to fit women better into labor operations.

74. Memorandum of discussion of General Thomas at State Secretary Koerner's and State Secretary Neumann's on 13 February 1941.

When the question of rear armization of urgent matters came up General Thomas pointed out that it was necessary to guarantee the supply industries, the mining industry and traffic.

75. Minutes of inspector's discussion of 22 February 1941.

General Thomas stresses in his address the necessity of arranging armaments for total war on the basis of ever increasing demands. The limitations in the civilian sector resulting therefrom will have to be counted on for some time. An appeal to national economy to be ready to assume the same burdens as the soldier in the field.

76. Memorandum on participation of General Thomas in the discussion of Reich Transportation Minister on 25 February 1941.

Thorough discussion of the measures to be adopted for the removal of transportation difficulties.

General Thomas points out that by no means should disturbances be allowed to arise which might lead to a shut-down, in plants which produce for the special task S and SS.

77. Communication OKW/VI Rue Amt Reich Minister of Economics of 30 April 1941 to the Wehrmacht branches.

Transmittal of the new version (released 26 August 1940) of regulations for the execution of the order of the Reichsmarshal for the systematic exploitation of the occupied western territories. The new version was worked out jointly by the Economic Armaments Office and the Reich Ministry of Economics.

78. Memorandum of Discourse of General Thomas at the Reichsmarshal's on 26 June 1941.

The Reichsmarshal expressed his appreciation and thanks to General Thomas for the development of the economic organization East. He then established anew that the Economic Armaments Office was the only office which gave him the correct economic support. The preliminaries for the economic organization East represented a particularly valuable piece of work.

79. Order OKW/VI Rue Amt to the Armament Inspectorates on 16 July 1941.

Utilization of the Armament Inspectorates on the field of exchange of authorities. Manpower and production authorities who are at liberty because of retrenchment in production for the army, are to be utilized in production for the Luftwaffe. (Luftwaffenfertigung.) Easing of bottleneck areas by shifting orders.

80. Order OKW/VI Rue Amt to the Wehrmacht branches of 21 July 1941 in regard to change-over in armament production.

Demarcation of new concentrated programs throughout the Wehrmacht branches, ruthless retrenchment or stoppage of all production non-essential for war, immediate withdrawal of all orders over and above those absolutely necessary to build up reserves or replacements, etc.

81. Letter of Chief OKW/WM Rue Amt to the VJF (Four-Year-Plan), RLM (Reich Air Ministry), RMI (Reich Labor Ministry), RVW (Reich Transportation Ministry) dated 10 August regarding change-over of armament.

Demands of further retrenchments on part of civilian sector in order to carry out the change-over of armament in accordance with the Fuehrer order. Renewed allusion to mobilization of woman power reserve.

82. Letter OKW/WM Rue Amt dated 4 November 1941.

Transmittal of an order worked out in cooperation with the Economic Armaments Office of the Reichsmarschal regarding attention to be given to the armament plants and other plants in the industrial economy of the newly occupied Eastern territories, dated 28 October 1941, to the competent authorities.

1942

83. Order OKW/WM Rue Amt dated 14 January 1942.

Coordination of war-essential programs in field of railroading into the concentrated program of the Wehrmacht.

84. Minutes on discussion of General Thomas with industrialists on cooperation between Capital and Labor, on 26 January 1942.

Thorough discussion of the possibilities of increase in armament production.

Especially, the necessity of more definite conversion to war economy, liberation of workers through systematic production, concentration of production to maximum performance, new basic regulations for employment of women.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1457-PS
(cont.)

85. Letter OKW/Wi RueAmt to the Wehrmacht branches dated 4 February 1942.

Directives regarding utilization of industrial plants in the annexed eastern territories, for German armament.

86. Minutes of Discussion of Inspectors (Inspektoren), on 13 February 1942.

Information on the armament tasks in 1942. especially demands for closest cooperation with the other authorities active in the armament program.

87. Letter OKW / Wi Rue Amt dated 20 February 1942.

Transmittal of an order of the Fuehrer issued in collaboration with the Economic Armaments Office dated 19 February 1942 in regard to safeguarding "key positions" (Schluesselkraefte) for war economy, to the competent authorities.

88. Order OKW / Wi Rue Amt to the Armament Authorities dated 5 March 1942.

Immediate increased coordination of the armament industry within the task of shifting of armament production into textile plants.

89. Order OKW / Wi Rue Amt dated 6 March 1942.

Program of the chief of transportation as well as the war-essential construction and repair programs of the Reich Railway receive preference above all programs except the mineral-oil program.

90. Memorandum of General Thomas for the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions on "Administrative and economic cooperation between Capital and Labor for the purpose of freeing all types of manpower for the conduct of war" dated 10 March 1942.

Proposals for the achievement of the cooperation between Capital and Labor, particularly a proposal for an act for conscription of womanpower.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1457 PS.
(cont.)

91. Order OKW/ W1 Rue Amt dated 13 April 1942.

Chief of Economic Armaments staff France was designated to take any measures necessary for the removal of damages arising from enemy action in industrial plants attended to by the Wehrmacht.

92. Order OKW/ W1 Rue Amt dated 23 May 1942.

Safeguarding of mineral-oil program against the withdrawal of manpower.

93. Letter of Minister Speer to General Thomas dated 16 November 1942 on the occasion of his retirement as chief of the Armaments department. (Rue Amt).

Thanks for valuable services, especially by rendering available the armament organization formed by General Thomas under the most difficult circumstances.

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I, WANDA S. TIESZEN hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1457 PS.

12 March 1946

WANDA S. TIESZEN
X, 046 265

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-7570
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CERTIFICATION OF SOURCE OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

I, Paul H. Gantt, War Department, do hereby certify that the document numbered 130/262 and dated 21 Nov. 1939 was taken from the files of the Filmt located in the German Military Document Section, War Department.

15 June 1947
Date

Paul H. Gantt
Name

(page 1 of original)

Lumitzsch

Berlin, 21 November 1939

Top secret

Memorandum
of a conference at General Thomas'
on 17 November 1939 on the
increase of the iron and steel quotas
for the implementation of the Krauch-Plan.

Present: General of Artillery Prof. Dr. Becker)
Major-General Staudt }
Colonel Haeger } Heeres Ruffenamt
Colonel Herneckamp } (Army Ordnance
Major Schmidt } Office)
Prof. Krauch
Dr. Zahn
and several specialists

Colonel Huchmannmann }
Colonel Becht }
Commander Moondsen - Dohlken }
and several specialists } Ruffen Amt
(Ordnance Office)

General Prof. Dr. Becker
says that he wants to stress, by his presence at this conference,
the particular importance of the matter to be dealt with.

General Staudt
Prof Krauch finds himself in a difficult situation. The shortened
dead lines, the new munitions program as the most urgent demand of
the General Staff, the bomb-program and the demanded

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increased production of chemical warfare agents cannot be carried
through with the iron quota of 140,000 tons per month, now at our
disposal.

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Dr. Zahn

Without an increase of the iron quota now at our disposal, the dead lines for carrying out the program demanded will be delayed as follows:

- powder manufacture for 1 year
- explosives manufacture for 1/2 year and
- the production of chemical warfare agents for more than 1 year.

There will be a monthly shortage of 9,000 tons of explosives for high grade bombs alone, which means that the Ju-88 program cannot be carried out as planned.

After 1 October 1940, a shortage of 1600 tons of powder per month; of these 1000 tons per month is full strength powder.

If the above-mentioned additional allocation of iron is not granted, a very serious breakdown must be expected.

(Dr. Zahn handed over a sheet of figures).

General Studt

As from 1 October 1940, munitions production will be affected by the lag in the manufacture of explosives and powder as follows:

- a) pointed steel, small-arms ammunition
planned production 600 million rounds per month,
will drop by 200 million rounds per month, that is to say,
to 2/3 of the monthly production.
- b) a 30% drop in the production of pointed steel core ammunition for the Luftwaffe

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- c) bomb production by 37%
 - d) anti-tank mines production by 50%
 - e) light field howitzers, a drop of 433,000 rounds
 - f) heavy field howitzers, a drop of 133,000 rounds *)
 - g) heavy mortars, a 25% drop in production (here the Fuehrer has already complained about the insufficient production).
- Owing to the lag in production of chemical warfare agents:
mustard gas fillings will drop by 46%
smoke fillings will drop by 65%
8 cm mortar ammunition will drop by 37%.

*) in a planned production of 522,000 rounds

General Thoms

It strikes me when comparing the quantity of ammunition now demanded with the ammunition produced during the last years of World War I, that a far lower output was sufficient then. What is the reason? Are the fillings larger now or are the demands made by the General Staff greater now?

General Prof. Dr. Becker

Both are true. During the last years of World War I, moreover, the Germans gave the shells only a 50% charge in order to keep the ammunition trains fully loaded.

In tests, made after World War I, it was proven however that the hitting power of a normally charged light field howitzer shell is greater than that of a semi-charged heavy field howitzer shell; it would have thus been more expedient to avoid filling the heavy shells only partially, and to distribute the explosive in the lower

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calibre shells.

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It is difficult to draw comparisons between World War I and the fighting we are facing to-day. The conditions under which the present war will be fought out are different and, what is more, a great deal harder.

Professor Krauch

The General Staff demands

for explosives 2 - 3 times

for chemical warfare agents 3 times the production of World War I.

The output originally scheduled for 1942 has now been advanced to 1941.

General Thomas

The event of a munitions crisis has been foreseen. Generalfeldmarschall Goring's attention was drawn to this on that Sunday, when the Fuehrer resolved to attack Poland, and statistics were submitted to him wherein the German munition situation was compared with that of the enemy states. It was pointed out to him in particular how far our munition program is still behindhand.

On that day the Fuehrer declared that the production capacity he was advised of was sufficient for him to carry the war through. He doubted the validity of the production figures quoted by the enemy.

Although I can thoroughly understand the demands made by the General Staff as to ammunition, they cannot possibly be fulfilled with the raw material on hand. Collection points should already have been established at the beginning of the war, in which the entire available material should have been concentrated. It is impossible to carry out all the tasks imposed on the 3 branches of the Wehrmacht.

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In order to make the present iron and steel quotas for the Wehrmacht possible at all, other important applications had to be cut down to a critical level. Todt has submitted a claim for an allotment of iron and steel to the building trade for the repair of building machinery, as otherwise the building business would collapse. The Reich Ministry of Economics demands iron for the same purpose in the rest of industry. In spite of the heavy and recognized need that has already arisen both claims naturally had to be turned down.

Professor Krauch

...the difficulties in the upkeep of industrial machinery caused by the shortage of iron allocations.

General Thomas

An increase in iron and steel quotas for the Krauch-Plan cannot be made. The OKW has no more reserves and it is out of the question to obtain any more from industry.

All building projects must first be examined individually to discover which are the most urgent. The Fuehrer is only interested in the erection of those plants which can be completed and put into operation

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without fail by 1940. How are the Kruech demands for steel distributed over

- 1) the explosives-plants controlled by the Wehrmacht
- 2) the plants for preliminary products
- 3) the transportation media?

Are the tank-cars needed for transporting explosives included therein?

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Is it necessary to allot iron and steel

- 4) for the generation of power
- 5) for the mining of coal for the operation of these new plants?

Professor Kruech

The increased quotas demanded would guarantee a 100% realization of the munition-program inclusive of all transportation media etc. But even then the execution of the munitions-program is not absolutely ensured if the transport situation of the German State Railroads cannot be improved. The transport situation is already influencing the production of nitro on to a very serious extent.

On account of this the Leuna production has already been set back by 300 tons per day. By putting the total daily production of 190 tons at Oppau beside this, a drop in production is revealed which must be viewed with serious anxiety. In Upper Silesia the coal-banks have already caught fire because the coal cannot be shipped.

World War I was lost by the catastrophic transport situation. Every effort must be made to improve the transport situation, so as not to lose the present war as well.

General Thoms

The German State Railroad needs increased allotments of steel; I have made repeated demands for this. The figures from Rumania and Russia depend on whether it is possible to right our transport situation.

Professor Kruech

The Rumanian oil can be shipped on the Danube. The importation of Russian oil is uncertain.

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Major Schmidt

Since the reserves for tanks and shells cannot be filled with the available iron quota it must be expedient to concentrate, according to need, either on tank production or on shell production.

Professor Kruech

Factories for explosives blow up occasionally. According to experience a risk of 20% must be included when calculating the production of explosives.

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General Thomas
needs assent.

Colonel Docht

The plants for producing the preliminary products for the manufacture of explosives are dropping behind. The 30,000 tons per month allotted for this from the quota of the Army Ordnance Office are not sufficient. In addition 13,000 tons per month are needed, 3,000 of them for Krauch, and 10,000 for the Wehr. (Colonel Docht illustrates this in detail in a special paper.) It emerges from this that an output of 32,000 tons per month can only be reached when the 13,000 tons per month can be allotted to the plants producing the preliminary products.

General Thomas

Is it still at all possible to do any considerable long-range planning? For we know very well that these plans cannot be carried out! Only those plants can be built which will be put into operation in 1940 in order to reach, by the end of 1940, the highest efficiency possible according to the actual situation in raw materials.

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General Studt

The General Staffs can't agree to that. The high explosive bomb production alone will drop by 1/3.

Colonel Docht

If the 13,000 tons per month which are needed to raise production of preliminary products to the level required for the production of explosives are not provided, then the munition production asked for cannot be carried out at all. The most urgent requirement is therefore the release of these 13,000 tons for the purpose.

General Thomas

Supposing that this quantity of iron could really be made available, would the question of labor and power be solved then in order to have these plants completed? Can the dead-lines be adhered to?

Professor Krauch

Yes, provided that the simplified construction method is applied.

General Prof. Dr. Becker

This will have to be done to a great extent.

Dr. Zahn

The simplified building method saves 20 % of iron.

Professor Krauch

The dead-lines have been set with careful consideration and must be adhered to. No iron can be saved in the installation of apparatus.

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General THOMAS

Is it at all possible to find a sufficient number of persons for the completed plants in order to start their operation?

Dr. ZAHN

Yes, but only if rigorous measures are taken.

General THOMAS

The Navy and Air Force will also come up with big demands for men for their new plants.

Major SCHMIDT

For the plants concerned, only unskilled workers, mainly women, come into question. By rigorous action it must be possible to supply the necessary masses of workers. It is inconceivable, that at the present time in Berlin not even three hundred women can be allotted to an explosives factory.

Freight Captain (Lt. Col., Navy) HENDSEN-BOHLKEN

This is the first time that such a complaint has been heard!

General THOMAS

They should be able to make these 300 women available without any difficulties. There is only an order which prohibits the bringing in of married women with children to work in factories.

General STUDT

In Berlin there are several thousands of sales girls unemployed. State Secretary SYRUP, however, has forbidden their being brought in to work in factories.

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Freight Captain (Lt. Col., Navy) HENDSEN-BOHLKEN

The factory for which these 300 Berlin women have been requested is probably located in a different district and it will probably take more than one and a half hours to get there. Women will hardly be released to do this.

General THOMAS

Orders that this case be investigated by "Rue" (Department of Ordnance Office).

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General Professor Dr. BECKER

Professor KRAUCH has guaranteed that his program will start operating at the proper time. As long as there are demands from the General Staff, the steel necessary for their carrying-through must be procured.

General THOMAS

That is impossible.

Neither General Dr. BECKER nor myself can be held responsible for not fulfilling the demands of the General Staff. It is necessary to make a joint report to the Fuehrer on this matter and to obtain a decision.

The present situation is as follows:

The High Command of the Armed Forces has no more reserves. The Army must keep its guns whatever the circumstances. The Air Force and KRAUCH should make allotments to the Navy from their iron quotas. One will also have to reckon with fairly large deficits once serious air raids begin.

General Professor Dr. BECKER

If the demands of the General Staff cannot be fulfilled, they will reproach the Ordnance Office that it has failed. General THOMAS, however, will also be blamed.

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General THOMAS

Such reproaches cannot be made. General Field Marshal GOERING has been kept continually informed as to the situation.

General Professor Dr. BECKER

In spite of this, a fresh statement must be made. Nobody must be able to say, that he was not warned in time.

Professor KRAUCH

General THOMAS

General Professor Dr. BECKER

It is unanimously agreed to submit to the Fuehrer a joint proposal to emphasize the ammunition program as the key problem. Other programs must be postponed or reduced because of this.

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CONTINUED

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General STUDT

An improved situation in the matter of ammunition will one day decide the war. In the proposed report to General Field Marshal GOERING not too much emphasis should be placed upon the difficulties of solving the manpower problem. These difficulties must be eliminated through rigid measures, which necessity will force upon us.

Major SCHLITZ

The armament plants already in operation are still short of 2 shifts of 50,000 men each, and these are plants which were already in existence in peace time, for instance Rheinmetall, Bochumer Verein, etc.

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General Professor Dr. BUCKE

If the compulsory work assignments are cancelled, how is one going to fill up these plants?

Major SCHLITZ

gives a few examples.
Owing to lack of workers, POLT had to transfer the cartridge production; TIGEL actually had to be shut down.

General THOMAS

It is to be regretted that still no clear decision as to the further military conduct of the war has been made. Colonel General (Generaloberst) KEITEL has declared that the Fuehrer intends to strike one more ~~heavy~~, quick blow in order to end the war speedily. On the other hand, however, all preparations must be made to carry on a war lasting for five years.

Enclosure:

General THOMAS reads a decree concerning the transition of peace time economy to war economy.
General Field Marshal GOERING has declared that in principle he approves of this decree; the decree has, however, not yet been signed.

General Professor Dr. BUCKE

Will this decree achieve the object? The discharge of skilled workers from the Army had also been ordered and still the scheme is not yet operating. It must be ascertained, when one may reckon with the discharge of skilled workers from the Army.

Major KRENSCH-ROTHKE

A considerable portion has already been re-assigned.

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General Professor Dr. BECKER

The decree promulgated by General THOMAS is appropriate and necessary, but it will be months before it is converted into practical measures. The Gauleiters will object to it.

General THOMAS

We shall set up commissions which will investigate the plants and pick out the skilled workers. In Berlin, for instance, they have succeeded in selecting workers who can be dispensed with. 600 specialized workers in the Adrema who have been wrongly assigned may also be released from armament plants.

General Professor Dr. BECKER

The execution of these measures is a matter which concerns the Military Economy Inspectorate departments; it is doubtful whether there will be quick results.

General THOMAS

Of course it will take a certain time to investigate the hundreds of plants which come into question. Is any other procedure being proposed?

General Professor Dr. BECKER

No.

General THOMAS

I suggest that our experts should now compile the previously mentioned memorandum for the Fuehrer. The aim is:

To obtain the decision of the Fuehrer for the future carrying-through of the Ammunition Program.

(page 14 of original)

General Professor Dr. BECKER

All right, but in the form of a report to the Fuehrer. Of course the essential points must be laid down in writing.

General THOMAS

Agreed.

(page 14 of original)

Oberst (Col.) BECHT is given the order to draw it up. The Army Ordnance Office should make the material available. The demands are to be reiterated, and not only the figures for powder and explosives, but also for ammunition. During the coming week a joint discussion on the subject is to take place at the General Field Marshal's quarters.

General Professor Dr. BECHT

asks that the date be fixed in good time.

General STUDE
Professor KRAUCH
General TROTS

All pressing plants available which are suitable for the production of ammunition are fully staffed. The question is brought up as to whether the production of containers for hydrogenation plants or whether the production of bombs has priority.

Professor KRAUCH will investigate the matter and will submit suitable proposals during the next days.

Distribution List :

" Rue (Office for Armament in the Army Ordnance Office)

" Rue (Office for Raw Materials in the Army Ordnance Office)

Oberst (Col.) Jensen

Hauptmann (Capt.) Dreher

Dr. Timberg for Ktb (Translator's remark: Perhaps card index entry)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT N. MI-7570
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 September 1947

We, Victoria ORTON, AGO No. 20 129, and Patricia E.C. WOOD,
AGO No. 20 139, hereby certify that we are duly appointed
translators for the German and English languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of the document N. MI-7570.

.....
Victoria ORTON
AGO No. 20 129

.....
Patricia E.C. WOOD
AGO No. 20 139

Ministerpräsident Field Marshal
General GÖRING
Plenipotentiary for the Four-
Year Plan
St.H. Dev. 11319/39

Berlin, 5 December 1939
(Rubber stamp)
Armed Forces High Command
9 Dec. 39

Re-organization of the Reichsstelle for Economic
Development.

The special circumstances of the war make it necessary to re-organize the Reichsstelle for Economic Development about which there have meanwhile been several discussions. I herewith summarize the results, whereby my decree of 5 February 1938 - St.H.Dev. 1245- is changed.

1. While retaining its characteristic as a high Reich authority, subordinate to the Reich Ministry of Economics, the Reichsstelle for Economic Development will now become
"The Reichsamt for Economic Development".
2. The Reichsamt for Economic Development has the following tasks:
 - a) to further research and development of industrial production and processing of raw materials by all measures deemed appropriate, to initiate and supervise research work and take care of inventors and inventions.
 - b) to observe the requirements and preparation of the planning still to be determined by the Reich Ministry of Economics in the field of industrial production.
 - c) To initiate, take care of and supervise the construction authorized under the planning; to make decisions with regard to raw materials and conduct negotiations for financing.
3. In order to carry out its tasks in time, the Reichsamt must be able to ask for direct information from the Supervisory Offices and other economic-policy organizations and authorities; vice versa, it must naturally hold itself at the disposal of the above offices for information and consultations.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7132
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

The more thoroughly this work is gone into, the better will be the results of this joint undertaking.

(numerous initials and figures,
mostly illegible)

Rubber stamp

Economic Armaments Office

10 Dec. 1939

Az.

No. 4412/39 Appendix -

To

- a) The Reich Minister of Economics,
- b) all other Reich Ministers,
- c) business groups and General Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan.

For b) and c) :

Copy for information.

(page 2 of original)

- 4. The work of building plant staff settlements, so far taken care of by the Reichsstelle for Economic Development is not to be carried out any further, but is to be transferred to the Reich Minister of Labor as the competent Reich Minister. The Office of Foreign and Colonial Raw Materials, which formed part of the Reichsamt for Economic Development, will be dissolved.
- 5. The other Departments continue as before when dealing with the Reichsamt.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7132
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

6. I agree to it, that my General Plenipotentiary for special questions, Professor Dr. KRAUCH, be entrusted temporarily with the direction of the Reichsamt. For dealing with the special tasks set by me, he will avail himself of the machinery of the Reichsamt, so that the creation of a special apparatus is superfluous.
7. This reorganization becomes effective on 10 December 1939.

signed: GÖRING.

Certified

STRAUCHMANN)

Administrative secretary.

Stamp

of Ministerpräsident GÖRING
-Plenipotentiary for the
4-Year Plan.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

5 August 1947.

I, Samuel Horn, A-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-7132.

Samuel HORN
A-443 113.

THE REICH ECONOMICS MINISTER
II L 512/43

Berlin W 9, March 30, 1943
Behrenstr. 43

To Professor Dr. H.C. KRAUCH
Reich Office of Economic Development
Berlin W 9
Saarlandstr. 120

(Translator's Note: Stamp: 1943
Daybook: 630
Handwritten Note: R M ct. (??))

Dear Professor,

I am referring to the repeated detailed conversations which the undersigned has had with you in order to define more clearly the work of the RWA (Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau - Reich Office for Economic Development) as well as your personal work as Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production, as divided from the work of the Reich Economics Ministry and its agencies and particularly the Reich Plenipotentiaries, Economic Groups, and so forth. We agreed that the war situation made it absolutely necessary to synchronize both tasks in such a way that any parallel or contrary work should be excluded as far as possible and duplication avoided. Furthermore, it seemed necessary to give full consideration to such changes as were brought about by the new organization of ration control, especially as far as the reference material in the form of statistics, etc., is concerned. In order to clarify matters for the experts of both agencies and for all other agencies which have a part in this also, (Reich Office Chemistry, Economic Group Chemistry, Land Economic Offices, and so forth), we agreed to establish each assignment for the agencies in a comprehensive report and to give an appropriate commentary and explanation, at the same time, to the previous decrees of the Reich Marshal (Decree of December 5th 1939, on the reorganization of the Reich Office for Economic Development, Decree of August 22, 1939, on the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production, and Decree of December 16, 1941, on the expansion of the field of work of the Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production). I therefore confirm the following as result of our talks:

I. Reich Office for Economic Development.

1. Research. The RWA has the task of promoting research work and development in the field of the industrial production of raw materials and their manufacture by ordering appropriate measures and by supervision of the research work and supervision of the inventors and inventions.

All questions and all work of the above-mentioned kind which might reach the Reich Economics Ministry or the agencies under its jurisdiction (Lenkungsgebiete) are to be forwarded to the RWA without delay. As far as that is concerned, the RWA is also entrusted with liaison and collaboration with the Reich Research Council. The RWA informs the Ministry and the chiefs of the appropriate agencies under its jurisdiction regularly on such developments as might bring about changes or additions in production or demand in the future, in order to make it possible that such technical developments can be taken into account in the planning.

For tasks of research and development, honorary collaborators of the Economic Group Chemistry, and the Economic Group Motor Fuel should be given preference and the work that is done should be synchronized

with possible work of the Economic Group in this field.

2. Preparation of New Plans. As within the reorganization of Ration Control, the tasks of the Reich Offices of distributing raw materials have been systematically extended to include the entire planning of the field they have to direct, the agencies under its jurisdiction now have the task of supervising the requirements situation, of making the appropriate statistics and plans and the registration of demands for extension of production capacities, and so forth. In order to avoid all duplication and, particularly, to avoid double investigations, I shall, as soon as you have confirmed this letter, give instructions to the agencies under its jurisdiction, to place at your disposal all the papers necessary for a judgment of new plans and to give the RWA all the information that might seem necessary in this regard. The RWA shall not make any inquiries itself. Should the information given by those agencies not be sufficient for a certain purpose, the Reich Economics Minister shall decide on extension and completion thereof.

3. Planning. On the strength of the requests for increase in production or extension of capacity filed by the agencies under its jurisdiction, the Reich Economics Minister, after consultation with the Chief of the RWA, and of the appropriate agency under its jurisdiction, establishes the final planning for development in accordance with its size. The RWA has to elaborate proposals for the most practical carrying-out of the development planning in detail and to submit them to final approval by the Reich Economics Ministry.

4. Execution of Expansion. The initiative for, care of, and supervision of buildings approved on the strength of the planning is the task only of the RWA, which is also in charge of the assignment of raw materials for this. Negotiations for the financing of these plans are to be conducted in agreement with the Main Dept. II of the Reich Economics Ministry.

5. The RWA does not supervise such enterprises as are already working. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions is to be kept informed by the Reich Economics Ministry on all such fields of the RWA as are of interest and concern to him, which also obtains his approval for such decisions as become necessary in the fields mentioned above.

II. Fleipotentiaty for Special Questions of Chemical Production. In compliance with the directive of the Reich Marshal, the general competence of the GE Chem (General Beauftragter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Produktion - Fleipotentiaty for Special Questions of Chemical Production) covers the fields of production of

Mineral oils,
Rubber,
Light Metals,
Powder and Explosives,
Chemical Warfare Agents,
Nitrogen,

as well as their preliminary products and auxiliary materials. As far as the field of powder and explosives and chemical warfare agents are concerned, the regulations mentioned below, however, do not apply for the duration of the war. In these fields, collaboration with the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions is to take place. Its Commission for Powder and explosives

(Page 3 of original)

conducts the research and development work. All other collaboration is regulated by the decree of G.L. RUEST the (Fleipotentiaty for Armament), RLA/PSV I -40. 1/43 of January 24, 1943. The tasks of the Special Fleipotentiaties (Fach-Beauftragten) (See IV) are taken care of by the Chief of the Main Commission for Powder and Explosives.

1. Research. The work and collaboration in this field are regulated in the same manner as described under I, 1.

2. Preparation of New Planning. Here the work is suitably regulated according to the provisions of I, 2. However, generally the GB Chem will have the initiative for starting on new planning. In order to ensure definitely that planning, is not even preliminarily started unless all the main requisites, especially coal and power, but also the supply of other raw materials and products, are assured to the fullest extent or can be assured, the GB Chem is to order the carrying out of expansion planning only after the Reich Economics Minister has promised the main requisites essential hereto as existing or obtainable.

3. Planning.

The planning which is to be established by the GB Chem is only to be put in force once it is finally approved by the Reich Economics Minister.

4. Extensions.

The carrying out of extensions is to be in conformity with the specific instructions of the GB Chem.

5. Supervision of Production and Enterprises.

In conformity with the decree of the Reich Marshal, the GB Chem is to promote and secure as far as possible and on the strength of his authority and by means at his disposal, the production in the special chemical fields which are under his control. In the past he has established for this purpose a special supervision of enterprises. This supervision covers, above all, the securing of labor supply, fuel, power, and other raw materials or auxiliary materials. In order to prevent the duplication of requirements and to do away with overlapping in supervision and all the difficulties resulting from it, the circle of enterprises which thus are under the control of GB Chem has to be defined very clearly. The supervision is to cover preliminary-products or auxiliary materials only insofar as they are to be extended or of special importance for the main raw material involved. The names of the enterprises covered are contained in the enclosed list (Enclosure 1.) Possible changes of this list are only to be made on the strength of agreements between the GB Chem and the Reich Economics Minister.

In the field of mineral oil production, the supervision is to take place in full agreement with those work-combines that come under the Economic Group Fuel Industry, and which direct the production.

In the fields in which the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production, in accordance with agreements with the Reich Economics Minister has an interest, the latter is to secure the participation or approval of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.

(Page 4 of original)

III. Rationing Control and Allocation of Raw Materials.

Both the GB Chem and the RMA, as well as their Plenipotentiaries, are to leave the ordering of questions of control and especially questions of the allocation of raw materials, (With the exception of buildings for their own purpose) and the distribution of production in general and in particular, exclusively to the competent agencies under their jurisdiction (Reich Offices and Reich Associations and their control offices) and to the Land Economic

18/11

Offices. For powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, the directives of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production are to be complied with as far as the distribution is concerned.

These rulings on jurisdiction, of course, do not exclude a participation of the G3 Chem in basic conversations about long-term distribution and planning as have already frequently taken place in the past.

IV. Experts ("Fachbeauftragte") of the G3 Chem.

In order to underline even more than up until now the self-responsibility of the industry and in order to promote the work of experts whose main work is in the offices of the RMA and the G3 Chem, the G3 Chem is to appoint his own experts for a central-professional supervision of the fields:

Mineral oils
Nitrogen
Rubber
Chemistry of Acetylene and Ethylene
as well as Light Metals.

The G3 Chem and the Reich Economics Minister are to agree on the choice of persons due care being taken that these experts be similar to those persons as are active in the organization of industrial economy. In the field of organic and inorganic chemistry (including deliveries of auxiliary material to the above mentioned sections), as well as in the field of soap, detergents, and yeast, no experts shall be appointed by the G3 Chem. In these fields the G3 Chem will rather resort to self-administration organizations of the economy, especially to the special division chiefs (Fachgruppenleiter), the special dept. chiefs (Fachabteilungsleiter), etc., as are to be appointed within the intensification of the work of the Economic Group Chemistry. The Chief of the Economic Group Chemistry shall agree with the G3 Chem about the persons to be appointed. He is authorized to issue directives to the special division chiefs, special dept. chiefs, etc., as far as tasks are concerned which are the G3 Chem's responsibility according to II.

The letter of authority to the experts which are to be appointed is issued in agreement with the Reich Economics Minister and the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production.

V. Collaboration with the Land Economic Offices.

1. The Plenipotentiaries which up to now were formally attached to the Directive Staffs Economy (Fuehrungsstab Wirtschaft) are now incorporated into the LWA (Landeswirtschaftsamter - Land Economic Offices).

2. Thereby such tasks in the field of chemistry as were dealt with by the Directive Staffs Economy are transferred to the LWA.

3. The Plenipotentiaries of the G3 Chem join the LWA in the capacity of Department Chiefs Chemistry (Abteilungsleiter Chemie). They are subordinate to the chiefs of LWA or their deputies. Basically, all other duties of supervision of production which the LWAs (had in the field of chemistry are to be transferred to them also.

4. The G3 Chem issues directives to the LWA in all fields in which he is competent according to II.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-620
Cont'd

(Page 5. of original)

The GB Chem has authority to issue direct orders to the Department Chiefs, Chemistry, as regards building and assembling within the chemical production plan. He has the same authority for all very urgent matters. In these matters Department Chiefs Chemistry may also report directly to the GB Chem.

This does not affect in any way the duty to keep the LWA Chiefs informed and their right to gather information on all developments and to issue, if necessary, directives for local reasons.

Should the GB Chem deem additional support necessary in special individual cases, he is to resort to the corresponding Betriebschaeffer of the Economic Groups Chemistry and Fuel Industry respectively for this purpose. Wherever possible, the chief of the Economic Group Chemistry shall take into account what wishes the GB Chem might have as regards personnel in the district agencies of the Economic Group and he shall consider this and particularly in cases where this seems appropriate shall appoint deputies to the Betriebschaeffer of the Economic Group in accordance with proposals of the GB Chem.

VI. Mutual Information and Contact.

The Reich Economic Minister and the GB Chem shall make it obligatory for their experts in each case to inform each other regularly on all interesting questions and to build up a close and confident collaboration.

The GB Chem shall appoint Dr. EISENHUT as general liaison man to the Main Division II of the Reich Economic Ministry. Apart from promoting the unhampered solution of the pending special questions, the not least task of this liaison man is to make this mutual instruction particularly thorough and productive.

By Order
(Sgd) KERNEL

Distribution to:

Berlin, March 30, 1943

- a) All Reich Offices (Reichsstellen) Except 1 to 6
- b) Chairman of 1) Reich Association Coal
- 2) Reich Association Iron
- 3) Reich Association Natural Fibres
- 4) Reich Association Chemical Fibres
- 5) Combine Shoes
- c) Reich Group Industry

The copy above is sent to you for your information and for that of your subordinate agencies as far as necessary.

By Order
(Sgd) KERNEL

Certified: (Signature) LUETZGEHAUS
Employee of the
Chancellory

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
Reich Economic Ministry)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-620
Cont'd

(Page 6 of original)

Reich Economic Ministry

Berlin, W 9, 3 April 1943
Behrenstr. 43

To II L 512/43

Correction (Supplement)

The following final sentence is to be added on page 5 of the letter --
II L 512/43 -- of March 30, 1943, addressed to Herr Professor Dr. h.c. KRAUCH,
Reich Office for Economic Development, Berlin, W 9:

"I have informed my co-workers of the agreements made
and request you to give appropriate information to
your co-workers and Plenipotentiaries also."

(Translator's Note: Stamp of the
Reich Economic Ministry)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a
true and correct translation of Document No. NI-620.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

A F F I D A V I T .

I, Dr. Felix EHRMANN, residing at Baddeckenstedt, District of Wolfenbuettel in the British Zone of Occupation, having been advised that by making any false statements I will become liable to punishment, hereby voluntarily declare the following under oath and without having been subjected to any duress:

The functions of the Plenipotentiary for Special Problem of the Chemical Production on one side and of the Reich Office for Economic Extension (Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau) on the other side were closely interlinked and their tasks were always overlapping. Dr. Carl KRAUCH was at the head of both organizations mentioned and so it happened that both of these organizations often were simply called "Office KRAUCH".

This "Office KRAUCH" distinguished itself from all other authorities by the fact that it availed itself quite independently of persons who were no officials, but acted honorarily. These honorary people were outstanding personalities of the Industry and in every respect by far superior to the paid employees of the Office KRAUCH. The essential policy followed by the Office KRAUCH was not conducted by the paid staff, but by the honorary representatives of the Industries.

The vast majority of these people acting on an honorary basis, were, approximately up to 90% of their total number, representatives of the I.G. Farbenindustrie.

Influence and importance of these honorary persons in the entire economic life was enormous and the various business enterprises were actually keen on obtaining appointments for their people to KRAUCH's Office.

I have carefully read this one page of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand. I made the required corrections with my own hand and initialed them with the first letters of my name and I herewith declare upon oath that I have said the pure truth in this statement to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Felix EHRMANN

(initials): F.E.

(Page 2 of the original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 13th day of March 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Felix EHRMANN, known to me to be the person

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4952
Cont'd

making the above affidavit.

(signature) Paul H. KATSCHER

Interrogator, U.S. Civilian,
D-150641,
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes,
U.S. War Department.

(initials:) F.E.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 April 1947.

I, Dr. HORN, Civ. 20004, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4952.

Dr. HORN,
Civ. 20004

KND

TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENT No. WI-2679
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

The Reichsminister and Chief
of the Reichschancellery
Rk. 11375 B

Berlin, 17 August 1942
at present fieldquarters

No. 472 15/8
Typed Schm
Road Th/...
Dispatched 16/8 Ho
with 1 annex

2.) To
the Reichsminister of Economics
Dr. h. c. F u n k.

Dear Mr. Funk,

I beg to send enclosed an anonymous letter,
addressed to the Fuehrer and concerning I.G.
Farbenindustrie A.G.; and I leave further steps
in the matter to you.

Heil Hitler!

Yours

(for the Reichsminister)

Enclosure

L (Lammers)
" (Willuhn) 14/8
BU 14/8

illegible 15/8

Translator's Note: A handwritten note on the letter says "with
enclosure". There are also three different initials on the
letter, with dates 15/8, and twice 14/8.

351365

(page 2 of original)

Ad Rk. 11375 B

Berlin, 14 August 1942.

1.) H e t o :

An anonymous sender deals in a petition addressed to
the Fuehrer with the allegedly unrestricted hegemony which
I.G. Farbenindustrie secured for itself during the war
through allegedly plutocratic economic methods. The offi-
cial frame was formed by the Reichsoffice for Economic
Expansion (Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau), whose head
was at the same time the leader of (the fate of) the I.G.
and whose positions were filled to about 70 per cent with
I.G. employees. On account of the pseudo-official position
of the Reichsoffice the I.G. had got into contact with all
the other command posts and had filled them in its own
interest. All still independent circles in the field of
chemistry were to be coerced into the network of dependency
in one form or other. The result was a widespread bitter-
ness of the industrial leaders in question. One already
started with handing in resignations since nobody could
dare, in their opinion, to attack I.G.'s hegemony. The
letter concludes with the request to the Fuehrer, to appoin

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-2879
Cont.'d

a responsible person who would look into the matter and to enlist the I.G. apparatus into service for the community; as it is the case with the armament industry;

(Translator's Note: Up to her the note is typed. The following is written in pencil):

The sender is obviously (well) informed. He exaggerates though, yet he gets down to the essentials. Also elsewhere opinions to the same effect have been voiced.

W

W (Willuhn)

351304

(Analyst's Note: In the handwritten text almost at the bottom of the note, typed and underlined "The" appears giving the impression that the Note is continued on another page. This all the more, as the note starts with "1.) Note" while no "2)..." appears on the page.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Otto HEILBRUNN, AGO No.30140, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-2879.

OTTO HEILBRUNN,
AGO No.30140.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 73-7474
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(73) Berlin

73/250

General council
Report of Meeting

FD

II 101

(Stamp)

Records of the Offices
of Military Economy

Journal No. 21/45

Serial No. 1 Document A II/101 Enc.:

(page 2 of original)

St. N. Gov. 11759.

(Stamp)	Economic Arguments' Office 1 Ibi	(18) Ibi
	22 December 1939	Not. 1939
	File Number 1	22 December
	No. 4378/39 g Enc. ...	Initials

I. Meeting of the General Council of 20 December 1939

under the Chairmanship of State Secretary

(Statsssekretär) Koppke.

Those present: State Secretaries

Journé
Dr. Stuckert
Weinhardt
Dr. Landfried
Facke
Dr. Schun
Kleinmann
Albers

Under State Secretary:
(Unterstatsssekretär) von Hanneken

Ministerial Directors: Götter
Lansfeld

Major General Thomas

Professor Dr. Krauch

Reich Cabinet Counsellor Dr. Hilke

Ministerialdirigent Haritzke

Senior Government Counsellors:
(Oberreferendarate) Garsmann
Schroetter.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

- I. State Secretary Koerner opened the meeting with a summary of the previous stage reached in war economy. He could state that for the present the only difficulties were in the transportation situation and that their removal was being worked on. He went over the Field Marshal's decree on the transfer of the GHI-businesses, explained this decree and stated that the apparatus of the Four Year Plan would be kept small even after part of the GHI-businesses had been taken over. Even in the future it would not deal with departmental work, but would sort out the exact material

(page 3 of original)

to be used in the General Council and by the Field Marshal, settle differences of opinion and maintain a uniform direction. The General Council will meet in future every Wednesday at 1400 hours; the next meeting will take place on

Wednesday, 3 January 1941.

- II. Professor Kersch reported on the results of his work in 1939 and forecast the prospects for 1940 and 1941. It appears that despite great difficulties success has been achieved in entirely fulfilling the demands of the Warinall Plan of 1938, and indeed even surpassing them in many points. The establishment of reserves ordered in the program in the course of 1939 will begin to operate in the course of 1940. (The figures referred to cannot be quoted here).

- III. State Secretary Backe reported on the stage reached in agricultural production:

- A. The harvest of 1939 was very good. The main harvest approached that of 1933. Threshing was of course still far behind. There was a danger of a great deal being used for fodder in view of the impossibility of supplying fodder in the pig-raising areas. The post-crop harvest was also very good. The potatoes had admittedly suffered injury through harvesting. In consequence of transportation difficulties, potato provisioning had not been carried out as planned; at the moment it was at a standstill as a result of the frost. 96% of the beets had been harvested. However, only 2/3 of the beets had been processed. As a result of the frost and the long duration of the sugar harvest we should have to count on a heavy loss in sugar.

The new Eastern territories would, apart from sugar,

(page 4 of original)

be able to give no surplus away from this year's harvest. We should have to count on the Government General's meeting supplies.

- B. The new harvest depended mainly on mobilizing production facilities.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

1. Workers.

Even if conscriptions were not be resorted to, ways must still be found of securing the work of the women closely connected with agriculture and a proportion of the workers becoming available from industry. Apart from this, 1 1/2 million Poles would have to enter the areas needing manpower from January on, and they would of course constitute an additional burden as regards feeding and maintenance. Adequate supplies of textiles and foot - wear were of particular importance to agriculture.

2. Fuel.

The arrears in winter plowing and sowing would result in increased work on the Spring. This could only be dealt with if fuel, and especially Diesel fuel, were made available in sufficient quantities. The tractor construction program had already been narrowed in consideration of the fuel situation. Before Buna production is operating at full blast, no amelioration in the supply of the urgently needed rubber - tired agricultural trucks could be considered.

3. Horses.

The recent conscription measures had been rather uneven in their effect on agriculture. Major General Thomas had taken over the job of investigating possibilities of equalization. He would moreover also take care that the release of, or short - term leave for plant leaders for cultivation purposes as promised by the Armed Forces took place, and would report on the disbanding of the construction battalions.

(page 5 of original)

4. Supplies of artificial fertilizer
would be of critical importance.

This depended largely on the solution of the transportation problem. For instance, only 30 - 40% of the trucks needed for potash were available. Curtailment of nitrogen production could perhaps be avoided if the planned increase in trucks production could be carried out. Care must also be taken that the production of "Thomasmehl" (fertilizer) was not restricted for reasons of transport.

5. Other production factors.

Yarn and jute supplies were quite uncertain. Experiments with substitute materials had not yet been successfully concluded.

6. The skinning of pigs, which was ordered for leather production, involved considerable expenditure of labor. The skinning of 2 million pigs meant, moreover, a loss of 100,000 tons of meat. Leather supply with substitute materials would be pushed forward with all speed in accordance with orders, since in consideration of the supply problem the loss of pig fat cannot be permanently.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

D. Industrial fats. In view of the poor supply of margarine raw materials, no fats suitable for human consumption could be spared by the industrial sector as from the 2nd war-year. In this first year of war 123,000 tons of margarine raw materials had been earmarked for export alone, an attempt would, however, be made to release this by increasing synthetic fat production on a large scale.

E. Details of the production program would be discussed at one of the next meetings.

IV. State Secretary Kleinmann stated as follows in connection with transportation committee meeting of 18 October:

(page 6 of original)

- a) 75 - 80 % of the necessary trucks for fertilizer had been provided recently.
- b) From the Spring onwards the strictest attention should be given to provisioning with coal in the sugar factories and the prompt transportation of fertilizers while traffic was slack.
- c) The relaxation of black-out measures was beginning to take effect.
- d) The Reich Ministry of Traffic Communications and the Ministry of Economics had agreed on local transportation and the use of vehicles owned by the factories for transportation from the railroad station.
- e) The rolling stock construction program had been set at 1120 engines and 42,500 cars for 1940. Iron, workers and output capacity were available.
- f) The essential canals had meanwhile frozen up. A further aggravation of the transportation jam was therefore inevitable.
- g) State Secretary Goerner was able to state that Colonel-General (Generaloberst) Milch had promised that more Luftwaffe motor vehicles would be made available for unloading in local transportation. State Secretary Kleinmann could refer to Colonel-General Milch.

V. At State Secretary Stuckert's instigation it was laid down that Su time should operate from 1 April to 6 October (i.e. the beginning of the winter schedule). The proposal became thus ratifiable.

signed Dr. GRAPSCH

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

Distribution:

State Secretary Koerner
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" Reinhardt
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Ministerial Director Heroldke
Ministerial Director Dr. Gramsch.

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Top Secret

Z.P. 723.5.32.

13 Series
10th Copy

3rd Meeting of the General Council of
10 January 1940, under the chairmanship of
(NS) State Secretary Koerner.

For our files.
Initial ed.

Those present:

State Secretaries

Koerner
Dr. Hammer
Hainke
Lohse
Dr. Lohse
Hainke
Lohse.

Reich Commissioner (Reichskommissar) for Arms Control
Senior President (Vorsitzender) and Senator Meier

Under State Secretaries

von Lohse,
von Hammer.
Thoma,
Ritter.
Seiler,
Dr. Hainke,
Dr. Hammer,
(for Under Secretary
Stamm)
Hainke
Dr. Hainke,
Dr. Hainke,
Seiler.

Lieut. General

Ambassador

Ministerial Directors

Ministerial Directors

Reich Cabinet Counsellor

Professor

Senior Government Counsellor

- 1) State Secretary Koerner submitted the statements made by Under State Secretary von Hammer at the second conference of the General Council as a topic for discussion. It was to be the aim of the discussion to ensure execution of the raw materials programme as to meet the demands of the Armed Forces. Steps had to be taken of domestic production, cutting civilian consumption, imports through our vital exports, were all means to this end.
- 2) After detailed discussion, the following statement on the iron situation was arrived at:
 - a) Maintenance of the present level of production was impossible without using up available stockpiles at a very fast rate. The transportation position, aggravated by the frost, would not permit us to avail ourselves fully of the quantities to be imported from Russia. Iron supplies promised by the Russians

(page 8 of original)

would effect a tangible relief only at a later stage. Under these circumstances, maintenance of present iron and steel production would be possible only for a few months; from July/August 1940 it would have to be cut by 200 - 250 metric tons a month, unless new sources of iron had been made accessible by then. After removal of the difficulties in the shipment of ores mined, domestic production of iron could in the current year only be increased to approximately 350 000 metric tons of iron a month. This increase could not be decisive in balancing the production cuts to be made in the second half of 1940. An allocation of iron quotas to other consumers had been kept barely adequate in favor of the armed forces quota, so that these quotas could not only not be slashed any more but would, after a few months, have to be increased in order to maintain the production system on which, after all, the armament industry depends (mining, machine construction etc.). It was questionable whether the armed forces quota could be maintained at its present level. According to a statement recently made to Reichminister Funk by General (Generaloberst) Heitel, as communicated by State Secretary Lohmeyer, the Minister had to state, regardless of these facts, all the iron available was to be put into the armament industry. In the light of these facts, iron production would remain at its present level of approximately 1.7 million metric tons a month and the present allocation would be adhered to.

- 3) Referring to the armed forces quota, Major-General Thoms stated that it had not been raised proportionately to the last year of World War I. Out of a total armed forces quota of 800 000 tons monthly, approximately 600 000 metric tons a month were at present being used directly for the needs of the armed forces. In 1918 the same quantity was used merely for manufacturing war implements. The iron quantities for preliminary manufacturing processes, enlargement of raw materials plants etc. which were now comprised in the quota for the armed forces had not, in part, been needed in the 1918-19 War partly they had been provided for by civilian industry. The new armaments program would call for 500 - 600 000 metric tons of iron a month for the army and air force alone, in addition,

(page 9 of original)

400 000 metric tons of iron a month could be processed in the manufacture of implements of war. That part of the quota which was to be needed for industrial preparations would decrease in the course of the summer, yet the saving thus effected would have to benefit the armaments program. Major-General Thoms pointed out that he had already proposed in the summer that the main weight be placed on armaments; he thought that keeping up the simultaneous running of the army, air force and navy on the scale now ordered, in addition to making available the exports needed to balance imports from Russia, was not possible.

(page 2 of original, cont'd.)

- c) State Secretary Backe announced that increases in the quota allotted to agriculture would have to be made if food production was to meet the demands made of it. He requested that the requisition of 3 sugar manufacturing plants and one of the most modern drying plants for the armed forces be rescinded. Mr. General Thomas was going to settle this matter.
- d) State Secretary Landfried placed great emphasis on the need for large imports and the resultant need for exporting. Exports were being jeopardized by the lack of iron. Only a fraction of the quantities foreign countries would take from us in exchange for raw materials and of the quantities we had undertaken to deliver could be supplied.

Under State Secretary von Jagwitz more detailed statements on the foreign trade position. Referring to the considerable price increases on foreign markets, he adduced the following examples: The cost of certain commodities in Roumania in gold shillings amounted to

	August 1939	December 1939
1 metric ton of aviation spirit	113	240
1 " " " motor gasoline	86	141
1 " " " gas oil	57	119

We could import goods to the value of approximately 500 million from Roumania, but goods to the value of only 250 - 300 million had so far been earmarked for return deliveries.

- e) Professor Krauch indicated the connection between the iron and the start of raw material production. In the years 1933-1937 the mineral oil program caused

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a yearly increase in production capacity of 300-350,000 tons per year. The iron shortage in 1937/38 reduced the increase in 1938 to 200,000 tons per year. In consequence of the commencement of the Marshall Plan in the summer of 1937, despite the concession of only 75% of the iron ordered, an increase of 885,000 tons per year was achieved in 1939, in 1940 an increase of 1,200,000 tons per year and in 1941 one of as much as 1,400,000 are to be expected. A reinforcement of the iron distribution has also succeeded in doubling the quantities envisaged in the Four Year Plan.

f) State Secretary Koerner requested the departments to submit their requests with regard to the raw material situation briefly in writing by 16 January.

State

2. Professor Krauch supplemented Under Secretary von Hanneken's statements in the following points:

a) Colored metals. From 1941 onwards an exchange of 120,000 tons of copper per year against magnesium, iron with little carbon content, and small quantities of aluminum would be possible. For the rest, industry would have to curtail its colored metal demands considerably. It was today receiving even more than in 1918.

The mercury supply for 1941 had been assured through successful negotiations with Italy.

The demands on wolfram and cobalt had been considerably decreased by recent technical progress.

b) The newly decreed switch-over from aviation spirit to automobile gasoline (about 8-10,000 tons per month) was considered impracticable by Professor Krauch, since aviation spirit can be obtained from Russia only in small quantities, and from Russia not at all, while both countries can supply automobile gasoline. The general oil supply was assured by exploitation of the recently disclosed possibilities for the import of 2,500,000 tons per year. This presupposed the settling of the transportation question. This could not be solved without the delivery of 1,000 Luftwaffe transport cars for the transportation of Russian mineral oil.

(page 11 of original)

c) Professor Krauch then touched on two further bottle-necks, which can be avoided by early decisions:

1. Leather. The mobilization requirements of 13,000 tons per month would be able to be fulfilled to some extent in 1941 by cutting down stocks. From 1941 onwards they could be satisfied only if the production of synthetic leather fibres and synthetic rubbers were expanded.

2. The mobilization requirements of industrial fats to the extent of 240,000 tons per year were assured for 1941, though very barely, by employing edible fats. In view of the situation with regard to edible fats supplies, however, State Secretary Pöcke stated that no more fats would be able to be made available for 1941. The complete lack of any

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

could be avoided only, if the processes already developed technologically in accordance with Professor Krauch's ideas were made ready for factory production. This demanded that iron be put in readiness additionally.

In the question of synthetic edible fats, Professor Krauch pointed out certain difficulties established in experiments. The major experiments would be continued, but there was a general agreement that any mention in propaganda form of this discovery must be avoided. It would then be perfectly satisfactory to improve the competition sector by saving edible fats in the soap sector.

3. Ambassador Ritter affirmed in answer to a query, that for the Russian deliveries there was no question of our advancing related details, since in this case the Russians delivered in advance. In the case of iron an advance would of course be unavoidable. He considered nevertheless that the substitution of these quantities of iron by later Russian deliveries was assured.

4. State Secretary Kleinmann stated that Rhine shipping must not be suspended from use, so that the coal intended for Italy would also have to be moved to Rotterdam by rail.

(page 12 of original)

5. In the next meeting, on 17 January, State Secretary Backe will report on the agricultural production program for 1944.

6. State Secretary Keener pointed out that the details discussed today must on no account go further. These minutes must therefore not leave the hands of the recipient.

Signed : Dr. Graessch.

Distribution:

State Secretary	Keener	1
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Reich Cabinet Counsellor	Dr. Kildner	1
Professor	Dr. Krauch	1

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No more copies to be taken!

[Handwritten signature]

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V.2. 1455.

To be submitted to office of

(1) Meeting of General Council of 17 January 1938

under the Chairmanship of State-Secretary

Those present:

State Secretaries:

Naumann

Dr. Schubert

Reinhardt

Dr. von Schöner

Isack

Dr. Syrup

Kleinmann

von Henniken

von Jagwitz

Thoms

Dr. Hansfeld

Dr. Mehl

Dr. Willman

Frebeck (for the Reich Commissioner
for Food Control)

Hartke

Reinmann (for the Foodstuffs Deputy)

Reid

Dr. Kitzke

Dr. Bruch

Schroeder

(1) Initialled

Excerpts
to be submitted
to AIA with request
for reply.

Initials

Under State Secretaries

Chief General

Ministerial Directors

Reich Cabinet Counsellor

Ministerialdirektion

Ministerial Counsellors

Professor

Senior Government Counsellor

1. State Secretary Reid reported on the food sector.

(1) Present grain deliveries were not sufficient to compensate
difficulties. Delivery dates had not been set or were not to be set
in addition to the burden on the railways. Grain supplies, including the
quantities needed to supply newly acquired territories, to be sent
the Government General and to make up for the quantities not supplied,
exceeded the quantities estimated for the current economic year of
1.7-1.9 million metric tons.

Consequently, allowances would have to be made, with all due
reservations, for the fact that our total grain reserves, which
amounted to 5.7 million metric tons on 1 August 1938, would be

(page 14 of original)

4 million tons at the most on 31 July 1946. A very rough estimate for the next economic year showed that, given a reduction of 10% in the spring harvest of 1941, considerable difficulties would arise.

b. This entailed the necessity of directing all efforts towards the maintenance, and if possible, the stepping up of this year's production. To this end provision for the following points had been made.

1. Cultivation of oil seeds would be increased to 200 000 hectares. A yield of 100 000 metric tons of oil could thus be expected (demand: 300 000 metric tons). Questions of price formation which were to be decided in this connection had been settled in substance.
2. Cultivation of fibrous plants would be increased. This would be hampered by the fact that this year's crop of flax and hemp had not been completely carried away and a considerable portion of it was thus liable to perish.
3. Cultivation of vegetables would be enlarged to the extent that soil was available.
4. An increase in the area planted with root crops was important because root crops produced the largest yield per unit of area cultivated. An increase in the reported quota by approximately 10% would be feasible. An increase in the area planted with potatoes was contingent upon production conditions.

c. The production program envisaged depended upon the following conditions:

1. The intake of Polish workers would have to be greatly speeded up, if only for psychological reasons. State Secretary Hilferding thought that the number of 8 - 10 trains a day could be substantially increased owing to the curtailment of passenger traffic. State Secretary Sprue believed that he could get about a million Poles. Certain misgivings on the part of the Reichsleiter SS were dispelled.
2. We would have to fall back on the services of other foreigners as far as our foreign exchange permitted. The treaty with Slovakia providing for the supply of 37000 seasonal laborers had been concluded.

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3. The procedure governing the discharge from, or leave granted to plant leaders (Betriebsführer) by the Armed Forces would have to be speeded up. The employment of numerous foreign workers and the presence of the Betriebsführer were more necessary than before.
4. The supply of fertilizers was not essentially a question of transportation facilities. It had been ascertained that nitrate production would be adequate to supply agriculture with 10% of last year's nitrate deliveries so that nitrate shipments would have to be accorded top transportation priority, and potash shipments next.

(page 15 of original, cont'd)

have to take second place, however assigned that right to. State Secretary Kleinmann believed that he could provide the requested number of cars.

5. Early supply of seed potatoes and other seeds was also necessary. Shipments would have to be completed by 15 April and/or 1 May. State Secretary Kleinmann thought that this task could also be solved.
6. The general consensus of opinion stated that adequate food supplies for agriculture had been secured only for the first half of the calendar year 1948 by allocating 16,000 metric tons. Adequate supplies for the second half of the year in which, prior to the harvest, were substantially larger quantities of food would be needed could be contingent upon our success in shipping into Germany supplies the import of which had already been negotiated.
7. The supply of tins and bags was discussed in the previous conference.
8. Agriculture would need an increased iron quota in order, i.e., to effect a substantial increase in the output of sugar products (Zuckerschmelze) within the next year (enlargement of drying plant facilities, mainly in the new Eastern Germany) and to initiate the production of cellulose flour (Kollidol). A decision would be made after consideration of the other sectors' demands for iron.
9. 4000 metric tons of copper per annum were needed for the protection of potatoes, fruit and vines against pests. Only 1000 metric tons could however be made available. In these circumstances, allowances would have to be made for a very poor vintage this year as the protection of potatoes and fruit was a very essential thing and problems would crop up in this connection as a result of the fact that Germany depended on viticulture for their livelihood.

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2. State Secretary Kerner refrained from going into details as the question of how to safeguard agricultural production would have to be thrashed out in a smaller circle. The results would be reported in one of the forthcoming conferences.
3. State Secretary Kerner put the following questions to Major General Thomas to be answered in the next conference:
 - a. Had he had the order to the effect that the construction battalions were to be dissolved and replaced by the Labor Service Corps (Arbeitsdienst) been modified? Several drafts and the setting up of new units appear very probable.
 - b. Had facilities been there for preventing waste of food in any installations?
 - c. What chances were there for speeding up the economic governing and release of agricultural plant leaders?

(page 16 of original, cont'd)

4. The following details were discussed:

- c. State Secretary Kleinmann stated that the arrangement of dispatching hotted potato trains to the West appeared to have worked well. Provision for extended further trips had been made.
- d. The provisional construction of train cars by utilizing empty trains from filling stations had been technically solved. The Rail Railroad yards would produce 4% of them in the next 4 - 5 weeks.
- e. Within the next few days, the Supreme Air Force Command would decide on the application, disposition of which was requested, the release of 1000 train cars to be used for shipments from Russia.
- f. Special trains for the Polish air could be run, the transport in train permitted. But there was to be no reduction of for the trains.
- g. Professor Hensch asked that a special commissioner be appointed to investigate the particularly difficult traffic situation in the Halle area of the Reich Railroad Directorate. State Secretary Kleinmann will investigate the suggestion and do as necessary.

5. The next meeting will take place on 21 January.

State Secretary Sneyd will report on the situation as regards allocation of labor.

Signature: L. P. Parnell

(cont. 17 of notebook)

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V.P. 232A

5th meeting of the General Council held on
31 January 1940
under the chairmanship of State Secretary Rosenberg.

Present:

State Secretaries:	Dr. Landfried	Initiated
	Dr. Syrup	5 February
	Alexander	
	Albers	
Under State Secretaries:	von Henneken	
	von Jagwitz	
Major General Tross		
The Ministerial Directors:	Demmer	
	Dr. Hensfeld	
	Dr. Mohl	
	Flotmann (on behalf of the Reich	
	Commissioner for Price Con-	
Reich Cabinet Counsellor Dr. Hilgen		
The Ministerial Directors:	Herzke	
	Dachbarts (on behalf of State	
	Secretary Stuckart)	
Reich Commissioner for Coal, Reich Office Chief Walter		
Ministerial Counsellor Dr. Lorenz (on behalf of State Secretary		
	Arcke)	
Senior Government Counsellor Dr. Schroetter.		

marginal
notes.

1. State Secretary Syrup reported on the situation with regard to allocation of labor.
 - a) At the beginning of 1940, 240,000 unemployed persons were registered in the Reich as compared with 820,000 in the previous year. Under normal conditions and with the prevailing peculiar weather conditions the unemployed could be expected to number 1-2 million. Of the unemployed persons, only 50,000 are fully fit to work and to serve as substitutes. The geographical spread over varies as much: Vienna 31,000, Hamburg 10,000, Berlin 7,000 unemployed persons. At the beginning of the world war the number of unemployed increased tenfold. The transition from peace economy to war economy was much better in this war, although a number of crises in the planning can not be denied.

A particularly important difference in comparison with the World War is that the building industry at that time was at a complete standstill, whereas now it makes surprisingly high demand on the workers.

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A comparison with foreign countries shows the following:

England has 1,36 million unemployed; France has none and used extensively colored men and Spanish refugees; Belgium 240,000; Holland 200,000; Denmark 174,000; Sweden 45,000; Norway 30,000; Switzerland 30,000; Hungary 42,000; USA about 9,5 million.

A surprising thing is that short-time work has also dimin

October 1939, 245,000

December 1939, 168,000, out of these, 150,000 are workers in the clothing and textile industries which it is difficult to transfer.

In January short time work increased, due to difficulties coal delivery; new regulations governing part-time compensatory payments have eliminated the hardships suffered by the workers.

b) Agriculture.

Up to December 20th, agriculture required 608,000 migrator workers and household employees. It is planned to bring in 780 Polish agricultural workers, 50-60,000 of them from the new Reichsgau. 57,000 Polish agricultural workers are already in Germany (Besides these, 30,000 Italians, 25,000 Slovaks and 12,000 Hungarians are expected). The starting of the transfer of the Poles has been hampered by the bad transport conditions. Consequently the first transports have to be recruited of necessity in the cities they have already started. Under State Secretary Syrup expects with certainty that by the second half of March about 600,000 Poles can be brought in. Under State Secretary Kleinmann confirms that the Reichsbahn (State railroads) is in a position to carry out job of transport.

Payment of the Poles is regulated by tariff. The Reich Estate (Reichsstand) will see to it that no German workers will be dismissed on account of the lower wages of the Poles. The possibility of transferring foreign workers into the western territory behind the front has not yet been cleared up. Major General T. however, surmises that the distrust of counter-intelligence can be allayed.

The Reich Labor Service must recruit whole groups of workers

(page 20 of original)

amongst them also agricultural workers; Major General Thomas reported that the General Field Marshal yesterday gave the necessary orders. Even after these requests to the Reichs Labor Service are fulfilled, 320,000 men will be ready for being drafted.

It has been determined anew that the compulsory service of women is of more help in agriculture than in the labor service.

(page 20 of original, cont'd)

At the present time about 100,000 service girls are working on farms. The mutual evaluation of compulsory-year and labor-service must be re-adjusted. There will be still enough girls left over to be recruited by the Reich Labor Service. In the case of difficulties in this field, Under State Secretary Syrup will report on same.

c) Industry.

Labor allocation in industry remains difficult because enormous demands are made by fits and starts, especially for skilled metal workers. Here only an individual survey of the plants is of help which is carried out by commissions, unacquainted with local conditions, and which have already produced good results. Under State Secretary Syrup emphasized the great differences in the various branches of industry: whereas the aircraft industry has instituted extensive training courses for unskilled workers and has also employed many women, it seems that shipyards will have to make up much loss in this respect. Here, generally speaking, a surprisingly large number of skilled workers and employees, but scarcely any women, are employed. The commissions, as mentioned by Under State Secretary Syrup, will take care of this question also.

It is planned that very soon a re-examination of the entire question of men in reserved occupations (U6-Stellung) (about 1, million) will take place in the positive as well as in the negative sense.

d) Labor conscriptions.

Until now conscription of labor has been used in 1,4 million cases. At the present time about 80-90,000 persons are conscripted monthly. They are, however, not restricted to armament plants, chemistry, transportation and the building industry. In those cases in which the drafting was well prepared, it has been carried out generally very successfully. The prerequisite therefore is always the securing of the billoting. The financial compensation is regulated voluntarily. The demands which are constantly cropping up for the continuation of the old wages, also in the new place of work, however, should not be considered, because this leads to confusion in the new plant.

(page 21 of original)

During the discussion Major General Thomas stated that the expansion of the armaments industry can only be carried out at the speed ordered by the Fuehrer if plants are closed down more drastically than has been done until now. He mentioned that in November only 300 plants with 13,800 workers were closed down. This speed must be accelerated. Under State Secretary Landfried pointed out the regulations as ordered by himself and expressed the belief that ammunition could be obtained from the still too well equipped building industry. He asked that stop be put to the continuance of planning work on building alterations and the like. Under State Secr

(page 21 of original, cont'd)

tary Koerner proposed to look into this matter at one of the next meetings.

The Reich Commissioner for Coal, Reich Office leader Walter, reported on coal deliveries. Even if it can not yet be said that the greatest difficulties have been overcome, it seems that during the last days a considerable improvement has set in. Owing to the drastic ban on accepting goods (for transport) on the Reichsbahn, in the last days about 30,000 boxcars of coal were loaded daily. If these measures could be maintained for some time, it is possible that domestic consumption and industry will receive for the next period the most urgent current needs.

The delivery of coal is only a question of transportation. If there is enough coal available; the possibilities of mining pit coal are yet fully exploited and as regards brown coal this is the case only in a few districts.

In conclusion, Under State Secretary Kleinmann points to the fact that the ban on accepting goods can be maintained only for a limited period. It is already eased by the transport of ores, pit wood and fluxes for blast-furnaces, on the return trip to the coal district. The delivery of box cars for fertilizers will be increased to 5,600 daily. The transport for the Polish workers is secured. In 1940, however, a full easing of the transport situation cannot yet be expected. Consequently all attempts to increase passenger traffic have to be abandoned. Also the complete lifting of the present restrictive measures and the re-introducing of unrestricted transportation cannot be considered for some time yet.

At the suggestion of Under State Secretary Landfried, State Secretary Koerner therefore proposes to start already next week the discussions about the priority list for transport requirements which have to be observed in the future.

(page 22 of original)

Here the problem of short distance transports for feeding the stations, will play a special part.

The transport of relations in heated trains seems to be going on even though it is not possible to transport large quantities.

- Under State Secretary Kleinmann mentions that unfortunately the negotiations with Roumania about the transport to Germany turned out to be disappointing owing to the low efficiency of the Roumanian railroads. In order to guide the interested parties who are working on pulling rolling stock to Roumania, he suggested discussing the possibilities of improving the rail service of the Roumanian railroads. The thought of dismantling railways in the Government General and utilizing the material in Roumania. As soon as the negotiations with the C.G. of military transportation are concluded, Under State Secretary Koerner will call a meeting to deal with this problem. At the request of I

(page 22 of original, cont'd)

Ministerial Director Niehl, the Foreign Office will participate in the meeting.

Dr. GRAMSCH.

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(page 23 of original)

Correction of typographical errors:

The minutes of the 1th meeting of the General Council of January 17th, 1940, should read:

on page 2 under No. 1: requirements 350,000 t
(instead of only 300,000 t)

and on page 3 under No. 5: 1st May
(instead 1st of March)

The minutes of the first meeting of the General Council of December 20th, 1940, should read:

on page 4 under C instead of "100,000 tons": "100,000 live hogs".

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(page 24 of original).

V.P. AGIC.

(Stamp) To be submitted to the
Chief of Office

7th meeting of the General Council held on 27 February 1940
under the chairmanship of State Secretary Koerner.

Present:

State Secretaries Reinhardt
Landfried
Backe
Dr. Syrup
Kleinmann
Alpers

Ambassador Ritter
Under State Secretary von Kanneken
Major General Gehrke
Reich Cabinet Counsellor Dr. Willuhn
Ministerialdirigenten Brebeck and
Cabel
Ministerial Counsellor Baerwald
Colonel Kuehnemann
Envoy Schuurte
Professor Krauch
Reich Office Chief Walter

1. Ambassador Ritter reported on the result of his negotiations
with Russia.

It has been agreed that the Russians shall deliver to us within
12 months:

1 mill. ton	Foodstuffs
0,9 "	" mineral oil
0,5 "	" phosphates
100,000	" cotton
100,000	" chromium ore
500,000	" iron ore
300,000	" scrap iron

in addition: manganese ore, platinum etc.

The fixing of the mutual delivery dates was especially difficult,
since the Russians declined in principle to deliver goods in advance.
Whatever the Russians send us in the first 12 months, we must pay for
during the first 15 months by return deliveries. For all shipments
of Russian goods during the following 6 months, we can extend the re-
quired for return deliveries to 12 months.

This means that even to carry out the present agreement, Germany
must exert itself to the utmost. This is also necessary in order to
achieve a favorable basis for future agreements.

(page 25 of original)

State Secretary Koerner stated that owing to the importance of the Russian deliveries for the outcome of the war, all departments must collaborate in solving the task. It is officially arranged that in addition to the permanent Treaty Office in the Reich Economics Ministry an inter-ministerial committee will be formed under the chairmanship of State Secretary Landfried. The following members will also be members: Envoy Schnurre, as deputy chairman, and one representative each of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, the Reich Economics Ministry, the High Command of the Armed Forces and of the Reich Air Ministry. The departments are requested to nominate their representatives by the end of this week so that the committee can start its work at the beginning of the next week.

On no account must departments conduct direct negotiations with the Russians themselves. State Secretary Koerner requests the representatives of the departments to carry out this request within their own sphere of activity. State Secretary Kleinmann requested that the transport program be established as early as possible.

One of the stipulations for our deliveries was that even according to the present agreement, - and to a greater extent next year - the Russians will ship us a greater amount of iron than that which we have to put into our return deliveries. Unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain advance deliveries for non-ferrous metals. These will be shipped by the Russians only within the framework of the big transaction. The Russians, however, declared they were willing to provide us with non-ferrous metals by way of transit and to ship us half of what they could buy themselves.

One of the main tasks of the new committee will be the control of prices. Both countries agreed to use as a basis the prices of August 1939.

2. State Secretary Alpers reported on the part to be played by Forests and Timber in the war, with the aid of diagrams and statistical material, which was passed round to those who attended the meeting.
 - a) The timber requirements of Greater Germany are about 90 mill. cu. (rough cubic metres), the normal growth of the forests of Greater Germany being about 60 mill. cu. The deficit during the last years was 2/3 covered by exhaustive cutting, the rest was imported.

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- b) If exhaustive cutting continues in 30 years time all older stocks would be destroyed. Consequently it must be stopped as soon as possible.
 - c) Sweden and Finland are the main countries from which goods can be imported. Last year 2.2 mill. cu. of timber were imported from these countries. It is expected that in 1940 the imports from Sweden will amount to 3 mill. cu. and those from Russia also to 3 mill. cu. The gap still remaining cannot be filled on the world market.

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- d) This gives rise to the need to intensify forestry; it is not feasible to increase the acre-yield by one fm. The increase of forest areas by reforestation will show results only after decades, but it would soon justify greater cutting of present stocks.
- e) Peace-time planning for 1940 provided for the cutting of 73 mill.fm. and the import of 10 mill.fm. War-time cutting has been fixed at 66 mill.fm. in several stages. This should fill the need in accordance with the rate of consumption.
- f) It is not expected that the new Reich areas will yield considerable surpluses in forestry. Not even the full requirements for pit wood for the Upper Silesian mines can be filled. To make up for it, the forests of the Government General will be utilized by 200% cutting which would give a surplus of coniferous and pit wood in favor of Germany proper. Also the requirements of wood fibre of the Eastern Territories would thus be filled.
- g) Planning for 1939/40 is based on the idea of an increase of reserves. Expectations have been exceeded. The decrease in consumption is distinctly shown by increased reserve stocks.
- h) The primary factor in the success achieved was the rigid execution of the regulations governing the marketing of timber and the price-policy. In this connection, Under Secretary Albers requested that prices for wood ought to be computed in such a way as to cover expenses on a basis of 100% cutting and to permit of further intensification. This aim has not yet been achieved. At present prices for timber, a number of State forestry administrations would already require subsidies on a basis of 100% cutting. The aim of the price

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policies of the Reich Forestry Ministry is to increase the prices to the same extent as the cutting is diminished. This question was not further discussed in the General Council.

- i) Allocation of Labor. The Forest and Timber Economy has lost 25% of the non-permanent forestry workers; the permanent forestry workers mostly remained owing to the far seeing housing policy. The output of the individual worker has been raised considerably by efficiency measures, instruction, improvements of tools and the like, so that the tasks were carried out with the available manpower. However, no more workers must be drafted.

In discussing the report, State Secretary Backs pointed out that the demands for timber for agriculture will increase (building of new farms in the East, increase in demands for packing materials, barrels and the like, due to the small allocations of steel) and that the demands for vineyard lumber are also very great.

State Secretary Koerner requested the representatives of the departments to get in direct touch with State Secretary Albers

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about these details. Moreover, he pointed out the importance of the market regulations, which made it possible to fill all demand in the timber market during the past difficult financial years. In view of the favorable experience with the market regulations in the fields of timber and nutrition, State Secretary Koerner suggested similar regulations also for the coal industry.

- 3) Ministerialdirigent Cabel reported on the part to be played by mining during the war.

The general planning was the result of the establishment of requirements, the laying down and individual investigation of output capacities and the establishment and preparation of the necessary means of production. By reason of the preliminary work achieved, mining has so far been able to meet the demands made on it. The details were illustrated by means of comprehensive diagrams. The following facts should be emphasized:

- a) Pit coal. The war-time target of 14,3 mill. tons per month has been far exceeded during 1939 in consequence of the addition of the former Polish mines, the planned output of 240 mill. tons per year will be obtained in 1940 without difficulties.

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Moreover, this provides for the export of 43 mill. tons per year, of which 6 mill. tons per year are destined for the Government General.

- b) The mining of lignite continues to exceed its wartime target during the first months of the war. The annual target of 247 mill. tons per year will be obtained. Export has been fixed at 1,5 mill. tons per year (to the Protectorate).
- c) Iron ore. Computed in iron, 6,5 mill. tons per year must be mined this year. Of this, the Hermann-Göring Works will deliver 3 mill. tons per year, the Salzgitter district alone 1,3 mill. tons per year. The further continuation of the program, however, depends on an increase in the supply of box-cars. The increase led in January to a sharp reduction of the ore deliveries. (The Hermann-Göring Works obtained in the last month only 15% of the required number of box-cars). In the summer, the amounts of ore thus lost should be made for by additional deliveries.
- d) Metals. The mining of crude ores has been especially increased. It will reach in this year 7,2 mill. tons per year. In view of the small metal content of the German ores, the metal yield is, to be sure, a modest one. In 1940 expected quantities are:

24,800 tons per year cover	
105,000 " " "	lead
276,000 " " "	zinc
1,200,000 " " "	pyrites
500 " " "	tin
150 " " "	nickel

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	350 tons per year cadmium
	100 " " " mercury
	300 " " " antimony (plus the yield from Yugoslavia)
and	1,440 " " " arsenic.

- e) Potash. The requirements for domestic agriculture and for export can be met by the target of 20 mill. dz. (approx. 200 lbs) potash oxyde, which is easily obtainable. The quantities which are requested at present amount only to 17 mill. dz. Consequently it is decided that potash mining industry has the obligation to store 3 mill. dz. It would also be helpful if agriculture would spread its requirements over the whole year. In this connection, State Secretary Eicke remarked that in his opinion a change of the price-policies on the part of the potash-syndicate would facilitate considerably the building up of stock-piles in agriculture, which has been also recommended by the Reich Food Estate (Nährstand).

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State Secretary Eicke moreover thought that the planned mine of 20 mill. dz. of potassium oxyde will lag behind the requirement. The further transition to more concentrated compounds is welcomed by agriculture too; it will facilitate the transport situation.

- f) Mineral oil. By the end of 1939, the production of mineral oil exceeded considerably its war-time schedule. The extraordinary cold January and February led to a recess which, however, will be made during the next months.
- g) Stones, clays and silicates. Wartime demands on mining will be met in all cases without difficulties.
- h) Necessary factors for the smooth carrying out of the mining program
- 1) The filling of manpower requirements. These have diminished considerably through the incorporation of Upper Silesia. In order to make full use of the capacities, however, the entire mining industry still requires 60,000 men, some of whom will be replaced through further efficiency measures while others will have to be brought from Poland.
 - 2) A considerable improvement in the delivery of box cars. In this connection a transport plan has been set up for 1940, which includes the coal stock piling program which was requested by the Reich Agency for Coal and which shows a requirement of 114,000 box cars daily during the peak-months. The Reich Economics Ministry will discuss the transport possibilities with the Reich Transport Ministry and with General Gehrke. The increased utilization of ways will also be discussed.

When discussing the point State Secretary Syrup doubted whether there really was a shortage of 60,000 miners. He thought the deficit to be 40,000. The campaign to make use of miners who had been working in other industries has been terminated: 11,000 miners have been re-employed; the 8,000 Saar miners, who became available, are now working in mining again. Then the drafting into the armed forces, which

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is now imminent, is discussed, the danger to mining will be elucidated. Colonel Huehnermann will make it clear to the High Command of Armed Forces how far it will be possible to alleviate the situation. The drafting of 12,000 miners from the Ruhr mines is held to be impossible.

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Ambassador Ritter emphasized the great part which coal plays as the most important means for the payment of vital raw material imports. He earnestly requested that everything should be done to improve coal exports.

signed: Dr. GRAMSCH.

Round Stamp:
Ministerpräsident General-
feldmarschall Goering
Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan

Certified:
sign: Krueger
Ministerial Regierungsrat

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11th meeting of the General Council held on 24 June 1941
under the chairmanship of State-Secretary Keerner.

Present:

State Secretaries:

Neumann
Dr. Stuckart
Backe
Dr. Landfried
Dr. Syrup
Kleinmann

Under State Secretaries

von Hanneken
von Jagwitz

General of the Infantry
Reich Cabinet Counsellor
Professor
for Reich Minister Dr. Tiedt:
for Reich Commissioner Wagner:
for State Secretary Reinhardt:
for State Secretary Alpers:
for the Party Chancellery:

Thoms
Dr. Hilluhn
Dr. Krauch
Ministerial Director Schulze-F
Ministerial Director Flettman
Ministerial Director Nasse
Ministerial Director Parchmann
Ministerial Counsellor Baermann

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- I. State Secretary Koerner opened the meeting and stated that owing to preparations for the case of war with Russia (Eventualfall "Russland") the convocation of the General Council would have to be omitted. Since fighting in Russia has now started, he was able to make the following statements about the work which has been done within the Economic Operations Staff East:

The entire Economic Command in the newly occupied Eastern Territories is in the hands of the Reichsmarschall as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. The Reichsmarschall is to use the services of the Economic Operations Staff East which consists of the representatives of the leading departments. The measures are to be carried out by the Economic Staff East under the leadership of

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Lieutenant General Schubert, who is supported for the industrial sector by Ministerialdirigent Dr. Schlatterer, and for the agricultural sector by Ministerialdirector Riecke.

The Economic Command in the newly occupied territories should direct its activities to extracting the maximum quantities of goods required for the war effort, particularly steel, mineral oil and food. All other points of view should take second place.

The necessary organization is in existence and will be utilized in accordance with the progress of the military operations.

State Secretary Koerner gave State Secretary Backe permission to speak about the food situation.

- II. State Secretary Backe stated concerning the food situation in the third year of the war:

1. Grain:

It is hard to estimate the harvest at the present time. Even in the case of a meager average harvest (24.5 Mill. t), the bread ration can be maintained if the initial stockpile of 1.3 Mill. t is made use of. However, in addition to this, the contemplated deliveries of 1 Mill. t of Balkan grain and 1.5 Mill. t of grain from France must take place. On the other hand, the balance of feeding grain will show a deficit of 1.65 Mill. t due to the Russian imports now lost to us, despite the reduction in the number of pigs to 22 millions. This must be compensated for by the feeding of the army in Russia. (2/3 of the bread grain requirements of the armed forces and the domestic cat deliveries to the army amount to 1.9 Mill. tons which could make up the deficit). The balance of grain includes deliveries from the Eastern Territories after deducting the requirements of

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Eastern Upper Silesia, amounting to 600,000 tons, whereas for current year only 200,000 tons have been delivered. For the occupied countries, the quantity has been fixed at 600,000 tons which are spread over the Protectorate, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Alsace and other countries. To sacrifice the entire initial stockpiles would be dangerous, because, owing to the already small stocks of the current year, there are periodic difficulties which make early threshing imperative.

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2. Potatoes:

The conservative estimate of the harvest, amounting to 53.6 million tons, makes it possible, even in the third year of the war, to manage without potato rationing. The present interruptions in deliveries in the large cities can be explained by the lateness of the early potato harvest, but the difficulty will be over in 14 days.

3. Meat:

The meat supply position has become much tighter owing to the reduction in the number of pigs which in its turn was necessary because of the lack of fodder. Especially burdensome are the heavy demands of the armed forces which take one fourth of the available amounts. In the current year, the armed forces cover their allotment by 80,000 tons, but this amount is already included in the stockpiles for the Russian campaign. Only by reducing rationing from June 2nd (this applies also to the armed forces) could the balance for the current year be effected. The prospects for the next year are that the deficit will amount to 27,000 tons if the present ration of 400 g is maintained, whereas it will amount to 67,000 tons if the ration is reduced to 350 g. It is only possible to avoid the second reduction and to effect the balance for the winter, as desired by the Fuehrer, if in Russia several millions of cattle and pigs are slaughtered and brought to Germany. All available stocks of tins must be reserved for the slaughtering in Russia.

4. Fats:

The stopping of imports from East Asia resulted in a loss of 150,000 tons of fats. Butter production will still amount to 634,000 tons, and domestic production may be expected to amount to 358,000 tons of fats from slaughtering and 125,000 tons of meat fats. 35,000 tons of butter from Denmark and 40,000 tons of vegetable fats from the Balkans can be added as imports. If the initial stockpiles are to be preserved, the maintenance of the present rations will lead to a deficit of 315,000 tons; the sacrifice of the stockpiles would still lead to a deficit of 4,000 tons. If the reserves are to be maintained, then the re-

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will have to be reduced from 27. g to 1.5 - 200 g. The intensive sunflower and cotton cultivation in South Russia would make it appear possible to import 1.5 Mill. tons of oilseeds. This would, if possible, cover the fat-deficiency.

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with margarine and increase the butter production with oilseeds. First, however, one has to wait for the rape-seed harvest and the development of the Russian campaign before the attitude regarding the question of the size of the ration can be defined.

5. Auxiliary means of production:

The bringing in of the harvest, the provisioning of the population and the securing of future food supplies depend in the main on adequate supplies of coal, liquid fuels and fertilizers.

III. Under State Secretary von Henncken stated in connection with the situation regarding industrial raw materials:

Coal: Merely the demand has increased during the last 4 years from 182 to 230 Mill. tons, mining during the same period has increased by 8 Mill. t. only. Therefore the European countries which depend on German coal received only 6% of the necessary amount of coal. The already restricted coal deliveries to domestic railroads which have already been entirely insufficient since the beginning of April, had to be reduced again by an average of about 1%. Many plants had to be shut down and production restricted even the coal consumption of the power plants had to be cut in some cases by 20%. Also the planned stock piling of domestic fuel lagged far behind the calculated amounts. Since the seasonal difficulties will set in by the end of September, it will depend on the box car deliveries during the months of July to September, whether we shall be able to avoid serious production losses in industry and the menace of a shortage in the stockpiles of domestic fuels.

Rubber:

All transports by Russian railroads have reached Germany. Should it be possible to bring rubber to Germany by running the blockade - 1,000 tons are on the way at present - or should it be possible to re-open the Transsiberian road before long, then we would have in Japan a further 15,000 tons of rubber at our disposal from additional purchases.

Rubber requirements for Germany and Italy, including all occupied and Reich-protected countries, have been fixed at 47,000 tons for the second half-year.

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The production of Buna will be gradually increased from 50,000 tons from July till September. Assuming that no unforeseen events take place in the second half-year, a total of 35,000 tons of Buna will be available. This amount could be increased to 39,000 tons by resorting to extraordinary measures. By using the last stocks of natural rubber, which amount at the present time to 5,400 tons, we could almost satisfy rubber requirements fixed for the second half-year.

Since, however, the processing of Buna still requires, at the present stage of development, at least 10-15% of natural rubber it is impossible to consume completely the stocks of natural rubber in July and August. Consequently if none of the rubber shipments which are now in transit, should arrive during July, it will become immediately necessary to reduce the amounts in course of being processed in order to make out the stocks of natural rubber.

France is equipped only for the processing of natural rubber. Therefore the French plants can keep working only if deliveries from overseas should arrive.

Every effort is being made to increase the production of Buna. Since the mass production of Buna in Duels had to be started at the time directly from the laboratory stage, there were considerable losses of production owing to unexpected difficulties. In order to maintain and increase the present production it was necessary to add intermediates - acetaldehyde - coming from other plants. The Minister of Economics had to make this decision, although it meant unwelcome repercussions in the explosives industry and the production of Plexiglass.

Iron and Steel:

After the iron producing industry increased its production steadily from the low level of 1,850,000 tons in February of this year, to 2,300,000 tons in May, when it reached the maximum so far attained, one has to expect a decrease in iron production at least 10% starting with the next month due to the diminished coal deliveries.

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The ore situation shows a further falling off. Owing to the restriction of tonnage in the Baltic Sea, instead of the planned shipments of 1,500,000 tons per month, only certain iron ore from Norway can be counted upon, as conditions are at present. Consequently, I had to decide that from 1st July the consumption of Scandinavian ores of low-phosphorus content has to be cut by 25% in the Ruhr-smelting-works and by 20% in Upper Silesia, the Protectorate and in the coastal works. This will necessarily lead

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to a further decrease in iron production since the smelting of 1 grade ores requires a higher specific coal consumption per ton of iron. Therefore in the third quarter of the year, provided no further reductions of coal and ore deliveries occur, a total production of only 1.8 Mill. tons of raw steel can be counted on at the best.

*/ the demand for stock-piling and

Orders on hand, which at the end of last September amounted to 5, tons, and with which it was just possible to cope, will amount at the end of this month to 12,000,000 tons, owing to the quotas not used by the consumers and notified for switching to the third quarter. This is chiefly due to loss of production through the increased danger of air raids and the present unfavorable weather conditions. Delivery dates far exceed 6-7 months, especially for products with bottlenecks in their manufacture; for piping, semi-finished goods, superstructure materials and thin plates delivery dates today are 1-12 months.

As it is not use to holders of quotas to receive iron allocations which cannot be delivered within a reasonable period, I expect to meet with understanding when steps are taken to reduce the number of orders. It can be readily understood that I cannot effect an increase of the quotas, especially an increase of the Wehrmacht quotas which has been applied for and which amounts to 300,000 tons per month, and still less so as we expect new commitments by reason of the Russian campaign.

Steel alloying metals:

The German manganese compounds with a 30% content of manganese are not rich enough to produce ferric manganese.

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Russia

For 1941 the supply of 300 000 tons had been agreed upon with/ to this considerable arrears from the supply of the previous year to be added. The available stocks would only last until winter. At present processes for the manufacture of Ferro Manganese from some manganese-containing substances and the possibility of substituting calcium-silicon for Ferro Manganese were being investigated. Calc Carbide which has been used as alternative during the world war is available today.

As the Tungsten and Molybdenum yield from the Iberian Peninsula was insufficient for our requirements I recently arranged for the curbing of Tungsten consumption by 15% and Molybdenum consumption by 10% and also ordered that Molybdenum be to a large extent replaced by domestic production of Vanadin from the vanadium clinker to be increased at the same time. Even after the stoppage of the Russian deliveries which had been set at 500 000 tons of Tungsten and Molybdenum, the reduced allocation of 240 tons of Tungsten and 150 tons of Molybdenum was expected to be sufficient until next spring. Economies in the use of the above mentioned alloying materials would bring about a certain increase in the consumption of dressing, but even without additional supplies (Turkey) it would be possible to meet the chromium requirements until next spring.

Italy:

For the third quarter of 1941 the supply for the Reich had been secured to the hitherto existing extent; however, cuts of copper had to be made in view of the requirements by industry and export considerations of the imminent exhaustion of the stocks. At the same time an increased allocation to our Italian ally could not be avoided. Mobilization in the occupied territories ordered by the Reich had had partly not such strong expression, this held especially true of the taking away of church bells. Owing to the restrictions of the rationing and the limits of the time to be used there would probably be a reduction of 10 to 25 per cent, i.e. about one-fifth supply. I therefore ordered the immediate discontinuation of copper rollers at the plants, this being essential to maintaining allocations during the third quarter of this year. Should for political reasons the utilization of church bells be carried out to a limited extent a considerable reduction of the present allocation to 65% as 1 October and to 25% for the first quarter 1942

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It would be necessary. 5 000 tons would be made available by the mobilization of the church bells, the present requirement was 10 000 tons monthly.

The already mentioned aluminum requirement of approx. 27 000 tons monthly at present would just be met by the German production and 8 figures from Norway, France and Switzerland. There were at present difficulties in regard to the supply of the aluminum foundries of America. There was already a production deficit in the Reich of 2 000 tons of aluminum monthly. As a result, the output of the foreign foundries had gone back to 1/3 of their output capacity. With the operation of new aluminum plants would an improvement be

*)at the beginning of the new year

22/11

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With regard to platinum it would be necessary partly to use gold instead.

Mineral Oil:

Nothing special was to be said in regard to airplane carburettor and fuel oil. Bottlenecks were carburettor fuel and Diesel fuel. to the Balkan campaign and the preparation of the Russian campaign there was a transport hold-up which had caused supplies to fall considerably. The supply of carburettor and Diesel fuel would still be dependent on the extent of its consumption by the army and the navy. According to reports so far received, gasoline would show a deficit of 57,000 tons as early as 1 August, Diesel fuel 64,000 tons at the beginning of September. The Reich Marshal had therefore ordered a 10% reduction of fuel consumption by industry. I need not emphasize that this would have serious consequences for industry, especially for agriculture.

To sum up the situation it could be said that long-term planning was at present inadvisable. In the light of the above data first immediate measures to secure the supply during the next six months were necessary firstly in the field of rubber, where immediate thinking was being considered, secondly in the metal fields, where the mobilization of the stocks seemed urgent;

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thirdly in the field of iron and steel, where orders had to be processed according to priority and adjusted to the production capacity of the industry.

With reference to the last point, General von Hammerstein suggested cancellation of such orders placed prior to 1 July 1940 as were still undelivered. This suggestion was generally approved.

He further requested that the OK's application for an increase of the Hehrsch quota from 1 million tons to 1.2 million tons be withdrawn. General Thomas pointed out that the execution of adult projects inevitably entailed an increase in the quota and that the OK must therefore insist on the quota being increased.

In contrast to this Ministerial Director Schulze-Fielitz and General von Hammerstein pointed out that outdated orders must be withdrawn. continuous check of current orders was unavoidable. This held true to an even greater extent in cases where programs were being drawn. (According to Ministerial Director Schulze-Fielitz certain orders e.g. in connection with the fortification of the Western border were still open. According to General von Hammerstein, orders placed for machinery for the manufacture of infantry munition had not as yet been completed.)

There was agreement that only by radically reorganizing orders to the quota which in turn had to be adjusted to output capacity, could a system of iron control be made effective. Old orders would have to be cancelled upon issuance of new orders.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7474
CONTINUED

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At the suggestion of State Secretary Koerner, General von Hanneke in conjunction with the authorities concerned would prepare appropriate measures and lay down new quotas after the new air force program had been determined.

After a report to Fieldmarshal Keitel, General Thomas would state whether the OKW's application for an increase of the Wehrmacht was to be upheld.

The decision on the ball problem would be sent to the Minister of Economy in the next few days.

Under State Secretary von Jagwitz thought

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adequate allocation of raw material to the export industry and as the import of war essential goods from some countries was not possible if deliveries were made in return by way of German exports. This was to be especially borne in mind in future negotiations with Turkey and Switzerland.

In regard to the Russian orders still undelivered, it was to be examined in how far their execution was expedient in the light of military economy or export objectives.

State Secretary Keerner requested that he be furnished with data difficulties arising from the fact that the Chiefs of the Civil Administration in Alsace and in Lorraine, who were directly responsible to the Fuehrer, issued such directives for their territories as were continually frustrating the enforcement of uniform rationing and controls imposed by the Reich Departments (Ressorts).

IV. In the subject of the position of the military economic production plan, Professor Krauch stated:

1. Minerals:

The requirements for 1941 amounted to 7,000,000 tons against 5,500,000 tons in the previous year. German production has increased from 3,500,000 tons in the past year to 4,200,000 tons in the current year. The imports from Rumania have doubled in the same period (from 800,000 to 1,600,000 tons). Imports from Russia, together with those from other countries, decreased from 800,000 in 1940 to 300,000 in the current year. To meet the increased requirements for 1941, the available stocks which can be used had to be broken into.

In 1942 there was a gap of 600,000 tons of supplies to be bridged assuming that the requirements remained the same, that home production increased from 4,200,000 to 5,400,000 tons and that imports from Rumania to Germany amounted to 1,600,000 tons. To meet the deficit increased imports from Russia had to be called back on. Increased imports were also prerequisites for the increase in aviation fuel production which had been ordered.

The total coal requirements amount to about 15,000,000 tons per year of pit-coal in 1943/44. Certain changes arose through the use of Russian mineral oils.

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2. Iron:

Iron production would reach 65-70,000 tons in the current year on 100,000 tons in the coming year.

3. Light metal:

Production increased from 238,000 tons of primary aluminum in 1941 to 250,000 in 1942. The expansion of Silumin production (from

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5,000 to 6,000 tons per year) and of reclamation of scrap metal (from 4,000 to 27,000 tons per year) run parallel. The Norwegian production capacity would be expanded from 30,000 tons per year in 1941 to 63,000 tons per year in the following year and to 145,000 tons of foundry aluminum per year in the year after that. Further supplementary building projects are included in the planning.

The alumina deficit amounted to 56,000 tons in the current year, and 46,000 tons in the coming year. The consequent aluminum deficit amounted to 28,000 and 23,000 ^{tons} per year respectively. Every attempt would be made to diminish the deficit. (Integration in C).

The new plan for light metals of 23 June 1941 would necessitate certain alterations in planning.

The magnesium expansion progressed with 31,000 tons in 1941 and 33,000 and 39,000 tons respectively in the next two years.

There were in Germany, Norway and the rest of Europe about 441,000 tons per year, against the enemy Powers' 420,000 tons per year. The difference would increase in our favor to 61,000 and 71,000 tons per year in the next two years respectively.

4. Leather:

Through the new synthetic substitutes, approximate provision would be possible (leather requirements: 13,000 tons per month). Supplies and stores of lect would be exhausted by the end of 1941.

5. Industrial oils and fats:

The demand for 210,000 tons per year could be met in the current year to the extent of 134,000 tons and in the next year to the extent of 184,000 tons by synthetic production. Shortening of the production period in these spheres would be possible only by integration in SS and C.

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6. Gunpowder and explosives:

The position with regard to supplies could be considered quite assured.

7. Nitrogen:

The increased gunpowder and explosives production had resulted in a 50% increase in the nitrogen requirements as against 1938/39. The nitrogen production in 1941/42 has increased by about 100,000 tons to about 1,100,000 tons and will rise in 1944/45 to 1,500,000. The home use of nitrogen fertilizer is at the same level as in 1938. As, however, the Eastern areas must also be supplied, 100,000 tons per year less are available in the old Reich area.

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In the statement after this, State-Secretary Backe pointed out the insufficient supply of nitrogen for agriculture. Only 83% of the German requirements were met. Professor Krauch emphasized that nitrogen production could be increased by 120,000 tons, i.e. 1.5 tons increase in grain production by exploitation of equipment available in the occupied Western area. A prerequisite for this was that sufficient coal and sulphuric acid should be made ready.

State-Secretary Landfried considered it a matter of urgency that coal requirements be brought into alignment with the possible production. According to Professor Krauch's statement, certain possibilities of economizing might emerge, if in place of German coal Russian crude oils could be hydrogenated.

According to State-Secretary Backe, delivery of edible fats to the industrial fats sector was cut off the question in the 3rd year of war.

State-Secretary Kleinmann broached the question of an increase in the Diesel fuel quotas for inland shipping. He pointed out that the present level of the quotas did not allow of full exploitation of inland shipping.

State-Secretary Landfried replied that the reasons presented by the Reich Minister of Transportation for an increase of the quotas had been thoroughly investigated. However, the supply situation did not permit of an increase in the quotas.

signed: Bergheim

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7474
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 January 1948

we,

Guenter K. Weber, ETO No. 35268,
Brigitte Turk, ETO No. 35130,
Eugene R. Kun, AGO No. D-429798

hereby certify that we are duly appointed translators for the
English and German languages and that the above is a true and
correct translation of the document No. NI-7474.

GUENTER K. WEBER, ETO No. 35268 BRIGITTE TURK, ETO No. 35130
pp. 1-17 pp. 37-42

EUGENE R. KUN, AGO No. D-429798
pp. 18-36

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 4714
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES.

M E M O

Statements of Herr Beiersdoerfer.

The key word "Krauch" is newly introduced as key for the chemical industry.

This key word includes the property group "Ruestungsgut" (armaments).

Under this heading comes the commodity group "Ruestungsgut" (armaments). This group includes goods of military importance, the transport of which is needed to maintain and to strengthen the striking power of the Wehrmacht, and which are being sent from one private address to another.

It therefore depends on the purpose of the individual products which, if the occasion arises, may be determined by inquiry from the sales departments or, if necessary, from the receiver.

The highest-priority commodities of the vital and war important parts of the chemical production have been classified under section "A". The following key-word shipments fall under section "A":

Fertilizer
Military Goods
Private Goods for the Wehrmacht
Ammunition
Ju 88 (Fighter plane)
Speer
Krauch
Fodder
Motorfuel
Lubricants,

which are all completely exempt from the embargo on shipping. These goods which fall under section "P" and for which a special permit for each shipment has to be obtained, only amount to a small percentage of the goods which are produced in the war-important chemical industry.-

According to Herr Blinn, shipping department, the key word "Speer", includes the new economic production plan in case of mobilization, that means the new construction of plants which are of importance to the army (gasoline plants, oppanol plants etc).-

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, E.T.O. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4714.

21 May 1947.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
E.T.O. 34079.

(E N D)

427

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. VI

CASE NO. 6

Prosecution Document Book No. 22

English



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NI-077		Minutes of meeting of the Advisory Board (Beirat) of the Reich Group Industry, 11 February 1938.	111	

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 1527
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Ministerpräsident
Feldmarschal GOERING
Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General
for Special Questions of Chemical Production

Stamp: Top secret

Berlin, 18 May 1940

27 copies

Decision on the priority classification of the powder and explosives factories building schemes in the Kassel district.	1 - 3	copies	Reichsminister
			Dr. TODT
	4 - 6	"	Professor
			Dr. KRAUCH
	7	"	Dr. RITTER
	8	"	Dr. AHL
	9	"	Dr. RAUH
	10	"	RINGLES
	11 - 12	"	High Command of the Armed Forces West.
	13 - 16	"	High Command of the Army Ordnance Office
	17	"	Armament Inspection Kassel
	18	"	Armament Command Kassel
	19	"	Armament Command Giessen
	20 - 21	"	Organization TODT Kassel
	22	"	Professor Dr. KRAEMERLIN
	23	"	DAG, Director SCHINDLER
	24	"	WASAG, Dr. MARQUARD
	25 - 27	"	File copy Dr. RITTER

On 17 May 1940 the building sites of the powder and explosives factories within the district of Kassel were inspected.

At a meeting, which was attended by representatives of the offices of the High Command of the Army, Ordnance Office, Armament Inspection Kassel, Armament Command Giessen, and Armament Command Kassel, Inspector General for the German Highway System Branch Office Kassel, Military District Plenipotentiary of the Reich Minister Dr. TODT for the Military District 9; Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production; Dynamit Action Gesellschaft and WASAG, the following was laid down:

1. Allendorf.

The tri-plant of the DAG including the filling and tamping installations is being built in 4 parts at 800 - 900 tons per month each. The main point of the decision made was to the effect that the first quarter should be completed by July, while the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 1527
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd.)

remaining parts should be completed within a period of approx. 6 - 8 weeks.

(page 2 of original)

Allendorf must be regarded as main part of the building scheme. With regard to the machinery there are no bottle-necks. Whether the building can be completed in time depends only on whether sufficient workers will be available. At present there are 3700 men at the building site, another 1000 German workers are necessary, also 1200 temporary workers (prisoners) for the construction of waste-water channels etc. The Armament Inspectorate has tried to obtain prisoners from the Ziegenhain camp, but has not succeeded. It must urgently be tried to effect in Berlin the immediate release of 1200 prisoners.

The branch office believes to be able to settle the question pertaining to building workers at Allendorf in collaboration with the Regional Labor Office. The main tasks in the plant in chronological order are as follows:

- a) First quarter of tri-production (800 - 900 tons per month). start of operation 1 July 1940.
- b) Temporary installation for filling grenades 10.5 cm. start of operation 1 July 1940.
- c) Bomb-filling installation.
- d) second quarter of tri-production (800 - 900 tons per month).

To put the plant into operation 300 men will be required; in August/September this requirement will increase up to approx. 800 men.

2. Hexa-plant and filling installation of MSIG.

By order of the navy a plant for the production of 360 tons per month of hexa is to be built in two building periods, also, in four building periods, a filling installation for navy explosives. The navy wants hexa production as well as half of the filling installations to be postponed for the present until 1 October 1940. At the building site the preparatory work is being started, a few places, where buildings are to be erected, are being excavated. Annexes have already been boarded in. Available building workers: 1300, immediate requirement: 1100, which could be met for simple digging by prisoners or foreign workers. It is to be checked in collaboration with the navy, whether the building cannot be stopped completely, in order to make workers available, and whether the filling installation cannot be incorporated temporarily or established somewhere else.

(page 3 of original)

3. Hessian-Lichtenau.

The existing tri-plant with a capacity of 1000 tons per month of the DAG is in full operation, as well as part of the extension with a capacity of 600 tons per month. The picric acid plant with a capacity of 250 tons per month is almost completed, the extension of the tarping and filling installation is also nearly completed. These parts are to be regarded as the main parts of the plant.

The building of the acid splitting plant must be continued for reasons of raw materials supply, even if its completion is not absolutely necessary for the start of operations.

The HP-plant with a capacity of 150 tons per month, as well as the recrystallization plant can be postponed. This work is being carried out at present by 1750 building workers, an additional 300 men are required and will be provided by the branch office TODT in Kassel.

With reference to the decisions of the last few days it has been determined to operate in Hessian-Lichtenau above all the tarping and filling installations in several shifts to make full use of their capacity. There are 1600 men and 850 women working in that plant, the immediate requirement is 400 men and 1260 women, at the beginning of June another 400 men. The branch office TODT will immediately provide 200 men. Further men required will be immediately drawn from the building workers until a replacement with new additional workers is possible. Details are left to the plant or construction management, President Dr. BRAUN in Kassel has definitely promised the plenipotentiary for the military district that the requirement of women can be met as soon as the accommodation problem in Hessian-Lichtenau has been settled. The construction of the housing camp is almost completed. The branch office TODT has to solve the accommodation question under any circumstances.

General points of view.

1. To do away with bottle-necks in the housing situation, it is urgently recommended to make the branch office TODT solely responsible for the housing, of which at present the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie is still in charge.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI 1527
CONTINUED

(Page 4 of original)

B. Local offices of the German Labor Front have to be instructed to keep in closer contact with the management and the branch offices of the TODT Organisation in their district, to bring about an immediate clarification in regard to the objections and complaints pertaining to the housing problem, without having these matters dealt with by the Central Offices in Berlin.

C. It is urgently required that in places which are near prisoners camps, prisoners will be made available temporarily for urgent work. In these cases the permanent Inspectorates must be granted some influence locally. The prisoners should not be familiarized with the work by their guards, but by foremen of the construction company, while the guards should be restricted to the actual guarding of the prisoners.

D. In the district of Kassel the problems pertaining to the workers in the district proper can be solved in collaboration with the Branch Office Kassel TODT, the Regional Labor Office and the Plenipotentiary for the Military District.

The plant and filling installations are to be given priority in Hessian-Lichtenau, after that the requirement of building workers will be met.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, Civ. No. 35 130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. MI - 1527.

Brigitte TURK
Civ. No. 35 130

- 4 -

- END -

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7294
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CHIEF

Draft

Ms. 3996/41 secret

22

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht

Berlin, 14 June 1941

Ref. No. 43 Economic Armaments Office/
Armaments VII b

No. 3996/41 secret

Secret

Reference: OKW Ref. No. 43

Economic Armaments Office/Armaments VII b
No. 2247/41 secret of 29 March 1941

Subject: Transportation of hexamethylene tetramine under
code name "KRAUCH"

Supplementing the above directive an order has been issued to the effect that bills of lading for hexamethylene tetramine which is delivered in the quantities quoted by the firms mentioned below, are to be marked with the code word "KRAUCH".

<u>Producer</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Production in tons per month</u>
Deutsche Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt	Wildau	800
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.	Elberfeld	400

The Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry points out that hexamethylene tetramine is a chemical product of essential and decisive importance to the war effort.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht

By order

F (?)

initial:

initial: F

27 May

initial: "

Distribution:

Armaments Inspectorate III with copy for Armaments Command Potsdam
Armaments Inspectorate VI with copy for Armaments Command Duesseldorf

For information:

Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry

stamp:
out 17 June 1941

for the files.

Ms: (illegible)

B 43 secret (King ?)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7294
CONTINUED

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Berlin T 9, 15 May 1941
Scharlandstrasse 128

The Plenipotentiary General for
Special Questions concerning
Chemical Production

Telephone: 120048
Teleprinter: K 1-113
Telegraphic Address:
Gebochen

Reference: I T 2 vS/bn/K1 Code word /7277
Journal No. 3832//1 secret

initial
illegible 21 May

Stamp: Secret

Reference:

Ms: (signature) illegible

Subject: Dispatch of Hexamethylene
Tetramine under the code
name "KAMUCH"

Stamp:
Economic Arrangements Office
Arrangements VII 21 March 1941

To the
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
for the attention of Lieutenant Colonel WERNICH

Ref. No.
No. 3996//1 secret

Berlin T 26
Bundlarstr. 15

In order to avoid misunderstandings, we request you to inform
the Supreme Command concerned, that hexamethylene tetramine is a
chemical product of essential and decisive importance to the war
effort.

<u>Producer</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Production in tons per month</u>
Deutsche Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt	Wiesbaden	100
I.G. Farbenindustrie AG	Elberfeld	100

Production must be guaranteed to the extent stated above through
the transportation of the finished product under the code name "KAMUCH".

I should be obliged if you would inform me of the steps taken.

Heil Hitler!
By order
signature illegible

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Beryl HESWICK, AGO No. D-427459, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and
that the above is a true and correct translation of the document
No. NI-7294.

Beryl HESWICK
AGO No. D-427459

Berlin, 27 February 1941

Stamp: Top Secret

Memorandum for the files on a report given at the
Headquarters of the Reichsmarschall on 26 February 1941

The following were dealt with:

1. Thanks for a picture sent on the occasion of his birthday.
2. Memorandum on the effects of an operation in the East.

The Reichsmarschall agreed with me that the occupation of the Ukraine only is of no value, but that the Baku mineral oil area must at all costs be occupied also. He, as well as the Fuehrer, was of the opinion that the whole Bolshevik state would collapse as soon as German troops marched into Russia, and that therefore no large scale destruction and total elimination of supplies and railroads such as I had feared is to be expected. The most important thing would be the rapid dispatch of the Bolshevik leaders. A particular source of anxiety for the Reichsmarschall was the interruption of communications with the Far East, which I specially pointed out to him. He told me that an agreement should be reached with the Japanese to re-open the Siberian railroad as soon as possible. The Reichsmarschall then spoke of the dangers of the whole operation which, in his opinion, can lie only in the failure of the necessary large scale supply organization. He pointed out that Napoleon, too, had failed owing to lack of supplies, and that he was constantly pressing the Fuehrer to increase the supply organization and to reduce the number of divisions to be formed which would only partly be in the front-line.

(page 2 of original)

Furthermore I pointed out our shortage of fighting men, which would become still more acute as a result of the operations in the East in which the long front-lines and the huge areas involved, increased the difficulty to be overcome. The Reichsmarschall admitted this and again made reference to his desire to avoid the formation of unnecessarily large numbers of new divisions. In answer to my objection, that we could only supply sufficient fuel for the operation - apart from the bringing up of the troops - for two months, the Reichsmarschall replied that he was to meet MEYERSCU the following week in Vienna, in order to hasten the development of the Roumanian oil fields. In connexion with the rubber situation, which I described as particularly grave, he ordered General von SCHILL to give orders for the production of substitute rubber for truck tires. It was impossible to waste our last rubber reserves on the bad Russian roads. With special emphasis the Reichsmarschall told me that he wanted to exploit the military economic assets of occupied Russia in a manner different from that which had been employed in the West and in Poland. He demanded that this responsibility be taken from the OKH and that an absolutely independent organization under his

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

command be created, an organization, which would advance into the country with the front line troops, carrying definite instructions, which are to be laid down beforehand. He charged me with the responsibility for the preparation and instructed me to make regular reports to him. He said that the Fuehrer had approved this request. I reported to him that these preparations were already under way and that I should submit the draft of the organization shortly.

3. Further detailed report on the gasoline situation. The Reichsmarschall then signed a new appeal to all Party offices and Reich authorities for the saving of gasoline and rubber.

(page 3 of original)

4. Soldiers temporarily released from the Wehrmacht for armaments work in 1940.

The Reichsmarschall did not agree with the measures taken by Mr. TODE - especially, with the distribution of the 22 200 service men temporarily released from the Wehrmacht, for armaments work in 1940 - and ordered Generaloberst UDET to record the effects of this measure, so that he could make a report to the Fuehrer on the subject. The Reichsmarschall considered impossible UDET's request, that all soldiers temporarily released for armaments work in 1940, be retained in the armaments industry instead of returning to the Forces.

5. Krauch Plan.

The Reichsmarschall had signed a new decree, according to which the Krauch Plan has priority over the other Wehrmacht products. The Reichsmarschall agreed with me that the products should in fact be put at the top of the groups concerned, but that no special group should be created.

6. Manpower Situation.

I once more gave the Reichsmarschall full information on the manpower situation, especially the shortage in the special groups. He said that on the strength of that he would again speak to the Fuehrer on the question and ask the Fuehrer to limit as much as possible his constant requests for an increase in the number of military units to be formed.

7. I asked the Reichsmarschall to induce the Fuehrer to cancel all measures for "Operation Sealion" ("Seelowe"), which provided for the reservation of all shipping space. The transport situation would be so serious in March and April, that we must at all costs commission all shipping space which had been kept in reserve for other tasks.

(signature) THOMAS 26 February

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7291
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Beryl BESICK, AGO No. D-427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7291.

Beryl BESICK
AGO No. D-427459

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-200
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES

(Transl.-Note
Handwritten Note) for: General NAGEL
Please submit
matter to Reichs-
marschall
Illegible initial
Document.

Rue (IV d/c)

Berlin, 4. October 1941.

Re: Labor allocation of Russian P.W.'s and civilian workers.

Conference notes for office chief

- I. Immediate need for workers for the most important branches of the war economy: At present about 800.000 (of this for the armament industry, mostly SS- und S-priority (Transl.note: both expressions mean special priority): 404.000, the Krauch Plan: 43.000, Reichsbahn: 101.000.)
- II. According to the speech of the Fuehrer of 3 October 1941, the entire European continent must be exploited for the German war economy. In the first place, the utilization of all available workers is concerned by this. According to WEST/L only a small contribution to the extension of the war economy can be made by the planned reorganization of the Wehrmacht. It is therefore impossible to cover the actual labor requirements unless we use Russian P.W.'s and civilian workers (see encl. 1 and 4). The experiences we have had up to now have shown that among both the Russian P.W.'s and the Ukrainian civilian workers a considerable reservoir of skilled labor is available (see encl. 3)
- III. Both the Foreign Counter-Intelligence and the Reichsfuehrer SS do not agree with the use of Russian civilian workers either from the old Russian or from the new Russian territories, and only agree to the use of Russian P.W.'s under very difficult conditions (handwritten note: Transl.Note: Ruhr Mines-approved)
- IV. It must be demanded that:
 - 1) Russian P.W.'s - in groups - are to be accepted for

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-200
CONT'D.

(page 2 of the original)

use in the armament industry and in surface mining operations too.

- 2) Moreover, hiring of Ukrainian civilian workers for the underground mining operations is to be approved.
- 3) The objections of counter intelligence have to be disregarded in favor of the labor allocation requirements.

4. Enclosures

(Transl. Note:
Handwritten notes:

Encl. 1 u. 2 back to Rue IV c (?) BDC Gotha
" 3 " 4 to the previous POW's-Russians
Various illegible notations).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, BTO No. 34079 hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-200

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
BTO No. 34079
U.S. CIVILIAN

TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT
No. EC-489
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Oberstleutnant z.V. (Lt. Col. Available
for Duty) KIRSCHNER
in Staff of the Plenipotentiary General
for Special Questions of the Chemical
Production
Prof. Dr. G. KRAUCH

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten number:)
17

(Translator's Note:
Semi-illegible receipt stamp:
Wi-Rue Office
23 Oct. 1941
(Handwritten number:)
6849/419

Berlin W 9, 20 Oct. 1941
Scharlandstr. 128
Tel.: 120048

7617/41g

S e c r e t!

(Translator's Note:
Various illegible handwritten notes)

To Chief of the Office of Military
Economy and Armament in the Supreme
Command of the Wehrmacht,
General of Infantry THOMAS
BERLIN W 62

Dear General,

Professor KRAUCH asked me yesterday, when I visited him, on his
sick-bed, to express his very special thanks to you for your energetic
efforts in the "Distress Project Bruch", and for your willingness to stress
the importance of the meeting on 23 October, which has become unnecessary
owing to the preliminary work of all persons implicated by your own presence.

During my visit, Professor KRAUCH developed an idea concerning the
employment of Russian POW's in the armament industry, for the further
development and, especially, the execution of which he considers you, dear
General, to be the right man.

I made a short note of the ideas of Professor KRAUCH in the enclosure,
which I am herewith handing you obediently as a suggestion of the P.D.-Chemie
(Plenipotentiary General for Chemical Production).

Heil Hitler!

Yours very obediently

Encl.

(signature) KIRSCHNER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, BPO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-489.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
BPO No. 34079

(E N D)

12

(page 8 of original)

Reichsmarschall Goering
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year PlanChemical Production Plan
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- I Survey of the Invested Assets
- II Individual Presentation of the Most Important Sectors
- 1 Mineral Oil
 - 2 Aviation motor fuels
 - 3 Aluminum
 - 4 Magnesium
 - 5 Generation of current
 - 6 Buna
 - 7 Synthetic materials
 - 8 Leather substitutes
 - 9 Synthetic tanning materials
 - 10 Nitrogen
 - 11 Gunpowder
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 - 13 Basic chemicals
 - 14 Cellulose and rayon
 - 15 Industrial oils and fats

III Changes in the supply situation in 1942 as compared with 1936, achieved in the most important sectors

Situation as of
January 1943

3502

(page 9 of original)

.....

I. Survey of the assets invested in the Chemical Production Plan.

The enormous economic happenings which the Chemical Production Plan is bringing about as part of the Four Year Plan and which are aiming to reach the given goal, by planning and directing, are shown on the attached chart I in a summarized form.

The quantity of iron which was used for new plants shows the extent of the total economic expenditure within the Chemical Production Plan. The left column shows these figures for the individual years. The column next to it shows the distribution, in percentages, with respect to the main fields of the Chemical Production Plan.

The 13.25 million tons of iron which were used in the construction of new plants thus far, and the expansion of existing plants are equivalent to a total investment of approx. 16 000 million RM of the German nation's assets, as may be calculated from the quantities of iron on the basis of the figures arrived at by experience, of the Chemical Industry; i.e. on an average approx. 2,500 million RM per year were invested in the course of 6 years of development. These assets, invested in new plants, provide the German Wehrmacht today with the raw materials necessary for the conduct

(page 9 of original cont'd)

of the war. Further investments, which will however decrease, will have to be made over the next few years.

To be able to create these assets for the plants within the Chemical Production Plan approx. 800 000 workers had to be employed constantly within the entire German economy during these six years of development; of these, approx. 200 000 workers at the actual building-sites. The number which is supposed to be at the building-sites and which has been recognized by the Central Planning (Zentrale Planung), but could not yet be put to work, is approx. 225,000 men for 1942. Even during the preceding years there has always been a shortage of 20,000 - 40,000 men at the building sites, for the completion of the new plants of the Chemical Production Plan.

The great fluctuation in the number of workers at the building-sites, which can be attributed especially to the assignment of foreign workers and men liable to be called up for military service, is responsible for the fact that up to now the constantly required number of workers had to be renewed, on an average, every 9 months, owing to the fact that so many were leaving, i.e. for a building project which lasted approx. two years, new workers had to be recruited or made available almost three times over during this period.

The number of factory workers within the Chemical Production Plan has increased during the last 18 months from 230,000 to more than 300,000 men in the main fields. Of these approx. 100,000 are in the powder and explosives industry, while under "Chemistry" we have only that part of the production branches of the total chemical industry which is particularly important from the viewpoint of national defense.

The sales value of the production from the new plants of the Chemical Production Plan has considerably increased from year to year and already amounts to 3 - 3,500 million RM in 1942.

.....

(page 11 of original)

1. Mineral oil (motor fuels, lubricants, and similar)

Due to the decisive significance of mineral oil in war, the new construction and expansion of plants for the production of mineral oil was the core of the chemical production plan. Whereas in the enemy countries it was possible to build up a technically simple mineral oil industry on the basis of petroleum, Germany was forced, because of the lack of sufficient occurrences of petroleum, to build up a synthetic production, based essentially on coal. The attached chart shows the total production of mineral oil from German raw materials: In the year 1942 it attains approximately 6 million tons per year, rising in the year 1944 to 8 million tons per year and later on to 11 million tons per year. In each case this includes approximately 2 million tons per year from German petroleum. For this increase of production the following processes were available:

(page 11 of original cont'd)

1. Hydrogenation. The high pressure process of the I.G. Farbenindustrie produced, using the natural coal structure, out of coal, lignite, but also out of tars, pitches or petroleum under 300 - 700 atm pressure, aviation motor fuels, automobile gasoline, diesel motor fuels, fuel oils, lubricants and paraffines. This process is thus far the only one which is in a position to furnish motor fuels which meet the quality requirements of the Luftwaffe, and marine fuel oils which combine with a maximum heating value per liter a specific weight which is greater than that of salt water. For use in war it has particular significance also in this way, that it allows of producing predominantly aviation gasoline or automobile gasoline or diesel fuel, depending in each case on the requirements.

So far 12 high pressure hydrogenation plants with an achieved output of 2.5 million tons per year of motor fuels have been erected. The development of an additional 6 hydrogenation plants will allow the total hydrogenation output to rise to over 5 million tons per year of motor fuels.

2. Synthesis. The Fischer process of Ruhrchemie gasifies the coal and reconstitutes from carbon oxide - hydrogen gas mixtures hydrocarbons which produce particularly good diesel motor fuel and furnish a paraffine which represents the basis of the fatty acid synthesis. The 9 Fischer synthesis plants which have been erected have a production capacity of 0.5 - 0.6 million tons of product per year.

3. The low-temperature distillation of lignite aims to remove the tar from lignite before it is burned up in the power plants. In 1940 already, 1.0 million tons of tar per year were obtained. The coal put through the low-temperature distillation plants will increase in 1943 to approximately 33 million tons per year, the production of tar to 2.2 million tons per year, of which approximately 1.6 million tons per year will be used in hydrogenation plants as raw materials.

4. The low-temperature distillation of coal had first to develop suitable processes for the various types of coal, so that development on a large scale will not begin until 1943. In 1946 there are to be subjected to low-temperature distillation 23 million tons of coal per year, particularly in the Saar and in Upper Silesia, from which 17 million tons of coke per year and 1.9 million tons of mineral oil per year are expected. The low-temperature distillation of coal has particular significance for the German production of coke, since high temperature coking cannot be increased sufficiently, due to a lack of suitable coal deposits.

5. Synthetic production of lubricants. In view of the scarcity of petroleum as a raw material for the production of lubricants in the German territory, the chemical synthesis of high grade lubricants from the waste gases of the hydrogenation and synthesis plants, and from paraffine, is of particular significance. Aviation motor oil, motor oil for the Wehrmacht, superheated steam cylinder oil, as well as, on the basis of the experiences of last winter, cold-resistant lubricants, particularly axle grease for the Reichsbahn, are supplied from this source; in 1942 approximately 40,000 tons.

(page 11 of original cont'd)

6. German and Estonian oil shale deposits as well as a German oil chalk deposit are also being utilized by the Chemical Production Plan for obtaining mineral oil and are to make a contribution of several 100,000 tons of oil per year.

(page 12 of original)

2. Aviation Motor Fuels.

The high quality of aviation motor fuels which the German Air Force demands can practically be made available in Germany only from the products of the hydrogenation plants. Unlike gasoline, diesel motor fuel and fuel oil, which are for instance also imported from Rumania, such import possibilities for aviation gasolines exist only to a very small extent, since they are produced in considerable quantities only in America, on the Persian Gulf and in East Asia. Therefore the Chemical Production Plan has always laid the greatest emphasis on furthering the production of aviation motor fuels. For reasons of the coal structure the most suitable raw material for the production of aviation gasoline is pit-coal. Before Upper Silesia was available for the development of plants, the main production centre for aviation gasoline had of necessity to be established on the Ruhr.

The attached chart shows the German aviation motor fuel production: The low production of 1936 (76,000 tons) was increased by 1941 to 809,000 tons. The production in 1942 is estimated at approx. 1.4 million tons and in 1943 at 1.9 million tons per year.

A considerable part of the plants can be converted to "maximum aviation motor fuel production" and can produce much more aviation motor fuel if the production of automobile gasoline and diesel motor fuel is decreased accordingly. In case of a maximum aviation motor fuel production, a production of 2.3 million tons would be possible as early as 1943 and in the final stage a production of 3.5 million tons. However, the possibility of this conversion can only be utilized, when additional quantities of automobile gasoline, diesel motor fuel or fuel oil are made available from other sources, for instance additional production of mineral oil. Apart from this switch over, various hydrogenation plants are so equipped that a considerably increased production of aviation motor fuels can be achieved in them if foreign mineral oil is made available.

Of particular importance is the proportion of "high capacity aviation motor fuels" marked red in the chart, which is supposed to reach approx. 100% of the entire aviation motor fuels in the final stage; the production target is 3.4 million tons. High capacity aviation motor fuels allow of a particularly increased engine efficiency in aircraft engines specially developed for these motor fuels. They consist of mixtures of a normal aviation motor fuel with a high capacity component. The latter are substances of the so-called iso-octane type or of the so-called aromatic type.

The raw materials for the iso-octane production are available in America in almost unlimited quantities, while we in Germany use only

(page 12 of original cont'd)

the waste gases - available only in small quantities - of the hydrogenation plants, and have furthermore developed - as an independent raw material basis - the gasification of coal and the synthesis of the gasification products into higher alcohols. In total our planning reaches only a proportion of 20% iso-octane in the high capacity aviation motor fuel, compared with for instance 50% and more in USA.

We have succeeded, through a special treatment of aviation motor fuels out of hydrogenation with special "catalysers", the so-called aromatization and dehydrogenation, in obtaining an additional high capacity component (aromatic type), which gives still better engine efficiency in aircraft than the high capacity aviation gasolines on the basis of iso-octane as used in America. The German high capacity aviation gasoline consists therefore nowadays of a highly aromatic special basic gasoline with an admixture of 20% iso-octane.

.....

(page 15 of original)

4. Magnesium.

The significance, from the viewpoint of military economy, of the specifically particularly light magnesium metal (specific weight: iron - 7.86, aluminum - 2.69, magnesium - 1.74) lies, as in the case of the light metal aluminum, above all in its advantageous utilization in the construction of aircraft and vehicles. In addition to this, magnesium is also used for the production of incendiary bombs and other military requisites.

The increase of the production of magnesium shown on the attached chart 4 was achieved by the new construction or expansion of 5 magnesium plants in addition to the required raw material and auxiliary plants.

The plants for the production of magnesium also represent large electrolysis installations, and require, in the same manner as for the production of aluminum, extensive amounts of electric current.

Magnesium is produced, in contrast to aluminum, entirely from German raw materials. Magnesite, dolomite, as well as the abrasum salts of the rock salt mines are used here as basic materials. In the case of the laundry in Hoyer (Hannover), which is under construction, the magnesium content of salt water is used for obtaining the metal.

Since magnesium in many respects (the industrial application is in part in the form of magnesium-aluminum alloys) has properties that are related to those of aluminum, the requirements of magnesium rise to about the same ratio with the requirements of aluminum, the metals industry requiring about 10% of the requirements of aluminum in the form of magnesium.

Thus the Chemical Production Plan for the Greater German Economic Area aims at a total production capacity of approximately 100,000 tons of magnesium metal per year, corresponding to the total aluminum capacity of approximately 1,000,000 tons per year, mentioned on the previous page.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8915
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 July 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-8915.

HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499.

-6-
"END"

12

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5934
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

This document
was available
to the gentlemen
of the 207th
session of the
Technical Management

Received
16 July 1943

(Handwriting)
Circulation
Chief Engineer

Initiated
Chief Engr. B
Initials

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE A.G.

Vermittlungsstelle W

Dr. Di/Ra.

Berlin NW 7, 13 July 1943
Unter den Linden 78

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Management Division T,

Frankfurt/Main/Hochst.

Subject: Specialists appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for
Special Questions of Chemical Production.

Enclosed herewith we send you a compilation of the specialists
appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical
Production.

In accordance with agreement with the Reich Ministry of Economics,
Pres. KERNEL, these specialists appointed by the Plenipotentiary General
for Special Questions of Chemical Production are in each case simultaneous-
ly chiefs of the Technical Committee of the corresponding sub-section of
the Economic Group Chemical Industry, in case such a sub-section was set
up in the field in question.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

Signature

Signature

Enclosure.

(page 2 of original)

Specialists appointed by the Plenipotentiary General
for Special Questions of Chemical Production.

- x) Simultaneously Chiefs of the corresponding Technical Committee of the
Economic Group Chemical Industry.
(as of 1.4.1943).

1) Sphere of Energy

a)	Department of Private heating plants	Dir. JACHNE	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt-Hoechst
b)	" " Public heating plants	" KNETSCHMANN	Rhein-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk, Essen
c)	" " Interpower plants	" SPENNER	Alpen-Elektrowerke, Wien
d)	" " Transmission lines	" GOLLMACHER	Brown, Boveri & Cie., Mannheim

2) Sphere of Gas and Coal

a)	Department of Gas production and transmission structures	REBRINK	Verein f.d.bergbaulichen Interessen, Essen
b)	" " Coal distillation plants	Dr. DING	Sudetenländische Treibstoffwerke A.G., Brüx
c)	" " Coal production plant	Bergass. HÜSTER	Reichsvereinigung Kohle, Berlin
d)	" " Lignite production plant	Dr. HIRZ	Braunkohlen-Industrie-Verein, Halle/S.
		Dir. HELBERG	Anhaltische Kohlenwerke, Verw. Berlin

3) Sphere of Mineral Oil

a)	Department of Lignite distillation plants	Dr. OTTEN	Lurgi-Gesellschaft f. Gasmototechnik mbH., Frankfurt a./M.
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(page 2 of original, cont'd)

b)	Department of	Slate oil distillation plants	Dir.Dr.WINKLER	Continental Oel A.G., Berlin
c)	"	" Petroleum processing plants	Dir.Dr.WELLER	Deurag-Merag, Misburg/Hannover
d)	"	" Hydrogenation plants	Dir.Dr.PIER	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Ludwigshafen
e)	"	" Synthesis plants	Prof.Dr.MARTIN	Ruhrchemie, Oberhausen-Holten

(page 3 of original)

f)	"	" Benzol production plants	Dir.Dr.Rudolf WELLER	Benzolverband, Essen
g)	"	" High duty lubricants plants	Dr. ZORN	Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., Leuna
h)	"	" High duty motor fuels plants	Dir.Dr.PIER	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen
i)	"	" Isooctane plants	Dir.Dr.GIESSEN	Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., Leuna

4) Sphere of Nitrogen

a)	Department of	Nitrogen plants Germany	Dir.Dr.v.STADEL x) Chief of the technical committee 3 and subcommittee 3a	Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., Leuna
b)	"	" Nitrogen plants West	Dr.RUSSCHMIDT	Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., Leuna
c)	"	" Nitrogen plants East	Dr. ASSMANN	Stickstoff-Syndikat Berlin

5) Sphere of Products Preliminary to FSK

a)	Department of	Toluol plants	Dir.Dr.WELLER	Benzolverband, Essen
b)	"	" Methanol plants	Dir.Dr.GIESSEN x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 1ld	Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., Leuna

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

- | | | | |
|----|--|---|---|
| c) | Department of Highly concentrated acid plants | Dr. WILFROTH
x) Chief of the technical committee 3 b | Ammoniakwerk Marsburg GmbH, Leuna |
| d) | " " Acid regeneration and concentration plants | Dr. v. WAGEL
x) Chief of the technical sub-committee 2 g | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| e) | " " Ethylene and methylene oxide plants | Dir. Dr. MEEROS
x) Chief of the technical sub-committee 11 k | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| | | Dr. BUELOW | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| | | Dr. ROSE | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen |

6) Sphere of Smoke Screen Materials

- | | | | |
|----|---|---|---|
| a) | Department of Smoke screen materials plants | Dir. Dr. MURSTER
x) Chief of the technical committee 2 b | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen |
|----|---|---|---|

(page 4 of original)

7) Sphere P-S

- | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|
| a) | Department of Powder plants | Dir. ODICKA | Deutsche Sprengchemie A.G., Berlin |
| b) | " " Explosives plants | Dir. SCHINDLER | Dynarit A.G., Troisdorf |
| c) | " " Stabilizer plants | Dir. Dr. HÄBERLAND | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Uerdingen |

8) Sphere C

- | | | | |
|----|--|-----------------|---|
| a) | Department of Chemical Warfare Agents plants | Dir. Dr. MEEROS | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen |
|----|--|-----------------|---|

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

9) Sphere T

a)	Department of	Plants on electro- lytic basis	President PIETSCH	Elektrochemische Werke Muenchen, Hoeft- gelskreuth
b)	"	" Plants on chemical basis	Dir.Dr.MUELLER- CUNRADI	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen

10) Sphere of Rubber

a)	Department of	Runa Production plants	Dir.Dr.MEROS x) Chief of the technical committee and subcommittee 13b	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Ludwigshafen
b)	"	" Soot Production plants	Dir.Dr.BALDWIN x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 13b	Deutsche Gold- u.Silber- scheideanstalt, Frankfurt/M.
c)	"	" Vulcanization accelerator plants	Dr. IMWIG x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 13b	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen
d)	"	" Rubber accessory products plants	Dir.Dr.XOCH	Phoenix, Hamburg- Harburg
e)	"	" Rubber processing plants	Dr. WEBER	Continental A.G., Hannover
f)	"	" Coke Sagys plants	Dr. MEYER	Ostgesellschaft f. Pflanzen, Kautschuk u. Guttapercha, Bln.

11) Sphere of Industrial Oils and Fats

a)	Department of	Glycerine plants	Dir.Dr.MUELLER- CUNRADI x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 32 g	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Ludwigshafen
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(page 5 of original)

b)	"	" Detergents plants	Dir.Dr.BERTSCH x) Chief of the technical committee 15	Henkel & Cie., Duesseldorf
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(page 5 of original, cont'd)

- | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| c) | Department of Mercol plants | Dir.Dr.RIEMEL | Hankel & Cie.,
Duesseldorf
Ammoniakwerk Merse-
C.m.b.H., Louna |
| | | x)Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 32(p) | |
| d) | " " Paraffine oxida-
tion plants | x)Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 32(q) | |
| e) | " " Oxy- and fatty-
alcohol plants | Dir.Dr.BERTSCH
x)Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 32(o) | Hankel & Cie.,
Duesseldorf |
- x) Chiefs of the technical subcommittees or technical committees, respectively, of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, who will simultaneously become active as specialists appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production.

(as of 1.4.1943)

12) Sphere of Acetylene Chemistry

- | | | | |
|----|--|---|--|
| a) | Department of Carbide industry
plants | Dir.Dr.WILDHAGEN
x)Chief of the
technical
committee 10 | Bayerische Stick-
stoffwerke, Berlin |
| b) | " " Acetaldehyde and
solvents plants | Dir.Dr.ALBERTS
x)Chief of the
technical
committee 11 | I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| | | Obering.KILB
x)Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 11a | Teckor-Burghausen |
| | | Dr. ROTH
x)Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 11b | I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., Ludwigshafen |

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| | Dr.v.RETZE | Deutsche Gold- u. |
| | x)Chief of the | Silberscheideanstalt, |
| | technical | Frankfurt/M. |
| | subcommittee 11c | |
| c) Department of Thermoplast pro- | Dr.KOLLEK | I.G. Farbenindustrie |
| duction and | x)Chief of the | A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| processing plants | technical | |
| | committee 24 f | |

(page 6 of original)

13) Sphere of Other Organic Chemistry

- | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| a) Department of Phenoplast pro- | Dir.Dr.HESSEN | August Nowack A.G., |
| duction plants | x)Chief of the | Brutzen |
| | technical | |
| | subcommittee 24(c) | |
| b) " " Phenoplast pro- | Dr. LUCAS | AG, Henningsdorf |
| cessing plants | | |
| c) " " Plants for the | Dir.Dr.v.STADEN | Ammoniakwerk Merseburg |
| Production of pho- | x)Chief of the | GmbH., Leuna |
| nol and analogous | technical | |
| substances | subcommittee 32(r) | |
| d) " " Formaldehyde | Dr.v.RETZE | Deutsche Gold- u.Sil- |
| plants | x)Chief of the | berscheideanstalt, |
| | technical | Frankfurt |
| | subcommittee 11(c) | |
| | Dr.FLUEGGE | Deutsche Gold- u.Sil- |
| | | berscheideanstalt, |
| | | Frankfurt |
| e) " " Leakage raw | Dr.JORDAN | I.G. Farbenindustrie |
| materials | x)Chief of the | A.G. Ludwigshafen |
| ("Lackrohstoff") | technical | |
| plants | subcommittee 24(d) | |
| f) " " G.M.I. plants | Dir.Dr.FUELLER- | I.G. Farbenindustrie |
| | CUNGLDI | A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| g) " " Lead tetraethyl | Dir.Dr.FUELLER- | I.G. Farbenindustrie |
| plants | CUNGLDI | A.G., Ludwigshafen |
| | x)Chief of the | |
| | technical | |
| | subcommittee 32(r) | |

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

- h) Department of Plants for plant
protecting agents
and insecticides x) Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 21(a)
- i) " " Synthetic and
chromium tanning agents plants x) Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 17(c) Dr. FELSCH I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., Frankfurt/M.
- j) " " Textile auxili-
aries plants x) Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 17(e)
- k) " " Polyalcohol
plants Dir. Dr. MUELLER-
CUNAU DI I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., Ludwigshafen
x) Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 11 (j)

14) Sphere of Yeast

- a) Department of Yeast plants x) Chief of the
technical
subcommittee 32 (i)

(page 7 of original)

15) Sphere of Pharmaceuticals

- a) Department of Pharmaceutical
plants Dr. BOEHRINGER Boehringer & Sohn,
x) Chief of the technical
committee 14 Ingelheim
- Prof. Dr. HOERLEIN I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., Elberfeld

16) Sphere of Inorganic Chemistry

- a) Department of Various inorganic
products plants Dir. Dr. MURSTER I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G., Ludwigshafen
- b) " " Water glass
plants Dr. ROEHL Henkel & Cie.,
x) Chief of the technical
subcommittee 33(j) Duesseldorf

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

c)	Department of Electrocarborundum plants	SCHEIDTHAUF x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 33 (c)	Waecker-Burghausen
d)	" " Sodium metal plants	Dir.Dr.BAERLEIND x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 1 (f)	Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheideanstalt, Frankfurt
e)	" " Sodium cyanide	Dir.Dr.BAERLEIND x) Chief of the technical committee 9 (a)	Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheideanstalt, Frankfurt
f)	" " Chromium compounds plants	Dr.DILFNEY Chief of the technical subcommittee 31 (g)	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Uerdingen
g)	" " Phosphorus plants	Dr. LANG x) Chief of the technical committee 5 (a)	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld
h)	" " Sulphur plants	Dr.GUERTERT x) Chief of the technical committee 2 (a)	Ruhr gas A.G., Essen
i)	" " Carbon disulphide plants	Dr. E.JACOB x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 2 (c)	Chem.Fabrik Kreuznach GmbH.
j)	" " Sulphuric acid and sulphur compounds	Dir.Dr.FURSTER x) Chief of the technical committee 2 (b)	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen

(page 8 of original)

k)	" " Dry ice plants	Dr.LINK x) Chief of the technical subcommittee 8 (b)	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Oppau
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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5934
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

- | | | |
|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1) Department of Soda and caustic soda (caustic) plants | x) Dir. VOGL
Chief of the technical subcommittee 1 (a) | Deutsche Solvay-Werke, Berlin |
| m) " " Sodium chloride and caustic soda (electrolytic) plants | x) H. BUERGIN
Chief of the technical committee 1 (d) | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld |
| | Dr. VORLAENDER | I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld |

- x) Chiefs of the technical subcommittees or technical committees, respectively, of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, who will simultaneously become active as specialists appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 June 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, B 397944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5934.

Herbert RODECK
B 397944

Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan,
The Plenipotentiary General
for special questions concerning the
production of Chemicals.

Berlin W 6, 9 August 1943
Scharlinstrasse 123
Telephone: 120040
Teleprinter: K 1-113
Telegrams: Gobeckon

Stamp:

HELG WOLKE BRUNNEN -WALD
In: 16. August 1943 a.m.
answered
Two illegible initials.

Reference: Employment of Labor 24/41.
Journal No. Circular No. 67/43
Subject:

Re: Measures for bringing back to work those French workers who
have been recruited by individual enlistment and have broken
their contracts.

To: Factories and Construction Managements within the plan for
chemical production,
for the attention of the Betriebsführer or his deputy.

As from 1. August 1943, my office - Liaison office of the
GCHQ in Paris, department Dr. Tittus, Field Post No. 66661 VI
VII- has been put in charge of all cases of breach of contract
by French workers recruited by individual enlistment.

The department of Dr. Tittus will search for workers who have
broken their contracts and eventually bring them back to their
place of work if there are really no decent reasons for doing
otherwise. The department will act in connection and cooperation
with the Military Commander-in-Chief and the officials under his
orders.

To take this measure effective it is necessary:

- 1) to report every breach of a labor contract occurring after
the 1. August 1943 immediately after its detection in order
not to lose time.
- 2) to use a sticker to stamp similar to the specimen attached for
each report.
- 3) to dispatch at the same time to the department "Employment
of Labor" a short memorandum giving the total figure of all the
reports sent to Paris; the district Plenipotentiary (Gebiets-
beauftragte) should be furnished by a copy of the memorandum.
- 4) where the local Labor Exchange, the Gestapo or any other
authority has previously been informed of cases of escape from
work, this procedure may be dispensed with; but in such cases a
note should be added stating that a report has been made directly
to Paris.

The factories and construction managements will be informed
directly by the Paris department of the result of the searches.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Will you please see that reports on workers who break their contract are sent to Paris in the proscribed manner, as quickly as possible, so that the search, which is always a difficult matter, should not be made still more difficult by delayed reports. In the same way, if a French worker should return in the morning to his place of work, this should be reported to Paris in order to stop further investigations.

Enclosure:

By order

stencilled signature
illegible

Ms.: Mr. Schroeder
Miss Dade
Please note if necessary

(page 2 of original)

Reich Office for Economic Development

Berlin W 9,
Sauerlandstrasse 128
Telephone: 120046

Journal No.

Part/Enclosure to circular Employment
of Labor

No. 67/43 of 9. August 1943.

Subject:

(date)

Reference:

Works

To

Department Dr. Tittus

F.R. No. 0661-III VII

Reference: French of Labor Contract

- Report.

..... (Full name) nationality

born in profession

of street No.

District last billeted in camp

..... left his place of work without permission

on the and has not returned for work has not

returned from his furlough which ended on the

Presumably the above mentioned is staying in his home district.
Please start a search for the absentee from work, and if caught,
escort him back to his place of work or take the necessary steps
for his return transport.

Remarks

Please notify us of the result of your endeavours.

Signature

Only to be used for French workers enlisted by individual recruitment,
not by draft or blue.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1336
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 June 1947

I, Victoria GRTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-1336.

Victoria GRTON
No. 20 129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7569
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Certification of Source of Original Document

I, Paul H. Gantt, War Department, do hereby certify that the document numbered WC/433 on dated 13 January 1944 was taken from the files located in the German Military Document Section, War Department.

17 June 1947
(Date)

Paul H. Gantt
(Name)

(page 2 of original)

Distribution list:

1. Addressee
2. Professor Krauch 13 January 1944
3. Dr. Ritter
4. Oberstleutnant Kirschner
5. Labor allocation office
6. Dr. Adolf Mueller

CK/G

1364/43

Your letter dated 22 December 43

Your reference: RoA (Raw Materials Office) CO/22.12./

Allocation of Labor.

To the Head of
the Raw Materials Office in the
Reich Ministry for Munitions and
War Production
President Kehrl
Berlin-Wannsee
Am Sandwerder 23.

Dear President Kehrl,

In your letter dated 22 December 1943 you pointed out the importance of close cooperation between your office and mine with particular reference to the allocation of labor. Of course I fully agree with your point of view. It is not surprising to find that your officials are giving strong support to my demands to my applications for manpower for the execution of tasks formulated in close agreement with your Planning Office. The aims of your Raw Materials Office are identical with the endeavours of my office: to ensure that the chemical factories under my supervision attain the highest possible level of production and that factories in course of construction are completed and equipped as soon as possible.

Only my office, however, is in a position to deal with the distribution of labor allocated for the various sectors under my supervision, or with the allocation to individual works of manpower demands made by the Wehrmacht, because this requires detailed information about the plan as a whole and the position in individual factories.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

I was not aware of any misunderstandings or even mistakes which are supposed to have occurred in the course of negotiations conducted in the past between my office and the Armaments Office; should matters of any importance be involved I should be obliged if you could let me have further details.

May I be allowed to point out, however, that the efforts of my office in such matters as the procurement of foreign labor within the restrictions set on the initiative of the individual employer by the Plenipotentiary General for the Provision of Manpower, and the employment of certain classes of manpower (prisoners of war, inmates of concentration camps, prisoners, units of the Military Pioneer Corps, etc.), have had an effect upon the speed of progress of chemical production, and upon that production itself, which must not be underestimated. I consider that the initiative displayed by my staff in the procurement of labor, a virtue which has proved its worth in the past, must not be repressed in the future.

Heil Hitler!

Distribution of copies:
CRR Pukall

signed: Dr. Krauch

T
T1
T3
T5

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 August 1947

I, ARTHUR MACNAMARA, Civ.No.20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7569.

ARTHUR MACNAMARA, Civ.No.20191.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7574
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CHIEFS

Ri/Rc.

13 February 1944

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion, General Director concerning labor
allocations at the Plenipotentiary General Chemistry.

- - - -

The Central Planning has established clearly the further procedure in carrying out the chemical production plan, which has been adequately supplied with iron allotments, in order to ensure the carrying-through as far as the manufacture of machinery and apparatuses is concerned.

During a discussion which took place on 8 February 1944 between the Reich Minister SPAER and Professor KRAUCH, the Minister promised that labor will also be made available to an adequate extent for the fulfilling of the important raw material programs:

- a) labor for assembling and construction at the building sites
- b) plant workers for the completed works.

According to the experiences of recent days it is necessary to settle the following points:

1. To give more consideration to chemical raw materials on the priority list.

Negotiations with
Kalk - Schiefer,
etc. ?

Since in future individual allotments will be made locally on the basis of the priority list, this list has come to be of increased importance. Fully inadequate consideration is given to the chemical raw material basis in the Decree Ruc/. 101/44 Secret, dated 17 January 1944. This must be remedied at the earliest possible moment in accordance with the application of the Plenipotentiary General Chemistry (Gebochen) dated 17 January 1944.

The Government office is requested - as was always done successfully formerly - to let the Plenipotentiary General Chemistry participate in the preparation of fundamental decrees.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT N. 7, NI-7574
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original cont'd)

2. The present disastrous situation as regards building, assembling and operating should be eased by immediate allotments.

The great shortage of supplies existing at Gobeckom at the present time, and which has taken on alarming proportions, must be covered by some kind of special measure, at least to some extent.

Demand for skilled and unskilled building workers

approx. 21,600*

Demand for skilled and unskilled metal workers

for assembling requirements

approx. 13,000

Demand for plant operators

" 14,400

Skilled metal workers for operating plants.

" 3,600

(handwritten) *) acknowledged and checked by Main Committee B-v.

(page 2 of original)

(handwritten marginal notes)

7 writes to Building Office

3. No withdrawals from building and plants without Gobeckom's consent.

Withdrawals from building projects and plants of the chemical production plant must be made in conjunction or in agreement with Gobeckom.

4. Unhindered transfer of labor within the Gobeckom field.

(handwritten marginal notes)

Satisfactory regulation of the former decree

In order to level up the production program and to form focal points in building and assembling, Gobeckom, of its own responsibility, should be in a position to transfer its labor without having the carrying-through of the projects delayed at intermediate levels.

5. Building workers to be earmarked by the Building Office for assignment to Gobeckom.

(handwritten marginal notes)

Letter for Building Office

Since the allocation of building workers through the Building Office has been denied, the Building Office should, in the same way as is being done for constructional iron, allocate to Gobeckom an earmarked quota.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

6. Immediate action for powder, explosives and preliminary products building projects by releasing labor from the Wehrmacht (inter alia from technical battalions, persons classified as AV and DU (AV-fit for labor duty only, DU-unfit for military service) who are to be discharged.)

(handwritten marginal note)

Discuss with Wehrmacht.

Allotments of labor are to be made immediately for the completion of powder, explosives and, in particular, preliminary products plants. (11,000 men, of which 5,000 metal workers are included in 2.)

7. Exemption of Gebochem from "Kolonieraktion".

(handwritten note)

Disapproved by Weeger

The envisaged exemption of Gebochem from the "Kolonieraktion" is absolutely necessary, because only this will ensure the starting up of the new factories as requested.

8. Foreign labor recruited for Gebochem must not be assigned for any other purposes.

(handwritten marginal note)

? and? have promised st.

The labor recruited by Gebochem abroad is earmarked for work in the chemical field. It must not be assigned anywhere else by any other offices.

Encl. II

Draft of a decree of the
To: Armament office to its agencies.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7574

CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

Labor Allocation - Ldn/Gs -

(handwritten) Enclosure I
10 February 1944

Manpower Requirements in the

Gebechem-Plan

1. Construction and /assembling/ (approximately 250 building sites)

	Total	proportion of skilled and unskilled con- struction workers	skilled and un- skilled metal workers
	-----	-----	-----
	34,600	21,600	13,000
fairly large building sites			
17 mineral oil	12,700	7,100	5,600
12 chemistry	3,700	2,300	1,400
10 light metal	4,400	3,900	500
14 PSVOT	5,400	2,500	2,900
<hr/>			
*) 42 fairly large building pro- jects on 33 building sites	26,300	15,800	10,400
<hr/>			
*) 3 large- scale projects in Upper Silesia	10,000	4,800	5,200

2.) Plants (approximately 150 firms)

	Total	of which skilled metal workers
	-----	-----
	approx. 18,000	3,650
fairly large plants		
18 mineral oil	8,000	1,050
9 chemistry	4,100	1,350
5 (PS)VOT	750	150
<hr/>		
32 fairly large plants in 25 major plants	12,850	2,550

(page 4 of original)

(handwritten) Enclosure II

Labor Allocation - Ldn/Gs

10 February 1944

Proposed Contents of an Instruction
to the Armament Offices and of a
letter to the GR (General Plani-
potentiary for the Employment
of Labor)

1.) To Rue (Armament) Offices:

- a. Gebachem draws my attention to the fact that the production programs of which he has been put in charge as central authority require a constant flow of labor in order to cope with threatening losses in production. Thus it is extremely important that the transfer of labor, initiated by him, should be effected as fast as possible and without being hampered by regional interests. The same applies to building and assembling projects still to be completed which are of particular importance to this program.

I therefore request you to give your active support to and speed up the transfers initiated by Gebachem or his commissioned representative. From these withdrawals, which have been ordered to eliminate bottle necks on high priority jobs, it must not be inferred that the works releasing the men, were able to release the labor without difficulty. On the contrary, unavoidable gaps have arisen at the moment which have to be filled again.

- b. In order to cover the requirements of the Gebachem plan, among other things, recruiting campaigns in the occupied territories have been initiated with cooperation of representatives of the individual industrial concerns applying for labor under the Gebachem-plan, to support the general measures taken for the procurement of labor. These foreign workers, who were recruited by the applicants for labour at considerable trouble and cost, are earmarked and their papers have been classified accordingly. They must therefore not be assigned to any other projects, unless they are used outside of their trade, in sudden emergencies for instance (floods, etc.).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7574
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

c. Withdrawal of labor from the Gebechem Plan :

In this connection, I refer to the decrees of 23 December 1943
- Ausl. Arb. I/1 No. 129 "par. 3" - and the one dated 17 January
1944

- Ausl. Arb. I/1 No. 161/44 Secret, "par. 4" -,
according to which Gebechem is to be placed on the same level
as the Main Committees (Hauptausschüsse) and Main Rings
(Hauptringe). Withdrawals for other spheres of work therefore
require the consent of the Gebechem.

2.) To the GRL.

Enclosed herewith I am sending a copy of an instruction issued
to the Ausl. Offices (Permanent Offices) with the request to
inform the Gau Arbeitsamt (Gau Labor Offices) and Labor
Offices accordingly.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 September 1947

I, Victoria GERTON, GC No. 20 129, hereby certify that I
am a duly appointed translator for the English and German
languages and that the above is a true and correct translation
of the document No. NI-7574.

Victoria GERTON
GC No. 20 129

TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7572
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Certification of Source of Original Document

I, Paul H. Gantt, War Department, do hereby certify that the document numbered WC/240 and dated 12 May 1944 was taken from the files of the F W Amt located in the German Military Document Section, War Department.

17 June 1947
(Date)

Paul H. Gantt
(Name)

(page 2 of original)

12 May 1944

Distribution List:

1. ~~Dr. Schisler~~
2. ~~Majorant Stolz/Hauptmann Fritsch~~
3. ~~Majorant Fehrl~~
4. ~~Majorant Dr. Kersch/Dr. Ritter~~
5. ~~Dr. Adolf Mueller~~
6. ~~Dr. Bickmann~~
7. ~~Hptm Lantour Coenau~~
8. 1 copy to be circulated to Mineral (mineral oil)/chem (chemistry)/ Light metals/ gunpowder and explosives production (PSV - Pulver & Sprengstoffverarbeitung?).

I Dr. R/G,
3822/A, secret
Withdrawal of 14000 builders from the
Chemical Production Plan
including gunpowder and explosives manufacture (Pulver und Sprengstoff
Verarbeitung?) program.

Reich Minister Speer
Reich Ministry for munitions and war
production
Berlin W. G.
to be transmitted by dispatch rider

Dear Reich Minister,

Discussions are in progress at the moment with the Planning Office and the Raw Materials Office on the suggestions for withdrawal. The result so far is as follows:

1. Staatsrat Dr. Schisler has agreed to withdraw from Gunpowder and Explosives Production building sites2000 men. It will presumably be possible to avoid serious consequences if Herr Dorsch undertakes to return the men as soon as possible and to rush work if necessary in order to catch up with schedules. Generally speaking this holds true for other transfers also.
2. It was suggested to withdraw6200 men of the approximately 14000 at Baltoel/Estonia. This is the best method of allowing for the principle that in the field of mineral oil production only the fuel oil or lubricating oil industries, which will not start production until 1945 should be affected by transfers and that withdrawals should be made from large building projects. Deficiencies

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-7572
CONTINUED

in Estonia will amount to approx. 75000 tons of fuel oil in 1945. This makes it possible to avoid transfers from German mineral oil projects, which would be a grave mistake in view of damage in Rumania.

3. In spite of protests the following numbers have during the last few days been withdrawn by the staff of the Flichter program from various building sites:

Carbide chemistry Fuerstenberg	80
Pharmaceuticals store Parchwitz	30
Pottau alumina	650
Workers' dwellings Bruex	730
Carlisle Gelsenberg	20
Winter Nitrogen	25
Halls	7; total approx. 1600.

The deduction of these 1600 men from the total number of men to be withdrawn is quite legitimate. Should there be difficulties about this, 1300 men still employed at Tyne in Norway could be offered for withdrawal.

Carried over from page 2: 9800

(page 3 of original)

Withdrawals effected at Pottau will put them 6 months behind schedule, i.e. there will be a deficiency of approx. 10000 tons of aluminum in 1945, total prospective production capacity being 25000 tons per month approx.

4. A list of 4200 men to be transferred immediately in accordance with promises made to Herr Lorch by President Keitel was completed yesterday. Among these 4200 men are 1700 inmates of Auschwitz concentration camp. This withdrawal can only be described as extremely serious. Work on building sites will on an average be about 6 months behind schedule. The deficiency in Buna production amounting to 7500 tons in 1944 and another 7500 tons in 1945 may be considered the most far-reaching of the consequences of the transfer. 14000 men.

To sum up:

The building sites of the Chemical Production Plan including gun powder and explosives production (PSV - Pulver- und Sprengstoff-Verarbeitung?) today comprise 105,500 builders.

Approximately 15,000 additional men would be required for the sites even at this early date if schedules are to be observed and targets set by the Central Planning Office are to be attained.

A few days ago I received from the Reich Marshall an enquiry as to methods of effecting considerable improvements in air raid protection at 14 of the most important fuel plants and 4 Buna factories. This would mean a building program requiring an additional 20,000 - 25,000 men for one year.

This is the situation in which the demands for workers under the Fighter project find us.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7572
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

Will you please do your best to have the 1700 inmates of the concentration camp struck off the list of men to be transferred in view of the effects of such a step on Auschwitz.

I submit that the permission of the Fuehrer may be necessary for the execution of the transfers from Estonia (which present the least harmful solution from the point of view of the mineral oil industry): he turned down the abandonment of building sites in Estonia on principle some time ago, but he might well give permission for the partial withdrawals contemplated.

Any arbitrary withdrawals from the building projects of the Chemical Production Plan ever and above those now authorized must be prohibited. Orders to that effect should be issued by Herr Dorsch to the branches of the construction office and to the staff of the Fichter Program.

In accordance with the first general discussion on 5 May between Herr Dorsch and myself, he should undertake to return the men as soon as possible, and to see to it that lost time is made up.

In view of the fact that they are indispensable to the Fichter program, a list of all aviation spirit - and fuel plants will be submitted to the Fichter staff for the purpose of attaining a higher rate of progress in construction work than is possible at the moment.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 August 1947

I, ARTHUR MICHAELI, Civ.No.20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7572.

ARTHUR MICHAELI, Civ.No.20191.

-3-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7571
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CRIE

13.: Kraml

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Certification of Source of Original Document

I, Paul H. Gantt, War Department, do hereby certify that the document numbered WE/239 and dated 15 May 1944 was taken from the files of the CRIE Unit located in the German Military Document Section, War Department.

17 June 1947
(Date)

Paul H. Gantt
(Name)

(page 2 of original)

Secret!

Berlin, 15 May 1944

Negotiations in connection with withdrawal of builders from the Chemical Production Plan for the Fighter Program.

(page 3 of original)

Excerpt from: Repair of air raid damage at hydrogenation plants.

Meeting, Leuna 16 May 1944.

With regard to repairs of damage the following was agreed upon by:

Reich Minister Speer
President Kehrl - Planning Office
Ministerialdirektor Dorsch - Construction Office
Dr. Fischer - - Raw Materials Office, Department Mineral Oil
Dr. Fischer - - Reich Coördinator of tasks (Reichsleistungsverteiler)
Prof. Dr. Krauch - Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry.

3. As regards the question whether in the circumstances any builders' men should be released for the Fighter program by the Plenipotentiary General, it was decided to carry out releases as planned. According to this, 4,200 men were to be released from chemical and light metal industries (including 1700 concentration camp inmates from Auschwitz), 2000 men from the Gunpowder and Explosives industry (ISV - Pulver- und Sprengstoffverarbeitung?), and 6200 men from Estonia. 1600 men had recently been transferred to the Fighter program from various building sites. The question whether the 1700 concentration camp inmates from Auschwitz should be struck off the list of men to be transferred is to be decided in consultation with the Fuehrer's Headquarters. The 100 men from Schkopau, put forward for transfer, are to be transferred, if at all possible, to the adjacent Leuna works.

(Decision to be communicated by Dorsch to Ritter and Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry).

(page 3 of original cont'd)

The effects of the transfer of 6200 men of the Baltool from Det'men are to be investigated in the near future. Extent and date of transfer is to depend on result of investigation. Basic decision on the whole problem of transfers to be requested from Fuehrer's Headquarters.

(Investigation of effects of Baltool transfers together with: Sonnenseld, Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry; report to Planning Office; decision: Planning Office and Dorsch).

4. Any transfers from building sites of the Production Plan for the Chemical Industry apart from those specified in the final list must be prohibited. Herr Dorsch is to issue orders accordingly to the branch offices of the Construction Office; corresponding orders to be given to the Fighter Staff.

(To be discussed by Schoenleben and Gantus).

(page 4 of original)

(Place and date partly illegible) May 1941

General prerequisites for the restoration of damaged hydrogenation plants

- 1.) Decision whether any transfers from Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry to Fighter program should be effected in the circumstances whether it would not be better to make the necessary changes in order to repair damage and strengthen air raid precaution terms within the department of the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry.

Transfer of 1700 concentration camp inmates from Auschwitz to be deferred on account of Speer/Krauch enquiry; 100 men from Schkeppau because of proximity to Launa.

- 2.) Answer to the question: how to obtain machine assembly men? Bräuer-Zeit and Becken, for example, had already asked for approx. 450 trained metal workers each. Use of pioneer units would seem indicated. Total strength of emergency squads of the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry in all hydrogenation plants was no more than 350 men, including 200 men from Launa, who could not be touched.
- 3.) Did not the break-down of the hydrogenation plants call for similar drastic measures as had been taken in the case of ball-bearing production among others? (Operation Schweinfurt or Kassel.)
- 4.) Instruction should be issued to the Plenipotentiaries for Building to raise the ban on building in cases of air raid damage and to supplement air raid precaution measures. Abolition of questionnaires and seniority numbers (Rangfolgennummern). There must be no delay in construction work.
- 5.) Inclusion of the repair - and air raid precaution schemes in the Fighter program scale of priorities is to be investigated.
 - a) With regard to the provision of builders it was suggested immediately to release 20,000 men (builders) in Italy on OT (Organisation Todt) terms - employment in Reich - for recruitment by the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry;
 - b) that 10,000 Italian members of the Wehrmacht in Italy be detailed immediately for work in the German armaments industry;

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7571
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original cont'd)

- c) that executive powers in Italy be strengthened immediately by the incorporation in Italian police units of 10,000 German police officials in order to ensure that the present recruitment campaign in Italy should bear fruit.
-

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 August 1947

I, ARTHUR MACMURRAY, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thorough, conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7571.

ARTHUR MACMURRAY, Civ. No. 20191.

STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I, KARL KRAUCH, Born on 7 April 1887, residing at Heidelberg Im Lindenried 23, herewith state under oath the following facts of which I have personal knowledge:

1. I was a member of the N.S.D.A.P. since 1937, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1940 until April 1945, and Plenipotentiary for Special Problems of the Chemical Production (Generalbevollmächtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung) within the frame of the Four-Year-Plan from July 1938 until April 1945.

2. In my official capacity as Plenipotentiary (Generalbevollmächtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung) (G.B. Chemie) I was the highest authority in passing judgment regarding the allocation of labor for the individual plants of the Chemical industry. This labor included, in addition to German workers, foreign workers, prisoners of war and inmates of concentration camps. The Reich Labor Ministry would send me the labor requisitions of the individual plants for final decision. I had the authority to either accept the full number requested or to decrease it if a check revealed that the requested number was too high. It was my responsibility to allocate the correct amount of labor necessary to accomplish whatever production program was involved. The Reich Labor Ministry kept me posted on the available number of workers. Frequently I would be informed that, for example, so and so many thousands were to arrive from Belgium or from Russia, and that these were available to the Chemical industry. The total number of workers employed in the Chemical industry amounted to approximately 400,000.

3. I am the originator of the "Karinhall Plan", erroneously known as the "Krauch Plan"; the purpose, among others, of this plan was to bring foreign workers into Germany on a voluntary basis. I also made the suggestion to General THOMAS through Herr KILSCHNER that Russian prisoners of war

(Page 2 of original)

be brought into Germany in order to employ them in the armament industry. This occurred in the year 1941 when hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners of war were living in Poland and Russia under terrible conditions.

4. I was aware of the fact that from the year 1942 on, workers were recruited in occupied countries on an involuntary basis. The Plenipotentiary (Generalbevollmächtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung) had permanent representatives in Paris, Brussels, the Hague, Amsterdam, Milan, Yugoslavia, Greece and Bratislava whose primary function was the recruitment of labor for Germany on a voluntary basis. After the German labor allocation authorities (Arbeitseinsatzbehoerden) recruited French workers involuntarily, the local representatives of the Plenipotentiary (Generalbevollmächtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung) together with the plants, made train escorts available.

5. The transfer of labor to Germany as a part of the Francolor arrangement came under my jurisdiction as Plenipotentiary (G.B. Chemie, Generalbevollmächtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung). I am aware of at least one case in which transports of workers brought in under the plan for recruiting foreign workers were in transit for weeks. The workers were hungry, tired, freezing, and without sufficient clothing.

6. It was my intention to use prisoners of war for construction rather than production work. I saw prisoners of war at work in Heydebreck and Gendorf. My office was informed that prisoners of war were taken from Chemical plants and used to work on fortifications. In at least one instance I negotiated directly with the armed forces (Wehrmacht) in regard to prisoners of war whose working conditions I wanted to improve.

7. I was present at the meeting of the 43rd Conference of Central Planning (Zentrale Planung) on 2 July 1943 at which, according to the minutes, the following matter was decided: That additional labor would be made available to Buna Auschwitz.

(Page 3 of original)

8. In the year 1943 ~~ROSENFISCH~~ informed me that it was planned to use concentration camp inmates in the labor force of Buna, Auschwitz. I was in Auschwitz in 1943, and I recognized the concentration camp laborers by their striped clothes and identification markings. I knew of the existence of crematoriums at the Auschwitz concentration camp. In reply to my questions I was told that they were used for the cremation of inmates who had died in the course of epidemics in the camp.

9. ~~ROSENFISCH~~, MUELLER, ECKARDT and LOEHR were my representatives in the offices of the Plenipotentiary (Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung) in Paris, Belgium, Milan and Yugoslavia respectively. They traveled frequently to examine labor conditions. They belonged to I.G. and their salaries were paid by I.G.

10. The welfare of the foreign workers employed by I.G. Farben was part of the responsibility of the Board of Directors (Vorstand). Christian SCHNEIDER had the primary responsibility as Chairman of the Social Welfare Commission (Sozialausschuss). I discussed labor conditions with Christian SCHNEIDER. Whenever the foreign workers in individual I.G. plants were underfed, their efficiency was impaired. I visited plants throughout the entire Chemical industry, and one of the first steps was always an inspection of the foreign workers' quarters to ascertain their living conditions.

11. I had the natural feeling that the use of foreign workers by force was not lawful. The detailed legal international agreements were not known to me to this extent.

I have read the above statement consisting of three pages in the German language and declare that it is the full truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief. I had the opportunity to make changes and corrections in the above statement. I have made this statement voluntarily without any promise of reward, and I was not subjected to any compulsion or threat.

(Signed) KARL KRAUCH

Kuernberg
22 January 1947.

Before me, ARTHUR T. COOPER, U. S. Civilian, AGO Identification No. D 434534, Interrogator, Evidence Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, appeared Karl Krauch, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement (Eidesstattliche Erklaerung), consisting of 3 (three) pages in the German language and swore that the same was true, on the 22nd day of January 1947.

(Signed) ARTHUR T. COOPER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-2972
Cont'd

I, ARTHUR T. COOPER, U. S. Civilian, AGO Identification No. D 434534, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-2972.

ARTHUR T. COOPER
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D 434534

E N D

Interrogation

of Albert SPEER by Mr. CHAMBERS
on 12 March 1947, from 10.30 to 12.30 hours.
Recorder: Amelia Hall.

- Q. Are you willing to testify under oath, Herr SPEER?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I remind you therefore of the oath you have taken previously.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Herr SPEER, on 29 May 1945 you were interrogated by an English-American team. In fact, it was the fourth session of a series of interrogations. Can you still remember it?
- A. There were at the time so many circumstances, that I could only recall the subject matter if you would give me some pointers.
- Q. In this interrogation on 29 May 1945, which lasted from 15.00 to 17.30 hours, you were questioned quite in detail about the Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftserhaltung (Reich Office for Economic Expansion), Professor FROST, the Economic Group Chemistry, the Office for New Materials, several certain problems of production, the Planning Office, and other technical questions. With this information, can you now approximately recall the interrogation under discussion?
- A. I do not remember the details any more, but I know that such an interrogation has taken place.
- Q. You stated in that interrogation that the Reich Office for Economic Expansion was founded for the purpose of managing the expansion of the production potentials of

(Page 2 of original)

- chemicals, especially of "strategic products", of synthetic oils and rubber, nitrogen and other products. The financing of these expansion projects was carried out by the government through the Reich Office for Economic Expansion, which, as you have stated, was a "I.G. promoted to government status", and that this Reich Office for Economic Expansion was almost exclusively staffed with I.G. personnel. Could you confirm this statement, and could you now explain it once more?
- A. As a matter of principle, I would like to remark concerning this statement that it was established at that time that it would not be used in the trial. I take it for granted that this evidence also is not to be used in court.
- Q. No, I cannot promise you that this time.

(page 2 of original cont'd.)

1. The English-American officers were not yet acquainted with the whole subject matter, and they wanted, therefore, basic information and got the first of it at these discussions. As far as I remember, no verbatim record was kept, but a report was written subsequently from memory and was not submitted to me, and thus I think it best now to formulate my former testimony now.
2. Would you, therefore, once more formulate the questions which you has discussed at that time, please?
1. I am not quite clear as to where the lines were drawn between the tasks of the "Reich Office for Economic Expansion" in the Reich Ministry of Economics and those of the "General Plenipotentiary for the Special Tasks in Chemical Production" in the Four Year's Plan. In my opinion; they both carried out the same

(page 3 of original)

- tasks, namely the expansion of all chemical raw materials which are essential for waging war. From a legal point of view, I do not know whether the Reich Office for Economic Expansion financed these projects. "However, I had that impression during my term of office as Minister.
- A large number of the employees working for the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry and the Reich Office for Economic Expansion were in constant contact with my employees and were, as far I know, employees who were supplied by I.G.-Farben. I don't know whether or not they left the employment of I.G.-Farben. Similarly, I cannot clearly distinguish between the employees of the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry and those of the Reich Office for Economic Expansion, since in conferences an accurate differentiation (Handwritten: Changed; signature: SPERER) was neither possible nor necessary. Therefore, I cannot say for sure whether all the personnel of the Reich Office for Economic Expansion came from the I.G.-Farben.
2. Surely you mean "Exclusively"?
 1. ...consisted exclusively. Or whether in this case a large percentage of the employees of the Ministry of Economics occupied leading positions.
 2. Could you not tell me in what sense and for what purpose you have used the expression that this Reich Office for Economic Expansion is "a nationalized I.G.-Farben"?
 1. Since the I.G.-Farben had the monopoly for the expansion of production of those raw materials, and the Office for Economic Expansion had the same task, I chose the expression that the Office for Economic Expansion had been a sort of "nationalized I.G.", in comparison with the "Self-responsibility of Industry" which was led by me. However, I am not quite clear as to what extent the principles of the Office for Economic Expansion coincided with those of the "Self-responsibility of Industry."

(page 4 of original)

- Q. In addition you have stated at the same interrogation that K. UCH was appointed Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production in the Four Year's Plan, at about the same time, and with almost the same functions as those of the Reich Office for Economic Expansion, and that it was planned to invest G. UCH with the additional powers incumbent on a Plenipotentiary of the Four Year's Plan. Taken as a whole, this office, namely that of the Plenipotentiary, was identical with the Reich Office for Economic Expansion. He added that you could not describe exactly how these powers and questions were officially allocated. Since we discussed these matters pretty thoroughly in our interrogations in September, and you have seen most of the documents, I presume that you can now tell us more in detail about these things and make additions to what I have told you previously.
- A. During the interrogations in September 1946 I also receive no accurate information as to definite spheres of functions of the Reich Office for Economic Expansion and the Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production. I did not see any documents at that time. But I stated in the interrogation of 29 May 1945 that the general impression which I had gained as Minister for Armaments and War Production, without having any knowledge of the legal aspects.
- Q. Do you wish to say that you got these impressions without knowing the legal aspects?
- A. Without being quite clear as to the details of the legal aspects of competency.
- Q. What was the relation between you, first as Minister for Armaments and Munitions, and later as Minister for Armaments and War Production

(page 5 of original)

and K. U. W. in his capacity as Director of the Reich Office for Economic Expansion, and also as Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production? Perhaps you will be able to recall that you once used the expression that K. U. W. was, so to say, "Reichsunmittelbar" (immediately subordinate to the authority of the Reich), and that he also remained thus after September/October 1943?

- A. It was obvious that before September 1943, as Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, I and in both places no power of command.
- B. As far as you know, who could give orders at that time to the Reich Office for Economic Expansion or to the Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production?
- A. At that time GOETTING attached great importance to the fact that he was the only one who had the right to give orders to K. U. W. In this connection, however, the following should be considered:

As is well-known, in the spring of 1942 the Armaments Office of the High Command of the Armed Forces was incorporated into my Ministry.

(Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPTR). General BECKT was in charge of a department in the Armaments Office, which, among other matters, planned the production of chemicals and distributed the chemical products necessary for waging war to the various components of the armed forces. (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPTR.) In the quarterly meetings of Central Planning at which the distribution of steel was decided on, General BECKT presented the steel requirements of the chemical industry for its expansion under the office of the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry.

In the event that Prof. K. U. W. was not satisfied with the decision of the Central Planning, he requested a special meeting of the Central Planning in order to discuss the requirements for his expansion plan.

If the Central Planning insisted on curtailing the planned projects, then a final meeting with GOETTING was called, which, however, happened only once or twice.

(page 6 of original)

The whole responsibility for the stipulations of the expansion plan, which thus was fixed as to quantity, rested exclusively with the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, who as far as its execution was concerned, was not to receive orders from a third party, but only from GOERING. The carrying out of the so-called F.S.V. Plan (Plan for the production of powder and explosives) provided under certain circumstances the only exception.
(Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER).
After my Ministry took over the total production in September 1943 conditions were not clear, because GOERING, as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year's Plan, took the viewpoint that only the tasks of the Reich Ministry of Economics were transferred to me, but not the superior power asserted in relations with the Reich Ministry of Economics, nor the tasks of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year's Plan, and here in particular, the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry. GOERING was right as far as formality is concerned because HITLER expressly specified this in his well-known decree of September 1943.
(Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER).

In spite of this attitude shown by GOERING, KRAUCH was fully willing to closely cooperate with the raw materials department of my Ministry. Whether for the purpose of this close cooperation with the raw materials department, KRAUCH gave KEMML the authority to issue directions, I don't know.

It appears to me that the cooperation between KRAUCH and KEMML, or between the manager of the Department Chemistry in the raw materials office KOEHL, and KRAUCH, respectively, was carried on so smoothly that there was no need of referring to the legal aspects.

Likewise, since September 1943, the Raw Materials Office determined the production of the various chemical products. This was done by allocating the intermediate chemical products, manufactured by I.G.-Farben as a monopoly, to the various chemical products, and where chemical firms outside the I.G.-Farben were concerned, to these individual firms.
(Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER.)
(Handwritten initial: Sp.)

(page 7 of original)

At that time I proposed to KRAUCH to take charge of these tasks of distribution and thereby, practically, to take over the Department Chemistry in the Office for Raw Materials. (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER)
However, at that time, KRAUCH declined to take over this task.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

A new problem regarding competency arose, when the reconstruction of chemical works destroyed by aerial attacks was transferred to the "Commissioner General for Immediate Measures" ("Generalkommissar fuer Sofortmassnahmen") in June 1944, because he not only carried out the reconstruction, but in addition wanted to issue orders concerning technical manufacturing problems. The problem was discussed between KRAUCH and GOERING, the "Commissioner General for Immediate Measures" in the presence of KIEHL and myself in a meeting, at which I decided that the Commissioner General for Immediate Measures was to be responsible for the reconstruction, but that KRAUCH, however, was to be the competent authority for technical manufacturing matters of the plant. The same applied to the building of subterranean fuel works, and the so-called "little plants" ("Kleine Anlagen").

KRAUCH, as Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER) had at that time a part in rebuilding the factories in so far as in view of the great damage done to the old factories, he ordered the construction of new factories stopped, and (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER) the materials and labor on hand for this purpose were made available for reconstruction. GOERING still insisted in June 1944 that KRAUCH was directly responsible to him only. I can give an example to illustrate this.

Q: And that he was not subordinate to anybody?

A: ... and was only subordinate to him. I can give an example to illustrate this: When, beginning with 12 May 1944, air attacks on fuel plants interfered seriously with the production, I suggested and arranged a meeting with HITLER, at which besides GOERING also KRAUCH took part.
(Handwritten initial: Sp.)

(page 8 of original)

GOERING was very angry at the time because KRAUCH, without obtaining his permission, went to a conference with HITLER. This, however, proved no barrier to very close cooperation which existed between my Ministry, the Commissioner General for Immediate Measures and KRAUCH in the practical re-building of the chemical factories which were damaged by air attacks. After this visit, HITLER, upon my suggestion, appointed the Commissioner General for Immediate Measures.

Q: Could you now briefly describe, the responsibilities of KRAUCH as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year's Plan for Special Questions of Chemical Production, just as they appeared in practice?

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

A: The Plenipotentiary for Special Tasks of Chemical Production was chiefly occupied with the planning and the construction of new plants. I have no doubts that this was his primary task. To what extent beyond this the Plenipotentiary considered himself competent for the entire chemical production, is not quite clear to me. I had the impression that the Plenipotentiary considered it as his duty to intervene in any branch of chemical production whenever it became endangered, as for instance, when German expert chemical workers were drafted into the armed forces. In such cases the Plenipotentiary represented not only the building interests, but also those of the whole chemical industry.

Q: I asked the question of how you interpret the term used by you, namely that KRAUCH was "directly subordinate to the Reich" ("reichsunmittelbar")?

A: KRAUCH was formally subordinate to GOERING, as the Commissioner of the Four Year's Plan. However, since GOERING from 1942 on or perhaps earlier already, (Handwritten initial: Sp.)

(page 9 of original)

no longer devoted himself so energetically to the Four Year's Plan, the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Year's Plan were left without a unifying head, and by losing GOERING they had in fact no longer a chief to whom they were responsible, nor could other Reich offices give them orders instead. (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPER.)

Q: In another interrogation, which took place in the morning of 30 May 1945, you mentioned that you had founded unofficially in 1942 an "Advisory Council (Beirat) for Economic Warfare", for which selected industrialists like VOLLMER, KRAUCH and ROECKLING, (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPER), as well as some electric power experts. Please describe to me how you set up this Beirat, who were its members, and what functions this Council for Economic Warfare had?

A: It seems to me that in the minutes here the meaning of the statements I made at that time, is not clearly given. It was not an Advisory Council for Economic Warfare that was in question. I intended to create an advisory board (Gremium) which was to assist the General Staff of the Air Force in selecting strategically and economically-important bombing targets. As the minutes correctly state I had chosen these men mentioned above for this particular purpose. It was not necessary to call a meeting of the advisory board (Gremium), because after a short time it became apparent

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

that the Air Force no longer was in a position to carry out large-scale air raids on economic targets. Consequently, the plan to set up this advisory board was not carried out. It was replaced by a special plan (Sender-planung), which was subsequently carried out by the Planning Advisor of the Inspector General for Water and Electric Power, Dr. KIEHL, whom I placed directly under me for this purpose.

Q: This Council, therefore, never did meet? And merely (Handwritten initial: Sp.)

(page 10 of original)

the appointment was discussed by you and the members?

A: The Council never met, and it was never officially appointed. According to my recollection, I did not personally discuss the subject with the individual members intended for the Council.

Q: Before September-October 1943, as Minister of Armament, you had with the exception of pure explosives and chemical warfare agents nothing to do with the chemical production. Is that correct?

A: Not quite. The Ordnance Office, under the management of General RECHT, continuously worked on questions of chemical production. General THOMAS had created an apparatus in the Armament Office designed to assume leadership with the outbreak of the war and in the tasks which had been prepared already before the beginning of the war by the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Year's Plan. I learned later that at the beginning of the war there were arguments about this between KIEHL and GOERING, and that GOERING, with the approval of HILLER, unequivocally fixed the unlimited authority of the Four Year's Plan, also as against the Armament Office. (Handwritten: Corrected; Signature: SPEER). General RECHT, therefore, took no leading part in questions of chemical production. Whether he secured a responsible position for himself by a agreement with the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, I don't know. With the taking-over of the Armament Office, however, the so-called "Trusteeship" ("Betreuung") of the most important chemical works, was transferred to my Ministry.

Q: What did this "Trusteeship" by the Ordnance Office consist of?

A: I cannot give any details of it for the chemical section because I don't know which part of the usual and to you familiar "Trusteeship tasks" (Betreuungsaufgaben) was in connection with chemistry actually carried out by the Armament Office.

(page 11 of original)

Affidavit.

I, Albert S. ERL, declare herewith that, after having been properly sworn in, have made these statements according to my best knowledge and belief. As taken of the accuracy of the minutes transcribed by the reporter, I have specially signed each individual page.

Sworn by me

Muenberg, 28 March 1947.

(Signed Signature)

J.P. CHURCH
O.U.S.C.C.

(Signed Signature)

Albert SPER
(Signature)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 May 1947

I, E.M. REDELSTEIN, Civ. No. X- 046 289, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5821.

E.M. REDELSTEIN
Civ. No. X-046 289.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-656
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

Lieutenant Colonel (retired) KIRSCHNER
in the staff of the General
Trussee for Special Questions pertaining
to Chemical Production
Prof. Dr. C. Krauch

Berlin " 9,
25 October 1941
128 Saarlandstrasse
telephone: 120046

(translator's note) handwritten
notation: Herr Sittmann was
given an extract of the letter.

To
Director Dr. von Schnitzler
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (Inc.)
Grüneburgplatz
Frankfurt on the Main

Dear Dr. von Schnitzler,

It naturally meets with my approval that Herr
Sittmann first goes away for a brief vacation which he
fully deserves in view of his accomplishments during
the East Campaign. This vacation also will restore to
him the needed capacity for work and the efficiency
required for the new and difficult tasks awaiting him
here.

With pleasure I take this opportunity to
advise you that the assistants whom you kindly made
available have so far and without exception proven a
valuable increase in strength for the execution of my
tasks.

I am also personally obliged to you for the
understanding assistance which you are ready to give.

Yours faithfully
(translator's note: handwritten
signature:) Kirschner.

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION

I, HENRY G. SMITH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document
NI-656.

HENRY G. SMITH,
U.S. Civilian,
AGO X-046355.

END

FILE MEMO

for Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ

Re:	Our Reference:	<u>BERLIN NW 7</u>
"Goering, Work and Man"	Dept.	Unter den Linden 82
as gift to staff members.	Ke/Ksch	31 March 1938

Dr. SCHNEIDER has proposed in the enclosed letter dated 27 March 1938, that the I.G. should buy 10,000 copies of the book "Goering, Work and Man", written by Ministerial-Direktor GRITZBACH, and present it to all staff members, who hold any honorary office in the service of the plant combine, on the occasion of Fieldmarschall-General GOERING's anniversary. Dr. SCHNEIDER has talked to me and Director KRAUCH about this proposal. We consider the execution of this plan as extraordinarily desirable, as he also does.

(signature) ILGHER

P.S.- I would be grateful if the enclosed letter could be signed and forwarded immediately, because the anniversary is already on 8 April.

Enclosure. 3 April 1938

(Page 2 of original)

REPLY

Ministerpräsident
General Fieldmarschall GOERING

BERLIN, 23 April 1938

Dear Herr SCHMITZ,

I was very glad about your letter, which you sent to me, also on behalf of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of my appointment as Prussian Ministerpräsident, and especially that you used this occasion to make the "Gritzbach" book accessible to your staff in such a generous way. Therefore, I should not like to miss thanking you heartily and I hope to please you yourself by presenting this book to you.

Heil Hitler !
Yours
(SIGNED) GOERING

To
Director SCHMITZ
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 82

(Page 3 of original)

Dr. Christian SCHWEIDER
Vorstand Member
of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Leuna Werke, 26 March 1938
Telephone: Merseburg 3831

To
Geheimrat Dr. H. SCHMITZ
Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82

Dear Geheimrat,

After I consulted Dr. KLAUCH, I am informing you that I intend to present the book "Goering, Work and Man" by Ministerialdirektor Gritzsch to some of the staff members on the occasion of the anniversary of General-Feldmarschall GOERING.

For this I have selected all those staff-members who at present hold an honorary office in the service of our plant-combine. Among these belong the members of the shop committees and their deputies, "Werkschamrockner", the local officials in the various departments and plants, and those persons with special missions such as airraid wardens, accident prevention wardens, "K.D.F." ("Strength Through Joy") representatives.

Altogether approximately 10,000 persons out of the whole I.G. Farben are concerned.

I am very grateful for your opinion concerning this suggestion.

With best regards,
Yours Faithfully,

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.F. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. VI -682.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.F. NO. 34079

E N D

- 2 -

61

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-682
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES

ERRATA SHEET

Document No. NI-682 first sentence of the file memo should read:

Dr. Schneider has proposed in the enclosed letter dated 26 March 1938,

Errata sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. A-444412

- End -

62

Berlin NW 7, 12 January 1939
Unter den Linden 82

Most venerable Fieldmarshal.

On the occasion of your birthday, today, we take the liberty of transmitting to you, most venerable Fieldmarshal, our best wishes.

May I, in the name of our company, and as a visible token of our sincere reverence put a sum at your disposal with the request that in view of the great variety of fields to which you devote your attention you will kindly determine the purpose of its application yourself.

With German salute

Heil Hitler

Yours very devotedly

for Geheimrat Dr. H. SCHMITZ

(Signed) C. KRAUCH

Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.
Postal Checking Account:
Munich No. 59459
Telegram address: ARTIBUS
Telephone No. 501 58

Munich 2, 12 January 1939
Briennerstrasse 13

Director Dr. C. K R A U C H

B e r l i n W 9
Saarlandstrasse 128

Dear Director,

We are taking the liberty of transmitting to you enclosed the bill for the oil painting sent to His Excellency, Fieldmarshal G O E R I N G upon your order.

This is a typical specimen and an especially fine peice of work of the master of the MANSI-Magdalena (Circle of the QUENTIN MASSYS).

The panel originated in the first quarter of the 16th Century and is remarkable because it is so unusually preserved.

Our best thanks and compliments,

Heil Hitler
Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.

(Signature Illegible)

Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.
Postal Checking Account:
Munich No. 59459
Telegram address: Artibus
Telephone No. 501 58

Munich 2, 12 January 1939
Briennerstr. 13

BILL OF SALE

Herr Director Dr. phil. C. KRAUCH

B E R L I N W 9
Saarlandstrasse 128

Upon your order we sent as a birthday present to His
Excellency, Fieldmarshal Prime Minister Hermann
GOERING

1 oil painting on wood (52x38)

MOTHER HOLDING THE SLEEPING CHILD AGAINST HER BREAST
Flemish, by the master of the MANSI-MAGDALENA.

Net price 38,000.—
Reichsmarks

Kindly remit to our account with the Dresdner Bank,
Munich.

Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.
Postal Checking Account:
Munich No. 59459
Telegram address: Artibus
Telephone No. 501 58

Munich 2, 24 January 1939
Briennerstrasse 13

Director Dr. phil. C. KRAUCH

B E R L I N W 9
Saarlandstrasse 138.

"
Fraulein Ester

Dear Director,

We are pleased to acknowledge the receipt of the crossed
check

for 38 000.— Reichsmarks

and the letter of transmittal.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-536
Cont'd

We credited your account with the above amount in payment of our bill of the 12 inst.

Please accept our thanks and compliments.

Heil Hitler

GALERIE FUER ALTE KUNST
G.m.b.H.

Signature: MEURER (Acting)

13 January 1939

Memorandum for Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ:

Upon Dr. KRAUCH's request the letter already signed by Herr Geheimrat was changed according to the enclosed copy and transmitted yesterday by Dr. KRAUCH personally. On that occasion Dr. KRAUCH also gave oral expression to the Geheimrat's special wishes that he did not consider it appropriate to have mention made in the list of congratulations.

Furthermore, Dr. KRAUCH is not yet well enough to leave the clinic. He will probably still have to stay there next week too.

Initial: TH

Berlin SW 11, 18 January 1939
Saarlandstrasse 128

Galerie fuer alte Kunst

M u n i c h 2
Brionnerstrasse 13

Gentlemen:

In the absence and upon the request of Dr. C. KRAUCH I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 12 inst. and I am pleased to transmit to you enclosed

Crossed Check No. A. 1 645 745 for 38 000.— Reichsmarks to cover your bill dated the 12th inst.

Heil Hitler
Illegible initial
Secretary

Enclosure.
Registered Mail

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-536
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-536.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-046355

END

Galerie fuer alte Kunst G.m.b.H.

Berlin W 9, 17 January 1940
Saarlandstrasse 128

Munich 2
Briennerstrasse 13.

Gentlemen:

In the absence and upon the request of Professor Dr. C. KRAUCH, I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 13th inst. and am taking the liberty of transmitting to you enclosed crossed check Nr. A. 1 764 727 for

60 000.-- Reichsmarks

in payment of your bill of the 13th inst.

Heil Hitler.

Initial illegible

Secretary

Enclosure.
Registered.

Berlin NW 7, 4 January 1940
Unter dem Linden 82

Dear Fieldmarshal!

On the occasion of the New Year I take pleasure in conveying my sincerest wishes to you.

Heil Hitler.

Yours very truly,

Member of the Reichstag

To:
Prime Minister
Fieldmarshal GOERING.

Berlin W 9
Leipziger Platz 11 a

Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.

Dresdner Bank
Munich
Postal Checking Account
Munich 59 459

Munich
Briennerstrasse 13

Telephone 50 156
Telegraph Address: ARTIRI

13 January 1940

BILL OF SALE

To Director Dr. phil. C. KRAUCH, Berlin W 9, Saarlandstrasse 128

1 Plastic "Standing Knight" from the Pacher circle. Alpine wood-cut (1492)
60 000.-- Reichsmarks

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-540
Cont'd

Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.
M u n i c h

Dresdner Bank, Munich
Postal Checking Account:
Munich 59 459

Briennerstrasse 13

Telephone 50 158
Telegraph Address: ARTIEUS

13 January 1940

To:
Director Dr. phil. C. KRAUCH

B e r l i n W 9
Saarlandstrasse 128

Dear Director!

We take the liberty of transmitting to you enclosed the bill for the plastic you bought as a birthday present for His Excellency, the Fieldmarshal GOERING.

The "Standing Knight" which belongs to the Pacher Circle is an excellent piece of Alpine wood-cutting; not only that it is especially well preserved as regards its polychromy, but on its base is also shown the year of its creation (1492) - an extremely rare indication - , and the initials of the master.

It is one of the most beautiful plastics in Germany.

Heil Hitler
GALERIE FUER ALTE KUNST
G.m.b.H.
Signature: Illegible

C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

Please issue for the account of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Berlin NW 7 a Reichsbank crossed check in connection with:

60 000.-- Reichsmarks (Sixty-thousand Reichsmarks).

Berlin, 16 January 1940

Signed: H. SCHMITZ

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-540.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-046355

END

Auszug aus Document No. NI-532
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

Walter Andreas Hofer

Berlin W 50, den 14. I. 1942.
Augsburger Str. 68 III
Tel. 25 41 56

Gemaelde alter Meister

Kunstgewerbe

Herrn
Professor Dr. Krauch
Saarlandstr. 128
Berlin W 9

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor,

Einliegend erlaube ich mir Ihnen die Rechnung fuer
das von mir zum Geburtstage des Herrn Reichsmarschalls
gelieferte Bild von Sandro di Pietro di Domenico "Madon-
na mit Kind und Engeln" zu uebersenden.

Mit hoefflichen Empfehlungen und

Heil Hitler !

Ihr ergebener

1 Anlage.

Walter Andreas Hofer

Berlin W 50, den 14. I. 1942
Augsburger Str. 68 III
Tel.: 25 41 56

Gemalte alter Meister

Bankkonto: Dresdner Bank
Dep.-Kasse 38, Luetzowplatz 1
Berlin W 62

Kunstgewerbe

Rechnung

Herrn
Professor Dr. Krauch
Saarlandstr. 128
Berlin W 9.

=====

1 Bild von Sano di Pietro di Domenico

Siena 1406 - 1481

"Madonna mit Kind & Engeln"

Ehemals in der Sammlung des Herzogs
von Anhalt-Dessau, Schloss Woerlitz.

RM 72.000.-

RM. 72.000.-

Walter Andreas Hofer
Berlin W 50, Augsburger
Str. 68

gez. W. Hofer

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

- 2 -

END

70

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-543
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

SECRETARIAT
Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ

19 January 1943

Deutsche Leanderbank Aktiengesellschaft
Correspondence

Unter den Linden 78

Gentlemen:

Upon the request of Geheimrat Dr. SCHMITZ I ask you to kindly issue a
Reichsbank crossed check (Reichsbank-Verrechnungsscheck) for

75,000.-- Reichsmarks

to be charged to the account of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Berlin LW 7.

Heil Hitler.

Initial: E.

* 017 Telegram

DEUTSCHE REICHSPOST
(Reich Post Office)

SS FROM HEADQUARTERS 5497 61 2/2 17.09

Accepted

Day Month Year Hour

3 - 1943 2000 PM

From: By:

(Initials Illegible)

Transmitted:

Day Hour

To:

By:
(Illegible Initial)

892190

(Stamp) Already given through by telephone.

THOUGH I HAD ALREADY AN OCCASION TO THANK YOU IN PERSON FOR THE
CONGRATULATIONS TRANSMITTED ME ON THE OCCASION OF MY 50TH BIRTHDAY
AND FOR THE MASTERPIECES OF TWO APOSTLE STATUES PRESENTED TO ME I
AM ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS TO YOU ONCE MORE IN THIS MANNER MY CORDIAL
THANKS FOR THE ATTENTION YOU HAVE BESTOWED UPON ME.

HEIL HITLER - YOURS GOERING REICHSMARSCHALL DES GROSSDEUTSCHEN REICHS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. HL-543
Cont'd

Berlin W 9, 19 January 1943
Saarlandstrasse 128

Galerie fuer alte Kunst G.m.b.H.

Munich 2
Briennerstrasse 13

Gentlemen:

In the absence and upon the request of Professor Dr. C. KRAUCH I
acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 16th inst. and I take pleasure
in transmitting to you enclosed crossed-check No. 7 796 378 for

75.000.-- Reichsmarks

in payment of your bill of sale of the 16th inst.

Heil Hitler.

Initial: E.

Secretary

Enclosure.
Registered.

Galerie fuer alte Kunst		
G.m.b.H.		
Dresdner Bank, Munich	Munich	Telephone: 50158
Postal Checking Account:	Briennerstrasse	Telegram Address: ARTIBUS
Munich 59459		

16 January 1943

BILL OF SALE for Director Dr.phil. C. KRAUCH, Berlin W 9, Saarlandstrasse 128

2 plastics, in wood

APOSTLES PETER AND PAUL

by the master of the "Freiburger Johannes"

Upper Rhine, end of 15th century

Linden wood, height 102 cm.

Reichsmarks 75.000.--

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-543
Cont'd

(Stamp) SECRETARIAT PROFESSOR KRAUCH
Received: _____
Diary No. 181

Galerie fuer alte Kunst
G.m.b.H.
Bank Account: Dresdner Bank,
Subsidiary Munich
Post Checking Account: Munich No. 59459
Tel-gram Address: ARTIBUS
Telephone Number: 50158

Munich 2, 16 January 1943
Briennerstrasse 13

Director Dr. phil. C. KRAUCH

Berlin W 9
Saarlandstrasse 128

Dear Director,

On the occasion of the 50th birthday of the Reichsmarschall you bought in our gallery, as a birthday present

Two plastics, in wood, of the APOSTLES PETER AND PAUL

which we mounted according to your wishes in the apartments of the Reichsmarschall.

We take the liberty of transmitting to you enclosed the bill of sale, the photograph and a description of these objects.

With our best regards and Heil Hitler.

GALERIE FUER ALTE KUNST
G.M.B.H.

(Signature: Illegible)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-543.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-046355

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-1315
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

GALERIE FUER ALTE KUNST G.m.b.H. (GALLERY FOR OLD ART Ltd.)

Dresdner Bank Munich
Postcheck Munich 59459

MUNICH
Briennerstr. 13

Telephone 50158
Telegraphic Address: Artibus

13 January 1944

REVOICED: Director Professor Dr. Phil. C. Krauch, Berlin, W.9
Saarlandstrasse 128.

1 oil painting
Portrait of a Man
by the Master P.L. (Master of the Rechberg panels)
Lime wood, 56,3 : 45,8 cm. RM. 70,000.--

(Page 2 of original)

(Translator's Note: Stamp)
Received Secretariat Prof. Krauch
Day book (Illegible)

GALERIE FUER ALTE KUNST
G.m.b.H.

Munich 2
Briennerstr. 13

13 January 1944

Bank account: Dresdner Bank Munich
Postcheck account Munich No. 59459
Telegraphic address: "Artibus"
Telephone 50158

Director Professor
Dr. Phil. C. Krauch,
Berlin, W.9

Dear Professor,

On the occasion of the birthday of the Reichsmarschall,
you purchased as a gift at our gallery

1 oil painting: Portrait of a Man

which we have put up at the residence of the Reichsmarschall, as requested.

We beg to hand you, enclosed herewith, invoice, photograph
and a description of this object.

With compliments and,

Heil Hitler!
GALERIE FUER ALTE KUNST
G.m.b.H.

(illegible signature)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the
above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HI-1315

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. 34079

(E N D)

74

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 628
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Notes:

W.T.B.

No. 1721

Saturday, 15 July 1933)

Proclamation of a General Economic Council by Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler.

Berlin, 15. July. The Reich Economics Minister announces the following:

In order to utilize the experience of practical economy for the tasks of the Reich Government, the Reich Chancellor nominates a General Council of Economy members of which are to be at the disposal of the Reich Government in regard to all economic questions. The General Economic Council meets by special invitation. The Reich Chancellor has made the following appointments to the new Generalrat for the time being:

Herbert BÄCKE, Domain Bailiff (Domaenenpächter), Berlin
Prof. Dr. Carl BOSCH (Heidelberg)
Geh. Landesbaurat, Dipl. Ing. Eugen BOEHRINGER,
Director of the Maximilianhütte (Rosenberg) Oberpfalz
Director - General August DIEHM, Deutsches Kalisyndikat (German Potash
Combine), Berlin
Banker August von FINCK, Munich
Dr. Otto Christian FISCHER, President of the Zentralverband des
Deutsche Bank- und Bankiergewerbes (Central Association of the
German Banking Business, Berlin
Dr. Albert FRACKELSBROER, Factory-owner, Oefflingen/Baden
Burgomaster v. KROGMANN, Hamburg
Dr. G. KRUPP von BOHLER und HALBACH, Essen
Prussian State Counsellor, Dr. Robert LEY Leader of the DAF (German
Labor Front), Berlin
Dr. Carl LUER, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Trustee of
Labor, Frankfurt/M.
Prussian Staatsrat, Friedrich REINHART, Bank Director, Berlin
Dr. Hermann REISCHLE, Leader of the Landhandel (Agricultural Trade
and the Landwirtschafts Genossenschaften (Agricultural Cooperatives),
Berlin
Kurt Freiherr von SCHROEDER, President of the Chamber of Commerce,
Cologne
Karl Friedrich von SIEMENS, Berlin
Prussian Staatsrat, Dr. Fritz THYSSEN, Muelheim/Ruhr
Generaldirektor Dr. Albert VOEGLER, Dortmund

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P., NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the
above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-628.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

2. 1

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-3512
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES.

OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF OF
COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I, Halter Marlmont, hereby state the following facts
under oath.

(page 2 of the original)

The plan to set up a corps of Reserve Officers for the National-Economy - the so-called Wehrwirtschaftliche Fuehrer-Korps - was probably first discussed within the circles of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Military Economic Staff), in 1945.

General George Thomas was Chief of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab since 1944. From 1939 until he was discharged on February 1, 1943 he was also Chief of the War Economy Office and Armaments Office in the High Command of the Armed Forces.

The undersigned, Walter Warlimont, General (retd.) was Chief of the Economic Department of the Army Ordnance Branch from the middle of 1934 to 1935, and Chief of the Economic Department in the Wehrwirtschaftsstab from 1935 until August 1936, in both cases under Thomas.

In this capacity the above-named Walter Warlimont was kept informed of the preliminary steps taken to create the Wehrwirtschafts-Fuehrer-Korps to the extent that his position was involved but he had no decisive influence in shaping these proceedings. Therefore, one would have to acknowledge that the following facts which have been taken from the notes of General Thomas and from documents reflect his recollections only in a general way.

The following problems were considered to be main tasks by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab in the OKW:

- a) To give a clear picture of the importance of National Economy in case of a future war.
- b) To compute the requirements, military and otherwise, of national economy in the event of war.
- c) To prepare for economic warfare, and
- d) to study the war potential of the presumptive enemy and friendly states.

(page 3 of the original)

Not only entrepreneurs (Betriebsfuhrer) were to be chosen as Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer but also those persons who were especially interested in ideas of national defense (Landesverteidigung) and who were in a position to collaborate energetically even in peacetime in the steps preparatory to mobilization.

Contrary to the expectations of the undersigned, and as he only learned occasionally from people belonging to these circles after he had left the staff of the Army (Aug. 36), the setting-up of a Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer-Korps was very favorably received in industrialist circles and many industrialists were very anxious to acquire the title of "Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer".

The Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer-Korps was created in 1936 and on the legal basis of the "Auxiliary Civil Servants Law" (Hilfsbeamtengesetz).

The detailed regulations concerning Mobilization - Plan-Preparation S.M.III for the creation of the Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer-Korps were issued by the Reich War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, v. D l e m b e r g on June 22, 1936, and became effective immediately.

The preparation of these instructions had been the task of Major Ludwig H u e l l e r.

They contained, among others, the following provisions:

1. PROVISIONS OF A GENERAL NATURE

The Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer are the responsible collaborators of the Wehrmacht in preparing and carrying out the mobilization of the armament industry, and its management during war-time.

(Page 4 of the original)

They correspond roughly to the officers of the reserve army in their importance and in their tasks and duties in the armament industry.

The basis for the "Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer-Korps" is the "Auxiliary Civil Servants Act".

2. PURPOSE OF THE "WEHRWIRTSCHAFTSFUEHRER-KORPS" is

- A. to guarantee the responsible collaboration of the leading personalities of the armament industry in war and peace on the basis of the "Auxiliary Civil Servants Act" in accordance with the interests of national defense.
- B. to guarantee that every armament factory is managed by the leaders, engineers and outstanding employees who are indispensable and have had long experience in the factory in peacetime, regardless of whether they may already have been drafted by entries in their Work Book (Arbeitsbuch);
- C. to designate militarily responsible collaborators in the Factory Work Schedule;
- D. to make more widely known technical and organizational details of blue-prints and processes of the armament industry, in the event of a mobilization, in order to especially accelerate the conversion of these factories to armament production which are not already so engaged during peacetime;
- E. in the event of mobilization to minimize difficulties expected to arise through unfair competition and price-fixations and instead of this to see to it that the community spirit is cultivated in nation united in the defence of its country;
- F. to have ready the necessary experts who can strengthen the

(page 5 of the original)

the war economic offices and also become members of new staffs, and to train these experts for their mobilization tasks.

3. TASKS AND DUTIES OF THE "BEREITSCHAFTSFUEHRER"

A. In Peace-time:

1. to adjust, to the greatest possible extent, the armaments factories to eventual mobilization needs, especially to give assistance in the preparations to meet their Work Schedule.
2. to do the compulsory drill which would train and give them experience in the duties provided for them when mobilization takes place;
3. to train skilled workers;
4. to prepare regulations for safeguarding the factory and to see that these regulations are carried out;
5. to prepare for, and carry out, the necessary measure to protect the factory during an air-raid and to train employees in their tasks during an air-raid;
6. to prepare, and administer security measures within the factory.

(Tasks 4 - 6 according to the directives of the competent agencies outside the War Economy organization).

B. In war-time:

1. to convert existing armament factories, and to organize new armament factories for wartime manufacture, in accordance with the mobilization schedule of the factory;
2. to manage the factory so as to safeguard the interests of National Defense;

(page 6 of the original)

3. to strengthen the War Economic Offices and the staffs of the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces).

5. FORMATION OF THE "WEHRWIRTSCHAFTSPUNKTER-KORPS"

A. Selection and Nomination:

Professional position and experience are just as important in the selection of Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer as suitability of character. As far as possible, such persons should be selected as leaders who are already officers, or candidates, for the reserve army.

Other persons who are important in economic life and leaders in their branch of industry may be nominated and appointed even if they are not officers of the reserve army.

The prerequisite is that their character and personality, their attitude and their way of life guarantee that they will perform their tasks properly.

As for Jews and Jewish people of mixed parentage, Article 15 of the Army Act, as amended on June 26, 1936 (R.G.Bl. I 3.518) applies. Since the personnel employed in armament works are considered a part of the Wehrmacht, the above-named persons do not even come up for consideration for the position of "Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer".

7. TRAINING OF THE "WEHRWIRTSCHAFTSPUNKTER"

The "Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer" will receive a special training of an organizational and technical character aimed at preparing them for the work that awaits them in the event of a mobilization.

The training will be based on the "Directives for the Training of the Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer-Korps".

(page 7 of the original)

DETERMINATION OF THE APTITUDE FOR W.Wi Fue (Wehrwirtschafts-
fuhrer):

Qualifications in War Economics is the primary condition for said applications for appointment as W.Wi Fue. It is determined by the professional knowledge and by the position which the suggested person holds in the industry or in the armament firm, for which he is to be appointed W.Wi Fue. It overlaps with

the personal aptitude of the applicant which also has to be established. For this purpose the firm concerned has to request, and present to the W-In:

1. information from the competent State Police Office as to whether any political charges or charges in connection with espionage were on record against the applicant.

For this purpose a printed form as specified in the decree of the Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander No. 2001, 11.35 Defence III a.g., dated 1/11/1935" made out in triplicate has to be sent to the Office of the State Police, who will make investigations and will forward the result directly to the inquiring office, if there were no charges against the person in question. In all cases, in which the State Police office ascertained incriminating incidents, information is not to be sent to the inquiring office, but is to be passed on to the counter-intelligence department of Corps Headquarters respectively to the Command of the Naval Station. The Counter Intelligence Office reports the incident to the inquiring office together with a statement of their point of view, briefly citing the charges.

The final conclusion has to read:

- a) No objections or
- b) Objections or

(page 3 of the original)

- c) Engagement (appointment of W. H. Fuc) entirely out of question.

The following persons should be excluded on principle:

- A. Foreigners
 - B. Former functionaries of the SPD and the KPD, as well as persons who have been especial active followers of Marxistic doctrines.
 - C. From Russia returned emigrants, if they have returned to Germany only recently.
 - D. Persons with a record of heavy and repeated previous punishment.
2. an extract from the penal register of the competent counter intelligence office of the Corps Headquarters of the Command of the Naval Station
 3. a questionnaire filled in by the person, proposed for appointment as *Wohrwirtschaftsfuehrer*.

In addition to the questionnaire:

- a) a curriculum vitae, in the applicants own handwriting
- b) 2 photos
- c) a certificate of good conduct, issued by the Police
- d) a statement with regard to possible former membership in a Masonic lodge, as per attached form 3f.
- e) a statement concerning a clear record of the applicant's past per attached form 3g
- f) a statement concerning applicant's support, without reservation, of the National Socialistic State per attached form 3h
- g) The entrepreneurs (*Betriebsfuehrer*) consent to the appointment
- h) proof of the right to use academic titles
- i) certified copies of the recommendations given by the entrepreneur (*Betriebsfuehrer*)

(page 9 of the original)

- j) record of the military career. In case that records of military service are not available, application must be made for the issuance of a certificate of military service.

When the persons suggested for appointment of W Mi Pao are officers commissioned for the duration, who have already received or submitted the proofs and statements mentioned above, they need not submit them again. Likewise, those who are generally considered important and leading personalities, need not produce the evidence to a), c), e), h) and i). The firm calling for the W Mi Pao must ask the competent recruiting district headquarters for access to the personal record, for the purpose of examination and making extracts.

Induction and administration of oath to the W Mi Pao and presentation of insignia:

The appointed W Mi Pao are to be thoroughly instructed by the W-In (W Mi St) regarding their duties and tasks in time of peace and war, regarding the chain of command and authority (compare S.H.III, part I No. 1, 2, 3 and 6) regarding espionage, counter intelligence, treason, regarding their obligation to guard official secrets and the supervision of defence, and in case all this has not already been done elsewhere, to bind them by handshake to fulfil their obligation faithfully and conscientiously.

Following this the oath of allegiance to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and people is to be administered. A written statement must be made of the induction and administration as per attached form 3L, and is to be signed by the W-In resp. W Mi St and the W Mi Pao. This statement is to be added to the personal record.

"End"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, E.H. Rodolstein No X 046289 hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. HI-3512

14 March 1947

E.H. Rodolstein
X 046289

Enclosure 3 f
to S.V. III part I
number 5 (Encl.3)

AFFIDAVIT

I declare upon oath, that I *)

a) have never been a member of a lodge, of an organisation

similar to a lodge or of substitute lodge,

b) have been a member of a lodge, of an organisation similar
to a lodge or of a substitute lodge, but that

on, I ceased to be a member of the
.....lodge,
(exact manner of leaving)

c) was a member of one of the above organisation in the
..... degree.

Name :

Profession:

Address :

STATEMENT ON CRIMINAL RECORD

I hereby declare that - excepting the convictions listed below - I have no previous convictions against me and that I have not suppressed any previous convictions which are subject to restricted information, have been annulled, or for which probation or exemption from punishment has been granted.

I further declare that, besides the decisions in matters of honor (also proceedings in a court of honor, according to the law regulating national labor) listed below, no proceedings affecting my honor have been instigated or are pending against me.

I know that the truthfulness of my declarations will be tested, and that untrue assertions will cause my dismissal as "No 1" fug.

Penalties:

Decisions made against me in matter of honor:

....., on 13 ...

.....

DECLARATION OF POLITICAL ATTITUDE

I hereby declare that I stand unreservedly (ruechhaltslos) on the National Socialistic conception of the State, and that I have not engaged in any activity against the interests of the People.

I am fully aware that the truth of my statement will be investigated, and that any untrue statement will result in my dismissal from the position of Mehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

I am fully aware that in case of any expressions or actions of mine which may constitute an offense against the National Socialistic conception of the State, I must expect not only legal prosecution, but also my dismissal from the position of Mehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

....., on.....19..

.....

Enclosure 3 L

Before the undersigned appears:

Mr.
born in
residing at

He is informed, that through the decree of
effective from he is appointed Military
Economy Leader (Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer) with

He has been informed of the duties and responsibilities of
a Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer and pledged by handshake to the loyal
and conscientious performance of his duties.

Instructions have also been given with regard to espionage,
counter intelligence, treason, safeguarding of official secrets
and control of men liable for military service, with reference
to the act changing provisions of the penal code and the code
of penal procedure, dated 24/4/1934.

He then took the following oath:

" I swear: I shall be faithful and obedient to the Fuehrer
of the German Reich and the German People, Adolf Hitler, obey
the laws and conscientiously fulfill the duties of a Wehrt-
wirtschaftsfuehrer, so help me God."

.....
(Signature of Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer) (Signature of W-Jn (War
Economy Staff))

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-3512
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL, FOR WAR CRIMES

I have made the foregoing deposition voluntarily and not under duress.

I have read each of the 12 pages and the last page of this deposition carefully and signed them with my own hand. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and signed them with my initials, and I hereby declare under oath that in this affidavit I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Handwritten signature): WALTER WARLIMONT

Sworn to and signed

before me this 31

day of January 1947

at Nurnberg

(signature) Henry A. Buxbaum

OCC APO 696 A
POSITION : Research
Analyst

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, E.M. Redelstein No. X 046 289 hereby certify, that I am thorough conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 3512.

14. March 1947

E. M. Redelstein
X 046 289

- 14 -

E n d

24

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-4623
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Military Economy - Inspectorate VI
No. 31096 /37 Ib

Muenster i.W. 16 March 1937

Strictly confidential !

Rubber stamp:

Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over under sealed cover; if sent by post, to be "registered".
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

Herrn Hauptmann a.D. Dr. Flinzer (Captain, retired)
Leverkusen
Karl Rumpffstr. 41

The Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has ordered that a Leader Corps (Fuehrerkorps) for Military Economy be set up immediately.

The War Economy Leaders shall be responsible collaborators of the Wehrmacht in preparing and carrying out the mobilization of the armament industry, and in the conduct of war.

Their significance, their tasks and duties in connection with the armament economy places them in a position corresponding approximately to that of Reserve Officers on active duty (Offiziere des Beurlaubtenstandes bei der Truppe).

It is intended to recommend you for appointment as Military Economy Leader.

Certain personal data are required for this purpose; please complete the enclosed forms and return.

1. Questionnaire,
2. 3 index cards (on all 3 copies fill out only the right hand side of the front and the left hand side of the reverse),
3. Declaration as to any previous membership in a Freemason Lodge,
4. Declaration as to clean police record,
5. Statement as to unreserved devotion to the national socialist state.

At the same time you are requested to submit the following:

6. Life history,
7. 2 photographs (approximately 4 x 6 cm), signed in the lower half

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4623
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

8. Good conduct police certificate (application form enclosed)
9. Betriebsfuhrers consent to the appointment as Military Economy Leader ("Wifus),
10. Evidence of authorization to use academic title,
11. Certified copies of testimonials issued by Betriebsfuhrer, under whose supervision applicant has been working up to this day.

(page 2 of original)

12. Records, if available, concerning military career, (Military identity papers, enlisted man's and officer's regimental record, military service certificates).

You are requested to submit the personal data, mentioned under items 1 - 12, to Military Economy Inspectorate VI, Munster i. W. "Arrenderferstr. 4, marked "Confidential".

If you are an officer of the reserve and have previously submitted the above evidence and statements, these requirements are considered as already complied with. In that case it will suffice to name the recruiting district headquarters concerned.

Heil Hitler !

-.-.-.-.-

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4623.

Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20 191

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-533
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

GRS/E/TH/75

4 February 1938.

Dear State Secretary,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 30th ult., as well as the certificate about my appointment to Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer with many thanks. I beg you to convey my sincere thanks to Ministerpresident General Goering, for the confidence in me expressed by it.

With my best respects
Heil Hitler

Yours faithfully
(handwritten signature)

signed: G. Schmitz.

To
State Secretary in the Reich- and Prussian
Ministry of Economics
Dr. H.E. P o s s e ,

Berlin W. 8
Behrenstrasse 43

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, MP 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-533.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
MP 34079.

END

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NY-8197
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 3 of original)

THE
REICH GROUP "INDUSTRY"

Location and Task
of the Industrial Organization
by

Dr. KARL GUTH

Principal Business Manager of Reich Group "Industry"

2nd Printing

1941

Junker and Dammhaupt Publishing House/ Berlin

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT NO. NY-3197
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

As the top organization of German industry and a component part of the industrial organization created by the National Socialist state, the Reich Group "Industry" is not an end in itself but serves the Reich and the enterprises of industry. Before we outline the nature and the tasks of the organization itself, we deem it appropriate to precede it with at least a thumbnail description of the development of German industry and of its outstanding importance, side by side with agriculture, to the whole Germany; of its influence on population policy, the level of the standard of living, trade and last, but not least, the military strength of our people fighting for its existence.

(page 17 of original)

The world war again brought about a union of German industry into one top association. The stern pressure of economic necessity led to the creation of the "War Committee of German Industry". It was joined on 16 February 1918 by the "German Industrial Council", a set-up, the name of which linked it with the old endeavors of the Hanseatics. The Industrial Council expressed the idea that, as the sole and independent representative of German industry

(page 18 of original)

it wanted to gain greater recognition after the war than hitherto for the contribution of the creative work of German industry to the political and economic life of Germany.

Then came the ninth of November 1918, and in the dark times which followed, this program seemed ironical. But the difficulties which had to be met, the attacks on the existence of German private enterprise which had to be fought off had some good in them. Compared with the danger confronting industry as a whole, the differences which before the war had separated the associations, seemed trifling. The need was recognized for contributing to the re-construction of the collapsed economy by joint, conscientious work. On 3rd and 4th February 1919, on the occasion of a joint conference, the two top associations of German industry, the "Central Association of German Industrialists" and the "Union of Industrialists", resolved to combine to form the "Reich Association of German Industry". After several weeks of preliminary work, the foundation and organization of the new association took place on the 12th April 1919 at Berlin.

According to its statutes the purpose of the Reich Association was to represent and further German industry, to bring about uniformity

(Page 18 of original cont'd)

in the actions of the circles concerned and to co-operate with the workers. It was not concerned with wage policies, however. The following could become members of the Reich Association:

1. Specialized industrial associations;
2. regional or local associations and bodies formed for the safeguarding of general economic interests;
3. individual industrial enterprises;
4. and, for special reasons in the interest of the Reich association, individuals, who, according to the statutes, "are, or have been, executives or members of the board of directors of an industrial enterprise."

A few figures will give a graphic view of that industrial organization. On the 1st November 1932, the following groups belonged to the Reich Association of German Industry, besides a number of individual members:

(Page 19 of original)

- 29 specialized groups with more than 1500 special associations,
- 22 regional associations, outstanding among which were the Association of Saxon Industrialists and the Danubian Verein;
- 25 local and general associations, such as the United Association of German Metal Industrialists and the Utility Association (Gewerverband) of North West German Industrial Representatives;
- 64 Chambers of industry and commerce.

Besides 26 special committees, eleven Advisory Councils were formed for general economic policies, questions of foreign trade, promotion of export, social and tax policies and others.

It must not be imagined that the industrial organization of that time was a hierarchical structure in which the relation of the federations of its members was governed by the principle of superior and subordinate. There was no legal basis for such leadership power. Besides the interests involved, which in turn depended on prerequisites of an industrial, agricultural and, last but not least, economic and political nature, the personality of the association heads and their business managers was of decisive importance to the question as to how far any leadership was carried into practice.

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To understand the real nature of the Reich Association of German Industry and its federated associations, it must be borne in mind: that the associations were representatives of certain interests. Their aims were quite different. While some limited their tasks to matters of a general economic nature, others were active, partly or exclusively, in the field of market regulation and thereby often took on the characteristics of cartels. The low levels often strove to introduce social policies, while at the top, the organizational assurance of the Reich Association of German Industry from the Federation of German Employers' Associations had brought about the separation of economic and social policies.

The associations were based on the principle of voluntary membership. In many cases they encompassed almost all of the firms of their respective trade or of their district, in other cases only a minority; on the average, the Reich Association of German Industry encompassed about 70 to 80% of all industrial

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enterprises. It is obvious that this great organizational accomplishment was instrumental in greatly facilitating the subsequent reorganization based on mandatory membership. In some fields, however, there was a definite overlapping, which sometimes resulted in duplication of work and organizational friction. On the other hand, the instinct of self-preservation alone forced the federations to keep always in close touch with their members. They had to consider it their task to bring up themselves those questions which were important to their trade or district; they could not wait until questions were put to them in the advanced stages of development. Differences between members had to be settled in order to reduce the sometimes disparate interests to a common denominator. They always had to be ready to advise and help as far as possible in order constantly to impart the feeling to their members that they (the members) were receiving a compensation to the full value of their contribution. In short, the enterprises demanded that "their" associations should be close to life and untiringly active. There is no need to enlarge upon the fact that the dependence of the federations on their members carried with it the danger that unproductive activity was sometimes taken to mean bustle and that the dynamics of association activities did not always attract well-balanced personalities.

The necessity always to remain in contact with the members and their worries and requests finds expression in the organization of the Reich Association in the equal status accorded to

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the trade and the district organization. It was clear that it was impossible, on the basis of industrial associations alone, to have a "Central Representation of Industrial Interests", as the Reich Association was meant to be. An enterprise does not live in a vacuum, bound to other businesses of the same branch of industry only by the tie of common professional interests; it is a part of a district and has grown up with it. Any organization which thought fit to ignore the regional peculiarities, which often give a whole branch of industry its color, would always have remained incomplete. The fact, that the relationship between the Reich Association and its affiliated regional associations was a loose one,

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that some of these associations, to name only the "Langensverrein", had a considerable life of their own, must not lead us to overlook the wealth of stimulation which they offered to the Reich Association.

The co-operation of the entrepreneurs on the advisory Councils and Committees of the Reich Association should prevent the danger, which exists in every top organization, of the rise of a bureaucracy removed from reality, and should guarantee a management working closely with the enterprises. The entrepreneurs, working as executives or consultants of the organization, perform their functions in an honorary capacity. The statutes of the Reich Association state that the members of the main committee, the executive board and the President work in an honorary capacity, while members of the business management are paid.

The State did not supervise the associations. Such supervision would have been incompatible with the conception then prevalent of the nature of the economy and the characteristics of the associations as voluntary federations. The aims of the organization made it necessary that the organization keep in touch with the moulders of the political will and the executive authorities, while the State Offices, in turn, willingly made use of the help which the associations afforded in order to obtain the data necessary to judge the actual conditions with regard to economic and technical questions. An outstanding example is the successful part played by the industrial organization in the re-opening of Germany's trade relations in the years following the world war. Such, in rough outline, was the situation of the associations before National Socialism took over control.

The days following the 30th January 1933 are characterized by a struggle in the field of industrial organization for the clarification of the class conception, whose prerequisites were not always clearly known, and of the Leader Principle.

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Dr. KRUPP v. DÖHLEN und HALSACK, who headed the industrial organization from the fall of 1933 until its final transfer to the Reich Group "Industry", described the tasks and aims deriving from the political change in the following, guiding words:

"In line with the desires and plans, which I cherished and expressed when I took over office as chairman of the Reich

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Association of German Industry, I issued directives on the 3rd May for the re-organization and simplification of industrial associations. My aim will be to use the authority given to me, firstly, to bring economic measures for industrial organizations into harmony with political necessity and secondly, to bring the new organization into complete accord with the political aims of the Reich Government and at the same time make it so efficient that, in accordance with the great importance of industry, it can be an effective instrument of industry within the framework of the national, social and economic reconstruction of Germany".

Thanks to this ideal the great changes in the many-sided body of the industrial organization could be carried out in the years following in such a manner, that administrative work never had to be stopped at any place or any time.

The Reich Association of German Industry and the Federation of German Employers' Associations merged in June 1935 to form the "Reich Estate (Reichsstand) of German Industry." The work of the Reich Estate, as the joint declaration of the Association formulates it, should "rest on the basis and reinforcement of the conception of the positive and confident co-operation of all men engaged in production." Such a conception also appeared from other directions. Mostly, however, it was not enough awareness of the fact that the Federation of all members of a branch of industry, not only of the entrepreneurs was a prerequisite of an "Estate". It was also this was the fact that efforts to regulate the market were often confused with extensible class interests which were often expressed in the form of mere slogans. This development, which threatened the general prestige of valued National Socialistic ideals was all the more regrettable, partly because hand in hand with it, went an abuse of the Leader Principle. Just as non industrial federations to an ever-increasing extent came to term their chairman "the Leader" and give him as much unrestricted authority as possible,

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so federations, particularly those with the aim of regulating the market, liked to use this convenient means to convince reluctant members of the correctness of their association policy. Moreover, as a direct consequence of the course taken, the more or less forcible bringing in of outsiders seemed justified and thereby cleared the way for complete cartelization of the German industry.

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The leaders of the National Socialist State had to arrest such development throughout industry and guide the industrial reconstruction into ordered channels. On the 27th February 1934, therefore, the Law for the Preparation of the Organic Structure of the German Industry was promulgated. Its basic paragraph 1 give the following powers to the Reich Minister of Economics:

1. to recognize industrial associations as the sole representatives of their branch of industry;
2. to found, dissolve or merge industrial associations;
3. to change or supplement the statutes and articles of association of industrial associations and, in particular, to introduce the Leader Principle;
4. to appoint or dismiss the leaders of industrial associations;
5. to bring entrepreneurs and enterprises into the industrial associations.

Within the meaning of this law, industrial associations are those associations and federations who represent the industrial interests of entrepreneurs and enterprises. All federations with special policy aims are, therefore, excluded; their continuation became impossible when the German Labor Front was formed.

The ensuing period is characterized by the institution created in March 1934 of "Leader of the Economy". Simultaneously with the Leader of the Economy, 13 Main Group Leaders were appointed, of which seven came from industry and the other six from trade, labor, finance, insurance, power and transport. While the division of the economy into main groups was a temporary thing,

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and it was only within Reich Group "Industry", that it lasted any length of time, the "Economic Groups", which, on the basis of the Law for Economic Reconstruction were to an increasing degree recognized as sole representatives of their branch of industry were to assume a lasting importance. The framework into which they were to be fitted became known through the publication of the First Decree of 27 February 1934 for the implementation of the Law for the Preparation of the Organic Structure of German Economy (Aufbauverordnung.)

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After the revocation in 1935 of the export embargo on war implements the Reich authorities concerned saw that it was necessary to place the export of war implements under a uniform supervision and direction. The Reich Group Industry was charged with carrying out this task for which it created the Export Combine for War Implements (AGK.). The task of the AGK consists mainly of promoting the export of war implements, while abiding by official regulations, directing with a view towards the greatest possible economic good and steering large armament enterprises from a central point.

At the same time as the steering of the economy by the State increased, a new field of endeavor opened for the members of industry: raw material rationing. This, too, is guided by the principle: the State should steer the economy but should not operate it. The specialists of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reich Offices subordinated to them, steer, and the industrial enterprises produce, process and consume. In general, the type of requirements and quantity can only be judged and handled uniformly according to special sectors. Consequently, for most raw material sectors, the economic and special groups are the suitable intermediary offices which can regulate applications and allocations between the individual Reich

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Office and the multitude of enterprises, as well as between the individual enterprise and the several Reich offices. Thus the economic and special groups constitute a welcome and necessary point of junction, or a sluice between the Reich offices and the enterprises. This will also ensure that the enterprises receive the various raw materials in the exact proportion needed for production, and moreover, at the right time.

This method of rationing is particularly suitable for meeting large or regular requirements, regardless of whether it involves finishing or auxiliary materials, material for repairs or packing material. Thus the Reich Group Industry itself handles centrally some quotas; others have been transferred to the economic groups or individual special groups for sub-division among their members. Raw Material rationing is closely connected with the military economy, on which today the main interest is focussed. It covers nearly all economic

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activity connected with the war. Therefore, let us single out merely the most important sectors: steering of production, transport and, taking both into consideration, directing of contracts. To this must be added the numerous other tasks connected with them, such as co-ordination for machinery, construction of new production facilities and utilization of existing ones, shifting of orders etc. In all these fields the industrial organizations have assumed important functions or have made great contributions to the solution of these problems. Steering of the production for each special sector is mainly done via the economic and special groups and according to directives from the ministries. In this field, therefore, the special branches play an important part as indispensable organs of the military economy. Persons in the beginning the supply position in the individual war-material sector was the decisive factor in the planning of the extent and type of production, the decrease in transport resulting from Government call-ups put the transport situation in the foreground as the decisive factor for further production in war. The general aim was, and still is today, to increase armaments production as much as possible, to maintain production of military importance and to cut out unessential production. Where the

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rough classification given here is separated into special fields, the economic and special groups start functioning; where further production poses regional problems; the tasks in question are to be solved by district organizations. Since the transport situation varies considerably from one district to the other, the industrial departments and chambers, in co-operation with State, military and Party offices have endeavored to release business from enterprises which could not receive contracts of military importance. The determining of so-called bottleneck districts, in which militarily important production tasks could not be carried out with the available local labor, and the discovery of idle machinery in other districts made it necessary to tighten up the steering of contracts. The Reich Group Industry is very active in this field, in co-operation with the Reich Minister for Arms and Munitions and the armaments council set up by him. In addition, it holds so-called contract-exchanges (Auftragsbörsen) in which industrialists compete for war contracts in accordance with available production facilities. Finally, the Reich Group Industry arranges for an exchange of free and suitable machines, machine-tools, raw materials and semi-finished products to promote war-time production.

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There is one field, that of plant air protection, which has taken on special importance during the war. Its underlying thought, that the industrial enterprises should protect themselves against air raids, was already promoted in 1929 by the top industrial organizations and was developed in the period following. In 1937, through the "First Decree for the Execution of the Air Protection Law", the Reich Group Industry was given the legal authority to direct the implementation of plant air protection according to the instructions of the Reich Minister of Aviation and the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.

It is the aim of plant air-protection work to enable industry in spite of damage done by the enemy to meet the requirements set by the State, of war implements and to produce goods essential to the population. To implement these tasks the Reich Group, as the

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organization in charge, uses its plant air-protection branch, district or local office. To deal with special problems, the Reich Group may naturally avail itself of the special branches.

Plant air protection includes the more important plants, not only industrial, particularly those important to the German armaments and military economy. The measures for plant air protection are of an organizational, as well as practical nature. The organizational task, to begin with, includes the formulation of a plan for plant air protection, the division of the staff into active, stand-by and reserve groups, the allocation of specific tasks, and so on. The practical measures extend to various fields; as for instance: building, camouflage and black-out, fire fighting, long distance signalling and warning system, gas protection, medical aid, veterinary service, repair service, supply etc.

The work of the organization in charge of plant air protection consists of formulating and issuing directives and instructions for all the fields of plant air protection. Moreover, it is necessary to maintain a permanent and thorough supervision of the protection measures of each plant.

The multiplicity of the work brings about close contact between the plant air-protection offices and the offices of the Wehrmacht and the interior administration concerned, as well as with other authorities and organizations whose work touches on air protection, particularly plant air protection. Moreover, the organization in charge of plant air protection, by reason of agreements made some time ago, is at the disposal of branches

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of the air protection service, such as the Offices of the Reich Post and Reich Railroad, for the purpose of pooling experience.

Thorough training of the members of the organization in charge, as well as of the staff members working in the protection service is of great importance to the successful accomplishment of the tasks. This training is undertaken in the plant protection schools of the organization in charge, as well as, - with the aid of local offices - in the plants themselves. It was already tested in peace-time by regular plant drills. Thanks to the work done in peace-time, the measures for plant air protection have also

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come up to expectations in time of war, as shown by the appreciative notices appearing in Wehrmacht reports.

In many cases, the measures taken within the framework of plant protection for defense against air raid damage mean an enlarging of peace-time measures for the security of the plant and its staff. This applies among other things, to the plant medical service, as well as to the measures taken for combating the danger of fire caused by air raids. Construction measures reduced the danger of fire, so that if a fire did start it could not spread too far. These constructions for fire protection are not enough, however, particularly since technical considerations often block such constructions. Therefore, special value had to be attached to well-trained and well-equipped fire fighters. Through the "Seventh Decree for the execution of the Fire Fighting Law" of 17 September 1940, the Reich Group Industry was made legally responsible for important tasks in the field of peace-time fire fighting. In the dealings of German enterprises and of individuals with firms abroad, those economic and contractual transactions which might have a lasting harmful effect on the home industry, especially those of such a nature as to bring about the removal of industrial potential from Germany, need to be specially watched in the interests of the home industry. Within the scope of this task, the Central Office of Reich Group Industry participates in the administrative preparation for plant inspections by foreigners and employment of foreigners in German enterprises for informational purposes. It further handles the question of the taking abroad of the results of German inventiveness, such as the sale of patents, granting of licenses, technical help in the construction of foreign production plants, etc.; it also handles the question of the sending abroad of specialists, of exporting of means of production and semi-finished products, participation by German firms in foreign enterprises and setting up factories abroad.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT NO. NI-8197
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

1 August 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, AGO-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8197.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
AGO-443 113

THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY
IN INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS

Composition
of the

REICH GROUP INDUSTRY

Issued by the Business Management

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NO. NI-3798
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-3798.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

Transcript of the Meeting of the Advisory Board to the Reich
(Economic) Group "Industry" at Berlin on 11 February 1938

1. Mr. Ebbecke reports about the reduction of the refinement clauses in the sales provisions of the combines and works concerning former securities and proposes that these refinement clauses be completely eliminated. This proposal is adopted after some people, for instance Dierig, expressed themselves against any reservation of property and made the demand for a return to personal credit. It was requested also that the security provisions of the banks be made known. The Reich Ministry of Economics, where Mr. Schwartz negotiated with Mr. Gottscheck, agrees to the issuance of the recommendation worked out by the Reich Group to the (individual) Groups and promised to give executive powers to the Reich Group if this recommendation should not meet with any success.
2. Mr. Junghans recommends that the conditions of payment and delivery be regarded as tasks for the whole group in the sense of the trust supervision, and that the groups impose to the affiliated firms in the form of orders if necessary, the given provisions made by the group.
3. Mr. Tabel reports about the cooperating groups "Iron" and "Metal" and mentions in this instance a decree just issued by the DAF concerning a reorganization of the Reich cooperating plant groups. Mr. Blohm is of the opinion that this somewhat "new" decree aims at a closer connection between this organization and the "Leaderships" and is furthermore of the opinion that it was urgently necessary that the deputy "Reichsfachamtsleiter" be identical with the chiefs of the Tabel organization.
4. Privy Councillor Guntz reports that the Reichsgruppe worked last year with a deficit of 70,000 RM. The amount needed for the year 1938 was 430,000 RM, he said, 130,000 RM of which had been raised by himself so that the groups and industry sections should raise 300,000 RM during this year, which was approved.
5. The question of the participation in the Norman Gearing Inc. is discussed. It is suggested, partly by the groups, that the manufacturing industry assume a participation to the amount of 1/3 of the turnover. Opinions are divided. Mr. Dierig considers it highly desirable that the financing be made as far as possible by private means.

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6. Dr. Guth reports about the organization of economy leaders who are appointed by the Wehrmacht (General Thomas).
 - 2.) by the Plenipotentiary for cases of mobilization (Fosse, Sarnow).
 - a) for the Army, Navy and Aviation 40 gentlemen have been appointed so far as managers of armament plants or for employment with the war economy staffs. (Mr. Blohm reports that he and his brother were appointed here by the Wehrmacht, two engineers who are not plant managers were appointed by the Aviation.)
 - b) The Plenipotentiary General has so far appointed 35 gentlemen who have not been appointed by the war economy staffs, for instance Flick, Thyssen, Fleiger. He wants to appoint all together two to three hundred persons and to form a war economy council attached to the Reich Economy Chamber.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. MI-077
cont'd

Since the gentlemen mentioned under a) apparently cannot be included, the grotesque situation arose that for instance Messrs. Pietsch and Dierig cannot be members of this council. I expressed my conviction that such an organization would be a superfluous and non-productive one.

c) War economy advisors with the war economy offices appointed by the Reich economic group "Industry" (One has in mind in the first place the chiefs of the industry sections and as their deputies, the managers.) Mobilization Commissioner of the Reich Ministry of Economics, appointed by the Economic Groups and Economic Chambers.

e) War economy liaison personnel essentially identical with the commissioner for mobilization mentioned under d).

f) Counter Intelligence Commissioners in the armament plants, especially for the maintaining of secrecy regulations, etc.

g) Confidential agents in the A- and L-plants.

It was generally agreed that this is a clear and well planned organization.

/s/ Ernst Poensgen

CC: To Messr.
Dr. Reichert
Dr. Spiedding
Dr. Steinberg
Dr. Voegler

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ERMA E. UBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. MI-077.

/s/ ERMA E. UBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

CASE NO. 6, TRIBUNAL VI

PROSECUTION

Document Book No. 23

English



MILITARY TRIBUNAL No.

CASE No. 6

prosecution Document Book No. 23

English



Minister President Lieutenant General Goering
Trustee of the Four Year Plan.

Berlin, 27 May 1937

I approve the following survey of the total plan of the Four Year Plan for those projects which will be carried out by the Office for German Raw- and Industrial-Materials which is responsible for them.

The Chief of the Office for German Raw- and Industrial-Materials has been instructed by me to take the necessary measures and issue directives necessary to carry out the projects.

He is furthermore responsible for the efforts to be made in regard to future consolidation and improvement of the Plan. All changes and supplements are subject to my approval.

(signature) Goering.



Minister President Lieutenant General Goering
Trustee of the Four Year Plan.

Berlin, 27 May 1937

Introduction

The present survey of the total plan of the tasks of the Four Year Plan shows the situation today in regard to investigations, experience and actual work. As and when further developments take place within the functions of the Office, it will, in due course, be brought up to date either by a new complete issue or by supplementary sheets.

The plan deals with the industrial sector of the economy; up to now it has only been possible to show some of the measures concerning the agricultural sector proper, as well as the possibilities of effecting economies; these will be supplemented when the occasion arises after clarification with the Administrative Group Food.

The time of construction quoted in the plan was arrived at on the assumption that there will be no difficulties in making available the necessary building materials.

Measures for the training and retraining of skilled workers will be drawn up and carried out in agreement with the Administrative Group Assignment of Labor within the framework of the total plan for the assignment of labor. In the total plan they are merely shown in the separate chart, which gives the necessary requirements of labor.

The amounts of the saving in exports are given in world market prices as at 15 February 1937; these, according to the world market index, are 17% above 1936 prices. It is therefore only possible to compare the total result of economies in imports with the volume of foreign trade for 1936 by taking into account the rise in prices.

Efforts are being made to avoid radical changes in the economic structure as well as in prices and quality, and consequently in the standard of living.

The requirements of the various sectors for the next few years have been based on the consumption for the calendar year 1936.

Those offices which received the survey of the total plan before 10 May 1937 are requested to return this copy in exchange for the present copy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-281
CONTINUED

Distribution:

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Minister President Lieutenant General Goering	2nd "
State Secretary Keerner	3rd "
The Chief Expert for German Raw- and Industrial-Materials	4th "
Administrative Group Foreign Currency	5th "
Administrative Group Distribution of Raw Materials	6th - 7th "
Administrative Group Assignment of Labor	8th - 9th "
Administrative Group Food	10th "
Reich Commissar for Price Control	11th - 14th "
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	a) Iron ore		11) High pressure containers, Thyssen, Muelheim		c) Power district "Middle Rhine"		
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	a) Gas soot		16) High pressure containers, Neisholz		h) Power district "Saxony"		f) Production of resin
	b) Flame soot		17) High pressure containers, Neisholz		i) Power district "Brandenburg"		g) Production of tanning materials
9	WOOD		18) High pressure containers, Neisholz		j) Power district "Lausitz"		h) Oils and other industrial
10	RUBBER		19) High pressure containers, Neisholz		k) Power district "Silesia"		
	a) Rubber		20) High pressure containers, Neisholz		l) Power district "location undetermined"		PLANTS (in special volume)
	b) supplemental machine requirements of the rubber industry		21) High pressure containers, Neisholz		m) Power district "location undetermined"	A	Total survey map (Eastern Germany, excluding Kurmark)
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13	CANDID SPIRITS (ALCOHOL)		28) High pressure containers, Neisholz		Chemistry	H	" : Mineral oil plants
14	WAXES		29) High pressure containers, Neisholz		a) Sulphuric acid	I	" : Petroleum boring program
15	GLASS FOR INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES (GLASS CANNES)		30) High pressure containers, Neisholz		b) Sulphuric acid	J	" : Forestry raw materials economy
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					d) Nitric acid	La	" : Stand-by plants
					e) Carbon sulphide	N	" : Construction of waterways & harbors
					f) Chlorine	O	" : Number of workers used (Eastern Germany, excluding Kurmark)
					g) Caustic soda	P	Survey map: Numbers of workers used (Northern and Central Germany, including Kurmark)
					h) Soda	Q	" 2 : Number of workers used (Northwest and Western Germany)
					i) A-carbon	R	" : Number of workers used (Southern Germany)
					j) Preliminary products for ammunition explosives and chemical warfare agents		
					k) Preliminary products chemical warfare agents and explosives		
					l) Acetylene and ethylene chemistry on the basis of carbide		
					m) ditto on the basis of electric arc and cracking		

SURVEY OF THE CONSOLIDATED PLAN

showing additional savings in Imports as compared with 1936

Figures quoted are of RM in Millions

Sector	Page	Current No of foreign currency balance sheet as at 1 October 1936	Investments					saving imports			
			1937	1938	1939	1940		1937	1938	1939	1940
I. Textiles	3a-3K	1-6	103,2	62,6	29,6	6,3		128,8	229,1	297,1	319,8
Base Metals	4a-i	7	100,5	117,7	119,2	21,0		20,7	47,3	57,8	75,2
Iron and Steel	5	8	66,7	63,3	29,3	17,8		23,3	32,7	47,9	69,7
Non-greasy detergents	6	9	19,0	38,0					6,9	18,0	18,0
Tanning materials	7	10	10,0	10,0	3,0			0,3	2,2	5,0	5,0
Soot	8	12	7,6	9,0				1,0	4,5	5,7	5,7
Guts	9	17	2,2					0,5	10,2	10,2	10,2
Rubber and Regenerates	10a-11	11	217,4	270,7	180,0	30,0		1,3	48,7	114,0	134,0
Paste	14	22							2,5	2,7	2,7
Casein	15	(5)	1,2					5,4	5,4	5,4	5,4
Mineral Oils	16a	13	752,0	625,0	434,8	182,6		24,8	67,9	451,7	179,4
Chemistry (on the basis of Wood)	17a-17h, 1, m	22	33,2	33,1	11,1	10,3		27,4	66,2	96,5	112,8
Wood	17i, K, o	14	8,3	1,0				0,1	0,4	0,4	0,4
Food	17n, p 21	(5)	144,3	127,3	107,8	45,3		185,5	228,9	295,4	341,2
Waterways, Construction of Harbors	22		161,2	154,0	187,8	164,6					10,0
Ship Construction Program	23		181,0	341,7	199,7	183,2		0,2	35,3	75,9	118,5
Substitute Substances	24a-c										96,7
Total I			1807,8	1853,4	1302,3	661,1	Total Investments I: 5624,6	435,3	788,2	1184,7	1504,7
II. Additional Program:											
Iron and Steel	28	8	83,9	99,3	72,7	30,1		23,4	42,3	70,9	112,6 ¹⁾
Textiles	29a-b	1-6		169,0	65,5					120,5	214,0
Wood	30e	22	0,2	6,9	10,7				0,8	5,8	14,0
Fodder - Yeast	30e	(5)		34,5	66,5	51,5				0,9	16,1
Chemistry (on the basis of Wood)	30f-h	14	1,0	2,1	2,0	3,0		5,0	14,4	22,4	31,4
Total II			85,1	311,8	217,4	84,6	Total Investments II: 698,9				
III. Coal	18a	16	94,0	56,0	53,5		Total	463,7	845,7	1404,2	1892,8
Power	19a-p		486,7	474,0	207,4	9,0					
Chemistry	12, 13, 20a-p	14	278,8	301,3	177,0	133,2					
Machinery and Machine-Parts	25, 26		114,1	71,2	22,0						
Total III			973,6	902,5	459,9	142,2	Total Investments III: 2478,2				
Total I - III			2866,5	3067,7	1979,6	887,9	Total Investments I-III: 8801,7				

1) The savings in imports are calculated on the basis of world market prices ruling on 15 February, which according to the world market index, are 17% above 1936 prices. It is therefore only possible to compare the total result of economies in imports with the volume of foreign trade for 1936 by taking into account the rise in prices.

2) The chronological order of the offices is subject to change, as the plan in question is a supplementary one, the commencement of which is not yet determined.

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV. GROUP	DEPT. III	DEPT. I	CHIEF OF OFFICE

SECTOR: TEXTILES 1)

CELLULOSE AS TEXTILE INTERMEDIATE 2)

TYPE OF SUBSTANCE	PRODUCTION OF CELLULOSE	VALUE OF EXPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 1 OCT 1937 GIP GERMANY BORDER
100	95	15
		0,27

QUANTITIES IN TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLION MARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS ON IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1937 WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 15 OCT 1937 GIP GERMANY BORDER			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	Production in Plants existing already	188						95	188	188	188	188	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Cellulose Factory I.G. Wolfen (except cellulose after the nitrous acid process) (see Linters substitute)	36						-	10-12	36	36	36	13,5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Westfaelische Zellstoff (Cellulose) A.G., Wild- hausen	20						-	-	17,5	20	20	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	Extension and Improvements of Bleaching Plants	-						-	-	-	-	-	1,5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		244						95	196	241,5	244	244	20	1	-	-	-	-	-	-

- 1) Cellulose exclusively as textile intermediate.
Resulphite and sulphate cellulose for paper production
refer to sheet 17 a
- 2) Chemical intermediates refer to sheets 20 a to g
- 3) See sheet 30
Compare with supplementary program sheet 29 a

Consultant	Main Sub.- Div. Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief of Office

SECTOR: TEXTILES

CELLULOSE
REFINED CELLULOSE AS SUBSTITUTE FOR
LINTERS

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF LINTERS FOR CHEMICAL PURPOSES	TOTAL PRODUCTION OF LINTERS SUBSTITUTES	IMPORTS OF LINTERS FOR CHEMICAL PURPOSES	VALUE OF IMPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICES ON 1 OCT. 1936 C.I.F. GERMAN BORDER
37.5	0.1	43.9	19

QUANTITY IN 1000 TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLION REICHSMARKS

3b

281

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS ON IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 15 JAN 1937 C.I.F. GERMAN BORDER)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	CELLULOSE FACTORY J.G. WOLFEN (NITROUS ACID PROCESS)	9								9	9	9	5.5					2.88	2.88	2.88
2	CELLULOSE FACTORY WALDHOF - JOHANNES-MUEHLE	24								18	24	24	8.8	2.2				5.76	7.67	7.67
3	CELLULOSE REFINING PLANT	3								1	3	3	0.5	0.5				0.37	0.96	0.96
										28	36	36	14.8	2.7				8.96	15.51	15.51

COMPARE WITH SUPPLEMENTARY PROGRAM SHEET 25

SECTOR: TEXTILES

ARTIFICIAL SILK

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICES ON 1 OCT 1936 CIP GERMAN BORDER
50 3)	46	4)	4)

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS ON IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 15.2. 1937 CIP GERMAN BORDER			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	Viscose Artificial Silk																			
1	Glanzstoff-Courtaulds GmbH, Koeln	4,5						4,4	4,5	4,5	4,5	4,5	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
2	I.G. Farben-Industrie A.G. Bobingen	1,6						1,3	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,6	—	—	—	—	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75
3	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Premnitz	2,5						2,4	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
4	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Rottweil	1,5						1,3	1,5	1,5	1,5	1,5	—	—	—	—	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50
5	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Wolfen	1,9						1,8	1,9	1,9	1,9	1,9	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
6	Kampf & Spindler, Hilden	0,6						0,6	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	Fr. Kuetzner A.G., Pirna	3,7						3,2	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,7	—	—	—	—	1,25	1,25	1,25	1,25
8	Mex A.G., Freiburg/Br.	0,3						0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
9	Spinnstoff-Fabrik Zehlendorf G.m.b.H.	2,0						1,8	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	—	—	—	—	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50
10	Spinnstoffwerk Glauchau A.G.	0,8						0,7	0,8	0,8	0,8	0,8	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
11	Glanzstoff Breslau	2,7						2,5	2,7	2,7	2,7	2,7	—	—	—	—	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50
12	Glanzstoff Elsterberg ..	2,0						1,9	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
13	Glanzstoff Kelsterbach ..	3,2						3,1	3,2	3,2	3,2	3,2	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
14	Glanzstoff Oberbruch ...	4,5						4,1	4,5	4,5	4,5	4,5	—	—	—	—	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
15	Glanzstoff Obernburg ...	2,8						2,7	2,8	2,8	2,8	2,8	—	—	—	—	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25
16	Glanzstoff Sydowsee ...	2,9						2,7	2,9	2,9	2,9	2,9	—	—	—	—	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50
	Extension of existing capacities or new constructions	10,0						—	—	—	6,8	10,0	ca. 30 to 40	—	—	—	—	—	17,00	25,00
	Carried Forward	47,5						34,7	37,5	37,5	44,3	47,5	ca. 30 to 40	—	—	—	7,00	7,00	24,00	32,00

- 1) Works 1 - 22: Increase in Production chiefly due to intensified use of existing capacities.
- 2) Quantities have not yet been split up among the various plants.
- 3) Decrease in stocks.
- 4) Export surplus: 2.

General	Main Sub-Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Brief of Office

SECTOR: TEXTILES

ARTIFICIAL SILK

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLION REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS ON IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1937 (WORLD MARKET PRICES OF 1937)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	Carried Forward:	47,5						34,7	37,5	37,5	44,3	47,5	about 30 to 40	—	—	—	7,00	7,00	24,00	32,00
	Copper Artificial Silk																			
17	I.P. Basberg, A.G., W.-Oberbarmen	5,5						3,2	5,5	5,5	5,5	5,5	—	—	—	—	6,90	6,90	6,90	6,90
18	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Dormagen	3,2						2,2	3,2	3,2	3,2	3,2	—	—	—	—	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00
19	Fr. Kuetzner A.G., Pirmas	1,4						1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4	—	—	—	—	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,90
20	Extension	2,0						—	—	1,0	2,0	2,0	—	—	—	—	—	3,0	6,0	6,0
	Acetat Artificial Silk																			
	Rhodiaseta, Freiburg/Br.	3,1						2,8	3,1	3,1	3,1	3,1	—	—	—	—	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,90
21	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Lichterberg	1,8						1,4	1,8	1,8	1,8	1,8	—	—	—	—	1,20	1,20	1,20	1,20
	Loxona A.G., Saschingen	0,4						0,1	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4	—	—	—	—	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,90
	Total:																			
	Total:																			
	Viscose Artificial Silk	47,5						34,7	37,5	37,5	44,3	47,5	about 30 to 40	—	—	—	7,00	7,00	24,00	32,00
	Copper Artificial Silk	12,1						6,5	10,1	11,2	12,1	12,1	—	—	—	—	10,80	13,80	16,00	18,00
	Acetat Artificial Silk	5,5						3,2	5,5	5,5	5,5	5,5	—	—	—	—	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00
	Total:	65,1						44,4	53,1	54,2	62,1	65,1	about 30 to 40	—	—	—	20,80	23,80	26,00	29,00

SECTOR: TEXTILES

CELLULOSE WARE

EXTENSION CARRIED OUT TO DATE AND FIRST STAGE
OF EXTENSION UNDER THE FOUR YEAR PLAN.TOTAL
CONSUMPTION
TIDRTOTAL
PRODUCTION

IMPORTS

1936

VALUE OF EXPORTS WORLD
MARKET PRIOR ON 1 OCT
1936 (UP GERMAN MARK)QUANTITIES IN TONNES PER YEAR
VALUED IN MILLION REICHMARKS

COMPARE WITH FINAL LAY-OUT

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS ON IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICE OF 15 OCT 1937) (UP GERMAN MARK)				
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	
1	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Prenzlitz	14,78 B						9,8	10,8	14,78	14,78	14,78	—	—	—	—	1	4,98	4,98	4,98	
2	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Wolfen	19,8 B						4,5	11,2	19,2	19,8	19,8	29,2	—	—	—	6,7	14,7	15,3	15,3	
	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Wolfen	7,76 W						1,7	5,56	6	7,76	7,76	—	—	—	—	13,51	15,05	21,21	21,21	
3	Glanstoff Oberbruch	3 B	1935 completed					2,9	3	3	3	3	—	—	—	—	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	
4	Glanstoff Kassel	26,4 B						13,8	21,3	26,4	26,4	26,4	5	—	—	—	7,5	12,6	12,6	12,6	
5	Schlesische Zellwolle A.G., Hirschberg	11 B						2,7	9,3	11	11	11	0,6	—	—	—	6,6	8,3	8,3	8,3	
6	Saechsische Zellwolle A.G., Plauen	11 B						0,1	6,8	11	11	11	1,7	—	—	—	6,7	10,9	10,9	10,9	
7	Thuringische Zellwolle A.G., Schwarz	10 W						0,2	5,4	9,4	10	10	4,3	—	—	—	18,2	32,2	34,3	34,3	
		5 B						—	2	4,5	5	5	—	—	—	—	2	4,5	5	5	
8	Sueddeutsche Zellwolle A.G., Kehlheim	15 B						0,8	8,6	13,9	15	15	2,4	—	—	—	7,8	13,1	14,2	14,2	
9	Spinnstoff-Fabrik Zehlen- dorf G.m.b.H.	1,6 W						0,8	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,6	2,3	—	—	—	2,8	2,8	2,8	2,8	
10	Spinnstoffwerke Glauchau A.G.	1,75 B						—	1,25	2,75	1,75	1,75	1	—	—	—	1,25	1,75	1,75	1,75	
11	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Dornum	6,5 W						3,8	4,3	6,5	6,5	6,5	3	—	—	—	1,75	9,45	9,45	9,45	
12	I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Lichtenberg (Aceta)	0,72 W						0,5	0,72	0,72	0,72	0,72	0,25	—	—	—	0,77	0,77	0,77	0,77	
13	Dr. A. Wacker G.m.b.H., Burghausen	0,9 W						0,6	0,8	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,38	—	—	—	0,7	1,05	1,05	1,05	
14	Rhodissta, Freiburg	1,2 W						0,6	1,1	1,2	1,2	1,2	0,4	—	—	—	1,75	2,1	2,1	2,1	
15	Rheinische Zellwolle A.G. Siegburg	8,5 B						—	0,5	7,5	8,5	8,5	7,6	1,9	—	—	0,5	7,5	8,5	8,5	
		1,5 W						—	—	1	1,5	1,5	—	—	—	—	—	3,5	5,25	5,25	5,25
Total		146,41						42,8	94,23	140,35	146,41	146,41	58,13	1,9	—	—	79,63	145,35	158,56	158,56	

Consultant	Head Sub- Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief of Office

SECTOR: LEAD

TOTAL CONSTRUCTION ION	TOTAL PRODUCTION ION LEAD FROM GROUND MAN OR TRATION	REPORTS LEAD IN THE FORM OF CONSTRUCTION	VALUE OF SAVINGS ON LEAD CONSTRUCTION	1956
230	51	1167	37	

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS ON LEAD AS PERCENT OF WORLD MARKET PRICE OF LEAD 1937.01.01 (BASELINE)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Hera (incl. Ramsberg)...	33.0						25.0	32.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	2.3	2.6	2.6		2.65	2.72	2.72	2.72
2	Hies-Scharley.....	10.6						10.0	10.0	10.6	10.6	10.6	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
3	Preussag	5.7						5.4	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
4	Altenberg	2.1						1.6	1.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	0.2	0.5	0.5		0.03	0.15	0.15	0.15
5	Stolberg A.G.	10.6						8.0	9.5	10.5	10.5	10.6	0.5	1.7	1.5		0.24	0.65	0.66	0.66
6	Auguste Victoria.....	5.0						3.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	1.6	1.7	1.5		0.85	1.70	1.70	1.70
7	Siegarland	0.6						0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
8	Mechemich	0.0						7.0	7.8	8.0	8.0	8.0	0.3	0.5	0.6		0.27	0.34	0.34	0.34
9	Gonderbach	0.3							0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2			0.10	0.10	0.10
10	Bayarland	0.07							0.05	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.1				0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
11	Salabrucke	2.70						1.20	2.20	2.70	2.70	2.70	0.4	0.8	0.8		0.41	0.75	0.75	0.75
12	Glanzenberg							0.5	0.50	0.50										
13	Messfeld	3.0						3.4	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0								
	TOTAL								10.35	10.35	10.35	10.35	10.35	2.0	3.1		1.40	7.95	7.95	7.95

COMMITTEE

DATE RECEIVED
GROUP

DEPT. III

DEPT. I

CHIEF OF BUREAU

SECTOR. COPPER

TOTAL GERMANY SUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION FROM GERMAN ORE 26	GROSS PLANT PRODUCTION INT AND INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT	1936	VALUES OF IMPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICES IN 10 OCT 1935 CIF GERMANY BORDER	QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR VALUES IN MILLION REICHSMARKS
299				105	

SERIAL NR.	NAME	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					IMPORTANTS					SAVINGS IN IMPORTS AS PERCENT OF 1935 MARKET PRICES IN 1937-1939 PERIOD			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	
1	Kaiserfeld	14.0						24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0									
2	Kaiserfeld	2.1						1.5	1.5	2.1	2.1	2.1						0.05	0.7	0.7	0.7
3	Stegberg	0.6						0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8						0.05	2.8	2.8	2.8
4	Siegersdorf	—						—	—	0.4	—	—						—	0.25	—	—
5	Wiedersheim	1.4						—	0.5	1.4	1.4	1.4						0.10	0.97	0.97	0.97
6	Wiedersheim	0.3						0.3	0.25	0.3	0.3	0.3						0.07	0.31	0.31	0.31
7	Wiedersheim	6.0						—	—	6.0	6.0	6.0						—	3.4	3.40	3.4
8	Wiedersheim	5.0						—	—	0.5	2.0	1.0						—	0.34	0.30	0.45

SECTOR: RARE METALS

TIN, WOLFRAM, MOLYBDENUM, BISMUTH, NICKEL, COBALT

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICES ON 1 OCT 1936 CIF GERMAN BORDER
			SEE BELOW

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLION REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS IN IMPORTS AS PERCENTAGE 1936 (BASED UPON PRICE ON 15 MAY 1937) OF GERMAN IMPORTS			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Zinnwald (Sn.)	about 0,500 tin						0,050	0,150	0,29	0,30	0,30	0,1	0,0	—	—	0,071	0,700	0,030	0,750
2	Altenberg (Sn.)																			
3	Ehrenfriedersdorf (Sn.)							—	—	0,10	0,20	0,20	0,4	0,3	—	—	—	0,291	0,382	0,382
4	Zinnwald-Altenberg (W)	about 0,100 Wolfram						0,0024	0,0124	0,0524	0,0824	0,08	0,1	—	—	—	0,009	0,195	0,005	0,113
5	Pechelargruen (W)							—	0,010	0,020	0,020	0,020	0,1	—	—	—	0,030	0,078	0,023	0,078
6	Molybdenum (Incl. Ofchhausen) abt. 0,140							0,0024	0,0224	0,0724	0,1024	0,100	—	—	—	—	—	0,015	0,015	0,015
7	Bismuth	abt. 0,020						0,011	0,021	0,021	0,021	0,021	0,3	0,1	0,1	—	0,060	0,060	0,060	0,060
8	Nickel	abt. 1,040						0,300	0,340	0,340	1,040	1,040	2,5	1,0	—	—	0,800	0,800	1,540	1,540
9	Cobalt	abt. 0,060						—	0,060	0,061	0,061	0,061	—	—	—	—	0,060	0,060	0,060	0,060
													0,60	0,00	0,00	—	0,074	0,069	0,069	0,068

YEAR	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION FROM GERMAN PLANTS	IMPORT (NET)	IMPORT IN THE FOR OF	VALUE OF IMPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICES ON 1 OCT 1936 CIF GERMAN BORDER
1936	8,680	0,000	8,680	8,130	1,550
1937	8,680	0,000	8,680	8,170	18,80
1938	8,680	0,000	8,680	8,600	20,00
1939	8,680	0,000	8,680	3,500	12,256
1940	8,680	0,000	8,680	0,300	0,000
				0,000	0,000
				0,000	0,000
				0,000	0,000
				0,000	0,000

SECTOR: ELECTRODES FOR ALUMINUM

1936			
Total consumption	Total Production	Imports	Value of Imports, "world Market Prices 1 Oct 1936 Cif German Border"
55	55		

Quantities in thousands of tons per annum. Value in millions of Reichsmarks.

Serial Nr.	Plant	Final Production	Building Period					Total Production					Investments				Total imports value 1937-1939			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	J. G. Griesheim	3						3	3	3	3	3								
2	Erdwerk	28						21	21	28	28	28	1							
3	Siemens-Planitz	35						30	30	35	35	35	2							
	Conradty	9						6	6	9	9	9								
5	Lippewerk-Hamm	22								5	22	22	5	5						
6	Werk A	25									12	25								
	Total	122						60			100	100	6							

SECTOR: ALUMINA

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS.

CURRENT NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION IN 1000 TONS	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION IN 1000 TONS					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICE 15.237 CIP GERMAN BORDER)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Leitawerk	85						76	85	85	85	85	—	—	—	—	—	0,18	0,18	0,18 1)
2	Saarnsdorf	50						—	33	50	50	50	5	—	—	—				
3	Partinswerk	98						80	89	98	98	98	2	—	—	—				
4	Industriechemie	68						65	68	68	68	68	—	—	—	—				
5	Wann	80						—	—	23	70	90	16	16	—	—				
6	Werk 2	50						—	—	—	25	—	—	10	10	—				
7	Werk 3	50						—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10	—				
														36	20	—	—			

0924

4h

SECTOR: ALUMINUM

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION 104	TOTAL PRODUCTION 100	IMPORTS 3,6	VALUE OF IMPORTS. WORLD MARKET PRICE 10 OCT 1936. CIF GERMAN BORDER
AMOUNT OF SCRAP NOT INCLUDED		RAA ALUMINIUM	3,6

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARK

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION IN 1000 T.	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICE 15 FEB 1937 CIF GERMAN BORDER)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Lautawerk) (.....	50						32	41	50	50	50	8	—	—	—	1,8	3,6	3,6	3,6
2	Erstwerk) VAW (.....	24						24	24	24	24	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	Innwerk) (.....	26						12	22	28	28	28	6	—	—	—	2,0	3,0	3,0	3,0
4	Bitterfeld	26						17	21	26	26	26	4	—	—	—	0,8	1,8	1,8	1,8
5	Rheinfelden	20						13	17	18	20	20	4	1	—	—	0,8	1,0	1,4	1,4
6	Hamm	40						—	—	12	20	40	15	15	5	—	—	2,4	4,0	8,0
7	Werk I	25						—	—	—	—	25	—	—	22	—	—	—	—	5,0
8	Werk II	25						—	—	—	—	15	—	—	11	11	—	—	—	3,0
	Aluminium-Silicon Preliminary Alloys																			
1	Horren	2						2	2	2	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Lautawerk	2						—	1	1,4	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total								100,0	128,0	161,4	172,0	232,0	37,0	16,0	38,0	11,0	5,4	11,8	13,6	25,8

Consultant	Main-sub. Div. Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief of Office

SECTOR: MAGNESIUM

1936			
Total	Total	Exports	Value of imports, World market prices 1 Oct. 36 cif German border
14	13.6	none	-

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARK

Serial No.	P L A N T	Yearly Production	Building period					Total production					Investments				Savings in imports as against 1936 (World market prices 1 Oct. 36 cif German border)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	AKEN.....	8.4						8.4	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	I. G. BITTERFELD.....	3.6						3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	STASSFURT.....	3.6						-	1.8	3.6	3.6	3.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	WINTERSHALL.....	1.8						1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	WERK A.....	4.0						-	-	2.0	4.0	4.0	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
	WERK B.....	5.0						-	-	-	2.0	5.0	-	5	5	-	-	-	-	-
Total								13.8	15.6	19.4	26.4	26.4	4	9	5	-	-	-	-	-

Consultant	Main Sub-Div. group	Department III	Department I Chief of office

SECTOR: IRON & STEEL

a) Iron Ore

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD MARKET PRICE 1 OCT 36 CIF GERMAN BORDER
11621	2141	8809.4	184.99

MAIN PLAN OF 23. MARCH 1937.

TOTAL PRODUCTION 1940 5.2 MILLION TONS FE-CONTENT.

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR.

SCHEDULED FE CONTENT.

VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS.

WORLD MARKET PRICE 15. FEB. 1937 CIF GERMAN BORDER.

- 23 RM TONS FE.

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AGAINST 36			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Siegerland	570						561	680	570	570	570	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.7	0.2	0.2	0.2
2	Lahn Dill Vogelberg	450						335	505	450	450	450	2.7	1.8	0.6	0.6	3.9	2.6	2.6	2.6
3	Peine-Ilse-Danne	740						465	582	582	660	740	0.9	2.0	2.0	0.8	2.7	2.7	1.5	6.3
4	Salzgitter	350						137	238	277	304	350	8.2	3.0	1.5	0.8	3.3	3.2	2.8	4.9
5	Harz	258						27	84.2	126	188	258	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.8	1.3	3.3	3.7	5.3
6	Wienau- und Wesergebiet	275						22	58.4	79	159	275	4.0	8.5	5.3	5.0	0.8	1.3	3.2	3.8
7	Schlesien	85.5						18	33.5	37	70	95.5	1.0	2.0	1.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.2	1.8
8	Dogger: a) Baden	628						20	57.1	197	394	628	25.0	30.0	10.0	5.0	0.9	1.1	8.6	14.0
	b) Württemberg	517						61	201.5	370	370	517	6.0	4.0	2.0		3.2	7.1	7.1	10.5
	c) Franken	454						66	110.3	209	336	454	12.0	5.0	1.0		1.0	3.3	6.2	8.9
9	Alb- und Spalterze	336						279	279	279	279	336	0.8	0.6						1.3
10	Thuringen	220						134	174.2	197	214	220	1.0	1.3	0.4	0.2	0.9	1.4	1.8	2.0
11	Rennsteinschnee	40							18.0	40	40	40	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.9	0.9	0.9
12	Various Mines	243						16	186.9	155	196	243	0.8	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.8	3.2	3.4	3.2
	TOTAL	6176.5						2441	3158.1	3568	4230	5176.5	66.7	63.3	20.3	17.8	25.3	29.7	32.2	65.7

1) Production capacity Wismutgebirge: End of 1940: 0.7 Mil. Tons Fe-content.

2) Compare Additional Schedule Page 26

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV. GROUP	DEPT. III	DEPT. I	OFFICE CHIEF

SECTOR: FATTENERS - PETERGERS

CHARTERED IN THE NAME OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENT				SAVINGS IN FATTENING COSTS 1936 TO 1940			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Schloppa Plant to pro- duce the basic substance required for 66,000 tons of Soap Powder per annum (saving of 20,000 tons fatty acids).....	20		—				—	—	9	20	20	7	12	—	—	—	2,7	6	6
2	Baderdorf Plant to produce the basic sub- stance required for 66,000 tons of Soap Powder (saving of 20,000 tons fatty acids).....	20		—				—	—	5	20	20	5	14	—	—	—	1,5	6	6
3	Hochst Plant to produce the basic substance re- quired for 66,000 tons of Soap Powder per annum (saving of 20,000 tons of fatty acids.)	20		—				—	—	9	20	20	7	12	—	—	—	2,7	6	6
	Total	60						—	—	23	60	60	19	28	—	—	—	6,9	18	18

Consultant	Admin-Sub. Div	Dept. III	Dept. I	Dept. II

SECTOR TANNING AGENTS

SYNTHETIC TANNING AGENTS

Final Capacity 1945	Final Production 1945	Final Production 1946
237.6	50.7	383.7

Value of Capital Investment in 1945
100.00

Plant	Name	Final Capacity	Building Period					Total Production					Production					Production in 1945		
			1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1957	1958	1959
1	Plant I for the production of synthetic tanning agents Werk: Leverkhausen.....	12							0.5	0.5	8.5	11.5	11.5	3	2	-	-	0.3	1.5	2.0
2	Plant II.....	18							-	-	4.0	11.0	18.0	7	8	3	-	-	0.7	3.0
Total		30							0.5	0.5	12.5	29.5	29.5	10	10	3	-	0.3	2.2	5.0

- 1) Estimate
2) Examining the preliminary products
3) Examining tanning agents & materials.

Consultant	Head-Dept. III	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief of Office

GAS - SOOT

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARK

0932

MAchine REQUIREMENTS OF THE RUBBER INDUSTRY FOR THE PROCESSING OF 24,000 TONS OF BUNKER RENTS OF THE RUBBER INDUSTRY FOR RUBBER PROCESSING MACHINES

	ROLLING ROLL 2100 x 800 mm	ROLLING ROLL 1800 x 1500 mm	UNIT PRESS 600 x 800	UNIT 210/110/135	
1. RUBBER ROLLING	34	15	2	1	
2. RUBBER ROLLING	18	1	1	1	
3. RUBBER ROLLING	15	3	1	1	
4. RUBBER ROLLING	24	1	1	1	
5. RUBBER ROLLING	22	1	1	1	
6. RUBBER ROLLING	9	1	1	1	
7. RUBBER ROLLING	135	26	2	8	
8. RUBBER ROLLING	18	30	4	12	
9. RUBBER ROLLING	7	15	1	3	
10. RUBBER ROLLING		ca. 20 - 30			

Consultant	Main Sub. Div. Group	Dept.	Dept. I	Office Chief

PRODUCTION SCHEDULE OF THE RUBBER MACHINES IN

a) ROLLING MILLS 84, 2100 x 665

SERIAL NR.	FIRM	1937						1938
		1.7.	1.8.	1.9.	1.10.	1.11.	1.12.	
1	Krupp	—	2	1	—	4	4	1
2	Troester	4	—	—	6	—	6	5
3	Berstorff/Vogels	14	12	12	12	10	10	10
4	Eck	4	3	3	3	3	2	3
5	Haubold	—	3	3	4	4	4	—
6	Berger	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
7	Harburger	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
8	Arndt	2	2	—	3	—	—	—
	Total	40	28	25	44	37	36	36

Consultant	Major Subcontractor	Major Subcontractor
		

0934

0935

PRODUCTION SCHEDULE OF THE RUBBER MACHINES INDUSTRY

ROLLING MILLS 60", 1500 x 550

FIRM	1937						1938
	1.7.	1.8.	1.9.	1.10.	1.11.	1.12.	1.1.
TRAPP	—	—	—	3	—	—	3
Tropel	—	6	—	6	—	—	6
Reichert	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Reichert/Vogels	—	3	3	3	3	3	—
Reichert-Jachmann	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Reichert & Meyer	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Schubert	—	4	4	4	4	4	4
Schubert	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Schubert	3	3	3	3	3	3	—
Alex	7	3	4	4	4	4	—
Total	18	27	22	21	22	22	21

In addition there are 20 - 30 rolling mills for other purposes

Ordered from firms 1 - 10
Requirements of rubber
Firms 5 - 10 can still
orders for

Consultant	Min. Sub- Div. Group	Dept.	Dept. 1	Office Chief

0936

EC-281

Production Schedule of the rubber machines industry 10e

Lieferungsmöglichkeiten der Gummimaschinen-Industrie

c) Kalandrier (Breite etwa 1,2 m)
calender (width of about 1.2 m)

Werk, Nr. Serial	Firma Firm	1937						1938	Zu- Total
		1.7.	1.8.	1.9.	1.10.	1.11.	1.12.	1.1.	
1	Strupp								
2	Dreher								1
3	Sorburger		2						2
4	Bernstorff Bögel								2
5	Ed	3	2	2	2	3	4		20
6	Hausbold		4	4	4	4	4		24
7	Arndt	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
	Gesamt Total	6	9	7	7	8	9	15	61

Already ordered from firms 1-4... 8

Bei den Firmen 1-4 bereits bestellt... 8

Requirements of the Rubber Industry... 15

Bedarf der Gummimaschinen-Industrie... 15

Firms 5-7 can still accept orders for... 53

Die Firmen 5-7 können noch Bestellungen ent-

gegennehmen für... 53

Ref. Consultant	Plan. Sub-Dir. S. Ref. / Group	Abt. Dept.	Abt. 1 Dept.	Chief
<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

0937

PRODUCTION SCHEDULE OF THE RUBBER MACHINES INDUSTRY

b) UNIT BREAKER, 500 x 800

SERIAL NO.	FIRM	
1	Troester	2
2	Barstorff, Voegels ..	1
3	Schwabenhan	4
Total		7

Requirements of Rubber Industry

c) REFINER, 810/810/225

SERIAL NO.	FIRM	
1	Mueller	10
2	Arndt	10
Total		20

Requirements of Rubber Industry

Consultant	Main Sub-Div. & Group	Dept.	Dept. I

SECTOR: SYNTHETICS ON A CHLORIDE BASIS

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORT	VALUE OF IMPORT, WORLD MARKET PRICES 1 OCTOBER 1936 OF GERMAN BORDER
ABOUT 400-600 t	ABOUT 400-600 t		Reduction of Import of Base Metals

12

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING OF IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICE 15.2.37 CIF GERMAN BORDER)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	A. Preliminary Products: Vinyl chloride,																			
	Rheinfelden	1,80						0,96	1,24	1,80	1,80	1,80	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	Schkopau	6,00						—	—	5,00	6,00	6,00	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total	7,80						0,96	1,24	6,80	7,80	7,80	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1	B. Polymerization Products:																			
	Ludwigshafen	1,20						0,54	0,70	1,20	1,20	1,20	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	Bitterfeld	0,72						—	0,36	0,72	0,72	0,72	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Schkopau	6,00						—	—	5,00	6,00	6,00	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	Total	7,92						0,54	1,06	7,92	7,92	7,92	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Consultant	Main Sub- Div. Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Office Chief

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

1936			
Total consumption	Total production	Imports	Value of imports. World market prices 1 Oct. 1936 cif German border
5000.0 ¹⁾	2 000.0	3 300.0 ²⁾	204.0

Quantities in thousands of tons per year

Value in millions of RM

Serial No.	P L A N T	RAW MATERIAL	Final Production	Building period					Total production					Investments				Savings on imports as against 1936 (world market price 15.2.37) cif German border			
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	A. PLANTS IN OPERATION																				
1	GERMAN BENZOL PRODUCTION	SK	400 IK						400	400	400	400	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
2	FUEL from agricultural, industrial distilleries and from synthetic production ³⁾	AGRICULTURAL RESIDUES AND CARAMEL	200 IK						200	200	200	200	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
3	REFINEMENT OF GERMAN PETROLEUM.....	Petroleum	100 IK 60 DI 149 Soe 10 Tg						319	319	319	319	319	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
4	FUEL FROM DESTILLATION OF LIGNITE TAR.....	BKT	25 IK 100 DI 100 Hoe 30 Pa						255	255	255	255	255	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
5	FUEL OIL FROM DESTILLATION OF BITUMINOUS COAL TAR..	SKT	105 Hoe						105	105	105	105	105	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
6	METHANOL PRODUCTION		100 IK						100	100	100	100	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-7	DOMESTIC REFINING OF MINERAL OIL.....	SK	499 IK						499	499	499	499	499	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	a) industrial gasoline.....	and	10 IK																		
	b) asph. factories.....	temporarily	10 IK																		
	c) cracking plants.....	foreign	10 IK																		
	d) lubricating oil.....	refined	10 IK																		
	Balance								1 878	1 878	1 878	1 878	1 878	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1) Includes the increase in national reserve stocks. 2) Includes export of 300 000 tons of refined products.																					

- 1) Includes the increase in national reserve stocks.
 2) Includes export of 300 000 tons of refined products.
 3) Partial conversion to carbide followed subsequently.
 (compare special sheet "carbide-spirits plants.")

IK = light fuels Soe = lubricating oil Sp = spirits BKT = lignite tar
 Di = diesel fuel Hoe = fuel oil Sk = bituminous coal SKT = bituminous coal
 Tg = fuel gas Pa = paraffin Bk = lignite tar
 Mo = coke

Consultant	Main Sub Div group	Department	Department I	Office Chief

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

1936			
Total Consumption	Total Production	Imports	Value of imports at market price of 1 October 1936, at German border
5000,09	2000,0	3300,09	204,0

Quantities in thousands of tons per year
Values in Millions of RM

Serial Nr.	Plant	Raw Materials	Final Production	Building Period					Total Production					Investments				Savings of Imports as against 1936 (at market price of 1 October 1936)			
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
8	Balance.....								1 878	1 878	1 878	1 878	1 878	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Lignite Hydrogenation (according to IG high pressure):																				
	a) Ammoniakwerk, Merseburg Bk (Leunawerke)		3501K 20 Tg						370	370	370	370	370	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	b) Brabag, Boehlen..... BkF		1601K 10 Tg						125	170	170	170	170	—	—	—	—	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5
	c) Brabag, Magdeburg..... BkF		1601K 10 Tg						85	170	370	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,6	—	—	—
9	Bituminous Coal Hydrogenation (according to I.G. High Pressure):																				
	a) Hibernia, Scholven I.. SK (Hiberniabenzin I)		1251K 15 Tg						35	140	140	140	140	—	—	—	—	8,1	8,1	8,1	8,1
	b) I.G. Experimental Plant at Oppau SK		71K						7	7	7	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	Hydrogenation in Fischer Plant (lignit basis)																				
	a) Brabag, Ruhland I..... Bk		251K 2,5Tg						5	27,5	27,5	27,5	27,5	—	—	—	—	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75
11	Hydrogenation in Fischer Plants (bituminous coal basis)																				
	a) Ruhrbenzin I, Holten... Ko		251K 2,5 Tg						3	20	27,5	27,5	27,5	—	—	—	—	1,31	1,9	1,9	1,9
	b) Rheinpreussen I, Repelen Ko		151K 10,0Tg						—	27,5	27,5	27,5	27,5	—	—	—	—	1,72	1,72	1,72	1,72
	Balance....								2 508	2 810,0	2 647,5	2 647,5	2 647,5	—	—	—	—	22,98	16,97	16,97	16,97

- 1) Includes the increase in national reserve stocks.
- 2) Includes export of 300,000 tons of refined products.
- 3) Conversion compare Pos. B 2c.

Consultant	Main sub-div. Group	Dept.	Dept. I	Office Chief

										1950				1951				1952				1953				1954				1955				1956				1957				1958				1959				1960				1961				1962				1963				1964				1965				1966				1967				1968				1969				1970				1971				1972				1973				1974				1975				1976				1977				1978				1979				1980				1981				1982				1983				1984				1985				1986				1987				1988				1989				1990				1991				1992				1993				1994				1995				1996				1997				1998				1999				2000				2001				2002				2003				2004				2005				2006				2007				2008				2009				2010				2011				2012				2013				2014				2015				2016				2017				2018				2019				2020				2021				2022				2023				2024				2025				2026				2027				2028				2029				2030				2031				2032				2033				2034				2035				2036				2037				2038				2039				2040				2041				2042				2043				2044				2045				2046				2047				2048				2049				2050				2051				2052				2053				2054				2055				2056				2057				2058				2059				2060				2061				2062				2063				2064				2065				2066				2067				2068				2069				2070				2071				2072				2073				2074				2075				2076				2077				2078				2079				2080				2081				2082				2083				2084				2085				2086				2087				2088				2089				2090				2091				2092				2093				2094				2095				2096				2097				2098				2099				2100				2101				2102				2103				2104				2105				2106				2107				2108				2109				2110				2111				2112				2113				2114				2115				2116				2117				2118				2119				2120				2121				2122				2123				2124				2125				2126				2127				2128				2129				2130				2131				2132				2133				2134				2135				2136				2137				2138				2139				2140				2141				2142				2143				2144				2145				2146				2147				2148				2149				2150				2151				2152				2153				2154				2155				2156				2157				2158				2159				2160				2161				2162				2163				2164				2165				2166				2167				2168				2169				2170				2171				2172				2173				2174				2175				2176				2177				2178				2179				2180				2181				2182				2183				2184				2185				2186				2187				2188				2189				2190				2191				2192				2193				2194				2195				2196				2197				2198				2199				2200				2201				2202				2203				2204				2205				2206				2207				2208				2209				2210				2211				2212				2213				2214				2215				2216				2217				2218				2219				2220				2221				2222				2223				2224				2225				2226				2227				2228				2229				2230				2231				2232				2233				2234			
										10	10.0	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.7	20.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMP- TION	TOTAL PRODUC- TION	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS: WORLD MARKET PRICES 1 OCT 1936 CIF GERMAN BOARDER 204.0
5000.0 ¹⁾	2000.0	3300.0 ²⁾	

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	RAW MATERIAL	FINAL PRO- DUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IMPORTS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICE 15,237 DM GERMAN DEMARK)			
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	Brought Forward								2508	2831	3109,9	3864,0	4075,0	—	—	—	—	22,98	45,58	88,91	103,27
b)	Rheinpreussen II,..... Epeleu	Ko	20 1K 2 Tg						—	—	17	22	22	7	3	—	—	—	1,3	1,7	1,7
c)	Chemische Werke, Essener Steinkohle, Kamen (Essenerbensin)	Ko	50 1K 5 Tg						—	—	41	55	55	10	20	—	—	—	3,15	4,25	4,25
d)	Hoesch-Bensin, GmbH, Dortmund	Ko	35 1K 3,5 Tg						—	—	29	38,5	38,5	6	16	—	—	—	2,2	2,95	2,95
e)	De Wendel, Harringen (De Wendelbensin)	Ko	25 1K 2,5 Tg						—	—	21	27,5	27,5	3	12	—	—	—	1,62	2,12	2,12
f)	Kloeckner, Baural (Kloecknerbensin)	Ko	25 1K 2,5 Tg						—	21	27,5	27,5	27,5	15	—	—	—	1,62	2,12	2,12	2,12
g)	Schaffgotsch, Odertal G.S. (Schaffgotschbensin)	Ko	25 1K 2,5 Tg						—	—	21	27,5	27,5	5	10	—	—	—	1,62	2,12	2,12
h)	Gaswerk, Frankfurt a/M (Frankfurtergas)	Ko	25 1K 2 Tg						—	—	20	27	27	7	18	—	—	—	1,54	2,07	2,07
	Hydrogenation in Fischer Plants (on the basis of low carbonization coke)																				
a)	Gaswerk Ludwig (with low temperature carbonization distilling plant)	Ko	35 1K 10 Tg 15 Hoe						—	—	41	55	55	10	22	—	—	—	3,46	3,52	3,52
	Brought Forward								2508	2831	3109,9	3864,0	4075,0	—	—	—	—	22,98	45,58	88,91	103,27

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD MARKET PRICES 1 ACT 1936 CIF GERMAN BORDER
5000,0 ¹	2000,0	3300,0 ²	204,0

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARK

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	RAW MATER- IAL	FINAL PRO- DUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING OF IMPORTS AGAINST WORLD MARKET PRICES 1936-1940			
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	Brought forward								2508	2852	3321,4	4144,0	4355,0	—	—	—	—	24,04	41,78	109,78	11,45
	b) Krupp-Treibstoff, GmbH. (with low temperature carbonisation distilling plant for bituminous coal	Sk & K	40 1K 4 1g 7 Hm						—	—	36	51	51	10	25	—	—	—	2,44	3,6	3,4
6	Soft Coal Tar Distillation a) Degussa, Rositz	SkT	7,51 1K 17,5 1g 12,5 Hm						—	—	24	37,5	37,5	0,5	1,0	—	—	—	1,02	2,4	1,4
	b) Koenig, Goelsdorf	SkT	1,5 1K 6,75 1g 3,15 Hm						—	—	7,8	11,4	11,4	0,2	0,3	—	—	—	0,32	0,44	0,46
7	Pitch Cracking Plant Bayerische A.-G., Arnhem	SkT	2,5 Hm 1,3 1K						—	—	2,8	3,8	3,8	0,08	—	—	—	—	0,09	0,12	0,12
8	Synthetic Lubrications (from hydrogenated gases) a) Lemmwerke I		0,6 5K						—	0,45	0,6	0,6	0,6	1,0	—	—	—	0,04	0,05	0,05	0,05
	b) Lemmwerke II		0,9 5K						—	—	0,07	0,9	0,9	1,0	—	—	—	—	0,05	0,07	0,07
	(from Fischer-Fermentation) c) Barmstedt		6 5K						—	1,3	6	6	6	1,4	—	—	—	0,08	0,12	0,12	0,12
									3708	4252	4407,4	5497,4	5811,0	11,7	18,3	—	—	24,04	41,78	109,78	11,45

SECTOR MINERAL OIL

1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
5000,0 1)	4000,0	3300,0 2)		2000,0

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	RAW MATERIAL	FINAL PRO- DUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS					TOTAL INVESTMENTS				
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940		
	Carried Over...								2508	2853,95	3407,2	4055,2	4665,2	—	—	—	—	24,76	66,47	116,22	130,50		
	C. Plants in course of being planned:																						
1.	Bituminous Coal Hydrogen- ation (I.G. Fohst process)																						
	a) Ruhr Plant	BK	50 LK 100 HOG						—	—	—	—	—	—	10	20	30	—	—	—	5,11		
	b) Schlesien Plant	BK	50 LK 100 HOG						—	—	—	—	—	—	5	20	35	—	—	—	3,43		
2.	Priority Stand by Plants Siberian Petroleum and/or Gelsenberg Petroleum	Sk	100 DZ						—	—	—	—	200	—	—	40	30	—	—	—	0,92		
3.	Lignite Hydrogenation (after I.G. High Pressure)																						
	a) Buxtehude, Muskeberg...	Lignite	60 LK 90 DZ						—	—	—	—	150	—	20	30	30	—	—	—	7,13		
4.	Oil Hydrogenation (From Bituminous Coal and Imported Crude Oil)																						
	a) Stettin Plant I	Sk	110 LK and Petroleum						—	—	10	200	200	—	10	50	90	—	—	0,59	11,8	12,8	
	b) Stettin Plant II	Sk	103 LK and Petroleum						—	—	—	21	250	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,43	13,4		
	Carried Over								2508	2853,95	3419,27	4076,2	4681,2	30,0	85,0	230,0	145,0	24,76	67,46	129,07	172,21		

- 1) This includes the increased stocks for the national reserve.
 2) Export of 300,000 tons of Refined Petroleum INCLUDED.
 3) The total capacity corresponding to the final production required will be reached on 31 December 1940.

Consultant	Head Sub-Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief of Office

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORT	VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLDWIDE MARKET PRICE 1 OCT 1936 CIF GERMAN FRONTIER
5000.0 ¹⁾	2000.0	3300.0 ²⁾	204.0

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUES IN MILLION REICHSMARKS.

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	ROW MATERIALS.	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				HAVING IN IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD) MARKET PRICE			
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	CARRIED OVER								2508	2853.95	3417.27	4476.2	5261.2					24.76	67.06	129.07	172.21
5	c) MINING CORPORATION HANAU.	Bkt	301 K 40 Di									21	70	5	10	15				1.14	3.78
	BITUMINOUS COAL DISTILLATION PLANTS:																				
	a) GASWORKS BERLIN	Bitum Coal	15 Hoe									5	15		2.0	2.5				0.15	0.45
	b) SAXONY BITUMINOUS COAL SYNDICATE.	"	15 "									7	15		2.0	2.5				0.21	0.45
	c) SAAR AREA	"	4 "									3	4		1	0.5				0.09	0.12
	d) SCHAFFGOTSCH, ODERTAL O.S.	"	10 "									3.5	10		2	1.5				0.1	0.3
	e) GAS WORKS FRANKFURT a/M	"	5 "									1	5		1.1	0.6				0.03	0.15
6	FISCHER PARAFFIN ERZEUGUNG IN SEVERAL PLANTS		551K 70 Pa									100	125		50	25				18.8	23.45
7	CONVERSION OF FISCHER GASOLINE PLANTS TO 15% DI PER WORKS.		68.5Di 68.5Di										9								
8	SYNTHETIC LUBRICATING OIL FROM HYDROGENATED GAS		3.5Hoe									3.5	3.5							0.1	0.1
	FROM PARAFFINE		25.5 "								8.5	25.5	25.5							0.25	0.77
	FROM FISCHER PRODUCTS		19.5 "								4.9	19.5	19.5							0.15	0.59
	CARRIED OVER								2508.0	2853.95	3430.67	4655.2	5553.7	5.0	68.1	47.6		24.76	67.46	151.05	178.92

- 1) This includes the increased stocks for the national reserve.
- 2) This includes the export of 300,000 tons of Refined Products.
- 3) The production of Diesel fuels having been made at the expense of the propellant fuels, no surplus production is shown when conversion took place in 1940.

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV GROUP	DEPT	DEPT I	CHIEF OF OFFICE

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

164

BITUMINOUS COAL EXPERIMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
PLANT

1936	1937	1938
5000	5000	5000

STAYING IN THE HANDS OF THE PDR ARMED
FOR THE WILLING OF THE PDR ARMED

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	YEAR PRODUCTION	BULKING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					STAYING IN THE HANDS OF THE PDR ARMED					STAYING IN THE HANDS OF THE PDR ARMED			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939
	Plants in course of construction or definitely projected:																				
1	Mining Corporation Gottow Sagen	0,75 Skf						—	0,25	0,25	—	—	0,25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	Mining Corporation Hansberg	0,7 Skf						—	0,25	0,75	—	—	0,25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	Gas Works Bremen Bismarck	0,36 Skf						—	0,24	0,36	—	—	0,2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4	Gas Works Berlin	0,7 Skf						—	0,29	0,7	—	—	0,34	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total							—	1,03	2,56	—	—	0,74	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

1) This includes the increased stocks for the national reserve.

2) Export of 300,000 of Refined Products included.

Consultant	Main Sub-Dir	Dept.	Dept. I	Chief of Office

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

BROWN COAL DISTILLATION PLANTS

1936			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS, WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 1 OCT 1936 CIP GERMAN BORDER.
5000 ¹⁾	2000	3300 ²⁾	204.0

16 k

QUANTITY IN 100 TONS PER YEAR

VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS.

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AS AGAINST 36. (WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 15 FEBR 37 CIP GERMAN BORDER.)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	PLANTS IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION OR DEFINITELY PLANNED SCHEMES	*BROWN-COAL TAR																		
1	Deutsche Erdöl A.G., Regio Extension	50 BBT ³⁾ *								37.5	50.0	50.0	11.0	4.0						
* 2	Coal Refining and Distillation plants, A.G. Gölitzau Extension.	15 ³⁾								11.3	15.0	15.0	2.5	1.1						
3	Mining operation of the Brown Coal Pit, Concordia Nachterstedt.	50 "								37.5	50.0	50.0	8.4	3.6						
4	Leipziger Brown Coal Works A.G. Mulchwitz.	27.5 "								20.6	27.5	27.5	5.2	2.3						
5	Braunschweigische Brown Coal Mining Plants Extension.	30 "								22.5	30.0	30.0	8.4	3.6						
6	Werschen-Weissenfelser Brown Coal A.G., Profen.	50 "								37.5	50.0	50.0	8.4	3.6						
7	Werschen-Weissenfelser Brown Coal A.G. Zechau	25 "								18.8	25.0	25.0	4.2	1.8						
8	A.G. Saechsische Werke Borsdorf Extension	50 "								37.5	50.0	50.0	70.7	33.3						
9	A.G. Saechs. Werke, Hirschfeld.	50 "								33.3	50.0	50.0								
10	Grube Leopold A.G. Dessau	50 "								12.5	50.0	50.0	5.3	6.0	1.7					
11	Dielsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Kemnath.	32 "								8.0	32.0	32.0	3.9	4.2	0.9					
12	Niederlausitzer Brown Coal Works A.G., Deutzen Extension	55 "								37.0	55.0	55.0	19.0	7.0						
	TOTAL									314.0	454.5	454.5	141.0	70.5	2.6					

1) This includes the increased stocks for the national reserve.

2) Export of 300,000 tons of refined products included.

3) Regio and Borsdorf are processing the tar in their own Distillation and Refining Plants (compare with Mineral. Plant B 6); the other Brown Coal Distillation plants supply tar to plants of the Hydrocarbon Combs to be processed into Fuel.

COMMITTEE	DEPT. I	DEPT. II	CHIEF OF OFFICE

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

OTHER PLANTS

1996			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION TON	TOTAL PRODUCTION TON	IMPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD MARKET PRICE 1 OCT 1996. CIF QATAR BORDER.
3000	2000	1000	204.0

QUANTITY IN 1000 TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLION REI/REMARKS

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	TIME OF CONSTRUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SALES OF PETROLEUM AS PER WORLD MARKET PRICE ON 15 OCTOBER 1996			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939
										0.36	0.36	0.36	0							

STOCKS OF MOTOR FUELS AND LUBRICANTS AND READING OF MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS
VALUES IN MILLIONS OF RUBLES

SERIAL NO.	MATERIAL	STATE OF STOCKS ON JAN. 1, 1937	STOCKS IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1937							STOCKS IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1938							STOCKS IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1939							STOCKS IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1940														
			DOMESTIC		FROM ABROAD		IN- CREASE 1937	TOTAL AMOUNT RM	STATE OF STOCKS 1.4.1938	DOMESTIC		FROM ABROAD		IN- CREASE 1938	TOTAL AMOUNT RM	STATE OF STOCKS 1.4.39	DOMESTIC		FROM ABROAD		IN- CREASE 1939	TOTAL AMOUNT RM	STATE OF STOCKS 1.4.40	DOMESTIC		FROM ABROAD		IN- CREASE 1940	TOTAL AMOUNT RM	STATE OF STOCKS 1.4.1941								
			AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON				AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON				AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON				AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON				AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON	AMOUNT	PRICE IN RM PER TON
1	Motor Fuel for Aircraft	226,4	80	300	70	110	150	31,7	376,4																													
2	Diesel Fuels for Air- craft	—	—	—	100	70	100	7,0	100																													
3	Other Motor Gasoline	—	—	—	75	60	75	4,5	75																													
4	Diesel Fuels for Motor Vehicles	60,0	—	—	100	40	100	4,0	160																													
5	Benzol for Aircraft	—	35	440	—	—	35	15,5	35																													
6	Motor Benzol	—	15	350	—	—	15	5,25	15																													
7	Lubricating Oil for Aircraft Engines	25,5	10	465	—	—	10	8,65	35,5																													
8	Lubricating Oil for Mo- tor Vehicles and Station- ary Engines	34,0	10	450	—	—	10	2,5	44,0																													
9	Lead Tetraethyl	0,3	0,3	5000	—	—	0,3	1,5	0,6																													
10	Opsonol	0,3	1,5	4000	—	—	1,5	6,0	1,7																													
11	Fuel Oil	12,0	—	—	—	30	75	2,25	117,0																													
12	Freights	—	—	—	—	—	—	8,75	—																													
13	Tank Cars	575 units (Property of Ministry)	6176	1200	7500	—	—	1200	9,6	1176	2000	—	—	—	2000	15	6176	2000	—	—	—	2000	15	6176	2000	—	—	—	2000	15	6176							

Notes: 1) The necessary stocks beyond the financial year 1937/1938 cannot be calculated even approximately yet.

2) 3,6 Million of this carried over from the budget for 1937/7.

3) The necessary requirements for the first equip-
ment of the Navy are also available.

Notes: 1) The necessary stocks beyond the financial year 1937/1938 cannot be calculated even approximately yet.
2) 3,6 million of this carried over from the budget for 1936/37.
3) The necessary requirements for the first equipment of the Navy are also available.

Consultant	Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief Office

SECTOR: MINERAL OIL

CONSTRUCTIVE OF LEADY-SPACE	CONSTRUCTIVE OF SPACED-SPACE	CONSTRUCTIVE OF SPACED-SPACE
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[illegible]

0955

GERMAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY PLAN FOR BORING AND LIFTING 1936 TO 1939

	AREAS OF LIFTING	NUMBER OF BORINGS				LIFTING IN TONS 1936	PROSPECTIVE LIFTING		
		TOTAL 1936 1)	TOTAL 1937 2)	TOTAL 1938 3)	TOTAL 1939 3)		1937	1938	
1	Nienhagen (Hannover)	69	83	83	85	325 000	200000 7)	300000 7)	
2	Wietze (Hannover) ...	8	8	8	8	47 000	47000	47000	47000
3	Edessa (Hannover) ..	8	8 4)	8 4)	8 4)	8 000	17000	18000	21000
4	Oberg (Hannover)	14	15	15	15	23 000	22000	22000	21000
5	Smaller Areas in Hannover (Molms, Gifhorn and others).	77	80	80	80	20 000	23000	25000	25000
6	Heide (Holstein)	19	30	35	40	8 000	8000	14000	20000
7	Baden	21	33	5)	5)	4 800	6000	6000 5)	6000
8	Volkenrode (Thuringen) Ground level borings in the Kali shafts ...	7	7	3	3	700	700	300	200
Total		223	264	232	229	436 500	43700	437300	437300

- 1) According to data given by the specialist group on petroleum production an accurate statistics on boring will be made by the Prussian Geological Central Office after 31 December 1936.
- 2) Settled Program of the individual firms.
- 3) Calculation, taking into consideration the other work carried out, using to the full all industrial and material means.
- 4) Unsuccessful borings which were made in 1936, have been subtracted.
- 5) Only calculations are possible here, for the accuracy of which the industry thinks it can vouch with comparative safety, provided that no surprises crop up.
- 6) No estimate possible; area is partly opened up; further production dependent on result of opening up.
- 7) At the present time, the corporation at Siwerath is trying out a project which provides for working oil fields near Nienhagen, which no longer give any remunerative results by constructing a shaft.

Consultant	Main sub. Div. Group	Dept.	Dept. I	Chief of Office

0956

MINERAL OIL PLAN

ADJUSTED TO 1938 REQUIREMENTS

SERIAL NO.	PROC. NO.	FIRM	LOCATION	RAW MATERIAL		TOTAL		LIGHT MOTOR FUELS		DIESEL OIL	FUEL OIL	LUBRICANTS																	
				TYPE	AMOUNT			AUTO	AIRCRAFT			Spindle oil	Machine oil	Motor oil	Grease														
		REQUIREMENTS: *)				4990	5695	2675	1630	80	600	1200	1500	550	1400	122	122	177	177	100	100	46	46	10	10	10	10	10	10
1		German petroleum processing		Ger. Petr.	425	425	399	289	100	75		60	60				37	50	37	40	35	23	10	10	10	10	10	10	
2		Motor fuel Gasoline.....		Ger. Petr.	400		400	350	100	260	90																		
3		Motor fuel Alcohol.....					200	165	200	105	90																		
4		Methanol.....	Leunawerke				100	100	100	100																			
5		Lignite tar distillation.....					255	255	25	25		100	100																
6		Coal tar distillation.....					105	175						105	175														
7		DOMESTIC REFINEMENT OF FOREIGN PRODUCTS:																											
8		Asphalt factories.....					20		20																				
9		Bitumen cracking plants.....		For. Petr.	300		204	146	30	25		24	30				65	45	60	30	35	23	10	10	10	10	10	10	
10		Lubricating oil.....		Ger. Petr.	100																								
11		FISHER PLANTS:																											
12		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			15		35			10																	
13		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			150		120			22																	
14		Reichsmann A.G.	Repsen	Re			30		20																				
15		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
16		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			75		64			11																	
17		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			40		34			6																	
18		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			30		42.5			7.5																	
19		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			35		30			5																	
20		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
21		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
22		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
23		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
24		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
25		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
26		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
27		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
28		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
29		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
30		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
31		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
32		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
33		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
34		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
35		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
36		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
37		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
38		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
39		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
40		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
41		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
42		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
43		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
44		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
45		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
46		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
47		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
48		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
49		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
50		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
51		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
52		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
53		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
54		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
55		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
56		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
57		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
58		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
59		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
60		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
61		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
62		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	
63		Reichsmann.....	Repsen	Re			25		22			3																	

Supplementary Notes to the Mineral Oil Plan.

The estimated requirement figures for 1938 in the event of the emergency (N-Fall) and in the event of mobilization (Mob-Fall) are laid down. The progress of requirements after 1938 will be taken into account later when the plan is further developed.

The gasoline, diesel oil, fuel oil and motor oil requirements in the event of mobilization are being examined at present.

1. 40,000 tons of foreign crude oil necessary for the Deurag cracking plant.
2. Deficit in relation to requirements in the event of the emergency, brought about by transfer of 40 000 tons foreign crude oil to Deurag cracking plant.
3. After expansion of the coking plants; production of benzol, after deduction of industrial requirements, estimated at 500 000 tons per year; thus a reserve of 100 000 tons - also to be used for chemical purposes - will be available, which does not figure in the plan.
4. Preliminary estimate of decrease in relation to requirements in the event of the emergency.
5. Provision has been made for addition of 30% benzol and 20% ethyl alcohol to estimated 300 000 tons aeroplane fuel.
6. If current German petroleum production increases to more than 425000 tons per year, the quantity to be imported accordingly falls below 500 000 tons.
7. Increase in German petroleum production by approximately 500 000 tons per year possible for two years in the event of mobilization. 200 000 tons of this are scheduled for use in current production to replace partly the foreign crude oil, in refinement. (300 000 tons as emergency reserve for extraordinary losses.)
8. It can possibly be arranged to increase the current use of German crude oil in the refineries in the event of mobilization by 100 000 tons (see No.7) to 300 000 tons or even more. By so doing the investment of money in stand-by plants for the production of approx. 40 000 tons of synthetic motor oil per year, which would otherwise become necessary (see Note 23), can be avoided.

Moreover, approx. 12 000 tons of gasoline and 12 000 tons of diesel oil which do not figure in the plan and which could, if necessary, form a reserve, would be gained annually.

9. See also No. 49 a.

10. Production of diesel oil in Fischer plants scheduled for the time being at 15% of total production, in accordance with the technical facilities at present available. Increase in the diesel oil production, in proportion to the technical development desired.
11. A process for the production in Fischer plants of paraffin-wax with a content of approximately 50% in the primary product, at present being developed from a technical point of view, and can therefore be ^{only} provisionally included in the plan. Final decision probably in the middle of 1937.
12. The plant is for the time being included in the plan to cover the diesel oil requirements. Given the appropriate technical development, there is a possibility of producing diesel oil on a base of pit coal. (See also No.36 and Note 19.)
13. The plant is being run for the time being for the production of gasoline only. The change-over to the production of gasoline, diesel oil, lubricating oil and paraffin and the simultaneous increase of production will probably take place in the middle of 1939.
14. The plant is being run, as before, for the production of gasoline only and produces approx. 160 000 tons of gasoline. It is scheduled to receive from the Loitz Works as soon as they go into production, the gasoline produced there by the low temperature hydrogenation (Tieftemperatur-Hydriervorfahren, T.T.H) and to manufacture from it the finished gasoline. The total gasoline production of the Böhlen Works will thereby be increased to approx. 205 000 tons of gasoline per year.
15. It is planned to send all of the T.T.H. gasoline, up to the amount of about 5,000 tons per year, to Böhlen for final processing (cf. No. 27).
16. The planning of the plant is not yet final. The 80,000 tons of tar from Wolfersheim and Borten, which it is planned to process here, can possibly be processed more economically in connection with the work in another larger plant.
17. Knock coefficient of octane number (O.Z.) 72, with 0.09% lead tetraethyl adjustable to O.Z. 87; therefore for these 300.000 tons per year of coal and aircraft motor fuel no admixture of ethyl alcohol and benzol required.
18. Later on the processing can possibly be increased to 200,000 tons, the increased production of 40.000 tons per year being allotted to fuel oil or Diesel oil, respectively.
19. Provision has been made for operating the " stand-by " plants for the processing of coal/heavy oil ahead of the coal hydration plants Scholven and Horst, for the production of Diesel oil and fuel oil. The plants can possibly be utilized for the production of Diesel oil (cf. Note 12).

20. The coal distillation plants have been included in the plan under the assumption that the tests now being made will prove that it is economical to produce distilled tar at reasonable prices for tar, and that it can be used as fuel oil. In case this is not true, there is the possibility, beginning with Oct. 1, 1940, of installing high pressure methods (cf. 35) in place of the distilleries.
21. The delivery of propellant gas has not been sub-apportioned to the individual plants, since there may be shifts in the locations of the propellant gas production, because of the expected chemical processing of propane and butane, whose locations cannot yet be definitely established. The 100,000 tons of propellant gas for which provisions have been made are covered several times over by the required yield of propane and butane in the plants of the mineral oil plan.
22. The propane/butane which in normal times is used as propellant gas would, in case of mobilization, be required for chemical processing.
23. In the case of a continuous processing of 300,000 tons of German petroleum in the refineries (cf. No. 9 and Note 8) the mobilization requirements of motor oil would be practically covered, if they amount to 120,000 tons per year. In the case of greater mobilization requirements corresponding " stand-by " plants for the production of synthetic motor oil on the paraffine or Fischer basis would have to be erected. Decision possible after clarification of the mobilization requirements.
24. The delivery of fuel oil from coal tar distillation can, corresponding to the level of 1936, possibly up to 175,000 tons also be furnished in a normal period of time (cf. No. 6)

PHOTOGRAPH BY JIMMYE BROWN

TOTAL OFFICERS
1937

See Legend at foot of chart



Deposits
4 Jahre
planen

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1. Name	
2. Address	
3. City	
4. State	
5. Zip	
6. Telephone	
7. E-mail	
8. Fax	
9. Other	

SECTOR CHEMISTRY

SULPHURIC ACID
a) SULPHURIC ACID (CHAMLER PROCESS)

1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

QUANTITIES IN TONS OF TONS 20 3 1936
AMOUNTS IN MILLION MARKS

SERIAL NO	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES	BUILDING PERIOD					PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SERVED FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE 1)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Laus-Werke	50.00						23.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00								
2	Hanburg	19.00						16.10	19.00	19.00	19.00	19.00								
3	Pommersdorf	25.00						22.60	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00								
4	Oranienburg (not working)	7.2							5.60	7.20	7.20	7.20								
5	Hannover-Buch	37.00						32.25	37.00	37.00	37.00	37.00								
6	Hievenheim	8.00						0	8.00	8.0	8.0	8.0								
7	Bergedorf	15.40 a. 12.70 b. 31.10						16.20	15.00	31.16	31.16	31.16								
8	Gelsenkirchen-Schalke	17.00 a. 4.00 = 21.00						12.50	16.00	16.00	21.00	21.00								
9	Duisburg-Mannheim	30.00						28.70	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00								
10	Hanfeld	4.30						2.40	4.30	4.30	4.30	4.30								
11	Berlin-Tegel	3.10						3.10	3.10	3.10	3.10	3.10								
12	Schönebeck (not working)	7.3							5.60	7.30	7.30	7.30								
13	Halle-Trotha (not working)																			
14	Recklinghausen (extension possible)	12.80						8.30	12.80	12.80	12.80	12.80								
15	Werkum (extension planned)	5.60						4.90	5.60	5.60	5.60	5.60								
16	Wessling	13.00						10.50	13.00	13.00	13.00	13.00								
17	Köln-Kalk	20.00						16.70	20.00	20.00	20.00	20.00								
18	Oberhausen, Hambach	20.50						17.50	20.50	20.50	20.50	20.50								
19	Mannheim-Rheinu (Conversion to Contact Process) ..	8.10						8.00	8.10	8.10	8.10	8.10								
20	Amöneburg (plan still under consideration)	30.10						22.80	30.10	30.10	30.10	30.10								
21	Bochum	20.00						39.60	62.00	70.00	70.00	70.00								
22	Duisburg (under repair)	28.60						89.00	89.60	98.60	98.60	98.60								
23	Oschersleben (partly closed down)	16.20						6.80	7.40	16.20	16.20	16.20								
24	Dessau	8.40						7.40	8.40	8.40	8.40	8.40								
Carry Forward 526.36								388.30	488.10	521.36	526.36	526.36								

FOR 1 - 71
TOTAL 7.5

1) Cannot yet be assessed as the method of covering the deficiency still existing has not yet been determined.

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV. GROUP	DEPT III	DEPT I	CHIEF OF OFFICE

SECTOR: CHEMISTR

SULPHURIC ACID

a) SULPHURIC ACID, CHAMBER PROCESS (contd)

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND OF TONS PER ANNUM
AMOUNTS IN MILLION PEICHENMARK

SERIAL NO	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES	BUILDING PERIOD					PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE ¹⁾			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
	BROUGHT FORWARD	526.36						358.30	488.10	521.36	526.36	526.36								
25	Krefeld.....	8.40						5.30	8.40	8.40	8.40	8.40								
26	Ludwigshafen.....	27.20						27.20	27.20	27.20	27.20	27.20								
27	Gravenbrueck	21.50						8.30	9.50	21.50	21.50	21.50								
28	Hoensingen	7.50						8.40	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50								
29	Oberhausen	50.00						37.00	50.00	50.00	50.00	50.00								
30	Greiffenberg.....	9.50						7.50	9.50	9.50	9.50	9.50								
31	Gleiwitz	16.30						16.30	16.30	16.30	16.30	16.30								
32	Haspe	7.00						6.80	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00								
33	Salzwedel	25.90						11.20	25.90	25.90	25.90	25.90								
34	Nordenham.....	17.80						17.80	17.80	17.80	17.80	17.80								
35	Hettstedt	32.00						32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00								
36	Duisburg (NW)	14.00						13.60	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00								
37	Harburg	8.90						7.30	8.90	8.90	8.90	8.90								
38	Hamburg	18.00						18.00	18.00	18.00	18.00	18.00								
39	Claus hal	1.50						1.10	1.30	1.50	1.50	1.50								
40	Seelze	2.40						2.26	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40								
41	Searsau	13.10						12.60	13.10	13.10	13.10	13.10								
42	Mueraberg	5.00						4.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00								
43	Halsbruecke	4.40						2.30	3.50	4.40	4.40	4.40								
44	Mulden Huette	2.70						2.60	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70								
45	Loehne.....	9.90						9.70	9.90	9.90	9.90	9.90								
46	Stettin (partly closed down)	28.00						19.00	22.00	28.00	28.00	28.00								
47	Oker	32.00						18.00	26.00	32.00	32.00	32.00								
48	Waldenburg (not working, but starting again).....	30.00						0	25.00	30.00	30.00	30.00								
49	Fachrbruecke	4.80						3.30	4.80	4.80	4.80	4.80								
50	Heinrichshall	25.00						11.50	12.80	25.00	25.00	25.00								
	TOTAL	949.16						691.56	868.60	949.16	949.16	949.16								

FOR 1 - 71:

TOTAL 7.5

1) See note page 20 a

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV GROUP	DEPT III	DEPT I	CHIEF OF OFFICE

SECTOR: CHEMISTRY

SULPHURIC ACID

b. Contact Sulphuric Acid

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND SO₃ PER ANNUM

VALUE IN MILLION REICHSMARK

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS A MONTH 36 MONTHS (PRICE 25.00)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
51	Bischofshammer	2,30						2,30	2,30	2,30	2,30	2,30								
52	Kievenheim	13,00								13,00	13,00	13,00								
53	Hamborn	7,30						7,30	7,30	7,30	7,30	7,30								
54	Weissig	36,00						36,00	36,00	36,00	36,00	36,00								
55	Krummel	10,00						10,00	10,00	10,00	10,00	10,00								
56	Schleibusch	17,50						17,50	17,50	17,50	17,50	17,50								
57	Magdeburg SO ₃	30,00						30,00	30,00	30,00	30,00	30,00								
58	Magdeburg O ₂	58,00						58,00	58,00	58,00	58,00	58,00								
59	Doberitz	36,00						36,00	36,00	36,00	36,00	36,00								
60	Wolfen	84,00						27,00	27,00	55,80	84,00	84,00								
61	Ludwigshafen	196,00						182,00	182,00	182,00	196,00	196,00								
62	Hoechst	74,00						49,00	70,00	74,00	74,00	74,00								
63	Leverkusen	225,00						175,00	175,00	200,00	225,00	225,00								
64	Dormagen	32,50						32,50	32,50	32,50	32,50	32,50								
65	Uerdingen	16,80						16,80	16,80	16,80	16,80	16,80								
66	Kame	14,10						14,10	14,10	14,10	14,10	14,10								
67	Wohlgelegen	17,00						17,00	17,00	17,00	17,00	17,00								
68	Hamburg	60,00						45,00	45,00	60,00	60,00	60,00								
69	Stettin	18,80								18,80	18,80	18,80								
70	Oker	126,50							60,50	126,50	126,50	126,50								
71	Coswig	20,00						20,00	20,00	20,00	20,00	20,00								
TOTAL b		1094,80						775,50	857,00	1027,60	1094,80	1094,80								
TOTAL a		949,16						691,56	868,60	949,16	949,16	949,16								
SO ₃ TOTAL		2043,96						1467,06	1725,6	1976,6	2043,96	2043,96								

See above

SULPHURIC ACID FOR S-SALT FACTORY. SEE SHEET 201

Sulphuric Acid production and requirement in 1000 tons SO₃

	1937	1938	1939
Total Consumption (produced)...	1971	2205	2310 tons per annum
Production	1730	1976	2043 tons per annum
Hence necessary increased production.....	241	229	267 tons per annum

for covering still existing deficiency, the following can be considered.

Construction of Gypsum Sulphuric Plants. 2. Serving at existing Plants (Ammonium Sulphate)

3. Utilization of the sulphur resultant from Gas purification.

CONSTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV GROUP	DEPT III	DEPT I	CHIEF OF OFFICE

SECTOR: CHEMISTRY

NITRIC ACID
(HIGHLY CONCENTRATED ACID)

TOTAL CONSUMPTION 10M	TOTAL PRODUCTION 10M	EXPORT	VALUE OF INVENTORY WORLD MARKET PRICE 1 OCTOBER 1936 CIF GERMANY FRONTIER
20,5	20,5	0	0

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AS A RESULT OF (WORLD MARKET PRICE 15.2.37 CIF GERMANY FRONTIER)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	WOLFEN	10,30						8,50	10,30	10,30	10,30	10,30								
2	HOBCHST	17,00						10,00	17,00	17,00	17,00	17,00								
3	PIESTERITZ B	7,00									7,00	7,00		Wehrmacht						
4	DOEBERITZ (EXTENSION)	15,00							7,00	7,00	7,00	15,00		Wehrmacht						
5	SONDERSHAUSEN B	7,00								7,00	7,00	7,00		Wehrmacht						
6	LANGELSHEIM B	15,00										15,00		Wehrmacht						
7	GERSTENHOFEN B	8,50									3,00	8,50	3,2	8,0 Mill R.M.						
8	MELBECK-EMSEN UND BOCHUM B	14,00										14,00		Wehrmacht						
9	LEUNA	2,00						2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00								
TOTAL		95,80						20,50	36,30	43,30	53,30	95,80								

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV. GROUP	DEPT. III	DEPT. I	OFFICE CHIEF

SECTOR: CHEMISTR

CARBON DISULPHIDE

1996			
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	TOTAL PRODUCTION	IMPORT	VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD MARKET PRICE 1 OCT 1996 CIF GERMAN BORDER
39.3	39.3		

20 •

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND TONS PER ANNUM

VALUE IN MILLION REICHSMARKS.

Serial No.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AS AGAINST '36. (WORLD MARKET PRICE 15.2.37 CIF GERMAN BORDER.					
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940		
1	Kreuznach.....	20,5						10,0	14,0	20,5	20,5	20,5										
2	Amendhof.....	10,0						6,0	8,0	10,0	10,0	10,0										
3	Billwacker	7,5						5,0	5,0	7,50	7,5	7,5	10									
4	Premnitz	22,3						18,3	18,0	22,30	22,3	22,3										
5	Geleiskirchen	6,0								6,0	6,0	6,0										
																			INCLUDED			
																			IN FINISHED PRODUCTS			

Serial No.	Plant	Height/ Feet/Option	Inches		Feet		Feet	
			1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Amur...	00						
2	Bitterfeld I.G.	35.40						
3	Bitterfeld I.G.	17.20						
4	Bitterfeld II St.	16.20						
5	Haydn	1.10						
6	Odermann	1.10						
7	Osterlamburg I	4.80						
8	Osterlamburg II	3.60						
9	Osterlamburg III	15.40						
10	Pirna	3.20						
11	Schkoppe	10.00						
12	Wassig	7.20						
13	Westerwald	12.00						
14	Wolfs	10.80						
15	Bargen	14.20						
16	Gerthaus	11.40						
17	Roedel I	15.40						
18	Roedel II	5.20						
19	Kohlhaas	2.20						
20	Ludwigshafen	21.00						
21	Waldsiedel	21.20						
22	Knapack	8.80						
23	Lavachau I	20.20						
24	Lavachau II	8.40						
25	Luedsdorf	8.70						
TOTAL.....		100.90						

1. Further plants see sheet 20.

Co. ...

SECTOR: CHEMISTRY

CAUSTIC SODA

TOTAL CONSUMP- TION	TOTAL PRODUC- TION	IMPORT	1936	
			WORLD MARKET PRICES 10 OCT 1936 CIG	IMPORTS WORLD MARKET PRICES 10 OCT 1936 CIG
266,48	266,48	0	0	0

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLION REICHSMARKS

206

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING IN IMPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD MARKET PRICES 10 OCT 1936 CIG)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Amendorf	7,30						5,57	7,50	7,50	7,50	7,50								
2	Bernburg K	120,00						37,20	70,00	75,00	120,00	120,00								
3	Bitterfeld I.G. I	43,30						31,00	39,70	63,30	63,30	63,30								
4	Bitterfeld I.G. II	20,00																		
5	Bitterfeld Neu-Stassfurt	15,80						9,50	14,60	15,80	15,80	15,80								
6	Haynau	1,25						0,80	1,25	1,25	1,25	1,25								
7	Odermünde	1,70						1,50	1,70	1,70	1,70	1,70								
8	Osternienburg I	5,40																		
9	Osternienburg II	4,20						5,15	6,80	11,30	13,00	13,00								
10	Osternienburg III	3,40																		
11	Pirna	3,40						3,35	3,50	3,50	3,50	3,50								
12	Schkopau	11,40																		
13	Stassfurt	15,00						5,87	15,00	15,00	15,00	15,00								
14	Weissig	5,16						2,76	3,76	5,16	5,16	5,16								
15	Westeregeln	9,00						7,79	9,00	9,00	9,00	9,00								
16	Wolfen	12,20						12,20	12,20	12,20	12,20	12,20								
17	Burghausen	16,40						9,40	16,00	16,40	16,40	16,40								
18	Gersthofen	16,40						13,80	16,00	16,40	16,40	16,40								
19	Hoechst I	17,40						9,28	13,60	23,40	23,60	23,60								
20	Hoechst II	6,00																		
21	Kahlbein	2,70						2,25	2,60	2,70	2,70	2,70								
22	Ludwigshafen	23,20						18,00	21,20	23,20	23,20	23,20								
23	Ludwigshafen K	6,00						2,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00								
24	Rheinfelden	25,20						23,16	25,20	25,20	25,20	25,20								
25	Rüsselsheim	10,50						10,00	10,50	10,50	10,50	10,50								
26	Kalk I	30,00						10,20	16,10	18,00	30,00	30,00								
27	Leverkusen I	22,30						16,60	21,10	31,40	31,40	31,40								
28	Leverkusen II	9,10						4,20	14,00	14,00	14,00	14,00								
29	Leverkusen K	14,00						7,50	7,60	7,60	7,60	7,60								
30	Malsdorf	7,60						2,40	2,40	2,40	2,40	2,40								
31	Oestrich	2,40																		
32	Rheinberg	37,00						15,00	19,00	21,00	37,00	37,00								
33	Stolberg	21,00																		
		560,51						266,48	376,48	416,48	416,48	416,48								

Electrolysis: Total about
25 millions RM plus 12 million
RM for Power Plants
Included in finished products

Caustification: 17,0 Million RM
including Power Plants

SECTOR: CHEMISTRY
SODA

TOTAL	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
770,80	1084,00	1210,00	1327,00	1400,00	

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLION MARKS

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BILDERBERG REGION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVED IN REPORTS AS AGAINST 1936 (MARKS MILLION) PERIOD 12.2.37			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Bamberg	112,00						290,00	400,00	437,00	478,00	542,00								
2	Buchanan	28,00						25,00	28,00	28,00	28,00	28,00								
3	Stahlfurt	54,00						43,80	54,00	54,00	54,00	54,00								
4	Heilbronn	130,00						110,00	115,00	130,00	130,00	130,00								
5	Oppau	370,00						26,00	37,00	37,00	37,00	37,00								
6	Wynlen	70,00						23,00	70,00	70,00	70,00	70,00								
7	Duisburg	84,00						84,00	84,00	84,00	84,00	84,00								
8	Köln-Kalk	120,00						88,00	96,00	120,00	120,00	120,00								
9	Rheinberg	330,00						84,00	200,00	250,00	330,00	330,00								
Total								770,80	1084,00	1210,00	1327,00	1400,00								

Total 30,0
Including Power Plants

Included in final
Products
Finished Products

Consultant	Main Sub-Div. Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Chief of Office

SECTOR: CHEMSTR

A - COAL
(GASMAK COAL)

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS							
			1935	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
1	Leverkusen	0,18						0,36	0,48	0,48	0,48	0,48	0,36							
	Premnitz	0,80						0,60	0,80	0,80	0,80	0,80	0,10							
3	Brilon	0,24						0,12	0,24	0,24	0,24	0,24								
Total		1,52						1,08	1,52	1,52	1,52	1,52	0,40							

Investment	Main Sub. Div. Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Office Cash

PRELIMINARY PRODUCTS AND PLANTS
(STATUS OF PLANTS)

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	TOTAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION					TOTAL PRODUCTION				
			1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
A	CONTACT FOR H. NITROGEN																					
1	Doberitz	27.0																				
2	Merseburg	27.0																				
3	Grasdorf	27.0																				
4	Medelsburg	27.0																				
B	NITRIC ACID (H) FOR NITRIC ACID FACTORIES SEE SHEET 15-2-57																					
C	PARA-FORMALDEHYDE FOR E. HEMMEL																					
1	Gerstehofen	15.5																				
D	PERACETIC ACID/PERACETIC ACID CONCENTRATED FOR SP 10-1																					
1	Witten	5.6/ 3.7																				
2	Bodenfelde	5.6/ 3.7																				
3	Dessau	5.6/ 3.7																				
E	CONTACT FOR AMMONIUM NITRATE																					
1																						
2																						
3	A plant is operating with hydrolysis of bituminous coal	24.0																				
A																						

- 1) Building permits in accordance with the completion of the Fehrmann's Powder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents Plants in agreement with the Ordnance Office.

CONSULTANT	DATE 1958-1975	DEPT. III	ENGINE I	OFFICE ENGINE

SECTOR CHEMISTRY

PRELIMINARY PRODUCTS FOR POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
(STAND-BY PLANTS)

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER YEAR
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NR.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD ¹⁾					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVINGS OF INVESTMENTS AS AGAINST 1936 (WORLD WAR II, PHASES 15, 2, 3) CITY OF BERLIN (GROSS)			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
F 1	Pentaerythrit for Nitropenta Wildau	2,2												3,5	3,5					
G	Crope for Nitride Cellulose 7 Plant in connection with cellulose plants	60,0													5,0	10,0				
H 1 2 3 4	Nitric acid for Nitriding Döberitz	24,0 2)																		
	Morschen	24,0 2)																		
	Frankenburg	24,0 2)																		
	Meklenburg	24,0 2)																		
J 1 2 3 4	Chloride of Lime for decontamination Westerageln	40,0												8,0	6,0					
	Schölvén	40,0												8,0	6,0					
	Gersthofen	40,0													8,0	6,0				
	Fuerstenberg	40,0													8,0	6,0				
K 1 2	Cracking Plants for Ethylene for thiodiglycol Stettin	18,5												10,0	9,0	8,0				
	Miesburg	18,5												10,0	9,0	8,0				
														39,5	54,5	38,0				

1) Building period in accordance with the completion of the
Wehrmacht's Powder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents
Plants in agreement with the Ordnance Office.

2) In SO 3

Consultant	Main Sub-Ord. UROSD	Dept. III	Dept. I	Office Chief

SECTOR CHEMISTRY

PRIMARY PRODUCTS FOR POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS.

(STAND - BY - PLANTS)

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND OF TONS PER YEAR

VALUE IN MILLIONS OF REICHSMARKS

SERIAL NO.	PLANT	FINAL PRODUCTION	BUILDING PERIOD					TOTAL PRODUCTION					INVESTMENTS				SAVING OF IMPORTS			
			1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940	1937	1938	1939	1940
L 1	Chloride for black powder	26,0												10,0	10,0					
	Chloride for C.A. materials	24,0												8,0	8,0					
M	Primary ammonia and methanol for nitric acid and formaldehyde																			
1	Gersthofen	57,0													20,0	40,0				
														18,0	38,0	40,0				

1) Building period in conformance with completion of the Wehrmacht's powder, explosives and chemical warfare plants in co-operation with the Ordnance Office.

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIV GROUP	DEPT. III	DEPT. I	OFFICE CHIEF

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER ANNUM
VALUE IN MILLIONS OF RM

PRELIMINARY PRODUCTS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
AND EXPLOSIVES
(STAND-BY PLANTS ON A BASIS OF ACETYLENES, ETHYLENES,
CARBIDE FURNACES, ELECTRIC-ARC, CRACKING PLANTS)

1) Building period in conformity with completion of the National powder, explosives and chemical safety plan, in co-operation with the Ordnance Corps

Case	1975-1976	1977-1978	1979-1980	1981-1982	1983-1984
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27					

SECTOR: CHEMISTRY

ACETYLENE AND ETHYLENE CHEMISTRY
ON CARBIDE PLANTS

QUANTITIES OF CHEMICALS AND EXPLOSIVES

SERIAL No.	PLANT	CARBIDE	NUMBER OF FURNACES	SCHEDULE FOR CARBIDE FURNACES					EXPLOSIVES	ALCOHOL PRODUCTION	PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES				INTERMEDIATES OF THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES		AMOUNTS OF ALCOHOL REQUIRED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES			AMOUNT OF CHEMICALS AND EXPLOSIVES PRODUCED (in tons)
				1935	1937	1938	1939	1940			DIGLYCOL	THIO- DIGLYCOL	D. OR N. MUSTARD GAS	ACETIC ACID	C ₂ H ₄	ETHYLENE GLYCOL	DIGLYCOL	THIO- DIGLYCOL	ACETIC ACID	
1	SCH. Kopan a) Buna b) Alcohol c) Diglycol	144 51	4						24	24	6	—	—	—	(5)	(6)	10	—	—	—
2	Mueckenberg Alcohol	44	1						—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,6 ¹⁾	6,0 ²⁾	—	7,4
3	Trutberg a) alcohol b) diglycol c) methylal d) acetic acid	73	2						—	36,5	6	—	—	—	(5)	(6)	10	—	—	—
									—	—	66	9,6	—	18	(6,1)	(7,2)	—	11,5	15	—
4	Fuerstberg a) Buna b) D. or N. mustard gas	144 50	4						24	24	—	—	20	—	(9,2)	(11,2)	—	18,0	—	—
5	Buna IV	144	3						24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	Grasnick	270	2 (new)						—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total									72	104,5	12	9,6	20	18	(33)	(39,8)	26,6	35,5	15	27,4

Pertaining to 3:
Under normal conditions production of alcohol (15,000 tons per year) is scheduled
instead of acetic acid. (see carbide spirit)

Pertaining to 4 and 5: It is not yet settled whether production will be via carbide.

Pertaining to 2: 1) alcohol for the wolfen stand-by plant.
2) Alcohol for the Mueckenberg stand-by plant.

No conclusion has been reached as to whether development will be of mustard gas D or N.

(b) - stand-by plant.

Consultant	Main sub-div. Group	Dept. III	Dept. I	Office Chief

SECTOR: CHEMISTRY

ACETYLENE AND ETHYLENE CHEMISTRY
ON ELECTRIC ARC AND CRACKING BASIS.

20 p

QUANTITIES IN THOUSAND OF TONS PER ANNUM

SERIAL NO	PLANT	CARBIDE	NUMBER OF FURNACES	SCHEDULE FOR CARBIDE FURNACES					PRODUCTION OF BUNGE	PRODUCTION OF ALCOHOL	PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES				INTERMEDIATES FROM CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTION		QUANTITIES OF SPIRITS NEEDED FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTS			AVAILABLE QUANTITIES OF SYNTHETIC SPIRITS FOR FUEL ETC. IN THE CASE OF WAR
				1936	1937	1938	1939	1940			DIGLYCOL	THIODIGLYCOL	MUSTARD GAS D. OR M.	ACETIC ACID	C 11.	ACETYLENE OXYDE	DIGLYCOL	THIODIGLYCOL	ACETIC ACID	
1	ELECTRIC ARC BASIS. (PRODUCTION OF ETHYLENE FROM HYDROGENATION WASTE GASES.)	1st phase of development																		
		2nd phase of development																		
	a) Buna.....								24	24										
	b) Alcohol.....																			
	c) Diglycol (B).....										6				(5)	(6)				
	d) Thiodiglycol (B).....											9,6			(6,1)	(7,3)				24,0
	BASES OF CRACKED HYDROGENATION WASTE GASES.																			
	a) Diglycol (B)										6				(5)	(6)				
	b) D or M mustard gas (B)												20		(9,2)	(11,2)				
3	STETTIN.																			
	D or M mustard gas (B)												20		(9,2)	(11,2)				
4	CRACKING.																			
	Thiodiglycol (M - com)															5				
	TOTAL			24	24	12	9,6		24	24	12	9,6	40		(34,5)	46,7				24,0

To 1. The hydrocarbons for the 1st phase of development (about 40-45 000 tons per year C₄H₆) are supplied by the Scholven hydrogenation plant.

n (B.) Stand-by-Plant.

*) No conclusion has been reached as to whether development will be of mustard gas D. or M.

CONSULTANT	MAIN SUB-DIVISION	DEPT. III	DEPT. I	OFFICE CHIEF
P				

FINANCIAL SURVEY

OF THE OFFICE FOR GERMAN RAW MATERIALS AND PLASTICS FOR THE PERIOD FROM
23 OCT 1936 to 20 MAY 1937,
INCLUSIVE

27

INCLUSIVE

WORK SECTOR	FINANCING BY AG- ENCIES IN CHARGE		CAPITAL MARKET				LOANS OBTAINED, WITH THE AID OF THIS OFFICE		REICH AND BUDGET FUNDS								TOTAL
	a) FROM OWN MEANS b) THROUGH CREDIT		STOCKS AND SHARES ISSUED a) UPON FOUN- DATION b) UPON IN- CREASE OF CAPITAL		LOANS, DEBENTURES				REICH LOAN		LOST SUBSIDIES		REICH GUARANTY OF PAYMENTS		GUARANTY OF LOSSES		
	ALREADY MADE	PROSPEC- TIVE	FIXED OR AUTHORIZED	PROSPEC- TIVE	FIXED OR AUTHORIZED	PROSPEC- TIVE	GRANTED	PROSPEC- TIVE	PRO- MISED	PRO- SPECTIVE	PRO- MISED	PRO- SPECTIVE	PRO- MISED	PRO- SPECTIVE	PRO- MISED	PRO- SPECTIVE	
	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	MTLL RM	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Shipping	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,5
Power	—	—	—	—	50,0	—	1,6	—	0,50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	51,650
Mineral Oil	a) — b) —	a) 97,61 b) 97,8	a) 39,5 b) 72,1	a) 36,1 b) 7,25	149,3	62,0	3,6	8,0	—	—	0,429	—	—	—	—	—	573,689
Research and Experi- ments	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,176	—	—	—	—	—	0,176
Iron, Non-Ferrous metals	—	a) 2,5 b) 8,0	a) — b) 0,3	—	—	—	—	—	—	23,5	4,973	—	—	—	—	—	39,273
Textiles	—	—	a) — b) 28,55	a) 6,19 b) —	—	15,0	20,35	—	—	—	0,859	—	—	—	—	—	70,949
Wood	a) 0,9 b) —	a) 1,7 b) 7,8	—	a) 9,0 b) 0,875	—	—	15,215	3,8	—	—	—	1,460	—	—	—	—	10,750
Chemie	a) 2,2 b) 45,050	—	a) 30,0 b) 0,075	—	—	—	5,0	—	95,0	—	—	—	—	0,450	—	—	177,775
Explosives	a) 3,4 b) —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,4
	a) 6,5 b) 45,050	a) 101,81 b) 113,6	a) 69,5 b) 101,025	a) 51,29 b) 8,125	199,3	77,0	45,765	13,3	150,50	23,5	6,437	1,460	—	0,450	—	—	959,162

Remarks: This survey includes 377 individual enterprises with a total amount of 959,162 Millions. In addition, 12 individual enterprises with a total amount of 410,12 Millions. are pending. They are not included in this survey because it has not yet been decided as to how to finance them.

Total: 389 Enterprises 1 369,282 Millions.

NOTE:

This figure is not readable

Department	With Sub- Group	Dept. 1	Dept. 2	Other Data

Book 24

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CASE NO. 1
Prosecution Document Book No. 24

English



INDEX TO DOCUMENT BOOK XXIV

I.G. FARBEW CASE - COUNT I/C.

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book Trans- cript
I-3097		Minutes of 43rd meeting of commercial committee of Farben, 23 September 1941, containing reference to various committees of the Reich Group Industry.	
I-3527		Personal letter of defendant Kuehne to defendant Schmitz suggesting to propose Mr. Bachmann be appointed leader of Economic Group Chemistry since Bachmann "though an I.G. man he is not so well known as an I.G. man", 1 September 1937.	12
I-3538		Secret circulation of Ministry of Economic's appointing mobilization commissioners in all economic groups, 18 March 1938.	1
I-5033		Affidavit of Dr. Ehrmann, deputy general manager of Chemical Industry on Jurisdiction of Economic Group in matters of labor allocation, 14 March 1947.	13
I-4054		Affidavit of Dr. Ehrmann, deputy general manager of Economic Group Chemical Industry, 13 March 1947, on discussions in Economic Group Chemistry preceding the war against Poland.	16
I-1332		Minutes of 59th meeting of Commercial Committee of Farben, 1 March 1944, on production committee of Economic Group Chemical Industry.	18
I-3005		Circular memorandum of Economic Group Chemical Industry, December 1943, showing structure and organization of Economic Group Chemical Industry and personnel in charge of its sub-groups and committees.	24
I-4900		List of sub-groups of Economic Group Chemical Industry, dated 10 March 1944, and supplements.	56
I-5704		Circular of Economic Group Chemical Industry announcing changes of sub-groups, 3 November 1944.	95

Document No.	Exhibit No.	Description of Document	Page in: Document Book Trans- cript
NI-4929		Affidavit of Dr. Ehrmann authenticating Document NI-4899, 20 March 1947	100
NI-6157		Minutes of meeting of technical management of Main Valley at Hoechst, 21 August 1944, Dr. Struss announces that defendant Warster will take ter Meer's place in the Praesidium of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.	102
NI-5181		Affidavit of ter Meer on defendant Buergin, 1 May 1947.	104
NI-3765		Secret book containing all offices and committees of Speer's Armament Ministry, 1 May 1944, with official supplements.	107
NI-6785		Table of Organization of Economic Group Chemical Industry, its production Committee and sub-groups, from Farben files, undated.	110

Minutes

of the 43rd meeting of the Commercial Committee on Tuesday,
23 September 1941, at 9.30 a.m., in Frankfurt am Main,

Grueneburgplatz.

Those present:

Geheimrat SCHMITZ	
von SCHLITZLER	Chairman
BORGMEIDT	
BRUCKER	
FRANK-PAHL	
HAEFLIGER	
HANSEN	
von HEIDER	part of the time
ILGNER	
von KIEHN	
KUGLER	
ALL	
MULLER	
OSTER	
OTTO	
OVERHOFF	part of the time
TERHAAR	
EBER-ALBRECHT	

.....
(page 3 of original)

8) South-east Europe.

Dr. Ilgner reported on the setting-up of a South-Eastern Committee of the Reich Group for Industry, analogous to the committees already in existence for Eastern Asia (leader, Kommerzienrat Mibel), for Russia (leader, Dr. Reysa of Siemens), for Italy (leader, Under-Secretary Dr. Trendelenburg), for Africa Colonial Committee (leader Consul General Mann). The Reich Group for Industry will, with these committees, safeguard the cooperation of the economic system in the sphere of the development of the economic and commercial policy, questions of raw materials, policy governing credit, finance and currency, problems of supply and demand.

(page 4 of original)

and economic and statistical problems connected therewith, and rectify the omissions which have occurred in the course of collaboration between the governments, by drawing the economic circles of the countries concerned into closer contact.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6087
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

The South-Eastern Committee of the Reich Group for Industry is set up as follows:

Chairman: Dr. Ilgner

Deputy

Chairman: Croon (Leader of the Economic Group for the Textile Industry)

Members: Avieny (Member of the Vorstand of the Metallgesellschaft)
Dietrich (Principal Secretary of the Central European Industrial Association)
Hasslacher - Timber merchant
(Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the Kreditanstalt/Bankverein)
Lange (Principal Secretary of the Economic Group for Machine Construction)
Kirchfeld (Direktor General of Ferrostaal-Konzern Gutehoffnungshuette)
Lenze (Member of the Vorstand of the Mannesmann-Werke)
Reuter (Direktor General of "Demag")
Ungewitter (Principal secretary of the Economic Group for Chemistry)
Voss (Member of the Vorstand of the Hermann-Goering-Werke)

The South-Eastern Committee is divided into committees for different countries as follows:

	<u>Chairman</u>	<u>Deputy Chairman</u>
Committee for Hungary	Dr. Ilgner	Boden (A.G.)
Committee for Austria	Lenze	Hassler (Lenz)
Committee for Bulgaria	Kirchfeld	Winckel (Geantama)
Committee for Greece	Avieny	Torkewitz (Deutsche Spinnerei-Maschinenbau A.G.)
Committee for Slovakia	Voss	Rhomberg (Merrburger & Rhomberg)
Committee for Croatia	Hasslacher	Brockhaus (Gewerkschaft Elwerath)
Committee for Serbia	Reuter	Hodiger (Stahlverein)

(page 5 of original)

Moreover, these committees of the Reich Group for Industry gain particular practical significance from the fact that the majority of the above-mentioned committee members are at the same time the chief delegates - appointed by the Reich Ministry of Economics at the suggestion of the Economic Groups - of the Industrial Committees set up by the Reich Ministry of Economics (Dr. Ilgner for the Economic Group for Chemistry).

The Industrial Committees are set up as official sub-committees of the governmental committees for the various countries.

A representative of the Reich Ministry of Economics will at times take the chair in these Industrial Committees.

One of the principal tasks of the Industrial Committees consists of giving expression to the wishes of German industry, lending a willing ear to the wishes of the other side, and transmitting to the governmental committees possible common recommendations arising out of the proceedings, which, with the approval of the German government, will be passed on to the interested firms for action.

Dr. Ilgner gave a detailed report on the Germano-Rumanian Industrial Committee discussions held in Bucharest in the middle of July, making reference to the record of proceedings approved by the Government and already dispatched.

With reference to Hungary, Dr. Ilgner informed us that the Hungarian offices had not, so far, been in agreement with the German Government's wish that they form their own Industrial Committees. The discussions held in Budapest in August and September in collaboration with the Reich Group for Industry, on which Dr. Ilgner made a report at the same time, succeeded in promoting a good understanding with the most important representatives of Hungarian industry who had assembled for this purpose, and in obtaining the consent of the Hungarian offices to the formation of a Hungarian Industrial Committee.

The record of these discussions was distributed after the approval of the German authorities had been obtained.

Questions of organization and personnel which concern Croatia and Serbia were discussed and are to be further dealt with by the Committee for South-East Europe.

In pursuance of the discussion which arose at the last meeting of the Commercial Committee and in connexion with the visit of Dr. Adolf and Erwin or Kuhn to Berlin on the 13th instant, the new position with regard to the Prager Verein^{WVF} discussed again. It was agreed that after the arrangement of the dyestuffs sector and the consequent alignment of the sales interests of the Prager Verein/Chemische Werke Falkenau in the Protectorate and in Slovakia no problems existed for the present.

(page 6 of original)

which necessitated a new establishment of contact with the Prager Verein. Without infringing upon the rescission by the Reich War Ministry of the so-called Tripartite Mandate (Dreier-Mandate) (I.G., von Hayden, Rustgers) von Hayden and Rustgers should be kept abreast of affairs, in so far as the necessity for having dealings with the Prager Verein in connexion with certain problems not concerning the South-East might arise later.

It was decided that Dr. Kuegler be appointed IG Verbindungsmann for Rumania.

9) Russia.

In connexion with the decision of the last Commercial Committee, lists were published of:

- a) those already appointed for Russia,
- b) those with a knowledge of Russia whose names have been sent in by the sales combines and companies within the Konzern and who will be held in reserve to meet the probable requirements of IG itself in the Chemical Sector and the requirements of the Chemie-Ost GmbH.,
- c) those whose names have been put forward for administrative service in WIGRU-Chemistry in Russia (circular of the Reich Group for Industry of 26 August 1941, and of WIGRU-Chemistry of 29 August 1941).

It was decided that all changes in personnel and essential developments in the Russian-Sector (such as the communication of experiences etc.) are to be reported to Wipo, who for their part are to keep the sales combines informed.

Dr. Oster told us in this connexion about his experiences in the sphere of nitrogen.

10) East Asia.

Dr. Kern proposed the continuation of our deliveries to East Asia, in so far as this is in our power. This proposal was agreed to. Appropriated negotiations with the authorities are to be entered upon.

11) U.S.A.

will be dealt with in the meeting of the Vorstand.

12) Latin-America.

Dr. von Schnitzler gave a review of our Latin-American relations and moreover, of how the authorities would like the German positions in Latin-America to be managed.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6037
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original)

On the basis of Dr. Overhoff's thorough exposition of the position in the individual countries the following was decided:

- 1) I.G.'s positions in Latin-America are to be held as far as it is at all possible to do so, in all spheres.
- 2) In particular:
 - a) The goods supply is to be continued within the bounds of existing possibilities. Beyond this, the creation of additional possibilities for the I.G. should be attempted by making the appropriate contacts with the authorities.
 - b) The sales combines will, in any way which seems expedient to them, instruct their representatives in Latin-America to build up reserves equal to the total expenses for one year.
 - c) The net proceeds in excess of this amount will be transferred to Germany in the usual way.
 - d) The existing manufacturing ~~openings~~ which have been acquired in the interests of the I.G. in the course of the recent years are to be maintained.

The Azo Dyes Factory in Rio must provisionally be shut down owing to the expropriation of the land and the lack of intermediates.

There are no objections to the setting up of the manufacture of alcohol-sulfones on the base of Chilean sperm oil in Max Hamor's works.

Despite the danger of a possible shut-down, the FUMERENSE works will be kept in operation as long as possible and instructions are given that every measure is to be taken to prevent the FUMERENSE from passing into British or U.S. hands.

The same applies to the QUEBRASA, for which a transfer of credits necessary in connexion with camouflage is approved. This, however, must be effected without the raising of a loan in foreign exchange.

The representatives are to be instructed to take the same action in the remaining strongholds, circumstances permitting.

- e) It was decided that no instructions aiming at a recall of German personnel or their families should go out to Latin-America. Of course - should IG employees of German citizenship state

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6087
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original)

wishes in this direction - their return would be approved.

- f) Those present considered a continuation of camouflage in Latin-America absolutely necessary in view of the necessity for holding the German positions.

.....

Frankfurt/Main, 24 September 1941.
FF/A 43/41

signed: von Schnitzler

signed: Frank-Fahle

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

19 June 1947

I, Beryl C. FESTICK, D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts of document No. NI-6087.

Beryl C. FESTICK
D 42 74 59

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-2507
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

(Translator's Note) Stamp: 1 Sept. 1937

(Original)

Dr. E. KUHNKE
Member of the Vorstand of
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktien-Gesellschaft

Leverhausen-I.G. plant, 31 August 1937
Long distance calls: Telephone office
Cologne No. 60941
Interurban calls: Telephone office
Cologne No. 60741

Personal

To
Geheimrat Dr. H. SCHMITZ,

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 78

Dear Geheimrat,

I heard from Herr PISTON that you discussed the question of
successorship to Herr CLEMM, as leader of the Group Chemistry and
that so far no clarity existed as to who could be proposed as a
successor to Herr CLEMM.

If you wish to propose anyone, I should like to recommend that
you mention Herr BACHMANN in Krapack. Herr BACHMANN is doubtless
one of the men best suited for this position. He has sufficiently
broad experience in the commercial field of chemical products; as a
merchant his technical appreciation is extraordinarily good, due to
his activity in Krapack. Contrary to Herr CLEMM, Herr BACHMANN is
a man who knows how to give orders and who does not shirk respon-
sibility and, finally, though an I.G. man he is not so well known as
an I.G. man that the general public might suspect that I.G. wants to
fill that position. Herr PISTON indicated that also Herr WEBER
ANDREAS was included in the discussion. In my opinion Herr WEBER
does not come into question at all because Herr WEBER is already
overburdened with his many jobs and would have to have his sub-
ordinates do the work; then, however, this is not suitable for a
direct I.G. man. All this does not apply for Herr BACHMANN, first
of all, he is able to accept the post because of his comparatively
small business.

May I remind you, in concluding, that I should be obliged to
you if you would return to me the letter of organization of Geheim-
rat BOSCH which you took along.

With best regards,

Yours very truly,

(Signature) KUHNKE

(Translator's Note: Marginal handwritten note: Taken
care of by telephone - 2 Sept. '37
(Initial) S.

17

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6507
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6507.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO NO. X-046355

END

8

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. III - 330
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF CONSUL

The Minister of Economics
for the Reich and Prussia

43 Behrenstrasse
BERLIN W 8
18 March 1938

WA 4/5279/38 Secret

(Stamp)

Received
24 April 1938
Journal No. (Illegible)

SECRET

21 (clock stamps) March

To: The Economic Groups of the
Ministry of Economics for
the Reich and Prussia.

Administrative Ruling No. 6/38 W.Gr.

(Economic Groups)

I am enclosing a list containing the names and addresses of the
Mobilization Commissioners appointed by me for the Economic Groups.
The name of the Mobilization-Commissioner for the Economic Group
Mining will be announced later.

I request you to see to it that letters which are directed to
the Mobilization-Commissioners of the Economic Groups with the
additional note "or representative in office" are handed to the
deputy of the Mobilization-Commissioner if the Mobilization-Commissioner
himself cannot be reached.

By order:
(signed) Godlowski

Certified:

(signature illegible)

Secretary, Justice
Administration.

(Stamp)

(Page 1 of original enclosure)

Mobilization-Commissioners were appointed and sworn in in the following
Economic Groups:

Economic Group:

Letters are to be directed to:

Chemical Industry

Dr. Klaus UNGEWITTER - or representative
in office -
19 Grossadmiral-Prinz-Heinrichstr
BERLIN W 35

Construction of Machines

Director Karl LANGE - or representative
in office -
35 Tiergartenstrasse
BERLIN W 35

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI 339
(Cont'd)

Print and Paper Processing	Dr. Lorenzen -- or representative in office - 1 Mollendorf Platz BERLIN W 30
Electro Industry	Dr. Ostermann -- or representative in office - 3 Korneliusstrasse Berlin W 35
Iron Producing Industry	Dr. Reichert -- or representative in office - 4 Matthaeikirchplatz BERLIN W 35
Precision Tools and Optics	Dr. Karl ALBRECHT -- or represent- ative in office - 2 Rauchstrasse BERLIN W 35
Non-Iron Metal Industry	Dr. Puff -- or representative in office - 4 Matthaeikirchstrasse BERLIN W 35
Wood Processing Industry	Director BAUM -- or representative in office - 101 IV Saarlandstrasse BERLIN S W 11
Glass Industry	Dr. SCHALLER -- or representative in office - 33 Am Karlsbad BERLIN W

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Paper, Cardboard, Cellulose and Pulp Production	von MUSSOW -- or representative in office - 5-6 Neue Grolmannstrasse BERLIN-Charlottenburg 2
Fuel Industry	Dr. ZIERVOGEL -- or representative in office - 35 Dorotheenstrasse BERLIN -- NO 7
Vehicle Industry	Professor Dr. WEHRLE -- or repres- entative in office - 8 Hardenbergstrasse BERLIN-Charlottenburg
Casting Industry	Dr. Ing. SCHMAUSER -- or represent- ative in office - 54-55 Kurfuerstendamm BERLIN -- W

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(Cont'd)

Steel and Iron Construction	Director OELERT - or representative in office - 24-25 Postdamerstrasse BERLIN - W 35
Stones and Clays	Dr. Boehlert - or representative in office - 30 Knesebeckstrasse BERLIN-Charlottenburg
Building Industry	von OBWURZER - or representative in office - 1a Luetsowufer BERLIN W 35
Ceramic Industry	Dr. WARNKE - or representative in office - 25 Luitpoldstrasse BERLIN - W 30
Leather Industry	Alfred SAUER - or representative in office - 3 Matthaeikirchplatz BERLIN W 35
Textile Industry	Dr. KLAUE - or representative in office - 20 Rauchstrasse BERLIN W 35

(Page 3 of original enclosure)

Clothing Industry	Diplom Kaufmann JUNG - or representative in office - 4 Kielganstrasse BERLIN W 62
Iron, Steel and Sheet Metal Goods Industry	Dr. Bruno PILZ - or representative in office - 24 Luetsow-Ufer BERLIN W 62
Refining of Synthetic Materials and Related Iron Industry branches	Hans PUTSCH - or representative in office - 8 Schadowstrasse BERLIN N W 7
Metal Goods and Related Industry Branches	Dr. Ullrich POELCHEN - or representative in office - 163 Kurfuerstendamm BERLIN - Halensee
Aviation Industry (supervised by Reich Air Ministry)	Secretary General CESAR - or representative in office - 68-90 Tierpitzufer 68/90 BERLIN W
Mining	

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI - 339
(Cont'd)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D - 150096, hereby certify that
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document
No NI - 339.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D - 150096

A F F I D A V I T .

I, Felix ZHRANK, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, states herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following :

1.) From 1 May 1926 I was employed by the Association for the Maintenance of the Interests of the Chemical Industry of Germany (Verein zur Wahrung der Interessen der Chemischen Industrie Deutschlands), and when the reorganization industrial economy into Economic Groups (Wirtschaftsgruppen), Reich Groups (Reichsgruppen) etc. was carried out, I was taken over, to do the same job, by the legal successor of the Association, the Economic Group Chemical Industry. From 1932 to 1945 I was Deputy chief manager of the Economic Group "Chemical Industry".

2.) As regards of the allocation of labor there were the following restrictions of the competence of the Economic Group Chemicals on the one hand; and of the Plenipotentiary General for Special Problems of Chemical Production (Generalbevollmächtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung) (G.B.Chem.) on the other hand: Subordinate to the Economic Group were all plants which were not directly engaged in armament production, but which produced for instance films, pharmaceuticals etc., and on the other hand, those armament plants which were not being extended and whose staff consequently remained more or less the same. All those plants were subordinate to the G.B. Chem. which were either newly established or which were being extended. In practice, it was difficult to make this distinction, especially because the G.B.Chem. itself endeavored to a large extent to obscure it and to extend its authority over a greatest possible sphere of chemistry. In this it actually succeeded because it had at its disposal an organization which much exceeded that of the Economic Group (Wirtschaftsgruppe).

3.) The mechanical procedure of a request for workers by a plant, controlled by the Economic Group Chemical Industry, was the following: First, the request was sent by the plant to the competent Labor Office. If the Labor Office or the Regional or Gau Labor Office (Landes- oder

(page 2 of the original)

Gauarbeitsamt) could not comply with this demand, it was transmitted to the Reich Ministry of Labor. The Reich Ministry of Labor however demanded an expert on the justification for this request in any case. This expert opinion had to be delivered by the Economic Group Chemical Industry for the firms, supervised by it. In this regard, the Economic Group made the final decision. (The procedure for plants supervised by the G.B.Chem. was similar; for their requests the G.B.Chem. represented the highest instance.)

4.) The requests for workers which were handed in to the Economic Group by the individual firms were collected by the Economic Group and submitted to the Reich Ministry of Labor,

later to the Speer-Ministry, at that moment, at which workers were available. This happened because at the time at which this procedure was necessary, the reserves of German manpower were already exhausted and foreign workers were only temporarily available, after the arrival of transports.

5.) From 1942/43 until 1945, Dr. Fritz ter Meer, member of the Vorstand of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. was Deputy head of the Economic Group Chemical Industry. Without doubt, Dr. ter Meer used this position to secure advantages for the firm he represented (I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G.) over other chemical plants in the procurement of foreign workers. This was simply managed in such a way that on his visits to the Economic Group in Berlin, Dr. ter Meer or his representatives directly suggested to the Arbeitsbeschaffungsreferent (Specialist for Labor Allocation) of the Economic Group, Dr. Kurt SCHROEDER, that the current requirements of the I.G.-Plants be supported especially strongly. Although naturally it would have been easier for Dr. SCHROEDER, to fulfil his tasks as specialist for Labor Allocation without such interference,

(page 3 of the original)

he had however, as an employee of the Economic Group, to consider the wishes of the Deputy Head to the greatest extent.

6.) The by far greatest part of the foreign workers was allocated to the chemical industry by the G.B.Chem. Therefore the special requests and complaints of I.G.Farbenindustrie A.G. were taken into consideration to a great extent by Professor Carl KRAUCK, who was plenipotentiary general (Generalbevollmachtigter) and at the same time chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the I.G. the smaller reserve of workers which were to be distributed by the Economic Group was used gladly and frequently by Dr. ter Meer and his representatives.

7.) When in 1944, the Economic Group Chemical Industry was informed by the Ministry of Armament that there was a possibility of sending a representative of the chemical industry to Italy in order to assist in the recruiting of Italian workers, a man from the chemical industry was charged with this task. This man then applied to the Military Governor and to all other offices which came into question and endeavored to procure the greatest possible number of Italian workers for the chemical industry. As a result approximately 20,000 Italian workers were gained for the chemical industry in Germany. In this connection, the presidency of the Economic Group Chemical Industry also had made available the sum of 100,000 Reichsmark for the establishment and financing of recruiting offices in Italy. Similar propaganda programs were also carried out by the G.B.Chem.; for this purpose personnel was made available by the various larger plants of the chemical industry.

(page 4 of the original)

I have carefully read and countersigned with my own hand each of the four (4) pages of this affidavit, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and declare herewith under oath, that in this statement I have told the truth, according to my best knowledge and belief.

(Handwritten signature):
Felix Ehrmann

Signature

Sworn to and signed before me this 14th day of March 1947 at
Nuernberg by Felix EHRENN, known to me to be the person making
the above Affidavit.

(Handwritten signature):
Arthur T. Copper

ARTHUR T. COOPER

U.S. Civilian; IGO number D 434534,
Interrogator, Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes,

U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHY L. GALEWSKI, M.P. 34079, hereby certify that I
am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
Document No. HI-5953.

DOROTHY L. GALEWSKI,
M.P. 34079

END

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A F F I D A V I T .

I, Dr. Felix HOFFMANN, residing at Baddeckenstedt, District of Wolfenbuettel in the British Zone of Occupation, having been advised that by making any false statements I will become liable to punishment, hereby voluntarily declare the following under oath and without having been subjected to any duress:

The main topic in the conversation of the responsible persons of the Economic Group Chemistry used to be, in the course of the summer 1939, the tension in the international situation. Though I don't know whether Dr. UNGEWITTER possessed any official information concerning the plans of an invasion of Poland, but he discussed those matters with many responsible persons of the Government and of the Wehrmacht and often remarked in my presence that HITLER will invade Poland.

This problem also appeared in connection with the question of the I.G. Farbenindustrie plants at Ludwigshafen/Opau. Dr. UNGEWITTER also considered the possibility that war with Poland might entail also war with France and England. Being the representative of the Economic Group Chemistry he had several conferences in this connection with delegates of the Reich Ministry of Economics. This problem was also discussed with Herr von SCHNITZLER, member of the Central Committee of the Executive Board (Zentralausschuss des Verstandes) of I.G. Farben. War with France and England would have meant great dangers for the factories at Ludwigshafen/Opau which were situated close to the French border and could be reached by French airplanes and even by French artillery. Therefore, it was considered advisable to stop all new constructions at the Ludwigshafen/Opau plants and to transfer part of the factories to the interior of Germany. Dr. UNGEWITTER was of the opinion that this ought to be done under all circumstances but the I.G. and probably also Herr von SCHNITZLER considered this not practicable.

After several conferences with Major BECHT of the War Ministry, Dr. HOFFMANN of the Ministry of Economics, Dr. UNGEWITTER of the Reich Office for Chemistry and 4 to 5 representatives of I.G. Farben (according to my memory there were among them Dr. MEYER and Dr. WURSTER and a representative of the Vermittlungsstelle of the Reich Office for Chemistry finally gave orders to the effect that further constructions for the enlargement of the Ludwigshafen/Opau plants were immediately to be stopped and the factories partly to be transferred to the interior

(initials) F.E.

(Page 2 of the original)

of Germany. The representatives of I.G. Farben did not agree to

this decision and get in direct contact with Dr. Carl KRAUCH of the Four Years Plan, at the same time completely neglecting the Reich Office for Chemistry and the Economic Group Chemistry. Therefore, this order was never carried out, I was, however, never told that the order of the Reich Office was ever withdrawn though Dr. UNGEWITTER availed himself of each opportunity when representatives of I.G. called upon him, to discuss this question and to complain about the attitude of I.G.

I remember that during these conferences several meetings took place between Dr. UNGEWITTER and Herr von SCHNITZER. In connection with the discussions about the imminent war, Dr. UNGEWITTER also made the remark that the war with Poland will not probably not begin before the harvest has been collected i.e. not till September 1939.

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand. I made the required corrections with my own hand and initialed them with the first letters of my name and I herewith declare upon oath that I have said the pure truth in this statement to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Felix HERLMANN

Sworn to and signed before me this 13th day of March 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Felix HERLMANN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Paul H. KATSCHER
U.S. Civilian, IGO-number D-150641
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

(initials): P.H.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 April 1947.

I, Dr. HORN, Civ. 20004, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4954

Dr. HORN,
Civ. 20004

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 71-1352
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

M i n u t e s

about the 59th Meeting of the Commercial Committee
held on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, at 10 A.M. in
Heidelberg, Haus BOSCH, Schloss Wolfesbrunnengweg 31-35.

Present:

von Schmitzler	Chairman
Borgwaldt	
Frank-Fahle	
Haeffliger	
Hanser	
Ilgnér	
Kugler	
Mann	
Oster	
Waibel	
Terhaar.	

1. General Discussion.

In connection with the expositions at the last Commercial Committee, Dr. TERHAAR reported about further organizational developments in the field of war economy, in particular, about the system of Production Committees, created in the last few weeks, which function as branches of the Raw Materials Office. Prof. MARTIN, Dr. ter HAAR, Dr. RANSTETTER and Dr. UNGEWITTER belong to the large production committee of Economic Group Chemistry headed by Dr. DOERR. This committee has its main office, as well as one of its permanent offices, in Hamburg. Dr. UNGEWITTER on orders of Dr. DOERR, the head of the Production Committee, has full authority to act for the committee, so that in his person, he combines membership.

- 1) in the Präsidium of Economic Group Chemistry,
- 2) in the Production Committee,
- 3) in the business management of the Group,
- 4) in the Reich Office,
- 5) in the large Production Office of the Economic Group (not identical with the Hamburg office).

25 representatives of the Special Groups,
3 representatives of the Mixed Groups, one specialist
each for coal and power, transportation and manpower,

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

steel allocation etc. belong to the large Production Office headed by Dr. UNGER. The responsibility for steering production in the Special Groups is borne jointly by the head of the Special Group and the head of the Production Committee.

The Office of the Technical Committee is to be notified centrally

(page 2 of original)

about each case, where I.G. processes are disclosed in the Special Groups and Production Committees.

2. Foreign Trade Questions

a) / Appointment of Experts for the Individual Countries.

The new Foreign Economy Department of the Reich Ministry of Economics, headed by Dr. KIRCHFELD, is to be activated by drawing in specialists from private enterprises, within the framework of the Reich Group Industry, and by a body of experts on foreign countries, into which about 100 gentlemen from industry are to be called.

Dr. ILGNER emphasized the necessity for co-operating in the new planning but pointed out that the old organizations and domestic and foreign relations must also be given consideration. Every one agreed that co-operation entailed a certain responsibility and that the efforts of the Reich Ministry of Economics should be given every possible support.

b) Export Increase/Advance Sale of Goods.

The above cannot be accomplished from the price angle alone, if additional efforts are not made at the same time from the aspect of goods.

The resolution passed at the 57th meeting of the Commercial Committee, that I.G. will participate in post-war deliveries, was discussed in its practical ramifications. Herr RAHM reported about the possibility of concluding such deals

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

in his sales sector. The heads of the other Sales combines will conduct corresponding practical investigations. The first deals of I.G. are to be made on the basis of the economic agreement concluded with Bulgaria (compare the Wipo's circular letter of 2 February 1944).

As soon as an over-all view of possible deals is available, NW 7 will start negotiations with the Reich Offices concerning conditions of agreements and/or any possible guaranties.

Presumably, agreements in such deals on investment goods will be concluded between states and agreements on consumer goods between the private firms of the countries concerned.

c) Degriges Discussion.

The members of the Commercial Committee received a memorandum concerning the Degriges process and the question of the introduction of this process into relations with countries other than Greece. In the opinion of the Commercial Committee this system should not be extended to other countries when it can be avoided.

In this connection there followed a discussion of the Greek currency situation and the consequences therefrom to our trade, and of the continuation of our representation.

(page 3 of original)

3. South-East Europe.

Roumania.

a) I.G. Taxes/Tariff Documents.

With reference to the detailed exposition of the 26 February 1944 sent to the members of the Commercial Committee, Dr. KUGLER reported on the results of the discussions about the above matters which he and Dr. KUPPER had in Bukarest in the first half of last month with Roumanian Government officials and the Roumanian National Bank.

As soon as a final regulation is obtained the members of the Commercial Committee will be

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

informed. The Reich Ministry of Economics has also requested a report, since the presumable result of the negotiations conducted by Dr. KUGLER and Dr. KUPPER, particularly with regard to transfers without documents will be of basic importance.

b) Alumina Project.

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notes:
Herr W.
Kleber
3152

Dr. ILGNER reported about the Roumanian alumina project, or rather, the large experimental plant. I.G.'s contribution consists of giving its know-how concerning the so-called Leverkusen process and of making available the furnace which will be taken over by the Roumanian group if the experiments prove satisfactory. I.G. will receive the equivalent value in Lei or an option to purchase Nitrogen shares to this value. It is further planned that I.G. furnish the amount, which the Roumanian group has to finance by itself, through the loan of Roumanian bonds. For that, I.G. is also to receive an option of purchasing Nitrogen shares. The sums concerned amount to 60 Million Lei each, altogether to 120 Million Lei. The Roumanian authorities have agreed to permit I.G. participation in Nitrogen up to 35 %.

4. Spain .

Dr. v. SCHNITZER reported that his negotiations with CROS, particularly with Mr. RIPOLE, with reference to the capital increase of FLIX from 9 to 12 Million Pesetas and the bond issue in the nominal amount of 10 Million Pesetas have been satisfactorily concluded. The bonds have already been placed. The capital is being increased. Dr. v. SCHNITZER further spoke about the situation prevailing at FLIX, FENCE and INQUIRESA.

The financial situation at our participating agencies and representations was discussed.

Herr KLEBLER gave an over-all survey of our interests in the metal sector.

5. Norway .

Dr. ILGNER reported about the negotiations concerning Bettmetal compensation for damages.

(page 4 of original)

The sum involved amounts to 230 Million Nkr., so that the remaining risk of I.G. will amount to about 23 Million Nkr. (1/3 of 70 Nkr.)

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Dr. ILGNER further reported about the personnel changes at Norsk Hydro and Nordisk Lettmetal, which were approved. The committee was informed of the creation of Vermittlungsstelle Nord, headed by Direktor von der BEY. It was planned to notify the German and Norwegian authorities in Norway of the creation of this office. The main task of the Vermittlungsstelle is to see that all the needs of the enterprises, in which I.G. participates or is otherwise interested in and/or with whom it has business relations, are fulfilled as smoothly as possible and that, above all relations with the authorities are channelled via Vermittlungsstelle Nord, in the interest of a smooth and frictionless completion. The commercial committee approved the measures taken.

6. East Asia.

Dr. Wenk
986

Herr WAIBEL reported about the situation in the greater Asiatic area and the developments of our relations toward it.

Among other things, Herr WAIBEL reported that the trade agreement with Manchukuo had been extended until 30 June of this year.

He further stated the Common Aid Fund (Gemeinschaftshilfe) of the German economy will be used to support needy firms in East Asia.

7. Miscellaneous.

a) Dr. HUGLER's suggestions of bonuses for our representatives in Roumania and Croatia were approved.

b) The opening of a courier service to Frankfurt/Main, Mannheim and Leverkusen was discussed. NW 7 was requested to investigate the matter and make appropriate suggestions.

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(page 4 of original, cont'd)

- c) Dr. ILGNER pointed out that in conversations abroad, extreme reserve is indicated. The members of the Commercial Committee will see to it that the gentlemen in question within their sales sector are once again instructed accordingly.

Heidelberg, 1 March 1947.
Fi/Schm.

signed: FRANK-FAHLE

signed: v. SCHNITZLER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

5 August 1947.

I, Samuel Horn, A-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-8508.

Samuel HORN
A-443 113.

Z.A. Office - 6 January 1944

CIRCULARIZED COLLECTIVE MEMORANDUM

(Formerly collective news)

of the

ECONOMIC GROUP CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Berlin 35, Sigismundstrasse 6 / Telephone: Collective number 227561 /
Telegram address "Alchimie"

December 1943

SPECIAL EDITION

The purport of the circularized collective memorandum is exclusively for the information of the members. The passing on of the information outside the circle of our members as well as complete or partial reproduction, especially in the daily papers or in the special literature, is illicit. - Printed as manuscript all rights reserved.

TO ALL MEMBER FIRMS :

At the instigation of the Reich Minister of Economics the Economic Group Chemical Industry has been completely divided into Groups, Departments and Sections. The main purpose of this is to create an instrument of strict leadership for the war economy and especially for the tasks newly given to the Economic Group by the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production. The various branches of production will be taken care of in future by the organization most closely connected with them; they will also direct the production.

To carry out these vital war tasks, which have to be handled with the utmost energy, the leaders of the Groups, Departments and Sections need the complete support of the firms of which they take care, and I herewith appeal to all these firms to give that support without reserve. I refer to the duty of the leaders and managers towards the organizations to give every information necessary for the completion of these tasks which includes also the right of the leaders of the organizations and their technical experts to inspect the firms. The great goal, to bring the production of the Chemical Industry up to the highest level demanded by the Reich Leadership, can only be reached through co-operation of all firms and by putting completely aside all peace-time special interests.

The firms are herewith invited to report to the leaders of the organizations, in as far as these have been newly set up, to which production branch they belong, to enable these immediately to include in

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5695
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(page 1 of original, cont'd)

their measures the entirety of the firms of one production branch. Copies should be sent to the district representative of the Economic Group Chemical Industry of the competent Gau Economic Chamber according to circularized letter of 3 November 1943 and to the Economic Group.

I expect the firms of the Chemical Industry to follow closely the directives of the leaders of the organizations appointed by me and thus, by joint efforts, help to bring about the conditions to guarantee final victory.

The Leader
of the Economic Group Chemical Industry

(signed) H. SCHLOSSER

(page 2 of original)

22. Economic Group Chemical Industry.

Location: Berlin " 35, Sigismundstrasse 6, Telephone: 22 75 61.
Telegraphic address: Alchimie. Statistical number of the
economic group: 51.

Chief: Hermann SCHLOSSER, Generaldirektor der Deutschen Gold- und
Silber-Schneidmanufaktur vormals ROESSLER, Frankfurt a.M.,
Weissfrauenstrasse 9.

Assistant chief: Direktor Dr. F. TER MEER, member of board of directors
of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Gruensburgplatz.

Managing member of the presidium and principal manager: Dr. UNGERLITZ,
simultaneously Reich Commissioner for Chemistry.

Assistant Chief Manager: Dr. EHRHARDT.

Presidium:

H. SCHLOSSER, Chairman of the Presidium.

Dr. F. TER MEER, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M.

Dipl.-Ing. H. Z. DOERF, Thrix-Werke GmbH., Hamburg.

L.M. KLUFTING, Chem. Fabrik Goodenow & Co. A.G., Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Prof. Dr.-Ing. F. WERTIN, Ruhrchemie A.G., Oberhausen-Kelten.

Dr.-Ing. LAUSTETTER, Deutsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Werk Westeregeln,
Bez. Magdeburg.

Dr. H. RICHTER, Henkel & Cie. A.G., u. GmbH., Duesseldorf.

Dr. C. UNGERLITZ, Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industrie, Berlin.
(Handwritten note:)

Dr. H. KOEFF, i.Fa. Vaseline-Werke K.G., Leipzig C 1, Wittenberger Str. 2.

Southwest Branch:

Location: Wien 40, III. Lotharstrasse 50. Telephone: U 12 560 Serie.
Telegraphic address: Chemverband. Manager: Dr. ROUVIER

Sudetenland Branch:

Location: Aussig, Gerbergasse 3. Telephone: Aussig 2562. Telegraphic
address: Sudetenchemie. Manager: Dr. KENZIG

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I. Chiefs
of the Economic Group Chemical Industry in the individual
Gau Chamber of Commerce Districts.

1. Ostpreussen: Dir. Dipl.-Ing. TOUSSAINT, Oster & Co., Königsberg i.Pr.,
Weidemann 10 - 12.
2. Danzig-Westpreussen: Präsident Dr. Eugen MOHR, Teerindustrie A.G.,
Danzig-Ohra, Neuer Weg 16.
3. Wartheland: Not yet named.
4. Oberschlesien: Dir. Dr. DUEHSELD, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Muschwitz (O.-S.).
5. Niederschlesien: Dir. SCHULKE, Georg von Giesecke Erben, Superphosphat-
werk, Breslau 16, Schliessfach 28.
6. Berlin: Prof. Dr.-Ing. QUASERANT, Auergesellschaft A.G., Berlin N 65,
Friedrich-Krause-Ufer 24.
7. Brandenburg: Prof. Dr.-Ing. QUASERANT, Auergesellschaft A.G., Berlin
N 65, Friedrich-Krause-Ufer 24.
8. Pommern: Dir. Dr.-Ing. SCHULZ, Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken A.G.,
Stettin-Sydowstrasse.
9. Mecklenburg: Kurt BEISSERODT, J.S. Brunwig, Malchin (Mecklenburg).
10. Schleswig-Holstein: Dir. Dr. WELLS, Dynamit A.G., Kruesmel, Post
Geesthacht (Bez. Hamburg), Postschliessfach 23.
11. Harburg: Gdn.-Dir. A.E. DOERF, Hamburg 36, Phrix-Haus.
12. Osthanover: Dir. Georg KAHLE, Lüneburger Wachswerke A.G., Lüneburg.
13. Weser-Ems: Dir. HEIN'S, Vertreter Dir. Fritz, Bergolin-Lackfabrik A.G.,
Bremen, Langenstrasse 107.
14. Sudhanover-Braunschweig: Dir. Dip.-Ing. ASSEFUCHER, Continental-
Gummi-Werke A.G., Hannover, Vahrenwalder Strasse 100.
15. Westfalen-Nord: Dir. Dr. GUNTHER, Chemische Werke Huls, Huls (West-
falen-Nord).
16. Westfalen-Süd: Dir. v. KROGH, Gewerkschaft Viktor, Castrop-Rauxel
(Westf. IV), Becklinghauser Strasse 77.
17. Essen: Prof. Dr. MARTIN, Ruhr-Chemie A.G., Oberhausen-Holten.

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CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

18. Duesseldorf: Dir. Dr. RICHTER, Honkel & Cie. G.m.b.H., Duesseldorf.
19. Koeln-Aachen: Dr. Wolfgang HERBIG, Herbig-Haarhaus A.G., Koeln-Bickendorf, Vitalisstrasse 198-222.
20. Moselland (mit Luxemburg): Dir. BENTHE, Kali-Chemie A.G., Hoenningen (Rhein).
21. Westmark: Dir. Dr. MASTER, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen (Rhein).
22. Rhein-Main: Dir. Dr. TER MEER, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Gruenburgerplatz.
23. Kurhessen: Dr. Lothar KOHL, H. Voelke, Eschwege, Bez. Kassel.
24. Thueringen: Dr.-Ing. Alfred FRIEDERICH, Thueringische Zellwolle A.G., Schwarz (Ordo).
25. Magdeburg-Anhalt: Dir. Dr. RUMSTETTER, Deutsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Westeregeln, Bez. Magdeburg.
26. Hildesheim: Dir. Dr. SCHNEIDER, Asmonidewerk Harseburg G.m.b.H., Lüneburger Werke, Hr. Harseburg.
27. Sachsen: Dr. KOSPP, Vaseline-Werke, Leipzig C 1, Berliner Strasse 61-63.
28. Sudetenland: Dir. Dr. THIERMANN, Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenberg G.m.b.H., Aussig (Albo).
29. Baden: Oberbuergermeister NEMMINGER, Mannheim, Rathaus.
Gebiet Elsass: Dir. Dr. GOEBEL, Kali-Chemie A.G., Werk Tann (Elsass).
30. Wuertemberg: Dir. LEHR, C. Siegle & Co. G.m.b.H., Stuttgart I, Postschlossfach 276.
31. Muenchen-Oberbayern: Dir. Dr.-Ing. HESS, Dr. Alexander Mecker, Gesellschaft fuer elektrochemische Industrie G.m.b.H., Muenchen 22, Prinzregentenstrasse 20.
32. Schwaben: Not yet named.
33. Bayern: Dir. Dr. EGST, Sueddeutsche Zellwolle A.G., Kalheim (Donau).
34. Franken: Dipl.-Ing. KLASS, Gesellschaft fuer Elektrometallurgie, Muernberg.
35. Mainfranken: Dir. Dr. STUEBE, Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken A.G., Obernburg (Main).

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36. Wien: Dir. Dr. KASTNER, Samperit-Werke A.G., Wien I, Halferstorfer Strasse 9-13.
37. Niederdonau: Gen.-Dir. Dr. HESSNER, Samperit-Werke A.G., Wien I, Halferstorfer Strasse 9-13.
38. Oberdonau: Dir. Dr. ZICK, Lenzinger Zellwolle A.G., Lenzing (Oberdonau).
39. Steiermark: Georg LEITNER sen., H.C. Leitner & Söhne K.G., Marburg (Drau), Schlechthofgasse 23.
40. Kärnten: Dir. Dipl.-Ing. HEINISCH, Fleiburger Bergwerksunion, Klagenfurt (Kärnten), Radetzkystrasse 2.
41. Salzburg: Dir. SCHÖNBERG, Ebensee Solvay-Werke, Hallein-Salzburg.
42. Tirol: Dir. Ing. Viktor ELLENER, Alpine Chemie A.G. und Elcheide G.m.b.H. Rufstein-Schaftenau.

II. Organization of Specialists.

The chiefs marked with an asterisk are, for the time being, appointed temporarily.

1. Group Soda, caustic alkalies, chlorine, hydrochloric acid and related products.

Location: open.

Chief: Dir. Hellmut EILSBARGER, i.Fa. Deutsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Bernburg (Anhalt).

Manager: open.

Department: a) Soda, bicarbonate, caustic soda.

*Chief: Gen.-Dir. Dr. KOSTICHEN, i.Fa. Deutscher Soda- und Natronverband, Berlin C 2, Neue Königstrasse 27-37.

Department: b) Caustic potash and potash.

*Chief: Dir. v. HEIDER, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Grüneburgplatz.

Management: Elektrochemische Produkte GmbH., Frankfurt a.M., Grüneburgplatz.

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Department: c) Crystal soda.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Kurt HOSBOLD, i.Fa. Saline Lüneburg Chemische Fabrik A.G., Lüneburg, Neue Sülze 26.

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Department d) Chlorine, hypochlorites and chlorates.

*Chief: Dr. Franz VOGLIENDESE, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld

Department: e) Hydrochloric acid.

*Chief: Dir. Bodo SCHLAF, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Berlin NW 7,
Unter den Linden 78.

Department f) Per compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Friedrich-Wilhelm SCHMIDT, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-
Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Department: g) Sodium and potassium metal.

*Chief: Dir. Friedrich-Wilhelm SCHMIDT, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-
Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Department: h) Chloride of lime.

*Chief: Alfred VORSTER, Koeln-Bayenthal, Bonner Strasse 530.

2. Group Sulphur and sulphur compounds.

Location: Open. (Handwritten note:) Berlin ST 68, Kochstr. 73, temp.
H. SCHUSTER.

Chief: Dir. Dr. Carl UNSTER, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen
(Rhein)

Manager: Open

Group board of directors: Dir. Dr. Carl UNSTER, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie.

Dir. Dr. GUERTT, i.Fa. Ruhrgas A.G., Essen, Herwarthstrasse 60.

Dir. BEIGER, i.Fa. Mansfeldsche Kupferschieferbergbau A.G., Eisleben.

Dr. JAKOB, i.Fa. Chem. Fabrik Dr. Jakob GmbH., Bad Kreuznach.

Dir. HINTZLER, member of board of directors of Chemikalien A.G.,
Pln.-Malensee, Kurfuerstendamm 74.

Department: a) Sulphur.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Fritz GUERTT, i.Fa. Ruhrgas A.G., Essen, Herwarthstrasse 60.
Management: Schwefel C.F.B.H., Berlin ST 68, Kochstrasse 73, Telephone:
12 00 21.

Department: b) Sulphuric acid.

*Chief: Dir. Rud. BERGM, i.Fa. Mansfeldsche Kupferschieferbergbau A.G.,
Eisleben.

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Department: c) Carbon disulphide.

*Chief: Dr. JAKOB, i.Fa. Chem. Fabrik Dr. Jakob GmbH, Bad Kreuznach.

Management: Schwefelkohlenstoff GmbH., Frankfurt a.M., Kaiserstrasse 2.

Department d) Sodium sulphate.

*Chief: Dr. Carl Hermann HILFSCHEIDT, member of board of directors of
Chemikalien-A.G., Berlin-Halensee, Kurfuerstendamm 74.

Management: Sulfatvereinigung GmbH., Berlin-Halensee, Kurfuerstendamm 74.

Department: e) Other sulphur compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Bodo SCHLAF, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Berlin NW 7,
Unter den Linden 76.

3. Nitrogen.

Manufactured by Stickstoff-Syndikat GmbH., Berlin NW 7, Neustaedtische
Kirchstrasse 9/10, Telephone: 12 00 24.

Chief: Dir. Dr. OSTEL, i.Fa. Stickstoff-Syndikat GmbH., Berlin NW 7,
Neustaedt. Kirchstrasse 9/10, Tel.: 12 00 24.

a) Primary (basic) nitrogen and nitrogen fertilizers

Chief: Dir. Dr. OSTEL, i.Fa. Stickstoff-Syndikat GmbH., Berlin-Schoeneberg,
Am Park 7, Tel.: 71 26 81

b) Industrial nitrogen.

Chief: Rudolf HANSEN, i.Fa. Stickstoff-Syndikat GmbH., Berlin NW 7,
Neustaedt. Kirchstrasse 9/10, Tel. 120024

4. Phosphorus fertilizers.

Manufactured by Grossdeutscher Phosphatverband GmbH., Berlin NW 35,
Am Karlsbad 17, Telephone: 22 56 16.

Chief: Stenarot MEIERHO, i.Fa. Grossdeutscher Phosphatverband GmbH.,
Berlin NW 35, Am Karlsbad 17, Telephone: 22 56 16.

5. Section Carbide chemistry, methanol and carbonization of wood.

Location: Offen.

Chief: Dir. Dr. Adalbert FISCHER, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheide-
anstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstrasse 9-11.

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Manager: Open.

Group board of directors: Dir. Dr. Adelbert FISCHER i. Fr. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt.
Dir. Dr. KRAEMER, i. Fr. Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoff-Werke A.G., Trostberg (Oberbayern).
Assessor MUELLER, i. Fr. Lonza-Werke GmbH, Weil (Rh.).
Dir. Dr. MERTOS, i. Fr. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen (Rhein).

Department: a) Carbide.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. KRAEMER, i. Fr. Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoff-Werke A.G., Trostberg (Oberbayern).

Department: b) Carbide subsequent products.

*Chief: Assessor MUELLER, i. Fr. Lonza-Werke GmbH, Weil (Rhein).

Section: 1) Acetyl aldehyde.

*Chief: Dr. Wolfgang ALT, i. Fr. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen (Rhein).

Section: 2) Acetic acid and acetic anhydride.

*Chief: Assessor MUELLER, i. Fr. Lonza-Werke GmbH, Weil (Rhein).

Section: 3) Solvents and butanol.

*Chief: Dir. Walther LUDWIGS, i. Fr. I.G. Farbenindustrie, Frankfurt a.M., Gruensburgplatz.

Section: 4) Acetone and isopropyl alcohols.

*Chief: Dir. Goe HUBER, i. Fr. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 5) Softeners.

*Chief: Dir. Walther LUDWIGS, i. Fr. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Gruensburgplatz.

Section: 6) Monochloroacetic acid and subsequent products.

*Chief: Dr. RUDLOFF, i. Fr. Kalle & Co. A.G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich.

Section: 7) Ethylene chemistry.

*Chief: Dir. Helmuth BONGARDT, i. Fr. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Gruensburgplatz.

Section: 8) Carbon chloride hydrogens.

*Chief: Dir. Walther LUDWIGS, i. Fr. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Gruensburgplatz.

Department: c) Methanol and carbonization of wood.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Adelbert FISCHER, i. Fr. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11.

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Section: 1) Methanol and isobutanol.

*Chief: Dir. Geo HUBERT, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 2) Formaldehyde and subsequent products.

*Chief: Dir. Geo HUBERT, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 3) Charcoal.

*Chief: Dir. HILLER, i.Fa. Holzkohlenverkaufsstelle GmbH., Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 116.

Section: 4) Activated carbon.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. RULPING, i.Fa. Lurgi, Ges.f. Aermettechnik mbH., Frankfurt a.M., Gervinusstrasse 17-19.

6. Department Ferro alloys, steel and light metal alloys.

Location: Berlin W 7, Unter den Linden 10. Tel.: 16 57 75.

Chief: Dr. Heinz GEHR, i.Fa. Ges.f. Elektrometallurgie Dr. Heinz Gehrs, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Hardenbergstrasse 3.

Manager: Dipl.-Volkswirt KERNBERG.

Section: 1) Ferrosilicon.

*Chief: Dir. Dipl.-Ing. FUCHS, i.Fa. Ges.f. Elektrometallurgie Dr. Heinz Gehrs, Elektrowerk Lippendorf, Post Neukieritzsch, Kr. Borna (Sachsen).

Section: 2) Ferrochromium and ferromanganese.

*Chief: Dir. Ernst HUEBLER, i.Fa. Elektrowerk Weisweiler, Weisweiler ueber Eschweiler.

Section: 3) Tungsten, molybdenum.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. HEY, i.Fa. Badische Wolframwerk GmbH., Soellingen b. Karlsruhe (Baden).

Section: 4) Vanadium.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Hermann LING, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld.

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Section: 5) Other steel and light metal alloys.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. EDELUCK, i.Fa. Theodor Goldschmidt A.G., Essen, Heilermannstrasse 15.

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7. Group Industrial gases.

Location: Open.

Chief: Not yet appointed.

Manager: Open.

Department: a) Cutting and welding gases.

Chief: Not yet appointed.

Department: b) Liquid carbonic acid.

Chief: Not yet appointed.

Department: c) Dry ice.

Chief: Not yet appointed.

8. Group Synthetic materials.

Location: Berlin W 35, Grossadmiral-Prinz-Heirich-Str. 20.
Telephone: 22 75 61.

Chief: Dir. GRÄPEL, i.Fa. Internationale Calalith-Gesellschaft, Hamburg-Harburg 1.

Manager: Dr. RADSTUEBNER (called to the colors)

Substitute: THUELMANN.

Board of directors: in preparation.

Department: a) Acetyl cellulose.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. HOSEMAN, i.Fa. Dr. Alexander Wacker GmbH., Gesellschaft fuer elektrochemische Industrie, Muenchen 22, Prinzregentenstrasse 20.

Department: b) Celluloid and acetyl celloid. *)

*Chief: Dir. Dr. BOEMM, i.Fa. Venditor GmbH., Troisdorf, Bez. Koeln.

Department: c) Vulcanized fibers.

*Chief: Dir. SCHMID-BIELENBERG, i.Fa. Vulkanfiber-Fabrik Martin Schmid, Berlin W 35, Potsdamer Str. 141.

Department: d) Production of synthetic resins and plastics.

*Chief: Dir. KOPP, i.Fa. August Nowack A.G., Berlin W 35, Stualerstrasse 7.

Department: e) Lacquer synthetic resins.

*) sic !

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*Chief: Dir. Dr. WINKLER, i. Pa. Chemische Werke Albert A.G., Wiesbaden-
Biebrich, Albertstrasse.

Department: f) Materials to be cast by spraying.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. WIEBES, i. Pa. Venditor-Kunststoff-Verkaufs-GmbH.,
Troisdorf, Bez. Koeln.

Department: g) Vinyl polymerisates.

*Chief: Dir. BONGELADET, i. Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M.,
Grüneburgplatz.

Department: h) Acrylates.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. MUELLER, i. Pa. Roehm & Haas GmbH., Darmstadt, Weiter-
stedter Strasse 42.

Department: i) Soda glass ("Zellglas").

*Chief: Dir. Adolf TODT, i. Pa. Kalle & Co. A.G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich,
Rheinstrasse 25.

Department: j) Artificial guts.

*Chief: Dir. Adolf TODT, i. Pa. Kalle & Co. A.G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich,
Rheinstrasse 25.

Department: k) Fire plate glass.

*Chief: Fritz H. VER, i. Pa. Haver & Boecker, Oelde, Kloygarten 2.

Department: l) Linoleum.

Chief: Dir. L. KUPFER, i. Pa. Deutsche Linoleum-Werke A.G., Delmenhorst
i. O.

Department: m) Sheet gelatine.

Chief: Rudolf L. LITHECK, i. Pa. Langheck & Co., Esslingen (Necker).

9. Buna.

Personal commission to: Dir. Dr. WIEBES, i. Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Ludwigshafen (Rhein).

10. Group Powder and Explosives.

Location: Open.

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Chief: Gen.-Dir. Dr.-Ing. Otto S. REIZIN, i.Fa. Westfaelische-Inhaltische Sprengstoff-...G. Chemische Fabriken, Berlin 79, Linkstrasse 25.

Manager: Open.

11. Group Chemical production of fibers (including fully synthetic fibers)

Location: Berlin 35, Sigismundstrasse 2, Tel.: 22 27 28.

Chief: Gen.-Dir. Dr. Ernst Hellmut VITS, i.Fa. Vereinigte Glanzstofffabriken A.G., Berlin 35, Standartenstrasse 5.

Manager: Dr. FELTZER.

12. Group Rubber industry.

Location: Berlin 62, Budapest Strasse 10, Tel.: 22 36 71/72.

Chief: Dir. Dr. Fritz KOENIGCKE, i.Fa. Continental-Gummiwerke A.G., Hannover, Vahrenwalder Strasse 100.

Manager: COTT...

Group President: Dir. Dr. KOENIGCKE, i.Fa. Continental-Gummiwerke A.G., Hannover, Vahrenwalder Strasse 100, chairman.

Dr. K. STIEGL, i.Fa. Semporit Gummiwerke A.G., Wien 1, Welfersdorfer Strasse 9-13.

F. W. K. ISE, i.Fa. Hansens Gummi- und Packungswerke, Hannover-Helfel.

Dr. PAHL, i.Fa. Pehlsche Gummiasbest-Gesellschaft, Dusseldorf, am Gatharhof 43.

Dr. BECK, i.Fa. Continental Gummiwerke A.G., Hannover, Vahrenwalder Strasse 100.

FRIEDRICH, i.Fa. Harburger Gummiwarenfabrik Phoenix A.G., Hamburg-Harburg 1.

Department: a) Soft and hard rubber goods.

Chief: F. W. K. ISE, i.Fa. Hansens Gummi- und Packungswerke, Hannover-Helfel.

Department: b) Rubber shoes, soles and heels, rubberized and gutta-percha substances, rubber threads.

Chief: Dir. PAJUM, i.Fa. Gummiwerke Elbe A.G., Klein-Mittenberg (Elbe).

Department: c) Tires.

Location: Berlin 62, Budapest Str. 10, Tel.: 22 36 71/72.

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Chief: Dir. Dr. Fritz KOENECKE, i.Fa. Continental-Gummiwerke A.G.,
Hannover, Vahrenwalder Strasse 100.

13. Group Varnishes (lacquers)

Location: Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 200, Tel.: 87 65 32.

Chief: Wulffing v. LINTZ, i.Fa. Hermann Wulffing A.G., Lackfabrik,
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Guerickestrasse 19.

Manager: Dr. LINTZ.

Department: a) Varnish requirements of the army.

*Chief: Dir. FUCHS, i.Fa. Lack- und Farbenfabrik Court & Baur A.G.,
Berlin 15, Duesseldorfer Strasse 52.

Department: b) General varnish requirements, exchange of metals.

*Chief: Dr. WEINDORF, i.Fa. Schramm, Lack- und Farbenfabriken A.G.,
Offenbach a.M., Postfach 38.

Department: c) Varnishes for tin cans and impregnation of cartons.

*Chief: Walter WIEDERHOLD, i.Fa. Hermann Wiederhold, Hilden (Rhein).

Department: d) Enveloping varnishes, motor fuel-resisting varnishes.

*Chief: Dr. NIEHLUS, i.Fa. Zeollner-Werke, Berlin-Neukölln, Neuköllnische
Allee 60-74.

Department: e) Paints for agricultural machinery.

*Chief: Paul PERTHUN, i.Fa. Gross & Perthun, Mannheim-Industrieafen,
Industriealasse 14.

Department: f) Camouflage and fire protection paints.

*Chief: Dir. MEISS, i.Fa. Glasurit-Werke A.G., Berlin 15, Grossadmiral-
von-Koester-Ufer 67.

Department: g) Paints for the Reichsbahn (Federal Railways).

*Chief: Dr. JESSE, i.Fa. Gustav Rath, Temperol-Werke, Hamburg, at the
present time: Jandhaus Stoppel b. Neuhaus (Elbe)

Department: h) Varnish requirements of the Navy.

*Chief: Dr. KOKEN, i.Fa. Dr. Koken und Dr. Renner K.G., Berlin-Tempelhof,
Berliner Strasse 167.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Department: i) Building varnishes, including rust protective paints.

*Chief: Dr. ZSCHOCKE, i.Pr. Herbig-Haarhaus A.G., Koeln-Bickendorf.

Department: j) Binders and emulsions.

*Chief: Dr. SCHMIDT, i.Pr. Springer & Moeller, Leipzig-Lautsch.

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Department: k) Electrical insulating varnishes.

*Chief: Dr. BECK, i.Pr. Dr. Beck & Co., Berlin-Adlershof, Augusta-Viktoria-Strasse 92.

Department: l) Varnish requirements of the Air Force.

*Chief: Dr. H. HERBIG, i.Pr. Herbig-Haarhaus A.G., Koeln-Bickendorf.

Department: m) Industrial varnish requirements for generally war-important purposes.

*Chief: Dr. Walter HAYM, i.Pr. DUCO A.G., Berlin-Scindlersfeld.

14. Group Mineral colors.

Location: Berlin 35, Grossadmiral-Prinz-Heinrich-Str. 19.
Telephone: 21 26 16.

Chief: Oberbaumeister C. KÜHNIGER, Mannheim, Rathaus.

Manager: Dr. BOLTE (called to the colors). Substitute: STOLLNER.

Group board of directors: In preparation.

Department: a) Lead paints.

Chief: Dipl.-Ing. Robert MEIER, i.Pr. Lindrens & Soehne, Koeln-Muchheim,*)
Deutsches Kaiser Strasse 173.

Department: b) Printing colors.

*Chief: Konsul Dr. Hans GILTZKE, i.Pr. Berger & Wirth, Druckfarben-
fabriken, Leipzig 4, Waldenstrasse 2.

Department: c) Earth and variegated colors.

Chief: Philipp LEBEL, i.Pr. G. Siegle & Co. GmbH., Stuttgart 1,
Postfach 276.

*) sic !

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Department: d) Lithopone.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. SCHUTZ, i.Pa. "Sachtleben" A.G., Koeln (Rhein).

Department: e) Titanium white.

*Chief: Dir. Carl v. WEIDEN, i.Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Grunburgplatz.

Department: f) Ultramarine.

Chief: Arthur LEVINKUS, i.Pa. Vereinigte Ultramarinfabriken A.G., Koeln-Marienburg, Lindenallee 11.

Department: g) Zinc colors.

*Chief: Dr. Max GRUFF, i.Pa. Lindgens & Soehne, Koeln-Muelheim, Deuts-Muelheimer Strasse 173.

Department: h) Chemical products for the glass, ceramics and enamel industries.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. Hans KOHL, i.Pa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Department: i) Soot.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Helmut GUTLACH, i.Pa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 1) Carbon (flame) soot.

*Chief: Ludwig SCHUMER, i.Pa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 2) Activated soot.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. HEUGEL, i.Pa. Deutsche Gasrusswerke GmbH., Dortmund, Luegheider Str. 173-181.

Section: 3) Acetylene soot.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. v. ILL, i.Pa. Bayer. Stickstoffwerke A.G., Berlin-Schoeneberg, Kufsteiner Strasse 69.

15. Textile and leather auxiliary aids and tanning materials.

Location: Berlin 35, Potsdamer Strasse 111. Tel.: 21 95 01.

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*Chief: Dir. Dr. WENZIG, i.Fa. Chemische Fabrik Gruenau A.G., Berlin-Gruenau, Regattastrasse 35.

Manager: SCHER.

Department: a) Textile and leather auxiliary aids.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. SCHWARZ, i.Fa. Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chem. Fabrik Doelau, Greiz-Doelau, Liebigstrasse 7.

Section: 1) Textile auxiliary aids.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. SCHWARZ, i.Fa. Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chem. Fabrik Doelau, Greiz-Doelau, Liebigstrasse 7.

Section: 2) Leather auxiliary aids.

*Chief: Lothar WENZIG, i.Fa. Chemische Fabrik OWG., Heilbronn (Neckar), Halbmondstrasse 3.

Section: 3) Auxiliary aids for the hides and skins, paper and bed-feather industry.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. SCHWARZ, i.Fa. Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chem. Fabrik Doelau, Greiz-Doelau, Liebigstrasse 7.

Department: b) Tanning materials.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. Carl FELDMANN, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen (Rhein).

Section: 1) Synthetic and mineral tanning materials.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. Carl FELDMANN, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen (Rhein).

Section: 2) Tanning extracts.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. HOFFES, i.Fa. Deutsch-Koloniale Gerbstoff-GmbH., Karlsruhe, Landstrasse 16.

Sub group: c) Shoes, leather and floor polishes.

Location: Berlin 15, Kurfuerstendamm 24. Tel.: 91 36 91.

Chief: Dir. Ernst LOTZ, i.Fa. Sidel-Werke, Siegel & Co., Koeln-Braunsfeld, Eupener Strasse 32.

16. Tar dyes and tar dye intermediate products.

Personal orders to: Dir. Dr. von SCHNITZLER, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Gruenburgerplatz.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

17. Group Pharmaceutical industry.

Location: Berlin W 62, Kleiststrasse 2, Telephone 24 94 21.

Chief: Fabrikbesitzer Joh. Carl PFLUGGER, i.Pa. MED., Fabrik chem.-pharm. Präparate J.C. Pflueger, Berlin O 112, Frankfurter Allee 56.

Manager: Dr. KOPPEL.

Group board of directors: In preparation.

Section: 1) General medicaments.

Chief: Dir. KIEFER, i.Pa. Astawerke A.G., Brackwede (Westf.)

Section: 2) Serums and vaccines.

*Chief: Dir. C. ZIMM, i.Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen (Rhein).

Section: 3) Chemotherapeutic products.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. A. THIEME, i.Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen (Rhein)

Section: 4) Vitamins.

*Chief: Dr. C. COMAUS, i.Pa. E. Merck, Chem. Fabrik, Darmstadt, Frankfurter Strasse 250.

Section: 5) Organic preparations.

*Chief: Prof. Dr. H. KLUCK, i.Pa. Degussa GmbH., Berlin NW 7, Luisenstr. 41.

Section: 6) Theobromine and caffeine.

*Chief: Dir. L. KAMSTENGER, i.Pa. Knoll A.G., Chem. Fabrik, Ludwigshafen (Rhein)

Section: 7) Quinine.

*Chief: H. ENGELHARDT, i.Pa. C.F. Boehringer & Soehne GmbH., Mannheim-Neckhof.

Section: 8) Opium and other alkaloids.

*Chief: Dir. Willy DETMANN, i.Pa. C.H. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim (Rhein)

Section: 9) Galenic preparations.

*Chief: Friedrich CLAUER, i.Pa. Pharma GmbH., Schweinfurt (Main).

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Section: 10) Surgical stitching material.

*Chief: Dir. J. WYK, i.Fa. R. Graf & Co., Sueddeutsche Katgutfabrik,
Kuerenberg-C., Gleissbuehlstrasse 16.

Section: 11) Medical plasters.

*Chief: Fr. LAKS BIER, i.Fa. Vulnoplast F. Lakemeier K.G., Bonn, Weststrasse
26.

Section: 12) Biological medicaments and homeopathy.

*Chief: Hans W. DAUS, i.Fa. Dr. Wadaus & Co., Radebaul-Dresden.

Section: 13) Dental medicaments.

*Chief: Dr. BOCHT, i.Fa. Dr. Jos. Schoene, Berlin-Grunewald, Hubertusallee
24a.

Section: 14) Disinfectants.

*Chief: Dir. Alfred SAGSTEDT, i.Fa. Chem. Fabrik von Heyden A.G.,
Radebaul-Dresden.

(page 6 of original)

Department: 15) Veterinary medicaments.

*Chief: Dr. Jos. SCHEFF, i.Fa. Chem. Fabrik Marienfelde GmbH., Hamburg 36,
Neuer Wall 10.

18. Department: Photochemical products.

Location: Berlin W 35, Sigismundstrasse 6, Telephone 22 75 61.

Chief: Dir. WILH. OTTE, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. - Agfa, Berlin
SO 36, Lohmuhlenstrasse 67.
Manager: Dr. SCHMIDT.

19. Group Plant protection preparations and insecticides.

Location: Berlin W 35, Grossadmiral-Prinz-Heinrich-Str. 20.
Telephone 22 75 61.

Chief: G. THOMBECKE, i.Fa. Otto Hensberg, Neckenheim (Rhein).
Manager: Dr. SCHMIDT.

Department: a) Caustics for seed grains.

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

*Chief: Dir. Dr. PAUL WILHELM, i. Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Abt. Pflanzenschutz, Leverkusen.

Department: b) Insecticides and fungicides.

*Chief: Dir. Erich FISCHER, i. Pa. Chemische Fabrik von I.E. Döbriant A.G., Hamburg 36, Alsterbarrasse 2.

Section: 1) Synthetic preparations.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Cl. LUTER, i. Pa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Appertal-Elberfeld.

Section: 2) Arsenic preparations.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. Friedrich BOCHLE, i. Pa. Fabr. Borchers, A.G., Goslar.

Section: 3) Copper preparations (also cuprous arsenic preparations)

*Chief: Dir. Erich FISCHER, i. Pa. Chemische Fabrik von I.E. Döbriant A.G., Hamburg 36, Alsterbarrasse 2.

Section: 4) Inter spraying preparations.

*Chief: Dr. HEINE, Avenarius-Werborn, i. Pa. Fabr. Avenarius, Gau-Algesheim (Rhine)

Section: 5) Nicotine preparations.

*Chief: Dir. Kurt FÖRSTER, i. Pa. F. Schacht K.G., Braunschweig, Bueltenweg

Department: 6) Pyrethrum, derris and quassia preparations (in so far as not for indoor fumigation).

*Chief: Dr. D. LUTER, i. Pa. Heideroff & Co. K.G., Appertal-Elberfeld, Uellendahler Strasse 499.

Department: c) Indoor fumigation preparations.

*Chief: Dr. G. FIEBIGER, i. Pa. Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Schaedlingsbekämpfungsmittel m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstrasse 9.

Department: d) Other plant protecting preparations and insecticides.

*Chief: Dr. D. LUTER, i. Pa. Heideroff & Co. K.G., Appertal-Elberfeld, Uellendahler Strasse 499.

Section: 1) Tree nursing preparations.

*Chief: Dr. D. LUTER, i. Pa. Heideroff & Co. K.G., Appertal-Elberfeld, Uellendahler Strasse 499.

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

Section: 2) Rat and mouse poisons.

*Chief: Dr. W. FREYBERG, i.Fa. Ernst Freyberg, Chem. Fabrik Delitia, Delitzsch (Sa.)

Section: 3) Fly papers.

*Chief: Dr. C. THIESS, i.Fa. Chemische Fabrik Dr. C. Thiesse, Zeitz, Wasserberg 10.

Section: 4) Moth protection preparations.

*Chief: Theodor SCHMALFUSS, i.Fa. Gottfried Schmalfluss, Koeln, (Rhein), Mainzer Strasse 32.

20. Group Glues, adhesives and gelatines.

Location: Open.

Chief: Dir. Dr. L. STEINFELD, i.Fa. Scheidemandel-Motard-Terke A.G., Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstrasse 35.
Manager: Open.

Department: a) Hide and leather glue.

Chief: Dir. F. MENSCH, i.Fa. Gebr. Garve, GmbH, Meuselz (Oder), Berliner Chaussee 11.

Department: b) Bone glue.

Chief: Dir. Dr. L. STEINFELD, i.Fa. Scheidemandel-Motard-Terke A.G., Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstrasse 35.

Department: c) Gelatine.

Chief: Dir. F. ALTMANN, i.Fa. Deutsche Gelatine-Fabriken A.G., Schweinfurt, (Main), Postfach.

Department: d) Synthetic glues.

*Chief: Wilhelm JANSSEN, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Uerdingen (Rhein), Rheinuferstrasse 7-9.

Group: e) Plant (vegetable) glues.

*Chief: Dr. SUPP, i.Fa. Sichel-Terke A.G., Hannover-Limmer.

Section: f) Synthetic glues.

*Chief: Dir. FIMCK, i.Fa. Atlas Agro Chemische Fabrik Aktiengesellschaft, Meiskau b. Leipzig.

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Department: g) Casein cold glue.

*Chief: Fritz ELHARDT, i.Pa. Elhardt Soehre, Durach b. Kempten (Allgaeu)

21. Group Soap, washing and cleaning materials industry.

Location: Berlin W 62, Budapest Strasse 21, Tel.: 25 47 61.

Chief: Ernst OEHME, i.Pa. Delespa-Werke GmbH., Delmonhorst (Oldenburg).

Manager: FRIEDRICH.

Group board of directors: Ernst OEHME, i.Pa. Delespa-Werke GmbH.
K.F. ZIEGE, i.Pa. Seifenfabrik Puhl & Co., Berlin SO 36, Treptower Strasse
36-39.

Dr. Jost HECKEL, i.Pa. Henkel & Cie, GmbH., Duesseldorf, Postfach 345.

Department: a) Solid soaps.

*Chief: Fabrikbesitzer K. F. ZIEGE, i.Pa. Puhl & Co., Seifen- und Chemische
Fabrik, Berlin SO 36, Treptower Strasse 33 - 39.

Department: b) Soap powder and laundering preparations for fine linens.

*Chief: Dr. Jost HECKEL, i.Pa. Henkel & Cie. A.G., und GmbH., Duesseldorf,
Postfach 345.

Department: c) Industrial soaps.

*Chief: Dr. Julius STOCKHAUSEN, i.Pa. Stockhausen & Traisor, Krefeld.

Department: d) Cleaning materials.

*Chief: Dr. Jost HECKEL, i.Pa. Henkel & Cie. A.G. und GmbH., Duesseldorf,
Postfach 345.

22. Group Toilet requisites.

Location: Berlin W 50, Budapest Strasse 39, Tel. 24 30 48.

Chief: Richard BURCHARD, i.Pa. Waldheimer Parfumerie- und Feinseifen-
fabrik A.H.A. Bergmann K.G., Waldheim (Sachsen).

Manager: Temporarily Dr. HORST.

Department: a) Dentifrices.

*Chief: Gen-Dir. Rich. MULLER, i.Pa. Leo-Werke GmbH., Dresden - N. 6,
Koenigsbruecker Strasse 12-14.

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Department: b) Hair lotions.

*Chief: Dir. Willy WEBER, i.Pa. Hans Schwarzkopf, Berlin-Tempelhof.

Department: c) Skin lotions.

*Chief: Dr. Walter OLFF, i.Pa. Wolff & Sohn GmbH, Karlsruhe (Baden),
Robert-Wagner-Allee 31.

Department: d) Foot lotions.

*Chief: Dr. Walter OLFF, i.Pa. Wolff & Sohn GmbH, Karlsruhe (Baden),
Robert-Wagner-Allee 31.

Department: e) Theatrical requisites.

*Chief: Dr. Siegfried LEICHER, i.Pa. L. Lechner, Berlin SW., Schuetzen-
strasse 31.

Department: f) Other body lotions.

*Chief: Dir. Herbert SCHUETTE, i.Pa. Ferdinand Muelhens 4711, Koeln-
Threnfeld, Vogelssanger Strasse 100.

23. Group Roofing paper industry.

Location: Berlin NW 21, Alt-Moabit 83 c. Tel. 397201.

Chief: Dr. Ewald KOHL, i.Pa. Zimmermann & Cie., Koeln-Muelheim.

Manager: Dr. KOSTZ.

24. Group Utilization of animal carcasses.

Location: Berlin W 35, Koernerstrasse 25, Tel. 22 75 61.

Chief: Dipl.-Landwirt Carl COHNHAHM, i.Pa. Carl Konnenberg, Hannover.

Manager: Dr. TROSCHE.

25. Group Processing of whales.

Location: Berlin W 35, Sigismundstrasse 6, Tel. 22 75 61.

Chief: Dr. Hugo HENCKEL, Dusseldorf, Melkastenstr. 15.

Manager: Dr. SCHMIDT.

Group is not functioning for the time being.

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Collective Group I.

Other inorganic products.

Section: a) Rare earths (also priming metal).

*Chief: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Karl QUASEBART, i.Fa. Auergesellschaft A.G.,
Berlin N 65, Friedrich-Krause-Ufer 24.

Section: b) Boron compounds.

*Chief: Dr. Wolfgang BERCKMEYER, i.Fa. Schering A.G., Berlin N 65,
Müllerstrasse 170.

Department: c) Phosphorus and industrial phosphorus compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. WACKER, i.Fa. Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Piesteritz.

Section: 1) Phosphorus, phosphoric acid and phosphorus compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. WACKER, i.Fa. Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Piesteritz.

Section: 2) Phosphoric acid salts.

*Chief: Robert MAXMILLER, in Fa. Chemische Fabrik Joh. A. Benckiser
GmbH., Ludwigshafen (Rhein), Frankenthaler Strasse 5.

Department: d) Salts and compounds of cyanide.

*Chief: Dir. Hans-Hugo DÄJER, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheide-
anstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 1) Salts of cyanide and cyanide metal.

*Chief: Dir. Hans-Hugo DÄJER, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheide-
anstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 2) Salts of ferrocyanide.

*Chief: August SCHENK, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt,
Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 3) Rhodanum salts and sulfo-urac.

*Chief: August SCHENK, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt,
Frankfurt a.M., Postfach 107.

Section: 4) Blue dyes.

*Chief: Dir. Joachim FINTENBERG, i.Fa. Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin-Nieder-
schönhausen, Berliner Strasse 1-4.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Department: a) Hardening agents.

*Chief: Dipl.-Ing. H.E. SCHIEGELBUSCH, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Gutleutstrasse 215.

Section: 1) Hardening salts.

*Chief: Dipl.-Ing. H.E. SCHIEGELBUSCH, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Gutleutstrasse 215.

Section: 2) Hardening powders.

*Chief: W.H. GORRIG, i.Fa. Gorrig & Co. KG., Mannheim, Elisabethstrasse 3.

Section: f) Ore flotation agents.

*Chief: Dir. Geo HUELT, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstrasse 9.

Section: g) Manganese compounds.

*Chief: Dir. SCHARMAGL, i.Fa. Chemische Fabrik Aussig-Falkenau GmbH., Aussig-Falkenau.

Section: h) Iodine compounds.

*Chief: Dr. Th. LINDHAR, i.Fa. Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Muellerstr. 170.

Section: i) Bromine compounds.

*Chief: Gen.-Dir. SACHS, i.Fa. Deutscher Salzverband, Steinsalzverkauf, Berlin SW 11, Schoenberger Strasse 5.

Department: j) Fluorine compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Edo SCHALF, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M. Grunenburgplatz.

Section: 1) Cryolite and aluminum-fluoride.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. KLEBERT, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen.

Section: 2) Hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds.

*Chief: Dir. SIEGEL, i.Fa. Ruetgerswerke A.G., Abt. Fluorwerke, Dohna u. a. b. Weidenau (Sachsen).

Section: k) Chromium compounds.

*Chief: Dr. DILTHEY, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Uerdingen (Rhein).

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Section: l) Barium compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Joachim FINKELMANN, i.Fa. Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin-Niederschöneweide, Berliner Strasse 1-4.

Section: m) Strontium compounds.

*Chief: Dir. PFISTER, i.Fa. Dr. L.C. Marquart A.G., Buel (Rhein)

Section: n) Iron salts.

*Chief: Theodor VOLMERS, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Verkaufsteilung Chem. Produkte, Leverkusen.

Department: o) Zinc compounds.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. SCHIESS, i.Fa. A.G. f. Zinkindustrie vorm. Grillo, Duisburg-Hamborn, Weseler Strasse 1.

Section: 1) Zinc sulfate.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. SCHIESS, i.Fa. A.G. f. Zinkindustrie vorm. Grillo, Duisburg-Hamborn, Weseler Strasse 1.

Section: 2) Zinc chloride.

*Chief: Dir. Edo SCHAAF, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M. Grunburgplatz.

Department: p) Aluminum compounds.

*Chief: Dr. Edgar GIULINI, Ludwigshafen (Rhein), Kaiser-Wilhelm-Strasse 56.

Section: 1) Aluminum chloride.

*Chief: Julius EISENGARTEN, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M. Grunburgplatz.

Section: 2) Aluminum sulfate and alums.

*Chief: Dir. Joachim FINKELMANN, i.Fa. Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin-Niederschöneweide, Berliner Strasse 1-4.

Section: 3) Alumina hydroxide and calcinated alumina.

*Chief: Dr. Edgar GIULINI, Ludwigshafen (Rhein), Kaiser-Wilhelm-Strasse 56.

Section: 4) Alumina gel.

*Chief: Dir. Franz LECHNER, i.Fa. Otto Krauffmann K.G., Niederschütz b. Dresden.

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Section: 5) Other aluminum compounds.

*Chief: Dr. phil. nat. Oskar JOCHIM, i.Fa. Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chemische Fabrik, Graiz-Doelau (Thür.).

Section: 6) Bismuth and bismuth compounds.

*Chief: Dir. L. PIERS, i.Fa. Norddeutsche Affinerie A.G., Hamburg 36, Alsterterrasse 2.

Section: 7) Beryllium.

*Chief: Dir. Robert HINTES, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11.

Section: 8) Arsenic compounds.

*Chief: Dir. PFISTER, i.Fa. Dr. L.C. Marquart A.G., Buel (Rhein).

Section: 9) Selenium compounds.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. Hans WOH, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11.

Section: 10) Nickel and cobalt compounds.

*Chief: Dr. ABELUNG, i.Fa. Fern. C. Starck A.G., Berlin W 9, Bollnauerstr. 13.

Section: 11) Lithium compounds.

*Chief: Dir. PFISTER, i.Fa. Dr. L.C. Marquart A.G., Buel (Rhein).

Section: 12) Salts of precious metals.

*Chief: Dir. Robert HINTES, i.Fa. Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11.

Section: 13) Activated bleaching clay.

*Chief: Dr.-Ing. ROEMER, i.Fa. Sandchemie A.G., Muenchen 43, Lenbachplatz 5/6.

Section: 14) Silicon carbide and electro-carborundum.

*Chief: Dir. REDEKER, i.Fa. Lonza Werke GmbH., Weil (Rhein), Weidstrasse 2.

Section: 15) Abrasive and polishing pastes.

*Chief: Dr. R. LEHMANN, i.Fa. Lingbein-Pfennhauser-Werke A.G., Leipzig O 5, Torgauer Strasse 76.

Section: 16) Water glass and metasilicate.

*Chief: Dir. PF. PF., i.Fa. Henkel & Cie., Dusseldorf, Postfach 345.

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Collective Group II.

Other organic products.

Section: a) Phenols.

*Chief: Dir. Carl MUELLER, i.Fa. Rueterswerke A.G., Berlin W 35,
Lustowstr. 33-36.

Section: b) Oxy-synthesis and fatty alcohols.

Chief: Not yet appointed.

Section: c) Mersol.

*Chief: Dir. H.C. KOEHLER, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt
a.M., Grunburgplatz.

Section: d) Oxidation of paraffins.

*Chief: Dir. A. IMHUSEN sen., i.Fa. Maerkische Seifenindustrie, Witten
(Ruhr)

Section: e) Polyalcohols.

*Chief: Dir. Valther LUEIGS, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt
a.M., Grunburgplatz.

Section: f) Ethyl ether, narcotic ether, amyl preparations and collodion.

*Chief: Dr. H. BERCKMEYER, i.Fa. Schering A.G., Berlin W 65, Muellerstr. 170.

Section: g) Lead tetraethyl.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. MUELLER-CURADI, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Ludwigshafen (Rhein)

Section: h) Edible acids.

*Chief: Dr. RETEMER jun. i.Fa. Joh. A. Benckiser & Co., Ludwigshafen
(Rhein) Frankenthaler Strasse 30.

Section: i) Oxalic and formic acid.

*Chief: Dir. WAGNER, i.Fa. Rudolph Koepp & Co., Castrich (Rheingau).

Section: j) Salicylic acid and salicylated.

*Chief: Dir. F. STRUBBERG, i.Fa. Chem. Fabrik von Heyden A.G.,
Radebeul b. Dresden.

Departm.: k) Saccharinization of wood.

*Chief: Dr. STRUMPFER, i.Fa. Sueddeutsche Holzverzuckerungswerke A.G.,
Regensburg, Postfach 126.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Department: l) Nutrient yeast.

*Chief: Dir. Baron von VARNHUELLER, i.Fo. Aschaffenburger Zellstoffwerke
A.G., Berlin W 62, Kurfuerstenstrasse 114.

Section: m) Glycerine.

*Chief: Dir. PFAFF, i.Fo. Henkel & Cie. A.G., Duesseldorf, Postfach 345.

Section: n) Saccharine.

*Chief: Dir. JULSTEIN, i.Fo. Fahlberg-List A.G., Magdeburg-Suedost,
Alt Salbke 63-63.

Section: o) Essences and perfumes.

*Chief: Dir. STACHE, i.Fo. Meiss & Co. A.G., Leipzig C 1, Schreiberstrasse 6.

Section: p) Camphor.

*Chief: Dir. Dr. STAMMANN, i.Fo. Schering A.G., Berlin W 65, Muellerstr. 170.

Section: q) Tannin and gallic acid.

*Chief: Dr. Theodor LINDNER, i.Fo. Schering A.G., Berlin W 65, Muellerstr.
170.

Section: r) Benzoic acid and its compounds.

*Chief: Wilhelm J. JENSEN, i.Fo. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Uerdingen (Rhein)
Rheinuferstrasse 7-9.

Section: s) Nitrobenzol, chlorbenzol and aniline.

*Chief: Walter FLOTKE, i.Fo. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M.,
Grüneburgplatz.

Section: t) Vulcanization accelerators.

*Chief: Dir. Walther BORSBERG, i.Fo. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt
a.M., Grüneburgplatz.

Section: u) Cellulose ether.

*Chief: Josef STUCKER, i.Fo. Kalle & Co. A.G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich.

Collective Group III.

Miscellaneous Products of the Chemical Industry.

Section: a) Fine chemicals.

*Chief: Dr. Carl HERCK, i.Fo. J. Herck, Darmstadt, Frankfurter Str. 250.

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

Department: b) Office requirements of chemical nature.

Chief: Dir. Willi FRITZ, i.Fa. Greif-Werke A.G., Goslar (Harz).

Sub group: c) Pencils.

Chief: Dr. Rudolf KREUTZER, i.Fa. I.S. Steadler, Mars-Fleistiftfabrik, Nuernberg.

Department: d) Match factories.

Manufactured by: Deutsche Zuendwaren-Monopolgesellschaft, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Bismarckstrasse 105.

Department: e) Natural resin and natural resin products.

*Chief: August WAGNER, i.Fa. Chemische Werke Albert, Wiesbaden-Biebrich, Albertstrasse 14.

Section: 1) Distillation of raw resin (raw balsam).

*Chief: August WAGNER, i.Fa. Chemische Werke Albert, Wiesbaden-Biebrich, Albertstrasse 14.

Section: 2) Refined natural resins.

*Chief: August WAGNER, i.Fa. Chemische Werke Albert, Wiesbaden-Biebrich, Albertstrasse 14.

Section: 3) Resin glue.

*Chief: Dr. SCHLEIFER, i.Fa. Chemische Fabrik R. Woess, Dueren (Rhld.)

Section: 4) Brewers' and industrial pitches.

*Chief: Dir. Waldemar LILBERT, Tivoli-Industriewerke Eisenhoiss & Co. K.G., Hamburg-Bidelstedt.

Section: f) Ceresins.

*Chief: Dir. K.MIE, i.Fa. Luenburger Wachswerke A.G., Luenburg

Department: g) Candles.

*Chief: Dir. Dr.-Ing. KLEINBOEHL, i.Fa. Deutsche Gasolin, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Adolf-Hitler-Strasse 7-11.

Department: h) Torches and pyrotechnical products.

*Chief: Dir. Franz KOLL, i.Fa. Deutsche Pyrotechnische Fabriken GmbH., Naumarkt (Oberpfalz), Weinberg 26.

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

Department: i) Gas masks.

*Chief: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Karl QUASEBART, i.Fa. Luergesellschaft A.G.,
Berlin N 65, Friedrich-Krause-Ufer 24.

Section j) Gas mantles.

*Chief: Dir. LICHTENBERG, i.Fa. Luergesellschaft A.G., Berlin N 65,
Friedrich-Krause-Ufer 24.

Section: k) Chemical agents for protecting wood.

*Chief: Dir. SIEGEL, i.Fa. Ruotgerswerke A.G., Abt. Fluorwerke,
Dohna ueber Haidennu (Sachsen).

Section: l) Chemical preservatives.

*Chief: Dr. EEDTMN, Berlin-Mariendorf, Blumenweg 9.

Department: m) Chemical agents for the protection of buildings.

Chief: Dir. BLANCHWEISTER, i.Fa. Akt.-Ges. Joh. Joserich,
Hamburg-Bidelstedt, Ottensenstrasse 2-4.

Department: n) Chemical agents for protection against fire.

Chief: Dir. Rudolf BECKERT, i.Fa. Brandor Farbwerke, Chemische Fabrik
G.m.b.H., Brand-Erbisdorf (Sa.), Bahnhofstrasse 31 o.

Department: o) Chemical agents for protection against frost.

*Chief: Dr. Kurt WEISS, i.Fa. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Verkaufsgemein-
schaft Chemikalien, Frankfurt a.M., Gruenewaldplatz.

Department: p) Chemical agents for use by bakers.

*Chief: Dir. Otto DOLL, i.Fa. C.H. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim (Rh).

Department: q) Cable insulating compounds.

*Chief: Willibald GRUNDZINSKI, i.Fa. Chemische Fabrik Grundzinski K.G.,
Duisburg, Parallelhafen 4.

Department: r) Chemical agents for foundries.

*Chief: Dr. h.c. Karl HUNTERESS, i.F. Gebr. Huettenes K.G.,
Duesseldorf-Meerdt, Kissenstrasse 23.

Department: s) Patties.

*Chief: Fritz BRANDENBURG, i.Fa. Boyer & Hase, Chem. Fabrik, Berlin-
Spandau, Seeburger Strasse 90.

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Section: t) Coal ignitors.

*Chef: Dir. H. NOLDT, i. Fa. Kavia-Spacer A.G., Barleben b. Magdeburg,
Bahnhofstrasse 27/28.

Section: u) Industrial cleaning materials.

*Chef: Dr. DITTMER, i.Fa. Wollnerwerke A.G., Ludwigshafen (Rhein).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 June 1947

I, Herbert, RODECK, B.397944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5695.

Herbert RODECK
R 397944

XVII

10 March 1944

Organization of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical advisor
1. Group	Soda, caustic alkalies, chlorine, hydrochloric acid and related products. Chief: Dir. Hellmut EILSBERGER, Deutsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Bernburg/Anh. Location: Bln. Zehlendorf, Theodor Fritsch-Allee 20, Tel.: 841044, Manager: Dr. WEISFERT	Dr. Ernst BUECHER, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld	
a)	<u>Soda, bicarbonate, caustic soda</u> Manufactured by: Deutscher Soda- u. Natron- verband Chief: Gen. Dir. Dr. KOETIGEN, Deutscher Soda- u. Natron- verband, Berlin C 2, Neue Koenigstrasse 27 - 37		Dir. Dipl.-Ing. VOGL Deutsche Solvay- Werke A.G., Berlin W 62
b)	<u>Caustic alkali and potash</u> Chief: Dir. v. HEIDER, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frank- furt a.M., Grunewaldplatz, Manager: Elektro-chemische Produkte GmbH., Frankfurt/., Grunewaldplatz		Dir. RUESEBERG, Kali-Chemie A.G. Berlin-Niederschoc- newalde
c)	<u>Crystal soda</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Kurt HOEBOLD, Solina Lueneburg, Chem. Fabrik A.G., Lueneburg, Neue Suelze 26		Emil GLISSE, Ehrhardt Seifen- fabrik, Berlin- Mohrenschoenkneusen
d)	<u>Chlorine, hypochlorite and chlorate</u> Chief: Dr. Franz WOHLMEIER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie, Bitterfeld		Dr. Ernst BUECHER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld
e)	<u>Hydrochloric acid.</u> Chief: Dir. Bodo SCHAAF I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G. Berlin NW 7, Unter d. Linden 78		Dr. KLEBERT, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	f) <u>Pur compounds</u> Chief: Dir. Friedrich- Wilhelm SCHMIDT, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Postfach 107		Dir. Dr. Ernst BIERTING, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M.
	g) <u>Sodium and potassium metal</u> Chief: Dir. Friedrich- Wilhelm SCHMIDT, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheid- anstalt, Frankfurt/M., Postfach 107		Dir. Dr. Ernst BIERTING, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M.
	h) <u>Chloride of lime</u> Chief: Alfred VORSTER, Köln-Bayenthal, Bonner Str. 530		Dr. BUGGICH Chemische Fabrik Kalk GmbH, Köln-Kalk
2. Group	<u>Sulphur and sulphur compounds</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Carl MURSTER, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/abh. with Group board of directors Location: Berlin S. 68, Kochstr. 73, Tel.: 129021, Branch : 335 Manager: Hermann SCHUSTER	Dir. Dr. Carl MURSTER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/abh.	
	a) <u>Sulphur</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Fritz GUMPERT, Ruhrgas A.G., Essen, Horwarth- str. 60, Management: Schwefel- GmbH, Berlin S. 68, Kochstr. 73		Dipl.-Ing. TRENNCK AG, Ruhrgas A.G., Essen
	b) <u>Sulphuric Acid</u> Chief: Dir. Paul BERGER, Mansfeld'sche Kupferschiefer- bergbau A.G., Eisleben		Dir. Dr. Carl MURSTER I.G.-Farbenindustr. A.G., Ludwigshafen/ Säureregeneration u. -konzentration: v. NAGEL
	c) <u>Carbon Sulphide</u> Chief: Dr. J. KOB, Chem. Fabrik Dr. Jakob GmbH, Bad Kreuznach, Management: Schwefelkohlen- stoff GmbH, Frankf./M., Kaiserstr. 2		Dr. JAKOB, Chem. Fa- brik Dr. Jakob GmbH, Bad Kreuznach

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	d) <u>Sodium sulphidate</u> Chief: Dir. Carl Hermann H. H. H. G. M., member of board of directors of Chemikalien- A.G., Berlin-Halensee, Kurfuerstendamm 74. Management: Sulfatvereinigung GmbH, Berlin-Halensee, Kurfuerstendamm 74.		Dr. MEYER, Winter- hall A.G., Kali- werke, Kassel
	e) <u>Other sulphur compounds</u> Chief: Dir. Rodo SCHLAF, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Berlin W 7, Unter den Linden 78		Dir. Dr. Carl WUR- STER, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.
3. <u>Nitrogen</u> (No group) Manufactured by: Stickstoff-Syndikat GmbH, Berlin W 7, Neustadt. Kirchstr. 9 - 10 Chief: Dir. Dr. OSTER, Stickstoff- Syndikat GmbH, Berlin W 7, Neustadt. Kirchstr. 9-10		Dr. v. STADEN, Ammoniakwerk Marsburg GmbH, Leunawerke Krs. Marsburg	
Sect. a) <u>Primary (Basic) nitrogen and nitrogen fertilizers</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. OSTER, Stickstoff- Syndikat GmbH, Berlin W 7, Neustadt. Kirchstr. 9-10, Tel.: 120024			Dr. v. STADEN, Ammoniakwerk Mar- burg GmbH, Leuna- werke Krs. Marsb.
Sect. b) <u>Industrial nitrogen</u> Chief: Rudolf HINSER, Stickstoff-Syndikat GmbH, Berlin-Schoenberg, Am Park 7, Tel.: 712281			Dr. phil. Ernst W. FLOTH, Ammoniak- werk Marsburg, Leuna-werke Krs. Marsburg
4. <u>Phosphorus fertilizers</u> (No group) Manufactured by: Grossdeutscher Phosphatverband GmbH, Berlin W 35, Am Karlsbad 17 Chief: St. atarat MEINBERG, Gross- deutscher Phosphatverband, Berlin W 35, Am Karlsbad 17		Dipl.-Ing. Fritz VORSTER, Chem. Fabrik Kalk GmbH., Köln-Kalk	

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical Advisor
5. Group	<u>Carbide chemistry, methanol and carbonization of wood</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Adalbert FISCHER, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- scheideanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Leissfreuenstr. 9-11, with Group board of directors Location: Berlin W 8, Fran- zösische Str. 33 f, Tel: 16 46 01, Manager: komm. Dr. MUEK (at the headquarters of the Degussa)	Dir. Dr. Otto J. BROS, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.	
	a) <u>Carbide</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. KUNZE, Sued-deutsche Kalk- stickstoff-Werke A.G., Trostberg-Oberbayern		Dir. Dr. Wildhagen, I.G.-Farbenin- dustrie A.G. Piestoritz
	b) <u>Carbide subsequent products</u> Chief: Assessor MUELLER, Lonza-Werke GmbH, Weil/Rh.		Dir. Dr. Otto BROS, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigsha- fen Rhein
	1) <u>Acetyl aldehyde</u> Chief: Dr. Wolfgang ALT, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rhein		
	2) <u>Acetic acid and acetic anhydride</u> Chief: Assessor MUELLER, Lonza-Werke GmbH, Weil/Rh.		Dir. Dr. phil. Ludwig MOERGEN/ Dr. Alexander WICKER, Ges.f. elektrochem. Indu- strie GmbH, Muenchen 22
	3) <u>Solvents and "butanol"</u> Chief: Dir. Walther LUDWIGS, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M., Grueneburgplatz		Dr. MOELLER, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/ Hochst
	4) <u>Acetone and isopropyl alcohols</u> Chief: Dir. Geo HUBERT, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber- scheideanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Postfach 107		Dir. Dr. phil. Ewald RITTER von RETZE, Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheideanst Frankfurt/M.

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	5) <u>Softeners</u> Chief: Dir. Walther LUDWIGS, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankf./M., Grueburgplatz		Dir. Dr. Reinhard JUNG, Dehydag, Rodleben
	6) <u>Monochloroacetic acid and subsequent products</u> Chief: Dr. RUDLOFF, Kalle & Co. A.G., Wiesbaden-Pfebrich		Dr. Wolfgang LUEBBERT, Kankel & Cie. A.G. und GmbH, Duesseldorf
	7) <u>Ethylene chemistry</u> Chief: Dir. Helmut BORG TRDT, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G. Frankfurt/M., Grueburgplatz		Dr. phil. Wolfgang BUELOW, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigsha- fen
	8) <u>Carbon chloride hydrocarbons</u> Chief: Dir. Walther LUDWIGS, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G. Frankfurt/M., Grueburgplatz		Obering. KALB, Dr. Alexander WACKER, Ges.f. elektrochem. Industrie GmbH, Muenchen 22
c) <u>Methanol and carbonization of wood</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Adalbert FISCHER, Deutsche Gold- und Silberscheide- anstalt, Frankfurt/M., Weiss- frauenstr. 9-11			Dir. Dr. phil. Ewald RITTER vo RITZ, Deutsche Gold- und Sil- ber-Scheidean- stalt, Frank- furt/M.
	1) <u>Methanol and isobutanol</u> Chief: Dir. Geo HUBERT, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber- scheideanstalt, Frankfurt/M. Postfach 107		Dr. Johann GIESSE Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH, Leuna-werke Krs. Merseburg
	2) <u>Formaldehyde and subsequent products</u> Chief: Dir. Geo HUBERT, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber- scheideanstalt, Frankfurt/M. Postfach 107		Dir. Dr. phil. Ewald RITTER vo RITZ, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- scheideanstalt; Frankfurt/M.
	3) <u>Charcoal</u> Dir. HILLER, Holzkohlenverkaufs- stelle GmbH, Frankf./M., Postf. 116		Dr. Karl HINTZ, Deutsche Gold- und Silberschei- deanstalt, Fran- furt/M.

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	4) <u>Activated carbon</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.HUEPFG, Lurgi, Ges.f.Haarmatech- nik mbH, Frankfurt/M., Gervinusstr. 17-19		Dr.HITZMAN, Lury Ges.f.Haarmatech- nik mbH, Frankfurt M.
6. Department Ferro alloys, steel and light metal alloys Chief: Dr.Heinz GEMM, Ges.f. Elektrometallurgie Dr.Heinz GEMM, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Hardenbergstr.3, Location: Berlin S 11, Saar- landstr.62-64, Tel: 195441, Manager: Dipl.-Volkswirt NEHRENBURG		Dir.Dr.Hermann LANG, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld	
	1) <u>Ferrosilicon</u> Chief: Dir.Dipl.-Ing.FUCHS, Ges.f.Elektrometallurgie Dr.Heinz GEMM, Elektrowerk Lippendorf, Post Haukieritzsch, Kreis Borna/Sa.		Dir.Dipl.Ing. FUCHS, Ges.f. Elektrometallur- gie Dr.Heinz GEMM, Elektrowerk Lip- pendorf
	2) <u>Ferrochromium and ferromanganese</u> Chief: Dir.Ernst MUELLER, Elektrowerk Weisweiler, Weisweiler uo/Eschweiler		Dir.Ernst MUELLER Elektrowerk Wei- weiler, Weiswei- ler uo/Eschweiler
	3) <u>Tungsten, molybdenum</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.NEY, Badische Wolframerz-GmbH, Soellingen bei Karlsruhe/Baden		Dir.Dr.NEY, Bad- ische Wolframerz- GmbH, Soelling- en/Karlsruhe/Bad-
	4) <u>Vanadium</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.Hermann LANG I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Bitterfeld		Dir.Dr.Herm.L. I.G.-Farbenind- ustrie, Bitterfel-

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| 5) <u>Other steel and light metal
alloys.</u>
Chief: Dir.Dr.HIEDBRAUCK,
Theodor Goldschmidt A.G.,
Essen, Heilermannstr.15 | Dir.Dr.HIEDBRAUCK
Theodor Gold-
schmidt A.G., He-
ilermannstr.15 |
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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
7. Group			
<u>Industrial gases</u>		Dir. Dr. Rich. LINDE	
Chief: Dir. Bruno MENGE, Vereinigte Sauerstoffwerke GmbH., Berlin SW 11, Trebbiner Str. 9 (Temp. Chief)		Gesellschaft f. Linde's Eisemaschinen A.G., Moellriegels- kreuth b/ Muenchen	
a)	<u>Cutting and welding gases</u> Dir. Bruno MENGE, Vereinigte Sauerstoffwerke GmbH, Berlin SW 11, Trebbiner Str. 9		Dir. Dr. Rich. LINDE Gesellsch. f. Linde's Eisemaschi- nen A.G., Moell- riegelskreuth bei Muenchen
b)	<u>Liquid carbonic acid.</u> Dir. Dr. Erich MAHL, Agafko, Kohlensaurewerke GmbH, Berlin W 62, Luetzowplatz 13.		
c)	<u>Dry ice</u> Dr.-Ing. Friedrich LUK, Schwefel GmbH, Berlin SW 68, Kochstr. 73		Dr.-Ing. Friedrich LUK, Schwefel GmbH, Berlin SW 68
8. Group			
<u>Synthetic materials</u>			
Chief: Dir. GRAEPPEL, Internationale Cellulith-Gesellsch., Hambg.-Harburg 1, with group board of directors Location: Spremberg/H.L., Berliner Str. 1, Tel. 394, Manager: temp. THURMANN		Dr. KOLLER, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.	
a)	<u>Acetyl cellulose</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. ROEMER, Dr. Alexander Macke GmbH, Gesellsch. f. elektro- chem. Industrie, Muenchen 22, Prinz- Regenten-Str. 20		Dir. Dr. ROEMER, Dr. Alexander Macke GmbH, Ges. f. elektrochem. Industrie, Muenchen 22

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b)	<u>Celluloid and acetyl celluloid</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. BOEHM, Venditor GmbH, Troisdorf/Bez. Koeln	Dir. Dr. BOEHM, Venditor GmbH, Troisdorf Bez. Koeln
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Department	Section-	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
c)	<u>Vulcanized fibbers</u> Chief: Dir. SCHMID-BISLWETAG, Vulkanfaserfabrik Martin Schmid, Berlin 35, Potsda- mer Str. 141		Dir. SCHMID-BISLWETAG, BEPG, Vulkanfaser- fabrik Martin Schmid, Berlin 35
d)	<u>Production of synthetic resins and plastics</u> Chief: Dir. KOPP, August Nowak A.G., Berlin 35, Stuelerstr. 7		Dr. HESSEN, August Nowak A.G., Berlin 35
e)	<u>Lacquer synthetic resins</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. LUKLER, Chemische Werke Albert A.G., Mescheden- Biebrich, Albertstrasse		Dr. JORDAN, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen Rh.
f)	<u>Materials to be cast by spraying</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. TIESS, Venditor- Kunststoffverkaufs-GmbH. Troisdorf Bez. Koeln		Dir. Dr. TIESS, Ven- ditor-Kunststoff- verkaufs-GmbH, Troisdorf Bez. Koeln
g)	<u>Vinyl polymerisates</u> Chief: Dir. BORGARDT, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frank- furt/M., Gruenburgerplatz		Dr. phil. Wolfgang BORGARDT, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.
h)	<u>Acrylates</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. LUKLER, Roehm & Haas GmbH, Darmstadt, Weiter- stedter Str. 42		KAUTER, Roehm & Haas GmbH, Darm- stadt
i)	<u>Stain glass ("Zellglas")</u> Chief: Dir. Adolf TODT, Kalle & Co. A.G., Mescheden-Biebrich, Rheinstr. 25		Dir. Adolf TODT, Kalle & Co. A.G., Mescheden-Biebrich
j)	<u>Artificial guts</u> Chief: Dir. Adolf TODT, Kalle & Co. A.G., Mescheden-Biebrich, Rheinstr. 25		Dr. Gert OELFF, Oelff & Co. K.G., auf Aktien, Rom- nitz b. Alsdorf
k)	<u>Wire plate glass</u> Chief: Fritz HAVEL, Haver & Boecker, Golde, Kleygarten 8		Fritz HAVEL, Haver & Boecker, Golde

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	1) <u>Linoleum</u>	Chief: Dir. L. KAUFMANN, Deutsche Linoleum-Werke A.G., Delmenhorst i.O.	Dir. L. KAUF- MANN, Dtsch. Linoleum-Wer- ke A.G. Delmen- horst i.O.
	2) <u>Sheet gelatine</u>	Chief: Rudolf LANGHECK, Langheck u. Co., Esslingen/Neckar	Walther LANG- HECK, Langheck & Co., Esslingen- Neckar
	9. <u>Buna (Synthetic rubber)</u>	(No group) Personal commission to: Dir. Dr. AMBROS, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rhein	Dir. Dr. AMBROS, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G. Ludwigshafen/Rhein
	10. <u>Group</u>	<u>Powder and explosives</u> Chief: Gen. Dir. Dr.-Ing. Otto SARRAZIN, Westfälisch- Anhaltische Sprengstoff- A.G., Chemische Fabriken, Berlin W 9, Linkstr. 25	Gen.-Dir. Dr. Ing. Otto SARRAZIN, Westfälisch-Anhalt. Sprengstoff- A.G., Chem. Fabriken, Berlin W 9
	11. <u>Group</u>	<u>Chemical production of fibers</u> (including fully synthetic fibers) Chief: Gen.-Dir. Dr. Ernst Hellmut VITS, Vereinigte Glanzstofffabriken A.G., Berlin W 35 Standartenstr. 5, Location: Berlin W 35 Buchenstr. 4, Tel.: 229674 Manager: Dr. PELTZER	Dr. H. RATHERT, member of board of directors of Vereinigte Glanzstofffabriken A.G., Aschaffenburg/Main, Postfach 7
	12. <u>Group</u>	<u>Rubber industry</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Fritz KÖNECKE, Continental-Gummiwerke A.G., Hannover, Vahrenwalderstr. 100, with Group Praesidium Location: Gallau/M.L., Töpferstr. 7, Tel.: Gallau 348 Manager: COTTA	Dir. Dr. WEBER, Continental-Gummiwerke A.G., Hannover

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	a) <u>Soft and hard rubber goods</u> Chief: P. MAISEL, Hansens Gummi- und Packungswerke, Hannover-Holzfel		
	(page 10 of original)		
	b) <u>Rubber shoes, soles and heels,</u> <u>rubberized and gutta-percha</u> <u>substances, rubber threads</u> Chief: Dir. P. JUNG, Gummiwerke Elbe A.G., Klein-Mittenberg/Elbe		
Sub- group	c) <u>Tires</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Fritz KOLLE, Continental 1-Gummiwerke A.G., Hannover, Vahrenwalderstr. 100		
13. Group	<u>Varnishes (lacquers)</u> Chief: Wulffing v. WITTIG, Hermann Wulffing K.G., Lackfabrik, Berlin- Charlottenburg 2, Guerickestr. 19, Location: Charl. 9, Kaiserstr. 24, Tol.: 933386, Manager: Dr. LUTJES	Dr. KESCH (Reichsstelle Chemie)	
	a) <u>Varnish requirements of the army</u> Chief: Dir. FUCHS, Lack- und Farbenfabrik Court & Beur A.G., Berlin 15, Duesseldorfer Str. 52		Dir. FUCHS, Lack- u. Farbenfabrik Court & Beur A.G., Eln. 15
	b) <u>General varnish requirements,</u> <u>exchange of retails</u> Chief: Dr. KILMKE, Schreier Lack- und Farbenfabriken A.G., Offenbach/., Postfach 36		Dr. FEUDORF, Schreier Lack- und Farbenfabriken A.G., Offenbach/.
	c) <u>Varnishes for tin cans and</u> <u>impregnation of cartons</u> Chief: Walter FIEDERHOLD, Hermann Fiederhold, Witten/Rhein		Walter FIEDERHOLD, Hermann Fiederhold, Witten/Rhein
	d) <u>Enveloping varnishes, fuel-</u> <u>resisting varnishes</u> Dr. MEYER, Zeillner-Werke, Berlin- Neukölln, Neukoellnische Allee 60/74		Dr. MEYER, Zeill- ner-Werke, Berlin- Neukölln

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	c) <u>Paints for agricultural machinery</u> *) Chief: Paul PERTHUS, Gross & Perthum, Mannheim-Industrie- hafen, Industrie-str. 14		Paul Perthum, Gross & Perthum, Mannheim- Industrie-hafen
	f) <u>Camouflage paints</u> Chief: Dir. MENKE, Glasurit- Werke A.G., Berlin " 35, Gross-Admiral-von-Koester- Ufer 67a		Dir. MENKE, Glasurit- werke A.G., Berlin " 35

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	g) <u>Paints for the Reichsbahn (Federal Railways)</u> Chief: Dr. ASSER, Gustav Ruth Temporol-Werke Hamburg, Z.Z. Jagdhaus Stapel b/Haus/Haus/Elbe		Dr. ASSER, Gustav Ruth Temporol- Werke, Hamburg
	h) <u>Varnish requirements of the Navy</u> Chief: Dr. NOKEN, Dr. Noken und Dr. Renger K.G., Berlin-Tempelhof, Berliner Str. 167		Dr. NOKEN, Dr. Noken und Dr. Renger, K.G. Berlin-Tempelhof
	i) <u>Building varnishes, including rust protective paints</u> Chief: Dr. ZSCHOCKE, Harbig- Hearhaus A.G., Koeln-Bickendorf		Dr. ZSCHOCKE, Harbig- Hearhaus A.G., Koeln-Bickendorf
	j) <u>Binders and emulsions</u> Chief: Dr. SCHLIER, Springer & Kosler, Leipzig-Lautzsch		Dr. SCHLIER, Springer & Kosler, Leipzig-Lautzsch
	k) <u>Electrical insulating paints</u> Chief: Dr. BECK, Dr. Beck & Co., Berlin-Adlershof, Augusta- Viktorie-Str. 92		Dr. BECK, Dr. Beck & Co., Berlin-Adlers- hof
	l) <u>Varnish requirements of the Air Force</u> Chief: Dr. W. HERBIG, Harbig- Hearhaus A.G., Koeln-Bickendorf		Dr. W. HERBIG, - Harbig-Hearhaus A.G. Koeln-Bickendorf

*) Translator's note:

Original has "Driving mechanism for agricultural machinery",
which presumably is a typographical error ("antrieb" instead of
"anstrich")

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	n) <u>Industrial varnish requirements for generally war-important purposes</u> Chief: Dr. Walter HENK, DUCC-A.G. Berlin-Spindlersfeld		Dr. Walter HENK, DUCC-A.G., Berlin Spindlersfeld
14. Group			
	<u>Mineral colors</u> Chief: Oberbuergermeister C. ALM. ENGEL, Mannheim, Rathaus, with group board of directors, Location: Berlin S 68, Kochstr. 73, Tel.: 120021, Branch 2429, Manager: Dr. BOLTS, substitute: STOLMSSER	Rudolf RHODIUS, Gebr. Rhodius, Burgbrohl Bez. Koblenz	
	r) <u>Lead prints</u> Chief: Dipl.-Ing. Robert W. HLEN, Lindgens & Soehnle, Koeln- Muelheim, Deutz-Muelheimer-Str. 173	Rudolf RHODIUS, Gebr. Rhodius, Burgbrohl Bez. Koblenz	

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b) <u>Printing colors</u> Chief: Konsul Dr. Hans W. LITZNER, Borger & Wirth, Druckfarben- fabriken, Leipzig W 24, Hildbourstr. 2	Konsul Dr. Hans Litzner, Borger & Wirth, Druck- farbenfabriken, Leipzig W 24
c) <u>Earth and variegated colors</u> Chief: Philipp LEBE, G. Siegle & Co., G.m.b.H., Stuttgart 1, Postfach 276	Dr. August GEBB, Fali-Chemie, A.G. Berlin-Charlotten- burg 2
d) <u>Lithopons</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. G. W. WITZ, "Sechtleben" A.G., Koeln/Rhein	Dir. Dr. Fritz WITZ, "Sechtleben" A.G., Koeln/Rhein
e) <u>Titanium white</u> Chief: Dir. Carl v. WEIDEN, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frank- furt/M., Grunewaldplatz	Dr. Friedrich H. W. I.G.-Farbenindustrie Leverkusen
f) <u>Ultramarine</u> Chief: Arthur LEWIS, Vereinig- te Ultramarinfabriken A.G., Koeln-Marienburg, Lindenallee 11	Arthur LEWIS, Vereinigte Ultra- marinfabriken A.G., Koeln/Rhein

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	g) <u>Blue colors</u> Chief: Dr. Max CRISPE, Langens & Soehne, Koeln-Muelheim, Deutz-Muelheimer-Str.173		Rudolf MODIUS, Fabr. Rhodius, Burgbrehl Bez. Koblenz.
	h) <u>Chemical products for the glass, ceramics and enamel industries</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. Hans KOHL, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/Main, Postfach 107		Dr.-Ing. Hans KOHL, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheid- anstalt, Frankfurt/A
	i) <u>Soot</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Helmut SCHTEMMER, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt Main, Postfach 107	Dir. Dr. Ernst B. SCHMIDT, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/Main	
	1) <u>Carbon (flame) soot</u> Chief: Rudiger BOJUNOW, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt Main, Postfach 107		Joachim WEGELIN, Gottfried Wegelin, Zons/Rhein
	(page 13 of original)		
	2) <u>Activated soot</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. HERMANN, Deutsche Gasrusswerke GmbH, Dortmund, Lubbeheider Str. 179/181		Dr. HUPF, Deussa- werk August Wegelin, Kalschouran/Bez. Koblenz
	3) <u>Acetylene soot</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. v. TILM, Bayer-Stickstoffwerke A.G., Berlin-Schoenberg, Kufstein- er Str. 69		Dir. Dr. v. TILM, Bayer-Stickstoff- werke A.G., Berlin- Schoenberg
15. Group			
	<u>Textile and leather auxiliary goods and tanning materials</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. HERZOG, Chemische Fabrik Grunau A.G., Berlin- Grunau, Eggenstr. 35, Headquarters: Berlin S. 66, Krausenstr. 22-24, Tel.: 166506, Manager: SCHNEIDER	Dir. Dr.-Ing. Heinrich SCHMIDT, Dehyd., Berlin-Charlottenburg 2	

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
c)	<u>Textile and leather auxiliary aids</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. SCHWARZ, Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chem.Fabrik Döslau, Greiz-Döslau, Lisbigstr.7	Dr. KLIMM, Bohna, Fettchemie-GmbH, Chemnitz	
	1) <u>Textile auxiliary aids</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. SCHWARZ, Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chem.Fabrik Döslau, Greiz-Döslau		Dr. KLIMM, Bohna, Fettchemie-GmbH, Chemnitz
	2) <u>Leather auxiliary aids</u> Chief: Lothar UEBELING, Chem.Fabrik OHG, Heil- bronn/N., Halbmundstr.3		
	3) <u>Auxiliary aids for the hides and skins, paper and bed-feather industry</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. SCHWARZ, Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chem.Fabrik Döslau, Greiz-Döslau		Dr. KLIMM, Bohna, Fettchemie-GmbH, Chemnitz

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b)	<u>Tanning materials</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. Carl FELZ- MANN, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.	Dr.-Ing. Carl FELZ- MANN, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rhein
	1) <u>Synthetic and mineral tanning materials</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. Carl FELZ- MANN, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.	Dr.-Ing. Carl FELZ- MANN, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.
	2) <u>Tanning extracts</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. W. PFES, Deutsch-Koloniale Gerbstoff-GmbH, Karlsruhe, Bondtstr.16	Dir. Dr. W. PFES, Deutsch-Koloniale Gerbstoff-GmbH, Karlsruhe, Bondtstr.

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
Sub c) Shoes, leather and floor group	<u>polishes</u> Chief: Klr. Ernst LOTZ, Sidel-Werke, Siegel & Co., Köln-Braunsfeld, Bupener Str. 32		Dr.-Ing. Carl GENTNER, Goetting
16.	<u>Tar dyes and tar dye intermediate products</u> (no group) Personal orders to: Dir. Dr. von SCHMITZLER, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Frankfurt/M., Grusenburgerplatz	Dir. Dr. STAUSS, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M.	
17.	<u>Group</u> <u>Pharmaceutical industry</u> Chief: Fabrikbesitzer Joh. Carl PFLUGGER, MED Fabrik chem.-pharm. Präparate J.C. Pflüger, Berlin O 112, Frankfurter Allee 56, Location: Berlin N 7, Mittelstr. 37, Tel.: 112287, Manager: Dr. KOPSCH	Dr. CLERIC, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Müllerstr. 170	
	1) <u>General medications</u> Chief: Dir. KIPPER, i. Pa. Lestwerke A.G., Brackwede/M.	Dr. Rudolf SCHMIDT Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Mü- llerstr. 170	
	(page 15 of original)		
	2) <u>Serums and vaccines</u> Chief: Dir. Gerhard ZIEHL, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen/Rhein	Dr. Wolfgang BELL- Sachsisches Serum- werk A.G., Dresden A.1	
	3) <u>Chemotherapeutic products</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Anton WERTENS, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen/Rhein	Dir. Dr. Rudolf SCHMIDT, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65 Müllerstr. 170	
	4) <u>Vitamins</u> Chief: Dr. C. COHLUS, E. Merck, Darmstadt	Dir. Dr. A. FEHRLE, I.G.-Farbenindustr A.G., Leverkusen/ Rhein	

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	5) <u>Organic preparations</u> Chief: Prof. Dr. Helmut KLUCK, Dugowop GmbH., Berlin NW 7, Luisenstrasse 41		Dr. Gustav RWEKAY, Riddel-E. de Haan A.G., Berlin-Brandenburg
	6) <u>Theobromine and caffeine</u> Chief: Dir. Leopold KUNSPERGER, Knoll A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.		Dir. Dr. Heinrich SCHWIDEN, G.H. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim/Rhein
	7) <u>Quinine</u> Chief: Hans ENGELHORN, C.F. Boehringer & Sohn, Mannheim-Neckhof		Dr. Walter BUCHLER, Chininfabrik Braun- schweig-Buchler & Co., Braunschweig
	8) <u>Opium and other alkaloids</u> Chief: Dir. Willy BETHLOFF, C.F. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim/Rh.		Dir. Dr. Erich SIEBE, E. Merck, Darmstadt
	9) <u>Galenic preparations</u> Chief: Friedr. CHLUBER, Pharma GmbH, Schweinfurt/El., Horst- Wessel-Str. 14		Dir. Dr. KELLER, Ch. Fabrik Helfenberg A.G., Helfenberg bei Dresden
	10) <u>Surgical stitching material</u> Chief: Dir. Alfred HAYR, A. Graf & Co., Sueddeutsche Catgutfabrik, Nuernberg-O., Gleisbuchstr. 16		Dir. Alfred HAYR, A. Graf & Co., Sued- deutsche Catgutfab- rik, Nuernberg-O.

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| 11) <u>Medical plasters</u>
Chief: Fritz L. KEMMER,
Vulnoplast, L. Kemmer K.G.,
Bonn-Rhein, Poststr. 26 | Fritz L. KEMMER,
Vulnoplast, L. Kem-
mer K.G., Bonn/R. |
| 12) <u>Biological medicaments
and homeopathy</u>
Chief: Hans MADDAUS,
Dr. Maddaus & Co., Radeboul-
Dresden, Stosch-Strauss-
Str. 15/22 | Dr. Herbert NEUGE-
bauer, Dr. Willmar
Schwabe, Leipzig |

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	13) <u>Dental medicaments</u> Chief: Dr. JOSEF, Dr. Josef SCHÖNE, Berlin- Grünwald, Hubertus- allee 24 f		Dr.-Ing. Erwin B.U- MANN, Dent-1-Zement GmbH, Berlin-Char- lottenburg 4
	14) <u>Disinfectants</u> Chief: Dr. Alfred S. GUSTTER, Chem. Fabrik von Heyden A.G., Hildebrandt-Dresden		Dr. Guenther ENDERS, Schulke & Mayr A.G. Hamburg 39
	15) <u>Veterinary medicaments</u> Dr. Josef SCHEPP, Chem. Fabrik Marionfeldt GmbH, Hamburg 36, Neuenwall 10		Dr. med. vet. Erich HETZEL, I.G.-Farben industrie A.G., Leverkusen/Rhein
18. Department	<u>Photochemical products</u> Chief: Dir. Ilh. OTTO, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G.- Agfa, Berlin SO 36, Lohmühlenstr. 67 Location: Berlin W 35, Sigismundstr. 3, Manager: Dr. SCHMIDT	Dr. Rudolf FISCHER, Technophot, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Hobrechtstr. 67	
19. Group	<u>Plant protection preparations and insecticides</u> Chief: C. THORBECKE, Otto HINSEBERG, Neckenheim/Rhein Location: Grosshartau/Bez. Bautzen, Schloss, Tel.: 175, Manager: Dr. SCHERING	Dir. Dr. LUTER, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Huppertal-Barmen	
	a) <u>Caustics for seed grains</u> Dir. Dr. K. MULLENBACH, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Abt. Pflanzen- schutz, Leverkusen		Dr. Dr. Ing. Hella. H. H. Fahlberg-List A.G., Magdeburg- Südost, Postschliessfach 27

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b) <u>Insecticides and fungicides</u> Chief: Dir. Erich FISCHER, Chem. Fabrik von I.E. Devrient A.G., Hamburg 36, Alsterterrasse 2	Dr. H. SCHOTTE, Schering A.G., Berlin W 65, Müllerstrasse 170
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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	1) <u>Synthetic preparations</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Cl. LUTTER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Hauptstr.-Elberfeld		Dr. FRITLING, Chem. Fabrik I. B. Davrient A.G., Harburg 36, Alsterterrasse 2
	2) <u>Arsenic preparations</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Friedrich BORCHERS, Gebr. Borchers A.G., Goslar		Dir. Dr. Friedrich BORCHERS, Gebr. Borchers A.G., Goslar
	3) <u>Copper preparations</u> (also cuprous arsenic preparations) Chief: Dir. Erich FISCHER Chem. Fabrik von I. B. Davrient A.G., Harburg 36, Alster- terrasse 2		Dr. H. SCHOTTE, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Müllerstr. 170
	4) <u>Tar and mineral oil preparations</u> (except corn weevil insecticides) as well as preparations from dinitroresol Temp. chief: Dr. Heinz J. WILHELMUS-HERBORN, Gebr. J. W. Herborn, Gau Algesheim, Tel.: 202		Dipl.-Ing. FISCHER, Chem. Fabrik ELL- wörden, Harburg- Billbrook, Tel.: 29 34 12
	5) <u>Sulphur sprays, incl. calcium sulphide liquid and vineyard sulphur</u> Temp. chief: Oskar EPLÉ, i. F. Gottlob Eple, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Tel.: 51047		Dr. HEIMZ, Chemische Fabrik Floorsheim A.G., Floorsheim/H., Tel.: 6
	6) <u>Nicotine preparations</u> Chief: Dir. Kurt FÖRSTER, i. F. F. Schacht A.G., Brunschweig, Bültenweg, Tel.: 4147		Dr. HEIMZ, Chemische Fabrik Floorsheim A.G., Floorsheim/H.
	7) <u>Pyrethrum, derris and curassia preparations</u> (in so far as not for indoor fumigation) Chief: Dr. D. LUTTERING, Kaudorff & Co., K.G., Hauptstr.-Elberfeld, Ullendahlstr. 499, Tel.: 33217		Dr. D. LUTTERING, Kaudorff & Co., K.G., Hauptstr.-Elberfeld Ullendahlstr. 499 Tel.: 33 217

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
	b) <u>Corn weevil insecticides</u> (except indoor fumigation preparations) Temp. chief: Otto LIEBZ, Chemische Fabrik "Litta", Kiel-Garden		Dr. PEASE, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M. -Höchst Tel.: 13801
	c) <u>Indoor fumigation</u> preparations Chief: Dr. G. PETERS, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlings- bekämpfung mbH., Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9		Dr. G. PETERS, Deutsche Gesell- sch. f. Schädlings- bekämpfung mbH., Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9
	d) <u>Other plant protecting</u> preparations and insecticides Chief: Dr. D. LAMMERING, Neudorff & Co., K.G., Wuppertal-Elberfeld, Ullendahlerstr. 499		Dr. D. LAMMERING, Neudorff & Co., K.G. Wuppertal- Elberfeld, Ullendahler- str. 499
	1) <u>Tree nursing preparations</u> Dr. D. LAMMERING, Neudorff & Co., K.G., Wuppertal- Elberfeld, Ullendahler- strasse 499		Dr. D. LAMMERING, Neudorff & Co., K.G. Wuppertal- Elberfeld, Ullendahlerstr. 499
	2) <u>Rat and mouse poisons</u> Chief: Dr. W. FREYBERG, Ernst Freyberg Chem. Fabrik Delitzsch, Delitzsch/Sa.		Dr. W. FREYBERG, Ernst Freyberg Chem. Fabrik Delitzsch, Delitzsch/Sa.
	3) <u>Fly papers</u> Chief: Dr. C. THIEME, Chem. Fabrik Dr. C. Thieme, Zeitz, Wasserberg 10		Dr. C. THIEME, Chem. Fabrik Dr. C. Thieme, Zeitz, Wasserberg 10

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- 4) Moth protections preparations Chief: Theodor
SCHMALFUSS, Gottfried
Schmalfuss, Köln/Rh.
Mainzerstr. 32
- Dr. PFROPPE,
Kleemann &
Behnke, Lud-
wigshafen/
Rhein

20. Group

Glues, adhesives and gelatines
Chief: Dir. Dr. L. STEINFELD,
Schneidemandel-Motard-Werke A.G.,
Berlin-NW 7, Dorotheenstr. 35

Dr. Wolfgang
LUMBERT,
Henkel & Cie.
A.G. u. GmbH,
Düsseldorf

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
a)	<u>Hide and leather glue</u> Chief: Dir. F. MENZEL, Gebr. Garvo GmbH, Housatz/Oder, Berliner Chrussoo 11		G. KOERD, G. Konrad / Soehne, Vaihingen/ Ess

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b)	<u>Bone glue</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. L. STEINFELD, Scheidemandel-Motard-Werke A.G., Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstr. 35		Dir. Dr.-Ing. Julius KOHLE, Scheidemandel- Motard-Werke A.G., Berlin NW 7
c)	<u>Gelatine</u> Chief: Dir. F. LEMANN, Deutsche Gelatine-Fabriken A.G., Schweinfurt a. Main, Postfach		FINKEL, Koepff & Soehne, Gelatine- fabrik, Heilbronn/N.
d)	<u>Synthetic glues</u> Chief: Wilhelm JENSEN, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Uerdingen a. Rhein, Rheinuferstr. 7-9		LUEBY, Th. Gold- schmidt A.G., Essen
e)	<u>Plant (vegetable) glues</u> Chief: Dr. SUPP, Sichel- Werke A.G., Hannover-Limmer		Dr. SUPP, Sichel- Werke A.G., Hannover- Limmer
f)	<u>Synthetic adhesives</u> Dir. F. KOCK, Atlas & Co. Chemische Fabrik A.G., Muelkau b. Leipzig		
g)	<u>Casein cold glue</u> Chief: Fritz EILHARDT, Eilhardt Soehne, Duerach b. Kempten-Allgäu		

21. Group

Soap, washing and cleaning materials
industry

Chief: Ernst WOLLMES, Dalespa-Werke GmbH,
Dalsenhorst/Oldenburg, with group board
of directors
Location: Berlin SW 11, Tempelhofer Ufer 16,
Tel.: 19 40 24/35, Manager: K. SCHWEN

Dir. Dr.-Ing. Heinrich
BERTSCH, Dehydag,
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2

e) Solid soaps

Chief: Fabrikbes. K. F. ZIEGL,
Puhl & Co., Seifen- & Chemische
Fabrik, Berlin SO 36, Treptower Str. 33-39

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical Adviser
b)	<u>Soap powder and laundering preparations for fine linens</u> Chief: Dr. Jost HÄGEL, Hinkel & Cie. ...G. und GmbH, Duesseldorf, Postfach 345	Dir. Dr.-Ing. Heinrich BERTSCH, Dehyd., Berlin-Charlottenburg 2	

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c)	<u>Industrial soaps</u> Chief: Dr. Julius STOCKHUSEN, Stockhausen & Treiser, Krefeld	Dir. Dr.-Ing. Heinrich BERTSCH, Dehyd., Berlin-Charlottenburg 2	
d)	<u>Cleaning materials</u> Chief: Dr. Jost HÄGEL, Hinkel & Cie. ...G. und GmbH, Duesseldorf, Postfach 345	" " "	

22. Group

Toilet requisites

Chief: Richard BIRCHMANN, Faldheimer
Parfumerie- und Feinseifenfabrik
...H.A. Bergmann K.G., Faldheim/Sa.
Location: Berlin S 63, Alexandrinerstr.
50, Tel. 67 56 67,
Manager: H. H. SCHULZ

Dr. SECK, Bayersdorf
& Co., L.G., Hamburg 30,
Bidelstädter Weg 48

a) Dentifrices

Chief: Gen. Dir. Rich. A. GILLER,
Leo-Werke GmbH, Dresden N 6,
Königsbruscher Str. 12-14

SECK, Bayersdorf
& Co., L.G.,
Hamburg

b) Hair lotions

Chief: Dir. Willy REBER,
Hans Schwarzkopf, Berlin-
Tempelhof

STUMGES, Ferdinand
Muelhens, Köln

c) Skin lotions

Chief: Dr. Walter WOLFF, Wolff
& Sohn GmbH, Karlsruhe/Baden,
Robert-Wagner-Allee 31

E. USCHINGER, I.G.-
Lousen, Frankfurt/

d) Foot lotions

Chief: Dr. Walter WOLFF, Wolff
& Sohn, GmbH, Karlsruhe/Baden,
Robert-Wagner-Allee 31

Dipl.-Chem. SCHLÖTT-
HAUER, Vaseol-
Werke, Dr. Arthur
WOLFF K.G.,
Königs C 1

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Department	Section	Director of the Technical Committee	Technical adviser
e)	<u>Theatrical requisites</u> Chief: Dr. Siegfried LEICHNER, Leichner, Berlin S., Schutzenstr. 31		Dr. Siegfried LEICH- NER, Leichner, Berlin S.
f)	<u>Other body lotions</u> Chief: Dr. Herbert SCHUSTTZ, Ferdinand-Luehns 4711, Köln-Ehrenfeld, Vogel- sängerstr. 100		Dr. LIE, Georg Dralle, Hamburg- Altona

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23. Group
Roofing paper industry
Chief: Dr. Ewald KOHL, Zimmermann
& Cie., Köln-Mulheim
Location: Berlin W 21, Alt-Moabit 33c

Dr. Otto BRAUN,
i. Pa. I. A. Braun,
Stuttgart-End-
Cannstatt

24. Group
Utilization of animal carcasses
Chief: Dipl.-Landwirt Carl GOSCHMANN,
i. Pa. Kunstduenger- und Fleischmehl-
fabrik C. Goschmann, Ronnenberg
b/Hannover,
Location: Berlin W 35, Koernerstr. 25,
Manager: Dr. TRIESCHER

Dipl.-Landwirt
Carl GOSCHMANN,
Kunstduenger- und
Fleischmehlfabrik
C. Goschmann, Ronnen-
berg b/Hannover

25. Group
Processing of whales
Chief: Dr. Hugo HECKEL, Düsseldorf,
Malkastenstr. 15
Location: Berlin W 35, Sigismundstr. 3

The group is not functioning for the
time being

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
<u>Collective Group I</u> <u>Other inorganic products</u>		
Chief and chairman of the technical committee: Dr. F. TER MEER, member of board of directors of I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M., Grubenburgerplatz		
Section a)	<u>Rare earths (also primary metal)</u> Tech. chief: Dir. Dr. Leon IMB, deputy member of board of directors of Auer-Gesellschaft A.G., Berlin N. 65, Friedrich Krause-Ufer 24	Dir. Dr. Leon IMB, deputy member of board of directors of Auer-Gesellschaft A.G., Berlin N. 65, Friedrich Krause-Ufer 24
Section b)	<u>Boron compounds</u> Chief: Dr. Wolfgang BECKMEYER, Schering A.G., Berlin N. 65, Mullerstr. 170	Dir. Dr. HERZOG, Chemische Fabrik Gruenau A.G., Berlin-Gruenau
Departr. c)	<u>Phosphorus and industrial phosphorus compounds</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. FLOCHER, Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Piesteritz	Dir. Dr. FLOCHER, Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Piesteritz
	1) <u>Phosphorus, phosphoric acid and phosphorus compounds</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. FLOCHER, Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Piesteritz	Dir. Dr. FLOCHER, Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G., Piesteritz
	2) <u>Phosphoric acid salts</u> Chief: Robert WERNER, Chem. Fabrik Joh. A. Benckiser GmbH, Ludwigshafen/Rh., Frankenthaler Str. 5.	WERNER, Chem. Fabrik Ludwigshafen A.G., Mainz/Rh.
Departr. d)	<u>Salts and compounds of cyanide</u> Chief: Dir. Hans-Hugo DIERER, Deutsche Gold- und Silberscheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Postfach 107	Dir. Dr. Ernst BERNHARD, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Postfach 107

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical- adviser
	1) <u>Salts of cyanide and cyanide metal</u> Chief: Dir. Hans-Hugo DREYER, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber-Scheidungsanstalt, Frankfurt/M. Postfach 107	Dir. Dr. Ernst DAIER-WIND, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber-Scheidungsanstalt, Frankfurt/M. Postfach 107

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2) <u>Salts of Ferrocyanide</u> Chief: August SCHENK, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber-Scheidungsanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Postfach 107	Dir. Dr.-Ing. Hans VERBEEK, Chem. Fabrik Wesseling A.G., Wesseling/Bez. Koeln
3) <u>Rhodium salts and sulfo-urea.</u> Chief: August SCHENK, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber-Scheidungsanstalt, Frankfurt/M. Postfach 107	Dr. Emil JACOB, Dr. Jacob, Chem. Fabrik GmbH., Kreuznach
4) <u>Blue dyes</u> Chief: Dir. Joachim FINTELMANN, Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin-Niederschöneweide, Berliner Str. 1-4	Dir. Dr.-Ing. Hans VERBEEK, Chem. Fabrik Wesseling A.G., Wesseling/Bez. Koeln

Departm. e) <u>Hardening agents</u> Chief: Dipl.-Ing. H. E. SCHIMMELBUSCH, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber-Scheidungsanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Gutleutstrasse 215	Dr. Walter BECK, Chief of Sonderring, Glueh- und Haerte-technik, Frankfurt/
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1) <u>Hardening salts</u> Chief: Dipl.-Ing. H. E. SCHIMMELBUSCH, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber-Scheidungsanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Gutleutstr. 215	Dr. Walter BECK, Chief of Sonderring, Glueh- und Harttechnik, Frankfurt/M.
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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
	2) <u>Hardening powders</u> Chief: W.H. GOERIG, Goerig & Co. K.G., Mannheim, Elisabeth- strasse 3	W.H. GOERIG, Goerig & Co., K.G., Mannheim
Section f)	<u>Ore flotation agents</u> Chief: Dir. Geo. HUBERT, Deutsch Gold- und Silber-Scheide- anstalt, Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9	Dr. phil. SIEDLER, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M.-Griesheim
Section g)	<u>Manganese compounds</u> Chief: Dir. SCHLÄGL, Chemische Fabrik Lausig-Falkenau GmbH, Lausig, Dr. Joseph-Gosbels-Str. 86	Dr. Wilhelm HUELLER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie, Citterfeld
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Section h)	<u>Iodine compounds</u> Chief: Dr. Th. LINDNER, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Müllerstr. 170	Dr. Karl RHODE, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Müllerstr. 170
Section i)	<u>Bromine compounds</u> Chief: Gen. Dir. R. CHELMN, Deutscher Salzverband, Stein- salzverkauf, Berlin S 11, Schoeneberger Strasse 5	Dr. Carl GROHMANN, J.D. Miedel-E. de Haen, A.G., Berlin-Spitz
Departm. j)	<u>Fluorine compounds</u> Chief: Dir. Bodo SCHLAF, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frank- furt/M., Grunburgplatz	Dir. Dr. KLEBERT, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen
	1) <u>Cryolite and aluminum- fluoride</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. KLEBERT, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen	Dir. Dr. KLEBERT, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen
	2) <u>Hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds</u> Chief: Dir. SIEGEL, Rust- gerswerke A.G., Abt. Fluorwerke, Dohna uo/Hai- denau/Sachsen	Dr. THIELE, J.D. Miedel- E. de Haen, A.G., Berlin Spitz

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
Section k)	<u>Chromium compounds</u> Chief: Dr.DILTHEY, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G. Uerdingen/Rhein	Dr.DILTHEY, I.G.-F: benindustrie A.G., Uerdingen/Rhein
Section l)	<u>Barium compounds</u> Chief: Dir.Jochim FIMTELANN, Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin- Niederschöneweide, Berliner Str. 1-4	Dr.v.DILTHEM, Chem. Fabrik Coswig-Anhalt Hans Schraube, Coswig- Anhalt
Section m)	<u>Strontium compounds</u> Chief: Dir.PFISTER, Dr.L.C. Marquart A.G., Bepel/Rhein	Dr.v.DILTHEM, Chem. Fabrik Coswig-Anhalt Hans Schraube, Coswig- Anhalt
Section n)	<u>Iron salts</u> Chief: Theodor OLTERS, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Verkaufs- abteilung Chem.Produkte, Leverkusen	Dr.Friedrich RASPE, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen
Section o)	<u>Zinc compounds</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.SCHIESS, A.G. für Zinkindustrie, vorm.Grillo, Duisburg-Hamborn, Moseler Str.1	

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1)	<u>Zinc sulfate</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.SCHIESS, A.G. für Zinkindustrie, vorm.Grillo, Duisburg- Hamborn, Moseler Str.1	Dir.Dr.SCHIESS, A.G. für Zinkindustrie, vorm.Grillo, Duisburg- Hamborn
2)	<u>Zinc chloride</u> Chief: Dir.Bodo SCHLAF, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Grüneburgplatz	Dir.Dr.E. NIEDERBACH Th.Goldschmidt A.G., Essen
Departm. p)	<u>Aluminum compounds</u> Chief: Dr.Edgar GIULINI, Ludwigshafen/Rh., Kaiser- Wilhelm-Str. 56	Rud.HOESCH, Chemisch Fabrik HOESCH A.G., DUESSEN/Rheinland

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
	1) <u>Aluminum chloride</u> Chief: Julius ZITZELMAN, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a. Main, Grusen- burgplatz	Dir. Dr. PFENNIGLITZ, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/
	2) <u>Aluminum sulfate and alums</u> Chief: Dir. Joachim FINTEL- MEYER, Kali-Chemie A.G., Berlin-Wiederschoonswiede, Berliner Str. 1-4	Prof. HOESCH, Chem. Fabrik HOESCH A.G., Dueren/Rheinld.
	3) <u>Alumina hydroxide and cal- cified alumina</u> Chief: Dr. Edgar GIULINI, Ludwigshafen/Rh., Kaiser- Wilhelm-Str. 56	Donzo GIULINI, Gebr. Giulini GmbH, Ludwi- ghafen/Rh.
	4) <u>Alumina sol</u> Chief: Dir. Franz LECHNER, Otto Kauffmann K.G., Wiederschlitz b/Dresden	Dir. Franz LECHNER, Otto Kauffmann K.G., Wiederschlitz b/Dresden
	5) <u>Other aluminum compounds</u> Chief: Dr. phil. nat. Oskar JOCHIM, Zschimmer & Schwarz, Chemische Fab- rik, Creiz-Deulau/Thur.	Prof. HOESCH, Chemische Fabrik HOESCH A.G., Dueren/Rheinland
Section q) <u>Bismuth and bismuth compounds</u>	Chief: Dir. L. PIERCE, Norddeutsche Affinerie A.G., Hamburg 36, Alsterterrasse 2	RICHTER, Staatl. Sch- melzen- und Blei- werke, Freiberg/Sa.
Section r) <u>Beryllium</u>	Chief: Dir. Robert HILTES, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11	Dr. Gustav JAEGER, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanst- Frankfurt/M.

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Section s) <u>Arsenic compounds</u>	Chief: Dir. PRISTER, Dr. L. O. Marguardt A.G. Bielefeld/Rh.	HASENGLER, Chem. Fabrik in Billwer- vern. Hohl & Othow A.G., Herburg-Bill
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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
Section t) <u>Selenium compounds</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. Hans KOHL, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11		MUELLER, Mannfeld- f. Bergbau- u. Huetten- betr., Hettstedt/Sachs- harz
Section u) <u>Nickel and cobalt compounds</u> Chief: Dr. ADELUNG, Herm. C. Starck A.G., Berlin 79, Bellevuestr. 13		SCHIEDER, Staatl. Sachs. Huetten- und Eisenerzwerke, Freiberg/Sa.
Section v) <u>Lithium compounds</u> Chief: Dir. PFISTER, Dr. L. C. Marquardt A.G., Buehl/Th.		Dr. HODER, Hans Hein- rich-Huetten GbH, Langelsheim Harz
Section w) <u>Salts of precious metals</u> Chief: Dir. Robert HINDES, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9-11		Dir. Dr. -Ing. THUTTE, Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheidanstalt Frankfurt/M.
Section x) <u>Activated bleaching clay</u> Chief: Dr.-Ing. KUEHN, Sued- chemie A.G., Muenchen 43, Lehnbachplatz 5-6		Dr.-Ing. KUEHN, Sued- chemie A.G., Muenchen 43, Lehnbachplatz 5-6
Section y) <u>Silicon carbide and electro- carborundum</u> Tech. chief: Dir. Dipl.-Ing. Ludwig SONTHEIMER, i. Pa. MSO-Werke A.G., Offenbach/M., Weidstrasse 195		Dir. Dipl.-Ing. Ludwig SONTHEIMER i. Pa. MSO- Werke A.G., Offen- bach/M.
Section z) <u>Abrasive and polishing pastes</u> Chief: Dr. RADENHAUSEN, Lang- bein-Pfennhauser-Werke A.G., Leipzig 05, Torgauer Str. 76		Alfred DOMKEWITZ, Chem. Fabrik Gebr. WIECHTER, Chemnitz
Section aa) <u>Water glass and metasilicate</u> Chief: Dir. PFAFF, Henkel & Cie., Duesseldorf, Postfach 345		Dr. DIETMER, Woellner- werke, Ludwigshafen

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
<u>Collective Group II</u> <u>Other organic products</u> Chief and chairman of the technical committee: Prof.Dr.-Ing. P. MARTIN, Ruhrchemie A.G., Oberhausen/Kolten		
Section a) <u>Phenols</u> Chief: Dir.Carl MUELLER, Kuetzgers- werke A.G., Berlin 35, Luetzowstr. 33-36		Dr.v.STEDEN, Ammoniak- werk Harseburg GmbH, Lounwerke Kreis Harseburg
Section b) <u>Glycerol and fatty alcohols</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.-Ing.BERTSCH, Deutsche Hydrierwerke A.G., Berlin-Charlottenburg, Kantstr.163		Dir.Dr.-Ing.Bertsch, Deutsche Hydrierwerke A.G., Berlin-Charlot- tenburg
Section c) <u>Marsol</u> Chief: Dir.F.G.KOCHER, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M. Gruesburgplatz		Dr.v.STEDEN, Ammoniak- werk Harseburg GmbH, Lounwerke, Kreis Harseburg
Section d) <u>Oxidation of paraffins</u> Chief: Dir.A.E.LUSSEN sen., Kreiskische Seifenindustrie, Witten/Ruhr		Dir.A.E.LUSSEN sen., Kreiskische Seifen- industrie, Witten/Ruhr
Section e) <u>Polvalcohols</u> Chief: Dir.Walter LUECKES, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M., Gruesburgplatz		Dr.Chil.Wolfgang BUELO I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen
Section f) <u>Ethyl ether, narcotic ether, and preparations and collodion</u> Chief:		Dir.Dr.WILDE, Deutsche Gold- und Silber- Scheidanstalt, Frankfurt/M.
Section g) <u>Lead tetraethyl</u> Chief: Dir.Dr.WILHELM-Cunradi, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.		Dir.Dr.Wilhelm-Cunradi I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.
Section h) <u>Edible acids</u> Chief: Dr.LIPMAN jun., Joh.A. Brockhaus GmbH, Ludwigshafen/Rh., Frankenthaler Str.30		SCHNEIDER, C.H.Boehrin- ger Sohn, Chem.Fabrik, Ingelheim Rhein

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
Section i) <u>Oxalic and formic acid</u> Chief: Dir. MACHENDORF, Rudolph Koepp & Co., Oestrich-Rheingau		Kurt SCHOMBURG, I.G.- Farbenindustrie A.G., Ritterfeld
Section j) <u>Salicylic acid and salicylates</u> Chief: Dir. F. STRUBERG, Chem. Fabrik v. Heyden A.G., Radeboul b/Dresden		Dir. Dr. Otto BOEHME, I.G.-Farbenindustrie, A.G., Leverkusen
(page 28 of original)		
Department k) <u>Saccharinization of wood</u> Chief: Dr. STRAUSSER, Sued- deutsche Holzverzuckerungs- Werke A.G., Regensburg, Postfach 126		Dr. ROCKSTROH, Braun- scheigische Holzver- zuckerungs-GmbH, Holzwinden/Waser
Department l) <u>Production of yeast and alcohol from sulfite lye residue and vegetable hydrolyzates</u>		Dir. Fritz KOCH, Phrix- Gesellschaft mbH, Hamburg 1
Section m) <u>Glycerine</u> Chief: Dir. P. P. F. F., Henkel & Cie. A.G., Dusseldorf, Postfach 345		Dir. Dr. phil. HEBERLAND, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Krefeld-Urdingen
Section n) <u>Saccharine</u> Chief: Dir. FULLSTEDT, Fahlberg- List A.G., Magdeburg-Suedost, Alt-Salbk 60-63		Dir. Dr. CH. LUPATY, Ver- einigte Chemische Fab- riken, Wien-Floridsdorf, Wien 141
Section o) <u>Essences and perfumes</u> Chief: Dr. STECH, Heine & Co. A.G., Leipzig C 1, Schreiberstr. 6		Dr. Leo SCHULZ, Schimmel & Co., Wiltitz/Leipzig
Section p) <u>Camphor</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. ST. LAMM, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Muellerstrasse 170		Dir. Dr. ST. LAMM, Sche- ring A.G., Berlin N 65, Muellerstrasse 170
Section q) <u>Tannin and gallic acid</u> Chief: Dr. Theodor LINDLER, Schering A.G., Berlin N 65, Muellerstr. 170		HEBER, E. Morck, Darmstadt
Section r) <u>Benzoic acid and its compounds</u> Chief: Wilhelm J. JENSEN, I.G.-Farben- industrie A.G., Uerdingen/Rh., Rheinufer 7-9		Dir. Dr. phil. H. BERLAND, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Krefeld-Urdingen

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
Section s) <u>Nitrobenzol, chlorbenzol and aniline</u> Chief: Walter WLODHO, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/A., Grubenburplatz		Dir.Dr.phil. HA-BELLAND, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Krefeld-Uerdingen
Section t) <u>Vulcanization accelerators</u> Chief: Dir.Rudolf SCHNEIDER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/A., Grubenburplatz		Dir.Dr.phil.Richard LUDWIG, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Leverkusen
Section u) <u>Water-soluble cellulose ethers</u> Chief: Josef STOMCHEN, Kalle & Co., A.G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich		Dr.Hermann EUBOTH, Kalle & Co. A.G., Wiesbaden-Biebrich
Section v) <u>Varnish</u> Chief: Dir.Helmut KREFF, F.Teerl's Vereinigte Harburger Cellfabriken A.G., Harburg-Harburg 1		Dir.Robert KREFF, F.Teerl's Vereinigte Harburger Cellfabriken A.G., Harburg-Harburg 1

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Department w) <u>Stearin industry</u> Chief: Dir.Bruno WUIS, Schickendahl-Woterd-Werke A.G., Berlin W 7, Dorotheenstr.35		Dir.Bruno WUIS, Schickendahl-Woterd-Werke A.G., Berlin W 7, Dorotheenstrasse 35
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Collective Group III

Miscellaneous Products of the Chemical Industry

Chief and chairman of the technical committee:

Dir.Dr.-Ing. RICHARD STÄTTER, Deutsche Solvay-Werke A.G., Park Westergeln
Bez.Magdeburg

Section a) <u>Fire chemicals</u> Chief: Dr.Th.LUDWIG, Schering A.G., Berlin W 65, Müllerstrasse 170		Dr.phil.Hans RICHTER, R.Schering, Berlin W 4, Chausseestrasse 24
Department b) <u>Office requirements of chemical nature</u> Chief: Dir. Willy KUTZ, Greif-Werke A.G., Coslar/Harz		Reichsmin.f.R.u.K., Prod.-Int
Sub group c) <u>Pencil industry</u> Chief: Dr.Rudolf KREUTZER, I.G. Staedler, Mars-Elektrostiftfabrik, Nuernberg a., Luitpold-Str. 14		Reichsmin.f.R.u.K., Prod.-Int

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Department Independent section	Section	Technical adviser
<p>Departm. d) <u>Match factories</u> Chief: Dir. TILS, Deutsche Zuendwarenmonopolgesell- schaft, Berlin-Steglitz Filanderstrasse 31</p>		<p>Dipl.-Ing. Carl STROCKE, Zuendwarenfabrik Sterck & Co., GmbH, Melle/Hann.</p>
<p>Departm. e) <u>Natural resin products</u> Chief: August WAGNER, Chemische Werke Albert, Wiesbaden-Biebrich, Albertstr. 14</p>		<p>Dr. Alfred WIDMANN, Badische-Kunstharzfa- brik GmbH, Harburg-Grunds- beck 1, Paul-Strasse 57</p>
	<p>1) <u>Distillation of rosin</u> (raw balsam) Chief: Aug. WAGNER, Chemische Werke Albert, Wiesbaden-Biebrich, Albert-Strasse 14</p>	
	<p>2) <u>Resin glue</u> Chief: Dr. SCHNEIDER, Chemische Fabrik Mosach, Duern/Rheinland, Postfach 164</p>	
	(page 30 of original).	
	<p>3) <u>Brewers' and industrial pitches</u></p>	
	<p>1) <u>Shallac</u> Dr. ROSS i. F. Kalkhoff Mainz</p>	<p>Dr. ROSS, i. F. Kalk- hoff, Mainz</p>
<p>Departm. f) <u>Candles</u> Chief: Dir. Dr.-Ing. Kleinboehl, Deutsche Gasolin A.G., Berlin- Charlottenburg 9, Adolf-Hitler- Platz 7 - 11</p>		<p>Dir. Dr.-Ing. KLEINBOEHL, Deutsche Gasolin A.G., Berlin-Charlottenburg 9, Adolf-Hitler-Platz 7 - 11</p>
<p>Departm. g) <u>Gas masks</u> Chief: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Karl QU. SEIBERT, Auergesellschaft A.G., Berlin N 65, Friedrich-Kreuss-Ufer 24</p>		<p>Reichsmin. f. R. u. H., Prod.-amt</p>

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
Section h) <u>Gas mantles</u> Chief: Dir. LICHTENBERG, Auergesellschaft A.G., Berlin N 65, Friedrich- Krause-Ufer 24		Dir. Herbert THIESE, Auergesellschaft A.G. Berlin N 65, Friedrich- Krause-Ufer
Section i) <u>Chemical agents for protecting wood</u> Chief: Dir. SIEGEL, Kunstgewerke A.G., Abt. Fluorwerke, Dohna ue/ Heidenau Sachsen		Dr.-Ing. Carl STUMPP, Chem. Werke Albert, Niesbaden-Siebrich
Section j) <u>Chemical preservatives</u> Chief: Dr. ERDMANN, Berlin-Marien- dorf, Blumenweg 9		Dr. Walter ERDMANN, Berlin-Mariendorf, Blumenweg 9
Department k) <u>Chemical agents for the protection of buildings</u> Chief: Dir. Erich BLANCHENSTEIN, A.G. Joh. Jegerich, Hamburg- Midelstedt, Ottensenstrasse 2-4		Ing.-Baumeister a.D. Erecht, Gustav A. BRAUN, Chem. Baustoffe, Siberwerk, Koeln, Coebenstr. 12

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Department l) <u>Chemical agents for protection against fire</u> Chief: Dir. Rudolph BECKERT, Brander Farbwerke, Chem. Fabrik GmbH, Brand-Orbisdorf/Sa., Bahnhofstr. 31a		Dr.-Ing. Carl STUMPP, Chem. Werke Albert, Niesbaden-Siebrich, Rheingartenstr. 30
Department m) <u>Chemical agents for use by bakers</u> Chief: Dir. Otto DOLL, C.M. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim/Rhein		Dr. WEYLAND, C.M. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim/Rhein
Department n) <u>Cable insulating compounds</u> Chief: Willibald GRUDZINSKI, Chem. Fabrik Grudzinski K.G., Duisburg, Parallelhafen 4		Willibald GRUDZINSKI, Chem. Fabrik Grudzinski K.G., Duisburg, Paral- lelhafen 4
Department o) <u>Chemical agents for foundries</u> Chief: Dr. e.h. Karl HUETTENES, Gebr. Huettenes K.G., Duesseldorf- Heerdt, Liesenstrasse 23		Dr. e.h. Karl HUETTENES, Gebr. Huettenes K.G., Duesseldorf-Heerdt, Liesenstr. 23

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Department Independent Section	Section	Technical adviser
Departm. p) <u>Putties</u> Chief: Fritz BRANDENBURG, Bayer & Haase Chemische Fabrik, Berlin-Spandau, Seeburger Strasse 90		Fritz BRANDENBURG, Bayer & Haase, Chem. Fabrik, Berlin-Spandau Seeburger Str. 90
Section q) <u>Coal igniters</u> Chief: Dir. HANOLDT, Ravis- Spoer A.G., Barleben b/Magdeburg, Bahnhofstr. 27-28		Dir. Dipl.-Ing. "Hanoldt", Ravis-Spoer A.G., Barleben b/Magdeburg, Bahnhofstr.
Section r) <u>Industrial cleaning materials</u> Chief: Dr. Max DITTMER, Voellnerwerke A.G., Ludwigshafen-Rheingoenheim, Koenigstrasse 31		Dr. Bruno BLASER, Henke & Cie. A.G. und GmbH, Duesseldorf

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12.4.1944
Dr. Koe/Krn.

Changes in and Amplifications of

List XVI of 10 March 1944.

1. Group

Soda, caustic alkalies, chlorine, hydrochloric acid and related products

Department a) Soda, bicarbonate, caustic soda is designated:

a) Soda, caustic soda, sodium bicarbonate

5. Group

Carbide chemistry, methanol and carbonization of wood

Section 6) Monochloroacetic acid and subsequent products in Department
b) carbide subsequent products is canceled. Monochloroacetic acid will
also be handled by Section Carbon chloride hydrogens.

6. Department

Ferro alloys, steel and light metal alloys

Section 5) Other steel and light metal alloys. The Chief and produc-
tion expert of the Section, Dr. WIEDERLACK, Theodor Goldschmidt A.G.,
Essen, is deceased and should therefore be stricken off. No substi-
tute has been named as yet.

8. Group

Synthetic materials

Department c) Vulcanized fibers

Dr. E. BECKER, Dynamit A.G., Troisdorf/Bez. Koeln, has been appointed
as production expert.

The Group will get the following two Departments:

n) Other high polymer synthetic materials

Chief: Dir. BOLGMARDT, I.G.
Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M.,
Grueneburgplatz

Prod. expert

Dr. KOLLEK,
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Ludwigshafen/Rh.

o) Campher

Chief: Dir. Dr. STALMANN,
Schering A.G., Berlin N 65,
Muellerstr. 170

Dir. Dr. STALMANN,
Schering A.G.,
Berlin N 65

9. Buna

Will be designated:

Buna (incl. vulcanization accelerators)

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13. Group
Varnishes (lacquers)

Department f) Camouflage paints.

KEIL, Zoellner-Werke GmbH, Bln.-Neukölln, Neuköllnische Allee 60-74, was appointed as chief and production expert.

14. Group
Mineral colors

Department d) Lithopone

Dr. VOIQUARTZ, "Sachtleben" A.G., Bad Homburg/Niederrh., was appointed as production expert.

Department e) Titanium white

Dir. Carl von REIDER, I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt/M., was appointed as production expert.

The Group will get the following department:

j) Artist' colors
Chief: Dr. Guenther MELDORFF,
Guenther Wagner, Hannover

Prod. expert:
Dr. Klaus BUNK,
Dr. Fr. Schoenfeld & Co.,
Duesseldorf-Cberkirch,
Postfach 124

17. Group
Pharmaceutical industry:

Section 5) Organic preparations

The Chief of the Section, Prof. Dr. Helmut KLUCK, has also been appointed as production expert.

Section 8) Opium and other alkaloids.

Dr. F. BERGER, E. Merck, Darmstadt, has been appointed as production expert of the Section.

Section 15) Veterinary medicaments.

The Chief of the Section, Dr. Josef SCHNEP, Chem. Fabrik Marienfeld's GmbH, Hamburg 36, Neutwall 10, has also been appointed as production expert.

The Group will get a new section:

16) Iodine compounds
Chief: Dr. Th. LEMMER,
Schering A.G.,
Bln.-65, Muellerstr. 170

Prod. expert:
Dr. Karl MOSE,
Schering A.G.,
Berlin N 65

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19. Group

Plant protection preparations and insecticides

The chairmanship of the Production Committee will be taken over by Dr. PETERS, Manager of the Deutsche Gesellschaft f. Schadlingsbekämpfung mbH, Frankfurt/M., Weissfrauenstr. 9

21. Group

Soap, washing and cleaning materials industry

At the suggestion of the Chief of the Group, the chairmanship in the Production Committee of the Group will be taken over by Carl KIRCHNER, C.Kirchner, Saarbrücken, Adolf Hitler Str. 91.

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Collective Group I

Other inorganic products

Section b) Boron compounds

Dr. Theodor LINDEMANN, Schering A.G., Berlin W 65, Müllerstr. 170, was appointed in place of Dr. BRÜCKENMEYER as Chief of the Section.

Section h) Iodine compounds

The Section will be incorporated in the Group Pharmaceutical industry

The Production expert of Section 2) Zinc chloride in Department o) Zinc compounds, Dir.Dr. WIEDENBRUCK, is deceased and his name should therefore be stricken off.

Section x) Activated bleaching clay.

The Section will be designated as:
x) Bleaching clay and bentonite products.

Collective Group II

Other organic Products

Section e) Polyalcohols

The Section will be transferred to Group 5) Carbide chemistry, methanol and carbonization of wood, the question remaining open as to whether it should be continued as a Section, or whether the Department Chief in charge should only get a special commission.

Section p) Camphor

The Section will be incorporated in the Group synthetic materials.

Section t) Vulcanization accelerators.

The Section as such will be taken out of the Collective Group and assigned to Dr. WITKOS for Section Buna.

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Collective Group II
Miscellaneous Products of the Chemical Industry

Department c) Natural resin and natural resin products

Section 2) Refined natural resins is transferred to Department c) Lacquer synthetic resins of Group Synthetic materials (8). In its place there is set up a Section 4) Shellac for which Dr. ROSE, Ernst Kalkhof, Mainz, is slated as Chief and also as production expert.

Department h) Torches and pyrotechnical products

The Department is canceled. The supervision of pyrotechnic products will be taken over by the Group Powder and explosives (10), that of wax torches by Department Candles. Department g) Candles thus is designated:

g) Candles (incl. wax torches).

Department i) Gas masks

No Production committee is formed here, since the chief of the Department, having a special assignment, is subject to the Production Office.

Department o) Chemical agents for protection against frost

The Department as such is to be disbanded, since Glysantin can also be handled by Group 5) Carbide chemistry, methanol and carbonization of wood.

It is proposed to incorporate into the Collective Group a new Section

Miscellaneous chemical-technical products.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

3 June 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, B 397944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. 4899.

Herbert RODECK
B 397944

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6784
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Economic Group Chemical Industry
as Office charged with production
of the Reich Minister for Armaments
and War Production
Sub-Section (Fachgruppe) 5 "Carbide
Chemistry, Methanol and Carbonization
of Wood"

The Chief of the Technical Office
of the Production Committee
Dr. Wolfgang Alt

Ludwigshafen/Rh.
3 Nov. 1944
No. 126

Rubber Stamp:

I.G.H.....
15 Nov. 1944

To the plants

Ludwigshafen, Oppau for Sparte 1, Auschwitz, Frose, Hoydebrock,
Moosbierbaum, Hoechst, Neunkir, Griesheim, Offenbach, Gersthofen,
Zweckel, Wolfen-Farben, Wolfen-Film for Sparte 3, Bitterfeld,
Rheinfelden, Leuna, Schkopau, Huels, Gendorf, Dyhernfurth, Holten,
Knapsack, Leverkusen, Uerdingen, Dormagen, Elberfeld, Waldenburg.

Sales Combine Chemicals, Frankfurt/Main
Tee Büro (Office of the Technical Committee), Frankfurt/Main
Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin

Enclosed herewith I send you, for your information, the most
recent compilation of the organizational makeup of Sub-Section
(Fachgruppe) 5, "Carbide Chemistry, Methanol and Carbonization of
Wood" of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

Position 5b5 was originally occupied by the Section "Softeners",
Chief: Direktor Walther Ludwigs, Production Expert: Direktor Dr.
Reinhard Jung. For practical reasons this section has been taken
out of Sub-Section (Fachgruppe) 5 and incorporated with Sub-Section
8 "Synthetic Materials".

Enclosure.

(sgd) ALT

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Organization of SUB-SECTION (FACHGRUPPE) 5
Carbide Chemistry, Methanol and Carbonization of Wood
of the Economic Group Chemical Industry

Sub-Section (Fachgruppe)	Production Committee
Sub-Department (Fachabteilung)	Production Expert
Section (Fachbereich)	Production Expert

5. "Carbide Chemistry, Methanol
and Carbonization of Wood"

Chief: Dir. Dr. Adalbert Fischer,
Deutsche Gold- und Silberscheide-
anstalt, (16) Frankfurt/1,
Weissfrauenstr. 9-11
Location: (1) Berlin W 8,
Französische Str. 33 F
Tel.: 16 46 01
Business manager: Dir. Dr. Herbert
Mureck

Dir. Dr. Otto Ambros,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Akt.-Ges.,
(18) Ludwigshafen/Rh.
Chief of the Technical Office
Ludwigshafen of the Production
Committee: Dr. Wolfgang Alt
Representative of the Production
Committee in the Production
Office Berlin: Dir. Dr. Herbert Mureck

a) Carbide

Chief: Dir. Dr. Gustav Kraemer,
Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoff-
Werke A.G., (13b) Trostberg/
Oberbayern

Dir. Dr. Max Wildhagen,
Bayer-Stickstoffwerke A.G.,
(1) Berlin-Schoeneberg,
Kufsteinerstr. 69

b) Carbide subsequent products

Chief: Dir. Ass. Albert Mueller,
Lonza-Werke G.m.b.H.,
(17 a) Weil am Rhein

Dir. Dr. Otto Ambros,
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
(18) Ludwigshafen/Rh.

1) Acetaldehyde

Chief: Dr. Wolfgang Alt,
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
(18) Ludwigshafen/Rh.

Dir. Dr. Otto Ambros,
I.G. Farbenindustrie
A.G.,
(18) Ludwigshafen/Rh.

2) Acetic acid and
acetic anhydride

Chief: Dir. Ass. Albert
Mueller,
Lonza-Werke G.m.b.H.,
(17 a) Weil am Rhein

Dir. Dr. Ludwig Hoermann,
Dr. Alexander Wacker
Ges. f. elektrochem. Ind.
G.m.b.H.,
(13 b) Muenchen 22

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Sub-Section	Sub-Department	Section	Production Committee Production Expert Production Expert
<hr/>			
3)		<u>Solvents and butanol</u> Chief: Dir. Walther Ludwigs, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., (16) Frankfurt/M. 20	Dr. Kurt Moeller, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., (16) Frankfurt/M. - Hoechst
4)		<u>Acetone and isopropyl-alcohol</u> Chief: Dir. Geo Hubert, Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheideanstalt, (17a) Konstanz/Baden	Dir. Dr. Ewald Ritter von Netze, Deutsche Gold- u. Silber- scheideanstalt (16) Frankfurt/M.
5)		---	---
6)		<u>Ethylene chemistry</u> (also frost protection agents) Chief: Dir. Helmuth Borgwardt, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., (16) Frankfurt/M. 20	Dir. Dr. Wolfgang Buelow, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., (18) Ludwigshafen/Rh.
7)		<u>Chlorinated hydrocarbons</u> Chief: Dir. Walther Ludwigs, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., (16) Frankfurt/M. 20	Obering. Eduard Kalb, Dr. Alexander Wacker Ges. f. elektrochem. Ind. G.m.b.H., (13b) Muenchen 22
c)		<u>Methanol and Carbonization of food</u> Chief: Dir. Dr. Adalbert Fischer, Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheideanstalt, (16) Frankfurt/M.	Dir. Dr. Ewald Ritter von Netze, Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheide- anstalt, (16) Frankfurt/M.
1)		<u>Methanol and Isobutanol</u> Chief: Dr. Wolfgang Alt, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (18) Ludwigshafen/Rh.	Dir. Dr. Johann Giesen, Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., (10) Leuna-Werke

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6784
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

Sub-Section	Sub-Department	Section	Production Committee	Production Expert	Production Expert
<hr/>					
		2) <u>Formaldehyde and subsequent products</u>			
		Chief: Dir. Geo Hubert, Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheideanstalt, (17a) Konstanz-Baden		Dir. Dr. Ewald Ritter von Netze, Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheide- anstalt, (16) Frankfurt/M.	
		3) <u>Charcoal</u>			
		Chief: Dir. Ludwig Hiller, Holzkohlen- verkaufsstelle GmbH., (16) Wolfgang b. Hanau/M., Post Gross-Sulheim		for retort charcoal: Dr. Karl Hintz, Deutsche Gold- u. Sil- berscheideanstalt, (16) Frankfurt/M.	
				for Meiler charcoal Dir. Ludwig Strenge, Deutsche Gold- u. Sil- berscheideanstalt, (16) Frankfurt/M.	
		4) <u>Activated Charcoal</u>			
		Chief: Dr. Alfred Heintzeler, Lurgi Ges. f. Huermeteknik mbH., (16) Frankfurt/M., Gervinusstr. 17/19		Dr. Walter Niemann, I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., (22) Leverkusen-I.G. Werk	

In addition the area of jurisdiction
of Sub-Section (Fachgruppe) 5 includes the products:

Monochloroacetic acid

Polyalcohols (for instance, pentaerythrite, trimethylolmethane,
trimethylolpropane and hexanetriol, but not glycerine
and glycerogene)

Vinylmonomers (for instance, vinyl chloride, vinyl acetate, etc.)

These products are not handled by special sections, but directly
by the Sub-Section (Fachgruppe) and its production committee.

Ludwigshafen/Rh., 15 October 1944.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6784
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6784.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129

SWORN STATEMENT

I, Dr. Felix EHRENN, living at Baddeckenstedt/district of Wolfenbuettel, British Zone, after having learned that I am liable to punishment if I make a false statement, declare upon oath voluntarily and without compulsion the following:

As deputy chief manager of the Economic Group Chemical Industry from 1932 - 1945 (de facto) I obtained full knowledge of the organization and the leading personalities of the Economic Group Chemical Industry during the above mentioned period.

I have carefully read the plan of organization No. XVII of the Economic Group Chemical Industry of March 10th, 1944 presented to me, consisting of 31 pages and 4 pages of modifications and additions and state herewith upon oath that this plan of organization is an exact and true presentation of the organic structure and the leading personalities of the Economic Group Chemical Industry according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Felix Ehreann
Felix Ehreann

Sworn to and signed before me this 20th day of March 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Felix EHRENN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Paul H. Katscher
Paul H. Katscher

U.S. Civilian, AGO number D-150641
Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, U.S. War Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-492
CONTINUED

(page 2)

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION

8 May 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, Civ. No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI- 4929.

Victoria ORTON
Civ. No. 20129

-2-
END

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6157
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, FRANKFURT (MAIN)- HOECHST

Recipient	Our File No:	Day	Page
		Rubber Stamp:	
		Despatched on:	
Subject		29.8.44.	
		Dir. Dept. T.	<u>No. 215</u>

Minutes
of the Meeting of the Technical Maingau-
Directorate in Ffm.-Hoechst on 21 August 1944

Present: Messrs. Lautenschlaeger
Engelbertz
Pehrle
Giesler
Lange
Roth
Struss
Winnacker
Gebhardt
Hagenboecker
Hilcken
Hirschel
Absent: Mr. Jachno.

The sickness position of the Hoechst Works is at present 4.1 %.

The decree of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production of 26.7.44 concerning the restriction by 30 % of the administrations of all the works affiliated with Armaments and War Production is discussed. We claim that our offices are almost without exception bound up with production and therefore only in a few cases must a restriction by 30 % be carried out. The intention is to examine whether a limitation by 10 % is possible.

Within the framework of the total war effort, endeavors must be made to increase the working hours, which hitherto have averaged 54 per week to 60 per week. If such a measure is carried out for the Maingau works, it is obvious that this would also mean an increase of output. This can, however, be achieved in the chemical industry only by the gain of full working days, therefore if work is also performed on Sundays. For the Maingau works, it is proposed that the works, including laboratories and offices, should operate on one Sunday per month.

Winnacker reports on the manufacturing position in the nitrogen field.

Damages to the I.G. Works by the last enemy air attack are discussed.

Struss gives a survey of the allotment of iron for new buildings.

Gebhardt report on his discussion with the Todt Organization Labor Leader of Armament Inspection XIIIa, Government Director Reich. With regard to the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6157
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

building of shelters, which has not yet been approved by the Gauleiter, Reich will shortly be coming to Hoechst. - The stoppage of planned construction work was also discussed.

The Recruiting Depot I Frankfurt (WEK I - Wehrbezirkshauptstadt) has cancelled the "indispensable" status of all officers of the age group 1893 and older. Even though we are assured that these officers remain at our disposal for the present, objection will be raised to this.

The Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production has ordered that works which obtain orders for programs of the priority grade without at the time of acceptance being assured that they have the labor for carrying out the orders, will, as a matter of principle, not receive any additional workers. - As the president of the Armaments Commission XIIIa states, it must be reckoned with that men fit for service in the field, of the age groups 1901 and younger, will be gradually withdrawn from the works and only the most essential supervisory personnel will be left in the works. It is the duty of the works managers to see to it that the positions becoming vacant, are filled by suitable substitutes.

Struss discusses questions which concern the organization of the Economic Group Chemical Industry. As the I.G. is sponsored by numerous Industrial groups (Fachgruppen) it would, whenever any general matters are up for discussion, have to be notified in writing by every Industrial group (Fachgruppe). In order to avoid this, it was agreed that all general questions should be routed via Herr Struss. The representative of Struss is Hansen, Vermittlungsstelle II, who takes part in the meetings of the Production Committee. Harster will, during the absence of Dr. von Meer, enter the Praesidium of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

Struss reports on the impending manufacturing restrictions in the Dyestuffs field. The allocation of sulphur for dyestuffs was reduced from 250 tons per month to 50 tons per month.

The estimates of costs which were submitted are discussed.

Ffm.-Hoechst, 23.3.1944.
Dr. Hi/H.

(signed) Lautenschlaeger

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 June 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. D 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6157.

.....
HERBERT RODECK, No. D-397499.

A F F I D A V I T

I, FRIEDRICH HERMAN TER MEER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1926 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

TM 1. Dr. ERNST DUERGIN succeeded Dr. PISTOR who retired in 1938 as the head of the Bitterfeld works combine which included the Bitterfeld works, the two magnesium factories of Aken and Stassfurt, the Doerberitz works, Wolfen-Farben, Teutschenthal and Rheinolden on the Rhine near Basle. DUERGIN's position as head of these important works was an important one. He was one of I.G.'s leading inorganic chemists, specializing in electrolytical processes and manufacture of light metals.

2. Dr. DUERGIN was a member of the Vorstand, member of the TEA and chief of the Works Combine Central Germany. He was an active participant at TEA meetings, reporting frequently on research activity, new plant construction and production at his works, in which there were important investments both before and after the outbreak of war. He participated normally in Vorstand meetings in matters with which he was involved.

TM 3. He was a member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Flix works in Spain and was the technical liaison man between I.G. and Flix. He travelled quite regularly in Spain and probably had conversations with other Spanish chemical firms on chemical processes and other matters.

C 4. Dr. DUERGIN was charged with the erection of the

TM

~~(Page 2 of the original)~~

magnesium plant in the Norsk-Hydro Works. He was assisted by Moschel, a chemist, and Von der Bey, an engineer, both of Duergin's Bitterfeld staff, who were the technical liaison men for Norway. These two men built the factory and gave it the know-how, under Duergin's direction. In 1940 or 1941 I.G. had participated in the founding of Nordisk Løtmetall AS for the purpose of running these works.

5. Either Dr. Duergin or one of his associates was an I.G. liaison man with the Krauch office in the Four Year Plan. This liaison certainly covered the field of electrolytic chemistry. I am not certain whether it also included magnesium, which was taken out of Krauch's office and placed in the Speer ministry. I am certain, however, that Duergin cooperated with

(Signed Dr. Fr. ter Meer)

-1-

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COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-5161
Cont'd.

Krauch in many ways. These liaison men met most of the time with Krauch's associates who dealt with the specific fields, and, on important questions, they dealt with Krauch personally. On Four Year Plan matters related to I.G. Farben, these men reported to the technical subcommittees, and to the Sparten and TEA when appropriate Four Year Plan matters usually involved construction of new plants, and the appropriations had to be approved through normal I.G. channels.

6. The I.G. chemical experts holding liaison positions in Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industrie likewise reported to I.G. technical subcommittees on matters of interest in their particular fields. Either BUERGIN or one of his associates was head of the subcommittee of Wigrü connected with the electrolysis of salt for making chlorine and sodium hydrate.

7. Buergin was represented on the boards of several

TM

~~(Page 3 of the original)~~

industrial firms. I know he had memberships in the following:

Aufsichtsrat, Deutsche Grube A.G.
" Aluminiumwerke G.m.b.H.
Kraftwerk Ryberg, Schwoerstadt, Switzerland.

8. I have carefully read each of the 2 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signed) Dr. Fr. ter Meer

FRIEDRICH HERMAN TER MEER

Sworn to and signed before me this 1st day of May 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nuernberg, Germany, by Friedrich Herman Ter Meer, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signed) Drexel A. Sprecher

U.S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No.
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.

CERTIFICATE

I, ERNA UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that this is
a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5181, the original of
which is in the English language.

(Signed) Erna Uiberall
Erna Uiberall
AGO No. D-150096
U. S. Civilian

ENE

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. WI-3765
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

III-46

Encl. to Rue In VII No. 179/44 g Kdof of 6.7.44
Rue Kdo Lunsburg

The
Independent and
Autonomous Branches
of the Armaments Industry.

Secret Reich Matter!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of par. 88 of the Reich Penal Code and according to the wording of the law of 24.4.1934 of Reich Penal Code Gazette (S. 341 ff.).
2. To be delivered only by hand or to a personal address in a double envelope against receipt.
3. Whenever possible to be forwarded by courier or a trustworthy person; if sent by mail to be posted as registered letter containing valuables (declared value 1050 RM).
4. Duplication of any kind or the making of excerpts is forbidden.
5. The person receiving it is responsible for its safe custody. Violations will be punished very severely.

No. 603

(page 12 of original)

.....

Group Sulphur and Sulphur Compounds.

Chief:

Dir. Dr. Carl Russter

of IG-Farbenindustrie A-G., Ludwigshafen/Rh.

Office:

H. Schuster

Altenberg-Lutherstadt, Lutherstr. 4

Long distance Telephone 336

Nitrogen

Chief:

Dir. Dr. Oster

of Stickstoff Syndicat G.m.b.H.,

Berlin W. 7, Neustädtische Kirchstr. 9/10

Office (same as chief)

.....

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. XI-37
CONTINUED

(page 13 of original)

.....

Dana

Chief:
Dir. Dr. C. Ambros Long Distance Telephone 6496
c/o Farbenindustrie A.G. Ludwigshafen/Rh.
Tel. 03473
Office (same as chief)

Group Powder and Explosives

Director-General Dr. Ing. Otto Saurasin
of Westfaelisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.
Chemical Factories Telephone
Berlin N 9, Linkstr.25 Local 219391
Tel. 011426 Long Distance 219646
Office (same as Chief)

(page 15 of original)

Aniline Dyes and Aniline Dyes Intermediates

Chief:
Dir. Dr. van Schnitzler
of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Frankfurt a. Main, Gruenburgerplatz

.....

(page 16 of original)

.....

Economic Group Fuel Industry

Chief:
Dr. Dastofisch, Berlin Long Distance Telephone
Office: 120021
Dr. Ziervegel
Berlin NW 1, Dorotheenstr.35 117131

(page 17 of original)

.....

Mutual Association for Hydrogenation, Synthesis and Distillation

Chief: Long Distance Telephone
Dr. Dastofisch, Berlin 120021
Office:
Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstr.35 124342

.....

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-3
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from the document No. NI-3765.

.....
VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6765
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

No. 126

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main 20
Wigru Chemical Industrie Production Committee

		<u>Production Office, Berlin-Mauern</u>	
		<u>Broad Tasks</u>	
	Energy	Dipl. Ing. Stauch Jeschke	(G.B. Chem. - Plenipotentiary General Chemistry Reich Association Coal) (G.B. Chem.)
	Coal and Gas	Dr. Peter	
		Dr. Lammertz	
<u>Præsidium:</u>	Labor Alloc-	Dr. Schroeder Gen. Oberst Schmidt Dr. Warnecke	(Wigru)
1) Praes. Doerr	ation		
2) Dr. ter Meer			
3) Prof. Martin			
4) Dr. Ramstetter			
5) Dr. Ungewitter			
	Quotas	Dr. v. d. Gableutz Dir. Dipl. Ing. Schenk	
	Transport-		
	tation and	Erhardt	(I.G.)
	Control of		
	Traffic		
	Shifting of		
	Plants	Dr. Fritze (Fa. Albert)	(Wigru)
	Production		
	and Stat-	Dr. Vormeerer	
	istics		

Collective Group:

I Inorganics

Dr. ter Meer Dr. Klebert ?

II Organics

Prof. Martin Dr. Feller Dr. Hansen

III Miscellaneous

Dr. Ramstetter ? Dr. Scholz

Dr. Maustor, Ludwigshafen
Dr. Ambros, Ludwigshafen
Prof. Dr. Lautenschlager, Hoechst
Dr. Haborland, Uerdingen
Dr. von Staden, Uerdingen

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L. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Frankfurt/Main-20

Sub-Sections (Fachgruppen)

Production Office

Berlin-Neuch

- | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1) Soda, caustic alkali
chlorine, hydrochloric
acid and related pro-
ducts | Dr. Buergin
(Dr. Vorlauer-
der) | Dir. Dipl. Ing. Schonk
Dr. Kayser | (Solvay)
(I. G. Bitterfeld) |
| 2) Sulphur and compounds | Dr. Wurster | Schuster | (Schwefels. Kontor) |
| 3) Nitrogen | Dr. v. Staden | Dr. Mueller
(Vertr. Dr. Hick) | (G. B. Chem.) |
| 4) Phosphorus fertili-
zers | Forster | Dr. Uhl | |
| 5) Carbide chemistry,
methanol and carbon-
ization of wood | Dr. Ambros
(Dr. Alt) | Dir. Dr. Hureck | (Degussa) |
| 6) Ferro alloys | Dr. Lang | Mehrenberg | |
| 7) Industrial gases | Linde | - | |
| 8) Synthetic materials | Dr. Kollek | Dr. Eckell
(Vertr. Dr. Stephan) | (G. B. Chem.) |
| 9) Buna | Dr. Ambros | dto. | |
| 10) Gunpowder and ex-
plosives | Dr. Sarrazin | Dr. Josten
(Vertr. Bernd) | |
| 11) Chemical production
of fibers | Vitz | Dr. Hartmann | |
| 12) Rubber industry | Dr. Weber | Dipl. Ing. Dietze | |
| 13) Varnishes | v. Martitz | Classen (Vertr. Koeck) | |
| 14) Mineral colors | Rhodium
(Baerwind) | Stewasser | (Wigru) |
| 15) Textile and leather
auxiliaries, tanning
materials | Dr. Bertsch
(Dr. Kling) | Dr. Schwen | (I. G. Lu) |
| 16) Tar dyes and inter-
mediary products | Dr. Struss
(Dipl. Chem.
Koenig) | Dr. Hansen | |
| 17) Pharmaceutical in-
dustry | ? | Dr. Schmidt (Vertr. Kruell) | |
| 18) Photochemical pro-
ducts | ? | Dr. Klusmann | (Reichsstelle
Chemie) |
| 19) Plant Protection | Peters | Hoos (Vertr. Fischer) | |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6785
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

20) Glues, adhesives and gelatine	Lucbbert	Dr. Kohl (Vertr. Dr. Steinfeld)
21) Soaps, washing and cleaning materials	Dr. Bertsch	Ziege (Vertr. Ahlmann)
22) Toilet requisites	Bergmann	Koettner
23) Roofing paper industry	Braun	Dir. Bracutigan
24) Utilization of animal carcasses	Gochmann	Dr. Troesch

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6785.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

Military Tribunal VI
Case No. 6
Prosecution Document Book No. 25

English



AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Max ILGNER, after having first been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

On 29 June, 3 July, and 7 July, 1945, I made statements about members of I.G. who at the same time held positions in the Government, in the Party and other public institutions. I have made these statements in my own handwriting and the facts stated therein are true according to the best of my memory, knowledge, and belief. The text of these statements which I have now consolidated in one statement is as follows:

I.G. Officials in Positions of the State, the Party, and Public Life

I. Positions within Germany

A. Positions of a General Nature

1. Academy for German Law: SCHWITZ, v. KNIERICH.
2. Labor Front: Main liaison man in his position as "Hauptbetriebsfuehrer" "Chief Plant Leader" for I.G., Dr. SCHNEIDER, Assistant to Dr. SCHNEIDER, Dr. BERTRAMS. Official representatives of the Labor Front in I.G.: The Hauptbetriebsobmann ZEH and the Betriebsobmaenner of the various plants. In order to advise Dr. SCHNEIDER for his meetings with the representatives of the Labor Front, meetings of the Betriebsfuehrer of the various plants took place. The Hauptbetriebsfuehrer was a special position in I.G. based on the law for the regulation of labor and on special direction of the Gauleiter of Hesse.
- (Page 2 of original)
3. Foreign Office: v. MALTZAN, formerly of the Foreign Office. During the war for some time he was again called into the Foreign Office for the armistice negotiations with France. Later on he was again with I.G.
4. House of German Art: SCHWITZ, Chairman of the Vorstandsrat.
5. Ministry of the East: Dr. PRANTZEL, during the war Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat (Chief War Administrative Counsellor). Dr. SCHILLER, Agricultural Advisor, also Sonderfuehrer (Special Leader) in the Eastern territories.
6. O.K.W. Abwehr - Foreign Countries: Dr. OECKEL served for some time as a Sonderfuehrer.



7. O.K.W. Abwehr - Germany: Because of his position as Chief Abwehr Officer (Hauptabwehrbeauftragter) Dr. SCHNEIDER was I.G.'s main liaison on Abwehr questions. His organization within I.G. for this function was the Bureau A with Dr. DIECKMANN on the technical side, and Dr. v.d. HEYDE, later Dr. RUEDIGER, on the commercial side. In addition, in all I.G. plants and enterprises there were Abwehr officers whose main concern was works espionage; and, later on, especially during the war, wherever applicable, the preparation of reports about the internal situation in the plants and the passing on of reports from abroad. The position of Chief Abwehr Officer was a special one of I.G. and the nomination through I.G. was made at the suggestion of Abwehr O.K.W. which had to give its consent.
8. Reichstag: SCHWITZ, guest member.

B. Technical Positions

1. Reich office for Economic Development and Plenipotentiary-General for Special Questions of Chemical Production (Gebechem): Professor Dr. KRAUCH, responsible for the development of certain kinds of chemical production: Buna, gasoline, nitrogen, and originally also light metals. KRAUCH took over with him a large number of I.G. employees from the various I.G. enterprises, among them RITTER, KIRSCHNER, BAASCH, von SOIRON. Besides that he had at his disposal advisors working in an honorary capacity from the firms of the chemical industry (from I.G., for example AMBROS, BUECHER, BUECHERFISCH, v.d. BEY,

(Page 3 of original)

GAJEWSKI, MUELLER-CUNRADI, SCHNEIDER, WURSTER.)

2. Armament Ministry: Section Chiefs (ring leiter) AMBROS, BUECHERFISCH, WURSTER, and possible also BUECHER.
3. Reich Air Ministry: Dr. MOSCHER, originally general director of WERDAG, later on of WERDISK LETTSTALL, in which I.G. had a 1/3 participation (I.G. representatives on the Aufsichtsrat were BUECHER, ILONER, HAEFLIGER, and v.d. BEY as building manager.).

C. Economic Positions

1. Reichsbank: Committee on Currency, SCHWITZ chairman.
2. Reich Group Industry: Advisory Committee, Engerer Beirat SCHWITZ member.
Committee for Exhibitions and Trade Fairs, von SCHNITZLER, chairman.
Committee for Africa and Russia, W. R. MANN, chairman.

Committee for Southeastern Europe, Hungary and Rumania, ILGNER, chairman; REITHINGER, member.
Committee for East Asia, WALBAL, chairman.
Committee on Currency, KRUGGER.
Committee for Taxation, SILCHER.
Committee for Insurance, KUPFER.
Committee for War Damages, HOYER.

3. Ministry of Economics: Oil Department, E. R. FISCHER, during the war Ministerialdirigent. Purchase of Molybdenum, and Tungsten, MEYER-KUESTER, probably with a mandate for these purchases. Working Committee for Foreign Trade questions (of the Reich groups Commerce and Industry) ILGNER REITHINGER.

(Page 4 of original)

Works commissioner for Aussig-Falkenau (Munich Agreement, 1938), KUGLER.

4. Military Economy Staff: THOMAS, KRUGGER, v.d. HEYDE, KLAS, the first two as reserve officers.
5. Advertising Council of the German Economy: v. SCHNITZLER, W. R. KLAS, UHL.
6. Economic Group Chemical Industry: Member of Praesidium, TERHAAR, WURSTER as deputy since 1943. Enlarged Advisory Council, GAJEWSKI, TERHAAR, ILGNER, OTTO SCHNEIDER, v. SCHNITZLER, WURSTER. Ost-Chemie-Gesellschaft, Manager during the war, W. PASSARGE. Southeastern Committee: ILGNER, GARTINEAU, REITHINGER.
7. Economic Group Mineral Oil Industries: BUETEFISCH, Economic Group Chief.
8. Economic Staff 'East' PRENTZEL, (Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat)(Chief War Administrative Counsellor) SCHILLER (Sonderfuehrer)(Special Leader), both as members of the army during the war.

II. Positions in Occupied Countries

A. Poland

Works Commissioner for the Polish dye factories: SCHOENER, SCHWAB.

B. France

Navy: von TIRPITZ as a Navy Officer attached to Admiral SCHUSTER for supervision of dock installations.

C. Norway

Reich Commissioner v.d. BAY, attached for problems of the chemical industry.

D. Military Commander Italy

TER MEER, attached to General Leiers for the chemical industry.

III. Allied Countries

A. Roumania

Air Force: RINGAR attached to General GERSTENBERG for air defense of the oil fields.

(Page 5 of original)

Conclusion

As the I.G. representatives in all large enterprises throughout the world were also amongst the leading representatives of the German colonies there, many of the general economic and organizational positions, such as Presidents of Chambers of Commerce, Chairmen of School Societies, and Chairmen of German Clubs were filled by I.G. representatives. In all these countries, I.G. was a member of the German Chamber of Commerce.

The functions which I.G. representatives held within the Foreign Organization of the Party in the various countries are not mentioned in this report.

Furthermore, those functions which I.G. members carried out for the Abwehr abroad but which did not occupy all their time are not mentioned.

In the following institutions which, however, are not party organizations or offices of public life and which existed continuously or only temporarily (F-Kreis) (Circle of Friends) 1933-1934) officials of I.G. took part as follows:

1) Circle of Friends of HILDLER

This was a group of leading economists. As far as I know, BUETEFISCH was introduced into the Circle by KRANEFUSS of the BRABAG; they were together in that company. BUETEFISCH decided himself to enter this Circle, but as far as I know at the same time, the Chairman of the Vorstand, SCHMITZ, knew about it.

2) F-Kreis

This was to advise the Ministry of Propaganda during 1933-1934. Leading personalities and people who were well acquainted with economy in foreign countries took part in it. BOSCH

(Page 6 of original)

and SCHMITZ knew about it.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-6713
CONT'D

I have carefully read each of the 7 pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them, and I declare herewith under oath that in this statement I have told the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Dr. Max Ilgner
(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this 2nd day of April 1947 at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Max ILGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Otto Verber
OTTO VERBER

U.S. Civilian, AGO No. A-444385
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6713.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M. P. No. 34079

DOCUMENT NO. NI-1294
Excerpts
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 1 of the original)

.....
1. Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau

Generalbevollmaechtigtter fuer Chemie im Rahmen des
Four Years Plan.

.....
the fact that Dr. Krauch had this leading position in
the working of the four years plan was perhaps the
greatest contribution I.G. paid to the party, because
not only the men whom Dr. Krauch took into his office were
at his disposal, but in his capacity as member of the
Vorstand and even more when he became chairman of the
board he could use the whole I.G.

.....
(page 2 of the original)

.....
2.) Ministry of economics.

Dr. E.R. Fischer, director of I.G. and Vorstandsmit-
glied of Deutsche Gasolin A.G. was before the war head
of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Mineraloel. I think it was on
the beginning of the war that Fischer became head of the
department for the whole oil production and distribution
of oil in the ministry of economics.

.....
4.) Foreign Office.

Legationsrat v. Kalschlag, who was previously a member
of the foreign office, which he had to quit on account
of his jewish mother, was an employee of Berlin NW 7.

.....
Dr. Fuerholzer was supposed to be in some way attached
to the foreign office.

(page 4 of the original)

6. Reichsbank.

Dr. Schmitz was member of the board of directors (?) and president of the committee for currency. I do not know whether this committee ever met.

.....

7. Semi-official organizations.

..... B.) Reichsgruppe Industrie.

Engerer Beirat (first council) Dr. Schmitz
Dr. v. Schnitzler (?)

Committee (Ausschuss fuer Steuerfragen) (on tax questions)

" (Ausschuss fuer Patentfragen) (on patent matters)

Dr. v. Knierim (substitute Mr. Silcher)

.....

Committee for exhibitions Dr. v. Schnitzler

" " insurance Dr. Euepper

" " war claims Dr. Hoyer, later Dr. Kuopfer

" " foreign exchange Dr. Krueger

(page 5 of the original)

Special committees for countries:

South-eastern Europe Ilgenor

Russia R. A. Mann

Africa " " "

Far East Weibel

The committees for south-eastern Europe and the Far East were especially active and in close contact with the Ministry of Economics and the foreign office; these committees took especially an active part in the negotiations of commercial treaties (Weibel) was also head of the Far East Committee of the I.G. and member of the presidency of the Ostasiatischer Verein, Hamburg).

(page 5 of original, cont'd.)

C. Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie.

Dr. v. Schnitzler was formally the vice-president. Later after Hess (Wacker Chemie, Munich) resigned, Schloesser became his successor and Dr. ter Meer member of the presidency. Dr. ter Meer was member of the so-called "Doerr-Ausschuss" (committee presided by Doerr) which acted I think upon the initiative of Kehrl to find new ways to simplify the organization of industry (some facts are mentioned in the minutes of the K.A.). Dr. ter Meer's substitute was Dr. Wurster.

Beirat Gajewski, Ilgner, Otto, Schneider, v. Schnitzler.

Wurster
(?)

The importance of the Wigru changed quite often. In all the years the former assistant to the president (Hauptgeschäfts-fuehrer) Dr. Ungewitter played usually an important part.

Reichsstelle Chemie

Pruefungsstelle Chemie (Born)

Dr. Kugler, Frankfurt, was member of the Beirat.

In the so-called "Fachgruppen (special sections of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie) there were so far as I know a great number of I.G. men either as head in the committees. These organizations interfered partly or overlapped with organizations created by the ministry of ammunition (Kehrl) or by the ministry of economics (Kehrl also) as for example the

Reichsvereinigung Chemische Faser

in which Mr. Otto was member of the presidency.

d.) Wirtschaftsgruppe Mineraloel

The president was Dr. E.R. Fischer, his substitute during

(page 5 of original, cont'd.)

the war Dr. Eustefisch.

o) International Chamber of Commerce

(German Section)

Dr. v. Schritzl was member of the court of arbitration.

Whether Dr. Ilgnor was a member of the German section,

I do not know.

.....

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY "

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-9457
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Guenther FRANK-FÄHLE, Jorursel-Tunus, Hohenakstrasse 123, having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, herewith declare under oath of my own free will and without coercion as follows:-

1. In 1933, I entered the IG Farbenindustrie A.G., Berlin NW 7, and in 1935 was appointed a manager. I was one of the heads of the Central Finance Administration (Zentralfinanzverwaltung) of the IG. In 1937, I undertook the establishment of the Commercial Committee, and also became the head manager of the office of the Commercial Committee, of which I was the recorder. This office I held until the capitulation.

2. I have been shown today a photo-copy of the Document NI-1294. This document represents a report on IG officials who had posts in the Government, was drawn up by me in the English language and signed on the 7th July 1945.

3. The statements made by me in this report are based on memory, as I had no documents at my disposal. I may therefore in one or another case have made a mistake in the date or in the precise description of the position, but otherwise I still consider the statements I then made as correct, with the exception of a statement in the second paragraph under I, 1.

4. In this paragraph an obvious error has crept in. The position of a member of the Vorstand is both legally and actually more influential than that of a chairman of the Aufsichtsrat, but it is difficult at any rate to give a clearly defined answer to this question.

I have carefully read through this one page of the affidavit and signed it with my own hand, have made the

(page 2 of original)

necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I hereby declare under oath that in this statement I have told the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. GUENTHER FRANK-FÄHLE.

Sworn to and signed before me this 7th day of August 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Guenther FRANK-FÄHLE, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: ARTHUR E. COOPER
U.S. Civilian, IG number D 434534
Interpreter, Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes, U.S. War Department.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9457
----- CONTINUED -----

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 September 1947

I, ANNE MARTIN, ER No. 20144, hereby certify that I am a
duly appointed translator for the German and English languages;
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
the document No. NI-9457.

ANNE MARTIN
ER No. 20144

MICROCOPY

892

ROLL

38

END

